reddit.

com/r/syriancivilwar 7 January 2017 Aleppo Special Edition

THE WEEK IN REVIEW

THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO, A REBEL PERSPECTIVE

IN DEPTH PROFILE
THE ROLE OF SHEIKH MAQSOUD DURING THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO LEADERSHIP PROFILE: ABU AMMAR TAFTANAZ

THE CIVILIANS OF EASTERN ALEPPO GROUP PROFILE: LIWA AL-QUDS

/R/SYRIANCIVILWAR
THE WEEK IN REVIEW INDEX AND MAP REFERENCE
Our team We are LOCATION PAGE TITLE

PUBLISHER A weekly publication written and edited by Map ref 1 Page 2 The battle for Aleppo, a rebel perspective
/u/oreng the moderators and contributors Map ref 1 Page 4 The Role of Sheikh Maqsoud During the Battle for Aleppo

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar Page 5 Leadership profile: Abu Ammar Taftanaz

/u/AofB, @qamaamaalamriki Page 8 Group Profile: Liwa al-Quds
DEPUTY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Social media Map ref 1 Page 6 The Civilians of Eastern Aleppo
/u/Naenil, @Naenil

ART DIRECTOR
Visit us on social media or scan the
/u/CIA_Shill, @scw_shill QR code:
PHOTO EDITOR
/u/Status_Gruen /ScwWeekInReview
MANAGING EDITOR
/u/stella-artois /r/syriancivilwar
EDITORS
Trenton S Email us
Andy Jackson 1
CONTRIBUTORS Contact us by email at:
/u/Beansareno1 contact.weekinreview@gmail.com
Chris Gentry, /u/Robowarrior123
/u/Naenil, @Naenil
Trenton S, /u/Chester_T_Molester Ethics Statement
/u/Solidus_Snake The editors and contributors are all members of an online community
that has managed - some might say against all odds - to preserve a cul-
ture of inclusiveness, civility and mutual dialogue between users ranging
from the staunchest supporters of Syrias government to supporters of
entities as diverse as the FSA, YPG, the Islamic Front, Western states,
Israel and indeed the Islamic State.
This coexistence is made possible by active, often heavy-handed
moderation by the moderators of the subreddit and through a publicly-
stated policy of enforcing civility rather than ideological compliance. The
/r/syriancivilwar community uses self-selected flairs to enable users
to wear their allegiances on their sleeves. If you wish to investigate the
stated allegiances of contributors to this publication feel free to inspect
their flairs on reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar.

7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2 7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 1
THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO
A REBEL PERSPECTIVE
K nown as the Mother of All Battles, the battle for Aleppo city
has finally ended. Eastern Aleppo had been a centre
for the Syrian opposition since 2012.1 After four years of
fighting, the Syrian opposition lost much of their control
over the city, and with it have suffered a significant blow.2
President Assad has hailed his victory as history being made.3
Despite being such a large loss for the opposition, its fall comes as
no surprise. The opposition had been plagued with factionalism, as
well as having been demoralized, outgunned, and out bombed for a
long time.
Large opposition protests did not begin in Aleppo until almost a
year after the Arab Spring began. For the first 16 months of the
conflict Aleppo remained relatively undisturbed and was mostly
supportive of the government.4 Fighting between rebels and security
forces began on the night of July 19th, 2012 in the Salaheddine
district in the south-west of the city. Many of these fighters came from
the outskirts of the city and neighbouring villages. The government
responded with a heavy hand, bombarding the areas of the city in
which the rebels were operating. The following day, fighting spread
into Saif-al Dawla and al-Jamaliya.5 Fighting continued over the next
four years during which brutal tactics were employed by both the
rebellion and government forces. Over 30,000 civilians and fighters
have been killed.6
By the summer of 2016, the rebels maintained control of the land
to the west of the city and a large pocket east of the city centre.
The government controlled most of the territories to the east and
south of the city, as well as a small portion to the north. By then the
Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had nearly surrounded the rebel pocket in
eastern Aleppo.7 The only access remaining to the rebel zones was in
the north through the Castello Road and the al-Jandul roundabout.8
They protected this vital supply route in an area known as the Mallah
Farms. The Syrian Army needed to capture the road to cut off the
eastern rebel forces' supply line.
