INTERNATIONALISM

Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights 2008

Socioeconomic rights are the most frequently unfulfilled human rights

UDHR Article 25.1 sets them out

Earlier European generations

1. Industrial societies then much less affluent relatively and absolutely
- This means that eradication of poverty completely would have
been a MASSIVE opportunity cost, which so so so so isnt the case
now e.g. US debt
2. Earlier generations werent committed to moral unversalism
- Whereas now the equal moral status of human beings is widely
accepted in the developed west

So how does our tolerance of poverty fit with our commitment to moral
universalism?

Moral universalism

Moral universalist iff:

1. Subjects all persons to same system of fundamental moral
principles
2. Principles assign the same fundamental moral benefits and burdens
3. Benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms

(1)Does allow special moral preference to arise i.e. contracts etc, but
the fundamentals are still the same
(2)Opens up questions about how UNIVERSAL MORAL CONCEPTION
(UMC) can respond to pragmatic pressures allowing assignment of
lesser fundamental benefits and burdens (BB) to children, mentally
disabled etc
- Could be adapted to allow some change, but fundamental has to
be equality

So there are a few ambiguities universalism is thus not a moral position

with a clearly defined content, but merely an approach

Our moral assessments of national and global economic orders

2 key qs about economic justice (EJ)
1. What fundamental moral claims do persons have on global
economic order and what fundamental responsibilities do these
claims entail for those who impose it?
2. apart from national economic order
prevailing opinion is that moral claims are considerably weaker under the
first statement
- but upon examination the discrepancy seems arbitrary

in such discussions national economic orders (NEOs) nations are

commonly understood as solidaristic or fraternal communities
such ties therefore generate specific moral claims
but this doesnt invalidate universalism it just makes it
1. now relates to moral constrants on claims to the GEO
2. now relates to moral constraints on claims to the NEO, when there is
a strong bond with a smaller unit

most people in rich countries would think of our global economic order as
basically just
but GEO doesnt meet these criteria that are minimal requirements on
NEO
1. social rules should be liable to peaceful change
- GEO relies on latent violence in military powers and set ups that
prevent and deter rule violations
- It is determined by a teeeeeny minority of its participants G8,
P5, IMF etc
2. Avoidable life threatening poverty should be avoided
- Surely any just EO needs to provide all with basic means and
needs
- But in GEO most citizens reject this

Then gives facts about GEO and world poverty that are probs now out of
date so look some up before collections

Conceptions of national and global economic justice contrasted

- No national society displays anything like the global inequality

that we see globally
- We would probably consider a national society with that kind of
income inequality unjust

Could say that this wouldnt be unjust because if we thought it was then
we would change it through ballot box
But this falls foul of minimum requirement (1) that there is peaceful
means to change which there isnt
Also surely we dont just accept an NEO because it is approved by the
majority

Imagine subbrazil where there NEO produces life-threatening poverty and

not subject to peaceful change by majority
Could we justify this state of affairs?
 1. Evade demand by surrendering the discrepancy i.e. strengthen the
minimal criteria applied to GEO or weaken the minimal criteria for
NEO
2. Defend a discrepancy of minimal criteria i.e. justify GEO unjust
even if it fails to meet NEO criteria
3. Insist on a discrepancy while rejecting the universalist demand to
justify this discrepancy i.e says that neo is subject to a min
criteria, geo isnt, but you dont need to justify this

Moral universalism and david millers contextualism

3rd response can simply point to our intuition

- Our discrepant criteria of neo and geo are moral points that need
to be confirmed
- An account that doesnt vindicate these intuitions should be
rejected on these grounds alone
- Miller was actually more complex, arguing that we should allow
diverse moral principles to hold in different contexts without
demanding any justification for such diversity
- But this is quite unconvincing, those who simply state different
contexts will often fail to convince and often seem offensive
- Miller does recognise this but argues that contextualism can still
be helpful

But lets move beyond this dogmatic contextualisms and the

unsupported endorsements or rejections it takes to be
appropriate

But also shouldnt go for complete moral universalism

It permits highly unified anti-contextualist moral conceptions
But also permits critical contextualist alternatives

So converge on critical contextualism

Contextualist moral universalism and John Rawls moral conception

Rawls wants to confine is distributive justice requirements to the basic

structure of a self-contained society existing under the circumstances of
justice

Rawls gives reasons like pluralism, avoiding demandingness, stability etc,

for why basic institutions are treated separately
But Rawls insists fundamental principles are different for national and
institutional schemes

Rawls doesnt justify this well enough

 1. Rejects the difference principle (DP) for global justice as it is
unacceptable for people to bear costs of decisions made by others
- But doesnt really explain why this doesnt apply on a national
level
2. Fails to explain rejection of DP as global order across with argument
- discusses how population of indeterminate size and as a self-
contained and closed system should organise itself
takes this principle to apply to the US but the US is not self
contained by any stretch of imagination
Rawls does then conclude that a national society need merely
endorse and (approximately) satisfy some not-unreasonable liberal
standard of EJ

3. This new minimal criterion defies the second challenge from moral
universalism
- But rawls should surely hold that the geo must meet this
standard, otherwise it is an unqualified and unjustified double
standard
- Also vague what even counts as an NEO and a GEO

Rationalising divergent moral assessments through a double standard

Easiest way is to subject the GEO to a weaker moral demand than the
NEO
Rawls doesnt do it

