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Robin (academic freelance writer)

Econ460

April 2, 2017

Reach me at (robtashley98xfthgb955@gmail.com)

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EXTERNALITIES

INTRODUCTION

Property rights define who the owner of an individual piece of property is and what they

can do with the property. When the owners rights to his property are reduced, they must be

compensated, and they have the right to transfer their property rights to whomever they wish.

When one has clear rights on a piece of their property, they are motivated to develop it and

transfer it to a party that can use the property more efficiently (Gibbon and John 100). Property

that exists by default or custom cannot be transferred or monetized, such property may be owned

by the government and would lead to less efficient use. When property rights are not defined, it

may give rise to either positive or negative externality. Some of the custom owned properties are

as a result of the difficulty in determining the property rights. For example, property rights of

clean air have not been established, if such rights were known, involved parties would adopt a

solution to the spillover effects. While a lot of property rights have been discussed in writing or

literature, there remain certain parts of this issue that should be emphasized. This paper intends
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to address the externalities caused by lack of limited rights to use of property. The externalities

are said to come from different directions. The paper hence uses a contractual approach to

explaining how the externalities arise. Secondly, it examines the control and exchange of goods

such as property. It explains how the interchange of goods and conservation of regulator over the

goods imposes costs on the owner and the trade of the goods. Additionally, it examines some

aspects of property rights as well as the activities of commercial firms that have damaging effects

on others.

THE MODEL OF A NON-EXCLUSIVE RESOURCE

The lack of exclusive rights to use a property gives rise to a lack of the right to contract

that would outline the utilization of that property. Hence, the absence of governance over the

property alters the constraints of competition that affects resource allocation. Joining the

resources of numerous owners in production requires the fractional allocation of property rights

outlined in a contract. The agreement defines terms such as the dissemination of income amid the

parties and the conditions on how the resources are to be used. The rights to the transfer are

governed by the forces of competition in the market. The choice of the contract, on the other

hand, is guided by the transaction costs, legal arrangements and the economic risks associated

with the transfer. In cases of private property, the right governing the use of that property is the

wealth maximization goal of the firm or the investor. Such contracts are intended to make the

most of the returns of all the resources subject to competition. Assuming there are no transaction

costs and the conditions of every contract would be reliable with the equimarginal standard. In

such case, the marginal gain and marginal costs would be equal. One or more contractual

condition is required to satisfy one marginal equality. It raises the question of whether it is

known if the marginal inequalities are satisfied. Additionally, the extent to which the provisions
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have on the consequence of income dissemination and resource apportionment. The conditions of

a contract may be inconsistent with the concept of marginal equality of resource. In other cases,

it may not exists as in cases of non-exclusive right. The lack of a contract or yet the presence of a

faulty contract does not suggest economic inadequacies. It can be traced in existing legal

activities, the presence of transaction costs and lack of cost information. Secondly, the

relationship between conditions and the actual outcomes is the contractual enforcement.

Unenforceable conditions may be absent in a contract. However, the absence of the contract itself

will lead to different uses of the resources than when the contract is enforceable. The central

concept here is that if an agreement requires the transfer of all resources used in production, only

the owner is responsible for the decisions made. However, when the transfer involves part of the

resources, the contracting parties have to negotiate the terms mutually. It is clear that the source

of externalities is either the lack of the right to contract, the presence of an agreement that lacks

complete stipulations or occurrence of stipulations that are inconsistent with certain marginal

equivalences.

A good example to explain the externalities is the use of marine fisheries. Fishing rights

are non-exclusive (Shogren, 32). Hence no contractual conditions are governing the utilization of

the fishing grounds. The lack of a contract and the corresponding lack of exclusive rights to use

the fishing ground does not correspond to the real life rules. Fish similar to other growing

biological assets require planting and harvesting. Like in production, decisions are made on what

to be produced, the mode of manufacture, the quantity and time the investment will take and the

method of harvesting. In private property, such decisions are made by the participants. The

absence of exclusive rights leads to increase in the cost of imposing the revenue made by other

private investment inputs. If the fishing ground ownership exists, the owner would enter into
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contracts with the stakeholders and restrict non-participants from interfering in undesirable

practices.

The choice of the product is compelled by the high cost of guarding individual

investment input that arises from the non-exclusive usage of the resource. Second, some

investment input will deterioration if a private fishing converts to non-exclusive. The situation is

due to the high cost of policing that private firm's input compared to the non-exclusive ones.

Third, the physical attributes in marine affect the maturity of the catch. In a private fishery, the

financial maturity and the rate of rotation chosen should be one that would maximize wealth.

However, this is not the case in marine fisheries. The several changes in decisions regarding

planting and harvesting in marine fisheries are examples of the most important effects that occurs

due to lack of exclusive ownership. The example shows that the lack of a right to a contract will

have an impact on the allocation of resources in several ways. Production decisions are many, the

marginal externalities affected are many as well.

When we evaluate the intensity of fishery harvesting in both exclusive and non-exclusive

fishing grounds, the externalities are said to exist in their purest form. The harvest made by one

fisherman is not only his input but the input of other fishermen as well. If you consider two

private inputs in fishery manufacture, the fisherman labor, and the fishing ground while ignoring

other factors; income from the fishing ground is the vital difference between wage rate and the

marginal creation of labor. The rate of change in income in respect to labor in private ownerships

is required to be zero to maximize income. It implies that wage rate equals the marginal product

of labor. The private ownership of marine fisheries gives the possessor the right to contract and

stipulate. Its absence in the non-exclusive fishery will affect the margin of damage. Every
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economic action has its effects, and the same applies to all decisions on the use of a specified

resource.

THE A.C. PIGOUS EXAMPLE

Using the exposition of F.H. Knight on A.C. Pigous example, a conclusion on models of

fishery harvesting can be deducted. In equilibrium, the average produce of fishing work which is

labor equals the wage rate which is the marginal factor cost. Therefore, economic waste occurs

since the marginal produce of labor in the fishery is less than that used elsewhere. Pigous does

not use the term externalities (Varia). However, you can trace the growth of the externality

concept since the idea has an origin in externalities.

In modern society, the private property consistently requires enforcement and recognition

of law. The existence of government in the society lowers the transaction costs. However, market

responses are faster than the legal responses in times of changing economic conditions.

Transaction costs are not only diminished by governments but by the market changes in demand

and supply, technological innovations, and improved organization operations.

The marine fisheries problem is not unique in the economy. Several non-exclusive

property ownership is facing similar challenges. The legal arrangements in some cases may yield

certain characteristics. The growth of the idea of externalities can be traced in the pigous analysis

of divergences between private net product and the social product. One major weakness of the

pigous analysis is the fact that it takes the assertions of fact for granted. Additionally, the report

accepts claims of incomplete contractual arrangements without asking for proof. The

demonstration of this is that some years later, cases of resource misallocation appeared and the

public wanted the intervention of the government.


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The second weakness of pigous is that the analysis does not have any massive attempt of

generalizing the different types of possible divergences. The analysis assumes that the various

kinds of deviations differ from each other and that there is no convincing way explanation as to

why they differ. The nature of the problem has remained incomprehensible, and its uncertainty

has continued to be a tradition in the literature of externalities. It leaves one wondering what

pigous example would become, had it taken advantage of Knights explanation regarding

misconceptions in the understanding of social cost. The social cost is an expense that cannot be

ignored in any discussion regarding divergences as it gives rise to externalities in the market.

Over the years, pigous was expected to revise his analysis, by incorporating Knights idea.

However, this was not the case. Pigous did not at any time change his report on the social and

private product.

Later on. R.H Coase advances some knowledge on the problem of social cost. In several

cases, he is found commenting on the works of Pigous. He in one instance identified that Pigous

makes a distinction between cases where there are no contracts and ones that have contracts that

are not satisfactory. He continues to recognize that the reason why some events are not subjected

to contracts is the same reasons why some contracts do not satisfy their requirements. In such

cases, it would require much cost to make the matters right. It is crucial to note that the two cases

are the same. Having a contract that does not satisfy the requirements is similar to having no

contract at all. The problem of the social cost will, therefore, occur whenever there are no

contracts or when the contracts are not satisfactory. Transfer of properties among individuals and

firms through the use of contracts in the market requires the owner to have exclusive rights. If

one does not have the exclusive rights to a piece of asset or property, they are not able to make

an honest transfer. This is the case even in legal without considering economics.
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The economic system requires control over goods and their exchange to survive with the

variety of wants of the specialist producers. The exchange and maintenance of these goods inflict

some costs on the owner and the trader. R.H. Coase has demonstrated that there is nothing

