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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL CONCEPTS OF LABOR RELATIONS

Chu v. NLRC 232 SCRA 764G.R. No. 106107 June 2, 1994

PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE:
It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of
its employees qualifications, aptitudes, and competence to move them
around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An
employees right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right
in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his
assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is
not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal.

NAFLU v. NLRC 202 SCRA 346, G.R. No. 90739 October 3, 1991

PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE:
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the
employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the
qualifications and fitness o workers for hiring and firing, promotion or
reassignment, are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code
and it implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in th different
Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer
is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided for by law. There is none ithe
instant case.

ALMODIEL, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 223 SCRA

341, G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993
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PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE:
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the
employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the
qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or
reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code
and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the
different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The
employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business
judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases
of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is
none in the instant case.

JENNY F. PECKSON, vs. ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 198534, July 3, 2013

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE:

It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of

its employees qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them
around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain
where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An
employees right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right
in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his
assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is
not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal.

As a privilege inherent in the employers right to control and manage its

enterprise effectively, its freedom to conduct its business operations to
achieve its purpose cannot be denied. We agree with the appellate court that
the respondents are justified in moving the petitioner to another equivalent
position, which presumably would be less affected by her habitual tardiness
or inconsistent attendance than if she continued as a Category Buyer, a
"frontline position" in the day-to-day business operations of a supermarket
such as Robinsons.
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CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE

WESTGROVE, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE

Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and

judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must
beexercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor."
Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or
despotic manner

RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION

Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp Labor

Union G.R. No. 121084 February 19, 1997

INELIGIBILITY OF MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES TO JOIN LABOR

ORGANIZATION

Art. 245 Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;

right of supervisory employees. Managerial Employees are not eligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
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own.

Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-

and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot,
for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one,
an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for
the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification
election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever
the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245
of the Labor Code.

Atlas Litrographic Services Inc. v. Laguesma January 6, 1992

PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF UNIONS

Supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union. What the law
prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file
employees (Art. 245, Labor Code) or their joining a national federation of
rank-and-file employees that includes the very local union which they are not
allowed to directly join.

Adamsom & Adamson v. CIR G.R. No. L-35120 January 31, 1984

PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF UNIONS

Republic Act 875, in its Section 3, recognizes the right of supervisors to form
a separate organization of their own, albeit they cannot be members of a
labor organization of employees under their supervision, that authority of
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supervisors to form a separate labor union carries with it the right to bargain
collectively with the employer.

Engineering Equipment, Inc v. NLRC, 133 SCRA 752 G.R. No. L-59221
December 26, 1984

WHO ARE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES

It is the nature of an employee's functions and not the nomenclature or title

given to his job which determines whether he has rank-and-file or managerial
status. Among the characteristics of managerial rank are: (1) He is not
subject to the rigid observance of regular office hours; (2) His work requires
the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (3) the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in
relation to a given period of time; (4) He manages a customarily recognized
department or subdivision of the establishment, customarily and regularly
directing the work of other employees therein; (5) He either has the authority
to hire or discharge other employees or his suggestions and
recommendations as to hiring and discharging, advancement and promotion
or other change of status of other employees are given particular weight;
and (6) As a rule, he is not paid hourly wages nor subjected to maximum
hours of work.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON. PURA FERRER-

CALLEJA, G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992

MUTUALITY OF INTEREST TEST

community or mutuality of interests which justifies the formation of a single

collective bargaining unit is wanting between the academic and non-
academic personnel of the university. It would seem obvious that teachers
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would find very little in common with the University clerks and other non-
academic employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and
intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy
of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as
in the compensation and working conditions of the academic and non-
academic personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two
separate bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-
academic personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file academic
employees, is the set-up that will best assure to all the employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. These special
circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and concerns as well as the
dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work, wages and compensation
between the academic and non-academic personnel, bring the case at bar
within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180. It
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Relations Director to
have ruled otherwise, ignoring plain and patent realities.

ROBERTO GONZALES, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 131653, March
26, 2001

TEST OF MANAGERIAL STATUS

The test of managerial status has been defined as an authority to act in the
interest of the employer, which authority is not merely routinary or clerical in
nature but requires in dependent judgment.23 As managerial employee,
petitioner is tasked to perform key and sensitive functions, and thus he is
bound by more exacting work ethics.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND

ERNESTO L. PONCE, President, v. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E.
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LAGUESMA, G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE RULE

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests. "Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the company's position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters."

An important element of the "confidential employee rule" is the employee's

need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is
the employee's necessary access to confidential labor relations information.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential

capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations

Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116194, February 2,

2000

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

Art. 245 of the Labor Code11 does not directly prohibit confidential employees
from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to
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confidential employees.12 The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion

of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. 13 It must
be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to
confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

METROLAB INDUSTRIES, INC., vs. HONORABLE MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-

CONFESOR, G.R. No. 108855, February 28, 1996

INELIGIBILITY OF MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES TO JOIN, FORM AND

ASSIST ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION; PROHIBITION EXTENDED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist
any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended
this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their
positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and
highly confidential records.

Exclusion of confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit;
not tantamount to discrimination.

Confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. As previously

discussed, the nature of employment of confidential employees is quite
distinct from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate category.
Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit,
therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.

CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO),

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vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT, and CENECO UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE),
G.R. No. 94045 September 13, 1991

EMPLOYEE-MEMBERS OF COOPERATIVES

Employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are
not entiltld to form or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining
agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-
owners.

COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC., vs.

PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, G.R. No. 77951 September 26, 1988

EMPLOYEE OF COOPERATIVES- EXCEPTION

Employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such

employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization,
collective bargaining, negotiations, and others as enshrined in the
constitution and existing laws of the country.

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12,1974

EXCEPTION: RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS; IGLESIA NI CRISTO MEMBERS

Members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sectors cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs
on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious
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profession or beliefs is superior to contract rights. In case of conflicts, the

latter must, therefore, yield to the former

AIRTIME SPECIALIST v. FERRER-CALLEJA

G.R. No. 80612-16 December 29, 1989

Art. 258 of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 442
reveals that compliance with the 30% requirement (now 20%) makes it
mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding of a
certification election in order to determine the exclusive-bargaining agent of
the employees. Stated otherwise, it means that with such, the Bureau is left
without any discretion but to order the holding of certification election.
Parenthetically, where the petition is supported by less than 30% (now 20%)
the Bureau of Labor Relations has discretion whether or not to order the
holding of certification election depending on the circumstances of the case.
Thus, it is Our holding in LVN Pictures vs. Musicians Guild, et al. (1 SCRA 132)
that in connection with certification election, the Court of Industrial
Relations enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary
to insure a fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees,
and having exercised its sound discretion, this Court cannot interfere.

