Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Control Device
Adriana Gil-Jurez
UNIVERSITAT AUTNOMA DE BARCELONA
ABSTRACT. This article discusses signs that, at least in the West, the consump-
tion metaphor is turning into the constitutive metaphor of our relations with
objects, with ourselves, and with others. This would probably be anecdotal
were it not that consumption has also taken on the character commonly
attributed to emotions: natural, inevitable, inexpressible, irrational, and spon-
taneous. This apparent lack of social features lends consumption enormous
strength and puts it in the position of a human need that requires no justifi-
cation. At the same time, the lack of social factors defining consumption justifies
deploying multiple mechanisms to control and manage subjectivity.
KEY WORDS: consumption, emotion, subjectivity
The object loses its nature as an object and turns into a subjective component of
the individual. It could be said that the object is subjectivized. Moreover, other
individuals are also appropriated in the same way; they are objectivized as
objects of consumption, whereby they become part of the objective in the world
and of the subjective in the individual. In addition, each individual appropriates
herself, knows herself on these terms and becomes an object of care and con-
sumption in many aspects (health, education, self-knowledge, etc.). In Western-
like societies, nowadays, no identity seems possible without consumption.
842 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
On the one hand, being a consumer seems something intimate to the individual,
precisely because it is bound up with our emotions, but also, on the other hand,
it seems like something external to the individual because it is commonly related
to action taken as part of the interaction between the subject and the objects in
the outside world, often the consequence of an act of influence. However, as I
will argue in the following pages, neither are emotions so intimate, given that
they can be socially constructed, nor are objects of consumption so external,
because they exist only insofar as we appropriate them significantly.
Emotions, but also feelings, passions, desires, sensations, and so on, have
constituent social dimensions. When we talk about any affective process, we
are not only talking about a series of individuals physical processes, but
about the whole society in action (Fernndez-Christlieb, 2000; Gil, 2006).
Emotion is not a purely physiological activity, although it needs, and stems
from, a body, just as neither speaking nor eating is a solely physiological
activity, although vocal cords, tongue, or hunger are involved. Emotions have
corporal effects and depend on the body to express themselves. However, in
this respect, they are not too much different from language, which also
depends on the body. Still, emotions seem to comprise something extra,
which language cannot exhaust. Some authors have described this as their
capacity for action (S.D. Brown & Stenner, 2001), their ability to generate
immediate effects, to establish, by means of specific affective practices and
power relations, strategies to change body states and change social relation-
ships (Barbalet, 2001; Scheff, 1990).
To feel emotions requires and provokes participation in a series of social
practices. Around any manifestation of emotion, considerable social activity
takes place (even if the individual is alone) in order to mould it into a recog-
nizable social form. At times this means repressing it, denying its expression,
and even denying its very existence. At other times, it means fostering it, raising
it up for everyone to see. In both cases, it serves to sustain or change a given
social relation. Emotions are social because they belong to the symbolic
realm and acquire meaning in social interaction, in the practices that sustain,
reproduce, and change society and in the power relations that shape it
(Burkitt, 1997, 2002; Williams, 2001). In consequence, to feel emotions
requires socialization within a specific culture (Lutz & White, 1986), negotiation
with others, and reflection so that we can decide whether we are feeling the
appropriate emotion or we are in the appropriate situation to feel emotion
(Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, & Benton, 1992). Like language, emotions
open as many paths to social reproduction as they do to resistance; they sustain,
reproduce, or change social relations.
GIL-JUREZ: CONSUMPTION AS AN EMOTIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL DEVICE 843
This contributes to our belief that our emotional world is our true self, as it is
the truth from within, silenced by the power of social constrictions. Society
constrains us by repressing and silencing our emotional self, but personal
or professional confession can help the individual to find who she really is.
This induces individuals to articulate their emotional particularity. The result
is especially significant for individuals, since to have a known and well-managed
emotional self is of the utmost importance in order to be a normal, free, and
accepted member of society.
Discourses on emotions conflate with discourses on nature and the body
(Le Breton, 2004; Lupton, 1998), and this situation makes emotions seem
authentic. This is why on many occasions we are encouraged to show them
so that we look more natural, more genuine, and not false like the social, as
in social obligations, giving a negative connotation to what we learn
socially, which is considered a set of masks which hide our supposed true
nature. Consequently, emotions appear to be also what is not corrupted by
society, for they are believed to be innate. Unlike the social, emotions appear
originally unregulated. In this way, control, power, and hierarchy are fully
legitimized, because it is assumed that we need them in order to be civilized
persons in control of our emotions (Elias, 1936/2000; Freud, 1930/1961).
