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Materiality, Form, and Context:
Marx contra Latour
Hylton White
M
ajor theoretical projects are organized as much by what they
dispute as what they propose. What has come to be called
the ontological turn in the humanities is no exception,
and little has been more important for advocates of that turn than the
effort to repudiate the claims of critical theory.1 Take Rita Felskis call
to understand texts as nonhuman actors, participating in fluid rela-
tions with other actorsreaders, for examplethat they come across
as they circulate in an open-ended world. As Felski writes in a recent
article entitled Context Stinks! (a reference to Bruno Latour), before
we can comprehend texts as actors that enter into diverse, unpredict-
able associations, we first need to estrange ourselves from conventions
of critical inquiry (denominated as the hermeneutics of suspicion)
that interrogate texts for ties to arrangements of power in specific
historical settings. In Felskis words:
While suspicion can manifest itself in multiple ways, in the current intellectual
climate it often pivots on a fealty to the clarifying power of historical context.
What the literary text does not see, in this line of thought, are the larger circum-
stances that shape and sustain it and that are drawn into the light by the corrective
force of the critics own vigilant gaze. The critic probes for meanings inaccessible
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668 HY LTON WHITE
to authors as well as ordinary readers, and exposes the texts complicity in social
conditions that it seeks to deny or disavow. (574)
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 669
What Is Anti-Fetishism?
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670 HY LTON WHITE
You are always right! When naive believers are clinging forcefully to their objects,
claiming that they are made to do things because of their gods, their poetry, their
cherished objects, you can turn all of those attachments into so many fetishes and
humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but their own projection,
that you, yes you alone, can see. But as soon as naive believers are thus inflated by
some belief in their own importance, in their own projective capacity, you strike
them by a second uppercut and humiliate them again, this time by showing that,
whatever they think, their behavior is entirely determined by the action of
powerful causalities coming from objective reality they dont see, but that you, yes
you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see. Isnt this fabulous? Isnt it really worth
going to graduate school to study critique? (Why Has Critique 239)
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 671
critics belief in the uniquely scientific status of his or her own forms of
knowledge. Disposition and proposition thus merge in the arrogant
act of exposing fetishistic errors: The fetishist is accused of being
mistaken about the origin of the power in question. He has built an
idol with his own hands . . . yet he attributes this labor, these fantasies,
and these powers to the very object that he has created (On the Modern
Cult 8). On this account, Marx leads the critic to portray fetishism as a
type of self-deceiving human agency. The real agent at work in the act
of fetishism is the human fetishist, not the fetishized object. Most
importantly, the anti-fetishist critic thinks the kind of human agency
at work is specifically cognitive: what animates the fetish is the fact that
humans believe in it. Critique, on this view, is a project of showing how
fetishists have been deceived by their own beliefs into attributing
powers to lifeless things. But how did fetishists come to think so wrongly
in the first place? At this point, anti-fetishists supposedly inflict Latours
second uppercut. They claim scientific knowledge to show how human
beliefs are shaped by hidden mechanismsespecially the functional
imperatives of social domination (On Interobjectivity 236).
According to Latour, this two-step operation produces a
paradox. The power of things over human affairs is first exposed as a
product of misguided beliefs, after which these beliefs are exposed as
products of thing-like social mechanisms that govern human affairs.
How can critics subscribe to both assertions simultaneously, without
seeing how they controvert each other? This is only possible, says
Latour, insofar as anti-fetishists themselves believe something special
about belief, namely that beliefs drive human actions. Since their own
beliefs are scientific ones, these critics are granted the stature of world-
making heroes, while ordinary fetishists are caught in a web of illusion
that prevents them from acting freely or effectively (On the Modern Cult
1416). One of Latours main conclusions is, thus, that the concept of
belief does essential enabling work for the anti-fetishist project by
allowing critics to paper over the cracks of a performative contradic-
tion. Ironically, the category of belief allows anti-fetishist criticsnot
fetishists, noteto deceive themselves about the role of beliefs in their
own behavior.
Finally, what is it about anti-fetishist critique that the concept
of belief hides from view? The answer lies in plain sight, says Latour.
Once more it is an irony, but now it concerns the category of society
and operates with devastating effect against the supposedly social aims
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672 HY LTON WHITE
Is Marx an Anti-Fetishist?
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 673
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674 HY LTON WHITE
The first man who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this
is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of
civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the
human race have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled in the
ditch and cried out to his fellow-men: Beware of listening to this imposter. (44)
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 675
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676 HY LTON WHITE
selectively quoting the famous lines from Capital in which Marx says
we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious
world in order to find an analogy with the fetishism of commodities
in capitalist society:
In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings
endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the
human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of mens hands.
This I call the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as
they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the
production of commodities. (qtd. in Latour, On the Modern Cult 10; see Capital 165)
With that Latour rests his case, if not his accusation. But of course, the
passage makes nothing like the claim Latour reads into it, namely that
the fetishism of commodities projects the illusions of minds onto
things. Latour cuts off this important passage not just from the argu-
ment that follows, but even from the balance of the chapter it concludes.
The effects of this are decisive, since Marxs account of capitalism is
designed to be read as a whole. In the very next line, for example, Marx
writes, as the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism of
the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character of the
labour which produces them (165, my emphases). However, even a careful
reading of the cited passage in isolation shows that Marx is not
asserting what Latour would have us believe. What makes two things
analogous is not that their parts are identical, but that there is an
isomorphic structure in the ways those parts are arranged. When Marx
compares the products of labour to those of the human brain
attending religion, he is not proposing we understand the fetishism of
commodities as something the mind has created. He is saying that in
the fetishism of commodities, as in religion, we see a kind of activity
displacing its own human subjects. In this instance, displacement
issues not from what those subjects believe, but from the peculiar
social character of their acts. In the detail just as much as the bigger
picture, Latour simply misrepresents what he is describing.
In the bulk of this chapter on commodities, Marx assembles a
complex set of relationships between iron and coats, producers and
political economists, and ultimately value, temporality, and the lives of
things, both magical and mundane. In other words, he provides a
detailed account of what Latour ought to see precisely as a type of
actor-network. Take this well-known passage, in which Marx claims
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 677
that the metabolism of labor into a product, far from being a reduc-
tively physical act, is diverted through the manifold of associations
converging in the commodity form as form:
It is absolutely clear that, by his activity, man changes the forms of the materials of
nature in such a way as to make them useful to him. The form of wood, for
instance, is altered if a table is made out of it. Nevertheless the table continues to
be wood, an ordinary sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it
changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet
on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and
evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were
to begin dancing of its own will. (16364)
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678 HY LTON WHITE
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 679
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MATERIALITY, FORM, AND CONTEXT 681
NOTES
This essay originated in a panel on Things of Nature, the Nature of Things, convened
by Sarah Nuttall at the fourth Johannesburg Workshop on Theory and Criticism (see
White). My thanks to her and the other participants in that session. I am also very
grateful to Lauren Goodlad and Andrew Sartori for invaluable editorial guidance, and
to Jean and John Comaroff, Bernard Dubbeld, Charles Piot, Achille Mbembe, Cathe-
rine Burns, Julia Hornberger, and an anonymous reader for comments on earlier
versions.
1
Broadly speaking, the ontological turn refers to a movement away from
questions of representation, discourse, subjectivity, and identity, and toward a new
attention to the roles of material and other nonhuman agencies in constructing
concrete events, collectives, and forms of life. In anthropology, for example, this has
inspired new experiments in posthumanist or multispecies ethnography (Kirksey and
Helmreich). In literary studies, book history is related to the same trend. One of the
signature features of this movement is its explicit repudiation of critical questions and
its unabashed embrace of an empiricist agenda.
2
On ANT, see Latour, Reassembling 117; Callon.
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682 HY LTON WHITE
3
Latourian anthropologist Webb Keane, for example, compares the Marxist
critique of commodity fetishism to the anti-idolatrous projects of Calvinist missionaries
in Indonesia (813).
4
See Latour, We Have Never 36; On Technical Mediation; On Interobjec-
tivity 241; On the Modern Cult 10.
5
It is important to note that theory in this Rousseauian tradition hardly ever
makes use of the notion of the fetish, preferring instead the metaphor of the mask
(Mauss; Levi-Strauss passim). Since Latour so often writes about the critique of the
fetish as if it were a critique of the dissembling representational work of the mask, it is
all the more incongruous that he directs his ire at Marxism and not at his own post-
structuralist inspirations.
WORKS CITED
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