PAGKAKAISA SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG SAN MIGUEL BREWERY

AT MGA KASANGAY v. HONORABLE JUAN ENRIQUEZ., et. al
G.R. No. L-12999 July 26, 1960

A member of a labor union may leave and cancel his membership with
the same at any time. When a laborer or employee joins a labor union, he
does not make any commitment or assume an undertaking to continue his
membership therein for any fixed period of time, much less indefinitely. In
this respect, he is a free agent. It may be that his separation from the union
will not and could not affect any bargaining agreement entered into by the
union and management while he was a member of said union, as to working
conditions, wages, privileges, etc.; but as to his right to separate from a labor
union and join another, it seems there can be no question. In the present
case, since there was a rule or practice of petitioner Pagkakaisa that those
members of the union who refused to sign the authorization for check-off
and, naturally, those who signed the authorization but later cancelled or
revoked the same, were considered automatically expelled from the union.

Francisco Salunga vs Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), San Miguel

Brewery, Inc. NABAILUP-PAFLU & etc.

Principle:
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Unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for

membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in
discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom
the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable
ground therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit
new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may
the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee
involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of
union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith
withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who
seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied
readmission.

On the otherhand, the court did not agree with the trial court on holding the
company guilty of unfair practice. The company was reluctant in discharging
the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely show a commendable
understanding and sympathy for his plight. It even tried to help him,
although to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain
from interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union. At the same time, the
Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in
refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the
true motives were not manifest, without such inquiry, and petitioner had
concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature
of the decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify
the company in regarding said decision unreasonable. On the other hand, the
Company cannot be blamed for assuming the contrary, for petitioner had
appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained
the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had
inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union
Officers.

KAPATIRAN V. FERRER-CALLEJA, G.R. No. 82914, June 20, 1988

Priciple:
The right of members of the Religious group (IGLESIA NI KRISTO) sect not to
join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar
the members of that sect from forming their own union. At the same time,
NEW ULO was able to file a timely petition for CE within the 60 day freedom
period and was able to ascertain the majority of the workers who prefer their
union.
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FURUSAWA RUBBER PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. HON. SECRETARY OF

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FURUSAWA EMPLOYEES UNION-
INDEPENDENT (FEU-IND), G.R. No. 121241. December 10, 1997

Principle:

The submission of a xerox copy of the unions certificate of registration to

prove its legitimacy is sufficient, hence, the Med-Arbiter correctly granted the
petition for certification election. As it been held in a long line of cases, a
certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is
ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a fact-finding and non-
adversarial character. It is not covered by the technical rules
of evidence. Thus, as provided in Art. 221 of the Labor Code, proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Commission are not covered by the
technical rules of evidence and procedure. The court hasalready construed
Art. 221 of the Labor Code in favor of allowing the NLRC or the labor arbiter
to decide the case on the basis of position papers and other documents
submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in
regular courts of justice.[12] Indeed, the technical rules of evidence do not
apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its
sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position
papers and other documents. In this regard, the factual findings of the Med-
Arbiter appear to be supported by substantial evidence, hence, we must
accord them great weight and respect.

Under the premises, or at the very least, when conflicting interests of

labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be balanced by sympathy and
compassion which the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is
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only in keeping with the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full
protection to labor

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 65, GR.

No. 144412, November 18, 2003

Principles:
1) Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they affirm
the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts accorded great weight and
even finality. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.
These exceptions are:
(a) When the findings are grounded on speculation, surmise or
conjecture;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(d) When the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting;
(e) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond
the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions
of the both appellant and appellee;
(f) When the judgment of the appellate court is premised on the
misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered will justify a different
conclusion;
(g) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(h) When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence of record.
2) Transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the
employees prerogatives. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has
the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary,
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inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.

3) Employer has the prerogative, based on its assessment of the

employees qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the
various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will
function with maximum benefit to the company.
4) Unfair Labor Practices relate only to violations of the constitutional
right of workers and employees to self-organization and are limited to
the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.

5) Refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes wilful disobedience of

a lawful order of an employer.

Lakas ng Mangggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises,

118 SCRA 422
Principles:
1) Managements suggestion that union file necessary complaint in court
in view of fact that there are several unions claiming to represent
employees does not constitute failure or refusal to bargain in good in
good faith to said unions demands.
2) Where there exist legitimate issues as to which of several unions is the
legitimate representative of employees, it is ULP for one of the unions
to stage a strike and demand that the employer sit down with it for
collective bargaining.
3) Employer may be justifies in the requiring a reasonable scheduling of
working hours of returning striking employees and inquiring into their
availabilities.
4) Right to engage in concerted activities is not an absolute one.
5) A lobor union cannot bring an action on behalf of employees who are
members of another union even if said employees signed in the
complaint.
6) Where a union brought suit in behalf of employees it was not
authorized to represent, the proper remedy is to drop the union as
party to the action and place the names of the employees instead.

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. NLRC

281 SCRA 509
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Principles:
1) A complaint for unfair labor practice is no ordinary labor dispute and
therefore requires a more thorough analysis, evaluation and
appreciation of the factual and legal issue involved.
2) The Labor Code does not undertake the impossible task of specifying in
precise and unmistakable language each incident which constitutes an
unfair labor practice.
3) The Lbor Code and its implementing rules do not vest in the labor
arbiter nor in the different divisions of the NLRC nor in the Courts
managerial authority.
4) The court has recognized and affirmed the prerogative of management
to implement a job evaluation program or a reorganization for as long
as it is not contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) and Sereno v. Schering

Plough Corporation
451 SCRA 689, G.R No. 142506, February 17, 2005

Principle:
1) Loss of Trust and Confidence; Fraud or wilful breach by the employee of
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative
is a ground for terminating an employment.

Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, SCRA 681, G.R. No. 60054, July 2,
1991

Principles:
1.) The act of dishonesty against his employer is obviously of so serious a
character as to merit the penalty of dismissal from employment.
2.) The Labor Code pronounces fraud or wilful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative, or serious misconduct on the part of the employee
to be lawful ground to terminate employment.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYERS

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Me-Shurn Corporation and Sammy Chou v. Me-Shurn Workers Union-

FSM and Rosalina Cruz
448 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 156292, January 11, 2005

Principles:
1.) Basis is the rule on termination cases that that the employer bears the
burden of showing that the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause, otherwise the dismissal is deemed unjustified. Clear and
convincing evidence of imminent economic or business reversals
should be present.
2.) A companys preference for a union at the expense of another union
could render said employees guilty of discrimination even if the
preferred union is not a company-dominated.
3.) If the basic inspiration for the act of the employer is derived from the
affiliation or activities of the union, the formers assignment of another
reason, no matter how seemingly valid, is unavailing.
4.) While the determination to cease operations is a management
prerogative that the state does not usually interfere in, where it is
manifest that the closure is motivated not by a desire to avoid further
losses but to discourage the workers from organizing themselves into a
union for more effective negotiations with management the state is
bound to interfere.

Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 271, G.R.
No. L-78604, May 9, 1988
Principles:
1.) Retrenchment, valid, but the manner in which it should be exercised
should not be tainted with abuse of discretion. Labor is a persons
means of livelihood.
2.) Discrimination by the employer in selecting employees to be
retrenched constitutes unfair labor practice.

Bankard, Inc. v. NLRC, 692 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 171664, March 6,
2013

Principles:
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1.) Acts considered as unfair labor practice relate to the workers right to
self-organization and to the observance of a collective bargaining
agreement.
2.) Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative. Absent any proof that management acted in
a malicious or arbitrary manner, the supreme court will not interfere
with the exercise of judgment by an employer.

Great Pacific Light Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance

Corporation, 303 SCRA 113, G.R No. 126717, February 11, 1999

Principles:
1.) While an act, or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not
every unfair act or decision constitutes Unfair Labor Practice as defined
and enumerated under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
2.) The decision of an employer to consider the top officers of a labor
union as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory and
constitute of an unlawful labor practice of employers. Discriminating in
the context of the Labor Code involves either encouraging membership
in any labor organization or is made on account of the employees
having given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code.
3.) Since the objective of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic
and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor leaders
should be upheld.

Kiok Loy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 141 SCRA 179,

G.R. No. L-54334, January 22, 1986

Principles:
1.) The Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising
under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreement, if requested by either party.
2.) Companys refusal to make counter-proposal to the unions purposed
collective bargaining agreement is an indication of bad faith.
3.) Employer should not be allowed with impunity to resort to schemes
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feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures.

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confessor, 432 SCRA

308, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

Principles:
1.) Interference, restraints or coercion of employees by the employers in
the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form
association is considered unfair labor practice. In order to show that
the employer committed Unfair Labor Practice under the Labor Code,
substantial evidence is required to support such claim.
2.) Surface bargaining is defined as going through the mother of
negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. It
involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates
an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.
3.) The duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of concession.

Singapore Airlines Local Employees Asscociation v. National Labor

Ralations, 130 SCRA 472, G.R. No. L-65786, July 16, 1984

Principles:
1.) There is no Unfair Labor Practice where employers refusal to extend
benefits under a Collective Bargaining Agreement provision was due to
an honest mistake. An error in interpretation without malice or bad
faith does not constitute unfair labor practice. Honest differences in
construction may arise in the actual application or contractual
provisions.

UST Faculty Union v. UST, 584 SCRA 648, G.R. No. 180892, April 7,
2009

Principles:
1.) The test of whether an employer has inferred with the coerced
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization is whether
the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be
said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees rights. It is
not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in
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fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if

there is a reasonable inference that antiunion conduct if the employer
does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective
bargaining.

Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations, 154

SCRA 368, G.R. No. L-76989, September 29, 1987

Principles:
1.) A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a provision in
a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the constitution.
2.) Union Security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an
employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of
responsibility and fairness.
3.) A union member may not be expelled from her union and from her job
for personal reasons or causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement.
4.) Union membership does not entitle hotel workers to be sloppy in their
work and inattentive to customers and disrespectful to supervisors.

Union of Filipino Employees, et.al v. Nestle Philippines,

Incorporated, 192 SCRA 396, G.R. Nos. 88710-13, December 19,
1990

Principles:
1.) A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of
an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and
thus, illegal.
2.) An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor
automatically results ina return-to-work of all striking workers, whether
or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of
Labor.
20 | P a g e

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT, STAFF AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
OF MERALCO, and FIRST LINE ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES, G.R. No. 91902, May 20, 1991

ARE SECURITY GUARDS ELIGIBLE TO FORM, ASSIST OR JOIN UNIONS?

Under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor
organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a
labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union,
depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the
Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security
guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization,
whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional
right to self-organization.

We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of

the law in allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the
company they serve. The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the
faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would present the
employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate their duties to the
allegiance they owe the union of which they are members, aware as they are
that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary
benefits.

Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may
neglect or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of
their employer and the persons of its officials and employees, the control of
access to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in the
event of emergencies and untoward incidents.
21 | P a g e

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND

ERNESTO L. PONCE vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, G.R.
No. 110399 August 15, 1997

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE RULE

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential

capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests. "Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the company's position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters."

An important element of the "confidential employee rule" is the employee's

need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is
the employee's necessary access to confidential labor relations information.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC

PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER, vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK, G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994
22 | P a g e

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration

the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees -if these
managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident
conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with
the presence of managerial employees in Union membership." Stated
differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are
supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives,
and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not
assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union
members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It
is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as
if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision.
If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather
than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the
extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in
the interest of" the employers. 30 It is not farfetched that in the course of
collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are
duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held that
"confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph
operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of
either party to a collective bargaining agreement."

In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of

respondent Bank, being confidential employees, are disqualified from joining
or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply only to the
present case based on the evidence of the parties, as well as to those
similarly situated. It should not be understood in any way to apply to banks
in general.
23 | P a g e

SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAJELCO), vs.

MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and MAGKAISA-ADLO, G.R.
No. 77231 May 31, 1989

RIGHTS OF ALL WORKERS TO ORGANIZATION

There are two types of employees in SAJELCO, namely: the members-

consumers and the members of their immediate families. As regards
employees of SAJELCO who are members-consumers, the rule is settled that
they are not qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes
of collective bargaining. The reason for withholding from employees of a
cooperative who are members-co-owners the right to collective bargaining is
clear: an owner cannot bargain with himself. However, employees who are
not members-consumers may form, join or assist labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees of
SAJELCO who are not members-consumers were employed ONLY because
they are members of the immediate family of members-consumers. The fact
remains that they are not themselves members-consumers, and as such,
they are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization,
collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in Section 8,
Article III and Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, Labor Code of
the Philippines and other related laws.

LEGITIMIZING LABOR ORGANIZATION

JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN

ANNEX "A,"1, vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES,
INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 146073, January 13, 2003
24 | P a g e

RULE ON REPRESENTATION

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be

prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. . .

A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under
Article 242(a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the
representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This
authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative
capacity "for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees
similarly situated," the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiters Office
so expressly states.

While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be

permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are
already represented will not be permitted to do the same except when there
is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in
good faith for the protection of all interests represented by him.

LIANA'S SUPERMARKET, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, G.R. No. 111014 May 31,
1996

RULE ON REPRESENTATION

One of the rights granted by Art. 242 of the Labor Code to a legitimate labor
organization, like respondent Union, is to sue and be sued in its registered
name.The Court held that the aforementioned provision authorizes a union to
file a "representative suit" for the benefit of its members in the interest of
25 | P a g e

avoiding an otherwise cumbersome procedure of joining all union members

in the complaint, even if they number by the hundreds.