Being civilized implies complex control of different situations in order to be
able to discern when certain emotions have to be expressed or repressed and
844 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
to understand why the same emotions are accepted in one case but rejected in
another. As a result, emotions are also indicators of social norms, relevant
situations, and moral values under discussion, such as when a person is ill at
ease for not feeling the right thing in that particular situation. Hence, emotions
need to be deliberately controlled; otherwise, they could put us in embarrassing
or even humiliating situations, threatening not only our autonomy, self-control,
independence, and individuality but also our community. Encouraging occa-
sional and managed emotion display forms part of the practices that construct
and sustain contemporary subjectivity as a subjectivity based on control
(Hochschild, 1983; Rose, 1989). As a result, emotions should also be looked
at as (micro-)social control devices.
Feeling Consumption
Through consumption, products are incorporated into our self, and the inner
and the outer of the body become conjoined (Featherstone, 1983). As Nelson
(1989) states, taking the digestive metaphor of consumption to its logical
extreme, to consume is to embody (p. 159). Dramatically, in the case of
genetically modified (GM) food, the way in which what is consumed is incor-
porated into our body, and therefore into our subjectivity, becomes more
apparent. As a result, our willingness (or lack thereof) to consume or not GM
products goes well beyond any rational calculation, with emotions, especially
fear, being an essential component of that decision. For the consumption of
GM food implies an intuitive calculation of risks due to the lack of precise
information and/or the need of science training to make a more sophisticated
decision (Tulloch & Lupton, 2002). We may like or dislike not only the product
itself, but also the way it is manufactured.
Yes, consuming is affective, but not only that, consuming is also feeling
and expressing special emotions: the emotions of possession. Moreover, posses-
sion is usually understood as having power over whatever you possess and
may come accompanied with the feeling of being someone. It is no coinci-
dence that society is nostalgically criticized for being materialistic, or that it
is a consolidated topic to say that people are valued for what they possess and
not for what they are. After all, the main way that we Westerners can now
know what we are is via our possessions (our clothes, our music, our friends,
our partner, our car, etc.). Thus, the emotion of possession and the desire
which I consider an emotional feeling (following Averill, 1994)to consume
invade different realms of life: fascinated students, like any good audience,
expect spectacular, entertaining classes; postmodern lovers expect and
require the partner whom they have chosen with meticulous care to satisfy
their most intimate desires; fashion fans demand that their clothes identify
them as people with their own unique style and, at the same time, as belonging
to a certain category of like-minded persons. In these situations, when failure
GIL-JUREZ: CONSUMPTION AS AN EMOTIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL DEVICE 845
to provide occurs, the emotions that invade the aggrieved could be described
as disappointment, much more similar to the way you feel in front of a
dysfunctional product you recently bought than to any of the ancient emotions
you could resent formerly: shame, humiliation, or anger for the breaking of a
personal promise.
From this perspective, it should come as no surprise that consumption might
be much more than simply emotive. Following similar arguments to those that
are used to consider why certain emotions are more basic than others (Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988), we can draw a parallelism between basic emotions
and consumption understood as a fundamental process in our societies:
not make sense anymore for a consumer is rationally involved in the satisfaction
of her desires. The consumer, naturally born as a Homo emotionalis, must be
someone who feels that what she desires to consume is her law and that nothing
can get between her and her desires of consumption. To put it in a very direct
form, Bauman (2001) uses a Deleuzian version of desire:
The spiritus movens of consumer activity is not a set of articulated, let alone
fixed, needs, but desirea much more volatile and ephemeral, evasive and
capricious, and essentially nonreferential phenomenon; a self-begotten and
self-perpetuating motive that calls for no justification or apology either in
terms of an objective or a cause. Despite its successive and always short-
lived reifications, desire is narcissistic: it has itself for its paramount
object, and for that reason is bound to stay insatiable, however tall the pile
of other (physical or psychical) objects marking its past course may grow.
The survival at stake is not that of the consumers body or social identity,
but of the desire itself: that desire which makes the consumerthe consuming
desire of consuming. (p. 13)
Of course, this consuming desire does not come from our most animal inside; on
the contrary, it comes from our most social side. We do not simply desire to eat,
we desire chocolate ice-cream, or at least, we wonder about which of the socially
established eating pleasures will comfort us in that particular moment.
Consequently, this desire, inherent to any particular act of consumption, is born
with a social burden inherent to its own practice, when the desire concretizes it
as a desire for something specific, rationally agreed to be perfect in that situation.
