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    Reforma policial . Buenos Aires

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    24 views12 pages

    10 1 1 364 6795

    Uploaded by

    Enter Hogar
    Reforma policial . Buenos Aires

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 12

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingrisk
    andinfluencingaction
    JerryH.Ratcliffe,PhD

    DRAFTOFFORTHCOMINGCHAPTERTOBEPUBLISHEDBYIALEIATHEINTERNATIONALASSOCIATIONOF
    LAWENFORCEMENTINTELLIGENCEANALYSTS.
    PLEASECITEASANINPRESSPUBLICATIONUNTILTHISWORKISPUBLISHEDBYIALEIA.THENPLEASECITE
    ASTHEIALEIAPUBLICATION.

    andtheplanningofpublicsafety.Itisachallenge
    thatshouldbeembraced.
    Introduction
    Intelligenceworkisoftencharacterizedas Thischapterbeginsbyexplainingtheneedwithin
    primarilyananalysisfunction,acovertactivity,or policingtomanagefuturerisksandwhytherole
    aboutknowledgework.Noneoftheseviewsis oftheanalystwithinthisistoidentifypatternsof
    entirelyaccurate.Intelligenceworkisprimarily criminalitytoaidfuturecrimepreventionaction.
    aboutanticipatingrisksandimprovingpublic Thisalltakesplaceswithinaframeworkof
    safety.AsthechiefarchitectsofBritainsNational intelligenceledpolicing(ILP),andthechapter
    IntelligenceModelhaverecentlywritten,we continuesbydefininganddescribingtwomodels.
    knewthattheintelligencemodelwasinfactan Oneisasimpleconceptualmodelofintelligence
    idealmodelforthewholebusinessofpolicing ledpolicing,andthesecondisabusinessmodel
    thatwouldenablepolicecommandersto thathasemergedfrombestpracticeinapolice
    understandandanticipaterisksandthreats departmentthathasmanyyearsexperiencewith
    acrossthepublicsafetydomain(Floodand partnershipmodelsofILP.Thechapterconcludes
    Gaspar2009:54,emphasisadded).Theroleof bysummarizingthemainpointssothatthe
    intelligence,atleastwithinthelawenforcement readercandevelopILPprinciplesintoILP
    domainunderdiscussioninthischapter,isthusa practice.
    dualroleofanticipatingfutureriskstopublic
    safety,andinfluencingdecisionmakerssothat
    crimepreventionactioncanbeinitiated.Itis Theneedtomanageanuncertain
    worthnotingthatthesubjectofthischapteris future
    notintelligence,butintelligenceledpolicing.
    Intelligenceledpolicingisacontemporarymodel Thefirststageofthedualroleoutlinedinthe
    forsituatingtheintelligencefunctionwithinthe introductiontothischapter(anticipatingrisk,
    overallmissionofthepoliceorganization(Carter influencingaction)istheanticipationofrisksto
    2005).Thedualroleofanticipatingrisksand publicsafety.Allintelligenceanalysis,even
    influencingactionintegratesanalysiswith descriptiveworkofpastcriminalactivity,makes
    decisionmakingandcreatesadditional animplicitprojectionofapossiblefuturecriminal
    challengesforintelligenceprofessionals.Taking environment.Forthisstatementtobetrue,we
    onthemantleofamoredirectresponsibilityfor havetosometimesexcludeoneareaofactivity
    publicsafetymaymakesomeanalysts oftenmislabeledasintelligenceanalysis;thatof
    uncomfortable;howeveritexpandstheroleof investigativesupport.Transcribingwiretapsand
    analysisbeyondasimpleadjuncttopolicingand otherworkthatsupportsinvestigationswiththe
    intoacorefunctioncentraltodecisionmaking aimofgatheringsufficientevidencetosustaina
    prosecutionisundoubtedlyworthyandvaluable
    1|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    work,butitshouldbemoreaccuratelydescribed termandongoinguntileffectiveremedialaction
    asaninvestigativesupportfunctionratherthan istaken.
    intelligencework,irrespectiveofanyjob
    descriptionsandtitlesoftheindividualsinvolved
    (Ratcliffe2008a;Sheptycki2004).Thiscaveatin
    place,theactivityofmostcrimeandintelligence
    analystsimplicitlyattemptstouseexisting
    knowledgetoprojectanimageofanuncertain
    future.Isayimplicitly,becausemanyanalystsare
    happytoreportexistingcrimepatternsand
    criminalactivityandmakenostatementofthe
    future;however,apredictionofthefutureis
    oftenwhatdecisionmakerscraveintheirroleas
    riskmanagerswithresponsibilitytomanage
    resourceallocation.