Moreover the Court stated that the detail that the number and names of the
striking members of petitioner union were not specified in the decision nor in
the complaint is of no consequence. Reiterating the rule in the Liberty case,
the Court held that it was the function precisely of a labor union to carry the
representation of its members and to file an action for their benefit and
behalf without joining them and avoid the cumbersome procedure of joining
each and every member as a separate party. The Court emphasized that it
would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization
through formation of labor associations if thereafter such collective entities
would be barred from instituting action in their representative capacity.

ANTONIO CATATISTA, JAIME MONSERATE, FRANCISCO ELISAN,

FERNANDO DE LA PENA, DIEGO TUPAS, ROSENDO MONSERATE,
ERNESTO SIBUNAL, DIOSCORO HINO-O, AURELIO DESCATAMIENTO,
LODOVICO DE LA PENA, and DIONISIO BALLADOS, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY,
INC., G.R. No. 102422 August 3, 1995

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
Article 283 of the Labor Code is clear that an employer may close or cease
his business operations or undertaking even if he is not suffering from
serious business losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his
employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length
of service. It would, indeed, be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if we
were to unjustly interfere in management's prerogative to close or cease its
business operations just because said business operation or undertaking is
not suffering from any loss.

The rule is well-settled that labor laws discourage interference with an

employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as
26 | P a g e

the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN, G.R.
Nos. 64821-23 January 29, 1993

PRINCIPLE OF "NO WORK, NO PAY; NO PAY, NO ECOLA"

The legal principles of "No work, no pay; No pay, no ECOLA" must necessarily
give way to the purpose of the law to augment the income of employees to
enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions brought about by
inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against the ravages
brought by these conditions. Significantly, it is the commitment of the State
to protect labor and to provide means by which the difficulties faced by the
working force may best be alleviated.

LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS), vs.MARCELO

ENTERPRISES and MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORP., MARCELO
RUBBER AND LATEX PRODUCTS, MARCELO STEEL, CORPORATION,
MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT CORP., POLARIS MARKETING
CORPORATION and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, G.R. No.
L-38258 November 19, 1982

RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION

It was never the state policy nor our judicial pronouncement that the
employees right to self organization and to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection, are absolute or upheld under all circumstances.

Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of several unions is the

legitimate representative of employees, it is unfair labor practice for one of
the union to stage a strike and demand that employer sit down with it for
collective. The concerted activities executed and carried into effect at the
instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal and violative of the
27 | P a g e

employers basic right to bargain collectively only with the representative

supported by the majority of its employees in each of the bargaining units.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs.THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-
ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP, G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992

CERTIFICATION AND ATTESTATION: MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR

REGISTRATION

The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures

against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only

upon submission of the following to the BLR:1) A charter certificate, within 30
days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and2) The
constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of
accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer,
as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local
or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.

In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate
status.
28 | P a g e

DONG SEUNG INCORPORATED, v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,

HANS LEO J. CACDAC, Director and NAMAWU Local 188 Dong Seung
Workers Union, G.R. No. 162356, April 14, 2008

CERTIFICATION AND ATTESTATION: MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR

REGISTRATION

Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau shall act on all applications for
registration within thirty (30) days from filing.

All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the
secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and
attested to by its president.

All that Article 235 requires is that the secretary's certification be under oath.
It does not prescribe a specific manner of its notarization. Based on its
interpretation of Article 235, the BLR, in its October 14, 1998 Advisory, allows
for the wholesale notarization of a union's application for registration and
recognizes the effects thereof even on the attachments, including the
secretary's certification. This is a reasonable interpretation considering that
the form of notarization contemplated in said Advisory adequately serves the
purpose of Article 235, which is to forestall fraud and misrepresentation.
More importantly, such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great weight by
the Court for it is said agency which is vested with authority and endowed
with expertise to implement the law in question.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. CEBU B-MEG FEED PLANT, vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of DOLE and ILAW AT
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), G.R. No. 116172 October 10, 1996

LABOR ORGANIZATION ACQUIRING LEGITIMACY

Ordinarily, a labor organizations attains the status of legitimacy only upon

the issuance in its name of a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of
Labor Relations pursuant to Articles 234 and 235 of the Labor Code
29 | P a g e

The foregoing procedure is not the only way by which a labor union may
become legitimate, however. When an unregistered union becomes a branch,
local or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements
for registration are no longer required. Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code governs the procedure for union
affiliation.

AFFLIATION WITH A FEDERATION

CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES LABOR UNION (CPLU),

vs. HON. FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, Acting Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), and CHRYSLER
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (CPC), G.R. No. L-46509 November 16,
1978

DISAFFILIATION

There is nothing in the Labor Code nor in the implementing rules which
provides that a duly registered local union which affiliates with a national
union or federation loses its legal personality, much less is there any
provision which requires that upon the disaffiliation of said local union, it
should register anew to be entitled to all the rights and privileges of a duly
registered labor union. On the contrary, the Labor Code expressly allows
disaffiliation for the purpose of operating as an independent labor
organization (Art. 241). In the case at bar, the record discloses that petitioner
CPLU has been duly registered as a tabor organization as early as 1965 with
an independent certificate of registration No. 4664-IP. ... It retained the same
registration number when it affiliated with ALU sometime in 1974 and had its
name changed accordingly to CPLU-ALU It is, thus, evident that the change of
name from CPLU to CPLU-ALU was only a matter of form which did not affect
in the least the legal personality of both affiliating unions. And it follows that
if, upon its disaffiliation, petitioner was required to secure a registration
certificate in its original name (without the suffix ALU), the same was only for
30 | P a g e

record purposes and nothing more. Second, the only way by which a duly
registered labor (union) can be disenfranchised is upon an order of
cancellation issued by the Bureau of Labor Relations and only after due
hearing in a proceeding instituted for said purpose as provided under 239 of
the Labor Code.

Therefore a local labor union which affiliates with a national union does not
lose its status as a labor union and no law requires that it should register
anew upon disqualification with the mother union.

DOLORES VILLAR, ROMEO PEQUITO, DIONISIO RAMOS, BENIGNO

MAMARALDO, ORLANDO ACOSTA, RECITACION BERNUS, ANSELMA
ANDAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN and RITA LLAGAS, vs.
THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of
Labor, AMIGO MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), G.R. No. L-50283-84
April 20, 1983

DISAFFILIATION

It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It
is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But
this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution.

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or

accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the
superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The
constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter
it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable
contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between
the members of the subordinate union inter se.

A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a

collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
31 | P a g e

association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al. vs. Artex

Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 561).
Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who
cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal
does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the
Court of Industrial Relations. (Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124).

A mere minority of a local union membership cannot disaffiliate their union

from its mother union.

FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORPORATION, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL LABOR UNION TUCP, and
EULOGIO LERUM, G.R. No. 115180 November 16, 1999

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MOTHER UNION AND THE LOCAL

UNION

At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother

union and the local union. The Court held that the mother union, acting for
and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union
remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest
of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution
and by-laws of the association

The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization.
Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother
federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal,
notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural
requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization.

TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES' UNION-CGW, ET.AL,. vs. TROPICAL HUT

FOOD MARKET, INC., ET.AL, G.R. No. L-43495-99 January 20, 1990

RIGHT OF A LOCAL UNION TO DISAFFILIATE

32 | P a g e

The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-
settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to
serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate
when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association

When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join a new
federation, it was merely exercising its primary right to labor organization for
the effective enhancement and protection of common interests. In the
absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing
disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its relationship with its parent

VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION FOR METAL, WORKERS, DMG, INC.,
PEOPLE'S CAR, INC., KARBAYAN INC., and RTC TRADING, INC., G.R.
No. L-45824 June 19, 1985

RIGHT OF A LOCAL UNION TO DISAFFILIATE

The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled.
In previous cases, it has been repeatedly held that a local union, being a
separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its
members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances
warrant. 4 This right is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association (Article IV, Section 7, Philippine Constitution).

RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., vs. VICENTE OXIMANA, ET AL., G.R. No. L-

19745 January 31, 1964

EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE PARDON

33 | P a g e

Absolute pardon restores a person to all his civil and political rights, one of
which is the rights to hold any office in any legitimate labor organization. In
the case at bar, the conviction in 1926 of the crime of abusos deshonestos
for which he served time in jail until 1930, cannot after his full and absolute
pardon in 1961 serve to disqualify the respondent president of labor union
from such office under Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI

GUTIERREZ, FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS ALINEA,
ELADIO DE LUNA and CRISANTO DE VILLA, vs.
THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR
ALFARO, G.R. No. L-62306 January 21, 1985

EXPULSION OF UNION OFFICERS

If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the
New Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98 SCRA
522, should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel
them from the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to decide
the issue;
The alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein union officers were
not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that they disbursed the
amount of P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on was disallowed for failure
to attach supporting papers thereon did not of itself constitute falsification
and/or misrepresentation. The expenditures appeared to have been made in
good faith and the amount spent for the purpose mentioned in the report, if
concurred in or accepted by the members, are reasonable; and
The repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position
of auditor at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and
demonstration of the union membership's faith in the herein officers'
leadership on one hand and aclearcondonation of an act they had allegedly
committed.

JULIAN DUYAG, ARMANDO OLIVARES, JOSE ECHEVARIA, ALEJANDRO

SEVILLA and FELIMON GUINGON, vs.
HON. AMANDO G. INCIONG, as Acting Director of Labor Relation
CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of Labor Relations, RICA R.
34 | P a g e

MANALAD, HONORATO K. LEANO, EDUARDO AMPARO and SANTOS

PUERTO, G.R. No. L-47775 July 5, 1980

EXPULSION OF UNION OFFICERS

Article 242 of the Labor Code.That paragraph provides that any violation of
the rights and conditions of union membership as enumerated in paragraphs
(a) to (p) of Article 242, "shall be a ground for cancellation of union
registration or expulsion of officer from office, whichever is appropriate. At
least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or
members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau (of
labor Relations). The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any
reported violation to mete the appropriate penal.
We hold further that Med Puerto and Leano violated the rights and conditions
of membership in the union within the meaning of Article 242. Hence, on that
ground their expulsion from office is also justified. The petitioners are
entitled to the refund of the union dues illegally collected from them. The
union should be the proper refund.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGENT

Democratic Labor Union v. Cebu Stevedoring Co., G.R. No. L-10321,

February 20, 1958

Principle:
By reason of the modern complexity of both employer and union structure, it
frequently becomes difficult to determine from the evidence alone which of
several claimant groups form a proper bargaining unit. It then becomes
necessary to give consideration to the express will or desire of the
employees. This practice of considering; the employees will has been,
designated as the Globe doctrine. This doctrine arose in a case where there
were four contending labor groups, three claiming to be the proper
bargaining units for employees coming within each of their three separate
categories of work, and the fourth claiming the right to be designated as the
bargaining unit for all employees on a plant-wide basis. The National labor
Relations Board, finding that each of the competing units have an equally
valid basis for their respective claims, decided to hold a series of elections,
35 | P a g e

not for the purpose of allowing the group receiving an overall majority of
votes to represent all employees, but for the specific purpose of permitting
the employees in each of the several categories of work to select the group
which each chose as a bargaining unit.

Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company And Kapisanan

Ng Manggagawa Sa Alhambra, V. Alhambra Employees Association
(PAFLU), G.R. No. L-13573, February 20, 1960.

Principle:
Employees having community of interest entitled to separate collective
bargaining unit. It appearing that the employees in the administrative,
sales, and dispensary departments of the petitioner company, with the
exception of the supervisors, security guards, and confidential employees
therein, are engaged in an entirely different kind of work which does not
involve production and maintenance and the places where they work are
separate from those of the workers in the other department of the company,
it can be said that they have a community of interest among themselves
which justifies their formation or existence as a separate appropriate
collective bargaining unit. The existence of such a unit will insure to said
employees in the departments aforementioned the full benefit of their right
to self-organization and collective bargaining and, thereby, effectuate the
policies enunciated in the Industrial Peace Act.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA,

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor and
Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS' UNION, represented by its
President, Rosario del Rosario, G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992

Principle:

Test applied: community or mutuality of interests test.

BASIC TEST: A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees
who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions
and other subjects of collective bargaining.
In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two general
classes:
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Firstnon-academicjanitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists,

carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers;
and
Secondacademicfull professors, associate professors, assistant
professors, instructors, research, extension and professorial staff.
It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with
the University clerks and other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social
life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of
the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working conditions of
the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these
two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining.

NAFLU vs. Mainit lumber, 192 SCRA 598

Principle:

While the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned

with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive
or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is
community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an
asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally
the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among
the employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their
functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same
way that the company needs them both. There may be differences as to the
nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, INC. and SURICON

EMPLOYEES & LABORERS MUTUAL ASSOCIATION (SELMA) v.
PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU) and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSG.R. No. L-22970, June 9, 1969

Principle:
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Law Applicable:
In this case, no law was applied since the issue involved has something to do
with the correctness of the examiners report on the basis of a court order.
The dispute between the union and the management should have first been
subjected to the remedies provided for in the Constitution which promotes
the preferential use of voluntary modes of settling dispute instead of going
directly to the courts. If they have availed first of various modes of voluntary
settlement, they would have avoided the gruesome and long process of
litigation. The case involved several issues but when it reached the Supreme
Court, the only issue left was the correctness of the reported money value
which they could have determined earlier if they resorted to an amicable
settlement to meet the demands of each other.
In this case SURICON, through employees duly designated, actively
cooperated with the CIR and its Chief Examiner in the examination of its own
books and in the computation of the money value of the questioned awards.
As a matter of fact, its only objection against the reports themselves was
that they were not correctly based, meaning that instead of the examination
and computation being based on the testimony of SURICON's general
superintendent, they were based on the statement made in open court by
SURICON's counsel subsequent to the giving of such testimony. At the very
least, therefore, it seems clear that SURICON must be deemed barred from
now saying that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the demands of
PLASLU. The Court ruled that neither the CIR nor its Chief Examiner nor the
latter's assistant committed any error in relation to this particular issue
under consideration.

Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrera-Calleja, 214 SCRA 174

Principle:
one company-one union policy
The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union
policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties could
derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could
undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their
disunity, division and dissension, is not without exceptions.
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to
the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof; the
recognition of these exceptions takes into accountant the policy to assure
employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated,
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the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees
to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-
organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among
others, which the Constitution guarantees

CERTIFICATION ELECTION

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109,

G.R. No. L-19791, May 16, 1967

Principle:
Relief within the unionUnder the statute redress must first be sought within
the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-laws.
However, it has been held that this requirement is not absolute, but yields to
exception under varying circumstances. In the case at bar, noteworthy is the
fact that the complaint was filed against the union and its incumbent
officers, some of whom were members of the board of directors. The
constitution and by-laws of the union provide that charges for any violation,
thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by the lower
court, if the complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect
be acting as respondent, investigator and judge at the same time. To follow
the procedure i4ndicated would be a farce under the circumstances. Where
exhaustion of remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a
denial of justice, or would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon,
particularly where property rights of the members are involved, as a
condition to the right to invoke the aid of a court.

Allied Free Workers Union v. Cia Maritime,19 SCRA 258,G.R. Nos. L-

22951 and L-22952, January 31, 1967

Principles:
The duty to bargain collectively exists only between the employee and its
employees. However, the actual negotiations which may possibly culminate
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in a concrete collective bargaining contract are carried on between the

employer itself and the official representative of the employees, in most
cases the majority labor union. In the case at bar, there being no employer-
employee relationship between the disputants, there is neither a duty to
bargain collectively to speak of. And there being no such duty to hold
certification elections would be pointless. There is no reason to select a
representative to negotiate when there can be negotiations in the first place.
When there is no duty to bargain collectively, it s not proper to hold
certification elections in connection therewith.

Progressive Development Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA

802,G.R. No. 96245, February 4, 1992

Principle:
Labor Code enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor
organization, among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining. But while it is provided under the
Labor Code Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 of The
code enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization
among which is the right to be certified as a exclusive representativeof all
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.

Philippine Phosphate v. Torres,231 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 98050, March

17, 1994

Principle:
The intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge
with the rank and file, or where the supervisors organization would represent
conflicting interest.

United Aluminum Fabricators v. Drilon, 211 SCRA 104, G.R. No.

93016, July 3, 1992

Principle:
Petition for certification election requires written support of 20% of affected
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employees of bargaining unit. In the present case, the record shows that
KAMPILS petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 20% of
the rank and file employees of the company, to make it mandatory for the
Bureau to order a certification election. In fact failure to determine with legal
certainty whether the union enjoyed majority representation may be ground
to nullify the certification election.

Monarck International v. Noriel, 83 SCRA 114, G.R. No. L-47570-71,

May 11 , 1978

Principle:
Even though the 30% requirement for holding a certification election cannot
be complied with the Department of Labor through the Director of Labor
Relations may still order holding of certification election if this is the most
efficacious way of determining employees choice of union representative. It
is discretionary for such official to order certification election. The discretion
as noted, is not to be interfered with except on a showing of improvident
exercise, in which case a procedural due process question may arise.

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS

Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Employees Union, 23 SCRA 465,

G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968

Principle:

In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved

was the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The
agent's interest never entered the picture. In fact, the justification for said
doctrine was, that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the
statute, is the true party in interest to the contract, holding rights through
the agency of the union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed
by the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal. Stated otherwise, the
"substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke
the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the
simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of
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this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract"
must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new
bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract,
except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.

Manila Electric Company v. Quisimbing, 302 SCRA 173, G.R. No.

127598, January 27, 1999

Principle:
If no agreement is reached within six months from the expiry date of
three years that follow the CBA execution, the law expressly gives the
discretion to fix the affectivity of the agreement.
Hold over Principle. In the absence of a new CBA, the parties must
maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement until a new agreement
is reached.

Rivera v. Espiritu, 374 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 135547, January 23, 2002

Principle:
Collective Bargaining has a two-fold purpose, one is to promote industrial
stability and predictability and the other is to assign specific timetables
wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Noting in
the Code provides the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory
timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
The right to free collective bargaining includes the right to suspend it.

STRIKES, LOCKOUTS, and PICKETS

Biflex Phils, Labor Union v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing

Corp, 511 SCRA 247, G.R. No. 155679, December 19, 2006

Princples:
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employment but who,
on a day they were scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join
a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage. Stoppage of work
due to welga ng bayan is in nature of a general strike, an extended
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sympathy strike. It affects numerous employees including those who

do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and
conditions of employment.
Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his employment, despite his
participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which
the Supreme Court may not supplant.

NUWHRAIN v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 125561, March 6, 1998

Principles:
An employer may lawfully discharge employees participating in an
unjustifiable wildcat strike because said wildcat strike was an attempt to
undermine the Unions position as the exclusive bargaining representative
and was, therefore an unprotected activity. The cessation from the
employment of the fifteen Junta officers as a result of their participation in
the illegal strike is a consequence of their defiant and capricious decision to
participate therein. The court accordingly uphold the dismissal from
employment of the fifteen officers of the Junta who knowingly participated in
the strike.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpico Lines v. Sulpico Lines, 426 SCRA

319, G.R. No. 140992, March 25, 2004

Principle:
The cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote
report were intended to be mandatory. Failing to comply with the mandatory
requirement, the strike mounted by union is illegal. The law leaves no room
for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven day strike ban after the
strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory.
Sarmienta v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676, G.R. No. L-75271-73, June 27,
1988

Principle:
Return-to-work order is to prevent impairment of the national interest. It
must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to
protect the workers who might otherwise be locked by the employer for
threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent
impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company
43 | P a g e

are disputed by the refusal of the strikers to return to return to work as

directed.

St. Scholasticas College v. Torres, 210 SCRA 565, G.R. No. 100158,
June 29, 1992

Principle:
Return-to-work order is immediately effective and executor notwithstanding
the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Labor Code provides that if a
strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking
employees shall immediately return to work. It must be strictly complied with
even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. After all the
assumption and certification order is issued in the exercise of secretarys
compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside must immediately
complied with.

