Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Gabina Punsalan-Luchavez,
Complainant,
(1) With due respect, I am not aware that complainant Mrs. Gabina
Luchavez filed a case against me on December 17, 2010. It is my
belief that a respondent in every administrative case must be given
due process. If not due process, at least a notice that an
administrative case whether meritorious or not was filed against a
judge as a form of forewarning of an impending
trouble as well as a way of protecting against troublesome litigants.
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(2) With due respect, in this administrative case, the Office of the
Court Administrator evaluated the propriety of the contents of our
court's lawful order dated July 7, 2010. With due respect, this
function is judicial in nature that is not lodged to the said office.
There is a proper judicial relief to be availed by the complainant
Gabina Punsalan-Luchavez against me with respect to the
questioned lawful order. An administrative complaint is not a
proper remedy for the court to explain its lawful order. The Office of
the CourtAdministrator is not the proper forum to explain and
justify the court's lawful orders. Thus, in Romero vs. Luna, A.M.
No. RTJ-11-2303 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3416-RTJ),
March 12, 2012, Your Honors in the Second Division adopted the
evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator:
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SO ORDERED."
(3) With due respect, our court agrees with the evaluation by the
Office of the Court Administrator about the lack of the need of
demand letter in Replevin case which appears to be contrary to the
questioned lawful order but no gross ignorance of the law can be
concluded from it. In City Service Corp. vs. Leo Mario Celdran, Civil
Case No. M-PSY-09-09586 for Sum of Money, my
Decision dated February 21, 2011 ruled in this wise that is
supportive with the evaluation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, to quote:
"As to the second issue, the plaintiff has a cause of action despite
the absence of a demand letter. There is an existing opinion among
lawyers regarding the necessity of giving a demand letter prior to
filing a civil case. To re-state this argument, to
the effect, "One common mistake committed by creditors in dealing
with their debtors is the failure to send a demand letter. For some,
it is sufficient that the loan has reached the maturity date, and
without sending any demand, they soon commence to file collection
suits. That is not correct. It must be bore in
mind that unless there is demand, the debtor is not yet technically
default. It is only when demand to pay is made and subsequently
refused that the debtor can be considered in default and where the
right to file an action to collect the debt accrue. The rule is that
since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not
only a legal right of the creditor and a correlative duty of the debtor
but also "an act or omission of the debtor in violation of said legal
right," the cause of action does not accrue until the debtor refuses,
expressly or impliedly, to comply with his duty. Thus, the following
must be present before a collection suit can be validly initiated: (1)
right in favor of the creditor to receive
payment; (2) an obligation on the part of the debtor to pay; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of the debtor violative of the right of
the creditor or constituting a breach of the obligation of the debtor
or the creditor. It is only when the last element occurs that a cause
of action arises. "Lack of demand
letter is a ground to dismiss a case on the ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity.
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recoverable by the plaintiff.2 An analysis of the jurisprudence
reveals that giving a demand letter is not a pre-requisite for a
collection suit yet it is helpful to avert expensive litigation.
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(4) With due respect, why it appeared in the questioned order as I
stated that complainant Gabina Punsalan-Luchavez must submit
proof that her signature in the demand letter was forged, meaning
a demand letter is required, it can be deduced that the same
questioned order does not show any sign of gross ignorance at all
on issue of demand letter, rather it was made out of the
court's judicial task of ferreting out the truth to aid both parties. It
is my humble submission that the primary duty of a judge during
trial is to know the truth not to apply the law. The questioned order
will prevent further delay of the case on the part of complainant
Gabina Punsalan-Luchavez who insisted that her signature was
forged thus there is a need to dismiss the case against
her. The questioned order means that the court is willing to hear
whatever, be it right or wrong, is the defense of complainant
Gabina Punsalan-Luchavez during trial that should proceed. The
plausibility or legality of her defense will
be determined in the Decision of the judge. In decision-making, the
primary duties of judge are to state the facts and apply the law.
(5) With due respect, our court disagrees with the evaluation by
the Office of the Court Administrator about the requirement of
representation of counsel of complainant Gabina Punsalan-
Luchavez. There is no law that prohibits complainant Gabina
Punsalan-Luchavez to represent herself in a civil case. The
representation of counsel in criminal case is stricter compared with
civil case because in the former case, what is stake is life or liberty.
In the Constitution and the Rules of Court, there is no right to
counsel in civil cases unlike in criminal cases. Right to counsel an
be waived especially in civil cases. The complainant in a civil case
is at risk of losing his or her case if there is no counsel that he or
she waived. Complainant Gabina Punsalan- Luchavez has herself
to blame if the trial proceeds and a decision is rendered
adverse to her without being represented by a counsel for reason
attributable to her. In small claims court, there are no counsels
required contrary to Sibal vs. People GR No. 161070, April 14,
2008 cited in the administrative matter for agenda report by
the Office of the Court Administrator. The case law is a criminal
case not applicable in the case of complainant Gabina
Punsalan-Luchavez. In practice, litigants are using lack of counsel
as an excuse to delay cases in Civil cases. Our court gives them
sufficient time and opportunity to bring their counsels and their
failure to do so for causes due to them would result to a waiver of
their right to counsel or failure on their part
to prosecute because an unreasonable delay of cases is violative of
one's Constitutional right to speedy trial. It is also prejudicial to
public interest to encourage delay through the excuse of lack of
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counsel because government's meager resources will be consumed
and wasted especially on intentional delay of cases that is made to
thwart the swift dispensation of justice in our country.
Rule 30, Section 9, Revised Rules of Court: The judge of the court
where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to
be adduced but the parties.
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Rule 115, Section 1 (c) Revised Rules of Court: Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
rights without the assistance of counsel.
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should not merely make the motions of defending the accused but
exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client."
The Solicitor General, in his eleven-page Brief, rebuts this, arguing
that appellant's actions during the trial showed instead a
"lackadaisical stance on his own defense." Appellant had been
given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but
his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his
act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of
his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears
that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on
purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and
the orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant did
not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio
were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his
claim that he was not effectively represented. In short, he was
afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by
his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It
taxes the mind to think that, almost two years since appellant first
invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still
could not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither
did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers. The facts of this
case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional
right to counsel because he was adequately represented by three
court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty.
Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure
and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly
administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an
obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that
the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be
negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
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RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
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that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the
same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of
calling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance.
Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-
0410. He would then be acting not as a counselor lawyer, but as a
party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying
Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is Section 34 of
Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the
latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.
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to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
PRAYER
Judge Eliza B. Yu
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