distinct concerning the side effects that instructs out the responsibility of being taken account of

the market (Cachanosky 65). In this context, side effects is used as an alternative of external

effects or neighborhood special effects. The effects are accountable by the market relations

between the affected parties. The role of the courts is to determine to whom the right of action

belongs. Assuming zero exchange costs and under competitive conditions, the transactions end

result in an efficient solution to the scarcity problem. Coase uses an example of a cattle ranch,

whereby; if the cattle are allowed to roam, and they stray into an unfenced farmland, the farmer

will offer to pay the rancher to lessen the quantity of cattle in his herd. If the rancher declines the

offer, then he should incur some costs, equal to the expense of the crop his cattle damaged. This

cost becomes the private cost of the rancher for raising additional cattle. Additionally, Coase

shows the competence of the resolution by the size of the crops and the number of cattle. He

does not deliberate the exchange costs of whether the farmer or the rancher is legally accountable

for the harm caused. The party which is not held responsible obtains the right to act, usually in

ways that have damaging side effects to the other party. If the rancher is accountable for the

damage, he will incur a direct cost in his maneuvers, and he has two options. Option one is to

decide whether to decrease his herd. Option two is to pay the farmer to reduce the size of the

crops he plants. The decision made will depend on economic value. If the rancher pays the

farmer to reduce the value of his crops will depend on the value of the crop lost. Additionally, if

the farmer will pay the rancher to lessen the size of cattle, will rely on the value of cattle lost.

Both options will depend on the whether the value lost in crop reduction is greater or less than
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the value lost in cattle reduction. Whichever way the rights are allotted, the consequence of the

bargain will be one that make the most of the value of output. That will be the economic view, as

it aims a maximizing output rather than being fair. The role of the markets and the government

are analyzed about the farmer and rancher example. The government should determine whether

it can take the harmful effects of activity at a cost less than the market can when the exchange

costs are positive. Again, it should identify if the resulting resource arrangement is worth the

charge of compelling the side effects into account at all. Like the farmer takes the damaging

effects because it maximizes the overall effects, so should the government. Since the government

is concerned in the economics of its country, it should be ready to take up side effects when the

exchange costs of that activity bring positive impact to the economy.

MISAPPLICATION OF OPTIMALITY THEOREMS

The optimality theorem of welfare economics helps determine whether or not the

realignment is worthwhile. There has been improper usage of the theorems though the

conventional method to the problems has not been determined. It is believed that the

circumstances under which side effects create inefficiencies are the same terms under which the

welfare theorems are unsuitable. The lack of markets in which suitable prices for measuring side

effects can be discovered causes the general analysis of market inefficiencies. When optimality

theories have wrongly interpreted the lack of price or markets, it becomes consistent with

efficiency.

In a competitive model, the market prices may bring equalities necessary for produced

goods and services. However, the question of whether some products produce side effects that

are not bartered in the market may arise. When the markets fail to provide incentives that will
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give a guide to behavior that takes justification of the side effects, the required equalities are

absent. It is said that even faultlessly competitive marketplaces do not achieve efficiency.

However, the reasoning does not consider the fact that provision of a market is a valuable and

costly service. In cases where the market or the political action would be the participants are

lacking, this service is not being produced. When there is no production of the service, then the

inequalities among the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation

may be consistent with efficiency. This consistency is similar to the case where the cost of taking

account of the side effects through the markets or the government may exceed the value of

realigning resources. In cases similar to the above, zero amounts of market pricing or

government equivalent will be efficient. The cost of facilitating these exchanges between

affected parties has been ignored. Considering the price of every good or service produced is

necessary to determine the efficiency (Coase 9). The absence of such prices does not mean that

the market transactions or the government substitute services are desirable. Hence, the most

welfare propositions concerned with these side effects is based on the wrong use of the standard

optimality theorems. They ignore the cost of some goods.

POLICE EFFECTS

The intrigued parties in some cases decide to take account of the side effects by

cumulating sales to extensions of the firm. Adscititiously, they may find it convenient to modify

the effects. The two alternatives are dependable with efficiency, and yet they do not exhibit a

market in the side effect. The property rights and valuation quandary have two primary tasks that

must be held by any allocative mechanism. The duties are a generation of information

concerning all employees benefit resources in alternative uses.


