MANU/MP/1769/2012

Equivalent Citation: 2012(3)MPHT270, 2013(III)MPJR56

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR

Second Appeal No. 863/2003

Decided On: 01.03.2012

Appellants: Dayal Das (dead) through L.Rs.

Vs.
Respondent: Rajendra Prasad Gautam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Shrivastava, J.

Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr. S.K. Dwivedi, Advocate

For Respondents/Defendant: Mr. A.K. Jain, Advocate

Subject: Tenancy

Acts/Rules/Orders:
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 116; Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 -
Section 12 (1), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Section 12 (1) (c), Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Section 12 (1) (f), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act 1961 - Section 12 (1)(f), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 -
Section 12(1), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Section 12(1) (c), Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Section 12(1) (f), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act 1961 - Section 2 (b), Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Section
25; Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 - Section 111 (g)

Cases Referred:
Nirvikar Gupta vs. Ram Kumar MANU/MP/0028/1992; Sheela and Ors. vs. Firm Prahlad Rai
Prem Prakash MANU/SC/0150/2002; Prem Narayan Barchhiha vs. Hakimuddin Saifi
MANU/SC/0440/1999; Manorama Bahadur and Others vs. A.C.M. Swami MANU/MP/0161/1976;
Devraj s/o Baldev Prasad Sharma vs. Naina Devnani w/o Ramesh Devnani and others
MANU/MP/0953/2007; Anar Devi (Smt) vs. Nathu Ram MANU/SC/0712/1994

Disposition:
Appeal Allowed

Citing Reference:

Discussed 3

Mentioned 1

Relied On 2

Case Note:
Tenancy - Eviction - Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act,
1961 - First Additional District Judge upheld order passed by Second Civil Judge
decreeing suit of Plaintiff/Respondent for eviction - Hence, this second Appeal -

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Whether in view of there being no authentic registered document in relation to
ownership of Plaintiff, Courts below seriously erred in law, in passing decree of
eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of Act - Held, in present case, Defendant/Appellant
had never set up title of his own and respectfully prayed to Court that without
prejudicing and adversely affecting right of Plaintiff and accepting him to be his
landlord, Plaintiff be directed to prove his ownership - However on going through
pleadings of Defendant this Court found that Defendant had never renounced his
character as tenant and in a clear and unequivocal term nowhere he had setup title of
suit premises in him or in a third party and he was bona-fidely calling upon Plaintiff to
prove his ownership or putting landlord to prove his title so as to protect himself
(Defendant) or to earn a protection made available to him under Act, but without
disowning his character of possession over tenanted premises as tenant - Therefore it
could not be said that his act was anyway injurious to landlord/Plaintiff and he had
not done any act which might likely to affect adversely and substantially to interest of
Plaintiff - Hence a decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of Act could not be
passed - Therefore Courts below had erred in law in passing judgment under Section
12 (1) (c) of Act - Suit dismissed.

Tenancy - Eviction - Bona-fide requirement - Section 12(1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation

Control Act, 1961 - Whether in view of there being no legal evidence in relation to
bona-fide requirement of suit shop to Plaintiff and his sons, Courts below erred in law
in passing a decree of eviction under Section 12(1) (f) of Act - Held, in present case,
Plaintiff was only collecting rent from Defendant for true owners - If that would be
position he could not be said to be "owner" even in narrow sense so as to evict
Appellant from suit premises under Section 12 (1) (f) of Act - Apart from that, had
suit been filed by Plaintiff/Respondent under second category of Section 12 (1) (f) of
Act (i.e., non-residential accommodation was bona-fide needed by landlord for any
person for whose benefit accommodation was held), matter would have been
altogether different - However present case had not been filed by Plaintiff by pleading
that for benefit of said true owners, accommodation was held by him and they were in
need of suit accommodation and for that Plaintiff or those persons did not have any
reasonably suitable vacant accommodation of their own in city or town - Hence a
decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of Act also could not be passed - Thus as
Plaintiff was not found to be owner of suit property, it could not be said that suit
accommodation was needed by him bona fide for his own requirement and for his
sons and Courts below had erred in passing decree of eviction under Section 12 (1)
(f) of Act - Resultantly judgment and decree passed by two Courts below were set
aside - Suit dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

"If Plaintiff is not found to be owner of suit property, suit accommodation shall not be
considered to be needed by him bona-fidely for his own requirement."

JUDGMENT

A.K. Shrivastava, J.

1. This is tenant's/defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 9-9-2003
passed by learned First Additional District Judge, Katni in Civil Appeal No. 41-A/2002, whereby
the judgment and decree dated 29-4-2002 passed by learned Second Civil Judge, Class II,
Katni in Civil Suit No. 11-A/1998 decreeing the suit of plaintiff/respondent has been affirmed.
The facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal lie in narrow compass. Suffice it is to say
that the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant filed a suit for
eviction against defendant/appellant on the ground envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f)
of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "Act").

2. The appellants are the L.Rs. of defendant/tenant who had died during the pendency of this
second appeal. In brief the case of plaintiff is that he is the landlord of the tenanted premises

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which is non-residential and he gave the suit premises on monthly rent of ` 1600/- shown in
the map annexed with the plaint, to the defendant. According to the plaintiff, no rent is due
upon the tenant/defendant. The suit accommodation is required by plaintiff for himself and for
his two major sons who after graduation are sitting idle and are not serving anywhere. The
need of plaintiff is bonafide and he is not having any reasonably suitable non-residential vacant
accommodation of his own in the town in which he along with his two major sons could start the
business of Seeds and Fertilisers and the suit premises is a suitable place to carry on such type
of business because nearby the suit premises there are several other shops of Seeds and
Fertilisers. The tenant/defendant is quite aware about the bonafide need of the landlord/plaintiff
and he also gave assurance that he would vacate the suit premises on 1-4-1997, but, despite
the assurance given by him, he has not vacated it nor delivered its possession to the plaintiff.
Hence, a decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide need as envisaged under Section 12 (1)
(f) of the Act was originally sought by the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the suit.

3. The defendant by filing written statement denied the bonafide need of plaintiff, although he
admitted the rate of rent to be ` 1600/- per month of the suit premises. The factum of tenancy
has not been denied by him in the written statement. On the other hand he has admitted that
he is the tenant of plaintiff of the suit accommodation given for non-residential purpose.
However, so far as the ownership of the suit premises is concerned, the tenant has pleaded that
he is requesting that the ownership part be proved by the plaintiff and this is also indispensable
because in respect to ownership for the year 1977-78 to 1995-96 in the record of Municipal
Corporation Mudwara (Katni) the name of plaintiff as owner of the suit property is not
mentioned and hence defendant by paying respect to the law and without prejudicing the
plaintiff's right in order to provide justice pleaded in the written statement and prayed to the
Court that plaintiff may be asked to prove his ownership. Further, defendant pleaded that in the
year 1996-97 also in the municipal record plaintiff has not been shown to be owner of the suit
premises however, anyhow, he got his name entered in the municipal record in the later year.
Although, earlier to 1996-97 throughout Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar and Krishna Kumar have
been shown to be the owners of the suit premises.

4. The defendant also specifically denied in so many words in the written statement about the
alleged bonafide need of the plaintiff for himself and for his two major sons and also denied that
plaintiff is not having any other reasonably suitable vacant non-residential place of his own in
the township. Further, he had denied the allegations of plaintiff that he (defendant) ever gave
any assurance to plaintiff that suit accommodation would be vacated by him till 1-4-1997 and
hence it has been prayed that suit be dismissed.

5. After the written statement was filed, looking to its averments, the plaintiff amended his
plaint and pleaded that earlier the owner of the suit property was one Mahadev Prasad Agrawal
and plaintiff was his Purohit (a Brahmin who often offers Puja in the house of a person) and
because plaintiff was offering Puja etc., therefore, said Mahadev Prasad in consideration of
service of Puja rendered by the plaintiff, gave the suit property to him and declared him to be
the owner of the suit property. Said Mahadev Prasad also delivered possession of the suit
property to the plaintiff and thereafter the plaintiff inducted the defendant as his tenant 20
years ago and the defendant by accepting to be his landlord is paying monthly rent to him
regularly. In the rent receipts also the plaintiff has been mentioned as the landlord of the
defendant and the defendant by accepting the plaintiff to be his landlord has signed the rent
receipts. Further, it has been pleaded by the plaintiff by way of amendment that defendant
never objected that plaintiff is not his landlord. Not only this by accepting the plaintiff to be his
landlord, the defendant in Case No. 11/A/90 (3) 1996-97 filed a case under Section 25 of the
Act before the Rent Controlling Authority praying the said authority to permit him to deposit the
rent and before the said authority, he also deposited the rent. Hence, the defendant cannot
challenge the title of the landlord/plaintiff.

6. Simultaneously, plaintiff further amended his plaint praying the Court that since the
defendant has denied his title of the plaintiff, therefore, a decree of eviction on the ground
under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act be also passed.

7. After the plaint was amended, the defendant also amended his written statement and denied

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the averments of plaintiff pleaded by him. According to defendant, at the time of obtaining the
suit premises on tenancy basis by him and by his father Kishan Chand, they contacted Dhanya
Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas Agrawal and indeed they inducted the defendant in
the suit premises and it was told to them that because several disputes often arise in the
Income Tax Department and in other Government departments in regard to tax etc., hence rent
receipts shall be issued mentioning the name of plaintiff to be the landlord. According to the
defendant, since he and his father were keen to obtain the suit premises, therefore, they
obtained the suit premises with the aforesaid understanding provided to them by Dhanya
Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas. It is relevant to mention that Dharamdas is the son
of Mahadev Prasad for whom it is pleaded by plaintiff by amending his plaint that on account of
consideration of the services of Puja, said Mahadev Prasad gave the suit property to the plaintiff
declaring him to be the owner of the same. Hence, in this manner the defendant is paying rent
to the plaintiff accepting him to be his landlord of the suit premises. Further, it has been
pleaded by defendant that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit premises in accordance with
law. According to defendant in regard to the assessment of house tax etc. Dhanya Kumar and
plaintiff themselves have submitted several objections in the Municipal Corporation, which are
pending for its decision.

8. On the basis of averments made in the plaint and denial in the written statement, learned
Trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties found that
the plaintiff is entitled for decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) of the Act.

9. The defendant being dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of Trial Court filed first appeal
before the learned First Appellate Court, which has also been dismissed by the impugned
judgment and decree.

10. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by defendant/tenant in this Court, which
was admitted on 20-8-2004 on the following substantial questions of law:--

(1) Whether in view of there being no authentic registered document in relation to

ownership of the plaintiff, the Courts below seriously erred in law, in passing decree
of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?

(2) Whether in view of there being no legal evidence in relation to bonafide

requirement of the suit shop to the plaintiff and his sons, the Courts below erred in
law in passing a decree of eviction under Section 12(1) (f) of the M.P.
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?

11. Shri S.K. Dwivedi, learned Counsel for appellant/defendant by inviting my attention to
clause (c) of Section 12 (1) of the Act has submitted that nowhere the defendant has set-up the
title of suit premises in himself and very clearly he has pleaded that by paying all the respect to
the law and without prejudicing the right of the plaintiff in order to serve the justice, the tenant
is requesting the Court that plaintiff be asked to prove his ownership because nowhere earlier
to 1996-97 his name was ever entered in the municipal record as owner of the suit property, on
the contrary the names of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar and Krishna Kumar Agrawal were entered
as owner of the suit property.

12. Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel that after the plaintiff amended his
written statement by pleading that at the time of obtaining the suit premises from Dhanya
Kumar and his father Dharamdas Agrawal on their assurance and understanding provided to
defendant and his father Kishan Chand that because several disputes would rise in regard to
income tax and property tax etc., therefore, plaintiff shall issue receipt in his name to the
defendant mentioning him to be the landlord of defendant, and because the defendant was in
need of the suit premises, therefore, in such a situation, he accepted the plaintiff to be his
landlord and therefore, in these facts and circumstances, if the clear picture is shown it cannot
be said that on the basis of such pleading the tenant has denied the title of plaintiff and his
pleading will never adversely or substantially affect the interest of the landlord/ plaintiff. In
support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of learned
Single Judge of this Court (Justice R.C. Lahoti, J. as His Lordship then was) in Nirvikar Gupta

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Vs. Ram Kumar, MANU/MP/0028/1992 : AIR 1992 MP 115. Learned Counsel submits that
similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Justice R.C. Lahoti in the Supreme Court in Sheela and
others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, MANU/SC/0150/2002 : (2002) 3 SCC 375. Learned
Counsel by inviting my attention to Paras 10, 12 and 14 onwards of the said decision has
submitted that the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra), is squarely applicable in the
present case and the facts of the case of Sheela (supra), and the pleadings of the written
statement of that case are akin to the pleadings of present case also, and therefore, said
decision of Supreme Court is squarely applicable in the present case and hence, it has been
submitted that no decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act can be passed against
the defendant/appellant.

13. By addressing on the second substantial question of law it has been propounded by Shri
Dwivedi, learned Counsel for appellant that bonafide need envisaged under Section 12 (1) (f) of
the Act can be conveniently divided into two categories. According to learned Counsel in the
first category the bonafide need of the landlord can be considered for the purpose of continuing
or starting his business or that for his any major son or unmarried daughter if he is owner
thereof and the second category contemplates and authorises the landlord to file suit on the
ground of bonafide need of any other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held with
a further stipulation in both the categories the landlord must not have any other reasonably
suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Thus,
according to learned Counsel the word "owner" is having great significance for the purpose of
this clause in passing the decree of eviction. Specifically, learned Counsel argued that it is not
his submission that in order to prove the ownership in a suit of eviction under Rent control
Legislation, the landlord is required to prove strict legal title as the same is required to be
proved in a title suit, however, still it is having some significance although in a narrow sense,
but, certainly it is having some wider connotation for the purpose of this clause in comparison
to the other clauses of Section 12 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that after
amending the plaint, the pleadings of ownership which plaintiff has pleaded, he cannot be
accepted under the law to be the owner of the suit property because according to plaintiff the
suit property was originally belonged to Mahadev Prasad Agrawal whose son was Dharamdas
and Dharamdas's son is Dhanya Kumar and without alienating the suit property by way of sale,
gift or any other mode of a valid conveyance recognised by law, the suit property cannot be
alienated to plaintiff. According to learned Counsel admittedly there is no registered document
of conveyance of the suit property which is immovable, in favour of the plaintiff.

14. Learned Counsel further submits that had the case been filed by present plaintiff in the
second category of Section 12 (1)(f), the matter would have been different. But, in order to
bring the case within the ambit and scope of first category of clause (f) of Section 12(1) of the
Act, the plaintiff was legally bound to prove his ownership which may be narrower in
comparison to the title suit, but, it is wider than that of other clauses envisaged under Section
12 (1) of the Act. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the
decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and also another decision of Supreme Court in
Prem Narayan Barchhiha Vs. Hakimuddin Saifi, MANU/SC/0440/1999 : (1999) 6 SCC 381.
Learned Counsel submits that although in Prem Narayan's case, the appeal of landlord was
allowed by the Apex Court by passing a decree of eviction but in Para 12 how clause (f) to
Section 12(1) is to be interpreted, the Supreme Court has thrown sufficient light on it and the
present appeal is to be examined on the anvil and touchstone of norms fixed by the Supreme
Court in Para 12 of the said decision. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on Single Bench
decision of this Court in Manorama Bahadur and others Vs. A.C.M. Swami,
MANU/MP/0161/1976 : 1978 JLJ 416. Hence, according to learned Counsel for appellant since
the grounds envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) are not proved, by allowing this appeal
the impugned judgment passed by two Courts below be set aside and the suit be dismissed.

