Adm. Case No. 5151. October 19, 2004.

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR.,

MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR
vs.
ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA
HELD:

Yes.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs.
Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons
particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar
through unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the
charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence
presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic)
that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of
the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the
practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the
pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required

in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction.

Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn
delaFuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in
the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and
stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with
his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. 13 It should be noted that said publication is under the
control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be
reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article
in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn delaFuente as his
wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be
edited out.

G.R. No. 89114. December 2, 1991

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR.

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD:

No.

Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the
basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence
of which, the entire cause of action rests. while the term evidentiary fact has
been defined as those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate
facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based.

Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the
complaint must succumb to a motion to
dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the
allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the
proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of
particulars.

Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioners acts in execution of the
alleged systematic plan to accumulate illgotten wealth, or which are supposed to
constitute flagrant breach of public trust, gross and scandalous abuse of right
and power, and violations of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines. The
complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the
particular rights he abused.

The allegations of the complaint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient
because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions,
unsupported by factual premises.

G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ
HELD:

No.

The Court therefore heldthat the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during
an illegal search and seizure. Therefore, the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution is in the negative because, the said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error
on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
G.R. No. 113213. August 15, 1994.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH
139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

HELD:

Yes.
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are
relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that
the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioners extradition.
Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the
petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia
were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to
have been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner,
the trial court correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal
laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and
false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The petitioners contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a

criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can
legally pass judgment of acquittal or conviction stretches the meaning of the
phrase wanted for prosecution beyond that intended by the treaty provisions
because the relevant provisions merely require a warrant for the arrest or a copy of
the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited. Furthermore, the
Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets attest to the fact that petitioner is not only
wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal
prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in
the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a
copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a
criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting
the phrase wanted for prosecution to persons charged with an information or a
criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for
the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.

G.R. No. 121099. February 17, 1999

FIDEL T. SALAMERA
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD:

There is none.

Admittedly, there was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of the gun to
enable the court to fix the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Assuming that
petitioner malversed the gun, in malversation, the penalty for the offense is
dependent on the value of the public funds, money or property malversed. In this
case, the Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum value of the gun
in the absence of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market
value and estimated its reasonable value at P5,000.00. This is a grievous error.

The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be
duly proved in evidence as a fact. The court cannot take judicial notice of a disputed
fact. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the court must receive evidence of disputed
facts with notice to the parties.This is an innovation introduced in the Revised Rules
of Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which should not be
unknown to the lower courts.The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it
was decided in 1995, six years after its effectivity.

G.R. No. 122648 August 17, 2000

W-RED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA INDUSTRIES, INC.

HELD:

No. The documents are admissible.

While only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record
shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. Hence,
it is not accurate to say that the original exhibits were not presented before the trial
court.

G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998

HELD:

No.

As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the courts duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form
opinions upon the facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I, 1989
ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in
many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that
either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of
the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment (Ibid., p. 886).

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of
the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of
the victims laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses,
especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the
testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial
court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts
enumerated various possible causes of the victims laceration does not mean that
the trial courts inference is wrong.

G.R. No. 127130. October 12, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ERNESTO EBIAS y MAGANA

HELD:

Yes.

The Court cannot say that Ronaldo Narez was mistaken in identifying accused-
appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin. After all, he never deviated
from his testimony that he saw accused-appellant when the latter shot them. The
crime was committed at noontime with the shooter a mere fifteen meters away
from his victims. Ronaldo Narez was thus able to see his attacker in full view. We
cannot, therefore, discount Ronaldo Narezs positive identification of accused-
appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin.

There is thus a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo
Narezs positive identification because there we circumstances that cloud his
identification of the accused vis--vis the alleged confession made by Leonardo
Eliseo since no less than a life is at stake.

G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ
HELD:

No.
The Court therefore heldthat the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during
an illegal search and seizure. Therefore, the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution is in the negative because, the said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error
on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

G.R. No. 132671. November 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
CRISANTO BAULA, RUBEN BAULA, ROBERT BAULA and DANILO DACUCOS

HELD:

1. Yes.

True, the rule has generally been that where the culpability or innocence of an
accused hinges on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimony, the assessment made by the trial court thereover is entitled to a great
degree of respect and, absent strong justifications to the contrary, it will not be
disturbed on appeal. The reason is simple. A trial court gets an opportunity, not
equally open to an appellate court, to observe the expression of witnesses at the
stand, including their demeanor under questioning, that makes up a most
significant factor in the proper evaluation of testimonial evidence. Obviously,
however, this rule will not apply where one judge hears the testimony of the
witnesses and another judge pens the decision for, in such a case, the thesis for the
rule is not in the least extant.

2. Yes.

Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he can be charged.

An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the

strength of the evidence yielded by that search.

G.R. No. 153911. December 10, 2004.

MELANIO MALLARI y LIBERATO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
HELD:

1. Yes.

In the case before us, petitioners co-accusedZaldy and Leonardo Bontia

executed, prior to trial, their respective extrajudicial confessions admitting their
complicity in the crime charged and implicating petitioner as the mastermind. On
the other hand, in denying their accusations, petitioner stood his ground and
refused to execute a statement. Precisely, their antagonistic defenses must have
impelled him to seek, and the trial court to grant him, a separate trial.

After reading the testimonies of Pagal, Alabado and the two Bontias and reviewing
the rulings, we find that the trial and the appellate courts could not have taken
those testimonies into substantial consideration, if at all, in convicting the
petitioner. In fact, the testimonies of Pagal and Alabado were merely corroborative
of those of the other witnesses who were presented during petitioners trial. On the
other hand, the declarations of Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia in open court were, on
their face, favorable to him. And the lower courts cognizance of those declarations
would not have prejudiced him, as petitioner asserts. However, despite the denials
by the Bontias, the lower courts still found them, including petitioner, guilty.

The Court therefore found no basis at all for the allegation of petitioner that the trial
and the appellate courts convicted him on the ground of evidence adduced at his
co-accuseds separate trial, but supposedly not during his own trial.

A close perusal of the testimonies of the witnesses presented against petitioner

reveals the absence of direct evidence establishing his criminal participation.
Nonetheless, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may still be based on
circumstantial evidence. But to warrant such conviction, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

2. No.
Corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must
exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.Hence, if the
totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility
of innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted.

As we have said earlier, witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they
have personal knowledge. Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is
based, not on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some
other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidencewhether
objected to or nothas no probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, as provided in the
Rules of Court. Clearly, none of the exceptions apply to the present case.
Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded
probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as
a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its
contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contents suspect and of no probative value.

G.R. No. 169494. July 24, 2007

CABALEN MANAGEMENT CO., INC., MA. ESTELA O. NIEVERA, IAN

TIONGSON, ADJI TIONGSON, ESTER O. NIEVERA and ANASTACIA NAVAL,
ADRIANO JR. CORPORATION, LEDA A. PANGILINAN, EVA S. CANDELARIA,
ROSE MARIE MORALES, DANILO SUNUBA, LETECIA DAVID, MARLON
BULANADI, MA. THERESA L. GADDI and CONSUELO HALILI REYES
vs.
JESUS P. QUIAMBAO, GERALDINE M. PALERMO, RODEL B. PANGILINAN,
WILLIAM F. LACSON, ROCHELLE B. DE LEON, JOCELYN B. DEANG, EDGAR
E. DE GUZMAN, VIZIER INOCENCIO, VINCENT EDWARD C. MAPUA and
JESSEBEL G. OBIEN

HELD:

Yes.

With respect to the statements of Balen and Malana and the audit report,
petitioners need only to be reminded that evidence, even if not objected to, may
still carry no probative value. For admissibility, should not be equated with weight,
of evidence.

Moreover, as respondents correctly point out in their Opposition, they have

vehemently objected to the statements of petitioners witnesses in their Reply for
being self-serving, undated, wanting in material particulars and not executed under
oath. The same Reply bears out the fact that respondents objected to the audit
report for being self-serving.

Even assuming that the originals of the statements of Balen and Malana were
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, still the copies extant in the records are lacking in
material particulars, specifically the dates of execution and the persons before
whom they were executed.

Notably, these particulars are determinative of whether the statements as well as

the audit report had indeed precipitated the investigation of respondents as
petitioners had claimed; or were presented only after the cases for illegal dismissal
were filed as respondents had contended.
 G.R. No. 86939. August 2, 1993.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO DUCAY,
accused. SANTOS DUCAY, accused-appellant.
HELD:
Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit
to Edwin and Linas testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it should,
pursuant to the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus likewise disregard their
testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit him. In People vs.
Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but
rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In People vs.
Pacada, we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts
and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs. Osias, we ruled that: It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when
witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is
not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. The primordial
consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he
positively identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged
xxx. Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary: It may be
said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless;first, in point of validity,
because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no
one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and
secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any
event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form
of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a
misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the
hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points
wholly unimportant in themselves.

G.R. No. 104494. September 10, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PAUL BANDIN Y
NARCISO @ ABLING, accused-appellant.

HELD:

1. No. With regard to the appellants signature on the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report (Exh. G), the Court reiterates its ruling in People vs. Rualo, 152 SCRA
635, that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor
confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a
statement of the accuseds being booked and of the date which accompanies
the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of
arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extrajudicial
statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction.

2. No. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying
marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his arrest. The
warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid.
 3. No. The field test conducted by Sgt. Tuzon is judicially admissible. This Court
has held that a chemical analysis is not an indispensable prerequisite to the
establishment of whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a
prohibited drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without
a knowledge of chemistry to such an extent that testimony of a witness on
the point may be entitled to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not
required, and the degree of familiarity of a witness with such drugs only
affects the weight and not the competency of his testimony.

G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA,
accused-appellant.

HELD:
1. No. Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and
ownership of the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of
Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding
the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it
deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also
conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim,
aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of
stenographic notes.

2. Yes. Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and
ownership of the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of
Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding
the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it
deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also
conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim,
aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of
stenographic notes.

G.R. No. 117010. April 18, 1997.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGR. CARLOS
GARCIA y PINEDA, PATRICIO BOTERO y VALES, LUISA MIRAPLES (at large),
accused, PATRICIO BOTERO y VALES, accused-appellant.
HELD:
No.
In effect, accused-appellant Botero wants this court to apply the doctrine of falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one part, false in everything) and to disregard the
entire testimony of Esclada. Under present jurisprudence, this maxim of law is rarely
adhered to by the courts. It is possible to admit and lend credence to the testimony
of a witness whom the Court has earlier found to have willfully perjured himself. x
xx (T)he testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part,
depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and
improbabilities of the case. In the case at bar, we hold that the trial court did not
err in giving credence to the testimony of Esclada against appellant Botero since it
was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of other witnesses. In fact,
Escladas testimony against Botero is trustworthy as he gave it after his conscience
bothered him for not telling the truth.

G.R. No. 119845. July 5, 1996

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

HELD:

Yes. The aforequoted declarations of Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are
conclusive. Such admission is binding and no amount of contradictory evidence can
offset it.
. . . Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no
evidence being required to prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212
SCRA 194; 204 [1992])
We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open
court, more so after the opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and
accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission
made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof. The record
here does not show any attempt on the part of SBTC to contradict such judicial
admission on the ground of palpable mistake.

G.R. No. 121099. February 17, 1999

FIDEL T. SALAMERA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, respondent
HELD:

There is none.

Admittedly, there was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of the gun to
enable the court to fix the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Assuming that
petitioner malversed the gun, in malversation, the penalty for the offense is
dependent on the value of the public funds, money or property malversed. In this
case, the Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum value of the gun
in the absence of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market
value and estimated its reasonable value at P5,000.00. This is a grievous error.

The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be
duly proved in evidence as a fact. The court cannot take judicial notice of a disputed
fact. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the court must receive evidence of disputed
facts with notice to the parties.This is an innovation introduced in the Revised Rules
of Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which should not be
unknown to the lower courts.The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it
was decided in 1995, six years after its effectivity.

G.R. No. 134974. December 8, 2000*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO ARAPOK y
CUTAMORA, accused-appellant
HELD:

1. No. In robbery with homicide, what is essential is that there be a direct

relation, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the
latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crime be
committed at the same time.

There is no question that the original and principal intention of the five armed
men was to rob the Mesionas, as is evident from the testimony of
Claudelia Mesiona that as soon as the five men entered their house
somebody shouted Hold-up! As the robbery resulted in the killing of PO3 Romeo
Calcitas, as charged in the information, the offense committed by the
malefactors is indubitably the specialcomplex crime of robberywith
homicide.

2. Yes. We are disconcerted by the uncertain testimony of ClaudeliaMesiona.

Initially, she identified a person other than herein accused-appellant as one of
the culprits. Subsequently, she admitted that the incident happened so fast
and over a year ago that she did not really get a good look of the malefactors
who stayed downstairs. Based on the foregoing, we cannot rule out mistaken
identity.

We find that the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant, which is

a show-up, falls short of totality of circumstances test. Specifically, there
was no prior description given by the witness to the police at any time after
the incident; and we cannot discount the possibility that the police may
have influenced the identification under the circumstances by which accused-
appellant was presented to him. This Court has held in People vs.
Salguero that this kind of identification, where the attention of the
witness is directed to a lone suspect, is suggestive. Also, in People vs.
Nino this Court described this type of out-of-court identification as being
pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated
visual imagination, and, all told, subverted their reliability as eye-witnesses.

In cases such as the instant one, where the identification made by the
principal eyewitness ClaudeliaMesiona was uncertain, a little extra effort on
the part of the prosecution to acquire appropriate corroborating evidence
goes far towards achieving the proper ends of justice. 30 Whatever flaw attended
the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant could have easily been cured
by a subsequent positive identification in court by EdithoMesiona himself.
Stated in another way, inadmissibility or unreliability of an out-of-court
identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.
 Once again we stress that the correct identification of the author of a crime
should be the primal concern of criminal prosecution in any civilized legal
system.Corollary to this is the actuality of the commission of the offense
with the participation of the accused. All these must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace
from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the accused
may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the people to
demonstrateguilt and notfor the accused to establish innocence.

G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias
KAWIT, appellant.
HELD:
No.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment,
conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit.
An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, so long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be
appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.
Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence.In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under
Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case
at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. November 11, 2005

ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HELD:
Yes.
In Mari v. Court of Appeals,petitioner therein was found guilty of slander by deed
penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code (Penal Code) by either
imprisonment or fine. In view of the fact that the offense was done in the heat of
anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court opted to impose the
penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.
In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friends house was bombed
resulting in the death of three people. This incident allegedly impelled him, out of
moral and social duty, to call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the
intention of exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by private
respondents against the electorate of Makati City.
We find that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which
the libelous publications were based similarly warrant the imposition of the penalty
of fine only, instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355 of
the Penal Code. The intensely feverish passions evoked during the electionperiod in
1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter.

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004

ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
HELD:

1. No. With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel or other similar
offenses shall prescribe in one year. In determining when the one year
prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91
of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive
periods of offenses.
The meaning of the phrase shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information in Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case of People
v. Olarte, where the Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation on the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein held
that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.

2. No. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the
presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation
qualifies as privileged communication.
 In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly
privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral,
or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power
to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice

J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.,

VITALIADO P. ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

HELD:

Yes. The general rule that the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader is not an absolute and inflexible
ruleand is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence,
provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (Italics supplied)
In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be
contradicted by showing that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no
such admission was made, i.e., not in the sense in which the admission was made
to appear or the admission was taken out of context.
In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an
error in appreciating the Answer filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission
of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading
filed by Atty. Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there
was neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the
application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial admission may be
contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context and no
admission was made at all.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
respondents.

HELD:

No. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject
petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement
between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
 obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not

admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While
parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. No
such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

No. 4123. November 16, 1907

LA YEBANA COMPANY, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TIMOTEOSEVILLA ET
AL., defendants and appellants.

Yes. In the case at bar we think the usual and ordinary construction of the language
used in setting out the alleged agreement as to the form of payment gave to Sevilla
the alternative right either to pay at the rate of P500 weekly or to pay from time to
time all money recovered from his debtors in Bataan.

But we would be compelled to reverse the judgment upon the mere allegation of the
defense of the existence of an agreement, by virtue of which Sevilla had the right to
pay his indebtedness in weekly installments of P500, without an allegation as to an
alternative mode of payment. It appears from the pleadings that the alleged
agreement as to the mode of payment of the admitted indebtedness was entered
into on the 23d day of February, 1907. The complaint was filed on the 21st day of
March, 1907, so that not quite four weeks had elapsed from the date of the alleged
agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint. Where a debt is payable in
installments, recovery can be had only for those installments due and payable when
the action was commenced, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the
contract.It is evident, therefore; that, since it does not appear from the pleadings
that it was expressly stipulated that upon the failure to pay any one of the weekly
installments the whole debt should thereupon become at once due and payable, the
most that could be recovered would be the sum of P1,500, being the weekly
installments of P500 for the three full weeks which had elapsed from the date of the
agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint.

No. L-70270. November 11, 1988.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO TURLA Y BATI,
defendant-appellant.
HELD:
No. As the trial court correctly found, "even if the documents, more particularly the
Booking and Arrest Report and the Receipt for Custody, are disregarded, there is
more than enough evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction. As already stated,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused in the offense charged.

PC Sgt. VenustoJamisolamin, detailed with the Third Narcotics Regional Unit

stationed at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, declared that when they
apprehended the accused in the morning of 24 September 1984, they found a big
plastic bag containing marijuana leaves in the trunk compartment of the car the
accused was driving.

It is claimed for the defense that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
contradictory and conflicting so that they do not deserve credence. It would appear,
however, that the contradictory and conflicting statements pointed out by counsel
for the accused-appellant refer to minor details which cannot destroy the credibility
of witnesses. Again, the issue posed is one of credibility of witnesses which, as this
Court has often said, is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial
judge, who had first-hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and
behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense, at the time of their
testimony. We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial judge.

Nos. L-32957-8. July 25, 1984.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PANTALEON PACIS,
ELISEO (ELY) NAVARRO, GUILLERMO AGDEPPA, and GINES DOMINGUEZ,
defendants, GUILLERMO AGDEPPA, defendant-appellant.
HELD:
No. The maxim of falsus in unofalsus in omnibus, however, is not a positive rule of
law. Neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. If a part of a witness
testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ARTURO MAUYAO y

LORENZO, accused-appellant.

HELD:

No. Minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declaration of

witnesses do not destroy their credibility, but even enhance their
truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

Minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declaration of witnesses

do not destroy their credibility, but even enhance their truthfulness as
they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Trial Court except in
case of an evident abuse thereof. This Court, in a long line of decisions,
has repeatedly held that the findings of fact of a trial judge who has
seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and
conduct while on the witness stand are not disturbed on appeal, unless
certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if
considered, may affect the outcome of the case.

G.R. No. 103959. August 21, 1997

SPOUSES REGALADO SANTIAGO and ROSITA PALABYAB, JOSEFINA ARCEGA,
petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. CAMILO C.
MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19,
and QUIRICO ARCEGA, respondents.
HELD:
The rule on parole evidence under Section 9, Rule 130 is qualified by the following
exceptions:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c)The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.
In this case, private respondent QuiricoArcega was able to put in issue in his
complaint before the Regional Trial Court the validity of the subject deeds of sale for
being a simulated transaction.
Moreover, the parol evidence rule may be waived by failure to invoke it, as by
failure to object to the introduction of parol evidence. And, where a party who is
entitled to the benefit of the rule waives the benefit thereof by allowing such
evidence to be received without objection and without any effort to have it stricken
from the minutes or disregarded by the trial court, he cannot, after the trial has
closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to
secure a reversal of the judgment by an appellate court.15 Here, the records are
devoid of any indication that petitioners ever objected to the admissibility of parole
evidence introduced by the private respondent in open court. The court cannot
disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has
been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Petitioners
have no one to blame but themselves in this regard.

G.R. No. 122290. April 6, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BAGO y
MADRID, accused-appellant. ARMANDO CAPARAS y CUENCO and RODOLFO
ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative.
It is well settled that before conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
others, as the author of the crime. Thus, the following requisites must be met: 1)
there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on this chain of
events:
1. Azkcon Metal Industries is engaged in metal business and for this purpose
contracted a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply whereby
Azkcon purchases the cold rolled sheets from the latter and the cold rolled sheets
are cut by Power Construction Supply;
2.Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with Power
Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting Department; and that as
such he was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to pull
out from the Power Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the same to
Azkcon;
3. On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees,
DaniloBaylosis and CandidoQuerobin entered the Azkcon premises with deliveries of
two cold rolled sheets loaded in the truck. Security Guard Manangan inspected the
materials in the truck and after confirming that the materials were loaded in the
truck, he stamped the receipts upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused
Bago brought out another receipt and requested Security Guard Manangan to
likewise stamp the same. Security Guard Manangan checked the goods covered by
the third receipt and found there were no cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The
third receipt carried a different date. Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago
as to the whereabouts of the materials covered by the third receipt and the latter
replied that they had long been delivered. Nevertheless, Security Guard Manangan
stamped this last receipt because he trusted that accused would not do anything
bad;
4. On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon, discovered
that there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were
delivered inside the company compound. The materials covered by the two (2)
receipts were delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo
conducted an inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials
in question. Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been delivered. Hilo
proceeded with his investigation and was able to secure from the Power
Construction Supply Company Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992
(Exh. D) which shows that the materials covered by the third receipt were taken
out by accused Bago from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23,
1992;
5. Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a document dated
March 23, 1992 (Exh. E) which contained information on the truck used in pulling
out the materials from Power Construction Supply on March 22, 1992 (sic). The
truck bears Plate No. PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the
certificate of registration secured from the Land Transportation Office, the truck is
owned by a certain Ruel Fernando who has no contractual relations with Azkcon.
Said vehicle is likewise not authorized to pull out materials from the Power
Construction Supply.
The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by Exhibit C.
The best evidence rule cannot be invoked unless the content of a writing is the
subject of judicial inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the original writing
itselfit finds no application where what is being questioned is the weight given by
the trial court to the testimony of a witness over the receipt which on its face shows
that certain materials in question were delivered.The rule cannot be invoked
unless the content of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case, the
bestevidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains to the admissibility of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. In the case at bar, no
secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of a document. What is being
questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the testimony of
Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question
were delivered to Azkcons premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no
application on this issue.

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
respondents.

HELD:

No. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject
petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement
between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not

admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While
parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the
petitioners in this case.

G.R. No. 135481. October 23, 2001

LIGAYA S. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
GERIATRICS FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

HELD:

Yes.

The Rules of Court provides, in case the original of the document is lost:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. -- When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence,

there must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of
the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court;
and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
offeror.Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.

In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been
established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto. The
loss of said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who
attested to the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copyof the contract at
the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center. These copies were lost in the chaos that
ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from its office. Without a place to
immediately move to, its files and records were left for sometimeon the street
where they were susceptible to theft. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted
to prove the contents of the contract.

The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of
witnesses,in the order stated.

There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease
contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of
petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified amount payable every
month, and the conformity to these terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed
thereon.Thus, even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the
trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of
testimonial evidence.

Petitioner's emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy of the contract is

misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy
thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.At best, the original copy of the
contract that was later found merely affirms what had already been established by
secondary evidence.

G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondents
HELD:
No.
Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective
intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal
cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases
involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of
the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with
some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary
but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is
part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not
furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be
sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The
three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached
as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T.
Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary
were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private
respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited
in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary,
published on February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. It
was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary
but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still
its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its
probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are
three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence,and (3) absence of the oath. Not all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of
hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine
whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more
circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule
130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he
would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period
promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by
Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and
Pagodnapagodnaako. Ayokona, masyadonangmasakit. Pagodnaakosa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of thisits too painful.
Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my
name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared
that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason
for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another
person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person. Jones explains that the basis for
admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. To use
the blunt language ofMueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
mumbo jumbo but common sense. In the Angara Diary, the options of the
petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him
as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask
Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified
exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said
he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter aliosacta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an
alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by
the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned
Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told
Secretary Angara: Mulaumpisa pa langngkampanya, Ed,
ikawnalangpinakikingganko. At hanggangsahuli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the
campaign, Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you
still are.) This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary
Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the
petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after
taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary
quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: Ed, kailangankona bang
umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.
Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that
met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary
shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of
their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the
crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently,
petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding
on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz.:
What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his
principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the
scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of
the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dumfervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal
and admissible in evidence against such principal.
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether
they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are
the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence
of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: a. Statement of a
person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his
physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from which an
inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge,
belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identity
the date, place and person in question; and e. Statements showing the lack of
credibility of a witness.
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angary
Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing
so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book
on evidence, states that: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the
trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that: A proper
foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the
identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-
requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263,
and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered
instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted
in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).
Petitioner cites the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro, which frowned on reliance by
courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the
service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between
the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the
cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording
the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument. . . (this is) not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith
and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to
object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated
February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental
Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental Memorandum
dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of
Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara
Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise
his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as
evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.

G.R. No. 159288. October 19, 2004

JOHNSON LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE
MARKETING, INC., respondents.

HELD:

In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by
the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in
evidence the photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence
in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine
qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the
resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The
remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of the charge
invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is
convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be
properly raised.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic
copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or
fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the
originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention
of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The
importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the
fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards
of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best
evidence rule.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a)
the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places. It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of the
action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.
G.R. Nos. 113472-73. December 20, 1994
ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN, DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit B and its translation,
Exhibit C, because these documents had not been properly authenticated.
Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 [1993]).
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of
the deed of sale, Exhibit B.
The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons
who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or by
any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it
and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar,
supra).

GR No. 11889. January 10, 1918

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant and appellee,
vs. CARMEN MARTINEZ and DOLORES MARTINEZ, claimants and appellants.
JULIO SALVADOR, claimant and appellee.
HELD:
No.
As the failure of the oppositor to present the original document in question was not
accounted for; as it is not proper to suppose that the original could not have been
presented within a reasonable time if he had exercised due diligence for he or his
counsel had the means, opportunity and time to find the original if it really existed;
as no proof was adduced that said document had been lost, or destroyed, or that
proper search therefor was made in the general files of notarial documents in the
City of Manila, or that an attempt was made to secure a copy thereof if it existed in
said files; as the notary, Gregorio Yulo, a person well known in Iloilo, was not asked
directly and clearly as to the whereabouts of said document or some particular or
data about it in order to obtain from him some conclusive and categorical answer;
as said notary has not been presented at the trial to be examined on these points;
and, lastly, as it was not shown that the party interested in the presentation of said
document, who is Julio Salvador, had made a diligent and proper, but fruitless,
search for said document in any place where it could probably be foundtherefore
the secondary evidence presented by the oppositor, consisting of the testimony of
the witnesses, Saez and Madrenas, and the certified copy issued by the registrar of
deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is of no value f or the purposes intended and such
evidence was improperly considered by the court in reaching the conclusion that
said Julio Salvador was the owner of the lots in question.
"The best obtainable evidence should be adduced to prove every disputed fact, and
a failure to produce it, but an attempt instead to sustain the issue by inferior
evidence, will authorize the inference that the party does not furnish the best-
evidence because it would tend to defeat instead of sustaining, the issue on his
part. In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to to each particuar
fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary
in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10,
p 903, par. 54, and cases therein cited.)
"Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in
the actual production of the instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary
evidence of its contents cannot be admitted until the nonproduction of the original
has been satisfactorily accounted for." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 903, par. 55,
and cases therein cited.)
"Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the
original cannot be produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered, within a
reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. And ordinarily secondary
evidence is not admissible until the nonproduction of the primary evidence has
been sufficiently accounted for." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 911, par. 66, and
cases therein cited.)
"Under the earlier English decisions no degrees of Secondary evidence are
recognized. The American courts, however, have asserted that secondary evidence,
to be admissible, must be the best legal evidence obtainable under the
circumstances.

No. L-21438. September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs..RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
HELD:
No.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down, Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in
evidence.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK),

petitioner, vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES,1
AND SPOUSE, respondents.
HELD:
Yes.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best
evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to
establish the terms of the writingmeaning the alleged promissory note as it is the
basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents
herein).
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year
1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was quoted as stating
that they should take into consideration the usages of trade and that the best
proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only required. Over the years, the
phrase was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule that
the terms of a document must be proved by the production of the document itself,
in preference to evidence about the document; it was also utilized to designate the
hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court and not subject to
the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the
group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to
that of others.
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule
that the best evidence phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of
the original writing the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more
than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words
may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting,
and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection, largely
avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference
for the original writing is justified.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the
justification for the best evidence rule, we declare that this rule finds no
application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the
terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far
as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear
enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings,
respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the
promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign
the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the
precise wording33 of the promissory note which should have paved the way for
the application of the best evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court
of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is
not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As
pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity
by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit
A was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application
one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the
execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for
petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial
admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that
petitioner failed to present the original of said note.