On June 25th, the SAA launched a large-scale assault commencing
with a heavy Russian bombardment. Over the next three weeks the
government forced its way through the farms and captured the
Castello Road.9 The rebels launched five counterattacks, attempting
to break through the government lines and reopen the road. Each
assault lasted no longer than a day before advances stalled and gains
were reversed.10,11,12 The failure to recapture the road left the eastern
pocket surrounded. By the end of July, the Jewel of the Rebellion
was poised to be lost.
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2
Many analysts predicted that
the Aleppo pocket would soon
meet its end unless the siege
could be broken.13,14 The rebels
were determined to do just that.
Beginning On July 31st, the Al-
Quaeda backed JFS-led Army
of Conquest command room
Rebel fighters advance on the
launched a counteroffensive in the
Artillery Academy in Aleppo
south of Aleppo to break the siege,
pushing into the al-Hikma school and the Rashidin neighbourhood.15
This offensive utilized the full force of rebel strength, consisting of
8,000-10,000 fighters and nearly 100 tanks.16 By the end of the first day
the rebels forced their way into the 1070 Housing Project.17 However,
the army soon counterattacked and recaptured a portion of 1070.18
On August 6th the rebels launched another wave of attacks that
pushed through to the military academy and the artillery school. Two
days later they succeeded in capturing the Ramouseh district. With
these gains the opposition had successfully reopened a supply line
into east Aleppo.19
Pro-government forces hold a position in Aleppo's 1070 district
on November 8, 2016, after seizing it from rebel fighters.
Four days later, the government began counterattacking the 1070
Housing Projects.20 Over the next month, the government recaptured
Ramouseh military base and most of the Ramouseh district. Yet again,
eastern Aleppo was under siege.21 This marked a turning point in
the battle for the eastern pocket. The rebels' failure to defend their
recent gains, including the Ramouseh corridor, in a unified manner,
was the catalyst for the rapid dissolution of the eastern rebel pocket.
Over the next month the army increased its stranglehold over the
Smoke rises as rebel forces attack the Military Academy during
an operation to break the siege in Dahiyet al-Assad
eastern pocket by slowly pushing in on three fronts towards both the
Farifa district of Old Aleppo as well as Bushtan al-Basha.22 By mid-
October the SAA also advanced into Owaija and Sheik Saeed.23
Being tightly encircled, there were few options for the rebels but to
force the government into a war of attrition. At the end of October
the rebels tried pushing into the pocket from the outside by mounting
a large attack on Dahiyah al-Assad and Minyan.24 However, being
fraught with factionalism and facing an overwhelming SAA presence,
the attack was repulsed. Any small territorial gains were recaptured
by the government.25 Then, on November 15th, the final government
offensive began. The rebels managed to hold their ground up until
November 26th when Hanano collapsed. Within a day the rebel lines
collapsed en-masse, allowing the government to quickly capture
Jabal-Badro, Ard Al-Hamra and Baibdeen.26 The complete failure
of the rebel lines continued and by November 28th their entire
north-eastern segment fell. The decimated rebels attempted to hold
ground but the remaining pockets of resistance were swallowed two
weeks later.27
The failure to defend the Ramouseh corridor was pivotal in the
loss of the eastern portion of the city. There are several important
reasons for their inability to defend this corridor which led to the
subsequent collapse of the pocket. The first and primary reason is
rebel infighting. Inter-rebel conflict is not unique to Aleppo nor is it
new to the Syrian opposition in general. Shortly after the rebellion
began, in 2013, the New York Times reported how factional infighting
was undermining rebel efforts.28 Even in this past year rebel conflict
has allowed for significant government gains in other portions of
Syria. For example, during April, the rebel coalition of Jahbat Fatah
al-Sham and Faylaq al Rahman attacked another rebel group, Jaish
al-Islam, in the rebel held pocket in East Ghouta.29 This infighting
left as many as 700 fighters dead, and crippled rebel efforts to
impede government advances allowing the government to gain
significant territory.
Rebels in Aleppo have been plagued with similar issues. Infighting
crippled their ability to launch any sustainable counter attacks during
the last year of the battle. During their attempts to break the siege
in November a member of Fatah Halab, who asked to not be named,
informed the media that the Fastaqim Union rebels inside the siege
were also supposed to launch an offensive from Salahuddin towards
Ard as-Sabbagh.30 However, a day prior to the operation, fighters
from Nour ad-Deen az-Zinki and Abu Amarah Brigades attacked
Fastaqem Union positions, arrested one of their commanders,
Istakem Kma Ouumrtm, as well as dozens of fighters. In response,
the Fastaqim Union opened fire on al-Zenki positions.31 There are
conflicting reports as to why this particular infighting occurred. Some
suggest that it resulted from a dispute over weapon distribution.
Others suggest that certain members of the groups wanted to accept
Assads offer of amnesty.32 Regardless of motivation this infighting
caused the cancellation of the Fastaqim Unions push towards Ard
as-Sabbagh. With one of the vital prongs of the rebel counterattack
absent, the government was able to concentrate its forces at the
brunt of the rebel push and thus crush the rebel counter attack.
Ahrar al-Sham has also been plagued with its own internal
divisions. This caused a sub faction of the group known as Jaish
ah-Ahrar to form,33 following a disagreement over the November
leadership elections. The more
hardline wing of the group
nominated Abu Jaber al-Sheik to
lead,while the more pragmatic
wing backed the chief of foreign
relations, Kinan Nahas.34 These two
Jaish al-Fatah, clash with
pro-government forces factions envisioned fundamentally
opposing directions for the group.
The former advocated cooperation with more hardline elements of the
opposition, such as Jaish Fatah al-Sham. The latter faction advocated
to maintain Ahrar al-Shams policy of moderate opposition.35,36 In
a third incident north of Aleppo in Azaz, Ahrar al Sham was pitted
against the Levant Front. Accusing them of acting like gangs, Ahrar
al-Shams forces seized checkpoints and headquarters previously
occupied by the Levant Front.37
These persistent inter-faction conflicts have made offensives
difficult to coordinate and defence practically impossible.38 Thousands
of fighters have been killed in inter-rebel conflict, moral has been
lost, and territorial weaknesses created that have helped the Syrian
Government successfully sweep through to victory.39,40
Another significant cause for the rebel collapse was the extensive
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 3
 bombing campaign by the
Russian and Syrian air forces.
Combined with the Assad
administrations starvation
tactics, these brought the
rebel controlled portions
of the city to its knees. The
Russian bombing campaign in
Aleppo began in November
A Syrian warplane dropping a 2015.41 By the following year,
parachute retarded bomb Russian bombers filled the
skies over Aleppo providing
aid for the Syrian Government.
Russian air support has been essential to the SAAs success in
turning the tide in Aleppo. Professor Fawaz Gerges of the London
School of Economics stated, Mr Putin's decision to intervene in
Syria and shore up Mr Assad with new fighter jets, military advisers
and advanced weapons stopped the bleeding of the Syrian army
and allowed it to shift from defence to offence.42 This bombing
not only killed fighters, but significantly assisted in Assads regularly
used tactic of starving out the opposition.43,44 By depriving a
besieged region of supplies and bombing any supply caches, the
government not only destroys equipment but also demoralizes its
opposition. Abu Nazaar of Jaish al-Fatah said that the November
2016 rebel counter-offensive failed in part due to the failure to
capture the 3000-housing project, which in turn he attributed to
the density of air strikes in the region. Similar explanations have
been offered for the failure to take both al-Assad and Minyan. In
the latters case, Fatah Halab claims they were impeded by over
400 Russian airstrikes.45 Add to these the bombing of hospitals
and the inability to distribute humanitarian aid, one can see how
starvation conditions have been imposed upon the besieged region.
The opposition fighters are left with a citizenry who are either going
to starve or surrender to the government. Andrew Tabler from the
Washington Institute for the Near East commented on the situation:
The way the regime has carried out these
siege-and-starve operations is you surround an area
and you squeeze it. In squeezing it, you weaken the
population therethere havent been humanitarian
deliveries of any sizable amount into East Aleppo.
You also weaken the military groups in that area,
because they cannot be resupplied.46
A general view taken on September 16, 2016, shows the
rubble-strewn Castello Road damaged from years of conflict
Finally, the closing of rebel pockets in the south enabled the
Syrian Army to redeploy additional soldiers to the Aleppo region.
The several hundred reinforcements who arrived in November
complemented the 1st armoured and 4th Mechanized divisions
which were deployed to Aleppo back in April. These new soldiers
began to give the army a purely numerical advantage with at least
12,000 soldiers to the rebels' 6,000.47,48,49 This made it difficult for
the rebels to defend their territory and was a major contribution in
their failure to mount successful counterattacks.
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 4
The Syrian rebels were aware of many of these deficiencies before
the collapse of the city. However, their solutions to overcome them
were both ineffective and poorly applied. Several attempts were
made to form a united front, particularly in Aleppo but also in the rest
of Syria. The last attempt was to form a unified Army of Aleppo
with Abu Abdal Rahman Nour as their commander.50 However, this
did not occur until December, and proved to be too little far too late.
The north of Syria is a complex region that challenged the rebels
ability to consolidate their forces. There are dozens of factions with
varying ideologies, making it a nearly impossible task to reconcile
differences and form a united front. An attempt to consolidate the
Idlib rebels under a single leadership has recently failed, particularly
since Ahrar al Sham has refused to participate.51 Without a unified
rebel front, and in the face of formidable air bombardment as well
as well as an SAA that is increasing its man-power, the rebellions
challenges will continue to grow. The fall of Aleppo is a symptom of THE ROLE OF SHEIKH MAQSOOD
a much larger condition of factionalism, infighting, and simply being
outgunned. Unless they can address these core issues, the rebellion
will struggle to make any sustainable progress. DURING THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO
The war is far from over, however, the Idlib rebel coalition is ready
for combat and the loss of the city of Tadmur is a significant setback
for national interests. Much fighting looms on the horizon, as both
the government and the rebels appear to be making big plans.
S heikh Maqsoud is a district in the North of Aleppo with a
Kurdish majority population. Except for its Northern section, it
consists of a relatively dense urban environment that rests upon a
An analysis of Sheikh Maqsoud's role during the Aleppo portion
of the war reveals that it became increasingly cooperative with Syrian
government forces. Despite a lack of any official acknowledgement,
The SAA will likely act in concert with their Hezbollah allies and
hilltop. Sheikh Maqsoud overlooks Castello Road, which is a major there is strong evidence towards this perception. This contrasts with
move to surround Aleppo with a buffer zone of friendly territory.
thoroughfare that constituted the last supply line for Aleppo's rebel rumours that YPG and government relations had broken down over
In the interest of protecting civilians from rocket/mortar attacks
groups before they were besieged by government forces. It is under fighting in Hasakah and Qamishlo in August of 2016.17,18 The territorial
and preventing intrusions into the city proper by future offensives,
military control of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Until parts making up Rojava, which is held by the SDF and includes
the government and its allies will likely move to push the frontline
recently the district attempted to remain neutral, choosing to ally the YPG as its biggest component, are relatively autonomous in
westwards. This would keep the fighting away from the urban areas.
with neither the government nor the rebels. However, at various their decision making. Therefore, it would be incorrect to directly
Offensives in the western Anadan Plains, southern countryside
times they have cooperated with both in opposing the other.1 extrapolate Sheikh Maqsoud's cooperation with the government as
around al-Eis, and westwards towards Taftanaz are all likely in the
This changed in February 2016 when the Syrian Democratic Forces general SDF policy. On the other hand, their cooperation in Aleppo
early months of 2017. There is some interest in the capture of the
(SDF) in Afrin began their offensive against the rebels in Northern is not the only instance where common ground has been reached.
besieged pocket of Foua and Kafraya, surrounded by rebel forces
Aleppo. Following this, relations between YPG and rebel militants For example, fighting between them in Hasakah and Qamishlo
since early 2013, but such a goal would be difficult to accomplish.
in Aleppo city soured. In response, various rebel groups repeatedly always ended quickly in ceasefires and compromises. During the
and indiscriminately shelled Sheikh Maqsoud, killing and wounding February offensive against the rebels by the Afrin Canton, the SDF
The rebels will likely plan a multi-stage offensive against Aleppo
hundreds of civilians.2,3 both benefited from the concurrent government offensive and may
in a bid to reclaim parts of the city. It is also probable that they will
attempt to pressure the government on other fronts, such as Hama
have even coordinated directly with the Russian air-force. Russia has
In September 2016 during the initial government offensive on also proposed that the autonomy of SDF-held Rojava be officially
or Latakia. Struggling with deficits of resources and manpower, the
Castello Road that succeeded in besieging Eastern Aleppo, it was acknowledged.19 Both the SDF and the Syrian government also
rebel coalition will need to plan their tactics carefully and strike where
rumoured that the YPG worked together with government forces. share a common interest in opposing Turkey's objectives in Syria.
their enemy is weakest to do the most damage. Most probably they
The YPG captured a former youth housing complex from the rebels, The Syrian government wants Turkey to desist in supplying various
will attempt to pressure the governments supply routes into Aleppo
by advancing towards Hadher and Safira. Aerial bombardment of
though it is unclear if they coordinated efforts or if the YPG acted rebel groups, and also wishes to prevent them from building a long-
independently to secure a perimeter around Sheikh Maqsoud to term base of operations in Northern Aleppo. For the SDF, Turkey
Idlib urban centres by pro-Assad warplanes, and the shelling of
prevent further rebel shelling.4 is the main impediment to connecting the Cantons via the city of
Aleppo by rebel artillery are both certain to be constant throughout
Al-Bab.
the coming year. This will inform us that Aleppo is not the end of the
More recently it is clear that the YPG cooperated with government
war, but just the beginning of the next stage.
forces to eliminate the remaining rebel pocket in Aleppo. Videos In the author's opinion there are two possible outcomes for this
have surfaced showing YPG soldiers several kilometres away from situation. The Syrian government and the SDF could forge a lasting
Sheikh Maqsoud in former rebel held territory, often alongside political solution and cooperate in their opposition to Turkey's
By Chris Gentry & Trenton S
government troops. These districts include Bustan al Pasha, Hellok,5 designs in Northern Syria. Alternatively, it could be Turkey that
the Ayn at-Tal Industrial area,6 Sheik Kheder and Sakhur,7 all of finds common ground with the Syrian government, dropping their
which lie to the east of Sheik Maqsoud.8,9,10 In addition, pictures and support for the rebels in return for cooperation in opposing Rojava
videos have been made showing YPG and government flags flying and the SDF, a close ally of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). There
alongside each other in several of the captured areas.11,12 The YPG is no scenario where all three factions' goals can be accommodated
hasn't officially confirmed any cooperation and in interviews with the simultaneously, nor is any one of them strong enough, militarily or
Middle East Eye, several officials have denied any cooperation with diplomatically, to completely go it alone.
government forces.13
Sheikh Maqsoud has been the recipient of large numbers of By /u/Beansareno1
refugees. According to Imad Daoud, Chairman of the local Council
of Sheikh Maqsoud, they took in approximately 45,000 refugees by
January 2015. This amounts to roughly half the district's population.14
The recent fighting in Eastern Aleppo led to more people seeking
refuge in Sheikh Maqsoud. The General Command of the YPG
states that an additional 6000 refugees have recently arrived.15,16 No
independent reports concerning these numbers are yet available.
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 5

Abu Ammar Taftanaz
GROUP PROFILE:
LIWA AL-QUDS
L iwa al-Quds is one of the largest auxiliary
forces fighting for the Syrian government
in Aleppo. It is
comprised mostly
of Sunni Palestinians
from the al-Nayrab
district of Aleppo
and the former
A Liwa al-Quds observation refugee camp
post looks out over Aleppo
Handarat. The
group was officially created in September or
October 2013 by the engineer Muhammad
al-Said, although its precursors were active as
early as 2012, mostly in the al-Nayrab camp. In
English, its name translates as The Jerusalem
Brigade.
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 6
LEADERSHIP PROFILE:
ABU AMMAR TAFTANAZ
O n November 29th, 2016, Ahrar al-Shams
primary spokesman Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir
announced quite
suddenly that a Abu Ammar al-Umar was one of the key figures in the development
major change in the
groups leadership
was coming.1 On that
Abu Ammar Taftanaz at the very day, a media
front line in Idlib, March 2015
briefing prepared
previously by Ahrar leadership officially stated
that Abu Yahya al-Hamawi, the previous leader
of the organization, would step down and be
replaced by a man known as Abu Ammar.2
Followers of the conflict immediately raised
several questions, the most prominent among
them asking, who is Abu Ammar?
By March of 2015 the group was composed of three main
battalions: the Lions of al-Quds Battalion, operating in the al-
Nayrab camp and its surroundings as well as in the southern
and eastern countryside; the Deterrence Battalion, focusing
in the North Aleppo countryside and south of the villages of
Nubl and Zahara; and the Lions of al-Shahba Battalion, which
focuses on the fronts within the city of Aleppo. The group
successfully defended the al-Nayrab camp from rebel forces
making it the only camp that has not been breached. The
group has also protected the Aleppo Airport (used by civilians
and the military), and the missile base to the south of the camp.
Liwa al-Quds was present in Aziza village, Sheikh Latfi, and
around the Air Intelligence building, the Greatest Messenger
mosque, the village of Haylan, the central prison located west
of Aleppo, around Handarat camp, and in a number of areas
south and east of Aleppo, as well as in Jamaia al-Jud south of
the then besieged villages of Nubl and Zahara. They also were
tasked with holding the first al-Rashadeen front.
The background, life, and childhood of Abu Ammar (born Ali al- within Ahrar.7 A few days later, Abu Ammar spoke to his followers in a
Omar) remain nebulous, although it is known that he was born in video cementing his new position, promising to continue fighting for
Taftanaz, a town located northeast of Idlib. When the civil war broke control of Aleppo, and supporting the revolution.8
out, Ali al-Omar took on the nom de guerre of Abu Ammar al-Umar
Taftanazi when he joined Suquor al-Sham sometime in early 2012. Abu Ammar Taftanaz, although clearly a competent commander,
faces great challenges as he comes into full control of Ahrar al-Shams
of Suquor al-Shams more conventional combat strategies throughout military might. Recent diplomatic manoeuvres by outside powers
2012, and was promoted to deputy commander of the organization.3 puts pressure on Ahrars leadership to take a stand against their more
extremist allies (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, in particular), and there have
Abu Ammar fought among and led Suquor al-Sham until March been internal arguments regarding Ahrars backing of the Turkish-led
2015, when the group was absorbed into Ahrar al-Sham in a merger.4 Euphrates Shield operation in Northern Aleppo. Although he has
Shortly afterwards, as Abu Yahya al-Hamawi succeeded Abu Jaber been chosen for the position based on merit, he faces many conflicts
al-Hashimi as leader of Ahrar, several shifts in command were made as the new year dawns, and has not made his intentions known to
to replace leaders killed in a Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) airstrike anyone outside of the organizations leadership. It is likely that Abu
in the summer of 2015.5 Abu Yahya al-Hamawi chose Abu Ammar al- Ammar will be making several major decisions soon, and will likely
Omar to become the new deputy commander, placing him within the stick with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and reject any notion of a ceasefire
upper echelons of the Syrian rebel leadership.6 with the Syrian government.
After the initial breaking of the Aleppo siege and the second
failed attempt in early November 2016, there were rumours that Abu By Trenton S
Yahya al-Hamawi would step down in favour of a younger primary
commander. These rumours were confirmed on November 29th, as
Ahrar al-Sham made their press release announcing the ascension of
Abu Ammar al-Omar, now Abu Ammar Taftanaz, to the cusp of power
Mohammad "The Godfather" Rafi
Liwa al-Quds played a significant part in the governments
offensive to capture Aleppo city. The group performed a
crucial role in capturing the Handarat camp, an area that saw
continuous clashes for nearly a week and changed hands
multiple times.1 It also supported the forces of the Syrian
Government in other parts of the city. For example, the group
took part in the storming of Inzaharat district, during which
their operational commander Mohammad "The Godfather"
Rafi was killed.2
Although the exact size of the group is unknown, a
commander in the Brigade estimated that by March of 2015
the group had suffered approximately 600 casualties: 200
dead and 400 wounded, mostly on the al-Rashadeen front and
around the Air Intelligence building.3,4
By /u/Prky008
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 7
 By
THE CIVILIANS OF EASTERN ALEPPO
T he fall of Eastern Aleppo in late 2016 marked the peak of a
protracted humanitarian catastrophe. The UN estimated that
there were over 250,000 people living in eastern Aleppo after
government forces encircled it in July.1 Approximately 100,000
people are estimated to have remained trapped in the rebels last
enclave in eastern Aleppo on December 13th after government
forces recaptured 90 percent of the area.2 Years of war have left
the city in ruins. Heavy and often indiscriminate bombardment of
eastern Aleppo by the Syrian and Russian air forces left hospitals,
power plants, and residential areas destroyed with countless civilians
killed and injured. The last standing hospital in eastern Aleppo was
destroyed by airstrikes on November 18th.3 Although hospitals tried
to reopen and relocate elsewhere, they faced tremendous difficulty
fulfilling the medical needs of thousands of people while being
bombarded.4 Food, fuel, and medical supplies were scarce due to
limited access to outside aid. Water supplies for the entire city were
cut as a result of power outages and fighting in eastern Aleppo,
leaving 2 million people without fresh water.5 Many Aleppo residents,
unsure of their survival, said their last goodbyes on social media as
government forces advanced into eastern Aleppo in early December.6
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 8
Civilians in eastern Aleppo faced many challenges in trying to
escape the ravaged warzone. Residents of Eastern Aleppo, whose
population was largely poor and working class before the war,
often could not afford to leave and resettle elsewhere.7 Fighting
along routes leading out of Eastern Aleppo has often made it too
dangerous for civilians to pass through. On October 20th, the
government opened humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to exit
East Aleppo.8 However, many feared being targeted or persecuted
by the government after leaving.9 Additionally, videos show rebels
firing hell cannons into the exit corridor at the Municipal Stadium in
response to an alleged SAA offensive there.10 Furthermore, there are
allegations that the rebels blocked civilians from leaving; according to
UN Human Rights Commission Spokesperson Rupert Colville, reports
suggest that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Kataib Abu Amara abducted
and killed an unknown number of civilians who requested to leave
the city.11
By
On December 13th, a ceasefire was negotiated between Turkey,
Russia, Iran, and the Syrian government to allow rebels and civilians to
evacuate from Eastern Aleppo to Idlib in exchange for the evacuation
of the besieged Shia towns of Fua and Kefraya in Idlib province.12
The ceasefire was broken on the following day, leading to violence
and forcing scheduled evacuations to be delayed until the 15th.13 On
December 16th, rumors suggested that Hezbollah and other Shia
militias had stopped evacuation buses and shot civilians.14 While
there is no proof that civilians were killed, evidence does suggest that
Hezbollah fighters stopped a bus and held evacuees at gunpoint.15
On the 18th, six buses headed to Fua and Kefraya were attacked and
burned by rebels (believed to be former Jund al-Aqsa members in
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) who opposed the evacuation agreement.16,17
Delays continued in the days that followed as thousands of evacuees
waited in freezing temperatures to depart.18 Finally, on December
22nd, the International Committee of the Red Cross claimed that the
evacuation of eastern Aleppo was complete.19,20
By /u/Solidus_Snake
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 9
BIBLIO & LINKS
THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO, A REBEL PERSPECTIVE
1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/19/fall-aleppo-west-has-
lost-control-middle-east-will-haunt-us/
2. https://friendsofsyria.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/mother-of-all-
battles-to-begin-in-aleppo/
3. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-syrias-assad-says-aleppo-is-making-
history-video-statement-2016-12
4. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38294488
5. https://www.aaas.org/aleppo
6. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-
toll-for-syrias-war-470000/
7. https://twitter.com/PetoLucem/status/751697589658087424
8. http://aljumhuriya.net/en/aleppo/the-road-to-castello
9. http://www.msn.com/en-nz/news/photos/syria-in-crisis-a-timeline-of-
the-battle-for-aleppo/ss-BBxnq29
10. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/syria-rebels-push-retake-
aleppo-supply-line-160711162633835.html
11. http://www.voanews.com/a/rebel-launch-counter-attack-in-syrian-city-
of-aleppo/3413804.html
12. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/214656
13. http://time.com/4405037/aleppo-siege-mainstream-rebels-bashar-
assad/
14. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/30/assad-targets-the-
doctors-in-syrias-medieval-siege/
15. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2016/Jul-31/364872-
syrian-rebels-launch-push-aimed-at-breaking-aleppo-siege.ashx
16. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/10000-opposition-troops-
launch-assault-8556525
17. http://intelligencefusion.co.uk/2016/07/31/rebels-attempt-to-break-
encirclement-of-aleppo/
18. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=49050
19. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-
idUSKCN10I0M2
20. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-08/syria-army-redeploys-after-
rebels-break-aleppo-siege/7699264
21. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/syria-army-besieges-
aleppo-as-us-russia-talks-stumble/3100204.html
22. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/22/syria-army-new-
aleppo-offensive-ceasefire
23. https://twitter.com/InsideSourceInt/status/786540647557632000
24. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37798924
25. http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/syria/syria-regime-eroding-rebel-
gains-in-aleppo-monitor-1.1928207
26. http://news.sky.com/story/syrian-army-reportedly-retakes-third-rebel-
held-area-in-aleppo-10674198
27. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38297511
28. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/world/middleeast/syrian-rebel-
infighting-undermines-anti-assad-effort.html
29. http://civilwaralsham.com/
30. http://eldorar.com/node/105421
31. https://twitter.com/archicivilians/status/793917650074304513
32. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-
idUKKBN12Y1JT
33. http://www.kataeb.org/articles/2016/12/13/ahrar-al-sham-and-the-
myths-that-surround-it
34. http://english.aawsat.com/2016/12/article55364211/divisions-harakat-
ahrar-al-sham
35. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/807709664637054977
36. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/803651354174468097
37. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/11/15/syrian-rebel-
factions-clash-in-north-western-aleppo-town
38. http://www.businessinsider.com/infighting-among-syrian-rebels-
strengthens-pro-assad-forces-in-aleppo-2016-
39. http://polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/u246/Pischedda_writing_
sample_ch1_2.pdf
40. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=4585
41. https://airwars.org/russia-nov2015/
42. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35562943
43. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/starvation-inducing-sieges-
tactic-war-syria-501307158
44. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/starving-syria-
weapon-isil-assad-madaya-
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 10
45. http://eldorar.com/node/105421 3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/aleppo-
46. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/aleppo-is- hospitals-knocked-out-airstrikes
falling 4. Ibid.
47. http://syrianperspective.com/2016/11/huge-syrian-army- 5. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
reinforcements-to-east-aleppo-for-the-liberation-over-50-isis-rodents- way/2016/08/09/489296670/2-million-residents-of-war-ravaged-
killed-in-aleppos-dayr-haafir-khaan-al-shaykh-liberated-alqaeda- aleppo-now-without-running-water
surrenders-all-positions.html 6. www.businessinsider.com/people-in-east-aleppo-say-goodbye-on-
48. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/array-of-pro-syrian- social-media-2016-12
government-forces-advance-in-aleppo.php 7. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37779478
49. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/29/aleppo-attack- 8. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2016/10/22/exit-corridor-
foreign-syrian-fighters-plan-shia-islamic shelling-west-aleppo-open-source-analysis/
50. http://syriancivilwarmap.com/appointed-leader-of-unified-rebel- 9. See 6.
group-army-of-aleppo-abu-abdul-rahman-noor-injured-in-clashes- 10. See 7.
with-saa-in-aleppo-c/ 11. http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/09/middleeast/syria-aleppo-war/
51. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/811649154854387712 12. http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/14/middleeast/aleppo-syria-
government-gains/
THE ROLE OF SHEIKH MAQSOUD DURING THE BATTLE FOR ALEPPO 13. Ibid.
14. https://twitter.com/Dalatrm/status/809962713355059200
1. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/09/12/friend-or-foes- 15. Ibid.
ypg-regime/
16. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/aleppo-hopes-
2. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/syria-armed- raised-that-evacuation-could-soon-resume
opposition-groups-committing-war-crimes-in-aleppo-city/
17. https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/810532162835480577
3. https://www.reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar/comments/4e570z/ 18. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/syria-aleppo-
discussion_who_is_targeting_sheikh_maqsoud/
evacuation-resume-residents-fear.html
4. http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=51723 19. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRS53OjVn9c
redcross-idUSKBN14B2E4
6. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/801921530099888128
7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZilaTtWDlM
8. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/802901079255982080
9. https://twitter.com/DrPartizan_/status/803274414271827968
10. https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/802927009387134978
11. https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/803247655778328576
12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kDKgbKhvMY
13. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-role-are-kurdish-ypg-
forces-playing-aleppo-554547107
14. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/syria-aleppo-
displaced-kurdish-region.html#ixzz4B7eVyOp8
15. http://en.hawarnews.com/ypg-command-we-have-rescued-6000-
civilians-from-eastern-aleppo/
16. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/syria-civilians-in-
eastern-aleppo-city-fear-revenge-attacks/
17. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-nisman/have-syrias-kurds-had-
a_b_3036931.html
18. http://syriancivilwarmap.com/another-round-of-fighting-in-hasakah/
19. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-russia-
mediates-between-kurds-and-assad.html
LEADERSHIP PROFILE ABU AMMAR TAFTANAZ
1. https://twitter.com/Moneer_Alssial/status/803616114211229696
2. http://i.imgur.com/qizdJME.jpg
3. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_
RebelGroupsJebelAlZawiyah_31July.pdf
4. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59471
5. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/abu-yahia-al-hamawi-ahrar-al-
shams-new-leader/
6. http://en.eldorar.com/node/819
7. http://i.imgur.com/qizdJME.jpg
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6bES4zlZRw&feature=youtu.be
GROUP PROFILE: LIWA AL-QUDS
1. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/pro-government-
palestinian-militia-fights-in-aleppo.php
2. https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/status/802961220974366721
3. http://www.alhadathnews.net/archives/151106
4. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/pro-government-
palestinian-militia-fights-in-aleppo.php
THE CIVILIANS OF EASTERN ALEPPO
1. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/8/57a98e934/fears-
grow-aleppo-residents-amid-latest-violence.html
2. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38132163
7 January 2017, The Week In Review | Page 11
 LIST OF CHARITIES RATED "B+"
(72%-74% OF FUNDS RAISED ARE USED FOR THE PURPOSES STATED)
WHO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF: