Canon 16

CANON 16
Case No. 1
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
This refers to the Resolution of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang
(respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the
payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order, the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from
receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of
her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order setting the
case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11,
2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner indicated that the said documents would be
reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 oclock in the
morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondents Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent
[defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and
P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011
until fully paid, plus cost of suit.
Complainants Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her
legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services
for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid
respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the
legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a
loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having
trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount
of P150,000.00, as filing fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the
high value of the land and the sheriffs travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the
service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent
was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When
asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle
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complainants case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial
court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not
attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of
contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency. Complainant
obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant
expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00
which was covered by a receipt, stating that it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00
shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010,
respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing
of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant
handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally
checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was
not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to
prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to
include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents
unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using
false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a
message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon
reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On
the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondents directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was
also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.
Respondents Position
In his Answer, respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to
1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainants
case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting
as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee
and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his
patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as no loan
and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he
received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the
complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of
the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their
hotel accommodations. Complainants husband approved of the amount. In the same vein,
respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge
who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was
bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he
would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.
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Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in
the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that
another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the
nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply, complainant mainly countered respondents defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in
the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations
long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was
never considered as no loan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding
probable cause against respondent for estafa.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to
return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting
to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion
for reconsideration. Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an
information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a
corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondents motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year
to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
respect to respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the
conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court
also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers conduct is not confined to
the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that
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the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be
incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when
in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected
to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his
client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of
all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should
be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts
from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the
excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, the client. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
representation expenses allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange
for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the
amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the
amount at the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to
gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of
demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his clients trust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This
is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public
service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would
damage the image of judges, lest the publics perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was
given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said
amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondents actuations would
seriously erode the publics trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of
the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent
was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that
he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that [a] lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client. In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00
for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00
or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency but was only given P22,000.00 by
complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the
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authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but
were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in
him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it
implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Respondents assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the
liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as no loan, does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.
Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not
confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice
of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of
misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondents lawyering for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are
at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation
of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written
consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra
Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the
fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very
document being questioned in complainants case. While the Investigating Commissioner found
that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract,
and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the
Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot
brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the
complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who
notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short
of prudence in action when he accepted complainants case, knowing fully that he was involved
in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the
participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles
of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his
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client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the
entire profession suffers.
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient
punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant
in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to
return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each
other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative
cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
would suffice to hold one administratively liable. Furthermore, the Court has to consider the
prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a
rule, imprescriptible.
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately
related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondents
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable
for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against
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him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession. The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of
P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 2
A.C. No. 5044 December 2, 2013
FELIPE C. DAGALA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY. AMADO T.
ADQUILEN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Felipe C. Dagala
(complainant) against respondents Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (atty. Quesada) and Atty. Amado T.
Adquilen (Atty. Adquilen), charging them for gross negligence in handling his labor complaints.
The facts
On November 8, 1994 complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando City, La Union
(NLRC-RAB) Complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and
attorneys fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol), and owner and General
Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as well as its Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De Jesus, docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11123-94. The said case was, however, dismissed without prejudice,
through an Order dated December 13, 1994 (December 13, 1994 Order), for failure of
complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory conference
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hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a
former Labor Arbiter (LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case, re-docketed as NLRC Case
No. RAB-I-10-1091-95 (LU).
Similarly, the case was dismissed without prejudice on June 28, 1996, this time due to the
parties' failure to submit their respective position papers.
Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time on August 27, 1996, docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-I-08-1191-96 (LU).
During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly offered the amount of P74,000.00
as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the latters position
paper.
Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint "for lack
of interest and failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order dated February 27, 1997 (February 27,
1997 Order). Atty. Adquilen and complainant received notice of the said order on March 11, 1997
and March 24, 1997, respectively. On July 11, 1997, complainant this time assisted by Atty.
Imelda L. Picar (Atty. Picar) filed a motion for reconsideration from the February 27, 1997 Order,
which was treated as an appeal and transmitted to the NLRC-National Capital Region (NLRC-
NCR).
However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution dated June 17, 1998 for having been
filed out of time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters dated November 18, 1998 to respondents,
informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them
before the Court. Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of settlement,
respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picars office. Only Atty. Quesada
responded to the said letter and subsequently, through a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 5, 1998 (December 5, 1998 MoA), undertook to compensate the damages sustained
by complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an administrative complaint against him. Atty.
Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus prompting complainant to proceed with the
present complaint.
In a Resolution dated June 21, 1999, the Court directed respondents to comment on the
Complaint within ten (10) days from notice. However, despite notices and the extension granted,
Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause resolutions.