15. On the other hand, Shri Jain, learned Counsel for respondent/plaintiff submitted that
admittedly defendant is paying rent to plaintiff for a considerable long period, and therefore,
under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, he is estopped from challenging the plaintiffs title.
Learned Counsel submits that admitting the plaintiff to be his landlord, the defendant submitted
the application under Section 25 before the Rent Controlling Authority praying to the said
Authority to permit defendant to deposit the rent. Hence, if now the defendant is disowning the

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title of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff) entitled to a decree of eviction as envisaged under Section 12
(1) (c) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, provision of Section 12(1) (c) cannot be
interpreted in a manner that if a title is denied by a tenant then only it would be a ground for
eviction but according to this provision if any act has been done by the tenant, which is likely to
affect adversely and substantially to the interest of landlord, he can be evicted from the
tenanted premises. Learned Counsel by inviting my attention to Section 111 (g) of Transfer of
Property Act has submitted that denial of title of the landlord by a tenant amounts to forfeiture
of tenancy but said analogy cannot be accepted for the Rent Control Legislation because the
present Act is a special creature of the statute and eviction decree can be passed in terms of
any of the grounds envisaged under Section 12 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel submits that for
last 20 years the defendant accepted the plaintiff to be his landlord and therefore, his act in
setting up the title in Dhanya Kumar cannot be said to be bonafide and hence by such an act of
the tenant/defendant the right of plaintiff has been adversely affected because it amounts to
setting up title in a third person. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has invited by
attention to Single Bench decision in Devraj s/o Baldev Prasad Sharma Vs. Naina Devnani w/o
Ramesh Devnani and others, MANU/MP/0953/2007 : 2008 (3) MPLJ 239 Para 12.

16. It has been then contended by learned Counsel for respondent that if the tenant is denying
the title of his landlord without setting up a title in himself or in third person then it would mean
that although he is denying the title of his landlord and is not setting up his title in himself or in
third person, but, he cannot be evicted from the suit premises and this cannot be the intention
of the Legislature and, therefore, in this backdrop the decisions of Sheela (supra) and Devraj
(supra), should be considered.

17. Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that for all practical
purposes, the plaintiff being owner of the suit premises so far as the defendant is concerned,
therefore, rightly a decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act has been passed.
Learned Counsel has also placed heavy reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi
(Smt.) Vs. Nathu Ram, MANU/SC/0712/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 250, and argued that what is the
meaning of word "owner" used in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act should be seen on the touchstone
of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this decision. On the aforesaid submissions, it
has been submitted by learned Counsel for respondent that this appeal is having no force and,
therefore, the same be dismissed.

18. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal of tenant
deserves to be allowed.

Regarding substantial question of law No. 1:

19. To deal with the rival contentions of learned Counsel for parties on the touchstone and anvil
of grounds of eviction envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) of the Act, it would be
appropriate to go through the Preamble, object and nature of the Act.

The Preamble of the Act is:--

An Act to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent of
accommodations, for expeditious trial of eviction cases on ground of "bonafide"
requirement of certain categories of landlords and generally to regulate and control
eviction of tenants from accommodations and for other matter connected therewith
or incidental thereto.

On bare perusal of the Preamble, it is gathered that the Act has been enacted to regulate and
control eviction of tenants from accommodation. The words "regulate" and "control" of tenants
are deliberately used by the Legislature so that it may be beneficial to landlords as well as to
the tenants. According to me, the Legislature will never use surplusage words. The object of the
Act is to provide protection to the tenants by preventing unscrupulous and veracious landlords
from evicting the tenants. Looking to the aim of the Legislature obviously it is not to extinguish
all the rights of landlords and the reasonable restrictions are provided under the Act itself to the

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extent that they are necessary for the purpose of preventing rack renting and ejectment of
tenants. According to me, one of the acts of legislating the Rent Control Legislation is to restrict
landlord to eject the tenant at his wishes and sweet will. Therefore, the paramount object of the
Act is to provide the safeguards to the tenants against their exploitation by landlords but
simultaneously to provide certain grounds of eviction to the landlords.

20. The grounds of eviction envisaged under clause (c) of Section 12 (1) of the Act can be
further sub-divided into three clauses. Under the first sub-clause the landlord is entitled to have
a decree of eviction if the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance. The
second sub-clause authorises landlord to seek a decree of eviction if the tenant has done any
act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he is admitted to the tenancy of the
accommodation and under the third sub-clause a decree of eviction shall be passed if any act
has been done by the tenant which is likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest
of the landlord. It would be germane to quote Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act in its entirety, which
reads thus:--

Section 12 (1) (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a
nuisance or has done any act, which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he
was admitted to the tenancy of the recommendation, or which is likely to affect
adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. Provided that the
use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed
to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the
tenancy.

21. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent has filed the suit of eviction under the third
sub-clause to clause (c). Hence, in order to give any finding whether the plaintiff's suit is liable
to be decreed under the said clause, it is to be seen whether defendant/appellant has done any
act, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of plaintiff and in order to
arrive at a conclusion in this regard it would be condign to see the pleading of the defendant
because originally the suit was not filed by the plaintiff seeking decree of eviction under this
clause, but it was filed on the sole ground of bonafide requirement envisaged under Section 12
(1) (f) of the Act. Indeed, after filing of the written statement a decree of eviction under sub-
clause (c) of Section 12(1) of the Act has been sought by the landlord. Hence, in order to take
out the grain from the chaff whether any such act has been done by the defendant, which has
adversely and substantially affected the right of the plaintiff, the pleading of the defendant in
the written statement is required to be seen and it would be appropriate to quote necessary
pleading made by defendant in Para 1 of his written statement, which reads thus:--

22. On bare perusal of Para 1 of the written statement this Court finds that very humbly the

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defendant has prayed to the Court that without prejudicing and adversely affecting the right of
the plaintiff and by paying full respect to the law, he is pleading that the burden of proof of
ownership of the suit premises is on the plaintiff and he may be asked to prove it. Further, it is
more necessary because in respect to ownership of the suit premises for a considerable long
period of 20 years, i.e., 1977-78 to 1995-96 his name was never entered as owner of the suit
premises. At this juncture, we are reminded that somewhere in the year 1977-78 the defendant
was inducted as tenant in the suit premises. Only in the year 1996-97 the name of plaintiff has
been entered as owner in the municipal record. It would also be relevant to go through the
situation that when suit was filed on 20-2-1998, immediately before filing of the suit, the name
of plaintiff was anyhow got entered in the municipal record. If Court goes earlier to 1996-97
nowhere plaintiff has been shown to be the owner of the suit premises in the municipal record.
It is well settled in law that civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance and
probabilities and, therefore, one can think that in order to evict the defendant from the suit
premises, first the plaintiff got his name entered as owner in the municipal record during the
year 1996-97 and thereafter the eviction suit has been filed. The plaintiff himself has admitted
in Para 22 of his examination that his name as owner of the suit premises was never entered
during the long period of 1978 to 1996. Further he has admitted in Para 23 of his cross-
examination that after the death of original owner Mahadev Prasad, the suit property was
entered in the name of Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Kishore in the municipal
record who are sons of Dharamdas and Dharamdas was the son of Mahadev Prasad.

