Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 BCE

Matthew A. Sears and Carolyn Willekes

Abstract
The Battle of Chaeronea, fought in 338 BCE between Philip of Macedon
and the Greek city-states, is known only from meager literary evidence
and a few archaeological finds. For decades, scholars had reconstructed
the battle to include a cavalry charge led by Philips eighteen-year-old
son, the future Alexander the Great. More recently, this cavalry charge
has been called into question, primarily because of the supposed maxim
that cavalry will not trample disciplined infantry. A reconsideration of the
evidence, however, including skeletal remains from the battle and stud-
ies of equine behavior, suggests that Alexanders charge was feasible.

Introduction
W. W. Tarn, writing of Alexanders cavalry charge at the Battle of Issus in 333
BCE, said that it was an axiom that cavalry could not make a frontal attack on an
unbroken line of heavy-armed spearmen, as the Persians had learnt to their cost
at Plataea.1 This axiom has by now attained the status of common knowledge,
due most of all to the hugely influential book of John Keegan, The Face of Battle.

1. W. W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, vol. 2, Sources and Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1948), 181.

Matthew A. Sears is an Associate Professor of Classics & Ancient History at the University of New
Brunswick. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University, and is the author of Athens, Thrace, and the
Shaping of Athenian Leadership (Cambridge, 2013), along with many articles and chapters on Greek
history and ancient warfare.
Carolyn Willekes received her Ph.D. from the Department of Greek and Roman Studies at the Uni-
versity of Calgary. She is the author of From Bucephalus to the Hippodrome: The Horse in the Ancient World
(I. B. Tauris, 2016) as well as several chapters and articles on horses and horse cultures in the ancient
world. She is part of the Antiochia ad Cragum excavations in Turkey, and has lectured for the Archae-
logical Institute of America.
The Journal of Military History 80 (October 2016): 1017-1035.
Copyright 2016 by The Society for Military History, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or trans-
mitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the Editor, Journal of Military History, George C.
Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, P.O. Drawer 1600, Lexington, VA 24450. Authorization to photocopy items for internal
and personal use is granted by the copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC),
121 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA (www.copyright.com), provided the appropriate fee is paid to the CCC.

1017
MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

In his treatment of the Battle of Waterloo, Keegan argues that a defining feature
of the battle was the repeated repulse of French cavalry at the hands of British
infantry squares. For Keegan, Waterloo demonstrated conclusively that a cavalry
charge could not prevail against a disciplined infantry formation.2 The widespread
acceptance of this axiom has been instrumental in several revisionist treatments of
one of ancient Greek historys most famous cavalry actions: the young Alexander
the Greats charge against the Theban Sacred Band, an elite unit of Greek hoplites,
at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE.
An interesting debate was sparked by Paul Rahe in 1981. Influenced by Keegans
then recently published work, Rahe argued that since horses would not have charged
into the Sacred Band, the most skilled and cohesive infantry unit among the Greek
poleis, it is unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played a large role in the battle.3 More
recently, John Buckler and Hans Beck stated rather bluntly that until someone offers
a reasonable explanation for the way in which a frontal cavalry assault could have
crushed the Theban formation, no one else need give any credence to the idea.4 The
most radical revision of the battle is offered by John Ma. Beyond removing Alexanders
cavalry charge, Ma changes the order of the two battle lines completely, suggesting
that the Sacred Band actually fought on the left of the Greek line against Philip and
his picked infantry troops, rather than on the right where scholars have traditionally
positioned the Thebans, opposite Alexander.5
Yet, revisionist accounts of Chaeronea go too far in discounting and even
disregarding the ancient literary evidence, sparse though it may be for this battle.
Comparative evidence and modern studies of equine behavior demonstrate that a
frontal cavalry charge against a disciplined phalanx of heavy infantry was indeed
a military possibility in antiquity, especially in the case of the Macedonian cavalry.
A cavalry charge led by Alexander against the Theban Sacred Band should remain
integral to any modern reconstruction of the battle.

Sources and Reconstructions

Though one of the worlds truly decisive battlesin which Philip of Macedon,
Alexanders father, crushed a coalition of Greek poleis led by Thebes and Athens in 338
BCE Chaeronea suffers acutely from a lack of literary sources. Our main source,
the first-century BCE universal historian Diodorus of Sicily (16.8586), is vague.
From him we learn, apart from the numbers and composition of the respective forces,
only that Philip stationed Alexander on one wing, along with Philips best generals,
and Philip himself led from the other wing. According to Diodorus, the battle was

2. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin, 1978), 15460.

3. Paul A. Rahe, The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea, American Journal of
Archaeology 85 (1981): 8487.
4. John Buckler and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Cen-
tury BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 256.
5. John Ma, Chaironea 338: Topographies of Commemoration, Journal of Hellenic Studies
128 (2008): 7291.

1018 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

Figure 1: The Plain of Chaeronea. The trees in the left-center middle distance surround the
Lion monument, while the clump of evergreens in the far distance marks the Macedonian
polyandrion (mass grave). [Courtesy of C. Jacob Butera]

hard-fought; Alexander succeeded in being the first to break through the enemys
line, and both Philip and Alexander strove to outshine all others in valor and tactical
success. Diodoruss account on its own hardly allows for a full battle reconstruction.
We do, however, get some help from scattered references here and there. The first- and
second-century CE biographer Plutarch (Alex. 9.2) adds the detail that Alexander
plunged into [enseisai] the Theban Sacred Band, an elite unit of 300 hoplites that
trained continuously at state expense. Given that Philip likely led from the rightthe
place of the Macedonian king as shown by Alexanders later battlesthis means
that Philip faced the Athenians on the Greek left, while from the Macedonian left
Alexander attacked the Thebans on the Greek right. The last substantial clue from
ancient literature as to how the battle progressed comes from Polyaenus (4.2.2),
the second-century CE compiler of stratagems, who tells us that Philip ordered
his infantry phalanx to feign retreat until, pursued by the jubilant Athenians, the
Macedonians reached a favorable position on high ground and then attacked and
broke the undisciplined Athenian infantry. Philip, then, led the Macedonian infantry,
and through his superior generalship might have critically weakened the Greek line,
both by enticing the Athenians to break formation and perhaps by stretching the
Greek line to the point where vulnerable gaps opened up.6 [See Figure 1, above.]

6. N. G. L. Hammond (Studies in Greek History [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973],

546) argues that the most salient feature of the stratagem mentioned by Polyaenus was the likely
opening of a gap between Greek contingents, particularly between the Thebans and the rest of

MILITARY HISTORY 1019

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

Since Diodorus says that there were 2,000 Macedonian cavalry present at the
battle, and since Philip was at the head of his infantry, it is reasonable to conclude that
Philip entrusted the cavalry to his son Alexander, who was, after all, accompanied by
Philips ablest generals. Alexander therefore led the cavalry against the Thebans and
the Sacred Band, the most formidable of the Greek hoplites and the greatest threat
to the Macedonians. It is worth noting that the verb Plutarch uses for Alexanders
offensive action, enseisai, when employed by the same author in other references to
actual combat, always denotes an action from horseback (see Marc 7.2; Cleom. 6.3;
Art. 10.1). As for the Sacred Band, Plutarch says that all 300 members were wiped
out. The sight of their bodies, lying on the field of battle where they had valiantly
faced the sarissas, or long spears, of the enemy, supposedly moved Philip to tears (Pel.
18.5). While the sarissa is usually understood to be the weapon of the Macedonian
phalanx, it can also refer to the cavalry lance, and there was a unit of Macedonian
cavalry called the sarissaphoroi, or sarissa-bearers.7
Students of the battle have supplemented these meager literary references with
a major archaeological marker, along with a reading of the battlefield topography,
to establish where the two armies were likely situated in the plain.8 Early in the
twentieth century, the polyandrion, or mass grave, of the Macedonians was excavated
by G. Sotiriadis. [See Figure 2, opposite.] Its position in the northeastern section
of the plain, near the Kephissos River, has been taken to represent the spot where
the greatest number of Macedonians fell, probably against the elite Sacred Band,
thus marking the Greek right. Scholars have reasonably postulated that the Greek
line extended from this point in a southwesterly direction in order to cover the

the Greek line which had stretched to the left to accommodate the Athenians impetuous charge.
Hammond also addresses the problem of there being no high ground on the plain to which
Philip could have withdrawn. Hammond plausibly argues that the banks of the Haemus, a river
that in modern times largely disappears beneath the modern agricultural plain, would have been
substantial in antiquity, providing an elevation sufficient for a considerable tactical advantage.
7. For the sarissa as a cavalry weapon, see Minor M. Markle III, The Macedonian Sarissa,
Spear, and Related Armor, American Journal of Archaeology 81 (1977): 32339; Markle, Use of
the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon, American Journal of Archaeology 82 (1978):
48397; and Philip Sidnell, Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare (London: Hambledon Con-
tinuum, 2006), 8084. For the sarissaphoroi, see, among other examples, Arr. An. 1.31.2; 14.1;
4.4.67. Robert E. Gaebels comment (Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World [Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2002], 156) that the sarissa is a weapon that the ancient sources
never associate with the Macedonian regular cavalry would appear to be wrong.
8. For the standard reconstruction of the battle based on a reading of the literary sources and
the topography and monuments at the site, see G. Sotiriadis, Das Schlachtfeld von Chronea
und der Grabhgel der Makedonen, Mitteilungen des deutschen archologischen Instituts 28 (1903):
30130; W. Kendrick Pritchett, Observations on Chaironeia, American Journal of Archaeology 62
(1958): 30711; Hammond, Studies in Greek History, 53457. These scholars do have slight differ-
ences in their interpretations, but they offer a similar overall picture of the battle. Moreover, they
all agree that the battle can be fairly accurately reconstructed. For a full account and critique of the
standard reconstruction, see Ma, Topographies of Commemoration, 7376.

1020 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

Figure 2: Trees growing atop the Macedonian polyandrion [Courtesy of C. Jacob

Butera]

Kerata Pass as an escape route. Excavation of the polyandrion yielded many weapons,
including very large spear points which likely came from sarissas.9 On the other
side of the battlefield, under the lion monument which has been reconstructed in
modern times, was found the mass grave of the slain members of the Theban Sacred
Band. Analysis of the skeletal remains reveals many types of battle wounds, some
of which are particularly consistent with cavalry fighting infantry, to which we shall
return below. Thus, the graves of the Macedonians and Thebans at Chaeronea have
been combined with the meager literary sources and a common-sense accounting of
the topography to provide a rather full reconstruction of the battle.
Despite this former consensus, in the past few decades various revisionist
accounts of the battle have been proposed. As mentioned above, Rahe, drawing
upon Keegan, argues that horses would never have charged against a disciplined
phalanx of heavy infantrymen, and therefore played at most an incidental role in
the battle. According to Rahe, it was the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx
that proved decisive.10 Buckler and Beck, in addition to dismissing the possibility
of a cavalry charge, argue that the stratagem described by Polyaenus is implausible
and best ignored by modern scholars.11 John Ma, in an illuminating article focusing

9. Sotiriadis, Das Schlachtfeld, 309.

10. Rahe, Annihilation of the Sacred Band; Keegan, Face of Battle, esp. 15462.
11. Buckler and Beck, Central Greece, 257. Polyaenus has often been censured as unreliable
and frequently inaccurate. Pritchett (Observations on Chaironeia, 310), for instance, feels that