Accordingly, a fine in the amount of P500.00 was imposed against him, which he duly paid on
September 19, 2005. On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his Comment, admitted having
accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He, however, explained that he was
unable to file the required position paper due to complainant's failure to furnish him with the
employment records and other relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed
of the dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the case with the
assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La Union Province. Anent the December 5, 1998
MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was merely prevailed upon to sign the same for fear of losing
his means of livelihood and license to practice law, and that he had no intention of reneging on
his promise to pay. Nonetheless, despite earnest efforts, he still failed to come up with the
agreed-upon amount.
In a Resolution dated March 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation or
decision.
The Proceedings Before the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) set the case for mandatory conference on
August 25, 2006 and required the parties to submit their respective briefs.
Complainant was duly represented by his counsel at the hearing, while respondents filed
separate motions to reset, only to subsequently waive their respective appearances. Atty.
Adquilen attributed the waiver to his medical condition; on the other hand, in a complete
turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant.
On March 25, 2009, Investigating IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued a Report and
Recommendation, finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling complainant's
case in violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). As
such, he recommended that each of them be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was directed to comply with his undertaking under the
December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of P68,000.00, with legal interest from January 20,
1999 until fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay the amount of P6,000.00,
representing the difference between the P74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and the
above-stated settlement amount, with legal interest from date of notice of the order of dismissal
on March 25, 1997 until fully paid. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the afore-
stated report and recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-262 dated November 19, 2011
(November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
8
record and the applicable laws and rules. Consequently, it directed respondents to pay
complainant the total amount of P74,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice.
In a Resolution dated September 12, 2012, the Court noted the Notic of the IBPs November 19,
2011 Resolution, and thereafter sent notices to the parties as well as the IBP-CBD, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Public Information Office. However, the notice sent to Atty. Adquilen
was returned unserved with the notation "Return to Sender, Deceased."
Thus, in the Resolutions dated February 20, 2013 and June 10, 2013, the IBP was required to
furnish the Court with the death certificate of Atty. Adquilen.
On August 30, 2013, the IBP filed its compliance, attaching therewith the Certificate of Death of
Atty. Adquilen which indicates that the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to cardiac
arrhythmia. In view of Atty. Adquilen's death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, the Court,
bearing in mind the punitive nature of administrative liabilities, hereby dismisses the case
against him. Hence, what is left for resolution is the complaint against Atty. Quesada.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively
liable for gross negligence in handling complainants labor case.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent Atty. Quesadas administrative
liability, but deems it proper to delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of
P74,000.00. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect
that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree
of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts.
These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which respectively read as follows:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x
x CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. x x x x
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and
Canons. Primarily, Atty, Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling
complainants case by his failure to justify his absence on the two (2) mandatory conference
hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 despite due notice, which thus resulted in its
dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with
competence and diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and
file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urge their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Atty. Quesadas failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and
without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing
his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Moreover, Atty.
Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD when he
denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant, and
claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer, despite his previous admission
before the Court of having accepted complainant's case. To add a perusal of the complaint dated
November 8, 1994 in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 reveals that Atty. Quesada signed the
same as counsel for complainant.
While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial
proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.
Besides, Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that complainant's corresponding failure to
appear during the mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 was upon
his counsels advice.
Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty. Quesada had indulged in
deliberate falsehood, contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code.
9
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.
In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year for inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of complainants appeal and for
misrepresentations committed before the CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. In the cases of Cheng v. Atty. Agravante and
Perea v. Atty. Almadro, respondent-lawyers were similarly punished for their negligence in the
discharge of their duties to their client and for misrepresentation committed before the Court, in
violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Hence, consistent with
existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly
suspends Atty. Quesada for a period of one (1) year. The Court must, however, clarify that the
foregoing resolution should not include a directive to return the amount of P74,000.00 as ordered
by the IBP in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the settlement initially offered
by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount partakes the nature of a
purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary
proceeding such as this case. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court recently illumined that
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the
respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only
concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the parties which are purely civil in nature,
should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrative-
disciplinary proceedings, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repitition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
On the other hand, the admnistrative complaint respondent Atty. Amado Adquilen is hereby
DIMISSED in view of his supervening death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
10
Case No. 3
A.C. No. 7965 November 13, 2013
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.
For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya

(complainant) against Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin (respondent), the antecedents of which are
detailed as follows:
The Facts
On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into a retainership agreement (retainer) whereby
respondent undertook to, inter alia process the registration and eventually deliver, within a
period of six (6 ) months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in
favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. In
connection therewith, respondent received from complainant the amounts of P15,000.00 and
P39,000.00 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively.
Notwithstanding the expenditure of the P39,000.00 given for registration expenses (subject
amount) and the lapse of more than three (3) years from the retainers date, complainant alleged
that respondent, without proper explanation, failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the
subject land and deliver to complainant the certificate of title over the same. As complainant was
tired of respondents excuses, she finally decided to just withdraw the subject amount from
respondent. For such purpose, she confronted the latter at his office and also subsequently sent
him two (2) demand letters, but all to no avail. Hence, complainant was prompted to file the
instant administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent admitted that he indeed received the subject amount from
complainant but averred that after receiving the same, the latters brother, Erlindo, asked to be
reimbursed the amount of P7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land surveyor.
