Data Privacy Act 2012

DATA PRIVACY ACT 2012
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand
eleven.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10173]
AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFORMATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
CREATING FOR THIS PURPOSE A NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to protect the fundamental human
right of privacy, of communication while ensuring free flow of information to promote
innovation and growth. The State recognizes the vital role of information and
communications technology in nation-building and its inherent obligation to ensure that
personal information in information and communications systems in the government and in
the private sector are secured and protected.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall have the
respective meanings hereafter set forth:
(a) Commission shall refer to the National Privacy Commission created by virtue of this Act.
(b) Consent of the data subject refers to any freely given, specific, informed indication of will,
whereby the data subject agrees to the collection and processing of personal information
about and/or relating to him or her. Consent shall be evidenced by written, electronic or
recorded means. It may also be given on behalf of the data subject by an agent specifically
authorized by the data subject to do so.
(c) Data subject refers to an individual whose personal information is processed.
(d) Direct marketing refers to communication by whatever means of any advertising or

marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.
(e) Filing system refers to any act of information relating to natural or juridical persons to the
extent that, although the information is not processed by equipment operating automatically
in response to instructions given for that purpose, the set is structured, either by reference
to individuals or by reference to criteria relating to individuals, in such a way that specific
information relating to a particular person is readily accessible.
(f) Information and Communications System refers to a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents
and includes the computer system or other similar device by or which data is recorded,
transmitted or stored and any procedure related to the recording, transmission or storage of
electronic data, electronic message, or electronic document.
(g) Personal information refers to any information whether recorded in a material form or not,
from which the identity of an individual is apparent or can be reasonably and directly
ascertained by the entity holding the information, or when put together with other
information would directly and certainly identify an individual.
(h) Personal information controller refers to a person or organization who controls the
collection, holding, processing or use of personal information, including a person or
organization who instructs another person or organization to collect, hold, process, use,
transfer or disclose personal information on his or her behalf. The term excludes:
(1) A person or organization who performs such functions as instructed by another person or
organization; and
(2) An individual who collects, holds, processes or uses personal information in connection
with the individuals personal, family or household affairs.
(i) Personal information processor refers to any natural or juridical person qualified to act as
such under this Act to whom a personal information controller may outsource the processing
of personal data pertaining to a data subject.
(j) Processing refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon personal
information including, but not limited to, the collection, recording, organization, storage,
updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use, consolidation, blocking, erasure or
destruction of data.
(k) Privileged information refers to any and all forms of data which under the Rules of Court
and other pertinent laws constitute privileged communication.
(l) Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:
(1) About an individuals race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color, and religious,
philosophical or political affiliations;
(2) About an individuals health, education, genetic or sexual life of a person, or to any
proceeding for any offense committed or alleged to have been committed by such person, the
disposal of such proceedings, or the sentence of any court in such proceedings;
(3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not limited
to, social security numbers, previous or cm-rent health records, licenses or its denials,
suspension or revocation, and tax returns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept classified.
SEC. 4. Scope. This Act applies to the processing of all types of personal information and to
any natural and juridical person involved in personal information processing including those
personal information controllers and processors who, although not found or established in
the Philippines, use equipment that are located in the Philippines, or those who maintain an
office, branch or agency in the Philippines subject to the immediately succeeding paragraph:
Provided, That the requirements of Section 5 are complied with.
This Act does not apply to the following:
(a) Information about any individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government
institution that relates to the position or functions of the individual, including:
(1) The fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution;
(2) The title, business address and office telephone number of the individual;
(3) The classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual;
and
(4) The name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of
employment with the government;
(b) Information about an individual who is or was performing service under contract for a
government institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the
contract, and the name of the individual given in the course of the performance of those
services;
(c) Information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature such as the granting
of a license or permit given by the government to an individual, including the name of the
individual and the exact nature of the benefit;
(d) Personal information processed for journalistic, artistic, literary or research purposes;
(e) Information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority which
includes the processing of personal data for the performance by the independent, central
monetary authority and law enforcement and regulatory agencies of their constitutionally
and statutorily mandated functions. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to have
amended or repealed Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act; Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act;
and Republic Act No. 9510, otherwise known as the Credit Information System Act (CISA);
(f) Information necessary for banks and other financial institutions under the jurisdiction of
the independent, central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to comply with
Republic Act No. 9510, and Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Money Laundering Act and other applicable laws; and
(g) Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign jurisdictions in

accordance with the laws of those foreign jurisdictions, including any applicable data privacy
laws, which is being processed in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Protection Afforded to Journalists and Their Sources. Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as to have amended or repealed the provisions of Republic Act No. 53, which
affords the publishers, editors or duly accredited reporters of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation protection from being compelled to reveal the source of any
news report or information appearing in said publication which was related in any
confidence to such publisher, editor, or reporter.
SEC. 6. Extraterritorial Application. This Act applies to an act done or practice engaged in
and outside of the Philippines by an entity if:
(a) The act, practice or processing relates to personal information about a Philippine citizen
or a resident;
(b) The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the entity is processing personal
information in the Philippines or even if the processing is outside the Philippines as long as
it is about Philippine citizens or residents such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;
(2) A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines but has central management and
control in the country; and
(3) An entity that has a branch, agency, office or subsidiary in the Philippines and the parent
or affiliate of the Philippine entity has access to personal information; and
(c) The entity has other links in the Philippines such as, but not limited to:
(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and
(2) The personal information was collected or held by an entity in the Philippines.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION
SEC. 7. Functions of the National Privacy Commission. To administer and implement the
provisions of this Act, and to monitor and ensure compliance of the country with
international standards set for data protection, there is hereby created an independent body
to be known as the National Privacy Commission, winch shall have the following functions:
(a) Ensure compliance of personal information controllers with the provisions of this Act;
(b) Receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable settlement of complaints

through the use of alternative dispute resolution processes, adjudicate, award indemnity on
matters affecting any personal information, prepare reports on disposition of complaints and
resolution of any investigation it initiates, and, in cases it deems appropriate, publicize any
such report: Provided, That in resolving any complaint or investigation (except where
amicable settlement is reached by the parties), the Commission shall act as a collegial body.
For this purpose, the Commission may be given access to personal information that is
subject of any complaint and to collect the information necessary to perform its functions
under this Act;
(c) Issue cease and desist orders, impose a temporary or permanent ban on the processing of
personal information, upon finding that the processing will be detrimental to national
security and public interest;
(d) Compel or petition any entity, government agency or instrumentality to abide by its orders
or take action on a matter affecting data privacy;
(e) Monitor the compliance of other government agencies or instrumentalities on their

security and technical measures and recommend the necessary action in order to meet
minimum standards for protection of personal information pursuant to this Act;
(f) Coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector on efforts to formulate
and implement plans and policies to strengthen the protection of personal information in the
country;
(g) Publish on a regular basis a guide to all laws relating to data protection;
(h) Publish a compilation of agency system of records and notices, including index and other
finding aids;
(i) Recommend to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the prosecution and imposition of
penalties specified in Sections 25 to 29 of this Act;
(j) Review, approve, reject or require modification of privacy codes voluntarily adhered to by
personal information controllers: Provided, That the privacy codes shall adhere to the
underlying data privacy principles embodied in this Act: Provided, further, That such privacy
codes may include private dispute resolution mechanisms for complaints against any
participating personal information controller. For this purpose, the Commission shall
consult with relevant regulatory agencies in the formulation and administration of privacy
codes applying the standards set out in this Act, with respect to the persons, entities,
business activities and business sectors that said regulatory bodies are authorized to
principally regulate pursuant to the law: Provided, finally. That the Commission may review
such privacy codes and require changes thereto for purposes of complying with this Act;
(k) Provide assistance on matters relating to privacy or data protection at the request of a
national or local agency, a private entity or any person;
(l) Comment on the implication on data privacy of proposed national or local statutes,
regulations or procedures, issue advisory opinions and interpret the provisions of this Act
and other data privacy laws;
(m) Propose legislation, amendments or modifications to Philippine laws on privacy or data

protection as may be necessary;
(n) Ensure proper and effective coordination with data privacy regulators in other countries
and private accountability agents, participate in international and regional initiatives for
data privacy protection;
(o) Negotiate and contract with other data privacy authorities of other countries for cross-
border application and implementation of respective privacy laws;
(p) Assist Philippine companies doing business abroad to respond to foreign privacy or data
protection laws and regulations; and
(q) Generally perform such acts as may be necessary to facilitate cross-border enforcement of
data privacy protection.
SEC. 8. Confidentiality. The Commission shall ensure at all times the confidentiality of any
personal information that comes to its knowledge and possession.
SEC. 9. Organizational Structure of the Commission. The Commission shall be attached to

the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and shall be headed
by a Privacy Commissioner, who shall also act as Chairman of the Commission. The Privacy
Commissioner shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Privacy Commissioners, one to be
responsible for Data Processing Systems and one to be responsible for Policies and Planning.
The Privacy Commissioner and the two (2) Deputy Privacy Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines for a term of three (3) years, and may be reappointed for
another term of three (3) years. Vacancies in the Commission shall be filled in the same
manner in which the original appointment was made.
The Privacy Commissioner must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age and of good moral
character, unquestionable integrity and known probity, and a recognized expert in the field of
information technology and data privacy. The Privacy Commissioner shall enjoy the benefits,
privileges and emoluments equivalent to the rank of Secretary.
The Deputy Privacy Commissioners must be recognized experts in the field of information
and communications technology and data privacy. They shall enjoy the benefits, privileges
and emoluments equivalent to the rank of Undersecretary.
The Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners, or any person acting on their behalf
or under their direction, shall not be civilly liable for acts done in good faith in the
performance of their duties. However, he or she shall be liable for willful or negligent acts
done by him or her which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if
he or she acted under orders or instructions of superiors: Provided, That in case a lawsuit is
filed against such official on the subject of the performance of his or her duties, where such
performance is lawful, he or she shall be reimbursed by the Commission for reasonable costs
of litigation.
SEC. 10. The Secretariat. The Commission is hereby authorized to establish a Secretariat.
Majority of the members of the Secretariat must have served for at least five (5) years in any
agency of the government that is involved in the processing of personal information
including, but not limited to, the following offices: Social Security System (SSS), Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Justice (DOJ),
and Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost).
CHAPTER III
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 11. General Data Privacy Principles. The processing of personal information shall be
allowed, subject to compliance with the requirements of this Act and other laws allowing
disclosure of information to the public and adherence to the principles of transparency,
legitimate purpose and proportionality.
Personal information must, be:
(a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared before, or as
soon as reasonably practicable after collection, and later processed in a way compatible with
such declared, specified and legitimate purposes only;
(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;
(c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be used the
processing of personal information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incomplete data must be
rectified, supplemented, destroyed or their further processing restricted;
(d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and
processed;
(e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes for which the
data was obtained or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or for
legitimate business purposes, or as provided by law; and
(f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected and processed: Provided, That
personal information collected for other purposes may lie processed for historical, statistical
or scientific purposes, and in cases laid down in law may be stored for longer periods:
Provided, further, That adequate safeguards are guaranteed by said laws authorizing their
processing.
The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal information

processing principles set out herein.
SEC. 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. The processing of personal
information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by law, and when at least one
of the following conditions exists:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;
(b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fulfillment of a
contract with the data subject or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract;
(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal
information controller is subject;
(d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the data subject,
including life and health;
(e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to comply with the
requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions of public authority which
necessarily includes the processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its mandate; or
(f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
personal information controller or by a third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed,
except where such interests are overridden by fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject which require protection under the Philippine Constitution.
SEC. 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. The processing of
sensitive personal information and privileged information shall be prohibited, except in the
following cases:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent, specific to the purpose prior to the
processing, or in the case of privileged information, all parties to the exchange have given
their consent prior to processing;
(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and regulations: Provided,
That such regulatory enactments guarantee the protection of the sensitive personal
information and the privileged information: Provided, further, That the consent of the data
subjects are not required by law or regulation permitting the processing of the sensitive
personal information or the privileged information;
(c) The processing is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject or another
person, and the data subject is not legally or physically able to express his or her consent
prior to the processing;
(d) The processing is necessary to achieve the lawful and noncommercial objectives of public
organizations and their associations: Provided, That such processing is only confined and
related to the bona fide members of these organizations or their associations: Provided,
further, That the sensitive personal information are not transferred to third parties:
Provided, finally, That consent of the data subject was obtained prior to processing;
(e) The processing is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, is carried out by a medical
practitioner or a medical treatment institution, and an adequate level of protection of
personal information is ensured; or
(f) The processing concerns such personal information as is necessary for the protection of
lawful rights and interests of natural or legal persons in court proceedings, or the
establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or when provided to government or public
authority.
SEC. 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. A personal information controller may

subcontract the processing of personal information: Provided, That the personal information
controller shall be responsible for ensuring that proper safeguards are in place to ensure the
confidentiality of the personal information processed, prevent its use for unauthorized
purposes, and generally, comply with the requirements of this Act and other laws for
processing of personal information. The personal information processor shall comply with all
the requirements of this Act and other applicable laws.
SEC. 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. Personal information controllers may

invoke the principle of privileged communication over privileged information that they
lawfully control or process. Subject to existing laws and regulations, any evidence gathered
on privileged information is inadmissible.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT
SEC. 16. Rights of the Data Subject. The data subject is entitled to:
(a) Be informed whether personal information pertaining to him or her shall be, are being or
have been processed;
(b) Be furnished the information indicated hereunder before the entry of his or her personal
information into the processing system of the personal information controller, or at the next
practical opportunity:
(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the system;
(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;
(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;
(4) The recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed;
(5) Methods utilized for automated access, if the same is allowed by the data subject, and the
extent to which such access is authorized;
(6) The identity and contact details of the personal information controller or its
representative;
(7) The period for which the information will be stored; and
(8) The existence of their rights, i.e., to access, correction, as well as the right to lodge a
complaint before the Commission.
Any information supplied or declaration made to the data subject on these matters shall not
be amended without prior notification of data subject: Provided, That the notification under
subsection (b) shall not apply should the personal information be needed pursuant to a
subpoena or when the collection and processing are for obvious purposes, including when it
is necessary for the performance of or in relation to a contract or service or when necessary
or desirable in the context of an employer-employee relationship, between the collector and
the data subject, or when the information is being collected and processed as a result of
legal obligation;
(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:
(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;
(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;
(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;
(4) Manner by which such data were processed;
(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;
(6) Information on automated processes where the data will or likely to be made as the sole
basis for any decision significantly affecting or will affect the data subject;
(7) Date when his or her personal information concerning the data subject were last
accessed and modified; and
(8) The designation, or name or identity and address of the personal information controller;
(d) Dispute the inaccuracy or error in the personal information and have the personal
information controller correct it immediately and accordingly, unless the request is vexatious
or otherwise unreasonable. If the personal information have been corrected, the personal
information controller shall ensure the accessibility of both the new and the retracted
information and the simultaneous receipt of the new and the retracted information by
recipients thereof: Provided, That the third parties who have previously received such
processed personal information shall he informed of its inaccuracy and its rectification upon
reasonable request of the data subject;
(e) Suspend, withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of his or her personal
information from the personal information controllers filing system upon discovery and
substantial proof that the personal information are incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully
obtained, used for unauthorized purposes or are no longer necessary for the purposes for
which they were collected. In this case, the personal information controller may notify third
parties who have previously received such processed personal information; and
(f) Be indemnified for any damages sustained due to such inaccurate, incomplete, outdated,
false, unlawfully obtained or unauthorized use of personal information.
SEC. 17. Transmissibility of Rights of the Data Subject. The lawful heirs and assigns of the
data subject may invoke the rights of the data subject for, which he or she is an heir or
assignee at any time after the death of the data subject or when the data subject is
incapacitated or incapable of exercising the rights as enumerated in the immediately
preceding section.
SEC. 18. Right to Data Portability. The data subject shall have the right, where personal
information is processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly used
format, to obtain from the personal information controller a copy of data undergoing
processing in an electronic or structured format, which is commonly used and allows for
further use by the data subject. The Commission may specify the electronic format referred
to above, as well as the technical standards, modalities and procedures for their transfer.
SEC. 19. Non-Applicability. The immediately preceding sections are not applicable if the
processed personal information are used only for the needs of scientific and statistical
research and, on the basis of such, no activities are carried out and no decisions are taken
regarding the data subject: Provided, That the personal information shall be held under
strict confidentiality and shall be used only for the declared purpose. Likewise, the
immediately preceding sections are not applicable to processing of personal information
gathered for the purpose of investigations in relation to any criminal, administrative or tax
liabilities of a data subject.
CHAPTER V
SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 20. Security of Personal Information. (a) The personal information controller must
implement reasonable and appropriate organizational, physical and technical measures
intended for the protection of personal information against any accidental or unlawful
destruction, alteration and disclosure, as well as against any other unlawful processing.
(b) The personal information controller shall implement reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect personal information against natural dangers such as accidental loss or
destruction, and human dangers such as unlawful access, fraudulent misuse, unlawful
destruction, alteration and contamination.
(c) The determination of the appropriate level of security under this section must take into
account the nature of the personal information to be protected, the risks represented by the
processing, the size of the organization and complexity of its operations, current data privacy
best practices and the cost of security implementation. Subject to guidelines as the
Commission may issue from time to time, the measures implemented must include:
(1) Safeguards to protect its computer network against accidental, unlawful or unauthorized
usage or interference with or hindering of their functioning or availability;
(2) A security policy with respect to the processing of personal information;

(3) A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities in its
computer networks, and for taking preventive, corrective and mitigating action against
security incidents that can lead to a security breach; and
(4) Regular monitoring for security breaches and a process for taking preventive, corrective
and mitigating action against security incidents that can lead to a security breach.
(d) The personal information controller must further ensure that third parties processing
personal information on its behalf shall implement the security measures required by this
provision.
(e) The employees, agents or representatives of a personal information controller who are
involved in the processing of personal information shall operate and hold personal
information under strict confidentiality if the personal information are not intended for
public disclosure. This obligation shall continue even after leaving the public service,
transfer to another position or upon termination of employment or contractual relations.
(f) The personal information controller shall promptly notify the Commission and affected
data subjects when sensitive personal information or other information that may, under the
circumstances, be used to enable identity fraud are reasonably believed to have been
acquired by an unauthorized person, and the personal information controller or the
Commission believes (bat such unauthorized acquisition is likely to give rise to a real risk of
serious harm to any affected data subject. The notification shall at least describe the nature
of the breach, the sensitive personal information possibly involved, and the measures taken
by the entity to address the breach. Notification may be delayed only to the extent necessary
to determine the scope of the breach, to prevent further disclosures, or to restore reasonable
integrity to the information and communications system.
(1) In evaluating if notification is unwarranted, the Commission may take into account
compliance by the personal information controller with this section and existence of good
faith in the acquisition of personal information.
(2) The Commission may exempt a personal information controller from notification where, in
its reasonable judgment, such notification would not be in the public interest or in the
interests of the affected data subjects.
(3) The Commission may authorize postponement of notification where it may hinder the
progress of a criminal investigation related to a serious breach.
CHAPTER VI
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 21. Principle of Accountability. Each personal information controller is responsible for
personal information under its control or custody, including information that have been
transferred to a third party for processing, whether domestically or internationally, subject to
cross-border arrangement and cooperation.
(a) The personal information controller is accountable for complying with the requirements of
this Act and shall use contractual or other reasonable means to provide a comparable level
of protection while the information are being processed by a third party.
(b) The personal information controller shall designate an individual or individuals who are
accountable for the organizations compliance with this Act. The identity of the individual(s)
so designated shall be made known to any data subject upon request.
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT
SEC 22. Responsibility of Heads of Agencies. All sensitive personal information maintained
by the government, its agencies and instrumentalities shall be secured, as far as practicable,
with the use of the most appropriate standard recognized by the information and
communications technology industry, and as recommended by the Commission. The head of
each government agency or instrumentality shall be responsible for complying with the
security requirements mentioned herein while the Commission shall monitor the compliance
and may recommend the necessary action in order to satisfy the minimum standards.
SEC. 23. Requirements Relating to Access by Agency Personnel to Sensitive Personal

Information. (a) On-site and Online Access Except as may be allowed through guidelines
to be issued by the Commission, no employee of the government shall have access to
sensitive personal information on government property or through online facilities unless the
employee has received a security clearance from the head of the source agency.
(b) Off-site Access Unless otherwise provided in guidelines to be issued by the Commission,
sensitive personal information maintained by an agency may not be transported or accessed
from a location off government property unless a request for such transportation or access is
submitted and approved by the head of the agency in accordance with the following
guidelines:
(1) Deadline for Approval or Disapproval In the case of any request submitted to the head of
an agency, such head of the agency shall approve or disapprove the request within two (2)
business days after the date of submission of the request. In case there is no action by the
head of the agency, then such request is considered disapproved;
(2) Limitation to One thousand (1,000) Records If a request is approved, the head of the
agency shall limit the access to not more than one thousand (1,000) records at a time; and
(3) Encryption Any technology used to store, transport or access sensitive personal
information for purposes of off-site access approved under this subsection shall be secured
by the use of the most secure encryption standard recognized by the Commission.
The requirements of this subsection shall be implemented not later than six (6) months after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 24. Applicability to Government Contractors. In entering into any contract that may
involve accessing or requiring sensitive personal information from one thousand (1,000) or
more individuals, an agency shall require a contractor and its employees to register their
personal information processing system with the Commission in accordance with this Act
and to comply with the other provisions of this Act including the immediately preceding
section, in the same manner as agencies and government employees comply with such
requirements.
CHAPTER VIII
PENALTIES
SEC. 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal

Information. (a) The unauthorized processing of personal information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal information without
the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act or any existing
law.
(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by

imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos
(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal information without
the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act or any existing
law.
SEC. 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due to
Negligence. (a) Accessing personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to negligence, provided access to
personal information without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by

SEC. 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. (a)
The improper disposal of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging
from six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who knowingly or negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal
information of an individual in an area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the
personal information of an individual in its container for trash collection.
b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by

imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or negligently dispose,
discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an area accessible to the
public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its container for
trash collection.
SEC. 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information for
Unauthorized Purposes. The processing of personal information for unauthorized purposes
shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing
personal information for purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise
authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from two (2) years to seven (7) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing sensitive personal information for
purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or
under existing laws.
SEC. 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed
on persons who knowingly and unlawfully, or violating data confidentiality and security data
systems, breaks in any way into any system where personal and sensitive personal
information is stored.
SEC. 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal Information. The
penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, after having knowledge of a
security breach and of the obligation to notify the Commission pursuant to Section 20(f),
intentionally or by omission conceals the fact of such security breach.
SEC. 31. Malicious Disclosure. Any personal information controller or personal information
processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who, with malice or in bad faith,
discloses unwarranted or false information relative to any personal information or personal
sensitive information obtained by him or her, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
SEC. 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. (a) Any personal information controller or personal
information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third
party personal information not covered by the immediately preceding section without the
consent of the data subject, shall he subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to
three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its
officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party sensitive personal information
not covered by the immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject,
shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million
pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
SEC. 33. Combination or Series of Acts. Any combination or series of acts as defined in
Sections 25 to 32 shall make the person subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3)
years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
SEC. 34. Extent of Liability. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical
person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case may be, who
participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the
offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of its rights under this
Act. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed,
be deported without further proceedings after serving the penalties prescribed. If the
offender is a public official or employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts penalized under
Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed herein,
suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be.
SEC. 35. Large-Scale. The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively provided
for the preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of at least one
hundred (100) persons is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above mentioned
actions.
SEC. 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. When the offender or the person
responsible for the offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of the
Philippines in the exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the
disqualification to occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty
imposed shall he applied.
SEC. 37. Restitution. Restitution for any aggrieved party shall be governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
CHAPTER IX
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 38. Interpretation. Any doubt in the interpretation of any provision of this Act shall
be liberally interpreted in a manner mindful of the rights and interests of the individual
about whom personal information is processed.
SEC. 39. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate the rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 40. Reports and Information. The Commission shall annually report to the President
and Congress on its activities in carrying out the provisions of this Act. The Commission
shall undertake whatever efforts it may determine to be necessary or appropriate to inform
and educate the public of data privacy, data protection and fair information rights and
responsibilities.
SEC. 41. Appropriations Clause. The Commission shall be provided with an initial
appropriation of Twenty million pesos (Php20,000,000.00) to be drawn from the national
government. Appropriations for the succeeding years shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act. It shall likewise receive Ten million pesos (Php10,000,000.00) per year
for five (5) years upon implementation of this Act drawn from the national government.
SEC. 42. Transitory Provision. Existing industries, businesses and offices affected by the
implementation of this Act shall be given one (1) year transitory period from the effectivity of
the IRR or such other period as may be determined by the Commission, to comply with the
requirements of this Act.
In case that the DICT has not yet been created by the time the law takes full force and effect,
the National Privacy Commission shall be attached to the Office of the President.
SEC. 43. Separability Clause. If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall
remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 44. Repealing Clause. The provision of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise
known as the Human Security Act of 2007, is hereby amended. Except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act, all other laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 45. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication
in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Republic Act 10173 or The Data Privacy Act of 2012 was approved into law last August 15,
2012. Here are its salient features:
1. It applies to processing of personal information (section 3g) and sensitive personal

information (Section 3L).
2. Created the National Privacy Commission to monitor the implementation of this law.
(section 7)
3. Gave parameters on when and on what premise can data processing of personal
information be allowed. Its basic premise is when a data subject has given direct consent.
(section 12 and 13)
4. Companies who subcontract processing of personal information to 3rd party shall have
full liability and cant pass the accountability of such responsibility. (section 14)
5. Data subject has the right to know if their personal information is being processed. The
person can demand information such as the source of info, how their personal information is
being used, and copy of their information. One has the right to request removal and
destruction of ones personal data unless there is a legal obligation that required for it to be
kept or processed. (Section 16 and 18)
6. If the data subject has already passed away or became incapacitated (for one reason or
another), their legal assignee or lawful heirs may invoke their data privacy rights. (Section
17)
7. Personal information controllers must ensure security measures are in place to protect the
personal information they process and be compliant with the requirements of this law.
(Section 20 and 21)
8. In case a personal information controller systems or data got compromised, they must
notify the affected data subjects and the National Privacy Commission. (Section 20)
9. Heads of government agencies must ensure their system compliance to this law (including
security requirements). Personnel can only access sensitive personal information off-site,
limited to 1000 records, in government systems with proper authority and in a secured
manner. (Section 22)
10. Government contractors who have existing or future deals with the government that
involves accessing of 1000 or more records of individuals should register their personal
information processing system with the National Privacy Commission. (Section 25)
11. Provided penalties (up to 5 million as per sec. 33) on the processing of personal
information and sensitive personal information based on the following acts:
Unauthorized processing (sec. 25)
Negligence (sec. 26)
Improper disposal (sec. 27)
Unauthorized purposes (sec. 28)
Unauthorized access or intentional breach (sec. 29)
Concealment of security breaches (sec. 30)
Malicious (sec. 31) and unauthorized disclosure (sec. 32)
If at least 100 persons are harmed, the maximum penalty shall apply (section 35).
12. For public officers (working in government), an accessory penalty consisting in the
disqualification to occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty
imposed shall he applied. (sec. 36)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Information and communications technology plays a vital role in nation-building and
development of the country. In the information age, he who holds information holds power.
From macro-economic perspective, the free flow of information is concededly vital to the growth
of any nation, and key to the success of any business. With the power that follows information,
it is in the interest of the State to govern the parameters by which such power will be held,
while at the same time ensuring the free flow of information to promote innovation and growth.
From the perspective of citizens and individuals, the State also protects their fundamental
human rights to privacy of communication. And with the exponentially increasing availability
of ways and means to access personal data and information, it becomes the duty of the State to
guard against transgressions of the individuals rights.
Republic Act No. 10173, otherwise known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012, is one formidable
piece of legislation. Its application encompasses all walks of business, from the banking and
finance sector, to labor and human resources, schools, and even non-profit organizations. This
is of course not to say that the Data Privacy Act of 2012 finds no application to individuals and
citizens. On the contrary, the units of information supplied by individuals and citizens in the
Philippines comprise the whole, which the Data Privacy Act of 2012 protects. Thus, access to
private and personal information belonging to individuals is covered by its mantle of protection
in the same and unyielding manner as trade secrets held by global conglomerates and
multinationals.
Data Privacy Act of 2012 protects all forms of information that are personal, private or
privileged. It covers all persons, whether natural or juridical, with particular emphasis to
companies or juridical entities involved in the processing of protected information.
It is important to note however, that by its very title, the law only protects information that is
considered private. Information that has been publicly available or accessible before its
enactment continues to the public. The value that the Data Privacy Act of 2012 adds to the
present state of Philippine law is the manner by which private or confidential information is
protected. To be more specific, the passage of this law has, to a great extent, upgraded the
value of data and its protection in the Philippines. To this end, the law specifies and provides
stringent parameters for their access, and imposes grave sanctions, both penal and pecuniary,
for unlawful use or disclosure of information.
As a matter of fact, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 upgraded the pecuniary liability for a violation
of its provisions. Never before has there been pecuniary liability expressly specified in a law, as
high as up to Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Moreover, unlike in the past where negligence
in handling confidential information is not met with penal sanction, the Data Privacy Act
punishes negligence in handling information with great severity. Finally, it is only until its
enactment that a large-scale violation of data privacy was defined. It may be important to state
that law imposes the maximum penal sanction where the personal information of at least one
hundred (100) persons is harmed, affected or involved. To give an idea of how stringent the
current state of data privacy laws in the Philippines are, the pertinent penal provisions of R.A.
No. 10173 are reproduced below:
SEC. 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information.
(a) The unauthorized processing of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who process personal information without the consent of the data subject,
or without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by

(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal information without the
consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.
SEC. 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due to Negligence.
(a) Accessing personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who, due to negligence, provided access to personal information without
being authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by

SEC. 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. (a)
The improper disposal of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging
from six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be
b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment

ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be
SEC. 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information for
Unauthorized Purposes. The processing of personal information for unauthorized purposes
shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more
than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing personal
information for purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise authorized under
this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be penalized
by imprisonment ranging from two (2) years to seven (7) years and a fine of not less than Five
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing sensitive personal information for
purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under
existing laws.
SEC. 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons who knowingly and unlawfully, or violating data confidentiality and security data
systems, breaks in any way into any system where personal and sensitive personal information
is stored.
SEC. 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal Information. The
penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, after having knowledge of a security
breach and of the obligation to notify the Commission pursuant to Section 20(f), intentionally
or by omission conceals the fact of such security breach.
SEC. 31. Malicious Disclosure. Any personal information controller or personal information
processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who, with malice or in bad faith, discloses
unwarranted or false information relative to any personal information or personal sensitive
information obtained by him or her, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year
and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
SEC. 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. (a) Any personal information controller or personal
information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party
personal information not covered by the immediately preceding section without the consent of
the data subject, shall he subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years
and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than
One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its officials,
employees or agents, who discloses to a third party sensitive personal information not covered
by the immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject, shall be subject
to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five
(Php2,000,000.00).
SEC. 33. Combination or Series of Acts. Any combination or series of acts as defined in
Sections 25 to 32 shall make the person subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years
to six (6) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more
than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
SEC. 34. Extent of Liability. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical
person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case may be, who
participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the
offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of its rights under this Act.
If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be
deported without further proceedings after serving the penalties prescribed. If the offender is a
public official or employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts penalized under Sections 27
and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be.
SEC. 35. Large-Scale. The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively provided for
the preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of at least one hundred
(100) persons is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above mentioned actions.
SEC. 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. When the offender or the person responsible
for the offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of the Philippines in the
exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the disqualification to occupy
public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty imposed shall he applied.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
The protection of personal information
(First of two parts)
By Cecille S. Visto
First Published in Business World (1/21/2013)

With the passage of Republic Act 10173, or the Data Privacy Act of 2012, companies may have
to change the way they handle employee data, suppliers information, and even customer
details. The law, which was approved on August 15, 2012, is expected to not only create a new
breed of human resource executives or organizations specifically tasked to handle and protect
employee information, but also to compel the adoption of stringent measures to prevent any
form of data breach.
In large organizations with thousands of employees, numerous suppliers and a wide customer
base, the careful handling of data may be taken for granted, which may result in unauthorized
access, use, misuse, and even disclosure of information. RA 10173 was enacted precisely to
protect the privacy of communication while ensuring free flow of information to promote
innovation and growth. It also seeks to ensure the security and protection of personal
information stored in information and communication systems in the government and in the
private sector.
Section 3 of the law defines personal information as any information from which the identity of
any individual is apparent or can be reasonably and directly ascertained by the entity holding
the information, or when put together with other information, would directly and certainly
identify the individual. The residential address, place of birth, and amount of salary are
examples of personal information. Meanwhile, sensitive personal information refers to personal
information on an individuals marital status, age, religious affiliation, health, education, and
tax returns. It also includes information issued by government agencies peculiar to an
individual such as tax identification and social security numbers, and licenses (or their denial,
suspension or revocation). Information that relates to the positions or functions of an
incumbent or former government officer or employee, and information on government
contractors or service providers on the performance of such services, are excluded. RA 10173
likewise does not apply to information used for journalistic purposes and those necessary to
carry out the official functions of monetary authorities and law enforcement and regulatory
agencies in pursuit of their legal mandate.
Personal information is gathered and collated on a regular basis. Under the law, this
information may be processed (i.e., collected, recorded, organized, stored, updated, used,
consolidated, among others) provided it is done in a transparent manner and for a legitimate
purpose. Suffice it to say that the gathered information must be accurate, adequate, and
relevant for the purpose for which it was collected.
Information can be exchanged and processed in a number of ways.
In a typical corporate setting, an employee furnishes data to the employer during application
and/or during recruitment. The Human Resources Department (HRD) normally encodes the
data in a database, or keeps the hard copies for future reference. The HRD may then access the
data upon the request of certain institutions, such as credit card companies and other
financial institutions, conducting background investigation; or when the company includes the
employee in the group insurance coverage; or to comply with reportorial requirements of
government institutions such as the submission of the alpha list to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) or the updated list of Social Security System members.
A service or utility company also requires its subscribers to provide personal data in the
subscription or service agreement. The submission of lease contracts with supporting valid
government-issued identification cards is also usually required. Credit card applications are
not processed without certificates of employment and copies of the latest withholding tax
returns indicating the annual gross and net taxable compensation.
A supplier whether participating in an open bid or entering into a negotiated contract may
likewise be required to provide information on its business to its prospective customer.
While most companies are careful about divulging information to third parties, there are still
some institutions that have not embraced the culture of confidentiality. Thus, the law puts a
premium on the role of the personal information controller (PIC), the one who is tasked to
implement appropriate measures to protect personal information against any accidental or
unlawful destruction, alteration, or disclosure. The PIC shall also determine the appropriate
level of security to be adopted, depending on the nature of the personal information protected.
More importantly, the PIC is not only responsible for personal information under his or her
custody, but also for information that have been transferred to a third party for processing,
whether domestically or internationally, including business process outsourcing (BPO)
companies. The PIC must comply with the requirements of RA 10173, including notifying the
affected personnel and soon-to-be-formed National Privacy Commission of any unauthorized
data breach that may pose harm to data subjects. Notification of any data breach is required to
allow for any mitigation strategy and even promote trust and transparency within the company.
In light of RA 10173, companies may need to secure the permission of employees, customers,
and suppliers to process data gathered in the course of their relationship. For instance, the
employee must be informed whether personal information on him or her will be, is being, or
has been processed. Before the entry into the processing system, the personal information and
the purpose for which these are processed must be described.
In lieu of securing such permission, any of the following conditions must exist:
The processing is necessary for, or related to, the fulfillment of a contract;
It is required for compliance with a legal obligation of the PIC;
It is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject;
It is required due to a national emergency or to fulfill public authority functions; and
Legitimate interests are served, except when such interests are overridden by fundamental
constitutional rights and freedoms.
Unless it falls under any of these six conditions, processing of personal information may not be
permitted and the burden of proving that any of the conditions exist lies on the PIC.
Latest jurisprudence on the right to privacy
In a July 24, 2012 decision, promulgated before the passage of RA 10173, the Supreme Court
reiterated its ruling in the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc that compelling state interest may
yield to the right of privacy. However, the SC declined to specifically rule on whether the
sharing of information during intelligence gathering is illegal pending the enactment of a data
protection law. It nonetheless cautioned investigating entities to observe strict confidentiality in
information sharing.
The Supreme Court also discussed the writ of habeas data, which is a remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. The
writ, the Supreme Court said, is available to any person whose right to privacy is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data information on the
aggrieved party.
With the Data Privacy Act, aggrieved parties are given the option to seek relief not directly from
the courts but from the National Privacy Commission, which can issue a temporary or
permanent ban on the processing of personal information and compel any entity to abide by its
orders.
Next week, we will discuss the implementation of RA 10173 and how companies can comply
with the provisions of the new law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos

Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division,
PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review
of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned
Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa
Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential
report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against
Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and
classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zearosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following
items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of
PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their
activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and
captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which
classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists
the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first
entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang
on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on
the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups
validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members
apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP
data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been
vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is
largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued communicating
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao
stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs
because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement
through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also
clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and
sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective
of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on
April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups,
the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte
gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed
that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her
supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and
police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to
her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports
against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13,
which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit
all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as
basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from
forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the
court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with
supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two
criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and
frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in
authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as
NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply
with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the
manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and
how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and
recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the
files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list
of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of
her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold
misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As
she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of
the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further
malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed

that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No.
275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private
armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list.
Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the
ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to
the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court
also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information
on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to
disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as
either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to
link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission
to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an
agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa
failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty
or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on
the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents
were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the
mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her
must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present
sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of

habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to
privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that
seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the
right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as
a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus

resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this
view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is
to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for

five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of
privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded

recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases
supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the
right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for
any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws
like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize
the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be

protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is
not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons
affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy
should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a
valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to

protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and

jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our
own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European
tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection
of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of
particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of
citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state
to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish
citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval
Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He was
refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which
was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was
prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security
control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the
right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his
classification in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating
to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity
to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private
life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following
grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion
in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The
following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing
social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
(see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22,
55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate
aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the
instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security
must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants
right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national
security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic
authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public
information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate

interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to
public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from
those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a
private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available
to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case,
and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the
Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person
concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively
applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph
31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards
contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of
paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation
available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present
case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component

of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar
fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being
an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of
the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the
state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides
for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with
the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275
likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP,
and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance
of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b)
maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and
(c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers
and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter
collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them
and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner
Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to
the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs
with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of
these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate,
and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1wphi1
Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure
that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in
place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make
any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific
stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of
investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue
encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities
empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature.1wphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any
event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to
her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and
her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted
against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As
public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to
a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag
City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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DATA PRIVACY ACT 2012

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Second Regular Session

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10173]

AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFORMATION AND

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

(c) Data subject refers to an individual whose personal information is processed.

(d) Direct marketing refers to communication by whatever means of any advertising or

(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept classified.

This Act does not apply to the following:

(g) Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign jurisdictions in

(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;

(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and

THE NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION

(b) Receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable settlement of complaints

(e) Monitor the compliance of other government agencies or instrumentalities on their

(m) Propose legislation, amendments or modifications to Philippine laws on privacy or data

SEC. 9. Organizational Structure of the Commission. The Commission shall be attached to

PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Personal information must, be:

(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;

The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal information

(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;

SEC. 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. A personal information controller may

SEC. 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. Personal information controllers may

RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT

(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the system;

(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;

(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;

(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:

(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;

(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;

(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;

(4) Manner by which such data were processed;

(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;

SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

(2) A security policy with respect to the processing of personal information;

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

SECURITY OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL

SEC. 23. Requirements Relating to Access by Agency Personnel to Sensitive Personal

SEC. 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal

(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by

(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by

b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by

1. It applies to processing of personal information (section 3g) and sensitive personal

(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by

(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by

b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment

(First of two parts)

First Published in Business World (1/21/2013)

The processing is necessary for, or related to, the fulfillment of a contract;

It is required for compliance with a legal obligation of the PIC;

It is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject;

It is required due to a national emergency or to fulfill public authority functions; and

Latest jurisprudence on the right to privacy

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed

xxx xxx xxx

3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;