MILITARY HISTORY 1021

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

on the commemoration of the battle, proposes an entirely new layout of the two
armies and their battle lines. He stresses first of all that the polyandrion need not
be located at any specific point in reference to the battle. To back up this claim,
he says that the polyandrion at Marathon, called the Soros, was nowhere near the
battlefield. Ma also argues that Plutarch received the information that Alexander
broke into the Sacred Band from the inferior vulgate tradition of Alexander
historiography, and that Plutarch himself does not vouch for the truth of this
fact since he adds an it is said qualification.12 In the end, Buckler and Beck
doubt whether any attempt should be made to reconstruct Chaeronea, insisting
that surprisingly little is known of [the battle], and that little has unfortunately
and unnecessarily been embroidered by modern historians.13 Rahe similarly
concludes that the evidence concerning the battle of Chaeronea is too sketchy to
justify confidence in any reconstruction of its course.14
It might seem doubtful, in light of such comments, whether historians should
even attempt a reconstruction of Chaeroneaincluding its cavalry chargeor
indeed of countless other battles of antiquity. But this need not be the case, since the

the passage in question is too anecdotal in nature to be made the basis for the topographical
reconstruction of the battle. For Polyaenus in general, see Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler,
Polyaenus: Stratagems of War (Chicago: Ares, 1994); and Everett L. Wheeler, Polyaenus: Scriptor
Militaris, in Polyainos. Neue Studien / Polyaenus. New Studies, ed. Kai Brodersen (Berlin: Verlag
Antiken), 754; and for Polyaenuss treatment of Alexander, see N. G. L. Hammond, Some Pas-
sages in Polyaenus Stratagems concerning Alexander, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 37
(1996): 2353. Despite Polyaenuss reputation, both Krentz and Wheeler and Hammond stress
Polyaenuss often rigorous original research and source consultation. We see no reason to disre-
gard Polyaenuss remarks on Chaeronea, especially the salient point that Philip led the infantry.
12. Ma, Topographies of Commemoration, 7374, n. 13. For a thorough treatment of
the source traditions for Alexander, see N. G. L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great: An
Analysis of Plutarchs Life and Arrians Anabasis Alexandrou (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), esp. 614 for Plutarchs sources for this period of Alexanders life. As Hammond
argues, expressions such as it is said (legetai) indicate that Plutarch doubted his sources. We
would hesitate to argue that such strong doubt is indicated in every single instance of this and
similar expressions since, as Hammond points out, Plutarchs doubt often concerns a salacious
or incredible episode, such as those surrounding Philips various sexual affairs. Hammond lays
down a good general principle (1314), namely, that other sources covering the same events are
to be preferred to Plutarchs supposedly dubious ones. There are, however, no other sources indi-
cating that Alexander attacked the Sacred Band, leaving us with the option of either accepting
the account as related by Plutarch, or admitting ignorance concerning Alexanders role in the
battle. We see no reason to do the latter. In this particular passage, the it is said could very well
indicate that Plutarch doubtsif indeed he doubts the account at allthat Alexander was the
first to break into the Sacred Band rather than that he attacked the Sacred Band at all: He was
present at Chaeronea and took part in the battle against the Greeks. It is said [legetai] that he
was the first to break into [enseisai] the Sacred Band of the Thebans.
13. Bucker and Beck, Central Greece, 254.
14. Rahe, Annihilation of the Sacred Band, 87.

1022 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

situation concerning Chaeronea is not at all as dire as these recent treatments of the
battle suggest. As a general principle, historians should be very hesitant to jettison
the testimony of ancient sources, even relatively late and sometimes unreliable
sources, unless the testimony in question is directly contradicted by other, arguably
more reliable, ancient evidence. There is no a priori reason to ignore or even flatly
contradict Plutarchs reference to Alexander attacking the Sacred Band, nor need
we dismiss the entirely plausible account of Polyaenus. Also, given that there were
2,000 Macedonian cavalry at the battle, it would be surprising if they were not used.
Philip had indeed used his cavalry to great effect in the past, including at the Battle
of the Crocus Field in the late 350s (Diod. 16.35.46), and the plain of Chaeronea
afforded ample room for the Macedonian cavalry, despite the objections of some
scholars.15 Finally, despite Mas arguments, the location of the Soros vis--vis the
action at Marathon continues to be a matter of some debate. Most scholars consider
the Soros to have been erected near the center of the battle where the Persians broke
through the Athenian formation and thus where the majority of the Athenians
fell.16 It is still plausible that the polyandrion at Chaeronea was constructed where
the greatest number of Macedonians died. The once-standard interpretation of the
battle advanced by scholars such as Sotiriadis, Hammond, and Pritchett makes the
best sense of all the ancient testimony and what archaeological and topographical
clues do exist on the battlefield itself. [See Figure 3, next page.]

Cavalry and Infantry

This entire discussion is moot, however, unless a frontal cavalry charge against
a disciplined phalanx is possible. The central thrust of Keegans argument is that
a cavalry charge works primarily in breaking the morale of the opposing infantry.
The thunderous approach of galloping horses and their metal-clad riders was often
enough to cause an infantry formation to buckle, leaving the infantrymen vulnerable
to being ridden down and slaughtered as they cowered or tried to run away. If the
infantry held firm in the face of a cavalry charge, however, then the horses would pull

15. John Buckler (Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 503) argues
that the plain of Chaeronea was too narrow for effective cavalry maneuvers. Below, we concur
with the generally received opinion that Alexander used his cavalry as the decisive shock force at
Issus, where the battlefield was essentially as narrow as at Chaeronea.
16. Until recently, scholars were nearly unanimous in placing the main action of Marathon
around the Soros: N. G. L. Hammond, The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon, Journal
of Hellenic Studies 88 (1968): 18; Eugene Vanderpool, A Monument to the Battle of Mara-
thon, Hesperia 35 (1966): 105; J. A. G. van der Veer, The Battle of Marathon: A Topographical
Survey, Mnemosyne 35 (1982): 290; J. A. S. Evans, Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon,
Historia 42 (1993): 29192; and Norman A. Doenges, The Campaign and Battle of Marathon,
Historia 47 (1998): 13. Against the majority view, see Peter Krentz, The Battle of Marathon (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010), 12229. For our part, we take Thucydidess comment
(2.34.5) that the dead at Marathon were so valorous that they were buried right on the spot
(autou) to mean that they were buried exactly where most of them fell, not merely in an arbitrary
spot in the battlefield.

MILITARY HISTORY 1023

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

Figure 3: Plan of the battle, from N. G. L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 550. Reprinted with the permission of Dorothy J.
Thompson and Oxford University Press.

up at the last minute and refuse to charge home. Keegans maxim has certainly taken
hold. He is explicitly cited, for instance, by I. G. Spence in a comprehensive book on
Greek cavalry. Spence argues that shock tactics, even those of the Macedonians, rely
on their moral and psychological, rather than physical, effects.17 Keegan is evoked

17. I. G. Spence, The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History with Particular
Reference to Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 107.