Respondent likewise alleged that he later found out that he could not perform his undertaking
under the retainer because the ownership of the subject land was still under litigation. Finally,
respondent stated that he wanted to return the balance of the subject amount to complainant
after deducting what Erlindo took from him, but was only prevented to do so because he was
maligned by complainant when she went to his office and there, shouted and called him names
in the presence of his staff.
In the Courts Resolutions dated December 17, 2008 and March 2, 2009, the case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After
both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference, IBP Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Salvador B. Hababag (Investigating Commissioner) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Complainant filed her position paper on October 8, 2009, while
respondent failed to do so.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On November 6, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation,
finding respondent to have violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) for his failure to properly account for the money entrusted to him without
any adequate explanation why he could not return the same. The Investigating Commissioner
found that respondents acts demonstrated his "lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client,
who entrusted him with money and documents for the registration of the subject land." The
Investigating Commissioner likewise held that respondents failure to return the subject amount,
despite being given "adequate time to return" the same, "not to mention the repeated x x x
demands made upon him," constitutes "gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even
misappropriation of money" in violation of the above-stated rules. In view of the foregoing, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation with modification, ordering the return
of the amount of P31,500.00, with legal interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, to complainant.
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent respondents administrative
liability but deems it proper to: (a) extend the recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year; and (b) delete the recommended order for
the return of the amount of P31,500.00.
11
Anent respondents administrative liability, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents
failure to properly account for and duly return his clients money despite due demand is
tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively
read as follows:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant
to cover for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his
clients act of confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. With the
fact of receipt being established, it was then respondents obligation to return the money
entrusted to him by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that complainants purported act
of "maligning" respondent does not justify the latters failure to properly account for and return
his clients money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyers duty to his client is one essentially
imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable
efforts towards its faithful compliance. In this case, despite that singular encounter, respondent
had thereafter all the opportunity to return the subject amount but still failed to do so. Besides,
the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional
frustrations of the lawyers client, especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the
lawyers work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal with his client with professional maturity and commit
himself towards the objective fulfillment of his responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the
correct course of action is for the lawyer to properly account for his affairs as well as to ensure
the smooth turn-over of the case to another lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien exception
under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer should not withhold the property of his
client. Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such exception or any other justifiable reason
therefor, respondent still failed to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the Code which perforce warrants his administrative liability.
The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the IBPs recommended period of suspension
from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to
exercise due diligence in handling his clients cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03
- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court observes that respondent did not only
accomplish his undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate
explanation for such non-performance despite the protracted length of time given for him to do
so. As such omissions equally showcase respondents non-compliance with the standard of
proficiency required of a lawyer as embodied in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt to
extend the period of his suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year
similar to the penalty imposed in the case of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive
for the return of the amount of P31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. The
same amount was given by complainant to respondent to cover for registration expenses; hence,
its return partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an
administrative-disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court recently held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the
parties involved which are purely civil in nature meaning, those liabilities which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement as the same should be threshed out in a
proper proceeding of such nature." This pronouncement the Court applies to this case and thus,
renders a disposition solely on respondents administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
12
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 4
A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., Respondent.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant Eduardo
A. Maglente (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent
Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return the amount
of P48,000.00 that he received from the former.
The Facts
Complainant, as President of Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated
(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in
order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan. In
connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to
cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment
executed by respondent himself. Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in
court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to
fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but
respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more money. Complainant
further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent
told him to shut up because it was not his money in the first place. Hence, complainant filed this
administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.
In his defense, respondent denied spending complainants money, explaining that he had already
prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This
prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise the
amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him.
In a Report and Recommendation dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a
warning that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to
account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly received the amount of
P48,000.00 from complainant, which was intended to answer for the filing fees of a case he was
supposed to file for the Samahan, but which he failed to do so. In this relation, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that had respondent prepared the complaint and performed research
works, as he claimed, then he could have kept a reasonable amount for his effort under the
doctrine of quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he could not present any proof in this respect.
In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty
from Censure to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. Aggrieved,
13
respondent moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated May 3,
2014.
liable for the acts complained of.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP, except as
to the penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and
devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyers neglect of
a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to
answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not
enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands,
viz.:
client.
xxxx
demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client. A lawyers failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in
this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment, and
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondents administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at
the same time, failed to return the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking
14
under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the
latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino, the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to
render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of
P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyers administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Since the aforesaid amount
was intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount

of P48,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 5
A.C. No. 10438 September 23, 2014
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, vs. NICOLAS C. TORRES,
Respondent.