    Policecommandersfrequentlyaskthe
    impossible.Whileoftenunabletoarticulatewhat
    theyseek,theyhabituallyseektheansweran Figure1.Frompatternstoprevention.
    unfeasibleprojectionofthespecificdate,time Source:Ratcliffe(2009),reproducedwith
    andplaceofafuturecriminalact.Provisionof permissionofFederationPress(Australia).
    anythinglessisdeemedfailure.Inreality,aiming Forexample,mostofthePhiladelphiacrime
    topredictanindividualcrimeeventwouldbe hotspotsmappedbyresearchersinthe1940s
    betterreplacedbytheobjectiveofpredicting (ShawandMcKay1942)arethesameproblem
    futurecriminalpatternsinordertobe areasthatexisttoday.Oncecrimeproblems
    preventativeratherthanreactive.AsIhave emerge,theylingeruntilresolved;when
    explainedelsewhere(Ratcliffe2008a),themove organizedcrimegroupsidentifyaweaknessthey
    tointelligenceledpolicingwasinpartdrivenby canexploit,theycontinueuntilsomesortof
    thedesireforpolicingtobeproactivein disturbinginfluenceisintroduced;onceoffenders
    preventingcrimeinsteadofsimplyreactiveto learnhowtostealaparticularmodelofvehicle,a
    crimeonceitoccurred.Forpreventionactivityto redesignofthevehicleisoftennecessary;and
    occur,thisrequiresthatthepoliceandcrime onceburglarsidentifyawaytocircumventa
    preventionpractitionersareproactiveintheir securityfeature,theywillcontinuetostealuntil
    actions.Proactivityrequiresthecriminalityin newpreventionmechanismsareimplemented.
    questiontohaveacomponentofpredictability TheimportanceofpatternsisinherentinwhatI
    aboutit.Ifacrimeisextremelyrareweare callmyfirstlawofintelligence:Themostreliable
    unlikelytobeabletoidentifyfutureevents indicationoffuturecriminalactivityiscurrent
    becausewerequirehistoricalpatternsto criminalactivity.Offenderswhohaveidentified
    establishatrendandtheconditionsthatmake andexploitedanopportunitywillcontinuetodo
    theeventlikely.Thereforepredictabilityrequires sountilstopped,andthatfrequentcriminal
    theidentificationofpatternsofcriminality.This actionwillresultinpatternsofevents.The
    chain(PreventionrequiresProactivityrequires strategicmanagementofcrimepatternswillbea
    PredictabilityrequiresPatterns)showninFigure1 moreeffectiveuseofenforcementenergiesthan
    tiestheidentificationofpatternsasaprecursor individualeventinvestigations.
    tocrimepreventionactionandisattheheartof
    intelligenceledpolicing(seeRatcliffe2009). Whatdoesallthismean?Itmeansthatinthe
    Whilesomeshorttermfluctuationssometimes analyticalrole,theidentificationofpatternsis
    exist,manycrimetrendsandproblemsarelong essentialtoproactivepoliceworkgearedtowards

    2|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    crimeprevention.Asstatedabove,even analystsaretosucceedinachievingthegoalof
    descriptiveanalysesofpastcrimepatternsmake improvedpublicsafetythroughILPthenthey
    acommentaboutthefuture,becausethereisan mustuseintelligencetodriveleadershipin
    impliedsuggestionthatpasteventsareindicative policing.Intelligencemanagersandseniorpolice
    offuturecriminality.Thereisalsotheimplication staffmayreadthisandinterpretittomeanthat
    thatsomecontinuationoftheobservedpatterns theabilitytopresentintelligence;tobrief
    willcontinueunlessactionistaken.Intelligence managersquickly,clearlyandarticulately;andto
    workisthereforeastatementofanuncertain prepareanddelivercompellingpresentationsand
    future,basedonanoftenincompleteimageof writtendocumentsareallsignificantskillsto
    thepresent,withtheaimofdirectingfuture considerwhenhiringorpromotinganalysts.They
    policeandcrimepreventionaction.Theanalytical wouldberight.AsMarkEvanspointsoutfromhis
    challengesaresignificant. experiencesasanintelligencemanagerin
    NorthernIrelandandNewZealand,Thebest
    Thesecondstageofthedualrole(anticipating analystshavepresence,engageineffective
    risk,influencingaction)isalsovitalwithinILP; verbalandnonverbalbehaviour,andhavethe
    thatofinfluencingdecisionmakers.HereIinvoke abilitytoreadasituationandtailortheir
    mysecondlawofintelligence:intelligencethat contributionaccordingly.Whilethesemaybe
    doesnotinfluencethethinkingofadecision qualitiesthatappearintangibletheycanbe
    makerisnotintelligence.Thisisnottodenigrate practicedandwhenusedsuccessfullywill
    thevalueofinvestigativesupport,background contributetotheimpactmade(Evans2009:
    reading,orothervaluableworkconductedby 198).
    analysts,butsimplyasconfirmationthat
    intelligenceisknowledgedesignedforaction Iftheanalyticaltaskistominimizeuncertaintyso
    (Grieve2009:29).Ifwearetouseknowledgeto thatdecisionmakersareabletomakewise
    driveaction,thenintelligencemustinfluence decisionsregardingpreventionactivityand
    decisionmakersinameaningfulmanner,andthis resourceallocation,whatisintelligenceled
    meanschangingorinitiatingacourseofaction. policingandhowisitaframeworkforthe
    Theinfluencingofadecisionmakertotakeno successfulachievementofthedualroleof
    actionisevenacceptablewithinthisframework anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction?
    andalmostinevitablegiventheroleofcrime
    intelligenceasapivotaltoolinresource
    allocation:therearerarelysufficientresourcesto Whatisintelligenceledpolicing?
    tackleallcriminality.Assuch,benignneglectisa
    formofaction,ifitistakendeliberatelyanddone Inapreviouswork,Idedicatedawholechapter
    suchthatotherprioritiesaregivenexplicit todefiningintelligenceledpolicingandproviding
    priority.Butmeaningfulactionoccurswhen someconceptualdaylightbetweenintelligence
    decisionsareevidencebasedandintelligence ledpolicingandCompstat,communitypolicing,
    led,wheretheintelligencedrivesacourseof andproblemorientedpolicing(Ratcliffe2008a).
    actionthataimstoreducecriminalityand Spaceprecludesthatoptionhere;howeverthe
    promotepublicsafety.AsHowardAtkinnotedin definitionisasfollows:
    thefirsteditionofthisbook,ILPispredicatedon
    Intelligenceledpolicingisabusinessmodeland
    theeffectiveandefficientproductionAND
    managerialphilosophywheredataanalysisand
    applicationofintelligence(Petersonetal.2000:
    crimeintelligencearepivotaltoanobjective,
    13,emphasisinoriginal).
    decisionmakingframeworkthatfacilitatescrime
    Askinganalyticalstafftotakeanactiverolein andproblemreduction,disruptionandprevention
    influencingdecisionmakerssounds throughbothstrategicmanagementandeffective
    Machiavelliananditis,butnotnecessarilyinthe enforcementstrategiesthattargetprolificand
    pejorativesense.Itismorearealizationthatif seriousoffenders(Ratcliffe2008a:89).

    3|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    Intelligenceledpolicingisabusinessmodeland problemsthatpoliceareaskedtodealwith,such
    managerialphilosophyRatherthanbeingan asspeeding,crashmanagement,nuisance
    abstractideatobedippedintoorconceptualized abatement,missingpersonsandpublicorder.
    intheclassroom,intelligenceledpolicingisa Theseriskstopublicsafetycanbeanticipated
    philosophyofbusinesspracticethatrequiresbuy withdataanalysisandcrimeintelligenceand
    infromallpartsoftheorganization. mitigatedthroughanobjectivedecisionmaking
    Furthermore,itisabusinessmodelthat framework.Whenthatoccurs,measured
    prescribes,throughmechanismssuchasthe(UK) responsesareoftenmorethansimplyarresting
    NationalIntelligenceModelorGMACPBM offenders,butincludeproblemreduction,
    (explainedlater),thewaythatinformationand disruptionandprevention,asrecognizedbythe
    crimeintelligenceflowaroundtheorganization UKSeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency:Law
    tothedecisionmakers. enforcementeffortsintheUKandoverseasoften
    leadtothedisruptionanddisplacementof
    wheredataanalysisandcrimeintelligenceare particulardrugsupplychains(SOCA2008:7,
    pivotalThetermcrimeintelligencemaybenew emphasisadded).
    tosomereaders.Itrepresentsablendofcrime
    analysisandcriminalintelligence,arguingfor throughbothstrategicmanagementThereis
    collaborationbetweentwostrandsofanalysis growingevidencethatproblemoriented
    thatintheUSatleastareoftenkept policingsapproachofaddressingtheunderlying
    artificiallyseparateduetoorganizational,cultural causesofproblemsthatcreateworkforpoliceis
    ortechnicallimitationsandtraditions.Crime effective(Scott2000;Shermanetal.1998).The
    analysiscantelladecisionmakerwhatisgoing inclusionofstrategicmanagementinthe
    on,andcriminalintelligence,rootedasitisin definitionisarealizationthatthereisan
    understandingandexplainingpatternsofcriminal importantroleformorelongtermstrategic
    behavior,cantelladecisionmakerwhy. approachesinthesearchforproblemprevention
    andreduction.Thisinclusioninthedefinition
    toanobjectivedecisionmakingframework enablespolicetowork,forexample,withstreet
    Thispartofthedefinitionprovidesreal engineerstoimprovetrafficaccidentblackspots,
    challengesforintelligencestaff.Whatisthe withhousingauthoritiestoaddresscrimeand
    decisionmakingframeworkoftheirworkplace? disorderinpublichousingprojects,withcity
    Wheredoestherealpowertoaffectchangeon agenciestorevokealcohollicensesatdisorderly
    thecriminalenvironmentlie?Whenanalystsstart bars,andwithlegislatorstoclosefinancial
    askingthesequestions,theanswerisoften loopholesexploitedbyorganizedcrime
    unexpected.Traditionally,wehavesoughtout syndicates.
    patrolofficers,buttheylackthepowertocontrol
    muchoftheirowntime,andoftenlack andeffectiveenforcementstrategiesthattarget
    accountabilitytoactionintelligence.Asananalyst prolificandseriousoffenders.Whilestrategic
    intheNewZealandPolicesaid,[Thereisa]lack managementopensuppossibilitiesforpoliceto
    ofresponsibility.Itisbettertogothroughthe workwithpartnersinacollaborativeandco
    supervisortogetaccountability(Ratcliffe2005: productionmodelofcrimeprevention(Taylor
    444). 2006;WoodandShearing2007),manyofthe
    criminologybasedcrimecontrolstrategiesofthe
    thatfacilitatescrimeandproblemreduction, last30yearshadnoexplicitroleforthepolice:
    disruptionandpreventionAsBrianFloodand crimewastobecontrolledbyaddressing
    RogerGasparpointedoutinthequoteatthe societysunderlyingwoes.Whilesociological
    startofthischapter,intelligenceledpolicingisa solutionstocrimeallhavesomemeasureof
    modelforthewholebusinessofpolicing.The academicmerit,theyoftenlackedpolicy
    definitionthereforerecognizesthatitcanbe relevancetocommunitiesandthepolice.Thereis
    usedformorethancrime,butalsothemyriad increasingevidencethatspecificandtargeted
    4|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    policingstrategiescanhelptoreducecrimeif ILPseekstoemployawiderrangeofdatasources
    targetedeffectively.Theykeywordhereis thanarefoundinanyotherpolicingstyle,with
    effective(andevidenceinsupportofthispartof thepossibleexceptionofproblemoriented
    thedefinitionisprovidedlaterinthechapter). policing.Problemorientedpolicing(POP)hasa
    naturalsynergywithintelligenceledpolicingas
    Thereisfrequentconfusiondistinguishing bothseekamorelongterm,strategic,risk
    betweenpolicingstrategies.Intelligenceled focusedandcomprehensivesolutiontocrime.
    policingissometimeslinkedtocommunity Problemorientedpolicingisaconceptual
    policing,Compstatandproblemoriented approachthatcanaddressavastarrayofpolicing
    policing.Whenthedefinitionisbrokendown(as issues,butitrequireslawenforcementtodelve
    above),thedaylightbetweenintelligenceled deeperintotheunderlyingproblemsthataffect
    policingandotherapproachesbecomes publicsafety.Thisrequirespolicetobeableto
    apparent.Forexample,communitypolicinghas scanacrossarangeofdataandinformation
    theprimaryaimsofregainingthelegitimacyof sourcestoidentifyproblems,analyzethese
    thepoliceintheeyesofthepublic,moving problemsandidentifytheunderlyingissue,prior
    towardsasocialserviceethos,andallowingthe toaddressingtheproblem(Clarke2004;Eck
    communitytotaketheleadindeterminingpolice 2006;Goldstein2003;Townsleyetal.2003).Both
    priorities(Skogan2006;Taylor2006).By POPandILPseekastrategicsolution,but
    comparison,theprimaryaimofintelligenceled intelligenceledpolicingismoreexplicitaboutthe
    policingisthepreventionofcrimeandarrestof roleofpolice,supportinglongtermstrategic
    prolificoffenders,anditseeksamoreobjective managementwithaclearroletobringserious,
    decisionmakingsystembasedondataand repeatoffenderstojustice.Thisenablespoliceto
    intelligenceanalysistodeterminepriorities. beproactiveandanticipaterisksfromorganized
    crimeandseriousoffenders,aswellasachieve
    Compstatisoftenmistakenasanintelligenceled thelongtermpublicsafetygainsthataresought.
    policingmethodology(seeforexample,Dannels
    andSmith2001).Compstatislinkedtoboththe Insummary,intelligenceledpolicing:
    ordermaintenancepracticesoftheNYPDthat isamanagementphilosophy/business
    havebeenassociatedwiththecrimereduction model;
    thatoccurredinNewYorkCityinthelate1990s, aimstoachievecrimereductionand
    andthebrokenwindowsapproach(Kelling preventionandtodisruptoffender
    1999;KellingandBratton2006;SousaandKelling activity;
    2006;WilsonandKelling1982).Compstatis employsatopdownmanagement
    largelyfocusedonstreetlevelandhighvolume approach;
    crime,anddrivesshorttermaccountabilityto combinescrimeanalysisandcriminal
    emergingcrimeproblems,whereasintelligence intelligenceintocrimeintelligence;
    ledpolicinghasalongtermstrategiccomponent usescrimeintelligencetoobjectively
    thatisasapplicabletotransnationalorganized directpoliceresourcedecisions;
    crimeasitistoneighborhooddisorder(Ratcliffe focusesenforcementactivitiesonprolific
    2008a).AsScottandcolleaguespointout, andseriousoffenders.(Ratcliffe2008a)
    Compstathasnotheoreticalbasisonwhichto
    secureanyshorttermgains,andboth
    communitypolicingandbrokenwindows Decisionmakingandleadership
    policingseemtobefoundedonthenotionthat
    communitydysfunctioncanbequicklyremedied Forintelligenceledpolicingtobecomeareality,
    byaninjectionofpolicing(Scottetal.2008: intelligenceanalysismustbeincorporatedinto
    243).WhereCompstatisfocusedoncrime, theplanningprocessofpoliceagencies(Peterson
    intelligenceledpolicingisfocusedonidentifying 2005).Morethanthis,ifagenciesareto
    threats(CarterandCarter2009). anticipaterisk,andinfluenceaction(thethemeof
    5|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    thischapter),thentherearethreerequirements neighborhoodblockwatch,andlowleveldrug
    thatQuarmbyidentifiesasessentialtoproactive marketarrestseventhoughithaslongbeen
    work:thereisanidentifiabledecisionmaking knownthattheseprogramsandtacticsdonot
    systemtosupport;thereisawilltothinkahead reducecrime(Shermanetal.1998).AsPhillips
    inboththeintelligencesystemandthedecision (2008:28)pointsout,Alltoo
    systemtobesupported;andthereisawillto oftencommandershaveastrongand
    applytheresultsinboththeintelligencesystem sometimessorryrecordofrelyingontheir
    andthedecisionsystemtobesupported preconceptionsratherthanacurrentand
    (Quarmby2009:1656).Thesethree measuredappraisaloftheprobleminhand.
    requirementsposesomerealchallengesforboth Strongleaderscanbepersonallyeffectiveand
    analystsanddecisionmakers. strategicallyweak.