Arguments for weak criterion usually apply to cultural diversity or

autonomy, or special ties to smaller groups

but all three factors exist within nations as well

only be defence of double standard if show that they are less relevant
domestically
we owe the global poor an account of why we take ourselves to
be entitled to impose on them a global economic order in
violation of the minimal moral constraints we ourselves place on
the imposition of any national economic order

rationalising divergent moral assessments without a double standard

basically argue that even with a change in GEO there wouldnt be a

massive impact on the lives of the poor
how is the quality of the order related causally to this starvation

argue that it is mostly to do with flawed economic regimes and their

corrupt and incompetent elits
this doesnt reflect a double standard, it just depends on economic
causality
so this is one main reasons to convince ourselves that the GEO isnt
actually morally significant

a) Would be wrong to impose ourselves upon countries

b) Interference could be counter productive
c) Can give development assistance but this may not be successful
due to corrupt elites

Does this work? Well probably not because it takes national systems,
corrupt elites and things like that as solely exogenous factors let alone
the economic problems and unliklehoods of the actual arguments

The causal role of global institutions in the persistence of severe poverty

- Strong case for GEO being important

1. International resource privilege
- Control by coercion over your own resources, and there is
therefore powerful incentives for coups etc in resources driven
economies
2. International borrowing privilege
- Any group holding power entitled to borrow funds in name of
whole society
- Important negative effects on corruption and poverty because it
puts credit at the hands of rulers (often dicks)
- Again coups and civil wars etc
- So 1&2 come together to severely increase poverty at the hands
of the GEO

Easier to detach ourselves when not to blame, but we share causal and
moral responsibility
Also increasing interdependency is massive because it makes the weaker
countries even more vunerable to exogenous shocks through decision and
policies made

Conclusion

The rules structuring the world econonomy have a profound impact on

the global economic distribution
the empirical rationalisation is not empirically sustainable

if economic rationalisation fails then we are employing a double standard

without a plausible rationale, our discrepand assessments

constitute covert arbitrary discrimination in facour of the wealthy
societies against the global poor
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS Caney 2005

What does a theory of distributive justice require (DJ)?

1. What sorts of entities are included?
2. Who are the rightful recipients of goods, and who is obligated to
distribute these goods?
3. What should people have fair shares of?
4. What criterion for distributive justice

(1)And (2) are scope of justice

If someone gives an individualistic account of 1 then you need to
know which groups are included in 2 i.e. everyone in the world,
within nations? What?

There are also questions not tied to justice about distribution i.e.
benevolence

II
Cosmopolitan approaches to DJ
1. Who is entitled most contemporary cosmopolitans affirm that the
duties are owed to individuals
2. Fundamental and derivative principles:
- Fundamental: all persons should be included in the scope of
distributive justice
- Derivative: fundamental may be best realised if people comply
with special duties to some i.e. global utilitarianism that
enforces family relations (as long as everyone has a family)

3. Modest vs ambitious cosmopolitanism

- modest makes a positive claim that all persons should be included
in the scope of distributive justice
- ambitious makes the positive claim, and the negative claim that
persons dont have any obligation of distributive justice to fellow
nationals or fellow citizens to a greater extent

4. Institutional vs interactions
- Institutional = apply to institutions (Pogge says trade,
communication and interdependence)
- Interactional= principles would apply even in absence of
institutional background
- But as we are increasingly interdependent this falls away
5. Principles lead to policies
POGGE: people should be taxed for using resources in their territory
and distributing to the worldwide poor
SHUE AND JONES: human right to subsistence
STEINER: natural right to equal portion of Earths resources
RAWLS DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE APPLIES GLOBALLY: Beitz
Scope2 claim the standard justifications of principles of distributive
justice entail that there are cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice

III

Beitz argues from Rawlsian point of view but seeks to show that it
implies cosmopolitan DJ
Rawls has an institutionalist position that maintains states are reasonably
self-contained
- Does argue for some global principles but argues that the original
position wouldnt create international DJ, only rights to self-
determination and defence

Version A

Beitz says that there are 2 reasons for Rawls theory supporting
cosmopolitcan DJ:
1. Natural resources
- The distribution is entirely arbitrary so surely cant be
beneficiaries by right
- If you apply this to OP (original position) states would surely give
themselves a fair chance at getting some natural resources
2. Insitutionalist framework
- The degree of international economic interdependence
constitutes a scheme of social cooperation

SO beitz proposes an internation DJ based on Rawls DP which supersedes

any questions about international justice concerning natural resources

Two criticisms of Beitz:

1. No global interdependence of the appropriate kind
- Rawls famously says that his theory applies to mutually
advantageous schemes and international economy just isnt like
that really? Trade? The UN? Extradition treaties?
- This is true when country A exploits country B but really
peoples actions are affected by those living abroad
- Surely to this just argue that yes there is interdependence like
this

2. DJ not concerned with moral claim that it applies within scheme of

cooperation i.e. that economic interactions dont really have any
moral relevance to DJ

- DJ could mean a) entitlement perspective or b) duty bearer i.e.

who has a duty to whom
- And it is difficult to see why interaction economically has any
affect on this
- So insitutionalist has a morally arbitrary connection to
entitlement making properties
Replies:
1) Impact:
- Morally relevant because they have HUGE impact on peoples
lives and the outcomes it produces
- But actually this only justifies making duties to all who can make
a difference and that is an interactional position
2) Pogge argues that there is a distinction between negative and
positive duties
- Persons have a negative duty not to sustain unjust structures,
and membership of institutions is important because as a
member one is subject to a negative duty not to uphold unjust
institutions
- This is quite good but if poverty results from things separate to
instutionalism there is no answer
- Caney sees this as fatal

Version B

Beitz and Pogges argument unconvincing as moral premise is implausible

Richards develops GOP on grounds that persons are entitled to be

included in the contract in virtue of their rights and interests as human
beings

Fair principles are the ones that you would get in the OP
In virtue of having as sense of justice and capacity for a conception of the
good, all should be represented in GOP