Grand Boulevard Hotel v. GLOWHRAIN, 406 SCRA 688, G.R. No.

153664, July 18, 2003

Principle:
The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an
opportunity for mediation and conciliation, which requirements are
mandatory, failure of union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. The
requisite of a valid strike are the following; a) notice of strike filed with the
DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in the case
of ULP; b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership
in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike. The requisite seven
day period is intended to give DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the
projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union
members. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike
will render the requisite periods nugatory.
SMC v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 119293, June 10, 2003

Principle:
Strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of
the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.
Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining
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agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses.

National Labor Union v. Philippine Macth Co., 70 Phil 300, G.R. No.
47107 June 27, 1940

Principles:

While the law recognizes, in a negative way, the laborers' right to strike, it
also creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided. This is
so, because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general
in its disturbing effects upon the social order and the public interests. When
employee therefore, declared a strike even before the outcome of the
investigation had been announced, and without previously having resorted to
any of the pacific means provided by law, they have acted unreasonably,
and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the
consequences of their behavior.

Dinglasa v. NLU, 106 Phil 671, G.R. No. L-14183

Principle:
Petitioner could not be held guilty of unfair labor practice under the Industrial
Peace Act. The cessation of the operation of the jeepney was not due to any
wilful, unfair and discriminatory act of the petitioner, but the result of the
drivers voluntary and deliberate refusal to return to work. While drivers may
be entitled to reinstatement, there is no justification for their receiving back
wages for the period that they were themselves refused to return to work.

Bacus v. Ople, 132 SCRA 690, G.R. No. L-56856, October 23, 1984

Principle:
Mere finding of illegality of strike should not be followed by wholesale
dismissal of strikers from employment.
Concerted stoppage from work may be viewed as one inspired by good
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faith. Acts of violence does not make strike illegal.

Violation on ban on strike against export industries, lack of strike
notice, and violation of CBA no-strike clause do not make a strike per
se illegal.
Even if strike were illegal, it need not result in dismissal of employees.

Association of Independent Unions v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219, G.R. No.

120505, March 25, 19999

Principle:
A strike though valid may be declared invalid where the means
employed are illegal.
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status.

Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. v. NLRC, November 16, 1999

Principle:
DOCTRINE: The mother federation is a mere agent and the local chapter/
union is the principal nothwithstanding the failure of the local union to
comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate
labor organization. The local union, being the principal and sole and
exclusive bargaining agent, and having staged the illegal strike should be
held responsible for any resulting damage sustained by the company as
result thereof

The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, has the status of an
agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to
serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. (Liberty Cotton
Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975])

The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization.
Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother
federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal,
notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural
requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization.

It would not affect its status as the principal and basic unit of the association.
The requirement laid down in the Progressive Development case, that the
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local union must be a legitimate labor organization, pertains to the

conditions before a union may file a petition for certification election and to
be certified as sole and exclusive bargaining agent. In the present case,
there is no dispute that THE UNION is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner company. The
union's status as a legitimate labor organization is therefore of no moment in
the resolution of the controversy here.

Furthermore, the petitioner company is now estopped from reneging on the

recognition it extended to the FPUW-NLU as the bargaining representative of
its rank and file workers, by belatedly attacking its status which petitioner
company had voluntarily recognized. It should be noted that even as early
as 1981, when the collective bargaining agreement sought to be
implemented by the union was entered into, the latter was already the
bargaining representative of the employees concerned. It is not, therefore,
true that it was respondent NLU which formed FPWU. At most, the entry into
the picture of the private respondent on March 23, 1983, merely affirmed the
status of FPWU as the recognized bargaining representative of the rank and
file employees of petitioner company.

Evidently, direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused
by the illegal strike sued upon fall on the local union FPWU, being the
principal, and not on respondent NLU, a mere agent of THE UNION which
assisted the latter in filing the notice of strike. Being just an agent, the
notice of strike filed by Atty. Eulogio Lerum, the national president of NLU, is
deemed to have been filed by its principal, the THE UNION. Having thus
dismissed the claim for damages against the principal, THE UNION, the
action for damages against its agent, respondent NLU, and Atty. Lerum, has
no more leg to stand on and should also be dismissed.

RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS UNION (FFW), vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS and RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., G.R. No. L-18442
November 30, 1962

Principle:
DOCTRINE: It could not be denied that the strikers failed to earn the wages
they ought to have received when they offered to return to work but not
accepted; but it likewise could not be denied that because of the strike and
how it was carried out, the employer also suffered.

upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875,
the case comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, which
enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries
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individual indespensable to the national interest when the President certifies

the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The evident intention of the law
is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only
in the manner prescribed under said Act No. 103, but with the same broad
powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial
Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and
such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it
cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the
power or jurisdiction to carry the solution into effect. And of what use is its
power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and
jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it had adopted. Lastly, if said
court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it
certainly can order the return of the workers with or without backpay as a
term or condition of employmen

CESAR ARICA, CAMILO BADANGO, AZUCENA EPILEPSIA, NOEMI

TABAMO, APOLONIO ANIS, MARIANO LADIERO, ANTONIO DELA
CUESTA, BERNARDO ALVARES, MYRNA REYES, NORMA CRUZ,
REDENTOR SABINO, LEONARDO SAN JUAN, ESTELITO ZAPANTA,
ZOSIMO RABAINO, ANTONIO EUBIEN, JUANITO TOLENTINO, JR.,
EFREN MAGNAYE, REGALADO POSADAS, WILFREDO AYCARDO, and
HERNANI PATRIARCA, petitioners, vs. HON. MINISTER OF LABOR and
RIVERSIDE MILLS CORPORATION, G.R. No. L-53427 June 27, 1985

Principle:
Any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may lock out in
establishments not covered by General Order No, 5 only on grounds of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining, in which case the union
or the employer shall file a notice with the Bureau of labor Relations at least
30 days before the intended strike or lockout. The Bureau shall exert all-out
efforts to effect a voluntary settlement during the 30-day period. Should tile
dispute remain unsettled thereafter, the union may go on strike and the
employer may lock out unless the President or his duly authorized
representative certificates the dispute to the National labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration in the interest of national security or
public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the
protection of the rights and freedom of others. Such certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the strike or lockout
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UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

Principle:
The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of
three (3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of
promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of
cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating
policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall
exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through
its divisions.In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the
aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve
a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in
Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary
under his delegated rule-making power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and
it is a matter of judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many
cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We find no
legal justification in entertaining petitioners claim considering that the clear
intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor
cases filed before the Commission

PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465

Principle:
The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of
peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct
interest to the context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent
bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to
seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),

CATALINO LUZANO, FELICIANO RUBIO, PRUDENCIO JALANDONI,
RODOLFO ANASTACIO, DOMINADOR REUBAL, DOMINGO BARREDO,
ELISEO CARPIO, LEONARDO ESPEJON, RUFINO AGUA, WILFREDO
ADEFUIN, NICASIO MORDENO, JOSE FERRERAS, HONORIO UNTAL and
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APOLINARIO DIZON, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, HON.