    Acentralissuefortheadoptionandsuccessof
    intelligenceledpolicingisthelevelof AbusinessmodelforILP
    sophisticationandmaturityofthedecision
    makingenvironment.Inreality,theproblemsare Onceideasofintelligenceledpolicinggobeyond
    oftenquiteprofound.Iveoftenbeenbemused thehermeticenvironmentoftheanalystand
    bythelackofclarityregardingthedecision starttolookatthebusinessofpolicing,thenthe
    makingprocessinmanypolicedepartments. limitationsoftheintelligencecyclebecome
    Mayors,policechiefs,midlevelcommanders, apparent.Otherchaptersinthisbookwill
    andindividualofficersoftenappeartohavefree examinetheintelligencecycle,anditisauseful
    reintomakesignificantdecisionsregardingcrime trainingtooltoconceptualizetheintelligence
    policywithoutrecoursetoobjectiveanalysisof processfornewanalysts,butitdoesnotaddress
    theissue,orevenapartialunderstandingor theproblemsofgainingtractionwithintelligence
    knowledgeoftheproblem.Whendonein products.Ineffect,itsaysnothingtoaddressthe
    responsetonewspaperarticlesorstoriesonthe secondlawofcrimeintelligence:intelligencethat
    nightlynews(asappearstosometimesbethe doesnotinfluencethethinkingofadecision
    case)itisoftenanexampleofmedialedpolicing. makerisnotintelligence.Thethreeimodel
    Thiskindofkneejerkresponsetoproblemsmay (Figure2)explicitlyaddressestherelationship
    haveemergedasanappropriateleadershipstyle betweenanalysisanddecisionmakerwithin
    whenagenciesdidnothaveaccesstodata, intelligenceledpolicing(Ratcliffe2003).Inthe
    informationandknowledgeabouttheproblems model,notonlydoestheanalysthavetoactively
    theyfaced,butitistheantithesisofintelligence interpretthecriminalenvironment,butalso
    ledpolicing. influenceadecisionmaker.Thisrequiresnotonly
    identificationofanappropriatepersonorgroup,
    Evenwhenclearlinesofcommunicationand butalsoconsiderationofthebestwayto
    decisionmakingexist,theydonotguaranteethat influencetheirthinking.Furthermore,asshown
    decisionsarestrategicandevidencebased(and inFigure2,wheninfluencingdecisionmakers,
    herethetermevidenceisusedwithreferenceto analystsshouldalsobecognizantoftheneedto
    effectivenessofstrategyratherthancriminal makeappropriaterecommendationsregarding
    evidence).Forexample,manypolice howtohaveaneffectiveimpactonthecriminal
    departmentscontinuetoencourageDARE(Drug environment.
    AbuseResistanceEducation)programs,

    6|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    ThereareanumberofadvantagestotheGMAC
    modelfromtheanalystsperspective.Thetime
    framesbringasenseofpredictabilitytothe
    provisionofthestrategicassessmentaswellas
    clarityabouttheroleofnonpolicepartners.The
    tacticalmeetings(heldeithermonthlyorevery
    twoweeks)arenotsofrequentthatmeeting
    preparationconsumesalltheavailabletime
    (comparethistimeframetopolicedepartments
    withweeklyCompstatmeetings).Finally,the
    recognitionofthedifferencebetweenastrategic
    partnershipbusinessgroupandatacticalgroup
    Figure2.Threeimodelofintelligenceled
    makesclearthatthereisaspecificrolefor
    policing.
    strategicanalysisinthemodel.
    Source:Ratcliffe(2003,andsee2008),
    reproducedwithpermission.
    Themodelalsohasadvantagesfordecision
    Whilethethreeimodelisaconceptualizationof makers.Thereisconsiderablecapacitytoinclude
    ILP,asecondmodelexplainshowitcanfunction nonenforcementagenciesatthestrategiclevel
    inpractice.GreaterManchesterAgainstCrime resultinginanopportunitytorecruitother
    (GMAC)haveestablishedaPartnershipBusiness governmentandnongovernmentagenciesto
    Model(PBM)thatprovidesalinkbetween assistwithcrimepreventionanddisruption.With
    strategicplanningandtacticaloperationsnot lessemphasisonindividualoffendersatthe
    onlyforpolice,butforthepublicsafetyoutcomes strategiclevel,therearefewerprivacyconcerns
    ofthehealthservice,ambulance,probation, andintelligenceproductscanbemorewidely
    communitysafetyanddrugactionteams,youth disseminatedtopotentialcrimereduction
    offendingteamsandlocalmunicipalauthorities partners.Thefocusonastrategysetonceayear
    (fordetails,seewww.gmac.org.uk).TheGMAC (duringSeptemberintheGMACmodelshown)
    PBMisdesignedtoallowtimefortheanalysisof enableslongtermsolutionstobeconsidered
    informationanddatafromallofthepartnersand withatimeframethatismorerealisticregarding
    tofeedbackstrategicprioritiestothoseagencies solutionimplementation.Inotherwords,the
    inacoordinatedsensewiththeirplanningand simplefactofdecidingthemainprioritiesfora
    budgetcycles(GMPA/GMPnd).Themodelhas wholeyear(updatedevery3or6months)allows
    beenindependentlyevaluatedasanexampleof decisionmakerstoimplementmoreconsidered
    bestpractice(Johnetal.2006)anditiseasyto andpreventionorientedstrategiesthanthe
    seewhy.Itincorporatesbothstrategicand ubiquitoussaturationordirectedpatrolsthe
    tacticalcyclesthatintegratewitheachother shorttermbandaidandfavoredtacticofpolice
    whileallowingseniorstafftoconcentrateon commanderswithtimepressures,limited
    longtermcrimepriorities,andmidlevel imagination,andalackofotherresources.
    managerstofocusontacticaloutcomes(Figure Finally,themodelistimedtocoincidewiththe
    3).Ineffect,astrategicoverviewinformslocal budgetcyclesoforganizationsthatcan
    targets(Flitcroft2006)1. contributetocrimereductionprograms.

    1
    WithinGMAC,thebusinesscycleactuallyoperates
    ontwolevels,butforspaceandconvenienceonlyone
    levelisshownhere.Thefigureshownistheregional assessmentsofthelocalareastobereflectedinthe
    cycle;however,thedistrict/localauthoritycycleis regionwidestrategicassessment(Superintendent
    identicalbutsimplyoffsetearlierbythreemonths. DaveFlitcroft,GreaterManchesterPolice,personal
    Thepurposeoftheoffsetistoallowthestrategic communication,March2009).
    7|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    Figure3.GMACPartnershipBusinessModel.
    AdaptedfromFlitcroft(2006).

    Withthelimitationsinherentintheintelligence surprisingthattherehavebeenfewerformal
    cycleinthatitdoesnotincorporatedecision researchstudiesthanhavebeenconductedon
    makersthethreeimodel(interpret,influence, otherpolicingstyles.Butthisdoesnotmeanthat
    impact)isamoreappropriateconceptualmodel wecannotmakeanystatementsregardingthe
    forintelligenceledpolicingandonethatplaces effectivenessofintelligenceledpolicing.
    greateremphasisontheneedforanalyststo
    workwithdecisionmakers.Therearemanyways Returningtothepartsofthedefinitionof
    toimplementthisconceptualapproach,butthe intelligenceledpolicingasamodelthatreduces
    GMACmodelisoneevaluatedframeworkthat crimethroughbothstrategicmanagementand
    canprovidemanagementwiththestrategic effectiveenforcementstrategiesthattarget
    insighttoanticipateriskandtargetaction. prolificandseriousoffenders;thequestion
    shouldariseatthispointwhereistheevidence
    thatthisapproachiseffective?Therearetwo
    Theevidenceforanintelligenceled outcomesthathavebeenthoroughlyevaluated:
    policingapproach strategicmanagement(abroadtermusedhere
    asaproxytorepresentproblemoriented
    Giventhatintelligenceledpolicingisarelative policing),andenforcementstrategiesthattarget
    newcomertothelexiconofpolicing,itisnot prolificandseriousoffenders.

    8|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    Thereisstrongevidencetosupportthecrime Sothestrategicoutcomesofconductingstrategic
    reductioneffectsofproblemorientedpolicing managementofcrimeandpolicingproblems,and
    (Scottetal.2008).Thatbeingsaid,problem effectiveenforcementstrategiesthattarget
    orientedpolicingishardtoevaluatebecauseitis prolificandseriousoffendersareeffective;but
    notsomuchaspecifictacticbutrathera whataboutthebusinessmodeltodeliverthese
    methodologyfromwhichasuitablecrime outcomes?Whiletherearepotentiallymany
    reductiontacticcanbeidentified.Inthisitisnot differentapproaches,onemodelthathasbeen
    dissimilartointelligenceledpolicing.Sherman evaluatedistheGreaterManchesterAgainst
    andEcksmetaanalysisofproblemoriented CrimePartnershipBusinessModel(GMACPBM)
    policingathotplaces,inotherwords mentionedearlier.TimJohnandhiscolleagues
    geographicallyfocused,found(withone (2006)performedanindependentevaluationof
    exception)substantialandstatisticallysignificant theGMACPBMagainstfivecriteria;theirdata
    reductionsincrimeattargetedlocations warehouse,theeffectiveuseofinformation
    (ShermanandEck2002;Shermanetal.1998). technology,theroleofStrategicAnalytical
    Furthermore,focusedtacticstoreducethe PartnershipCoordinators,thecoredecision
    instanceofgunviolenceandguncarryingwere makingdocuments,andtheGMACPBMitself.
    alsoevaluatedassuccessful.ShermanandEck Notonlydidtheyfindeachofthecore
    summarizedtheirfindingsbystating,"Thereis componentswerefitforpurpose,buttheir
    considerableevidencebasedonstrong evaluationconcludedthatthestrategic
    evaluationsthatproblemorientedpolicingisan assessmentdocumentswereexemplarsofbest
    effectivewaytoreducecrime"(2002:321). practiceinthefield.

    Thesecondoutcomeintheintelligenceled TheGMACPBMhasanumberofkey
    policingdefinitionisenforcementstrategiesthat components.Firstly,thereisanexplicitstrategic
    targetprolificandseriousoffenders.Again,the planningfunction.Thisisimportantbecauseit
    ShermanandEckmetaanalysisisauseful drawspolicecommandersintoacollaborative,
    summaryoftheexistingresearch,andagain,this coproductionmodelofcrimecontroldelivery
    issupportiveoffocusedpoliceactivity.Notonly withotherkeystakeholdersinthefield.The
    isthereconsistentscientificevidencethat strategicfunctionalsopreventsanoverreliance
    concentratingpolicepatrolstohighcrimeareas onchasingunsustainableshorttermgains(a
    atthepeaktimesofcriminalactivityiseffective, criticismleveledattheCompstatprocess,see
    butalso,"theevidenceonthefocusedproactive Scottetal.2008).Secondly,themodelexplicitly
    arresthypothesisisgenerallysupportiveacrossa tiestheroleofanalyticalproductsdevelopedby
    widerangeofstudiesandresearchdesigns" crimeandintelligenceanalyststoaclear
    (ShermanandEck2002:312). decisionmakingstructure.Theinclusionof
    decisionmakersintoaconceptualmodelof
    Forexample,policeinAustraliawereableto intelligenceledpolicingismissingfromthe
    substantiallyreduceburglariesinCanberraby intelligencecycle(acriticismthatI'veleveledin
    focusingpatrolactivityinburglaryhotspotsand thepast,seeRatcliffe2008a)butiscentraltothe
    throughtheintelligenceledtargetingofrepeat threeimodelandtheGMACPBM.Thisis
    offenders.Withaweeklycityaverageofabout importantbecausetheGMACPBMdelivers:Over
    146burglariespriortotheadoptionofan 90percentofparticipantsintheGMAC
    intelligenceledpolicingapproach,theywereable partnershipbusinessgroupssaidthatthedelivery
    toreducethistotalbyover50burglariesaweek. ofcrimeanddisordersolutionshadbeen
    Furthermore,becauseoftheincarcerationof improvedthroughtheGMACPBM(Johnetal.
    repeatoffenders,thebenefitsextendedfor 2006:49).Finally,thecombinationofastrategic
    monthsafterthepoliceoperationhadconcluded andtacticalapproachdemonstratesthatpolice
    (Makkaietal.2004;RatcliffeandMakkai2004). cansuccessfullyincorporateworkingwithpartner
    agencieswithinaframeworkthatstillallowsfora
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    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    focusoncrimeanddisorderhotspotsandthe datadrivenhotspottodatadrivenhotspot.
    targetingofprolificandseriousoffenders. Irrespectiveofhowdatainformedandrealtime
    thesereflexivetacticsbecome,intheabsenceof
    astrategicmanagementplantheystillrepresent
    Holisticcrimemanagement oldfashionedreactivepolicing.Thismayseem
    contrarytomyfirstlawofcrimeintelligencein
    Thischapterhassuggestedthatintelligenceled theprecedingparagraph,butthepurposeofthe
    policingisaboutanticipatingriskandinfluencing lawistofocusstrategiccrimemanagement
    action.Increasingly,riskisbeingconceptualized activity,notshorttermreactivepolicing.
    asmorethanjustcrime,butratherassocialharm
    (HillyardandTombs2007).Thissuggestsnotonly Thesolutionisforbothsides(analystsand
    abroadeningofthethreatsthatthecommunity decisionmakers)tocometotheparty.Itisoften
    facetoincludequalityoflife,trafficproblemsand forgottenthattheoverarchingaimof
    financialhardships,butalsoawideningofthe intelligenceledpolicingisforgoodpolicing
    potentialsolutionsandpartnersthatpolicecan ratherthanjustgoodintelligence.Theanalytical
    workwithtopreventharm.Inaholistic communitywouldsometimesdowellto
    environment,acombinationofcrimeanalysis rememberthis.Equally,decisionmakershaveto
    andcriminalintelligenceisparamount,wherethe lifttheirgazebeyondimmediateshortterm
    formertellsadecisionmakerwhatishappening, outcomesthatarefrequentlyfleetingandPyrrhic
    whilethelattercanexplainwhy(Ratcliffe2007). victoriesandrecognizethattheaimisfor
    Thiscombinationofoldknowledge(criminal intelligenceledpolicingandnotjustintelligence
    intelligence)withnewknowledgefromcrime ledinvestigations.Thereisarealneedfor
    analysisisessentialifdecisionmakersaretoget decisionmakerstoviewcrimeintelligenceas
    acompletepictureofthecriminalenvironment valuablebeyondinvestigativecasesupport,and
    (Ratcliffe2008b).Unfortunately,resistanceto asapivotalaidtoanobjectivedecisionmaking
    mergingthesetwoimportantinformation frameworkthatstrivesforstrategicmanagement
    sourcesrunsdeepinlawenforcement. ofcrimeproblems.AstheformerChiefConstable
    ofKentPolicenotedrecently,Strategyisabout
    Withacombinationofcrimeanalysisandcriminal makingthebestuseofresource,time,andspace.
    intelligence,decisionmakerscanstarttotackle Itisalsoaboutrecognizingthecontingencieson
    longtermcrimeproblems.Theimportanceof thewidercanvasandidentifyingawinning
    patternswasstatedatthestartofthischapter, formulaintheprevailingcontext;successful
    andinthefirstlawofcrimeintelligence:The operationswithinalosingformulaavail
    mostreliableindicationoffuturecriminalactivity nothingStrategicaimsarealltooeasilysetaside
    iscurrentcriminalactivity.Justtoreiteratea forshorttermadvantages.Strategicoversightis
    pointfromearlier:thisisnottosayweshould thereforeanongoingresponsibility(Phillips
    ignoreemergingandfluctuatingproblems; 2008:29).
    however,acentralroleofintelligenceled
    policingistheefficientuseofpoliceand CarterandCarter(2009)notethatUSlaw
    intelligenceresources.Efficiencywillcomefrom enforcementagenciesmayhavesomeissues
    tacklingbothperennialproblemsandhotspots, regardingtheadoptionofintelligenceled
    andseriousandrecidivistoffenders. policing.Nolegacyofwidespreadintelligence
    use,anilldefinedintelligencefunction,alackof
    Therealsoremainsasignificantchallengeto trainingandexpertise,andwidespreadlackof
    operationallyintegrateintelligenceledpolicing policedepartmentsizemayallhamper
    intothepoliceorganization(Carter2004).There intelligencecapacitydevelopment.Theyarespot
    isstillawidespreadfixationwithshortterm onintheiranalysis,buttheircritiquealsoactsas
    tacticaloutcomesthattrapspolicedepartments aroadmaptothechallengesforagenciesstriving
    intoanendlesscycleoftryingtorushcopsfrom tobeintelligenceled.Intelligenceledpolicingis
    10|P a g e

    Intelligenceledpolicing:Anticipatingriskandinfluencingaction

    notjustaboutintelligence,butaboutpolicing.A permitpoliceleadershiptoescapethenoxious
    greaterintegrationoftheintelligencefunction gravitationalpullofshorttermcrisesandmove
    intothedecisionmakingprocessesofpolicing towardsamoreholistic,strategicand,ultimately,
    willallowanalyststohavetheimpacttheir successfulcrimereductionstrategy.
    contributiontocrimereductiondemands,and

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