There are problem siwth the GOP but these arent problems with Beitzs
cosmopolitanism per se

IV
Alternative to contractarian theories of DJ
Outcome centred
Singer says:
- Poverty is bad
- Persons have duties to prevent bad things
- Concludes that affluent persons have obligations to aid the
impoverished, wherever they live and whatever their nationality
- Does this equate acts and ommissions
- But even then one can argue that if not the same, not saving a
life is still deeply morally wrong

Is the scheme arduous

1. Well morality might be highly demanding
2. Also surely not doing something is highly onerous for the weak and
defenceless
 3. More moderate lines are taken than singer Goodin says there
needs to be aid but not necessarily complete

Strength of the consequentialist outcomes is that it would seem

implausible to claim that principles of distributive justice should be utterly
indifferent to the outcomes they generate

Problems
1. Incomplete maximising consequentialism has troubling outcomes
(hence core and basic rights i.e. poverty isnt complete
redistribution
2. Indeterminate above threshold, complete? Difficult to tell which
GDJ would be chosen

Consequentialist approach fails to provide a convincing answer to the

question of how burdens and benefits should be divdied, even if they
provide a good answer to the question of what we judge to be a benefits
and a burden

Rights based cosmopolitan perspective from rights based approaches

Held derives 7 types of human rights and three economic rights health,
social and economic
Shue defends human right to subsistence as necessary to enjoy other
rights
inherent necessities for the exercise of any right
Jones says rights should protect important human interests

Plausible as any credible account of peoples rights reflects what is

important to persons their fundamental interests
Objection in that it fails to produce adequate account of duties
But you can surely put political insitutions in place to protect rights and
then infer duties to support institutional arrangements that protect rights

VI

General nature of cosmopolitan arguments

Contractarian+consequentialist+rights based = prinicples of justice that
all lead to rome i.e. a global cosmopolitan account

But still need to prove scope/specific principles

4 principles we might consider adopting:
1. Persons have a human right to subsisence
2. Persons of different nations should enjoy equal opportunities: no one
should face worse ops because of their nationality (follows
straightforwardly from domestic equality of opportunity
 3. UNHDR declares everyone without any discrimination has the right
to equal pay for equal work (but what is relevant, quality of work or
demand for product, also seems to be problematic with gifted
people for example)
4. Benefitting people matters more the worse off the people are (Parfit)

These statements arent too onerous they strike a good balance of basic
rights and undue strenuessness of maximising consequentialist view

Ecumenical appeal variety of perspectives can agree on these

If scope2 (standard justifications of DJ theories entail cosmopolitanism)

claim is true then no option but to accept these

VII

Rawls argues for international OP contract with representatives of states

But argues that they wouldnt chose principles of international
distribution

Makes 3 claims for this:

1. Negative claim that cosmopolitan DJ is innapropriate because it
would exhibit tolerance to non-liberal states
2. All persons must have some basic economic rights
3. Parties would accept duties of assistance to burdened socieities

Objections to contractarian theory

1. Use of peoples questionable as they arent homogenous
2. It fails to derive human rights (surely they could have just stemmed
from something different though_
3. Ad hoc basis
4. Incoherence arguments for civil and political liberties entail global
equivalents
5. Incogernece 2 rejects some proposed preconditions for other
human rights
(DONT GET THIS READ THE ACTUAL BOOKS FOR FINALS)

why would people agree to more global redistribution?

Rawls defines people in a way such that they will not
But why assume liberal societies have no interest in having more
resources rather than less? why do they want more for themselves at a
domestic level and not internationall?
3 reasons why they would:
1. Rawls says parties wish to preserve equal standing
2. Rawls says parties wish to preserve self respect (international
inequalities could easily corrode this)
 3. Rawls says parties will be concerned about stability and will only be
secured if parties enjoy decent economic well-being of all its people
So on Rawls own position he seem to commit to some form of global DJ

VIII

Rawls second challenge to GDJ is that it doesnt recognise the importance

of moral self governance/autonomy

Basically argues that where people are self governing they are responsible
for ensuring that their members receive just entitlements
e.g. one society industrialises whilst the other doesnt
and the wealthier nation shouldnt have to redistribute because of the
decisions that they make because this violates autonomy
feels quite like a Nozickian argument scaled up)

but this is a shit argument

1. Unjust towards individuals
- Why should a member of a third world country be econonmically
disadvantaged by the decisions a member of the econ/political
elite made?
2. Intuition that with self determination comes responsibility that
doesnt always apply
3. Nature of position criticising
Regects egalitarian cosmopolitanism but then accepts the
minimal economic rights thing
But this is surely weird
must either abandon their argument against egalitarian
conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice, or abandon their
commitment to any economic human rights, or provide some
explanation as to why their economic human rights are immune
to their argument whereas other economic human rigths arent

IX

Argues agains GDJ on the grounds that the principles of DJ must be able to
motivate people to comply with them and because of nationalist
grounding you cannot do this

1. individualistic version
- individuals cannot be swayed so lack of obligation
2. societal version
- claim about necessary preconditions for scheme of DJ
- system of justice must be one with which participants identify
otherwise social support collapses
- people identify with fellow nationals but not at a supranational
level
well 1. Is ridic because it assumes you only have obligatios if motivated to
comply

against 2. A) overstates necessity of national sentiments i.e. there are

huge forms of social unity apart from national ones b) dispute model of
human motivation ahistorical and unchanging account of human nature
assuming we are only willing to make sacrifices for fellow-nationals
relies on an impoverished moral psychology

Assess the argument that ambitious cosmopolitanism is incorrect for

people to have special obligations for fellow nationals

the claim is that membership of a nation generates duties to ones fellow

nationals and also entitlements one can claim of them

two reason:
1. intuitive
a) drawns on peoples moral convictions making the claim that
correct moral principles have to match intuition
b) people have a strong intuition that you should favour
nationsals
objection: why do we make intuition authoritative? Not obvious
that people do think we have special obligations to nationals?
Even if people do have these intuitions it isnt necessarily an
obligation of DJ

2. Reciprocity argument
- People who engage in a system of cooperation acquire special
rights to goods produced by cooperation and entitlements that
non-participants laxk
- Nations are systems of social cooperation and therefore duties
and rights are generated
Objections 1. Do not comprise schemes of reciprocity interdependency
and nationals abroad mean that a nation isnt just or even at all a system
of cooperation between members of one nation 2. No force when social
institution isnt cooperative 3. Denies rights to those unable to cooperate
i.e. the disabled or future generations

XII

Realist perspective that CDJ is utopian and unworkable

Systemic argument that international systems are such that states cannot
act to bring about CDJ no coercive global authority
But surely this a) isnt a moral fact and b) depends on the character of the
international system and assumes that it has a statis character

Also dont necessarily need cooperation like this i.e. if the US wiped its
debts it wouldnt be a huge cost, but big impact for beneficiary

Also can be based on cooperation

The other is the one dealt with by Pogge that actually aid is ineffective
and goes to corrupt leaders and it badly organised anyway etc

Two points against this a) dispute empirical point, and b) doesnt alter
fundamentally moral claims

XIV SUMMARY

So
1. Contractarian accounts of cosmopolitan justice can overcome 2
challenges but prove unconvinging
2. Consequentialist accounts overcome some difficulties but are
incomplete and indeterminate
3. Existing rights based conceptions are plausible but unconvincing
4. Rationale underlying traditional domestic theories of justice actually
justifies the global application of their theories (scope2 claim) and
this is because they are based on universalised principles
5. Rawls appeal to toleration fails to invalidate CDJ
6. Rawls and Millers responsibility argument rests on a dubious
analogy (will need to read book for this)
7. Arguments that CDJ is unfeasible is unconvincing
8. Both arguments that persons have special obligations of dj to fellow
nationals are unconvincing
9. The claim that persons have cosmo rights but that th duty to uphold
them falls on fellow nationals is poor
10. Realist arguments are stupid

WOW HELPFUL

Nagel The Problem of Global Justice 2005

2 issues that will focus on

1. Justice and sovereignty (Hobbes argued actual justice needs a
sovereign state)
2. Limits of equality as a demand of justice (Is Rawls consistent, can
you have an egalitarian structure of states, can you be consistent if
you dont require this?
Argues that sovereignty is linked to justice as a) it coordinates conduct
and b) is an enabler because it is backed by force and therefore can cut
out free riders

There is a kind of agreement that there are some conditions of

fairness/equality that should be employed when thinking of the way a just
society treats its citizens and this is what creates the unrest when there
is an absence of these comparable relations with other societies

It is also clearly a humanitarian disaster let alone justice so surely some

kind of humane assistance from the well off is clearly called for even apart
from any claim of justice
And surely these duties exist in virtue of absolute, not relative, need

2 principle conceptions:
1. Cosmopolitanism that individual sovereign states is an unfortunate
obstance to the establishment of global justice
2. Political derives from Rawls view that justice is strictly political-
argues that it is a states existence that gives the value of justice its
application
Dworkin argues that equal concern is the special and indispensable
virtue of sovereigns so global justice isnt necessarily distressing
If it turns out that in an essay I conclude that we shouldnt go for
global justice, make sure you make the humanitarian point i.e. that
it is humane to transfer, and it isnt a condonement

IV

On either view, though, global justice would require sovereignty

Then looks at rawls just in less depth than caney

Cosmo has moral appeal as birth place does seem completely arbitrary
points us toward the utopian goal of trying to extend legitimate
democratic government to ever-larger domains in pursuit of more global
justice

socioeconomic justice
depends on positive rights which can only arise upon joining together
(claim to right to democracy if we are a unit of people)
Rawls appeal to elimination of morally arbitrary sources of wealth and to
the extent that these factors create differences, the system needs
justification

So there is a kind of set of rights that are crucial to being in a society so

it isnt just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage
It is that we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed
system, and subject to its norms that creates the special presumption
against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system

So does this membership mean we can do what we want to other groups?

Well no states can be left to their own devices as long as they dont harm
others most our basic rights and duties are universal

the state makes unique demands on the will of its members

and those exceptional demands bring with them exceptional
obligations, the positive obligations of justice

perhaps arguing that because you do not sign up to be a member of the

human race, these special obligations arent generated

however the political conception doesnt take content from universal

moral relation, it doesnt deny it i.e. minimum morality and human
standards
and this doesnt necessarily depend on institutions but it might be
practically impossible to maintain these without institutions

but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society with everyone

so there is a big difference here

cosmo argues that the formation of the state as answering also a
universal demand for equality
whereas pol argues that universal requirement of equality is
conditional
we are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we
are joined in a strong and coercively imposed political
community

VII

Rawls is slightly different, talking not of general international obligation

but about what principles should govern the foreign policy of a liberal
society
So it is more an elaboration of the account of a just society rather than an
independent account of a just world
And the moral units, therefore, arent individuals they are societies

So perhaps a rawlsian would say things about international justice like

Caney outlines but he actually considers a different question, so trying
to force a rawlsian into this mode may not be the best way around it

Says there needs to be equal respect enough for liberal societies to

tolerate nonliberal societies that meet the condition of decency
it is surpising that internationally, equal respect should result precisely in
toleration for the absence of such restraint in nonliberal societies

the claims of individuals come in at a far lower level basically claims of

human rights

but he argues that this is silly, and that there is no real reason for the
principled toleration of nonliberal societies
there are practical reasons for them to show restraint, ut there are no
moral reasons for restraint of the kind Rawls offers

more plausible perhaps that liberal states not obliged to either tolerate or
to transform

that there is a respect for autonomy of other societies

argues that interdependence doesnt bring in a political conception of

justice, because these institutions dont rise to a level of statehood
they are still not appropriate sites for justice

surely this is misunderstanding, bodies like the EU directly take

sovereignty, and even things like the IMF remove certain decision making
powers
so perhaps a good way would be to marry them to the extent that there
is sovereignty, there is obligations, so there may be weak obligations
owed due to international interdependence

argues against this (the red thing) saying that international institutions
act in the name of the state
but again surely this is a misunderstanding of the way bodies work
internationally, if they were simply arms of our existing sovereign states
then they wouldnt be international
also do not buy the argument that the correct constituents of these are
countries, because the country doesnt exist independent of the people ffs

sliding scale of degrees of co-membership

natural suggestion in light of clearly multi-layered morality
Miller Citizenship and National Identity 2000

Nationality under attack

Starts from a humean kind of argument that says ordinary sentiments

should be left in place until strong arguments for rejection appear
- correcting them only when they are inconsistent or plainly
flawed in some other way
- we dont aspire to some universal and rational foundation such
as kant

so from this view Miller is going to seek to defend nationality doesnt

need to justify this standpoint (he says) so will do a) examine arguments
against nationality and b) assuage tension between the ethical
particularism implied by such commitments and ethical universalism

i.e. philosophers often give weight to agent-neutral justifications of stuff

but nationality seems to present competition to this

- seems as though nationality is seen as backward looking or a

reactionary notion

so there is the philosophical challenge and a progressive challenge to

nationalism

nationality has 3 interconnected propositions

1. personal identity
- it may properly be part of someones identity that they belong to
this or that national grouping i.e. it may be, but it may not be
part of personal identity
2. bounded duties
- contour lines in the ethical landscape the duties we owe our
fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than the
duties that we owe to human beings as such
3. political self-determination
- people who form a national community in a particular territory
have a good claim to self determination needs an institutional
structure for collective decisions primarily governing own
community
argues that these propositions are linked together in such a way that it is
difficult to feel the force of any one of them without acknowledging the
others

feels a bit weird though. Take (1) for example this is slightly chicken and
egg if it can be shown that national identity breaks down/is arbitrary,
then we are basing something moral on an arbitrary assumption for
example I may think that ginger people are ethically superior, but and I
therefore have more moral standing with them hm not sure about this
but something doesnt feel right

features of nationality
1. national communities are constituted by belief: a nationality exists
when its members believe that it does
- features like race or language only feature when nationality takes
it as a defining feature i.e. for everything that people say links a
national community there are clear counter examples
2. identity embodies historical continuity
- nations stretch back into the past and the historic community is
a community of obligation i.e. because of what those before us
did we are obliged to continue their work historical and
intergenerational continuity again weird how could a nation
become independent then this is a very statist model of
nationhood

3. national identity is an active identity

- communities that do things together there is a proxy that we
think acts on our behalf and expresses the national will
4. connects a group of people with a particular geographical place
5. essential that people who compose the nationa are believed ot
share certain traits that mark them off from other peoples
- national divisions must be natural ones; they must correspond to
real differences between peoples
- immigration not excluded but they must take on the essential
elements of national character

and it is these 5 things that distinguish nationality from other collective

sources of personal identity

nationality defended

but the real question is if this performs enough value that we should be
positive towards nationalism or at least acquiescent

could argue that it performs a very very valuable service in that there is a
need for solidarity among populations of states that are large and
anonymous need for collective goods for example
also because of the mythical nature of national identity it can be changed
very easily
i.e. doesnt necessarily need to be a conservative thing, national ideas
often quite liberal or socialist programmes

liberal objection

liberal critique is that nationality is detrimental to the cultural pluralism

that liberals hold dear
this derives from the assumption that national identities are exlusive in
their nature
where a state embodies a single nationality, the culture that makes up
that nationality must drive out everything else

but nationality isnt an all-embracing identity

need not extend to all cultural attributes but the liberal argument
assumes no line can be drawn

liberals could admit that a line is drawn, but say that it is drawn by the
dominant cultural group
- empirically this is probably true but it is integral that it is loaded
this way
- also nationality can be an inclusive identity which can
incorporate sub groups

also agues that a distinct and clear national identity that stands over and
above the specific cultural traits of all the groups in society in question

it wont be painless though like some things will have to go

is this convincing surely for a national identity to become recognised the

dominant group will be the ones calling the shots?

The Balkan objection

Argues that the principle of nationality cannot in practice be realised but

the belief that it can leads to bloodshed
- i.e. would be nationalities so entangled that there is no way of
drawing boundaries so as to satisfy all claims
- nationality holds that those who form a national community have
good claim to self-determination says that this isnt consent
theory because it isnt about individual will its about individual
identity

if the group is dissatisfied you need to ask does the group have a
collective identity which is or has become incompatible with the national
identity of the majority in the state?
3 answers
1. dissatisfied group is ethnic and it isnt getting a good deal
- black Americans, needed domestic reform but not secession
2. group has national identity but is radically incompatible with identity
of majority, where elements of commonality and difference
- shared common historical identity, but with distinct national
character (Scotland and wales)
- not secession but an arrangement that gives the sub-community
right of self-determination in those areas of decision which are
especially central to its own sense of nationhood
3. state contains two or more nations with radically incompatible
identities
- no realistic possibility of shared identity
- prima facie case for secession

so the pricniples of nationality doesnt generate an unlimited right of

secession

justice and sentiment

objection that duties of justice dont depend on feeling towards others

true but national identity marks out to whom special duties are owed
- may do so without determining the content of these special
duties
- doesnt mean htat they are based on sentiment though (like
family for example)
but obligations nationally can seem sentiment based
therefore nation with less sentiment would have less obligations
I feel bound to them as sharing in a certain way of life, epressed by the
public culture
and the content of the obligations depend on that public culture

so this means that a swede may feel more bound than an American
this may seem uncomfortably relativistic but yeah

CHAPTER 10
National self-determination and global justice

Big tension seems to be no theory that makes belonging to one or other

society itself a relevant consideration in deciding what is due

Principle of national self determination is that people who inhabit

continuous piece of territory form a national community who have right to
determine their own future
In many cases this is achieved by having an independent state

National self-determination
Assume it is possible (NSD)
Why might it be intrinsically valuable?
Well just as SD is important for people it is important for groups

Self evident for a tennis club that was set up

Self-evidence falls away for nations
Compatriots are thrown together (unlike the tennis club) national
boundaries are arbitrary, nationals dont sign up (tennis members do)

Case for NSD most obvious if

1. communities institutions are as near as possible to deliberative
democracy
2. the standard range of civil and political rights should be
constitutionally entrenched
3. legal right of emigration

the demands of justice

appealing solution perhaps that national self-determination is valuable so

long as it remains within the bounds laid down by justice
i.e. justice demands certain requirements and as long as NSD conforms to
these, it is a good things, analougous to individuals within a state

this solution though varies completely based on the DJ theory you pick
some may be very demanding leaving little room for NSD, some might not
giving a lot of space

also the analogy between individual and group doesnt quite hold firm
because nation-states are engated in the pursuit of an important form of
justice social

but could social justice simply be global justice on a smaller scale

(basically the scope2 claim from Caney)

argument goes:
- justice is a matter of entitlement
- social justice within society means state ensures access
- global justice demands ensemble of states ensure access

but this assumes that we can give a spec of the demands of justice in
advance of the articulation of those demands within the many different
political communities that make up the world we inhabit

but surely it is more reasonable that conceptions differ slightly in different

cultural milieux
thus under NSD policies of social justice will vary

three reasons for divergence

1. justice is about the way valued goods are allocated
 - how these goods are conceived will vary
- point can be missed in talking of basic goods
- the meaning of such goods is socially constittuied
2. criterion of distribution varies
- almost all societies discriminate on the basis of merit but
different qualities make the merit
- basic needs are universal but most other things will depend on
social goods
- potential to marry this with Rawls ideas about universal goods or
primary goods surely if they are truly primary goods it will work
across borders

3. context in which criteria applied is different

societies have a free hand in deciding how to arrange the social contexts
simply that where contxts differ, so will conceptions of justice

argues that this is contextualist rather than subjectivist (are these really
that different ngl)

is this really good enough? It is quite wishy washy? And also the current
global injustice would certainly not be permitted within a state, not only
that but it goes far beyond distribution it is highly unlikely that any
conception of justie would allow babies to live and die in adverse and
extreme poverty

against global egalitarianism

clear that global justice cannot require that people everywhere should
enjoy the same resources and advantages regardless of their membership
in particular political communities
so membership must make a difference (well only if you accept the
premise)

perhaps works in a more abstract way like EAA or something like that
argues that it is wrong to see inequality as the problem (unless you use
Cohen type thing) so have to see the problem of poverty

global justice

what are the positive requirements of global justice?

1. Must respect the conditions that are universally necessary for
human beings to lead minimally adequate lives
- Negative answer of not infringing rights
- Positive of access to rights
2. Individuals and collectives should refrain from exploitation
3. Obligation to ensure that all political communities have the
opportunity to determine their own future and practise justice
among their members
 - If we value NSD we have to value others NSD as well
- Could we provide the resources needed to achieve justice
internally?
- Well argues that the injustice may have arisen from NSD based
decisions, so we cannot value NSD and then seek to nullify the
effects if it goes wrong (CANEY REFUTES THIS REALLY WELL)

So basically concludes that NSD allows social justice to be reached in each

community with a shared understanding global justice must be spelt out
so that it doesnt rely on thick conceptions

SANGIOVANNI GLOBAL JUSTICE, RECIPROCITY

AND THE STATE 2007

All cosmopolitans have to hold:

1. Human beings are the ultimate units of moral concern family,
tribes, states etc only become concerns indirectly
2. Status of an ultimate unit of concern extends to all human beings
equally
3. Human beings should be treated as ultimate units of concern by
everyone
Remember this formulation of cosmopolitanism

She accepts these but outlines the conflict that you ordinarily believe
that fundamentally different principles of DJ apply to the NEO and the GEO

She is going to try and show that it is not an arbitrary distinction to make
defending the idea that equality is a demand of justice only among
citizens of a state
- This isnt down to the difference in coercion

Will argue that:

- Equality as a demand of justice is a requirement of reciprocity in
the mutual provision of a central class of collective goods,
namely those goods necessary for developing and acting on a
plan of life
- Because these states provide these goods not the global order
we have special obligations of egalitarian justice to fellow citizens
and residents who together sustain the state
- Again, stresses the point that this doesnt mean we have no
obligations of distributive justice at the global level, only that
these are different in form and content
1. Will draw distinctions necessary to understand cosmo
2. Two recent attempts to bound the scope of justice within cosmo
sphere
3. Sets out her own
I:
Relational and non relational
Relational: holds that the practice-mediated relations in which individuals
stand condition the content, scope and justification of those principles
The content is varied, as is the scope and justification
i.e. some say that social goods (health, leisure) gain their value and
meaning from the culturally distinct practices through which they are
distributed, and these culturally contingent values and meanings that give
content to and bound the scope of distributive justice
others (still relational) hold that it isnt the social meanings that matter it
is the institutions
social and political institutions fundamentally alter the relations in which
people stand and therefore alter the principles of distributive justice that
are appropriate to them

but they basically all share the idea that principles of DJ cannot be
formulated or justified independently of the practices they are intended to
regulate

nonrelational: reject the idea that practice-mediated relations matter for

DJ
the point is not that social practices dont play a role
its more that they dont play a role in the justification and formulation of a
given set of principles they might condition the way they are applied
the idea is that concpetions of DJ are grounded on the basic intuition that
no one should be worse off through no fauly of their own, whether or not
thehy share in practices or institutions

hmmmm perhaps ask Ian about this

this distinction cuts across internationalism and globalism

globalists equality of justce has a global scope
internationalists equality as a demand of justice applies only among
members of a state

internationalists arent committed to the idea that there arent other

principles of DJ at global level only that these distributive justice
pricniples arent derived from DE with a global scope

so you can therefore take a few routes to the globalist conclusion

1. All participate in a global order with profound and pervasive effects
on the life prospects of all human beings so domestic demands
apply internationally
This is relational because the content and scope of DJ is born out of
the current extent and degree of interaction
2. Non relational to globalist
Argue that extent/depth of interaction doesnt matter to the
nonrelational globalist
So internationalist must therefore fight a battle on two fronts

II: coercion-based internationalism

Blake says that the autonomy-restricting character of a state that

demands special justiciation in terms of a conception of social equality
Nagel says that it is our joint authorship of coercively backed laws that
generates the concer for equality

But they all agree on state coercion being a necessary condition for
equality as a demand of justice
Will argue that this premise is false
Then tries to revise Nagel so it avoids this

ANY ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONALISM has to have an empirical claim

about why states differ from trans, supra or sub national bodies
Then they have to have a normative claim about what makes this special

Empirical - Blake says that this is the coercive enforcement

She says that this is straightforwardly false (pain of sanctions etc)
So he qualifies that it isnt the fact of coercion that marks the boundary
between domestic and international society it is also the domain over
which coercion is applied
i.e. it goes over a lot more, like private law, taxation and respect to
individuals

the normative premise Blake this kind of coercion compromises

autonomy as it subordinates the will of the person to the will of others
so they need a special justification consent is one way, and to get
consent you must plausibly show that the worse off could hypothetically
consent to it because any departure would make them worse off
and because the international system doesnt do this it doesnt need to be
justified in the same terms
so egalitarian justice is only relevant nationally
doesnt really apply to some kind of sufficientarianism though that could
be seen to be key

B
Going to argue that coercion isnt necessary
Imagines a terror attack that disables the whole coercive apparatus but
the state continues to function as normal does this mean the justification
is mooted?
Well following Blake yes the coercion and therefore autonomy breach is
no longer present

But imagine a band of rich people cite Blake and argue that norms of
egalitarian justice no longer apply to them - they reform the tax structure
to make it less progressive
Why do the principles of distributive justice act differently in this case?
They could argue that just as churches and universities (due to their
voluntary natures) dont have to be egalitarian justice oriented, the legal
system is now voluntary so they are fine

The problem she argues is the ambiguous use of the word voluntary
The analogy with the church and uni doesnt work because opting out isnt
very burdensome
However the postattack state isnt really like this it is excessively
burdensome, they lose access to basic goods and services etc

C recast the coercion argument

If you change it to include the authority of the state rather than its
capacity to coerce this is better
So two premises
1) Subjection to state law is nonvoluntary;
2) States exercise of de facto legal authority therefore requires special
justification to those subject to it the same is not true of inter,
supra and transnational institutions

This doesnt rely on coercive norms, and doesnt rely on the tough
intracacies about whether inter, supra and transnational orders regulate
property

But now still needs a link to a content, scope and justification of a

conception of distributive justice

D Authorship and nonvoluntariness

Nagel comes close but no cigar
Equality as a demand of justice:
- Special involvement of agency or the will that is inseperable from
membership in a political society
- Not to become a member, bit the engagement of the will in being
a subject of society and being the citizen in whose name
authority is exercised
- Sovereign state more than just cooperative enterprise for mutual
advantage it is coercively imposed
- We are assigned a role in the collective life of society
- This makes us responsible for its act and holds us responsible for
obeying its laws and conforming to its norms supporting the
institutions through which advantages and disadvantages are
created and distributed
- We are therefore responsible for asking why we should accept
arbitrary inequalities that they produce
This claims to give us, the, an account of why in a nonvoluntary,
authoritative system of legal norms there are presumptions against
arbitrary inequalities and it doesnt depend on the coercion/legal point

but does this account free us from the idea that we are just as tied to
trans, supra and international orders?
And more so, are these voluntary in a meaningful sense that state
apparatus isnt
The notions of authorship and general will dont help us much
Well it doesnt seem so
So tweak it a little

Make the argument

1. Our subjection to nonstate institutional orders is voluntary but our
subjection to state laws is not
2. Voluntary associations need not meet the same stringent standards
as nonvoluntary ones because you cannot opt out of imposed
disadvantages
But still weak on the nonstate order things
Opting out of WTO is more of a take it or leave it option (Cohen and Sable)

So surely you need a kind of traceable scale the more significant the
costs of exit the more stringent the justice norms which should apply
- This isnt an approach available to Nagel so this is the tweak
Nagel believes extra rempublicam nulla justitia

So concludes that a far better way to view internationalism isnt

interjection with the will it is more of a concern about what the state does
rather than how it engages, constrains or thwarts the will
Feels like a lot of this can be put to the criticism in red below these notes
but check with Ian

Reciprocity based internationalism

Argues that equality is a relational ideal of reciprocity among those who

support and maintain the states capacity to provide basic collective
goods necessary to protect us from physical attack and to maintain and
reproduce a stable system of property rights and entitlements
We therefore owe obligations of egalitarian reciprocity to fellow citizens
and residents in the state who provide us ith the basic conditions and
guarantees necessary to develop and act on a plan of life

For reciprocity-based internationalism (RBI) coercion is relevant because it

is a useful way to preserve autonomy (rather than the Nagel view of it
violating it)

Basic things
Police, courts, administration, military, markets property rights and
entitlments

But the global order (in all but failed states) doesnt provide these
This is maintained by the people within the state (there is support, yes,
but dont overstate the IMF role for example)
Moral arbitrariness?
Two nations A is poor B is rich
Is there a claim if the difference is purely down to brute luck?
Well she says no because there are no distributive institutions regarding
the production and sharing of basic collective goods

Says that the interdependence argument doesnt really work because

although a worker in a particular country is dependent on another, this
isnt the kind of basic goods (physical protection, property rights etc) that
matter

Conclusion:
We should give priority to the interests of fellow citizens and we owe them
unequal concern

Okay criticisms
How do we make the move to distributive justice (normally thought of in
terms of goods and things) simply by providing national security and
property rights?
Well, you could say that the conditions created by these things allow for
the distribution of goods? But this would seem to allow for the
interdependency argument to come into it i.e. the distribution of goods
is also determined by international trade laws and to get round this
objection she limits it to freedom from physical attack etc

So limiting it to these kinds of basic goods it doesnt really go very far in

coming up with a principle of distributive justice, it simply proves that we
need to give priority to our own citizens in as far as it helps to uphold the
apparatus that frees us from certain things and guarantees us property
rights (i.e. minimum level of taxes)

But this seems to be more a theory of political obligation what we are

interested in is whether the vast inequalities are justified across borders?

ASK IAN ABOUT THIS how does she move from a theory of political
obligation to one of distributive justice, she says things like limit the
amount of permissible inequalities but does the size of inequality harm
the workings of the apparatus she says is necessary? Not really so does
it really offer us any kind of answers to the question we are looking
for??????

BROCK GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT

What does cosmopolitanism imply for questions like human rights, poverty
etc?
The equal moral worth of people doesnt necessarily imply any account
but just as clear is the pervasive influence of national ethnic or religious
identity but in some respects it seems to stand in the way of overcoming
injustice

can we adequately roll the two together?

Thesis is that one should appreciate that one is a member of a global

community of human beings as such one has responsibilities to other
members of that community

Varieties of cosmopolitanism:
Moral and institutional
Moral cosmo is the ultimate unit thing
Pogge
1) Individualism
2) Universality
3) Generality

It is attractive because
- Rules out valuing people differently on race, ethnicity, gender etc

Doesnt imply the need for a world state/government

Institutional cosmo maintains that there are deep institutional changes

that are needed to reach the cosmo ideal
- But some cosmos reject this some just reckon that our global
obligations are effectively discharged but a number of solutions
are available to this end doesnt have to be institutional
changes

Extreme vs moderate cosmo

Introduced by Scheffler needs to distinguish between these two things:
1. Justificatory basis of cosmo
2. Content of cosmo justice
Extreme would say that the underlying source of value is cosmopolitan
and it is with respect to cosmopolitan principles, goals or values that all
other principles of morality must be justified

Moderate can take a more pluralistic line on the source of value, admitting
that some non-cosmo goals have ultimate moral worth and this is the
type that doesnt necessarily devalue the meaning of special attachments

The difference is amplified in considering whether there is norms of justice

that apply only within individual socieites and not to the global population
at large
Extreme says no
Moderate says that this may be possible
Also distinction between weak/strong cosmo i.e. conditions that are
necessary for people to live universally decent lives, vs more demanding
account aimed at what is sufficient to live a minimally decent life

Cosmo justice
Different conceptions of what it consists in which is unsurprising as there
is different concpetions of justice (util, Kantian, Aristotelian etc)
Most popular is contractarian from rawls

Reconciling cosmopolitanism with other commitments

Can it be done?
Common misconception that cosmopolitans have to eschew such
attachments in favour of some kind of notion of impartial justice that the
individual must apply directly to all, no matter where they are
But this isnt entailed by a lot of sophisticated accounts of
cosmopolitanism

Recognise that for a lot of people some of their most meaningful

attachment in life derive from their allegiances to particular communities

For example cosmopolitan justice principles should govern global

institutions, such that these treat people as equals in terms of their
entitlements
However once people have discharged their obligations to support the
background global institutional structure, you may then favour your
compatriots so long as they dont conflict

That is, cosmopolitan ideals provide a floor not a ceiling of commitment

Allows scope for some discretionary resources and time on particular
communities or attachments important to their life plans or projects

Very strong forms of egalitarian duties might leave little room, weaker
ones might leave more

She argues that you need at least the kinds of resources etc to enjoy
relevant prospects for a good life
Combined with some kind of prioritarianism

ASK IAN
Can see how questions about owing more to citizens of your own take
shape i.e. the arguments stack up towards owing foreigners the same
With questions about the justness of nation states and other things like
that do you have to come up with theories of political obligation,
egalitarianism etc. I assume not so how can this be avoided????????

Theories of democratic equality like arneson dworkin cohen