23. A very interesting part in the present case is that the plaintiff examined Dhanya Kumar as
P.W. 2 and when cross-examination was started upon him, unfortunately, it was not, completed
because Court's time was over and, therefore, this witness was given-up by plaintiff later on
and was never called for further cross-examination and, therefore, again one can infer why he
was given-up and not put for cross-examination. Because in cross-examination when this
witness was cornered, he has admitted that his name alongwith the names of his other brothers
has been entered as owner in the municipal record not only in regard to the suit property but
also in respect to several other immovable properties in the township. This point was further
cross-examined but unfortunately Court's time was over and the cross-examination was
deferred to next date of hearing 14-5-2001. On 14-5-2001 plaintiff's uncrossed witness Dhanya
Kumar was not present and a date was sought on behalf of plaintiff and matter was adjourned
to 27-7-2001. On this date and also on 24-8-2001 said witness Dhanya Kumar was not present
although other witnesses of plaintiff were examined. Similarly, on next date 19-9-2001 some
more witnesses of plaintiff were examined but said witness Dhanya Kumar did not remain
present. Ultimately on 24-9-2001 plaintiffs Counsel stated to the Court that his evidence is over
and he does not want to examine any more witness and in this manner said witness Dhanya
Kumar was not further cross-examined.

24. In the aforesaid backdrop, if we uplift the veil, the hidden malafide idea of seeking eviction
of defendant is exposed that in order to create a ground of eviction of alleged bonafide need
firstly the name of plaintiff was entered in the municipal record as owner and thereafter the
truth may not come out from the mouth of witness Dhanya Kumar when he was cornered
during cross-examination that indeed plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and this
witness alongwith his brothers, is the owner of the suit property and the defendant/tenant was
asked to accept the plaintiff as his landlord on the assurance and the understanding provided by
the true owners to him, the present suit for eviction has been filed. Hence, the said witness was
not produced for cross-examination so as to save him from saying the truth. As a matter of
fact, the purpose of quoting the Preamble, aims, object and nature of the Act hereinabove was
only in order to visualise the pleadings of the parties on the touchstone and anvil of ground of
eviction which plaintiff has taken and whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, can a
decree of eviction be passed or not.

25. According to me, the principles laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela
(supra) and that of decision of this Court in Nirvikar Gupta (supra), are squarely applicable in
the present case. In the decision of Sheela (supra), although defendant pleaded inter alia, that
the plaintiffs were not the owner of the suit premises and therefore, tenant was not liable to be
evicted but in that very written statement at other places the defendant admitted the plaintiffs
to be his landlords. The purpose of quoting the relevant portion of Para 1 of the written

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statement was only this much that how and in what manner the facts of two cases are more or
less akin to each other. Nowhere defendant of Sheela's case (supra), had setup title of his own
and prayed that plaintiffs may be directed to prove their title although defendant is accepting
that they are his landlords. In the case at hand also the defendant/appellant has never set up
the title of his own and respectfully prayed to the Court that without prejudicing and adversely
affecting the right of plaintiff and accepting him to be his landlord, the plaintiff be directed to
prove his ownership.

26. On going through the pleadings of the defendant this Court finds that defendant has never
renounced his character as tenant and in a clear and unequivocal term nowhere he has setup
title of the suit premises in him or in a third party and he is bonafidely calling upon the plaintiff
to prove his ownership or putting landlord to prove his title so as to protect himself (defendant)
or to earn a protection made available to him under the Act, but without disowning his
character of possession over the tenanted premises as tenant. In these facts and
circumstances, according to me, it cannot be said that his act was anyway injurious to
landlord/plaintiff and he had not done any act which may likely to affect adversely and
substantially to the interest of the plaintiff. Hence, according to me, a decree of eviction under
Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act cannot be passed.

27. The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the Courts below have erred in
law in passing the judgment under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act.

Regarding substantial question of law No. 2:

28. At the cost of repetition, I may again state here that initially the suit for eviction was filed
by plaintiff for bonafide need of himself and for his two major sons to start the business of
Seeds and Fertilisers in the suit premises. After the written statement was filed, the plaintiff
amended his plaint and pleaded in Para 1 (a) that because the then owner of the suit property
Mahadev Prasad Agrawal was pleased on account of services of offering Puja etc., by the
plaintiff, he gave the suit property to the plaintiff, which was in consideration of the Puja etc.
Further it has been pleaded by the plaintiff that said Mahadev Prasad also declared him to be
the owner of the property and delivered its possession. According to me, for no scintilla of
imagination it can be said that any title of the suit property whose value is admittedly more
than ` 100/- was conveyed in the plaintiff because no registered document and a valid
conveyance deed has been executed in favour of plaintiff. True, as rightly contended by learned
Counsel for respondent that inquiry in respect to ownership in eviction suit under the Rent
Control Legislation is not that much wider as that of title suit. But according to me, it is equally
true that it is having some wider connotation (though in narrow sense) than that of other
grounds of eviction envisaged under Section 12(1) of the Act and the plaintiff is legally bound to
prove his ownership in narrow sense so as to bring his case within the ambit and scope of word
"owner" used in Section 12(1) of the Act.

29. The word "owner" has not been defined in the Act although words "landlord" and "tenant"
are defined in Section 2 (b) and (i) respectively. In order to obtain a decree of eviction on the
ground of bonafide requirement envisaged in clause (f) of the Act, according to me, the plaintiff
is required to prove not only that he is a landlord but at the same time he has to prove that he
is also the owner of the premises for the simple reason that the word "owner" has been
deliberately used by Legislature under clause (f) of the Act. As already held hereinabove by me
that Legislature will never use any surplusage word while enacting a particular provision of the
statute and therefore, according to me if bonafidely the tenant is disputing the ownership of the
plaintiff then upto certain extent within the ambit and scope of narrow sense, the plaintiff is
required to prove his ownership. True, a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the
rent of any accommodation would come within the ambit of definition of "landlord" but merely
he is receiving or is having right to receive the rent, cannot be said that he would be the owner
of the said accommodation unless and until he proves it. The plaintiff has already admitted in
the first line of cross-examination that his name was never recorded as owner in the record of
Municipal Corporation for long period from the year 1978 to 1996 and further admitted that suit
property has been recorded in the name of Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and
Kishore. The defendant Dayaldas (D.W. 1) has specifically stated in Paras 1 and 7 of his

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testimony that he took the suit premises from Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and
Dharamdas Agrawal and on being said by these persons he accepted the rent receipts in the
name of plaintiff showing him to be landlord. Indeed this is the initial pleading of the defendant
in his written statement. The limited purpose of quoting this vital piece of evidence going to the
root of the matter is to take out the grain from the chaff whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree
of eviction under Section 12(1) (f) of the Act. Hence, according to me, the plaintiff was only
collecting rent from the defendant for the true owners Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar, Krishna
Kumar and Dharamdas and if that would be the position he cannot be said to be "owner" even
in narrow sense so as to evict the appellant from the suit premises under Section 12 (1) (f) of
the Act.

30. By keeping these situations in mind as well as the proposition of provisions of Section 116
of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in the decision of Sheela (supra), has thrown sufficient
light in Para 10 of the said decision. Further on bare perusal of Para 7 of the said decision, the
Supreme Court by clarifying that although the ground under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was
not the point in hand in the Supreme Court, but, in order to interpret clause (c) of the Act
effectively the Apex Court in Para 10 has laid down the law in regard to bonafide need also. On
the aforesaid backdrop, the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi (supra), and the decision of
this Court in Devraj (supra), relied by learned Counsel for respondent are not applicable.

31. Apart from what I have held hereinabove, had the suit been filed by the plaintiff/respondent
under the second category of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act (i.e., the non-residential
accommodation is bonafide needed by landlord for any person for whose benefit the
accommodation is held), matter would have been altogether different. But the present case has
not been filed by the plaintiff by pleading that for the benefit of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar,
Krishna Kumar and Dharamdas the accommodation was held by him and they are in need of
the suit accommodation and for that plaintiff or those persons do not have any reasonably
suitable vacant accommodation of their own in the city or town. Hence, I am of the view that a
decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) also cannot be passed.

32. Substantial question of law No. 2 is thus answered that because plaintiff is not found to be
the owner of the suit property, it cannot be said that suit accommodation is needed by him
bona fide for his own requirement and for his sons and Courts below have erred in passing the
decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is
hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by learned two Courts below are
hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

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