ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A.
TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUT-
MISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G.
ALMAZAR, Petitioners,
vs.
PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is respondent Pearlie Ann Alcaraz's (Alcaraz)
Motion for Reconsideration dated August 23, 2013 of the
Court's Decision dated July 23, 2013 (Decision).1
At the outset, there appears to be no substantial argument in the
said motion sufficient for the Court to depart from the
pronouncements made in the initial ruling. But if only to
address Akaraz's novel assertions, and to so placate any doubt
or misconception in the resolution of this case, the Court
proceeds to shed light on the matters indicated below.
A. Manner of review.
Alcaraz contends that the Court should not have conducted a
re-weighing of evidence since a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) is limited
to the review of questions of law. She submits that since what
was under review was a ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
rendered via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules, the Court should only determine whether or not the CA
properly determined that the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The assertion does not justify the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision.
A careful perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that the
Court actually resolved the controversy under the above-stated
framework of analysis. Essentially, the Court found the CA to
have committed an error in holding that no grave abuse of
discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC since the latter
arbitrarily disregarded the legal implication of the attendant
circumstances in this case which should have simply resulted in
the finding that Alcaraz was apprised of the performance
standards for her regularization and hence, was properly a
probationary employee. As the Court observed, an employees
failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have
been clearly made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis
for a probationary employees non-regularization. As detailed
in the Decision, Alcaraz was well-apprised of her duties and
responsibilities as well as the probationary status of her
employment:
(a) On June 27, 2004, [Abbott Laboratories, Philippines
(Abbott)] caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager,
indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties
and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position; this
prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on
October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbotts December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that
Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment
contract which specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to be
placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning
February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbotts employment offer,
Bernardo sent her copies of Abbotts organizational structure
and her job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation
where [Allan G. Almazar] informed her that she had to
implement Abbotts Code of Conduct and office policies on
human resources and finance and that she would be reporting
directly to [Kelly Walsh];
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as
part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and
Performance Modules from [Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa] who
explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance
of probationary employees; she was further notified that Abbott
had only one evaluation system for all of its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another
pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have an
"extensive training and background" to acquire the necessary
skills for her job.2
Considering the foregoing incidents which were readily
observable from the records, the Court reached the conclusion
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, viz.:
[I]n holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her
status as a regular and not a probationary employee, the Court
finds that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on
the premise that Alcarazs receipt of her job description and
Abbotts Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not
equivalent to being actually informed of the performance
standards upon which she should have been evaluated on. It,
however, overlooked the legal implication of the other
attendant circumstances as detailed herein which should have
warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was indeed a
probationary and not a regular employee more particularly
the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the
same would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her
termination.3
Consequently, since the CA found that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion and denied the certiorari
petition before it, the reversal of its ruling was thus in order.
At this juncture, it bears exposition that while NLRC decisions
are, by their nature, final and executory4 and, hence, not
subject to appellate review,5 the Court is not precluded from
considering other questions of law aside from the CAs finding
on the NLRCs grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point
of analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with
ancillary issues such as, in this case, the question of how a
probationary employee is deemed to have been informed of the
standards of his regularization if only to determine if the
concepts and principles of labor law were correctly applied or
misapplied by the NLRC in its decision. In other words, the
Courts analysis of the NLRCs interpretation of the
environmental principles and concepts of labor law is not
completely prohibited in as it is complementary to a Rule
45 review of labor cases.
Finally, if only to put to rest Alcarazs misgivings on the
manner in which this case was reviewed, it bears pointing out
that no "factual appellate review" was conducted by the Court
in the Decision. Rather, the Court proceeded to interpret the
relevant rules on probationary employment as applied to settled
factual findings. Besides, even on the assumption that a
scrutiny of facts was undertaken, the Court is not altogether
barred from conducting the same. This was explained in the
case of Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna6
wherein the Court held as follows:
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings
of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise
in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own
judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the
weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The
factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are
generally conclusive on this Court.
Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the
exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be
urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition.
For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there
is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the
factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established only if supported by substantial
evidence.7 (Emphasis supplied)
B. Standards for regularization;
conceptual underpinnings.
Alcaraz posits that, contrary to the Courts Decision, ones job
description cannot by and of itself be treated as a standard for
regularization as a standard denotes a measure of quantity or
quality. By way of example, Alcaraz cites the case of a
probationary salesperson and asks how does such employee
achieve regular status if he does not know how much he needs
to sell to reach the same.
The argument is untenable.
First off, the Court must correct Alcarazs mistaken notion: it is
not the probationary employees job description but the
adequate performance of his duties and responsibilities which
constitutes the inherent and implied standard for regularization.
To echo the fundamental point of the Decision, if the
probationary employee had been fully apprised by his
employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic
knowledge and common sense dictate that he must adequately
perform the same, else he fails to pass the probationary trial
and may therefore be subject to termination.8
The determination of "adequate performance" is not, in all
cases, measurable by quantitative specification, such as that of
a sales quota in Alcarazs example. It is also hinged on the
qualitative assessment of the employees work; by its nature,
this largely rests on the reasonable exercise of the employers
management prerogative. While in some instances the
standards used in measuring the quality of work may be
conveyed such as workers who construct tangible products
which follow particular metrics, not all standards of quality
measurement may be reducible to hard figures or are readily
articulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A good
example would be the case of probationary employees whose
tasks involve the application of discretion and intellect, such as
to name a few lawyers, artists, and journalists. In these
kinds of occupation, the best that the employer can do at the
time of engagement is to inform the probationary employee of
his duties and responsibilities and to orient him on how to
properly proceed with the same. The employer cannot bear out
in exacting detail at the beginning of the engagement what he
deems as "quality work" especially since the probationary
employee has yet to submit the required output. In the ultimate
analysis, the communication of performance standards should
be perceived within the context of the nature of the
probationary employees duties and responsibilities.
The same logic applies to a probationary managerial employee
who is tasked to supervise a particular department, as Alcaraz
in this case.1wphi1 It is hardly possible for the employer, at
the time of the employees engagement, to map into technical
indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality standards by
which the latter should effectively manage the department.
Factors which gauge the ability of the managerial employee to
either deal with his subordinates (e.g., how to spur their
performance, or command respect and obedience from them),
or to organize office policies, are hardly conveyable at the
outset of the engagement since the employee has yet to be
immersed into the work itself. Given that a managerial role
essentially connotes an exercise of discretion, the quality of
effective management can only be determined through
subsequent assessment. While at the time of engagement,
reason dictates that the employer can only inform the
probationary managerial employee of his duties and
responsibilities as such and provide the allowable parameters
for the same. Verily, as stated in the Decision, the adequate
performance of such duties and responsibilities is, by and of
itself, an implied standard of regularization.
In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance
standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be
contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that not all
employers, such as simple businesses or small-scale
enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human resource
management, so much so that the adoption of technical
indicators as utilized through "comment cards" or "appraisal"
tools should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of
probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system of such kind
is employed and the procedures for its implementation are not
followed, once an employer determines that the probationary
employee fails to meet the standards required for his
regularization, the former is not precluded from dismissing the
latter. The rule is that when a valid cause for termination exists,
the procedural infirmity attending the termination only
warrants the payment of nominal damages. This was the
principle laid down in the landmark cases of Agabon v. NLRC9
(Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot10
(Jaka). In the assailed Decision, the Court actually extended the
application of the Agabon and Jaka rulings to breaches of
company procedure, notwithstanding the employers
compliance with the statutory requirements under the Labor
Code.11 Hence, although Abbott did not comply with its own
termination procedure, its non-compliance thereof would not
detract from the finding that there subsists a valid cause to reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
terminate Alcarazs employment. Abbott, however, was conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
penalized for its contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay conceivably opine otherwise.14 To the Court's mind, this
nominal damages. threshold of evidence Abbott amply overcame in this case.

As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v. All told, the Court hereby denies the instant motion for
Feliciano12 (Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable reconsideration and thereby upholds the Decision in the main
to the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales executive, case.
was belatedly informed of his quota requirement. Thus,
considering the nature of his position, the fact that he was not WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated August
informed of his sales quota at the time of his engagement 23, 2013 of the Court's Decision dated July 23, 2013 in this
changed the complexion of his employment. Contrarily, the case is hereby DENIED.
nature of Alcaraz's duties and responsibilities as Regulatory
Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing. SO ORDERED.
Records show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did
not manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of
her staff and to build an effective rapport with them; (c) failed
to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the
knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case
processing and article review which were necessary for the
proper performance of her duties.13 Due to the nature and
variety of these managerial functions, the best that Abbott
could have done, at the time of Alcaraz's engagement, was to
inform her of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate
performance of which, to repeat, is an inherent and implied
standard for regularization; this is unlike the circumstance in
Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard, in the term
of a sales quota, was readily articulable to the employee at the
outset. Hence, since the reasonableness of Alcaraz's assessment
clearly appears from the records, her termination was justified.
Bear in mind that the quantum of proof which the employer
must discharge is only substantial evidence which, as defined
in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a

GALLARDO U. LUCERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59684,
entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC (Second
Division) and Gallardo U. Lucero," which has reversed and set
aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on a case involving a complaint for illegal dismissal.
On 18 January 1995, petitioner Gallardo U. Lucero started
working on a contractual basis with private respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB). He was hired by Excellent
Manpower Services, a manning agency, which then supplied
the manpower requirements of the PNB. On 06 December
1995, the PNB extended Lucero an original and permanent
appointment as Liaison Officer 1, with Salary Grade II, at the
banks cash division.
On 23 May 1996, Lourdes V. Ledesma, Vice-President of the
Human Resources Department (HRD) of the PNB, issued a
memorandum to Linda U. Gaerlan, then Vice-President of the
Cash Division, informing the latter that the management
approved the termination of services of Lucero due to the
"unsatisfactory" performance rating obtained by him during the
probationary period of his employment. Acting on the
memorandum, Gaerlan wrote to the HRD requesting that
Luceros name be dropped from the official roll of PNB
employees effective at the close of business hours of 31 May
1996. Meanwhile, on 24 May 1996, Lucero was served his
termination papers.
On 07 June 1996, Lucero wrote to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) protesting his dismissal by the PNB and
asking for his reinstatement. The CSC referred Luceros letter
to the PNB for comment and appropriate action. In compliance
with the directive of the CSC, the PNB wrote to Lucero on 25
June 1996 and furnished him with copies of the evaluation
reports of his superiors at the bank. The CSC acknowledged the
response of the PNB to the formers letter regarding Luceros
complaint and informed the PNB that it considered the
complaint "closed." When informed of the action of the CSC,
Lucero pressed for a clarification on what "closed" meant. The
CSC explained that, at the time he filed his complaint on 07
June 1996, the PNB had already been privatized and that it was
no longer covered by the CSC rules.
On 04 September 1996, Lucero filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the PNB before the Labor Arbiter. On 28
September 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter declared that Lucero
was still a government employee when he was dismissed on 24
May 1996, the PNB having been privatized only on 27 May
1996.
On 17 December 1998, Lucero went on appeal to the NLRC.
The NLRC issued its judgment, dated 14 March 2000, which
reversed the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter and held
that Lucero had been illegally dismissed by the PNB. The
NLRC concluded:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
respondent bank is hereby declared guilty of having illegally
dismissed the complainant; and it is hereby ordered:
"1) to immediately reinstate complainant without loss of
seniority rights and privileges;
"2) to pay his backwages inclusive of his allowances, other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, based on his last gross
salary rate of P8,009.00 and computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement,
whether actual or in the payroll; and
"3) attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the above awards.
"All other claims are dismissed for lack of factual basis to
award the same."1
The PNB filed in due time a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the NLRC in its resolution of 28 April 2000.
Consistently with the decision of the NLRC, Lucero was
meanwhile reinstated to his former position by the PNB, and he
resumed his functions in the bank. The PNB, nevertheless, filed
with the Court of Appeals on 07 July 2000 a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure,
contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over the case and in ruling that
Luceros dismissal was illegal. The PNB argued that since
Lucero was dismissed on 24 May 1996, or prior to its
privatization (on 27 May 1996), the case should have been
decided on the basis of the Civil Service Law and not the Labor
Code; that the NLRC erred in finding, even assuming that the
NLRC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, that
Lucero was illegally dismissed; and that the probationary
employment was validly terminated because of his
"unsatisfactory" performance.
On 31 July 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to
the effect that the NLRC properly assumed jurisdiction over the
case; nevertheless, it found Lucero not to have been illegally
dismissed. The appellate court held:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with the result that the
complaint of Gallardo U. Lucero for illegal dismissal against
the Philippine National Bank is DISMISSED."2
Lucero filed a motion for reconsideration; the Court of Appeals
denied, in its resolution of 24 January 2002, the motion.
In the instant petition, petitioner Lucero focused his argument
on the following asseverations; thus:
"The Court of Appeals committed a serious legal error in
failing to hold that petitioner was already a regular employee at
the time of his dismissal and hence, could not be dismissed
without just or authorized cause.
"The Court of Appeals legally erred in not holding that
petitioners subsequently high performance rating should have
been taken in his favor."3
The petition lacks merit.
It would appear that on 18 January 1996, petitioner was hired
by Excellent Manpower Services, a manning agency, which
used to supply the manpower requirements of the PNB, to work
as an administrative assistant at the banks cash division. On 06
December 1995, petitioner was given by the PNB an original
appointment as Liaison Officer I, with a permanent status,
thereby foregoing his previous relationship with the bank, as
aforesaid, and accepting thereby the terms appurtenant to his
new appointment. At the time of the appointment, PNB was
still a government agency subject to civil service rules and
regulations that, among other things, subjected appointments
"into the career service under a permanent status" to a
probationary period.
Section 2, Rule VII, of the Rules Implementing the Civil
Service Law reads:
"Section 2. Original appointment refers to initial entry into the
career service under a permanent status of a person who meets
all the requirements of the position including the civil service
eligibility.
"(a) All such persons must serve a probationary period of six
(6) months following their original appointment and shall
undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may
be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want
of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary
period: Provided, that such action is appealable to the
Commission."
The Court of Appeals, reiterating the findings of the NLRC,
held that at the time of the services of petitioner were dispensed
with on 31 May 1996, his employment with the PNB was still
under probationary status, i.e., that he was still on trial during
which time his qualification for his career employment would
be determined.4 The performance by Gallardo was found
inadequate by the PNB that entitled it to drop him from the
service. Whether, indeed, that performance was satisfactory or
unsatisfactory, was a factual question best addressed for final
determination by the Court of Appeals, the findings on which,
when supported by substantial evidence, would be binding on
this Court.5 The appellate court said:
"Applying the foregoing standards, we hold that PNB validly
exercised its prerogative to terminate Luceros probationary
employment for unsatisfactory performance. Before expiration
of his probationary employment, Lucero was informed of his
termination. And it is noteworthy that his immediate superiors
were one in saying that his attitude and work performance left
much to be desired.
"Thus, in his memorandum dated June 17, 1996 for Ms.
Ledesma, Ubaldo L. Laranang, Suvpg., Money Position
Specialist, stated that Lucero was oftenly given oral reprimand
for his negative attitude and willful neglect of his duties; that
considering the negative feedbacks from other Units where he
was previously assigned, he was sufficiently advised to reform
and mend his ways in order to give a good account of himself;
that his irresponsible ways was already a common knowledge
in the entire Department; that he never reformed; and that
several Units heads are in unison in giving him unsatisfactory
rating.
"On the other hand, Norma P. Perez, Dept. Manager III, in her question being his performance during the probationary period
memorandum for Ms. Ledesma dated June 17, 1996, declared of the employment.
that they always reminded Mr. Lucero to improve his work
attitude and performance while assigned in my division; that WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the
he ignored all our reminders and oral reprimands as Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59687 are AFFIRMED.
manifested in his work output; and that she observed no No costs.
improvements on his work attitude and performance.
SO ORDERED.
"Finally, Roger V. Estanislao, Asst. Dept. Manager I, in his
memorandum dated June 17, 1996 for Ms. Ledesma, stated that
for several times, Mr. Lucero was called upon at the Office of
the Vice President to explain his poor performance and
misconduct reported by his assigned supervisors; that Lucero
was absorbed by the Bank after he promised to the Vice-
President that he will do good and improve his performance;
that Lucero ignored the counseling and oral reprimands by his
supervisors; and that he received a written complaint from a
lady employee of this department on Mr. Luceros untoward
behaviour which has affected her work performance.

"A probationary appointment is intended to afford the employer

an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of
a probationer (Escorpizo vs. University of Baguio, 306 SCRA
497). In the instant case, Lucero proved himself unworthy of
permanent employment. Consequently, PNB cannot be faulted
for terminating his services."6

It would be difficult to sustain the stand taken by petitioner that

the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring his subsequent high
performance rating. The high rating of "very satisfactory"
obtained by petitioner after his reinstatement, in compliance
with the order of the NLRC, was not controlling, the point in

ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET
CORPORATION and/or JESS MANUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
IRENE R. RANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated
August 29, 2006 and the Resolution2 dated May 16, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91631.
The Facts
The facts of the case are as follows.
Respondent was a probationary employee of petitioner
Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation
(petitioner Supermarket) for a period of five (5) months, or
from October 15, 1997 until March 14, 1998.3 She underwent
six (6) weeks of training as a cashier before she was hired as
such on October 15, 1997.4
Two weeks after she was hired, or on October 30, 1997,
respondent reported to her supervisor the loss of cash
amounting to Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Nine
Pesos (P20,299.00) which she had placed inside the company
locker. Petitioner Jess Manuel (petitioner Manuel), the
Operations Manager of petitioner Supermarket, ordered that
respondent be strip-searched by the company guards. However,
the search on her and her personal belongings yielded
nothing.5
Respondent acknowledged her responsibility and requested that
she be allowed to settle and pay the lost amount. However,
petitioner Manuel did not heed her request and instead reported
the matter to the police. Petitioner Manuel likewise requested
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office for an inquest.6
On November 5, 1997, an information for Qualified Theft was
filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Respondent
was constrained to spend two weeks in jail for failure to
immediately post bail in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).7
On November 25, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages.8
On March 12, 1998, petitioners sent to respondent by mail a
notice of termination and/or notice of expiration of
probationary employment dated March 9, 1998.9
On August 10, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision,10
the fallo of which reads:
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the claim of illegal dismissal for
lack of merit.
Respondents are ordered to accept complainant to her former or
equivalent work without prejudice to any action they may take
in the premises in connection with the missing money of
P20,299.00.
SO ORDERED.11
In dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal, the Labor
Arbiter ratiocinated that at the time respondent filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal, she was not yet dismissed by
petitioners. When she was strip- searched by the security
personnel of petitioner Supermarket, the guards were merely
conducting an investigation. The subsequent referral of the loss
to the police authorities might be considered routine.
Respondents non-reporting for work after her release from
detention could be taken against her in the investigation that
petitioner supermarket would conduct.12
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a decision13 dated
October 20, 2003. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE. The
respondents are hereby ordered to immediately reinstate
complainant to her former or equivalent position without loss
of seniority rights and privileges and to pay her full backwages
computed from the time she was constructively dismissed on
October 30, 1997 up to the time she is actually reinstated.
SO ORDERED.14
In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC ruled
that respondent was denied due process by petitioners. Strip-
searching respondent and sending her to jail for two weeks
certainly amounted to constructive dismissal because continued
employment had been rendered impossible, unreasonable, and
unlikely. The wedge that had been driven between the parties
was impossible to ignore.15 Although respondent was only a
probationary employee, the subsequent lapse of her
probationary contract of employment did not have the effect of
validly terminating her employment because constructive
dismissal had already been effected earlier by petitioners.16
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the NLRC in a resolution17 dated July 21, 2005.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. On August 29, 2006, the CA
rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that should reinstatement be no
longer possible in view of the strained relation between the
parties, Petitioners are ordered to pay Respondent separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay in addition to backwages
from the date of dismissal until the finality of the assailed
decision.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA
denied the same in a Resolution dated May 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the reinstatement of respondent, highlighting
the fact that she was a probationary employee and that her
probationary contract of employment lapsed on March 14,
1998. Thus, her reinstatement was rendered moot and
academic. Furthermore, even if her probationary contract had
not yet expired, the offense that she committed would
nonetheless militate against her regularization.19
On the other hand, respondent insists that she was
constructively dismissed by petitioner Supermarket when she
was strip-searched, divested of her dignity, and summarily
thrown in jail. She could not have been expected to go back to
work after being allowed to post bail because her continued
employment had been rendered impossible, unreasonable, and
unlikely. She stresses that, at the time the money was
discovered missing, it was not with her but locked in the
company locker. The company failed to provide its cashiers
with strong locks and proper security in the work place.
Respondent argues that she was not caught in the act and even
reported that the money was missing. She claims that she was
denied due process.20
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent was
illegally terminated from employment by petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative.
There is probationary employment when the employee upon
his engagement is made to undergo a trial period during which
the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular
employment based on reasonable standards made known to
him at the time of engagement.21
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys
security of tenure.22 However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281
of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be
terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus,
the services of an employee who has been engaged on
probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:
(1) a just or (2) an authorized cause; and (3) when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer.23
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject to the
constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
right to be protected against dismissal, except for just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be
terminated, a written notice containing a statement of the
causes of termination, and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of a representative if he so desires, in accordance
with company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines
set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
In the instant case, based on the facts on record, petitioners
failed to accord respondent substantive and procedural due
process. The haphazard manner in the investigation of the
missing cash, which was left to the determination of the police
authorities and the Prosecutors Office, left respondent with no
choice but to cry foul. Administrative investigation was not
conducted by petitioner Supermarket. On the same day that the
missing money was reported by respondent to her immediate
superior, the company already pre-judged her guilt without
proper investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as
the suspected thief, which resulted in her languishing in jail for
two weeks.
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the due process
requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not
be supplanted by police investigation or court proceedings. The
criminal aspect of the case is considered independent of the
administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely solely
on the findings of the Prosecutors Office. They are mandated
to conduct their own separate investigation, and to accord the
employee every opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore,
respondent was not represented by counsel when she was strip-
searched inside the company premises or during the police
investigation, and in the preliminary investigation before the
Prosecutors Office.
Respondent was constructively dismissed by petitioner
Supermarket effective October 30, 1997. It was unreasonable
for petitioners to charge her with abandonment for not
reporting for work upon her release in jail. It would be the
height of callousness to expect her to return to work after
suffering in jail for two weeks. Work had been rendered
unreasonable, unlikely, and definitely impossible, considering
the treatment that was accorded respondent by petitioners.
As to respondents monetary claims, Article 279 of the Labor
Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, to full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, due to the strained relations of the parties, the
payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable
alternative to reinstatement, when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On the one hand, such payment liberates
the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other, the payment releases the employer
from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its
employ a worker it could no longer trust.24
Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee,
respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2)
backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from
each other and are awarded conjunctively.25lavvphil
In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee at
the time she was constructively dismissed by petitioners, she is
entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of
respondent is no longer viable considering the
circumstances.1avvphi1
However, the backwages that should be awarded to respondent
shall be reckoned from the time of her constructive dismissal
until the date of the termination of her employment, i.e., from
October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998. The computation should
not cover the entire period from the time her compensation was
withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement. This is
because respondent was a probationary employee, and the lapse
of her probationary employment without her appointment as a
regular employee of petitioner Supermarket effectively severed
the employer-employee relationship between the parties.
In all cases involving employees engaged on probationary
basis, the employer shall make known to its employees the
standards under which they will qualify as regular employees at
the time of their engagement. Where no standards are made
known to an employee at the time, he shall be deemed a regular
employee,26 unless the job is self-descriptive, like maid, cook,
driver, or messenger. However, the constitutional policy of
providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or
destroy management.27 Naturally, petitioner Supermarket
cannot be expected to retain respondent as a regular employee
considering that she lost P20,299.00 while acting as a cashier
during the probationary period. The rules on probationary
employment should not be used to exculpate a probationary
employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge
and common sense, in regard to which, there is no need to spell
out a policy or standard to be met.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91631 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioners are hereby ordered to pay respondent Irene R.
Ranchez separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay and
backwages from October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.