1024 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

indirectly by Robert Gaebel, who considers that Rahes arguments should lay to rest
once and for all the notion of a cavalry charge at Chaeronea.18 Even Philip Sidnell,
whose central project is to defend the idea of true shock tactics in antiquity before
the advent of stirrups, attributes the success of cavalry against infantry to the latters
loss of nerve.19 To be sure, under any circumstances a direct cavalry assault against
well-ordered infantry would have been difficult. But Keegans maxim, at least as it
has been adopted by scholars of the ancient world, is in need of reappraisal.
Tarn certainly had reason to employ the Persians at the Battle of Plataea
in 479 BCE as an example of cavalry failing to break an infantry formation. Yet
the Persian cavalry at Plataeathe land battle that ended the Persian invasion
of Greecewas a far cry from the Macedonian Companions. At Plataea and
elsewhere, the Persian cavalry was strictly speaking light cavalry, skilled in the
use of missile weapons such as the javelin and bow and prone to use its speed
and mobility to attack the vulnerable flanks and rear of the enemy. Mardonius,
the Persian commander at Plataea, had sought for many days to lure the Greeks
into open ground so his superior cavalry could swarm around the Greek hoplites
to discharge its missiles and withdraw and regroup at ease, far out of reach of
the heavy-armed and relatively immobile hoplites. Mardonius only attacked the
Greek phalanx directly, with disastrous consequences for the Persians, when he
thought that the Greeks were retreating in disarray and thus ripe for attack (Hdt.
9.1824, 5865). Much of the history of Graeco-Persian warfare is one of the
Persians trying to fight on open ground, and the Greeks seeking the protection
and force-multiplying elements of narrow passes and mountainous terrain.
As is well known, the Macedonian cavalry was much different from the Persian,
both in terms of equipment and tactics. The best Macedonian units, such as the
Companion Cavalry, were heavy-armed and designed for shock, not hit-and-run
attacks. [See Figure 4, next page.] An important passage concerning the tactics of
the Macedonian heavy cavalry is found in the Tactica of Arrian, himself a military
commander of considerable experience and prestige in the second century CE:
We hear that the Scythians used wedge formations, and the Thracians
too, having learned from the Scythians. Philip of Macedon taught
the Macedonians to use this formation as well. This formation
seems useful because the leaders are arranged around the outside
and the front narrowing to a point allows the unit easily to cut
through every type of enemy formation and grants that it can make
sharp about-faces one way and then another. Square formations are
difficult to wheel about, but the pointed formation, even when it
advances in depth, rapidly turning about the point is able easily to
unfold into line. The Persians, especially, use the square formation,
as do the natives in Sicily and the majority of the most skilled
Greek cavalries (16.69).20

18. Gaebel, Cavalry Operations, 156.

19. Sidnell, Warhorse, 9799.
20. Unless otherwise noted, translations are our own.

MILITARY HISTORY 1025

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

Figure 4: Artists
conception of a member
of the Macedonian
companion cavalry, from
John Warry, Warfare in the
Classical World (Norman:
University of Oklahoma
Press, 1995), 82. Reprinted
with the permission of
Salamander Books and the
University of Oklahoma
Press.

First of all, perhaps the key point in this passage is that the wedge formation
as used by the Macedonians was importantly different from other cavalry tactics,
particularly those used by the Persians and Greeks. Thus, Tarn would seem to err
in applying the lessons of Plataea directly to Alexanders cavalry charge at the
Battle of Issus. Another major point has to do with what the wedge formation
could accomplish in battle. Though scholars have tried various ways to make
sense of Arrians passage in light of the apparent axiom that cavalry cannot break
a disciplined phalanx, according to the plain sense of Arrians Greek a crucial
advantage of the wedge is its ability to cut through (diakoptein) any enemy
formation, phalanx included.21 Nothing in the verb diakoptein suggests attacking
on the flanks, or picking off disorganized troops fleeing in a panic before galloping
horses. The examples cited by the Greek-English Lexicon of Liddell and Scott are
instructive: Xen. Anab. 1.8.10 tells that Persian scythed-chariots are designed to

21. For one novel interpretation of Arrian, see Spence (Cavalry of Classical Greece, 1048),
who suggests that Arrian really means us to understand the cavalry wedge slowing down before
encountering the phalanx in order to engage in a series of one-on-one combats, relying on the ad-
vantage of their long lances. Once the lead horseman killed his opponent, the wedge would slowly
advance like mounted police controlling a crowd. Unsurprisingly, Spence arrives at these ideas be-
cause his reading of Keegan has convinced him that cavalry could not charge at speed into infantry.
A slow and deliberate march through infantry, affording the infantry plenty of opportunity to make
the most of its own weapons, strikes us as far more dangerous than a rapid charge.

1026 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

cut through the ranks (taxeis) of the enemy; Plut. Pyrrh. 7.5 describes the soldiers
of Pyrrhus cutting through a Macedonian phalanx; and Xen. Hell. 7.5.23 speaks of
the military innovator Epaminondas leading his army prow-first, like a trireme
in order to cut through a point in the enemys line. Diakoptein, then, implies a
direct breakthrough of an enemy formation.
Antiquity furnishes good examples of clashes between cavalry and infantry that
seem to defy modern sensibilities. Employing a charge of heavy cavalry to break a
formation of heavy infantry is exactly what Alexander did at Issus, five years after
Chaeronea. Based on Arrians account of the battle, Alexander personally led his heavy
cavalry, a mixture of squadrons drawn from the Companions and other units, in a
brazen charge across the river Pinarus, a maneuver reminiscent of his attack at the
Granicus (Arr. An. 2.8.9; 10.34).22 The attack at Issus was directed at the Persian units
known as the kardakes, which Arrian tells us were equipped as heavy-armed hoplites
(An. 2.8.6).23 These kardakes were quickly routed, allowing Alexander to commence
an assault directly against Dariuss position, leading to the Persian kings panicked
retreat. N. G. L. Hammond argues that Alexander led the attack on foot, at the head
of his own heavy infantry. Hammond, basing his argument primarily on the axiom
that cavalry cannot charge heavy infantry, is forced to explain away the obviousand
widely acceptedreading of Arrian as he scrambles to account for all of the action
on the battlefield. For instance, Hammond places Alexander first on horseback,
haranguing the troops, before dismounting to lead his infantry against the kardakes,
and then finally remounting in order to attack Darius.24 To support his interpretation,
Hammond focuses in on Greek words such as badn (step-by-step) and dromi (at a
run), which for Hammond indicate an infantry action even though he is forced to
admit that they can just as sensibly refer also to cavalry, even within Arrians text.25 In
the end, Hammonds argument is circular: Alexander could not have charged heavy
infantry with cavalry, since cavalry could not have charged heavy infantry. Arrians text
is clear in placing Alexander in personal command of heavy cavalry, both during the
initial advance and the decisive attack against the kardakes (An. 2.8.9; 10.34).26

22. For the superiority of Arrians account, probably based on Ptolemys eyewitness testi-
mony, see N. G. L. Hammond, Alexanders Charge at the Battle of Issus in 333 B.C., Historia
41 (1992): 39599.
23. There is some debate as to whether the kardakes were not in fact lightly armed peltasts,
as they are labeled as such by Polybiuss sources (Polyb. 12.17.7). Tarn (Alexander the Great, 180
82) argues that the kardakes were lightly armed, which would explain the success of Alexanders
cavalry charge. We agree with Hammond (Alexanders Charge, 399400, n. 15) that Arrian
clearly meant us to understand heavy-armed soldiers arranged in a phalanx.
24. Hammond, Alexanders Charge.
25. Ibid., 402 and n. 24.
26. An. 2.8.9 clearly puts Alexander in charge of cavalry units: Alexander, when the ground
began to open up a little while he was advancing, brought the cavalry units to the front, those
called the companions, the Thessalians, and the Macedonians. He placed them on the right wing
under his own command. And 2.10.4 refers to these same units, those marshaled under Alex-
anders command: Alexander and those with him won brilliantly.

MILITARY HISTORY 1027

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

At the Granicus River too, in 334 BCE, though the main action of the battle
was a clash of cavalry against cavalry, Alexander defeated a solid phalanx of heavy
infantry at least partly with his cavalry. Once the Persians had been defeated, their
Greek hoplite mercenaries were left to fend for themselves, closely packed together
on a hillock. In a rage, Alexander ordered his infantry and cavalry to attack the
mercenaries at once, attacking head-on against all sides of the square the infantry
had managed to form. That the cavalry took a central role in the attack itself is
evinced by the report that Alexanders own horse was killed under him by a sword
thrust of the enemy (Arr. An. 1.16.2; Plut. Alex. 16.7).27 Alexanders preference for
the cavalry charge was sometimes emulated in the Hellenistic period. At the Battle
of Magnesia in 190 BCE, for example, Antiochus III led his heavy cavalry directly
against a Roman legion, and managed to break through ( Justin 36.8.6).28
The modern world has many instructive cases too. In the eighteenth century,
Frederick the Great achieved success after success with his cavalry, his favorite military
arm. Eschewing large horses and large riders as too slow, he urged smaller horsemen
riding upon lighter horses to attack as quickly and ferociously as possible directly
against the enemy, using only their thrusting swords instead of firearms. For Frederick,
speed and boldness were the keys to a successful charge, and the smaller mounts of
the Macedonians might have fit in well with the Prussian cavalry. Fredericks tactical
writings do not at all suggest that his cavalry would fail to slam into the ranks of the
enemy, including enemy infantry. Rather, the rush of the charge would force even the
cowardly cavalryman to ride along with the others into combat.29
The Baron de Marbot, a Napoleonic cavalry officer, is a lively firsthand source
on the effectiveness of the cavalry charge. Several passages from his extensive
memoirs shed light on how cavalry could and did attack infantry around the turn
of the nineteenth century:
As soon as their fire had shaken the Austrians, Marshal Bessires
charged them with six regiments of heavy cavalry, supported by
part of the cavalry of the guard. In vain did the Archduke form
squares; they were broken with the loss of their guns and a great
number of men.
Having come to attack us unawares, they were so astounded at
being thus unexpectedly attacked themselves that the foremost
ranks had hardly time to bring their bayonets down. In a moment
the three battalions were literally rolled over under the hoofs of the
cuirassiers horses, not one remaining on his legs.

27. In his account of this action, Sidnell (Warhorse, 9799) argues that the cavalry would
have represented the main thrust of the assault.
28. See Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Cam-
paigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 16373, esp. 170. It should be noted that
Antiochus employed cataphracts, which were more heavily armored than Alexanders horses.
Nevertheless, the horses did charge into and through disciplined infantry.
29. For a useful collection of Fredericks own writing on the art of warfare, see Jay Luvaas,
Frederick the Great on the Art of War (London: Free Press, 1966), esp. 8184, 14956.

1028 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

Montbruns cavalry, having beaten that of the enemy, soon found

itself in presence of Craufurds infantry. It charged and broke two
squares, cutting one literally to pieces . . . The third English square
held firm. Montbrun caused Fourniers and Wathiez brigades to
attack it, and they had pierced one of the faces when both generals
had their horses killed under them and all the colonels were
wounded, so that there was nobody to take charge of the victorious
regiments. . . .
The Austrian general replied that his men could defend themselves
with the bayonet, and would be all the better to do so that the
French horses were up to their hocks in mud, and could not meet
them with the breast-to-breast shock in which the strength of
cavalry lies.
I tried to break the square, but our horses could only advance at a
walk, and everyone knows that without a dash it is impossible for
cavalry to break a well-commanded and well-closed-up battalion
which boldly presents a hedge of bayonets . . . Their long weapons
[of lancers], outreaching the enemys bayonets, soon slew many of
the Prussians. . . . 30
According to Marbot, cavalry are perfectly able to charge and break infantry
squares. Moreover, it was breast to breast shock that proved the most formidable
weapon of the cavalry, which certainly does not indicate mere psychological shock,
but instead a physical collision of mass on mass. Only when muddy ground or
other factors prevented the horses from gathering enough speed was a charge
inadvisable.
In his seventeenth-century cavalry manual, John Cruso, an English military
writer, reinforces the picture given by Marbot. The manual advises that on open
and favorable ground, cavalry can charge infantry, even if the infantry is in good
order. Only if the infantry is in a fortified or otherwise favorable position must a
direct charge be avoided. The legendary Swiss pikemen are invoked as an example
of the type of infantry that is most effective against cavalry and thus should not
be attacked directly.31
It seems to us that the Swiss pikeman, wielding a massive two-handed
weapon, is what most general readers and even scholars have in mind when they
envision an ancient phalanx withstanding a cavalry attack. A horse charging
at full speed against such a weapon, perhaps braced against the ground, would
literally be skewered by the force of its own momentum. This, certainly, seems to
be what Cruso has in mind. However, Greek hoplites, including the members of
the Sacred Band, were equipped with one-handed spears, necessarily so given that
the left arm of the hoplite was needed to hold the large double-grip shield. One of

30. Jean Baptiste Antoine Marcellin de Marbot, The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, vol. 2,
trans. Arthur John Butler (London: Greenhill, 1988 [1891]), 19, 45, 165, 371, 381.
31. John Cruso, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968
[1632]), 99.

MILITARY HISTORY 1029

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

the most important innovations of the Macedonian phalanx was the substitution
of the smaller pelte for the large hoplite shield. The pelte could be secured by a strap
around the neck to allow the soldier to hold the long sarissa with two hands. There
is no evidenceeither literary or iconographicthat hoplites ever held their
spears in two hands or braced them against the ground in order to receive a charge
of infantry or cavalry.32 No hoplite phalanx, therefore, could pose the same sort of
threat as Swiss pikemen against charging horses.33 The momentum of a galloping
horse, far from impaling the animal against a hoplite spear, would instead trample
the opposing hoplite underfoot, with the hoplites one-handed grip on his spear
perhaps availing little against such an impact. This image is in line with the breast
to breast shock described by Marbot. Later, in the Napoleonic period, when
infantry prevailed against cavalry as at Waterloo, it was not by relying upon the
tactics of pikemen. While bayonets certainly could do considerable damage, the

32. The closest one might come to such evidence is an enigmatic statement made by Diodo-
rus (15.32.46; picked up by Nepos Cha. 1.2) concerning the Athenian general Chabrias, who
ordered his mercenaries to rest their shields against their knees and hold their spears upright to
await a charge of Agesilauss hoplites. As John Buckler (A Second Look at the Monument of
Chabrias, Hesperia 41 [1972]: 46674) has persuasively argued, this was an at ease position to
show contempt for the enemy, rather than the sort of bracing action performed by pikemen.
33. Rahe (Annihilation of the Sacred Band, 8586; nn. 910), drawing on the nineteenth-
century work of Sir Charles Oman and Hans Delbrck, cites six medieval battles as evidence for
the inability of cavalry to charge disciplined infantry: Hastings, Bannockburn, Courtrai, Grand-
son, Morat, and Nancy. The latter three battles all feature the action of Swiss pikemen deploy-
ing their novel square formation during the Burgundian Wars of the late fifteenth century (see
Richard Vaughan, Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy [London: Longman, 1973],
359432). Courtrai, a battle of the early fourteenth century between the French and Flemish, did
see infantry defeat aristocratic cavalry partly by using pikes, which at the time was virtually un-
precedented. The cavalry was also hindered, however, by ditches and other obstacles deliberately
cut into the plain. Bannockburn, also of the early fourteenth century, and fought between the
Scottish and English, saw the Scottish king Robert the Bruce innovatively deploy the schiltrom,
a formation employing long stakes and spears, which was effective against cavalry. The schiltrom,
prefiguring the Swiss pike square, was probably invented by William Wallace, the Scottish revo-
lutionary, in the two decades preceding Bannockburn. Just as at Courtrai, the cavalry at Ban-
nockburn was hindered not only by infantry formations, but also by the thorough preparation of
the battlefield, with ditches and other obstacles carefully strewn about (for concise accounts of
Courtrai and Bannockburn, see Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century
[Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 1996], 922, 6685). We do not see why Rahe included the
much earlier Battle of Hastings. William the Conqueror did supplement his cavalry with archers
and other arms in order to be more effective against Harolds infantry, but there is no reason to
believe that Williams cavalry could not have charged the Anglo Saxon infantry, even if unsup-
ported by a diverse force (see M. K. Lawson, The Battle of Hastings, 1066 [Charleston, S.C.:
Tempus, 2002]). The hedge of long anticavalry spears represented by the schiltrom and the Swiss
pike square was a type of formation not really seen before the fourteenth century, and even then
deployed only on rare and noteworthy occasions by specially trained troops. The comparison of
the medieval pikeman to the Greek hoplite is simply misleading.

1030 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

greatest danger to cavalry was well-timed gunfire, which Keegans account makes
clear.34 Gunfire of course was not a factor in antiquity.

Horses and Bones

Many have commented on the deadliness of the Macedonian cavalry lance,
a thrusting weapon of considerable length.35 Philip Sidnell, in a comprehensive
volume on ancient cavalry, suggests a cavalry lance of around twelve feet in
length, and tries to put to rest the notion that shock tactics were impossible in
antiquity.36 Peter Connolly argues that armed with the lance, and arranged in
a tight and disciplined formation, the Macedonian cavalry effectively became a
mounted phalanx.37 While these scholars support the idea that a frontal attack
by lance-equipped cavalry could break a well-ordered phalanx, Sidnell prefers still
to imagine that such a charge was most effective when the infantry lost its nerve.38
Paul Rahe, however, disputes that the technology of the lance would have been
so decisive since the problem lay with the horse. Horses, according to Rahe,
simply will not go into a mass of men unless a path is cleared before them.39 If
Rahe is right, then no discussion of technologythe cavalry lance, the Swiss pike,
the musketis of any real bearing. If the above historical instances indicating
the opposite of Rahes point are not enough to revise the communis opinio, then
let us consider the horses themselves, based on the insights gained by Willekess
extensive experience and experimentation with horses.
If we approach the topic of the cavalry charge at Chaeronea from the perspective
of equine behavior, it seems, at first glance, that scholars have been correct in
discounting the possibility of the Macedonian cavalry successfully attacking the
Sacred Band. The horse is first and foremost a prey animal with an overriding flight
instinct; equines are physiologically and behaviorally hard-wired to flee any potential
danger, rather than to face it and fight. Thus, equine evolution suggests that a cavalry
charge at Chaeronea was impossible. This same logic, that the horse as a flight
animal will avoid danger, also discounts the possibility of any cavalry charge or even

34. Keegan, Face of Battle, 15462, esp. 15657.

35. Markle (Macedonian Sarissa; Use of the Sarissa) suggested through experimental
archaeology that a Macedonian cavalry lance as long as eighteen feet could be wielded effectively,
even without the aid of stirrups which were long thought to be essential for true shock tactics.
Markles lance, however, seems too long and poorly suited to the dense formation employed by
the Macedonian cavalry. A lance considerably shorter than eighteen feet would still project well
in front of the horse and be an effective weapon against infantry and cavalry alike.
36. Sidnell, Warhorse, esp. 84.
37. Peter Connolly, Experiments with the Sarissathe Macedonian Pike and Cavalry
Lance A Functional View, Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 11 (2000): 10312.
38. See Sidnells treatment of the destruction of the Greek mercenaries at the Granicus
(Warhorse, 9799). As we hope the present paper will demonstrate, while Sidnell is right to sug-
gest that Alexander used his cavalry to attack the Greek mercenaries head-on, he need not posit
that the mercenaries thus lost their nerve.
39. Rahe, Annihilation of the Sacred Band, 85.

MILITARY HISTORY 1031

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

the effective use of cavalry on the battlefield not only at Chaeronea, but at any point
in history. If we take the argument that horses would shy away from or even outright
refuse to charge a phalanx because they are flight animals, we must also accept that
they would avoid anything that might potentially harm them, namely, essentially
everything found on a battlefield. Yet cavalry was a military mainstay for thousands
of years and often played a decisive role in determining the outcome of a battle.
Clearly the inherent flight instinct of the horse could be overcome or controlled, and
if this was possible in other situations, why are scholars so resistant to the notion of
a cavalry charge at Chaeronea? The charge at Chaeronea and its success against the
Sacred Band were possible for two reasons: equine behavior and training.40
Although the prey status of the horse has a huge influence on equine behavior,
we must also take into consideration the fact that equines are herd animals, and the
herd mentality plays a significant role in determining how a horse reacts to different
situations.41 A horse herd is very hierarchical. Within the herd an individual horse
can be considered dominant, submissive, or somewhere in between. Each horse knows
its place within the herd, and jockeying for position typically occurs only when a new
member joins the group.42 The rank of a particular horse within the herd is determined by
personality: bold and assertive horses are likely to rank higher than a shy or timid animal.
Dominant horses will use aggressive body language and posturing to dissuade other herd
members from trying to usurp them, and occasionally such confrontations will result
in physical blows as well. This is most likely to occur when a stallion is challenged by a
rival for control of his harem, but in most cases disputes are solved solely through body
language and intimidation.43 The harem band is led by the alpha mare, while the stallion
guards the rear. The other herd members follow the lead of the alpha mare without
questions and any disobedience is quickly punished either by the lead mare or the harem
stallion. The need to be part of a herd is a significant factor in determining how a horse
reacts to a particular situation as the greatest fear for any horse is to be forced out of a
herd and thus without protection as a vulnerable prey animal.44

40. Carolyn Willekes, From the Steppe to the Stable: Horses and Horsemanship in the
Ancient World (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary, 2015), 5356. See also Carolyn
Willekes, Equine Aspects of Alexander the Greats Macedonian Cavalry, in Greece, Macedon
and Persia: Studies in Social, Political and Military History in Honour of Waldemar Heckel, ed. Timo-
thy Howe et al. (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2015), 4758.
41. Two types of herds will form in the wild. The harem band consists of a stallion, his
mares, and their young offspring; the bachelor band is made up of young stallions that have yet
to successfully challenge a harem stallion for his mares and older males who have been defeated
and are unable to regain control of a harem band.
42. Most of this upheaval occurs between the lower-ranking horses that are trying not to fall
further down in the hierarchy. Other than this, the herd is a relatively stable and cohesive unit.
43. S. Budiansky, The Nature of Horses: Exploring Equine Evolution, Intelligence and Behavior
(New York: Phoenix, 1997), 8998.
44. This innate fear is used by natural horsemen who assert dominance over a horse via
body language and chase the horse away from the safety of the herd (the trainer) whenever
the horse reacts negatively to instruction.

1032 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

This powerful herd mentality played an essential role in the training of the
cavalry horse. According to Xenophon, the ideal cavalry horse was one who
. . . is sound in his feet, gentle and fairly speedy, has the will and
the strength to stand work, and, above all, is obedient, [this] is the
horse that will, as a matter of course, give least trouble and the
greatest measure of safety to his rider in warfare.45
The training process was unique to each animal, but it always took into consider-
ation the notion of the herd. The instinctive herd mentality of the horse can be eas-
ily manipulated, and this was a boon for cavalry combat. The principle of the cavalry
formation was built upon the idea of the horse herd and its inherent hierarchies.
At the front of a formation, such as the wedge favored by the Macedonians, were
the bold and dominant horses. These animals had a lower flight instinct and were
unafraid of charging towards danger when trained to do so. Behind these came the
more submissive or shy animals. These horses were less eager to approach danger
but, and this is the key here, they were even more unwilling to be left behind by the
herd. At the rear of the formation were more of the dominant sort who prevented
the submissive animals from falling out of rank. Thus, the success of the cavalry
formation relied on the same principle as the herd.
The charge itself was a controlled affair, not a flat-out gallop. This served to
keep control within the formation as the faster a horse goes, the more difficult it
becomes for the rider to maintain control and balance. The controlled, collected
cavalry charge also added more strength to the attack as a collected horse is more
powerful than one that is strung out at racing speed. By keeping the horse balanced
and between the hand and legs the cavalryman was better able to convince his
horse that the potentially scary thing (the phalanx) was not so scary after all,
reinforcing the notion that he (the rider) was in charge. The worst thing a rider
can do is to chase his horse towards a frightening object: the more a rider urges
his mount to speed up in the hope that the horse will not see the scary thing, the
more likely the horse is to notice and react to that same scary thing.
From the time of the domestication of horses, humans have trained them to
accept a variety of things that are contrary to their prey nature, including the very
act of riding. In many ways, training a horse to charge a phalanx is no different
from training him to do most of the other things we have asked of him. Just
as with the phalangite, the cavalry horse was the result of hours of practice and
drilling. These drills instilled necessary combat skills in the horse and tested him
without the risk of overfacing him. When it came time for the horse to charge
on a battlefield, a cavalryman could use the familiar patterns of practice to keep

45. Xen. On Horsemanship 3.12. He continues: But those that want a lot of driving on
account of their laziness, or a lot of coaxing and attention on account of their high spirit, make
constant demands of the riders hands and rob him of confidence in moments of danger. Trans-
lations from On Horsemanship are taken from the 1925 Loeb edition of E. C. Marchant and G.
W. Bowersock.

MILITARY HISTORY 1033

MATTHEW A. SEARS & CAROLYN WILLEKES

his horse focused.46 Horses are very much creatures of habit, and establishing
a regular routine can be beneficial for combat. Finally, proper training built a
relationship between horse and rider, and this should not be underestimated. The
training process was one that required much patience on the part of the trainer,
but the reward was an animal that was obedient, fit, and confident.47 Thus, by
making use of inherent equine behavior in tandem with a careful consideration of
where to place each horse within the formation, cavalry were more than capable of
confidently charging a massed group of infantry like the Sacred Band.
In addition to experimental archaeology with horses, the excavated skeletal
remains from the Theban Sacred Band provide another new type of evidence to shed
light on the battle. [See Figure 5, opposite.] Students of the battle can now benefit
from the careful work of Maria Liston, a forensic anthropologist who had a rare
opportunity to study the bones from Chaeronea in person. Though 254 skeletons
were initially excavated from the Lion enclosure in the nineteenth century, only
those bones that showed clear signs of battle trauma were preserved. Liston estimates
that between 10 and 18 individuals are represented in the surviving collection. The
evidence from the bones provides chilling testimony to the horrifically violent
experience of combat at Chaeronea in 338. Most importantly for the present study,
three of the preserved skulls exhibit sharp force trauma wounds, all of which were
delivered to the top of the head from above, by a long, straight sword blade. Though
it is possible that the soldiers were kneeling at the time that they suffered these
blows, according to Liston these injuries were most likely delivered from horseback
against infantry standing on the ground. As Liston says, in the evidence from
other battles in which sword wounds were delivered by infantry fighting against
infantry, the wounds tend to be on the sides of the head, rather than the top. Listons
anthropological analysis, thus, provides compelling evidence that the Macedonian
cavalry did participate at Chaeronea, and that it engaged the Sacred Band.48

46. Xenophon writes: It should also be known that a horse can be taught to calm by a chirp
with the lips and to be roused by a cluck with the tongue . . . Accordingly, if a shout is heard or
a trumpet sounds, you must not allow the horse to notice any signs of alarm in you, and must
on no account do anything to him to cause him alarm, but as far as possible let him rest in such
circumstances, and, if you have the opportunity, bring him his morning or evening meal (On
Horsemanship 9.1011).
47. As suggested by Xenophon: Let the groom be under orders also to lead him through
crowds, and accustom him to all sorts of sights and all sorts of noises. If the colt shies at any of
them, he must teach him, by quieting him and without impatience, that there is nothing to be
afraid of (On Horsemanship 2.5).
48. Maria A. Liston, Skeletal Evidence for the Impact of Battle on Soldiers and Non-
Combatants, in New Approaches to Greco-Roman Warfare (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell,
forthcoming). Matthew A. Sears has benefitted from several conversations with Dr. Liston con-
cerning the Chaeronea skeletons and the likelihood of the presence of cavalry in the battle. Dr.
Liston also generously shared a copy of her forthcoming chapter. Sears has also seen Dr. Liston
present this often arresting evidence in visually compelling lectures delivered in her role as a
speaker for the Archaeological Institute of America.

1034 THE JOURNAL OF

 Alexanders Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea

Figure 5: The Lion

of Chaeronea,
where the dead of
the Theban Sacred
Band were buried.
[Courtesy of C.
Jacob Butera]

Conclusion
As we have seen, horses could be trained to charge into infantry head-on, and
the wedge formation used by the Macedonians was ideal for exploiting the natural
herd instinct of horses. Not only would the horses in the broad part of the wedge
naturally follow the lead horse into an enemy formation, but the more timid
horses could be placed in the center of the wedge. This latter point corresponds
to Arrians comment that one of the strengths of the wedge is its distribution of
the leaders around the outside. These observations also corroborate the testimony
of Frederick the Great to the effect that even the most craven riders and horses
will be swept up in the rush of the charge to attack the enemy despite themselves.
Plenty of examples exist in the modern period of cavalry physically smashing into
formed infantry, and on a plain reading several accounts of ancient battles bespeak
the penetrating power of heavy cavalry. Finally, Listons work on the Chaeronea
skeletons strongly suggests that mounted soldiers killed at least some of the
members of the Sacred Band. Certainly a direct charge was dangerous and risky
for any cavalry to perform, to which the results of Waterloo and several ancient
and medieval battles attest. The Macedonian cavalry, though, superlatively well
trained and equipped, and led by a brazen commander, no less than Alexander the
Great himself atop his famously aggressive horse Bucephalus, was the ideal force
to carry out such a maneuver. The bulk of the evidence indicates that Alexander
led a successful cavalry charge against the Theban Sacred Band at Chaeronea.

Sears would also like to thank C. Jacob Butera for his insights on and photographs of ancient
battlefields; Barry Strauss for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper; the audi-
ence of the 2013 Atlantic Classical Association annual meeting, at Acadia University in Wolfville,
Nova Scotia, where some preliminary thoughts on the cavalry at Chaeronea were presented; Sally
McGrath for sharing her wide knowledge of all things equestrian; and the anonymous readers and
editor of the Journal of Military History for offering valuable suggestions and feedback.

MILITARY HISTORY 1035