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Secondly, the individuals have to be incentivized to take account of the information. The

allocative mechanism solves the two tasks. Hence the quandary regarding the efficient allocation

reduces to an arithmetic issue. The enforcement of the underlying property rights has a

substantial effect on the faculty of prices to quantify benefits. Prices which reflect particular

benefits, do not quantify the gregarious benefit derived from the good. Surmising that it does not

cost to police property rights, shows that there subsists a direct relationship between the extent to

which conveyed property rights are enforced and the degree to which the private benefits

approach convivial benefits. In general, in the case of public goods, if the cost of policing

benefits achieved from the utilization of these products is minimal, then there is an excellent

cause of eliminating those who do not pay for the goods. In that case, the market can calculate

the value of diverting resources from other uses to the engendering of public property.

Eliminating those who do not pay for the public goods will help determine if the asset is likely to

bring more income than its cost.

As it was distinguished on account of the farmer and the rancher, an activity of one

individual can lead to the damage of the other person or gathering of individuals. Comparable,

the activities of firms could convey damage to the welfare of people in general. The economic

analysis of such circumstances will dependably separate between people in general and the

private firm. Most economists feel that it is attractive to make the individual creating the

mischief obligated for the harm caused to the general population. On the other hand, a tax system

ought to be delivered to the firm bringing the harm or the company can be dispensed with from

the general population area altogether. Pollution is an example of positive externalities. When

industries emit harmful fumes into the air, they cause harm to people and the natural resources.

High taxation of these industries helps reduce the pollution. The tax is used to discourage those
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polluting the environment by enticing them to use modes of production that are environment-

friendly. The tax makes manufacturers pay for the social cost of pollution. An example of an

effective tax is the carbon tax.

The reciprocal way of the issue is one where the conventional approach is taken. In such

an approach, the issue is for the most part on what A makes hurt B, and the choice is the means

by which to limit from A. Thus one deals with a problem of an equal sort. For B to evade the

damage, they would need to hurt A consequently. At that point the main issue progresses toward

deciding, to settle on a choice on whether An is permitted to harm B and the other way around.

The problem is how to avoid more serious damage.

Second is the evaluating framework with risk for damage. For this situation, most

business analysts would concur that the best approach to tackle the issue is to the individual or

firm making the mischief pay for the harm created. For example on account of the cows that

damaged the farmer's crops, the rancher should pay the farmer for the damage caused. In this

illustration, it is insignificant whichever supposition is made regarding marginal loss as the size

of the herd increments or as the measure of the crop diminishes.

The third is the pricing system with no obligation for damage. In this case, the

responsible party is not liable for any damage it caused. The business does not have to make a

payment for the damages caused by its actions. The allocation of resources, in this case, will be

similar to when the damaging party was liable for them. In the same example of the farmer and

the cattle-raiser, the farmer will suffer an increased damage of his crops as the herd of cattle

increases. Assume that he would pay the rancher to increase his herd above the size he would

wish to maintain. This would occur after the bargain and so as to induce the farmer to make a
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larger payment. In the same way, the actions of the farmer in cultivating land that planting would

later be abandoned as a result of an agreement with the rancher. Such situations are preliminary

to the agreement and will not affect the long-term equilibrium position. Determining whether or

not one party is liable is important as without the initial delimitation, market transactions would

not occur.

An example is the case of Cooke v. Forbes. In this case, one of the processes in weaving

cocoa-nut fibre was to immerse it in bleaching liquids; then it was hung and dried. The fumes

from a manufacturer of sulfate ammonia would turn the matting from a bright color to a blackish

one. The decolorizing liquid contained chloride of tin which when mixed with the sulphureted

hydrogen caused the dark color. In this case, an injunction was raised to stop the defendant from

emitting the fumes. The defendants lawyer argued that if the plaintiff could stop using the

particular bleaching agent, the fiber would not be affected. He proceeded to identify the

procedure employed by the plaintiff to be unusual and not complying with the custom trade. The

judge ruled that every person has a right to carry on their manufacturing process and that their

neighbor has no right to pour in gas that would interfere with the production process. He

continued that the view was that the damage was accidental and occasional. Hence careful

precautions were taken, and there were no exceptional risks, the injunction was refused. The

economic analysis of the case is similar to the one of the farmers and the cattle rancher. The

sulfate ammonia manufacturer could reduce production or transfer to another area to avoid the

damage. Either course of action would increase their costs as they would alternatively pay for the

damage. The payment for the loss would become an extra charge for the production of sulfate.

The court argued that change of bleaching agent could solve the case. If the extra cost were less

than the damage that would occur, it would be possible for both manufacturers to make a
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satisfactory bargain in the use of the new bleaching agent. The reasoning that courts apply in

determining legal rights always looks strange to the economists. Most of the ways decisions in

court turn may be irrelevant to the economist. Hence decisions on an economic argument of view

must be treated inversely by the courts. In all issues of harmful effects, the economic difficulty is

how to maximize the value of production.

When taking into account the cost of market transactions, it is crucial to determine the

party that wishes to deal with the other, fundamentally contrary to popular belief. When one

decides whom they want to deal with generally, they inform people of the terms that leads to the

negotiations, which is quite significant. The negotiations, in turn, basically leads to the bargain

than the drawing of the contract in a subtle way. Then the necessary inspections are carried out to

ensure the terms of the agreement specifically are observed in a tremendous way. These

transactions are usually actually expensive sufficient enough to prevent very many operations

that would occur in a system that pricing kind of occurred without cost. When dealing with the

issue of rearrangement of legal rights in the market, the reorganization would occur whenever the

situation would lead to an upsurge in the worth of production, radically contrary to popular

belief. This assumption kind of was made when the transaction costs for the most part were

ignored. Considering the transaction costs, it kind of is basically evident that the rearrangement

would for the most part occur in cases where then upsurge in the value of production kind of is

greater than the costs associated with the reorganization, which particularly is fairly significant.

ASPECTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Laws that relate to demand equalization of factors, comparative advantage, as well as the

relationship between price and cost, can de deduce from traditional microeconomic theory. This
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approach does not deal with the role of property rights exclusively but touches on it in good

proportion. Some social arrangements exist to define or to provide a definition of ownership of

property. A discussion of the significant aspects that talk about the rights on properties based on

traditional approach is crucial. People have been ignoring this method because it does not give

information on the whole. By use of an example, it will be easy to tell the importance of

assumptions on social provisions. For instance, as the traditional economic laws states about

demand curves being negatively sloped or the queues that tend to be removed by prices that

fluctuate freely. Despite the fact that ownership of property does not comprise the right to sell or

buy the law of demand remains true but the second law on queues only remains true if there is

right to the right to sell or buy property. This explains more on the economic laws that still stands

when the ownership of property comprises of selling and buying rights and when it does not

include the rights.

Private property systems

The system applied on private ownership include the twofold system which requires the

owners to have a prior agreement before such property becomes affected by others. The court, in

this case, helps to decide on the person who possesses the rights to the property and thus is

allowed to complain in case such rights are affected by other people. It means that the rights

given to that person are under police power protection. This property system is valid, and this

implies that the owner assigned the rights bears the value of any beneficial or harmful effect the

use of property and property rights should be used efficiently when the rights are a form of utility

maximizers. It also implies that output from the property is not dependent on any distribution

rights unless the changes in the distribution of the wealth touch the pattern of demand. These
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implications from a standard proposition of economics on an economic resource while the rights

assigned to the property is a kind of right to make new products.

Costs involved in assigning right of ownership system

The efficiency of property rights depends on the ability of value derived from the use of

the property to sufficiently cover both the realignment costs and valuation cost. Apparently, only

the beneficial and harmful effects in the usage of property rights get noticed because other effects

only get to be known in case a significant cost is incurred. This is why property right system such

as twofold advocates for an agreement between the input owners such as workers to ensure that

any cost incurred will be taken care. Costs such as effects of smoke from a factory can only be

substantial if the property bears a significant or very great cost. However, the cost of

uncertainties increase around the rights of the inputs affected and the extent to which they are

affected, and sometimes it is possible for the expected cost that is estimated before the effects

happen to exceed the gains. Other expenses such as those involved to measure legality of claims

in the event of uncertainties have chances of going high as well. Thus, a policy of prior

agreement on compensation uneconomically obstructs chances of change and innovation

however when the extent of the effect is known in advance it would be unfair to deny the inputs a

prior payment.

THE LEGAL RESTRICTION OF RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE

The case of Cooke v. Forbes, not only gave a glimpse of the argument but the legal

approach to the issue of harmful effects, which is fairly significant. Though the above case

essentially was in English, similar selections of American cases would have the same judgment.