Consumption has a socially constructed emotive layer that turns it into a
most real experience, because emotion always ensures individuals possession
of the truth. Emotion legitimizes individuals consumption desires by making
it clear that they come from inside. Inner feelings appear authentic because
they do not seem to depend on society (Averill, 1983). For the individual
concerned, desire is never false. If no one can call our emotion into question,
if no one is legitimated to tell us what our true feelings are, this proves the
authenticity of our individual life. The individual is increasingly convinced of
her powerful inner side and, hence, of the force of her desire. For this reason,
emotion is not only the gratification obtained when consuming; emotion
conforms the very act of consumption from its inception, and translates
consumption into a real, meaningful experience.
Consumption of Objects
Creative processes of appropriation mediate the relationship between people,
things, and places (de Certeau, 1988), up to the point that many authors have
suggested that we appropriate objects to construct our identity (Belk, 1988;
Csikszentmihlyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Dittmar, 1992; Firat &
Dholakia, 1998; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Tomlinson, 1990). Moreover, the
consumption of objects is fundamental to maintain diverse forms of subjec-
tivity (Hand & Shove, 2007; Jantzen, stergaard, & Sucena Vieira, 2006).
Nevertheless, according to Bauman (2001), the relationship between objects
and people is not as instrumental as it used to be:
to avoid confusion, it would be better to follow that fateful change in the
nature of consumption and get rid of the notion of need altogether, accepting
that consumer society and consumerism are not about satisfying needsnot
even the more sublime needs of identification or self-assurance as to the
degree of adequacy. (p. 13)
The relationship between consumption and objects is not only functional, but
also meaningful and, particularly, emotional (Lupton, 1998). This is not only
because advertisers and sellers want to encourage us to buy their products by
evoking emotions, but also because we desire the objects which we do not yet
possess in order to experience different emotions and because peoples affective
states change by providing them with actual objects and experiences to consume.
A superficial look at advertising rapidly teaches us that the same words used
by lovers, particularly words evoking love and pleasure, are used to describe
shampoos, detergents, or milk in cartons. Anyone would think that this trivializes
feelings, but it seems to do the contrary. It fills them with content; we love our
lovers as we love a shampoo because the promise held out by the product is the
same as the promise offered by the lover and because, chronologically, Western
subjects get to know the products and advertisements first and their lovers later.
The difference is that lovers are less stable, as common sense tells us that lovers
have an inside that can let us down, whereas the product is intended to be always
the same and not to let us down. This perceived faithfulness might be the reason
why the product is more appealingat least until the manufacturer decides to
change it or discontinue its production, which can be a terrible and frustrating
experience to many consumers. As Bauman (2001) comments,
there is a nearly perfect fit between the characteristics of commodities
the consumer market offers, the fashion in which it offers them, and the kind
of anxieties and expectations which prompt individuals to live their lives as
a string of shopping expeditions. (p. 24)
848 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
Consumption of Oneself
Some of the objects we consume turn us into objects of consumption for
ourselves at the same time. For example, self-help and personal growth
books, which have been bestsellers for years, including books on emotional
intelligence (Goleman, 1996, 1998), focus on emotion management. They
prompt us to discover ourselves, to predict ourselves, and to control ourselves
as we think fit, or at least to mould ourselves in the image we and others have
of ourselves. From these books, we can learn how to control our emotions and
how to communicate them properly. We can train ourselves to recognize
situations in which it is appropriate or inappropriate to express them.
Obviously, a tamed lion is no longer a wild beast, but it is essential that
spectators believe that it is one to sustain the tension; as we know, the show
must go on. The same occurs with emotions: we say that they must be man-
aged, but at the same time we maintain a discourse about their wild and
primitive side, which can never be tamed. This duality allows emotions to
perform their function as a social control instrument. Whenever soap operas
or wars require it, emotions can be deployed savagely and without control;
if not, they must be kept under control for the good of society and peace.
Persons described as emotional fulfil these requisites exactly: they are fit for
sociality (compassionate, open, expressive, etc.) but maintain a capacity for
uncontrollability (like in a nationalist riot or a social episode of impulsive
buying during Christmas).
Emotion is constructed in different consumption situations: for instance,
we can adapt to a specific situation by choosing the particular products we
need to consume at each time and occasion. Books on how to develop our
human potential want to guide us through every situation and aim to give us
the tools to design and shape ourselves in line with the particular require-
ments of any circumstances. We turn into our own object so that we can
become better subjects. Our own emotions have even come back into fashion,
now that they have been brought back into the social world as consumer products.
The almost emotion-free utopia Walden Two (Skinner, 1948/1962) is not possible
nowadays, since emotions are not wasteful anymore.
The interest in controlling emotions until they were almost eliminated had
to do with their interference in the world of production: they distracted men
GIL-JUREZ: CONSUMPTION AS AN EMOTIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL DEVICE 849
and women from their objective activities and made them waste time on
sensitivities and romanticisms. However, once placed at the disposal of con-
sumption, they acquired renewed sense and were put back into circulation.
Emotional intelligence is a construct that makes it possible to manage the self
and get the most out of interpersonal relations in order to triumph. As Iranzo
(1999) put it, subjects driven from the inside, especially those closest to the
Protestant ethic, can immediately identify with Golemans conceptualiza-
tion of emotions. From the point of view of emotional intelligence, emotions
are chaotic, ambivalent events that must be subjected to intelligent control,
which does not belittle them, but contains them and manages them in order to
have the capacity to defer immediate gratification and to control and channel
impulses profitably [italics added] (Iranzo, 1999, p. 19).
Moreover, those who cannot express their emotions or who do not know
them and wish to let them blossom can always consume the variety of
professionals who specialize in finding them inside other people.
Alongside emotions offered la carte (supplied as packages of happiness,
humour, hate, action, violence, intrigue, etc.) in the form of films, virtual
games, saloon sports, raves with designer drugs, fashion, and UV rays with
massages, the body shares the quality of object of consumption with emotions.
Emotions and the body are objects which can be bought and contemplated, as
we see in pornography and its derivatives, from beauty contests to television
series such as Baywatch. On a par with emotions, the body has likewise come
back into fashion because so many products, objects, and scenographies are
needed to keep the body natural, healthy, and ecological that it has become
completely profitable. The shop windows for displaying themindispensable
for establishing contacts with other bodiesare also paid for (discothques,
shopping centres, bars, etc.), and, since it is said that a picture is worth a thou-
sand words, plastic surgery, gymnasia, diet foods, and the entire cosmetics
industry have much to offer to the bodys image. The performing self in
consumer culture engages in body maintenance as a means of presenting
itself to others (Featherstone, 1983), but this cannot be done outside consump-
tion. In a recent advertisement which showed many bodies of different races,
the voice-over said that the important thing is not the colour of the skin, but
that it is moisturised with cream X. Today, those incapable of taking care of
their own body, for example fat people, may find themselves marginalized.
As Sennett (1977) argued, in this day and age, appearance and bodily pres-
entation are believed to reflect the inner-self. Moreover, Bordo (1995) found,
when analysing jurisprudence in bodily integrity, that the body was consid-
ered to be no mere physical entity but a self embodied. Hence, the disgust
some people feel towards the homeless may be caused neither because they
are not producers anymore nor because they may belong to a lower social
class, but because they fail to take care of their body.
That is to say, today our bodies are a consumable part of what we are: the
self performs itself through the control of its body, which is consuming it in
850 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
Consumption of Others
We have constructed this emotional feeling (Averill, 1994) that is desire as
something that we simply have or cease to have or which is simply aroused in
front of an appropriate (desirable) body/object. Nevertheless, Harvey and
Shalom (1997) assert that desire as that intimate, deeply compelling and pro-
foundly private experience also has its public face, which emerges in contro-
versies and arguments around issues of group identity, agency and justice
(p. 3), for the bodies/objects that arouse our desire are not always socially
appropriate or we do not desire them in the appropriate way or at the appropri-
ate moment. This apparent desynchronization between desire and social order
has often been seen as proof that desire indeed goes its own way, deviating from
the natural and socially appropriate. Deignan (1997) in her analysis of the
metaphors of desire argues that we fear it for its potential to disrupt our lives:
desire is talked metaphorically as a wild animal, and as the dangerous and
elemental forces of water, fire and electricity .... Thus desire appears uninvited
and takes us over; we are not responsible ... for sinful desire (p. 40). Actually,
this idea of an independent desire answers for our new capacity to consume
other people instead of establishing personal relationships. We consume
because we desire tothat would be, in brief, the ideology sustaining the pos-
sibility of consuming other people. It is in this sense that we consume the peo-
ple who perform emotional labor: therapists, teachers, bank tellers, secretaries,
flight attendants, hairdressers, health service workers, waiters, religious workers,
librarians, lawyers, counter clerks, and so on (see Hochschild, 1983, for an
extended list). We consume them literally; we demand their particular emo-
tional involvement and the authenticity of their deployment of emotions, but we
do not care who they are, what their opinions are, demands, or anything con-
cerning their job if it is not related to our act of consumption.
GIL-JUREZ: CONSUMPTION AS AN EMOTIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL DEVICE 851
We can see, then, that when consuming other people it becomes increasingly
difficult to establish frontiers between who is consumable and who is not.
Moral values can go in the opposite way of desire, and the battle between
them does not have an easy ending. Dangerous subjects become socially con-
figured as such through a desire constructed as deviated. Obviously, the devi-
ated fulfils the function of marking the social norm: the madman marks the
frontier with madness because the concept does not suffice on its own; the
homosexual marks heterosexuality; the delinquent marks the law.
Sacralization of youth in the abstract as an object of consumption not only
produces anti-wrinkle products and puts them at customers disposal, actu-
ally, infantilizing the female body or the massive eroticisation of little girls
(Walkerdine, 1997) produces models with childlike bodies that we demand to
consume. Dramatically, in this last case, the model is supposed to embody the
norm and, as a result, the paedophile marks the latest frontier of desirable
objects.
However legitimate they may be, at least in terms of the degree of satis-
faction which they bring, a quick look at the most common fantasies (as collated
in Maltz & Boss, 1997) promoted in erotic culture (literature, film, painting,
etc.) leaves the common denominator of ownership and objectification of the
other in the name of the individuals own satisfaction. The passion and fan-
tasies that feed it are supposedly individual, despite the fact that they affect a
more than significant percentage of the population. Of course, the base passions
re-created in erotic fantasies are also sold to us as emotions beyond discourse,
as natural; the product of uncontrollable impulse; directed by hormones or, if
these base passions refer to the male gender, genetically programmed.
However, the only socially accepted way of satisfying these fantasies is to
resort to more or less freely established relations of convenience, through the
consumption of the other.
Apparently, the Western value of respect of the individual is slowly turning
into respect of the desire; just as we recognize our own desires, so we
recognize those of others. If consuming this desire leads to satisfying rela-
tions, then consumption will be elevated as a model for relations, as the norm,
and, consequently, any member of the community will be converted into an
object of consumption for others.
852 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
Consumption of Emotions
The works of Elias (1936/2000) clearly express how the process of civilization
and constitution of the modern individual demanded development of emotional
control. External coactions were transformed into self-control of emotional
expression, and this gave birth to a modern individual who had to control
herself to demonstrate that she could be autonomous and civilized. Controlled
emotions can also be consumed as if they were any other object: executives
practise (calculated) risk sports; (safe) sex is sought in bars and discothques;
and, tourists aspire to consume (malaria-free) authenticity when travelling. In
post-industrial society, although individualism is exacerbated, emotional con-
trol is changing slightly: it is not disappearing, but it is formalizing a series of
spaces in which a certain controlled decontrol of emotions is permitted
(Wouters, 1989); these spaces are set aside for the consumption of emotions.
As Wouters commented, this controlled decontrol is not only becoming per-
mitted, but is even becoming mandatory. In practice, anyone who does not
know how to enjoy her emotions may be accused of not being spontaneous
and of not knowing how to amuse herself properly. Still, the requirement is
that these must be experiences with a calculated risk, which is why those who
do not control their decontrol sufficiently are also disliked. This is why
young people who suffer an accident of some kind, with drugs for example,
tend to be held in low esteem.
One example of these spaces created to consume emotions are the new cathe-
drals of the 19th and 20th centuries, department stores, in which we gape at the
multitude of products on display without any kind of modesty. However, these
are not the only spaces where consumption is turning into a religious experi-
ence, according to Ritzer (1999); so are fast-food restaurants, fashion-shop
franchises, mail-order sales, discount supermarkets, popular cruisers, casinos,
theme parks, and theme restaurants. In summing up his conference, designed to
advise the tourist industry, Bordas (2003) made the following analysis:
In this lecture the author looks at the implications that the dream society
phenomenon has for the tourist industry. Once the information society has
been taken on board, western society will tend increasingly towards a society
of this kind, a society in which the emotionalvalues, emotions and feelings
will assume far greater importance than the rational. The new tourist will be
looking not for services but wanting instead experiences that will satisfy the
emotional system.
We produce so that we can consume, because this is where emotions can be found.
Conclusions
Notes
1. Although the work of Lodziak, clearly established in the consumption of pro-
duction approach, was published in the same year of 2002.
854 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(6)
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