EUTROPIO MIGRINO, PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS COMPANY, INC.
and ALFREDO CHING, G.R. No. L-49580 January 17, 1983

Principle:
What justifies the interposition of the corrective authority of this Tribunal
even more is the fact that the information is limited to petitioners having
engaged in picketing. It need not be stressed that peaceful picketing is
embraced in freedom of expression. As emphatically declared in Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees' Association.
The present law on the subject, Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, is even more
emphatic: "(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress
from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thorough fares

HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION (CLO),

vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE
and BISIG NG CANLUBANG (NLU, G.R. No. L-1340, October 13, 1947

Principle:
Under the authority granted by the Constitution, the National Assembly
sought through Commonwealth Act No. 103 to set up a system of settling
labor disputes orderly, justly, and to the best interest of the parties
concerned in particular and of the people in general. Both the Delegates of
the Constitutional Convention and the Members of the National Assembly,
without depriving laborers of their essential rights, and rather having heir
benefit in mind sought to avoid in the Philippines the repetition of the
interminable strikes occurring in the United States of America. Their evil
effects may easily be absorbed by the enormous economic capacity of the
American people but certainly will be disastrous to the economic life of the
Philippines.

the blanket prohibition against picketing in any guise or form contained in

the order of February 21, 1947. The prohibition should be understood to
cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal
means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of
Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to
illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means.
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NATIONAL INTEREST DISPUTES

PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO, CESAR

DAVID, EMMANUEL AGUSTIN, PECSON BARANDA, NELSON BAGUIO,
ROLANDO MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO SANTOS, ISABELO
GALOPE, REYNALDO MALEON, AL PEDRIQUE, BAYANI HERNANDEZ,
ROBERT LORESCA, LEONARDO LACSINA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY
NIEVES R. CONFESOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION, GERARD BRIMO, HARRY
McMILLAN, G.R. No. 117169. March 12, 1997

Principle:

The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to
determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon
the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is
indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the
labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature
of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good
considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national
economy. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his
certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers
right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. This is well-
articulated in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, in
this wise:
Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the
Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters
share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the
Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of
the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd
and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter
concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said,
(i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would
breathe life into it, rather than defeat it
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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), G.R. No. 88210, January 23, 1991

Principle:

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an

unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike

Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the
holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The
prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful
deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from
seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the
union's illegal mass action

The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's
damages because of his failure to act promptly and use his authority to avert
the illegal strike under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The Secretary's
delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union in
declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and
exclusive.

INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., vs. HON. SECRETARY OF

LABOR and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), G.R. Nos. 92981-83
January 9, 1992

Principle:
1. Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a)
Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide . . . the following cases involving all workers. . . .
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1. Unfair labor practice cases;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts; . . .
2. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which declares:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike of lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .
3. Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which states:
Sec. 6. Disposition of cases. . . .
Provided, that when the Minister (Secretary) of Labor and
Employment has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or lockout
dispute or certified the same to the Commission, the parties to
such dispute shall immediately inform the Minister (Secretary) or
the Commission as the case may be, of all cases between them
pending before any Regional Arbitration Branch, and the Labor
Arbiter handling the same of such assumption or certification,
whereupon all proceedings before the Labor Arbiter concerning
such cases shall cease and the Labor Arbiter shall await
instructions from the Minister (Secretary) or the Commission.

The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely
abuse his discretion when he issued the questioned orders.
As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al. the
fundamental normative rule that jurisdiction is the authority to bear and
determine a cause the right to act in a case. However, this should be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case
at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ACTING

SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES, NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED
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WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU), MARCOPPER EMPLOYEES LABOR

UNION (MELU), respondents.

Principle:

A return-to-work order is a statutory part and parcel [21] of the Secretarys

assumption or certification order. Article 263 (g) succintly provides that:
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time
of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout. x x x
Thus, following an assumption or certification order, returning to work, on
the part of a worker, is not a matter of option or voluntariness but
obligation. The sanction for failure to comply with such obligation, under the
law, is loss of employment status. Case law likewise provides that by staging
a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration,
workers forfeited their right to be readmitted to work, having abandoned
their employment, and so could be validly replaced.
We cannot countenance the Secretarys tolerance of the unions willful
breach of the provisions of Article 263(g) as well as its defiance of
the February 28, 1995 order. He cannot gloss over his findings showing prima
facie the illegality of the unions actuations. It would be unfair, indeed
unreasonable and oppressive, to compel petitioner to accept the workers
who refused to return to work, pending arbitration proceedings.
We stress that it is the NLRC which must resolve the issues involved in
the labor dispute. Our resolution in the instant case does not pre-empt the
NLRC. We make no findings or ruling on the relative merits of the parties
positions. We rule simply that pending arbitration proceedings, petitioner
cannot be compelled to accept the workers who failed to return to work.
We cannot but highlight the national interest involved in the instant case.
Petitioner Marcopper operates the San Antonio Copper Project in Marinduque.
The project is financed through long term loans granted by the Asian
Development Bank and its co-financers, in the aggregate amount of
US$40,000,000.00. It also supplies electrical power to the
entire province of Marinduque. In the assumption order of the Secretary, it
was emphasized that:
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Any disruption in the operations of the Company will adversely affect its
financial status and consequently its capacity to pay the loans acquired.
Considering that the Companys project is basically financed by these loans,
the continued operation of the project is threatened. Consequently, the
means of livelihood of about 1,500 employees stands to suffer.

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

Principle:
The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of
three (3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of
promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of
cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating
policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall
exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through
its divisions.In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the
aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve
a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in
Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary
under his delegated rule-making power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and
it is a matter of judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many
cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We find no
legal justification in entertaining petitioners claim considering that the clear
intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor
cases filed before the Commission

The failure of UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the
return-to-work orders was because the academic institutions were not
industries indispensable to the national interest.

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his

capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and
SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA.
ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU,
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Principle:
Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) the:
1. Authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
2. decide the same

This authority to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute must

1. include and extend to all questions and include and extend to all questions
2. controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor
Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts (g) When, in his opinion, there exists
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.

Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically

enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order.

If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied).
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Art. 264. Prohibited activities. No labor organization or employer shall declare

a strike or lockout:

1. without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of

this Book or

2. without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or

3. without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.

No strike or lockout shall be declared:

1. after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or

2. after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary

arbitration or

3. during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout

Article 263 (g): if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption,
"all striking . employees shall immediately return to work."

This means that a return-to-work order is immediately effective and

executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration
(University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).

It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity