Republic of the Philippines In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of his wife.

rent version of the killing of his wife. He said that he had gone to sleep
SUPREME COURT early that night but was awakened when he felt a stab wound in his stomach. He could not see his
Manila assailant because it was dark. He covered the wound with his right hand but there was a second thrust
that wounded him again almost in the same place. Instinctively, he curled himself into a fetal position
FIRST DIVISION with his hands at the back of his neck and asked, "Why did you stab me?" He received no answer but
soon enough a third thrust sliced through his left arm and pierced the right part of his chest. It was then
G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992 that he grabbed the fist of his attacker and the two of them wrestled in the dark for possession of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, weapon. He could not recall what happened afterwards as he must have fainted. He said he also had
vs. no recollection of the statement he supposedly made before he was brought to the hospital. He
JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant. recovered consciousness there only on May 4, 1980, and was then told that his wife had tried to kill
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. him. 4
Mario A. Encinarel and Refael R. Raeses for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son, Edwin, who testified that there was no quarrel
between his parents when his father went to sleep early that night of April 29, 1980. His mother was in
A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to investigate reports of a stabbing in the house of
her usual angry mood, however. After studying his lessons, he himself went to sleep while his mother
Jose and Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in Legazpi City. On the floor awash with blood, Jose was
continued folding clothes. He was awakened later by the sound of a scuffle, and when he turned on his
locked in a final embrace with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained fifteen wounds and
flashlight he saw his mother stabbing his father. He amplified his testimony with gestures, swinging his
had expired due to shock and massive hemorrhage. Jose himself had four wounds in his body and was
right arm downward in simulation of stabbing. Afraid to succor his father, he woke up his two brothers
hardly alive. Because he refused to release his hold on his dead wife, the couple was rolled in a mat
and rushed with them to their grandfather's house to seek his help. On their way out, they heard his
and rushed to the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1980.
father say, "Why did you stab me?" 5

That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member of the investigating team took down the
Edwin identified the bolo-knife as belonging to his mother, who he said usually carried it on her person
following exchange between him and Jose, 1 whom he believed to be on the verge of death:
for cutting leaves to cover herself whenever it rained. On two occasions, however, she used it for a
different purpose. The first incident was when Adelfa stabbed Jose on the right side of his body, and the
Q What is your name please? second was when she hacked Jose's upper right arm. Both incidents were reported to the barangay
A Jose Agripa.
captain. 6
Q Who stabbed you?
A I myself.
Q Who stabbed your wife? Edwin admitted loving his father more than his mother. He recalled that when he was in Grade I, his
A I myself. mother hanged him by the neck from a coconut tree with a piece of katsa cloth. 7
Q Why did you stab your wife?
A Because of problems in the family.
Q What do you think, will you die from your wounds? The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another witness, Manuel Cardel, who testified that he was
A No. in the store of one Macedonio in the afternoon of April 29, 1980, when he heard Adelfa say she would
Q Was it really your intention to kill your wife? stab Jose if he came home without any money. (As it turned out, Jose did come home without his
A Yes, I want to die with her. salary, saying he would collect it the following day. This could have been the reason why Edwin
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's request, it was witnessed by the barangay observed his mother to be in a sullen mood that night.) Cardel also recalled one time when Adelfa ran
captain, Salustiano Botin, who was present during the recorded conversation. after her husband with a bolo in her hand. 8

Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months later. He was convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial was the above-quoted statement, which was
offered as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. Also submitted as an exhibit was the 8-inch
bolo-knife used in the killing, which was turned over by Botin to the police at seven o' clock that same
morning. He had received it from a neighbor of the couple who had picked it up at the scene of the
killing. 3 The police had evidently neglected to look for it when they went to investigate.
The trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted interrogation as a dying declaration because it did
not comply with all the requirements of this particular exception to the hearsay rule. The statement does
not show that it was made by the declarant under the consciousness of impending death (although it is
true that Jose was near death at that time). Nevertheless, it was correctly admitted as part of the res
gestae, having been made soon after the startling occurrence of the multiple stabbing of Jose and
Adelfa.
But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that it is also credible. The
testimony of a competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not for this reason alone
believable. According to Rule 128, Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the evidence by the
court in accordance with the guidelinesprovided in Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid
down by this Court. 9
As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as part of the res gestae, is not credible
evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full possession of his faculties
when he made that statement, which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the authorities
came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead wife and was rolled up with her
cadaver in a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man. Moreover,
Jose was himself suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had he not been
treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and body at the time the statement was made,
Jose could not be expected to think clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning confession
now imputed to him.
It is true that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he loses the
constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing
evidence, the justification for his act. 10 The essential elements of self-defense, according to Article 11(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, are: a) unlawful aggression: b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. We feel that all these requisites are present and have been sufficiently established in the case
at bar.
The accused-appellant was sound asleep when he was suddenly attacked by his wife, who fell upon
him with intent to kill. There was no warning at all of the deadly assault. There was no provocation
either, unless it be her frenetic anger over his failure to bring home his salary, which was not the
sufficient provocation required by the law. Jose was totally unprepared for the knife thrusts in his
stomach and chest that posed an immediate threat and danger to his life. Under this vicious attack, he
had no choice but to defend himself against his unknown assailant and by the only means available to
him. He grabbed the knife from his maddened wife and struck wildly at his would-be killer. He stabbed
blindly, thinking only to save his life even as it drained from the wounds he had sustained. If it appeared
later that he had wounded his wife no less than fifteen times, it was not because he was a cruel and
bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that he was fighting desperately for his very life and, animated
only by his mortal fear of his unknown aggressor and moved like a wild beast by the elemental instinct
for survival, did not know when to stop.
Jose Agripa was a peaceful law-abiding person with no known police record. He pursued the humble
tenor of his life, working quietly as a lowly laborer, struggling as best he could to provide for his wife and
children. If suddenly he became a killer, it was not by inclination or design or with malice aforethought.
He was merely a hapless pawn of fortune, an unfortunate victim of tragic circumstances, more so,
indeed, than the wife he killed.
The Court sees in this case a man dominated if not terrified by a wife given to cruelty and violence. It is
not unlikely that she was paranoid. Twice before, she had hacked her husband with her bolo, and there
was also that time he ran for dear life as she chased him with her trusty weapon. The act of hanging a
small child by the neck from a coconut tree can hardly be called the manifestation of a normal psyche. It
was this woman who, heeding the urgings of her twisted mind, decided to kill her sleeping husband in
the dark even as her children slumbered peacefully nearby.
A Higher Tribunal shall judge Adelfa Agripa. But this Court need not wait a minute longer to absolve the
accused-appellant. Jose Agripa is innocent. There is no stronger instinct than the instinct for survival,
which moved him without fault to do what he did.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and accused-appellant Jose Agripa is
ACQUITTED on the ground of self-defense. It is the order of this Court that he be released immediately.
No costs.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 676901-91 January 21, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, MERLITO HERNANDEZ and MAXIMO HERNANDEZ alias "Putol,
" accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cesar D. Cabral for accused-appellants.
NARVASA, C. J.:
At about eleven o'clock in the evening of May 28, 1979, the people in the house of the spouses Eligio
Mendoza and Eustaquia de Rosales at barrio Bukal Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, had all retired. With
said spouses in their house were their sons, Buenaventura, Narciso and Marino; Elena Magararo,
Buenaventura's wife; and a visitor, Donato Tabanao, who had been invited to spend the night.
Then a male voice was heard from outside the house saying: "Tao po, kami ay alagad ng batas, puede
ba kaming makapagtanong?" Elena got up to rouse her husband, Buenaventura but saw that he was
already up. She saw him open a window in the living room and look out; but he immediately shut the
window. Suddenly two gunshots rang out. Buenaventura fell. She started towards him but other
gunshots came in a burst, and she dropped to the floor in terror. She saw her brother-in-law, Narciso,
also fall.
The shooting stopped. Elena heard a voice from outside say, "Eddie, tayo na, patay na sila." She
thereupon went to her husband who was lying on the floor, covered with blood. Buenaventura asked for
water and she gave him some. Then she asked him if he recognized the persons who had shot him.
Buenaventura said he had glimpsed the brothers, Merlito and Eduardo Hernandez, and had seen that
the one who had the gun was Maximo Hernandez. Again Buenaventura had another drink of water after
which he expired. His brother, Narciso Mendoza, had been hit in the breast and died instantly. The
Mendozas' house guest, Donato Tabanao, was slightly wounded.
The police investigators recovered a number of empty bullet shells of a cal. 30 carbine scattered on the
ground just outside the Mendozas' home, and slugs of the same caliber inside the house. They also
noted several bullet holes in the front part of the house, in its interior partition or divider, as well as in a
mosquito net and the victims' clothes.
The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Domingo Alcala disclosed that Buenaventura Mendoza
had been hit by a bullet fired from a caliber .30 carbine which penetrated his right lung and caused his
death from internal hemorrhage secondary to that gunshot wound. The autopsy performed by the same
physician on Narciso Mendoza revealed that he had been shot in the chest and in the right shoulder
also by caliber .30 rifle, and death had also resulted from the bullet would in the chest which had injured
one of his lungs. The slightly upward trajectory of the bullets indicated that the rifle-wielder had been
standing at a lower level than his victims.
The persons identified by Buenaventura shortly before he died were known to Elena. As she later
testified, Eduardo and Merlito Hernandez had once been their neighbors at Barrio Cabatang, Tiaong,
Quezon; and she became acquainted with Maximo Hernandez at the house of Eduardo, also in the
town of Candelaria, Quezon.
Having found adequate basis to indict the Hernandez brothers, Eduardo and Merlito, and their uncle
Maximo, for the killings, the Provincial Fiscal filed two separate informations for murder against them in
the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. Both informations alleged that the accused had acted in conspiracy,
and that there felonious assaults were aggravated by alevosia and evident premeditation.
All three accused entered pleas of innocent when arraigned. They were thereafter tried jointly.
Elena Mendoza was the prosecution's first witness. Apart from confirming the events set out in the first
two paragraphs of this opinion, she told the Trial Court of other facts from which a motive for the killings
might be ascribed to the accused siblings: revenge. According to her, five months earlier, or more
precisely on December 27, 1978, at Barangay Cabatang, Tiaong, Quezon, Leonides Mendoza, a
brother of Buenaventura, had killed a brother of the defendants, Carlos Hernandez. The killing was in
the police blotter; but no prosecution in court ever took place because the Mendozas paid the
Hernandez family the sum of P4,600.00 in settlement. Elena learned, however, that the Hernandezes
had simply deposited this amount of P4,600.00 in a bank with the intention of returning it to the
Mendozas at a later time; and she claimed that the "amicable settlement" notwithstanding, the
Hernandezes had been waiting for her husband, Buenaventura "inaabangan" near the spring
where he normally fetched water, at Bukal Norte, Candelaria, Quezon.
The police investigators and the medical expert also gave testimony respecting the findings made by
them within their respective fields of competence, already above outlined. Finally, Gelacio Mendoza, a
brother of the slain victims, was called to the witness stand.
Gelacio Mendoza deposed that at the time in question about 11 p.m., May 28, 1979 he heard his
dog barking. He had peered through a hole in the wall of his house and seen three (3) men walking by
the northern side of his house. He could not make out their faces as they passed but, by the light of the
moon, was nonetheless able to identify two of them, by their build or general physical appearance, as
his former neighbors, Eduardo Hernandez and Merlito Hernandez. He kept his eyes on the three men
and saw them proceed toward the west and then directly south, in the direction of his parents' house,
about 150 meters away from his own. From that direction, he heard gunfire some five minutes later. Not
long afterwards, his brother, Marino, came to tell him that his other brothers, Buenaventura and Narciso,
had been shot in their parents' house. He had immediately gone there and found his brothers dead.
From his sister-in-law he learned of Buenaventura's Identification of the three Hernandezes as the
killers. And like her, he also theorized that revenge was the motive for the killing.
The defendants denied all complicity in the crime. They claimed that at the time of its commission, they
were somewhere else.
Maximo Hernandez testified that he had gone to Sitio Quinti, Barrio Masalukot II, Candelaria, Quezon,
at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 28, 1979 to act as one of the judges in an amateur singing contest
held there as part of the celebrations of the town fiesta; that he was at that contest continuously from
9:00 o'clock that night up to 2:00 o'clock the following morning, together with the other judges, Roberto
Burgos and Serapio Macasaet, and the master of ceremonies, Carlito Teseco; and that after the
contest, he, his wife and children, had gone to the house of his friend, Roberto Cantos, on the latter's
invitation, and there they had all passed the night.
Maximo's alibi was confirmed by the testimony of the emcee of the singing contest, Carlos Teseco, who
was the barangay captain of Barrio Masalukot II. Confirmation of the alibi was also made on the witness
stand by the Chairman of the Board of Judges of the singing contest, Roberto Burgos, a municipal
councilor of the place. Burgos, however, admitted on cross-examination that Sitio Quinti is only two or
three kilometers distant from the scene of the crime, that the distance could be negotiated by a one-
hour walk, and that during the intermission he could not recall whether or not Maximo had left the place
because he had been very busy.
Eduardo Hernandez, for his part, testified that at the time of the murders, he and his brother, Merlito,
were in Barangay Bulagsong, Catanauan, Quezon, having gone there to help in the harvest of the palay
on the land of Camelo Morales, Eduardo's father-in-law, land which was irrigated but untenanted. His
testimony is that he had left his home at Bilirang Buli, Lagalag, Tiaong, Quezon, at about 5:00 o'clock in
the morning of May 28, 1979, together with his wife, Lucila Morales, his small child, and his brother,
Merlito. They rode on a bus and arrived at Lucena City at around 10:00 o'clock that morning. They then
boarded a small bus which brought them to Catanauan, arriving there at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Finally, they took a tricycle which deposited them at Camelo Morales' house at Barangay Bulagsong an
hour later, at about 5:00 o'clock. They stayed at Barangay Bulagsong for about a month, and did not
return to Bilirang Buli until the harvest had been completed.
Merlito Hernandez gave evidence to the same effect.
To corroborate the brother's alibi, four persons were called to the witness stand by the defense.
The barangay captain of Lagalag, Tiaong, Quezon, Leodegario Isles, deposed that he met Eduardo and
Merlito Hernandez in the morning of May 28, 1979 on the path leading from their barrio to the highway,
while he was awaiting transport to Tiaong, he asked the Hernandezes where they were going and was
told they were on their way to Catanauan. A few days afterwards, he saw Eduardo's wife at Lagalag;
she told him she had returned from Catanauan to get some things from their house which she had
forgotten.
Another barangay captain, Segundino Diaz, of Bulagsong, Catanauan, Quezon, told the Court that he
had seen Eduardo and Merlito Hernandez on May 28, 1979, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at
he house of Camelo Morales. He saw them again in the same house that evening, an occasion which
he particularly recalled because it happened to be the siyaman, the ninth day of the novena prayers
offered for the deceased mother-in-law of Camelo Morales. He saw the Hernandez brothers a third time
the following day. Segundino Diaz admitted that Eduardo Hernandez is his nephew, in fact he was
giving evidence at the request of Eduardo's mother; that Camelo Morales, Eduardo's father-in-law, paid
his fare to Lucena City where the courthouse was situated; that at Lucena City, he had taken his meal
and slept in the house of Eduardo's uncle; and that he had disclosed the matters testified to by him for
the first time only to the defendants' attorney.
Camelo Morales was called to the stand but could not confirm the alibi of his son-in-law, Eduardo
Hernandez, his testimony being that it was not in 1979 but in 1981, that Eduardo and Merlito Hernandez
had gone to his place to help him harvest palay, and that the ninth day of the prayer offering for his
deceased mother-in-law fell on a day in May, 1981 and the prayers were said from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00
p.m. that day.
The fourth defense witness, Rolando Latorre, recalled having seen the two Hernandez brothers at
around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of May 28, 1979, alighting from a vehicle at Candelaria, Quezon;
that since as it turned out they were all going to Catanauan, they rode on the same bus up to Lucena
City, and then on another bus to Catanauan which they reached at about 4 p.m.
The prosecution presented one rebuttal witness: Alejandro Cruz, team leader of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform stationed at Catanauan, Quezon, whose primary duties included the survey of landholdings
planted to rice and corn. He declared that of his personal knowledge, borne out by his official records,
there was no irrigated riceland at all at Bulagsong, contrary to the claim of the Hernandez brothers that
Camelo Morales' land was irrigated.
The Trial Court found that the evidence established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
rendered judgment on March 8, 1984 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Eduardo Hernandez, Merlito Hernandez and Maximo Hernandez, alias "Putol," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER in both Criminal Cases Nos. 2620
and 3375, and hereby sentences the said accused . . . each to suffer a prison term of
Life Imprisonment (Reclusion Perpetua) for the death of victim Buenaventura Rosales
Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 3375; and
2. In Crim. Case No. 2620 for the death of Narciso Rosales Mendoza, accused
Eduardo Hernandez, Merlito Hernandez and Maximo Hernandez, alias "Putol," each
to suffer a prison term of Life Imprisonment (Reclusion Perpetua) and to indemnify
proportionately the heirs of the two victims in the amount of Twenty Four Thousand
(P24,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by virtue
of the penalty imposed, with all the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.
The Trial Court's Clerk of Court, opining that "the penalties (of reclusion perpetua) imposed . . . in both
cases call for automatic review by the Hon. Supreme Court," transmitted the record including the
transcripts of stenographic notes, the minutes of the proceedings and the exhibits, to this Court's Clerk
of Court. Although such a transmittal was erroneous, considering that an automatic review is authorized
by law only when the penalty of death has been imposed, this Court nevertheless accepted the
appeal. 1 Briefs were thereafter filed in due course for the appellants. One was filed in behalf of Maximo
Hernandez; 2 that for the other two (2) appellants was filed by another counsel. 3
The appellants argue that it was error for the Trial Court to
1) have rejected Exhibits 1 and 2 of the defense;
2) have admitted and accorded full credit to the dying declaration of Buenaventura Mendoza (on the
basis of the "uncorroborated, unreliable and unbelievable testimony of Elena Mendoza");
3) rule that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence proving the appellants were the perpetrators of
the crime;
4) have taken account of revenge as motive although there was no direct evidence pointing to the
appellants as authors of the crime; and
5) have refused "due credence to the duly corroborated and reliable testimonies of appellants . . . and
their witnesses."
It should be apparent that the entire case of the prosecution turns upon the identification of the
appellants verbally made to Elena Mendoza by her husband shortly before he died from the gunshot
wounds received by him moments earlier. It is therefore essential to ascertain if the dying man's
statements were indeed correctly received as a dying declaration in accordance with the Rules of
Court, 4 and also, since those ante-mortem statements were testified to by Elena Mendoza, to analyze
carefully the latter's testimony respecting them and determine how much credit should be accorded to it,
if at all.
The requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration, as an exception to the hearsay rule, are well
known. It is necessary that (1) the declaration be made by the deceased under the conciousness of his
impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration,
concerns the cause and sorrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and (4) it is offered in a
criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. 5
The decisive factor is that the declaration be made under the conciousness of impending death. It is this
which imparts trustworthiness to the essentially hearsay character of the declaration hearsay,
because it is some person other than the deceased declarant (of course) who testifies to the same. A
declaration made with awareness of imminent demise, it has often been said, is "made in extremis,
when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a
situation so solemn and awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
created by a positive oath administered in a court of justice." 6 The idea, more succintly expressed, is
that "truth sits on the lips of dying men."
In a well known work on evidence, 7 the following theory is advocated, viz.:
When death supervenes speedily after the declaration is made, the inference that the
declarant realized his condition may be obvious. In a case in which the declarant died
immediately after stating who had attacked him, his declaration was admitted (People
v. Gallos, 47 Phil. 994). In another case where the declarant was seriously wounded
and died a few minutes after stating the name of his assailant, the statement was held
admissible (People v. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil. 182).
The theory is not quite correct; it is not justified by the jurisprudence cited. Gallos did not involve the
dying-declaration rule; the statement of the dying victim was mentioned only in passing, there being
other evidence quite adequate to sustain conviction. And in the Chan case, the declaration of the
expiring victim was admitted not because death came soon after he had been wounded, but because
the circumstances were such as to generate a reasonable inference that he knew he was shortly going
to die; i.e., he had fallen into so weakened a condition while being interrogated by the police that the
doctors had to ask that the questioning be stopped on that account, and indeed, he died within minutes
thereafter.
It may be that when death takes place immediately after a dying person makes a declaration, the
inference that he knew he was dying when he made the declaration is not far-fetched. The inference is
however not one that necessarily follows. For it may also be that a gravely wounded individual may
express hopes of recovery while making statements as to the cause and sorrounding circumstances of
his injury, and die immediately thereafter, within minutes after being hurt; and it is clear that in this
situation, the declaration is not admissable. The correct principle then is that it is not so much the rapid
eventuation of death as the decedent's conciousness that his demise is at hand, that invests his
utterances in the premises with admissibility by way of exception to the hearsay rule. Not speediness of
dissolution from injury, but realization of the imminence of that dissolution, is what controls.
Now, whether or not such a conciousness of the imminence of death is present in any given case is, of
course, a matter of proof. It may be proven by the very statements of the decedent himself, as when he
says he knows he is dying, 8 or there is no hope of recovery for him, 9 or that he should be brought to
the hospital because his wounds were serious,10 or contrariwise, it is futile to bring him to a hospital, or
that a priest should be called to administer the last rites to him or so that he may make his peace with
God prior to meeting him, or asks his spouse to look after their children or makes provisions respecting
his property and personal affairs, 11 etc. It may be established by his acquiescence, express or tacit, to
apprehensions made known by his physicians or other persons that no hope could be held out for
him, 12 or to suggestions that a priest be called to make him ready to meet his Creator. It may also be
inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent's wound, or other relevant circumstances. 13 The
important thing, to repeat, is that there be some persuasive evidence of the decedent's consciousness
that death impended from his wounds, regardless of whether he actually dies very quickly after being
wounded, or there is an appreciable lapse of time between his wounding and his dying.14
The record of Elena Mendoza's testimony is unfortunately barren of any circumstances from which a
reasonably reliable ascertainment might be made of whether or not her husband, Buenaventura, had
made the identification of the appellants under the conciousness of impending death. In the People's
brief, Elena's relevant testimony on the point is reproduced, as follows:
Q After the gunshots stopped, what happened next?
A I overheard a voice saying "Eddie tayo na, patay na sila."
Q Where was the voice coming from, if you know?
A Outside our house, sir.
Q After you heard the voice saying "Eddie tayo na, patay na sila," what happened next?
A I approached my husband, sir.
Q What did you do with your husband?
A I twisted his body and I saw his body was soaked with blood, sir.
Q What happened afterwards?
A My husband asked for some water, sir.
Q After drinking the water, what happened next?
A After he drank the water, I asked him if he recognized who shot him.
Q What was his answer?
A He said he recognized and he told me the names, sir.
Q What did your husband tell you regarding the persons who fired at him?
A The brothers Merlito and Eduardo Hernandez, and the one who was holding the gun was Maximo
Hernandez alias "Putol", sir.
Q After your husband had Identified his assailants, what happened next?
A I gave him water and after drinking, he passed away, sir.
(pp. 8-9, TSN, May 10, 1992)
It seems therefore that, for lack of predicate, Buenaventura's statements may not qualify as a dying
declaration. Nevertheless those statements may be admitted as part of the res gestae in accordance
with Section 36, Rule 129 of the Rules, 15 which provision reads as follows:
 Sec. 36. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. . . .
The infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should qualify by any standards
as a startling occurrence. And the rule is that testimony by a person regarding statements made by
another as that startling occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto,
although essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said statements are "natural
and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, . . . made before there had been opportunity to devise or
contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred," it being said that in these cases, it is the event
speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event. 16
It seems entirely reasonable under the circumstances to conclude that Buenaventura's statements,
made moments after receiving his fatal injury, were made without opportunity to devise or contrive, and
under the influence of the occurrence.
The next question is whether the statements attributed to Buenaventura relative to the identity of his
assailants were indeed uttered at the time and under the circumstances narrated by his widow in the
witness chair.
The record shows that a barangay councilman, and three (3) police officers two of whom were known
to the widow as Casayuran and Atienza came to her home some seven hours after her husband's
death; and stayed for "several hours," surveying and studying the scene of the crime, taking
photographs, collecting whatever physical evidence there was, and interviewing witnesses. Now, there
can scarcely be any doubt that among the very first questions, if not indeed the most important
question, that the police investigators asked at the time was, who was or were the perpetrators of the
killing; or who had seen the foul deed being done and whether the person or persons doing it had been
recognized or could be described. Certain it is that the widow and the victim's relatives (e.g., his brother
Gelacio) would have been among those to whom this question would have been among those to whom
this question would have been put, not once but several times and not only by the police but by other
persons. And certain it is, too, that the widow would have forthwith responded by telling the police
officers the names of the slayers as told to her by her husband, if it was indeed true that he had
identified them to her in his dying moments. In fact the government's evidence is that this question was
asked of her by one of her brothers-in-law, Gelacio Mendoza, before the three police investigators
came, and she had thereupon confided to him the names of the culprits identified by her husband
moments before his death.
But they quite frankly admit, neither the widow nor her brother-in-law, Gelacio, ever divulged the victim's
alleged "dying declaration" (spontaneous statements which are part of the res gestae) to the barangay
councilman or any one of the three police investigators who came to said victim's home and stayed for
several hours. It appears that the widow revealed her husband's statements for the first time only when
she gave testimony at the trial of the persons charged with her husband's killing. Her reason for not
making the revelation earlier was, in her own words, "I was confused at that time; . . . there were so
many persons who went to our place so I was not able to tell (banggit) those things . . ." Gelacio, too,
appears to have kept quiet about the widow's disclosure to him (re the victim's identification of his
assailants), and like his sister-in-law, made that disclosure public only when he testified at the trial of his
brother's supposed killers. Conduct like this is passing strange. It is unnatural. It is incredible. It makes it
extremely difficult to accord any credit to the testimony of either the widow or her brother-in-law with
respect to the ante-mortem statements allegedly made by the deceased seconds before he expired
from his gunshot wounds.
The ante-mortem statements being thus relegated to limbo, as it were, very little remains by way of
evidence upon which to rest a verdict of conviction against the appellants. There is, to be sure, the
attempt by the same Gelacio Hernandez to make an identification of the appellants by their build and
general appearance. He testified that having been awakened by his dog's barking at about 11 o'clock in
the evening of the day in question, he had looked out of his house and by the light of the moon had
seen three (3) men walking by; that although he could not make out their faces as they passed, yet he
was able to identify two of them, by their build or general physical appearance, as his former neighbors,
Eduardo Hernandez and Merlito Hernandez; he had seen the three men go toward the direction of his
parent's house; that about five minutes afterward, he had heard gunfire; and soon afterwards he was
told that his brothers, Buenaventura and Narciso, had been shot in their parent's house. The testimony,
standing alone, cannot be deemed satisfactory proof of identification of the appellants as the killers.
What has been stated makes discussion and assessment of the appellant's alibis unnecessary. The
Court will say, however, that there appears to be adequate evidentiary basis for those alibis.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered against the appellants by the Court a quo on March
8, 1984 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and all three (3) appellants are, on reasonable doubt,
ACQUITTED of the crime charged, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96928 June 16, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee,
vs.
BERNARDO GONZALES, accused/appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Bernardo Gonzales appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Alberto de Guzman and to pay P30,000.00
as indemnity for death and P10,000.00 as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred.
The information filed against appellant alleged:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1982 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab several times with a kitchen knife on the different parts of the
body one ALBERTO DE GUZMAN y PINIANO, thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds
upon the latter which caused the death of the said victim at the Manila Central
University, this city.
Contrary to law. 1
Appellant Gonzales, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.
The prosecution presented as its principal evidence the testimony of three (3) witnesses, namely: (1)
Myrna de Guzman who is the mother of the victim; (2) Juliana Flores who had personally witnessed the
stabbing incident; and (3) Cpl. Paulino Batarina who had conducted an investigation and referred the
matter to the Fiscal's office.
Appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence; it was denied by the trial court which instead afforded
appellant the opportunity to adduce evidence. Appellant waived his right to present evidence and never
did present any.
On 16 August 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as already noted.
The facts of the case are starkly simple and have been summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief
for the People in the following manner:
At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of February 7, 1982, victim Alberto Piniano de
Guzman was sleeping in the driver's seat of a passenger jeepney parked along
Katarungan Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City when he was stabbed several times
by appellant. The stabbing was witnessed by Juliana Flores who was buying
something from a store located at the corner of Katarungan and Anonas Streets,
about two full arms-length away from the jeepney. Flores saw appellant, who
appeared very angry, deliver the first thrust using a knife measuring about six (6)
inches long excluding the handle, on the chest of the sleeping victim (TSN, pp. 6-8,
March 12, 1990; Juliana Flores, Direct Examination). Appellant then ran away and the
victim, who was bathed in his own blood, rushed to his own house (Id, at p. 9). Flores
knew the victim and appellant as she was leasing a house in that area, on KKK
Street, which was about 25 meters away from the scene of the incident (Id., at pp. 6,
9). There were other persons who witnessed the stabbing (Id., at p. 12).
When the stabbing incident happened, Myrna de Guzman was inside their house with
her younger son when her older son, the victim, with blood oozing out from his
wounds and clutching his breast, entered the house asking for help. The victim
informed Myrna that he was stabbed by appellant. Myrna knew appellant since 1963
as he was an associate of her husband in the barangay. Myrna brought the victim to
the Manila Central University Hospital aboard a tricycle. Along the way, the victim kept
on repeating that it was appellant who stabbed him. The victim died while undergoing
surgery at the hospital (TSN, pp. 4-5, March 14, 1990; Myrna de Guzman, Direct
Examination).
During the trial of the case, Myrna chanced upon Juliana Flores and asked her to
testify after another eyewitness, Jaime Andaya, who had executed a statement, failed
to testify in court. Myrna [had] met Juliana Flores, a market vendor like her, one week
after the incident and the latter informed the former that she witnessed the stabbing
(TSN, pp. 10-11, March 14, 1990).
The Medical Certificate issued by the attending physician, Dr. Gregorio Conner (Exh.
"D"), described the wounds as follows: "multiple stab wounds, 4 cm. chin; 4 cm. left
cheek, 1.5 cm. M/3rd medial left; Anterior and posterior aspect, D/3rd, arm, left; U/3rd
int. lateral aspect, left leg; 2 cm. midsternal, 2 cm, parasternal left 4th ICS, 2 cm. 6th
ICS, AAL, left, Laceration, diaphragm 1 cm., hemothorax, left; Hemoperitoneum,
perforation, T&T, Transverse colon 0.5 cm. jejunum 0.5 cm." (Exh. "D", Medical
Certificate, p. 21, Records).
The father of the victim reported the stabbing to the police station in Caloocan City.
The case was referred to Cpl. Paulino Batarina for investigation. He was not able to
interview the victim since the latter was already being operated on when he arrived at
the hospital with the father of the victim. (TSN, pp. 2-4, March 12, 1990, Paulino
Batarina, Direct Examination). After investigation, a criminal complaint was
subsequently filed against appellant before the fiscal's office on February 11, 1982.
However, when policemen tried to serve the subpoena, appellant could not be found
at his residence. Appellant was arrested only in January, 1990 (Id. at pp. 4-5). 2
Since appellant Gonzales did not present evidence on his own behalf, the instant appeal does not relate
to any form of defense, but involves only issues concerning the reliability and sufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution.
Appellant first contends that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of Juliana
Flores who stated that she had witnessed the stabbing incident. Although Juliana Flores temporarily
resided in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City where the victim lived and was supposed to know the mother
of the victim, appellant argues, she had not revealed her knowledge of the incident until after the lapse
of a considerable period of time.
The Court is not persuaded because if there was any delay, it was sufficiently explained by Juliana
Flores. She stated that she did not feel compelled immediately to inform the relatives of the victim about
her knowledge as there were other people who had seen the stabbing anyway. 3 It has been held that
eyewitnesses are commonly naturally reluctant to get involved in criminal investigations; 4 if these
eyewitnesses do not come forward immediately without delay, the fact of delay should not, by itself be
considered as seriously affecting their credibility. Rather, credibility should be assessed independently,
on the basis of the substance of the testimony offered and the surrounding circumstances.
Juliana Flores had positively identified appellant Gonzales as the person who stabbed the victim to
death. She was only two (2) arms-length away from the assailant and the victim at that time and was
quite certain of the identity of appellant as the doer of the criminal deed. The identification made by
Juliana Flores was reinforced by the victim who, while still alive and on the way to the hospital, had
repeatedly told his mother Myrna de Guzman that it was appellant who had assaulted him with a knife.
Appellant Gonzales, however, disputes the admission in evidence of the ante-mortem statement; he
alleges that the evidence of record does not indicate that statement was made by the victim under the
consciousness of impending death. In its decision, the trial court noted that during the relevant period,
the victim had sustained multiple stab wounds and blood was spurting from his chest. The degree and
seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death supervened shortly after arrival at the hospital's
operating room constitute adequate evidence that the victim must have been aware of his impending
death as he told his mother that appellant had repeatedly knifed him as he slept. 5 The law does not
require that the declarant first explicitly state his perception of the inevitability of death as it is sufficient
that from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent
to the
victim. 6
A strong indication of appellant's guilt was his disappearance from his place of residence for about eight
(8) years. As early as 11 February 1982 when the complaint was filed before the Fiscals Office of
Caloocan City, appellant could no longer be found it his house. He remained at large for many years
despite the issuance of several warrants for his arrest and showed up only in 1990.
Appellant, however, argues that flight which constitutes evidence of guilt is disappearance from the
scene of the crime and not concealment to evade arrest. We agree with the Solicitor General that such
a distinction makes no legal difference. It does not really matter whether the disappearance immediately
followed the commission of the offense or a few days afterwards when the police begin to close in on
the fleeing suspect. 7 The legal consequence would be the same because in either case, the purpose of
the fugitive is to evade responsibility for the offense committed. It is the act of flight which is the principal
basis of inference rather than the precise proximity thereof to the time of commission of the criminal act.
Appellant finally alleges that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
He contends that the casual mention by Juliana Flores that the victim was sleeping in the parked
passenger jeepney when the stab wounds were inflicted, was not sufficient to establish treachery.
We consider, however, that there is no further proof required in the instant case to show that treachery
had attended the commission of the offense. The mode of attack described by Juliana Flores indicates
that it was made suddenly and unexpectedly, rendering the victim helpless and without opportunity to
defend himself. 8 As correctly observed by the trial court, the victim was then unarmed and oblivious of
the possibility of a deadly attack as he slept on the driver's seat of a passenger jeepney. There was no
confrontation or altercation that preceded the attack. 9 Appellant Gonzales chose that particular time to
attack the victim when retaliation or defense was not possible. That is the very essence of treachery as
a criminal law concept.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, save that the amount of indemnity for
death payable by appellant Bernardo Gonzales to the heirs of the victim is hereby INCREASED to
P50,000.00 conformably with recent jurisprudence.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63202 April 9, 1985
DOLORES G. GOMEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX which found petitioner
Dolores Gomez guilty of the crime of ESTAFA.
The information charged the petitioner with estafa as follows:
That on or about and during the period comprised between November 20, 1973 and
December 3, 1973, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rodrigo Gomez and Wilson
Gomez, brothers of Belen Espiritu, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Belen Espiritu in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
received in trust from the said Belen Espiritu on consignment basis four (4) pieces of
jewelry, to wit:
One (1) pinkish lady's ring................. P45,000.00
One (1) yellow onyx ring 4k................. 25,000.00
One(1) dominic ring.............................. 4,500.00
One(1) dangling earring..................... 45,000.00
with a total value of P119,000.00 with the understanding and under the express
obligation on the part of the said accused of selling the same on commission basis
and turning over the proceeds of the sale thereof, if sold, or of returning the said four
 (4) pieces of jewelry to said Belen Espiritu, if unable to sell the same immediately
upon demand; but the said accused, once in possession of the said four (4) pieces of
jewelry far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, and despite repeated
demands made upon her to return the aforesaid pieces of jewelry and/or pay the
entire value of the same, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the
aforesaid pieces of jewelry, except the Dominic ring valued at P4,500.00, and instead,
with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the above-described pieces of jewelry to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Belen Espiritu in
the total amount of P76,000.00, Philippine currency, that is the value of one (1) pair of
dangling earring in the amount of P45,000.00 plus the amount of P31,000.00 which
said Belen Espiritu paid in order to redeem the two (2) rings (the pinkish lady's ring
and the yellow ring 4k) pledged by said accused to Jose Lontok and the Agencia de
Empenos de Tambunting respectively.
That Wilson and Rodrigo Gomez, being brothers of Belen Espiritu, are exempted from
criminal liability for the offense under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts adduced by the prosecution and accepted by the respondent court as basis for the judgment
of conviction are summarized as follows:
Dolores Gomez is the wife of Rodrigo Gomez, who has a brother, Wilson Gomez, and
a sister, Belen Gomez Espiritu. Belen is the complainant, who initiated the filing of the
charge of estafa against her sister-in-law, Dolores. The main thrust of the defense is
that, accused should have been acquitted as Rodrigo and Wilson, both surnamed
Gomez, who are the brothers of Belen, were the only ones responsible for having
taken the pieces of jewely in question.
The evidence shows that on November 20, 1973, Rodrigo Gomez, husband of
accused, went to the residence of his sister Belen, in Angeles City because there was
somebody in Manila interested in buying some pieces of jewelry. Belen, together with
Lourdes Balajadia and Rodrigo, went to the residence of accused at 2275 P. Roman
St., Sta. Ana, Manila. (Tsn., pp. 3-4, September 25, 1975).
At the house of Rodrigo and Dolores Gomez and in the presence of Rodrigo and
Lourdes, Belen delivered to Dolores three pieces of jewelry: a 7 karat pink stone
lady's ring worth P45,000.00; a 4 karat onyx stone ring worth P25,000.00; and a
dominic ring worth P4,500.00. (Tsn., pp. 2-3, September 25, 1975).
In the morning of November 21, 1973, Milagros Gomez, sister-in-law of Dolores,
accompanied by Belen Tiotuico, brought to her residence a pair of dangling earrings
worth P45,000.00.
The four pieces of jewelry were left with Dolores without any acknowledgment receipt
as they were relatives, under the condition that, if after two or three days, the jewelry
would be sold, Milagros would give Dolores and Rodolfo Punongbayan alias Willie
Bakla P2,000.00 except for the dominic ring in which she would give them P200.00;
and if they could sell the jewelry for more than her price, the difference would belong
to them (Dolores and Rodolfo) but should they fail to sell the same, they would return
the same. (Tsn., pp. 6-10, September 26, 1975).
On November 22, 1973, Belen reminded Dolores of their promise concerning the
jewels and Dolores requested more time to sell the same, to which Belen agreed.
On November 23, 1976, Belen called up by long distance telephone, inquiring about
any possible buyer. Dolores answered that the jewels were not yet sold and that they
were with Rodrigo in Laguna. (Tsn., p. 12, September 25, 1975). On the same day
when Belen called up again, Rodolfo told her that Dolores had followed her husband
to Laguna where the latter brought the jewelry.
Sensing something was wrong after she again talked with Rodolfo in the evening of
the same day, Belen reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and asked them to look for Dolores, Rodrigo, and Wilson.
A week after the filing of the complaint, Rodrigo and Wilson were apprehended, both
of whom promised to return the jewelry to Belen. Wilson made a promise in writing,
Exhibit A, while Rodrigo made a verbal promise. (Tsn., pp. 15-16, September
16,1975).
Three days after, the dominic ring valued at P4,500.00 was returned to Belen by
Wilson.
In December 1973, Dolores told Belen that Rodrigo had two of the remaining
unreturned pieces of jewelry. And when Belen met her brother Wilson in Angeles City,
he told her that he would tell her where the jewels were pledged if she would not
include him in the case. Wilson even gave her (Belen) a copy of the receipt for
P25,000.00 signed by Jose Lontok to whom the 7-karat pink stone ring had been
pledged.
When Belen tried to get the 7-karat pink stone ring from Jose Lontok in Ermita,
Manila, he declined to give her the jewelry pledged because, according to him, it was
not the original receipt that was presented to him. Belen told Jose that the jewelry
pledged to him belonged to her. (Tsn., pp. 18- 19, September 25, 1975).
The next day, Belen returned to Jose to redeem the jewelry and told him she had
merely asked Dolores to sell it for her. Jose promised to give her the jewelry if Willie
would come with her and bring the original receipt. The next day when Willie and
 Belen came, she was able to recover the ring after paying Jose the amount of
P25,000.00. (Tsn., pp. 20-21, September 25, 1975).
After Wilson had given Belen the receipt of Antonio Tambunting's Pawnshop, as to the
jewelry Dolores pledged to guarantee payment of P6,000.00, and after she (Belen)
executed an affidavit that she was the real owner of the jewelry pledged, Belen was
able to redeem it after paying the amount of P6,000-00. (tsn., pp. 22-23, September
25,1975).
As to the pair of dangling earrings, Belen was not able to recover the same and so
she had to pay on installments, the value thereof to Belen Tiotuico from whom she
had received the jewelry. (Tsn., pp. 26-27, September 25, 1975).
Dolores Gomez on the other hand denied any liability and pointed to Rodrigo Gomez, her husband as
the only person liable. The defense evidence is summarized as follows:
On December 3, 1973, at about noontime, Dolores Gomez and her husband Rodrigo
Gomez were at their residence at 2275 Paco Roman St., Sta. Ana, Manila, when her
sister-in-law, Belen Gomez Espiritu, arrived from Angeles City, Pampanga. On the
verge of tears Belen told Dolores that she was in dire need of money. As a sister-in-
law, Dolores cannot help but ask her what help she can do for her. Belen then brought
out a ring, a jewelry, and ask her and her husband Rodrigo if they can help her out to
pawn the ring because she had a postdated check she issued to somebody in
Angeles City, and to cover up with the amount she wanted the ring to be pawned.
Belen talked over the matter with Rodrigo, Dolores' husband, who was then present.
(Tsn., October 21, 1975, pp. 2-3).
Belen suggested to pawn the ring at Monte de Piedad Pawnshop because that is
where some of the Angeles City people who are engaged in jewelry business usually
pawn their jewelry. (Id., p. 4)...
At the Monte de Piedad, Dolores presented the ring. Monte de Piedad offered only
P2,000 for the ring, but the amount was not sufficient because Belen needed
P5,000.00. So Dolores returned to the car and told Belen about the offer. Belen then
told Dolores that they look for another pawnshop which could give the amount
needed by Belen. (Id., p. 4) Belen suggested the Tambunting Pawnshop. Dolores and
her husband then went to the Tambunting Pawnshop at Raon Street, Quiapo, Manila,
again leaving Belen in the car. The Tambunting Pawnshop offered P6,000 for the ring,
but deducted the interest for four months and service fees. Inasmuch as her sister-in-
law needed only P5,000, Dolores agreed to pawn the ring. (Id., pp. 4-5). Dolores
received P6,000 from the pawnshop. The pawnshop ticket was issued to her. (Id., p.
6). Dolores and Rodrigo returned to their car. Dolores handed the amount of P6,000
to Belen and the pawnshop ticket. They then drove Belen to the Philippine Rabbit bus
terminal in Rizal Avenue, Manila because Belen has the money with her. (Id., p. 8).
The next day, Belen came back to the residence of the Gomez spouses. She was
trying to deal with her brother Rodrigo Gomez, Dolores' husband, concerning some
jewelries. They had a till-day transaction. (Id., p. 9). Dolores saw Belen gave (sic) four
(4) pieces of jewelry to her husband Rodrigo, Belen's brother. (Id., p. 8). Petitioner
had nothing to do with her husband's transaction with her (sic) sister Belen. (Id., pp.
7-8).
Once Rodrigo was with the jewelry, he had been with his brother Wilson. Belen knew
this. (p. 11). Apprehensive, Belen called up Dolores by phone asking where her
husband could be found. Dolores informed Belen that he went to Laguna in his
kumpadre's place. (Id., p. 9). Belen told her that if Rodrigo would not be home that
night, Dolores should better follow him up to Laguna. (Id., p. 9). The next day, Dolores
and her niece proceeded to laguna, but her husband's kumpare told her that he
(Rodrigo) did not got there. (Id., p. 10). Dolores then returned to Manila. Arriving at
her residence, Belen was calling her at phone from Angeles. She told Belen that she
had just come from Laguna but her husband was not there. She asked Belen why she
was looking for her husband, and Belen answered it was because of the jewels which
she gave to Rodrigo and Rodrigo was with their brother Wilson in Angeles City.
Dolores then proceeded to her mother-in-law's place in Angeles City to find out
whether her husband was really with his brother Wilson. Belen was also there. Belen
informed their mother that Wilson was under the custody of the police in Angeles City.
Wilson Gomez was brought out from the cell and was forced to make a statement by
the policemen anf he was asked to bring out her husband and he made a promise to
bring out the jewels.
After Wilson Gomez signed the written promise (Exh. 2), he was released. (Id., p. 13).
Dolores and Wilson went to Manila. It turned out, however, that Rodrigo was in
Saigon. There was no communication between Rodrigo and Dolores (Id., p. 14),
although Rodrigo wrote her sister Belen while he was in Saigon regarding their
transaction. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Dolores saw her husband only when he returned to Manila from Saigon and while he
was detained at the NBI upon a charge of falsificat ion of passports. Dolores talked
personally to her husband and inquired about the jewelry. He said that he brought the
jewelries to Saigon and sold them there, and he don't know what happened with the
money. (Id., p. 16)
xxx xxx xxx
On February 24, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Manila convicted Dolores Gomez of the crime of
estafa and directed the City of Manila to file the appropriate information charging Rodrigo and Wilson
Gomez with estafa after conducting the required preliminary investigation. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dolores Gomez, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa, defined and penalized in Article 315,
paragraph I (b), of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and
absent any attendant modifying circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer
indeterminate prison term of from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days
of pision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, the necessary penalties thereof, to indemnify the offended party Belen
Gomez Espiritu in the amount of P45,000, the value of the unrecovered pair of
dangling earrings, and P31,000, the amount spent to redeem the pink stone ring and
onyx ring from Jose Lontok and Agencia de Empenos de Antonio Tambunting, or a
total of P73,000, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
Upon the facts relative to the participation of Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez, the Court
hereby directs the City Fiscal of Manila to file the information charging them with the
same offense of estafa charged against the herein accused, after conducting the
required preliminary investigation, if one has not been actually conducted when the
instant case was filed against the accused Dolorez Gomez, otherwise to proceed
against them without any further delay.
On July 31, 1980, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the decision holding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, (sic) and the same being in accordance with law and evidence, the same
These motions however were denied by the respondent court in its resolution dated February 8, 1983
is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.
The petitioner bases her petition on the following arguments found in her memorandum:
A motion for reconsideration filed by Dolores Gomez was denied by the respondent court in a resolution
dated October 19, 1982.
On December 29, 1982, the petitioner filed her second motion for reconsideration Petitioner also filed a
supplemental second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for the reception of newly discovered
evidence. The evidence consists of an affidavit of Belen Gomez Espiritu dated January 7, 1983
declaring under oath that it was her brother who took the pieces of jewelry but had already paid the full
amount representing the value thereof. The affidavit states in part:
That I have been the complainant in a criminal case now on appeal to the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20886-CR, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Dolores Gomez",
That after reviewing the facts of this case, I have come to realize that it was really my
brother, Rodrigo Gomez, who converted to his personal use the pieces of jewelry
subject of this case and that my sister-in-law, Dolores Gomez, had nothing to do
whatsoever with said jewels;
That this is evidenced by the letter which my brother Rodrigo Gomez sent to me from
Saigon dated January 8, 1974, quoted verbatim on page 3 of the second motion for
reconsideration,...
That it is clear from the tenor of the aforequoted letter of my brother Rodrigo Gomez,
husband of Dolores Gomez, the defendant-appellant in the appealed case CA-G.R.
No. 20886- CR; that he has been in possession of the jewels;
That in my complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office, I included both my brothers
Rodrigo and Wilson, together with my sister-in-law Dolores; however, my brothers
were excluded and dropped from the charges by reason of the provision of Art. 332 of
the Revised Penal Code; while my sister-in-law was left and charged;
That my aforementioned brother, Rodrigo Gomez, has already made full restitution to
me of the value of the said pieces of jewels showing that it was not my sister-in-law
who is to blame;
That for the above reasons, I have no more interest in the further prosecution of the
case because clearly, it was not my sister-in-law who committed the acts complained
of but my brother Rodrigo who was dropped from the charges.
xxx xxx xxx
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FACT THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE WAS EXECUTED
BY THE OFFENDED PARTY EVEN AFTER JUDGMENT WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO AN
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RECANTATION OF
COMPLAINANT BASED ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE AS A NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH IS A GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRAISING MATERIAL AND CONCRETE
EVIDENCE WHICH TEND TO SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED HAD NOT INDEED
ABSCONDED WITH THE JEWELRIES IN QUESTION SINCE IN TRUTH AND IN FACT SHE
 HAS NOT IN ANY WAY TAKEN PART NOR BENEFITED FROM THE CRIME OR
TRANSACTION, AND THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN-WHICH CONSTITUTE
GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND FACT WARRANTING THE EXERCISE BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT OF ITS INHERENT SUPERVISORY AND EQUITY JURISDICTION TO
PREVENT A MANIFEST AND PALPABLE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD
NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE CRIMINAL CASE AS THE SAME INVOLVES
MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
OF THE CRIME CHARGED, HER GUILT NOT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Relative to the first alleged error, the petitioner submits that the affidavit of desistance shows that she
did not participate directly or indirectly in the commission of the crime charged, and that it was her
estranged husband who is solely criminally liable. Dolores Gomez also submits that the affidavit of
desistance casts a shadow of doubt as to the veracity and credibility of the prosecution's evidence
linking her to the crime charged.
The Solicitor General on the other hand contends that the affidavit of desistance of Dolores Gomez and
the fact that Rodrigo Gomez had already paid the amount swindled do not preclude the prosecution of
the petitioner because estafa is a public offense which may be prosecuted independently of the will of
the offended party.
We agree with the petitioner. It is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal
offenses under the full control of the fiscal and that the dismissal of criminal cases by the execution of
an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. However, it is also true that
an affidavit of desistance may create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused. At the very least, it
calls for a second hard look at the records of the case and the basis for the judgment of conviction.
Jurisprudence on the effect of desistance notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptrily
dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. In People v. Pimentel (118 SCRA 695), we held that:
Undeniably, affidavits of desistance are generally frowned upon by our courts for they
make a mockery of our judicial system. Thus, in People versus Manigbas (109 Phil.
469), where a new trial was sought on the basis of a retraction, We ruled that-
Unless there be special circumstances, which, coupled with a retraction of the
witness, really raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by him at trial and
accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of
conviction, so much so that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different
conclusion, a new trial based on such retraction would not be justified, Otherwise,
there would never be an end to criminal litigation.
Such special circumstances exist in the case at bar. And, as already discussed, they
engender serious doubts as to the appellant's guilt. Accordingly, due consideration
must be afforded the complainant's affidavit of desistance.
There are such special circumstances in the case at bar which raise reasonable doubts as to the
culpability of Dolores Gomez. The letter of Rodrigo Gomez (Exh. F and F-1) addressed to the
complainant Belen Gomez Espiritu indicates that there may be some truth to the contention of the
petitioner about her sister-in-law picking on her because she could not run after the guilty parties, her
own brothers. Doubts are engendered regarding the testimonies taken at the trial court. The letter was
mentioned by complainant Belen Gomez Espiritu in her testimony regarding the pair of dangling
earrings. It shows that it was Rodrigo Gomez, husband of Dolores, who was in possession of some of
the pieces of jewelry and who appropriated the proceeds thereof The full text of the letter states that:
Jan. 8,1974
Saigon, Vietnam
Dear Ateng Belen,
Try to understand my letter. You know I do not like to commit this but I lack time. You know I
have plenty of compromise and I do not like this to happen but time asks for it.
Anytime it happened. I like to return one I promised for the two. Anyway, it happened already
and I'm in another country we share it 50%-50%.
I have to know your answer at the earliest, time for I'll be leaving for Iran on the 26th of
January and I'll be waiting for your go signal I want to give the one and how can you get this
one.
If you do not like I'll pay you $200 dollars a month once I work in Iran.
Write me before the 26th of January and my address 22/10 Cuxia Lungia, Phutho. The other
one Asia Hotel Bangkok because the visa is Thailand going to Iran. Do not tell Loleng that I'll
be going to Iran and work there. And your decision is that only the two of us wig know. Write
me at once in Bangkok. Have patience in me and waiting for your reply.
Your brother
This letter of Rodrigo Gomez is a declaration against his own interests under Rule 130, Sec.
32 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and should have been given weight.
The records likewise show that some of the pieces of jewelry were in the possession of Wilson
Gomez, another brother of the complainant, Belen Gomez Espiritu.
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals based on the prosecution evidence indicate:
(1) It was Rodrigo Gomez, petitioner's husband who went to Angeles City to inform his
complainant sister, Belen, that there was a buyer of jewelries in Manila.
(2) Complainant Belen claims she turned over the jewelries to petitioner Dolores. Yet, her
brother Rodrigo was there allegedly merely looking on.
(3) When Belen inquired over the phone about the jewelries, she was told that Rodrigo had
them with him in Laguna.
(4) The two brothersRodrigo and Wilson, after being apprehended, promised to return the
jewelry.
(5) It was Wilson who returned the dominic ring to Belen.
(6) In December, 1973, Dolores told Belen that Rodrigo had two of the unreturned jewelries
with hint
(7) When Belen met her brother Wilson in Angeles City, he gave her a copy of a receipt for
P25,000.00 signed by Jose Lontok to whom the 7-karat pink stone ring had been pledged.
(8) When Belen redeemed the ring from Lontok, she was in the company of her brother Wilson
who pledged the ring and secured the original receipt.
(9) Wilson was the one in possession of the pawnshop receipt. Wilson was the one who gave
the receipt to Belen.
There are other circumstances in the records strongly suggesting that the transactions were between
Belen and her two brothers and that the petitioner came into the picture only because she was the wife
of one of the brothers.
These circumstances coupled with the affidavit of desistance of the complainant which explicitly states
that it was her brother Rodrigo Gomez who was in possession of the pieces of jewelry; that he
converted to his personal use the said pieces of jewelry but had already made full restitution of their
value to the complainant; that Dolores Gomez had nothing to do whatsoever with said pieces of jewelry;
and that it was not Dolores Gomez who committed the acts complained of but Rodrigo Gomez, create
doubts as to the petitioner's liability. It is to be noted that the veracity and authenticity of the affidavit of
desistance and the letter of Rodrigo Gomez dated January 8, 1974 have never been questioned.
Therefore, the petitioner should have been acquitted.
The respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court convicted the petitioner solely on the finding that
there was a conspiracy between her and Rodrigo and Wilson.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
subject to certain exceptions (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 61647,
October 12, 1984). In Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734), we held
that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when(1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee.
In the case at bar, the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals failed to consider some
circumstances which negate the presence of conspiracy.
In People v. Palon (127 SCRA 529), states the proof needed to establish a conspiracy
...that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot
be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact. The same degree of
proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence
of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself (People v. Custodia 47 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the people to establish the presence of conspiracy is even
murkier than the proof on the commission of the crime itself. The factual findings of the respondent
Court of Appeals and the trial court do not show the participation of the petitioner in the events that
followed after the pieces of jewelry were delivered to her and her husband, Rodrigo. The records show
that the only participation of the petitioner in the transaction was when she and her husband received
the pieces of jewelry from Belen Gomez Espiritu on November 10 and 21, 1973 at their residence. After
the same were received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took possession of the said pieces of jewelry and
disposed of them without the knowledge of the petitioner. Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez alone absconded
with the pieces of jewelry. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not even know the whereabouts of
Rodrigo and Wilson who were then in possession of the said pieces of jewelry. The participation of
petitioner Dolores in the attempts to locate the missing brothers and to compel them to return the
jewelry to their sister is not proof of conspiracy in a crime. It was understandable why she was involved
in looking for her own husband at the behest of her sister-in-law.
To establish conspiracy, there must be evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330). There is no
evidence of such kind of participation.
Furthermore, in People v. Drilon (123 SCRA 72), we held that:
The mere presence of appellant at the scene when the crime was perpetrated by
Drilon is not by itself indicative of the existence of conspiracy between them. As this
Court said in People v. Ybaez,(77 Phil. 664) ... the accused must be shown to have
had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this
presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design, It is not enough that
there be a relation between the acts done by the principal or accomplice, it is,
furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent,
should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.
The evidence of the prosecution fails to show that the petitioner knew the criminal intent of her husband
Rodrigo and brother-in-law Wilson Gomez. She was not even aware that Rodrigo went to Vietnam and
that he brought with him some of the pieces of jewelry. Dolores saw her husband Rodrigo and learned
from the latter that he sold some of the pieces of jewelry in Vietnam only when he returned to Manila.
All these circumstances coupled with the letter of Rodrigo dated January 8, 1974 addressed to the
complainant Belen Gomez Espiritu and the latter's affidavit of desistance dated January 7, 1983 negate
the existence of conspiracy involving the petitioner.
Without conspiracy, the petitioner cannot be held liable as she had no direct participation in the
commission of the crime charged. The presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner has not been
successfully overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged on grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines The dramatis personae in this case, namely, the victims, the brothers Manuel Pasuquin and Martin
SUPREME COURT Pasuquin, and their brother-in-law, Antonio Reyes, as well as the accused Francisco Doria, the brothers
Manila Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, their uncle, Filemon Lazarte, and their friend Rodolfo
Fernandez, all resided in the vicinity of Malong Street in the poblacion of Alcala, Pangasinan. They were
SECOND DIVISION neighbors. Doria, the stepfather of Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, stayed with them in the
same house. Filemon Lazarte lived in his house at the corner of Malong and Funston Streets (Sketch,
Exh. B in Criminal Case No. U-401; Exh. D in Criminal Case No. U-402).
G.R. Nos. L-26188, L-26189 and L-26190 January 31, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, The assault presently to be recounted have their background in the smoldering enmity between Doria
vs. and the Pasuquin brothers. Certain incidents had strained their relations to the breaking point. At one
FRANCISCO DORIA, accused-appellant. time in 1957 Doria suspected Martin Pasuquin of having stolen his cassava. In September, 1957 Doria
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
charged Martin Pasuquin with having stolen his bananas.<re||an1w> The case was amicably
vs.
settled by the chief of police. In February, 1958, Martin Pasuquin was again charged by Doria with
FRANCISCO DORIA and BARTOLOME LAZARTE, accused-appellants.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, having allegedly stolen the latter's palay. Martin was acquitted. In May, 1959 Doria denounced Martin to
vs. the police for having stolen his plow. On the night of November 24, 1959, Bernabe Lazarte, Doria's
BERNABE LAZARTE, accused-appellant. stepson, was mauled. Manuel Pasuquin was suspected to be one of the maulers.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel Santos for plaintiff-appellee. It was thus expectable that the tension between Doria and the Pasuquin brothers would erupt in some
Manuel M. Crudo for accused-appellant.
manifestation of violence.

At about seven o'clock in the morning of November 26, 1959, Martin Pasuquin and Manuel Pasuquin,
AQUINO, J.:
together with their brother-in-law, Antonio Reyes, and six companions named Alfredo Dilan, Rudy
Cacabilos, Ernesto Gambol, Berting Baldomero, Bernardo Tadeo, and Villamor Ferrer went to
In L-26188 defendant Francisco Doria appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bersamin, a barrio of Alcala, to cut grass as fodder for their carabaos. They rode in five bullcarts
Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of a firearm and sentencing him to an indeterminate
following one another. Manuel Pasuquin rode in the first cart.
penalty of one (1) year to five (5) years and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos plus costs (Criminal
Case No. U-440).
As they passed the corner of Malong and Funston Streets, Filemon Lazarte, who chanced to be
stationed at the window of his house, saw the passing bullcarts. When the Pasuquin brothers were
In L-26189 defendants Francisco Doria and Bartolome Lazarte appealed from the decision of the same
nearing the place where they were to cut grass in Barrio Bersamin, they espied in the distance
court, convicting them of murder, sentencing Doria to "life imprisonment" and Lazarte to an
acarromata (carretela) following them. It was driven by Doria, its owner. His passengers were Bartolome
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
Lazarte, Bernabe Lazarte, Filemon Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez (who was not on speaking terms
and ordering each of them to indemnify the heirs of Martin Pasuquin (Pasuquen) in the sum of six
with Martin Pasuquin since July, 1958).
thousand pesos plus costs (Criminal Case No. U-401).

In L-26190 defendant Bernabe Lazarte appealed from the decision of the same court, convicting him of
frustrated murder, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional and to indemnify Manuel Pasuquin (Pasuquen) in
the sum of two thousand pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus costs (Criminal
Case No. U-402).
The evidence for the prosecution, as shown in the record and as summarized by the trial court and the
Solicitor General, may be restated as follows:
When the Pasuquin brothers and their companions reached their destination and when they were about
to unhitch their carabaos, the carromata stopped near them. Doria and his group alighted from
thecarromata. Thereupon, Bernabe Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez approached Manuel Pasuquin who
was sitting on the edge or rim of his bullcart. Fernandez immediately disabled Manuel Pasuquin by
holding his hands at the latter's back while Bernabe Lazarte with a sharp pointed bolo (Exh. E or 9 in
Criminal Case No. U402 and Exh. G in Criminal Case No. U-401) stabbed Manuel twice, first, at the
right side of his abdomen and, second, at the right flank located below the last rib along the posterior
axillary line. During the assault, Manuel Pasuquin was not able to say anything. He "was surprised".
Almost simultaneously, Doria and Bartolome Lazarte approached Martin Pasuquin who was sitting on
the edge or rim of the cart of Antonio Reyes, about three or five meters from Manuel. Reyes stood
beside the cart about one meter from Martin. As Doria asked Martin where he was going to cut grass,
Doria forthwith shot Martin pointblank at the latter's face with a paltik gun (Exh. A and A-1 in Criminal
Case U-400 and Exh. C and C-1 in Criminal Case U-401). Instinctively, Martin stood up to jump out of
the cart but Bartolome Lazarte struck him with a long bolo called panabas, hitting him in his right arm
(Exh. F or in Criminal Case U-401). Inspite of his injuries, Martin was able to jump out of the cart and
run away, but Doria Bartolome Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte chased him and on overtaking him,
repeatedly stabbed him (see sketch, Exh. F in Criminal Case No. U-402). Martin Pasuquin sustained
several mortal wounds and died on the spot where he had collapsed. The scythe used by Doria in
cutting the throat of Martin is Exhibit E (Criminal Case No. U-401).
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Fernandez, armed with a bolo, attacked Antonio Reyes who, after parrying the
blow, ran away.
Doctor Juanita Santos Estacio, the town's municipal health officer, examined the body of the deceased
twenty-two year old Martin Pasuquin, in the town puericulture center at around one-thirty in the
afternoon of November 26th. She found the following wounds:
I. HEAD
1. Lacerated wound, chin right. Wound is 1- inches long, 1 inch wide and inch
deep.
2. Shotgun wounds (5 in number) produced by small pellets of lead located at
forehead left temporal region, left base of nose, left cheekbone and base of left
ear.
II. NECK
1. Wound, lacerated, front of neck. It is 4 inches long, 3 inches wide and 2 inches
deep, exposing some muscles, tendons and blood vessels.
III. TRUNK
1. Wound, lacerated, epigastric region. Wound is skin deep, 1 inch long by inch
wide.
2. Wound, punctured, epigastrium. It is 1- inches long, 3/2 inch wide and about 5
inches deep running inwards.
3. Wound, punctured, lumbar region, right. It is 1 inch long, inch wide and 3
inches deep running outward and laterally.
4. Wound, punctured, abdomen right. It is 1 inch by inch by 1 inch deep
located inch below the right coastal arch.
IV. EXTREMITIES
A Right upper extremity:
1. Wound lacerated 4 inches by 2- inches arm upper thirds lateral side.
2. Wound lacerated 4 inches by 3 inches by 2 inches forearm, upper thirds,
medial side.
3. Wound, lacerated, palm bases of 4th and 5th fingers; size of wound is 2
inches by 1 inch by inch.
B Left upper extremity:
1. Fracture, compound, forearm, lower third, left. Open wound is 4 inches long
gaping, exposing bone, muscles, tendons and blood vessels. (Exh. A, Criminal Case
No. U-401.)
The doctor opined that Martin Pasuquin died due to loss of blood and to shock as a
consequence of the cutting of the blood vessels.
Doctor Estacio also attended to the sixteen-year old Manuel Pasuquin at about ten
o'clock in the morning of November 26th. Her findings were as follows:
A. Preliminary Findings:
1. Patient is pale, conscious, complaining of pain at the abdomen.
2. There's profuse bleeding of wound at abdomen staining his clothes.
B. Physical Examination:
1. Wound, punctured abdomen right. Wound is located at right side of abdomen
2 inches below the coastal arch. It is 1 inch long, 1/3 inch wide and about 4 inches
deep going inwards and medially.
2. Wound, punctured right, flank located below the last rib along the posterior
axillary line. It's about inch long, 1/3 inch wide and 1 inch deep.
It takes about 2 weeks for the 2nd wound to heal barring complications and about
1 month for the 1st wound depending on treatment and complications. (Exh. A in
Criminal Case No. U-402.)
Doctor Crisofero P. Cabangon, who operated on Manuel Pasuquin, described his
abdominal wound thus:
Wound stab lateral, hypochondriac region with laceration of liver; massive hematoma
of transverse mesocolon; shock, secondary to massive abdominal hemorrhage. (7 tsn
Abalos.)
Doctors Estacio and Cabangon were of the opinion that the wounds of Manuel Pasuquin were serious
and sufficient to cause his death. He was given blood transfusion at the San Carlos General Hospital.
He would have died were it not for the operation or timely medical attendance.
On that same morning or immediately after the tragic occurrence, Bartolome Lazarte surrendered to the
police. He delivered to the guard the pointed bolo and the panabas. He confessed to the police that he
had killed Martin Pasuquin (25 tsn Rollolazo).
Doria visited Bartolome Lazarte in prison. He was arrested on that occasion. He was investigated by
Manuel Castro, a private of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). He signed a statement sworn to before
the justice of the peace wherein he admitted that he had fired his twelve-gauge paltik gun in the
morning of the incident. The chief of police also investigated him on that same day. He admitted to that
police officer that he was the owner of the paltik gun and ammunition. He had no license to possess the
same.
As a result of the prompt investigation conducted by the police and the constabulary, sworn statements
were executed on that same date, November 26th, by Rudy Cacabilos, Alfredo Dilan, Villamayor and
Antonio Reyes (Exh. 10 Criminal cases No. U-402). In substance, they stated that Doria, Bartolome
Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte killed Martin Pasuquin while Bernabe Lazarte wounded Manuel Pasuquin
with the help of Rodolfo Fernandez. The police recovered the paltik gun, one bolo and two scythes.
On the basis of the eyewitnesses' affidavits and the medical certificates, three complaints dated
November 26, 1959 were filed by the chief of police in the justice of the peace court of Alcala:
One complaint was for illegal possession of a firearm against the twenty-eight year old Doria (Econg).
The second complaint was for murder against Doria, Bartolome Lazarte (Roming) and Filemon Lazarte
for the killing of Martin Pasuquin. The third complaint was for frustrated murder against Bernabe Lazarte
(Bening) and Rodolfo Fernandez (Ruding). (Criminal Cases Nos. 418, 419 and 420).
The appellants waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The cases were elevated to
the Court of First Instance, where the special counsel of the fiscal's office filed three informations: (1) an
information against Doria for illegal possession of a revolver, twelve-gauge paltik, and one round of
ammunition, in violation of section 2692, in relation to section 878, of the Revised Administrative Code
and as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and Republic Act No. 4 (Criminal Case No. U-400); (2)
an information charging Doria, Bartolome Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte with the murder of Martin
Pasuquin, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation (Criminal Case No. U-401), and (3) an
information for frustrated murder against Bernabe Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez qualified also by
treachery and evident premeditation in connection with the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin (Criminal
Case No. U-402). The three cases were tried jointly. The trial court rendered one decision.
Filemon Lazarte died of pulmonary tuberculosis on November 9, 1962, or eight days after he signed his
confession (Exh. 1). As to him the case was dismissed. Rodolfo Fernandez was acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
In this appeal, the appellants, through Manuel M. Crudo, their counsel de oficio, argue that the trial court
erred (1) in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which were allegedly
vitiated by contradictions and inconsistencies; (2) in admitting the alleged hearsay, irrelevant,
incompetent, and immaterial testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; (3) in disregarding the evidence
for the defense such as the medical certificate as to the injuries of Francisco Doria (Exh. 2) and the
supposed dying declaration of Filemon Lazarte (Exh. 1); (4) in basing Francisco Doria's conviction for
illegal possession of a firearm on his sworn statement which was not voluntarily executed; (5) in holding
that the chief of police regularly performed his duties; (6) in holding as improbable that only one
assailant inflicted thirteen wounds on the Pasuquin brothers; (7) in discrediting Filemon Lazarte's
admission that he alone assaulted the Pasuquin brothers; (8) in not giving the defense the benefit of the
doubt; (9) in not acquitting Francisco Doria and Bartolome Lazarte of murder; (10) in not acquitting
Bernabe Lazarte of frustrated murder, like Rodolfo Fernandez, and (11) in not holding that it had not
acquired jurisdiction because there was no preliminary investigation conducted by the special counsel
who filed the informations.
Appellants' last assignment of error raises a jurisdictional or procedural issue which should first be
resolved.<re||an1w> They note that the special counsel did not certify under oath in the three
informations that the accused were "given a chance to appear in person or by counsel" at the
corresponding preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal. They contend that the trial court "had
not acquired jurisdiction to try the three cases". They invoke Rule 112 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by
state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance.Except where an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, municipal judge or other
officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceeding sections, no information
for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial
or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in
a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a
corresponding subpoena. If the accused appears the investigation shall be conducted
in his presence and he shall have the right to be heard, to cross-examine the
complainant and his witnesses, and to adduce evidence in his favor. If he cannot be
subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the fiscal the investigation
shall proceed without him.
This fiscal or state attorney shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by
him that the defendant was given a chance to appear in person or by counsel at said
examination and investigation.
Appellants' contention is untenable. The epigraph and opening exclusionary clause of section 14 shows
that it applies only to the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal or state attorney (See Sec.
1687, Revised Administrative Code; Republic Acts Nos. 732 and 5180 and Presidential Decree No. 77
dated December 6, 1972). It does not apply to the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of
the peace, now municipal judge.
Moreover, section 14 is a new provision of the 1964 Rules of Court. It is not found in the 1940 Rules of
Court which were in force in 1959 when these three cases arose.
As already noted, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace of Alcala. The
defendants waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The special counsel of the fiscal's
office based the informations on the record of the preliminary investigation elevated by the justice of the
peace to the Court of First Instance. It was not incumbent upon the fiscal to conduct another preliminary
investigation. On the basis of that record, "he may forthwith file the information in the Court of First
Instance" (People vs. Pervez, 110 Phil. 214, 218; People vs. Reginaldo, L-15960, April 29, 1961, 1
SCRA 1307; People vs. Mapa, L-15345, May 26, 1969, 5 SCRA 95).
Appellants' assignment of errors revolve around the issue of credibility. Their theory is that the
deceased Filemon Lazarte single handedly killed Martin Pasuquin and wounded Manuel Pasuquin and
that they merely witnessed the encounter between Filemon and the Pasuquin brothers. That theory is
based on Filemon's handwritten statement in the dialect dated November 1, 1962, or about three years
after the incident. In that statement Filemon declared:
I would like to declare before I die that my co-accused had no participation in the
killing because I was the one who killed Martin and wounded Manuel.
Yes, sir, it was all my fault. They do not have any participation when I killed Martin and
also Manuel (Exh. 1 and 1-A).
The appellants characterize Filemon's confession as a "dying declaration".
That characterization is not correct. Filemon's confession that he alone killed Martin Pasuquin and
wounded Manuel Pasuquin is an admission against his penal interest. It is not the dying declaration
contemplated in section 28, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Sec. 31, Rule 130, 1964 Rules of
Court) which constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 28 refers to the "declaration of a
dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death", which "may be received in a
criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death".
The declaration of Filemon Lazarte does not deal with the cause and circumstances surrounding his
death. It refers to the killing of Martin Pasuquin and the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin. Filemon Lazarte
was not the victim whose death is the subject of inquiry in these cases. He was one of the assailants.
He did not die as a consequence of the wounds sustained in the incident. He died of tuberculosis (Exh.
3, 4 and 7, pages 181, 216 and 261 Criminal Case No. U-400).
The trial court branded appellants' theory as "utterly incredible". The Solicitor General dismissed it as
"unnatural", "possible only within the realm of fantastic fiction" and, therefore, "obviously a fabrication".
The justification for such superlative epithets is that Martin Pasuquin sustained ten lacerated and
punctured wounds in the head, neck, trunk and arms and five gunshot wounds in the neck, while
Manuel Pasuquin had two wounds. It seems unbelievable that one person could have inflicted all those
wounds in an encounter with two antagonists, considering that the fight transpired in a matter of
minutes. Appellants' theory is negated by the fact that Bartolome Lazarte surrendered immediately after
the killing.
Moreover, no motive had been established as to why Filemon Lazarte would be the only person to
assault the Pasuquin brothers. Doria testified that he could not tell why Filemon Lazarte fought the
Pasuquin Brothers (10 t.s.n October 2, 1967). On the other hand, it is obvious that he collaborated with
Doria and his nephew, Bartolome Lazarte, in killing Martin Pasuquin because Doria, who was in a way
his relative by affinity, wanted to chastise Martin for the wrongs supposedly committed by Martin against
Doria.
One circumstance which shows the irrationality of appellants' theory is that if, according to them, they
saw Filemon Lazarte fighting the Pasuquin brothers, it was quite strange that they did not bother to
succor Filemon. He was the uncle of Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, being the brother of their
father. He should be close to Doria who is the stepfather of his nephews. Yet Doria and the Lazarte
brothers, according to their theory, did not help Filemon at all. He did not sustain any wound.
The appellants point to certain contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Manuel
Pasuquin and Antonio Reyes.
For example, the appellants alleged that the testimonies of Reyes and Manuel Pasuquin do not agree
on the number of bullcarts, the time when the bullcarts arrived at Bersamin, the place where Martin
Pasuquin was positioned at the time he was shot by Doria, and the question uttered by Doria before he
assaulted Martin.
Those inconsistencies refer to trivial and minor details that do not impair the credibility of Reyes and
Manuel Pasuquin. The discrepancies signify that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the truth
in their narrations. The discordances in their testimonies on collateral matters heighten their credibility
and show that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1973; 6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 138-141).
It was Doria who made inconsistent declarations. Aside from admitting at first that he was the owner of
the paltik revolver (Exh. A) and later denying that it was his property, Doria committed a flagrant
contradiction which reveals the fabricated nature of his defense. When he testified on February 10,
1965, he made it appear that he went to Barrio Bersamin to cut grass (82 tsn Abalos). That testimony
was corroborated by Rodolfo Fernandez, Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte (92, 98, 111 tsn.
Abalos).
But when Doria testified on October 2, 1967 (his testimony had to be retaken because of the loss of the
stenographic notes of his testimony on direct examination), he declared that he went to Barrio Bersamin
to buy pigs (2 tsn). The discrepancy is not minor. It refers to a vital detail of Doria's defense. It shows his
deliberate distortion of the truth. The prosecution established that Doria an his companions went to
Barrio Bersamin on that fateful morning of November 26, 1959 for the sole purpose of assassinating the
Pasuquin brothers. Doria did not buy any pigs. Neither did he and his companions cut grass.
The Court has painstakingly scrutinized the evidence. It is convinced that the culpability of the
appellants for the killing of Martin Pasuquin and the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant Doria contends that credence should have been given to the medical certificate dated
November 27, 1959, that he suffered contusions with hematoma in the neck and abdomen (Exh. 2), as
proof that he was maltreated while under custody. He claims that he admitted ownership of
the paltikgun, as indicated in his sworn statement, because he was under duress. Doctor Estacio
testified that the contusions described in the medical certificate could possibly have been self-inflicted.
The chief of police and the Constabulary soldier, who investigated Doria, denied that the latter was
maltreated. Doria did not complain to the justice of the peace, before whom his statement was sworn to
(page 2, Record of Criminal Case No. 400), that he was maltreated. The circumstance that in his
statement he did not admit that he shot Martin Pasuquin is an indicium of its voluntariness.
The crime of illegal possession of a firearm, imputed to Doria, was proven beyond reasonable doubt by
his written confession and his oral admission to the chief of police that he used the paltik revolver (Exh.
A). He was not able to produce any license or permit for its possession (People vs. Ramos, 62 O. G.
6326; 8 SCRA 758). The chief of police testified that Doria was not among the residents of Alcala who
held licenses to possess firearms.
No license may be issued for a paltik revolver (People vs. Fajardo, L-18257, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA
494). The admission of the accused that he had killed a person with an unlicensed firearm is sufficient
evidence to prove the offense of illegal possession of a firearm (People vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 195).
The crime of illegal possession of a firearm (which is not a rifle, etc.) is "punished by imprisonment for a
period of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a
fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the
court" (Sec. 2692, Revised Administrative Code). A conviction carries with it "the forfeiture of the
prohibited article or articles to the Philippine Government" (Sec. 2692, Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 4).
In Criminal Case No. U-400, now L-26188, the indeterminate penalty of one year to five years and a fine
of one thousand pesos, imposed on Doria by the trial court, should be modified as to the minimum
range, which should be one year and one day. (See Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225).
The informations for murder and frustrated murder in the other two cases qualify the offenses with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation. The trial court found that there was
premeditation in the killing of Martin Pasuquin and in the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin. It held that the
sudden attack on the Pasuquin brothers was treacherous.
In Criminal Case No. U-402, now L-26190, the assault made by Bernabe Lazarte on Manuel Pasuquin
while the latter's hands were held behind his back by Rodolfo Fernandez was treacherous because
Bernabe Lazarte and his companion employed a form of aggression tending to insure the execution of
the crime without any risk to themselves arising from any defense which Manuel Pasuquin might have
made (Par. 16, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Oracion and Lambino, 18 U.S. 530; People vs.
Zosimo Gonzales, 92 Phil. 1078; U.S vs. Valdez and Gamit, 40 Phil. 876; People vs. Carandang, 54
Phil. 503; U.S vs. Feria, 2 Phil. 54). Treachery absorbs the abuse of superior strength employed by
Lazarte and Fernandez.
The crime committed against Manuel Pasuquin is frustrated murder because Bernabe Lazarte
performed all the acts of execution which would have consummated the killing. It was not consummated
due to a timely medical attendance, a circumstance independent of Lazarte's will (Art. 6, Revised Penal
Code).
The trial court found that Bernabe Lazarte was only thirteen years old when he committed the crime on
November 26, 1959. He acted with discernment. Inasmuch as he had long passed the age of sixteen
years, he is no longer entitled to a suspended sentence (Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Estefa, 86 Phil. 104; People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 125). But he is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority or a two-degree reduction of the penalty (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code).
The indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court is correct insofar as the minimum penalty of six
month of arresto mayor is concerned. It is one day short as to the maximum range, which should be
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, instead of four (4)
years and two (2) months only (Art. 248, in relation to art. 61 and the table facing art. 76, Revised Penal
Code).
As recommended by the Solicitor General, that part of the trial court's judgment, that Bernabe Lazarte
should serve subsidiary imprisonment for the indemnity of two thousand pesos in case he is insolvent,
should be eliminated. Republic Act No. 5465, which took effect April 21, 1969 amended article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code by abolishing the subsidiary imprisonment for the indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. U-401, now L-26189, the crime committed by Francisco Doria and Bartolome
Lazarte is murder qualified by treachery.<re||an1w> They perpetrated a deliberate and sudden
aggression on Martin Pasuquin who insured the consummation of the killing without any risk to
themselves. Treachery may be appreciated in a sudden frontal assault (People vs. Noble, 77 Phil. 193).
As in L-26190, abuse of superiority is merged with treachery. As no mitigating circumstances and
generic aggravating circumstances can be appreciated with respect to Doria, he should be sentenced
toreclusion perpetua (Arts. 64 [1] and 248, Revised Penal Code). "Life imprisonment" is not a correct
term (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).
The trial court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant Bartolome Lazarte. He is entitled to an indeterminate sentence. The penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum imposed on him
by the trial court, is within the proper range.
However, the indemnity imposed on Doria and Bartolome Lazarte should be raised to twelve thousand
pesos.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is modified as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. U-400, now L-26188 for illegal possession of a firearm, the minimum range of
the penalty should be one (1) year and one (1) day. The paltik revolver and ammunition (Exh. A and C)
are forfeited to the Government.
b) In Criminal Case No. U-401, now L-26189, for murder, the indemnity is raised to P12,000. The
penalty imposed should be designated as reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment.
(c) In Criminal Case No. U-402, now L-26190, for frustrated murder, the maximum range of the
indeterminate penalty imposed on appellant Bernabe Lazarte should be four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum. The provision for subsidiary imprisonment is
eliminated.
In other respects the judgment of the lower court in the three cases is affirmed with costs against
appellants Francisco Doria, Bernabe Lazarte and Bartolome Lazarte. So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t