Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Oces for The True
Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW).
Ceferino Padua Law Oce, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Oce and Antonio R.
Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna led the present
petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including
those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualication of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benet the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded the
case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any qualication, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not
only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. The Court
stressed that the very reason for the establishment of the party-list system is the
fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have
more in law. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them
not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specic concerns of their constituencies; and simply to
give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger aairs of the State. The State
cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social
justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to assist the Comelec in its
work of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the qualications of the party-
list participants.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. These cases present an exception to the
rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially
involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat
in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count
their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"
is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law denes "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office."
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY
REPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In
other words, while they are not disqualied merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in
the party-list system.
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST
NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualied under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualication as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It
advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or
organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
ocers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to
exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of the party-
list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by
citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its ocials in the aairs of a party-list candidate
is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of
the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IS
RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. A problem was placed before
the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district
system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
under representation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and
party-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission
chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is
reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of
the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats
system when it provides in Art. IX, C, 6 that "A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benet them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence,
but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus,
allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district
elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualication of private respondents, arguing mainly that the
party-list system was intended to benet the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration led by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to
the Comelec, "[v]erications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last
party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the
legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations
takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)
divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on
political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition
of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations led their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also led Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties led their Manifestations beyond
the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed
March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party led before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
'Certied List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes
cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's
nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-
Youth also led a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualication
cases to le Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for
hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatised with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party led a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on
the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also led before this Court a Petition, 12
docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of
the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to le
their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may
proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections,
but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specied in this
Decision.ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had led before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven
the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally
resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Oce of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been
held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public
interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20
percent of the House of Representatives.
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Oce of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution
and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualied from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
"MR. TADEO.
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34
He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have ve or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law denes "political party" as
"an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the rst ve (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in
the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of
the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, .
. . , to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of
the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Oce of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens specically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives.
The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim
that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to
treat them similarly dees reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality
is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and inrmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specic concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger aairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm
hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement
to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental dierence between the congressional district elections and the party-
list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections
and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it
would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it those
privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders
to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benet of outsiders
only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such
special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the
"outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for
the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the
chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the
law to en h an ce it. The party-list system is a tool for the benet of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot
let that icker of hope be snued out. The clear state policy must permeate every
discussion of the qualication of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of
the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding
thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched
in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law . Pursuant
thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law rst. Only when we nd its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted
to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benet the nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well dened.
Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express
their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning
and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG
as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized
and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualication of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the ve (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the
May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting ocial Comelec Election Returns, Certicates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers . . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the
party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the
purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section
26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources
and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should rst be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court nds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec
in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identied in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by
laws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must
demonstrate that in a conict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In
other words, while they are not disqualied merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as
the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in
the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated
by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in order to
circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their
inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will
that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
"MR. VILLACORTA.
REV. RIGOS.
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered." 59
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list
system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its ocials in the aairs of a party-list candidate
is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective
of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2
of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the
youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor
or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State
policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-dened political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benet the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one
such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of
our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and
the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is
an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualication, open to
all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized
and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the
party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization.
In eect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty oering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance
with the foregoing disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente
M. Mendoza.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People
Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a
cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation
in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a
single party in power a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI,
Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter
Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C.
Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats
in the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a
selected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would
continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they
would have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation in
Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the
legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the
terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). First, the system should only apply to
the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives,
second, it would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and,
third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be represented in
voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations or
similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and
Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through the
Party-List System." In the May 1998 rst party-list elections, the sectors were
required, to test, for the rst time, their political mettle in an open electoral contest
with other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system. While the
elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness of
an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however, were
dierent. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for
registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six
of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY,
NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground
that their participation does not level the playing eld for less known and less
organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery.
Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors,
as well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter eld sectoral
candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualication of the large
major political parties and groups which do not represent any "genuine" sectoral
interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the
electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the
qualications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the
system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of
R.A. 7941 reads
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of
the 1987 Constitution took o from two staunch positions the rst headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was
opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the diculty in delimiting
the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into
full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the
sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an
electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the
bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the rst ve major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in
the party-list system for the rst party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent
seats for sectoral representatives made an eort towards a compromise that the
party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This
proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the
party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required
number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to
the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was
able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time
they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political
groups.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of
the party-list system. At rst glance, it gives the impression of being a combination
of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral
representation. The rst, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no
other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader participation and
representation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that every
underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-
based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specic sectors to be
represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to the
underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on
Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case
not later than sixty (60) days before election."EcTIDA
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, dening
a "sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties"
and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and
coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee
representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority
of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-
list representation.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves.
Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and
authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control
political power, parties add an important element of stability to a political system
and also help organize the government and electorate by recruiting candidates,
conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and generally educating
the public, stimulating voter participation and providing varying degrees of policy
direction to government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and
recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the multi-party as
allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a complex
society, including a range of ideological dierences, conicting political values and
philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit "A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people." 2 The
multi-party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the
House of Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not
have well-dened political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or
small parties.
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and
their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies,
becomes physically incapacitated, removed from oce by the party or the
organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualied during his term, his party can
send another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the
replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC
upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
aliations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also, if a person changes his
sectoral aliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for
nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization. 10
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as
they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged
deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but
before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political
agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-prot
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party
representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors.
Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection with the
election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R. No.
147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the registration of the following parties classied as "political parties"
and "organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),
R.A. No. 7941, 5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to
participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration not
later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, 4 of the same law
requires that any party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with
the COMELEC should declare its intention to participate in the party-list system 90
days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the
applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties,
organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certied list of parties,
organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All
in all, 148 parties, organizations, and coalitions were accredited, including private
respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively
for the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine society and
that there is no way by which other sectors not so identied, much less the major
political parties, can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in
particular calls attention to the fact that seven of the respondent political parties
(PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the
major political parties in the country today as determined by the COMELEC in its
Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and charges that the rest of private
respondents are "pseudo party-list organizations" which are actually satellites of the
major political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the
problem of ineective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and
enhance direct people's action and participation in the decision-making process to
counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of
Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list system of
respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose
because these parties do not represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, 11, par. 2 be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the ve major political
parties from participating in the party-list system only in the May 1998 elections,
it leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they
do not prohibit, the participation of "registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations" to participate in the party-list system,
whether or not said parties or organizations represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society. 2
For three consecutive terms after the ratication of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the
House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners' recourse
is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization,
or coalition represents "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a question
of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a
matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based
on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD,
CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
(1) Whether the petitions led in these cases should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the disqualification
of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases were led on April
16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was doubt
whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualications was forthcoming. In fact,
up to the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved.
Petitioners, therefore, had no other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law" within the meaning of Rule 65, 1-2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and were justied in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal
resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press
statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not
representing "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in the
election for the party-list system a fact conrmed by it in its comment and
memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting that petitioners
should have exhausted administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second issue
above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system is
limited to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the
affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the
Constitution:
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List
System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the rst ve (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." 3 The
text of Art. VI, 5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
"registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratication of the
Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2)
provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional
intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms
of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of
history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it
was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they
meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look
behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote
and what they said, anything we may nd is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils.
There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. 6
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the
House of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative
Department: one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta,
and another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two
are not the same. As Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for
the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of
choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors . . . . In
eect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves
who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of
which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors
cited were the farmers, shermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identied here as "sectoral representatives" to be
represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine
sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the problem of who
comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer"
so he would be included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. . . .
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order
to participate as a party and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization
or coalition.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system. 7
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modication it later
became the basis of the present Art. VI, 5(1)(2).
MR. DAVIDE:
MR. MONSOD:
MS. AQUINO.
Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not
necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD:
MS. AQUINO.
And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any
sector? In other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list if
it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the
sectors.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. LERUM.
MR. TADEO
MR. TADEO.
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve
the problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who
can best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized than
those coming from within their ranks. 13
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them
effective representation:
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the
party list representatives will be reserved for the sectors. 14
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on 5 was
suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one week, a
compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary
session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall be elected
from the sectors and the party list," it was proposed that the following be inserted in
5 of the Draft Article:
When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with nineteen (19)
voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against. 15
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors referred to
by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended
to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a
district but are suciently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore,
misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners
Villacorta and Monsod diered in their proposals as to the details of the party-list
system, both proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is
for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as
termed by Comm. Monsod, which he dened as those which are 'always third or
fourth place in each of the districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically dierent, and they do not
have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was
permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Under Art. VI, 5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the
House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or
fourth place(rs)" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended,
refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be
suciently strong to enable them to be represented in the House. They may include
Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to
them. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of
the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same
ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the
Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI, 5(1)(2), namely, that certain
sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that
the big parties might gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will
not solve the problem of ineective representation of the "underprivileged sectors."
These objections, however, did not carry the day, as the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is
noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod proposal did not vote
against it. To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the Constitutional
Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the
existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were
proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This
Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners
contend without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art.
IX, C, 6 that "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to
the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that
the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner Ople
said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-
Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations.
And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like
the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that
they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties
to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can
be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that
will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open
to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the
COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations aliated with
them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have
in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming eect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties. 18
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system,
6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or
purpose of the provision being construed.
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of 2 of R.A. No.
7941. The provision reads:
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what
the majority claims, 2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-dened political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation"
to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the
law is "to promote proportional representation through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
t h ereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-dened
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not
its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to
enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of
winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5,
i.e., labor, peasants, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the
elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the
party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in 5 of the
law , i.e., labor, peasants, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals? After all, what is provided for is "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" each of which is separately
defined in 3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from 5 of the
law:
There would be no need to provide specically for the sectors if the party-list
system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be dismissed.
Footnotes
1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco, Runo S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z.
Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
8. TSN (GR Nos. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
11. Comments were led by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the
Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Oce of the Solicitor
General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement,
Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.
14. These were led by the Oce of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong
Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local
Autonomy Movement.
15. Memoranda were led by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong
Bayani Organization, the Oce of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
16. See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17. See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon
Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18. Rules and regulations governing the ling of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections.
19. OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
21. "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not
allowed:
22. Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also led before the Comelec
a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the
Oce of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et
seq.
23. Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan , 263 SCRA 222, October 16,
1996; BF Corporation v. CA , 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304
SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA , GR No. 134437,
January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134169, February 2, 2000.
24. Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections , GR No.
133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25. Salonga v. Cruz Pao , 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
See also Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales , 219
SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
27. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p.
18.
28. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
30. Italics supplied. See also 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31. It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of
the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
36. Infra.
37. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan , 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA ,
248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
40. Infra.
44. Supra. See also 6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
45. Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
46. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration , 31 SCRA 413, February 18,
1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also
Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez , 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
48. 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v.
Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
49. Taada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona,
298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603,
September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
51. See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals , 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr.
v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC , 257 SCRA 680, June 28,
1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA , 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997;
Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals , 270 SCRA 360, March 24,
1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
60. See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
61. The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill
No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
10. Ibid.
11. Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.
12. People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
4. 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph , 111 Pa. 365, 3
Atl. 220 (1886).