In cases where the market transactions are free, the rights of the various parties would be the
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only concern. These rights should be well defined, and the legal results should be predictable.

When market transactions mostly are involved, the situation definitely for all intents and

purposes is a bit different, and it makes it difficult to change the arrangements of rights

determined by the law in a subtle way. When this particularly is the case, the courts influence the

economic activities. It is crucial that the courts, for the most part, understand the economic

implications of their actions in a pretty significant way, pretty contrary to popular belief. They

should necessarily definitely take these outcomes into consideration when making their decisions

and try to specifically avoid uncertainty about their legal position in a relatively big way, which

is fairly significant. Even when it, for the most part, is particularly possible to alter the legal

boundaries of rights through market transactions necessarily, it is desirable to minimize the need

for these transactions, definitely fundamentally contrary to popular belief, which is fairly

significant. It will be specifically kind of help lessen the employment of resources in carrying out

the businesses.

PIGOUS TREATMENT IN ECONOMIC WELFARE

As discussed earlier in cases of fisheries, Pigous explains the divergences that occur

between social and mainly private net products. Such deviations specifically occur in cases

where party A in offering services to which payment, for the most part, is made to B. Then Party

A also renders services to the third party, of a sort that services cannot be extracted from the

benefited party, very contrary to popular belief. Additionally, no form of compensation imposed

on the injured parties in a subtle way. Pigous attempts to explain how the unusually free

operations of self-interest, for the most part, allocate resources of a country in a big way. He

explains that the allocation occurs in a way that is most satisfactory to the making of a huge

significant national dividend, undoubtedly contrary to popular belief. Additionally, the


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distribution considers how feasible it is for the actions of the state to enhance natural tendencies,

contrary to popular belief. He concludes that improvements could be made and he continues to

imply that what is necessary to bring these enhancements mostly is state actions in a pretty

significant way.

Economists fail to substantially reach a correct conclusion on how harmful effects should

be treated, which specifically is fairly large. As such, the failure cannot be attributed to several

omissions in the analysis. Rather, it rises from the approach used in solving problems of welfare

economics. A change to the approach is needed in an enormous way. Analyzing divergences

between fundamentally private and social products pays more attention to for all intents and

purposes certain discrepancies in the system. The analyses tend to nurture the belief that any

measure proficient of eliminating the deficiency is virtually required, or so they mostly thought.

The approach hence ignores the changes in the system that are unavoidably associated with a

measure that can cause more harm than the initial shortage in a very major way.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined a variety of property rights and the externalities that are likely

to occur in the absence of these property rights. Any economic transaction implies mutual

recognition of parties who hold the right of ownership. Property rights may be the real factor or

the legal factor in an economic situation. The use of marine fisheries has enabled the discussion

of the effects that would occur in cases where the there are no property rights. The paper has

determined that property rights are necessary for preconditions for market economies to happen.

The market factors have been identified to be faster than the legal factors when responding to

changes in the economic environment. However, the relevance of these legal factors has not been
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ignored. In determining the social effects caused by harms of firms in the economic environment,

the law has a role to play. Though the decisions made by the law are not consistent with the

reasoning of the economists, it is crucial to determine that indeed they have an effect. In future, it

would be helpful if the courts with consider the views of the economists in deciding cases

regarding economic welfare. Problems of social welfare must be eventually dissolved into the

study of aesthetics and moralities.

Works Cited

Cachanosky, Nicols. "Calculation and Equilibrium Problems in the Coase

Theorem." Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, vol. 14, no. 1, Spring2011,

pp. 63-77

Coase, R H. Essays on Economics and Economists. , 1994. Internet resource.


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Gibbons, Robert, and John Roberts. The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 2013. Print.

Lin, Ming-Jen and Chia-Chi Chang. "Testing Coase Theorem: The Case of Free

Agency in NBA." Applied Economics, vol. 43, no. 20, 20 Aug. 2011, pp.

2545-2558.

Shogren, Jason F. Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics. ,

2013. Internet resource.

Stevenson, Dru. "Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem." Iowa Law Review,

vol. 97, no. 5, July 2012, pp. 1645-1673

Varia. "On Pigous Theory of Economic Policy Analysis." conomia - History, Methodology,

Philosophy, 2 Feb. 2012, oeconomia.revues.org/1373.