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint dated October 30, 2008 filed by complainant CF Sharp
Crew Management Incorporated (complainant) against respondent Nicolas C. Torres
(respondent), charging him with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in
overseas maritime employment. It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by
profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal
counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases and medical related
claims instituted by seafarers against complainants various principals. Among the cases
respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of seafarers
Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and
Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondents request, complainant issued
checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00, and P296,808.40
as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua. However,
complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to
Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at
International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.
With respect to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts of
P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
P652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order requiring respondent
to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did respondent appear in the mandatory
conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he file his position paper.
In a Report and Recommendation dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and accordingly recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
15
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was issued
checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua on the
pretense that the requested amounts represented what was lawfully due them. However, instead
of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he deposited the same at the International
Exchange Bank, Banawe,Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1, except for the
check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado.
Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open Investigation)
on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an answer because
complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-bailable criminal cases against
him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell and, thus, his inability to comply with the
IBPs directives.
On the merits of the complaint, respondent maintained that the seafarers claims had long been
settled and that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were already in actual
custody and possession of the complainant. He further contended that he only signed the dorsal
portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their genuineness and that he could not have
encashed them as they were all payable to a particular payee. Lastly, respondent claimed that
when he resigned in August 2008, complainant forced him to sign promissory notes to reimburse
certain amounts which had not been accounted for by the latter in exchange for his clearance
documents. But before he was able to settle the promissory notes, he was already arrested in
connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against him.
In a Resolution dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification, increasing the
recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering
respondent to return the full amount of money he received from complainant which is legally due
to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 22, 2013 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution dated March 8, 2014.
liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its report
and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. This is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the CPR, which read:
client.
demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had duly
proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed respondents
modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for the purpose of
settling seafarers claims against the complainants various principals, only to have such checks
(except for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an
unauthorized bank account, particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City
Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that "when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client." This,
respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondents acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his clients interests which he is
duty-bound to protect. They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct."
Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession;
it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
16
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty
recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
misappropriated their clients money, the Court imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of
disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, the Court disbarred
the lawyer for misappropriating his clients money intended for securing a certificate of title on
the latters behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v. Reyes, the same penalty was imposed upon the
lawyer who misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her clients deceased husband.
As already discussed, respondent's conduct of misappropriating complainant's money has made
him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts. As a member of the Bar, he
is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Court to withdraw the same, as in this case. In view of the foregoing, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP's recommendation regarding the return of the
settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among others, that it was
not specifically prayed for in the latter's administrative complaint and that the civil liability of
respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing cases involving the same parties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of
attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 6
A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants, v.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA,
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint filed by complainants
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with
gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their
cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a
17
pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.
Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture,
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he
promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda,
who, believing that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the
aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks in
respondents name:
Check No. Date Amount Payee

0000561925 03-23-06 P750,000.00 Elmer dela
Rosa
0000561926 03-23-06 P850,000.00 Elmer dela
Rosa
0000561927 03-23-06 P900,000.00 Elmer dela
Rosa
Total: P2,500,000.00
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of
the checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checks and that he
agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days. In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by
respondent.
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent
merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008, Blesilda sent a demand letter to
respondent, which the latter did not heed. On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their new
counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter to respondent. In his
Reply, the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, respondent
claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor.
Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants letter-complaint
charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from
borrowing money from clients unless the latters interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice.
In his Comment, respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that
Nault was the real debtor. He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect
from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
In their letter-reply, complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone,
as evidenced by the checks issued in the latters name. They categorically denied knowing
Nault and pointed out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the
amount of P2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a
copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint which Nault filed as third-party defendant in a
related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent. In said pleading,
Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged that it was respondent who incurred
the subject loan from them.
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883. In
the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory
conferences. Hence, the same were terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. Respondent, however, did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the
CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the clients
18
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in
trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondents name
and that he personally received and encashed them. Annex E of the Verified Complaint shows
that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to
return the P2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.
On the other hand, respondents claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be
implausible. The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not
the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants demand letter;
however, he did not. He also observed that the acknowledgment Nault allegedly signed
appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself. Finally, the Investigating Commissioner
cited Naults Answer to the Third Party Complaint which categorically states that he does not
even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the loan from
them.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondents actions degraded the
integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR.
Respondents failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect
to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated
interest.
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the
applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioners Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013, 38 but reduced the
penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered
the return of the P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated
interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however,

denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-294 dated May 3, 2014.
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBPs findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondents receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by

substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.
Also, Annex E of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the
checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five percent
(5%) per month within five (5) days. The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that
respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued. With respondents
direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any
credible indication to the contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeed the
one who borrowed the amount of P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed
to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondents theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Naults acknowledgment of his debt to the
complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the
complainants and incurring the same obligation.
19
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a
P2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the
other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondents receipt of the
checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the P2,500,000.00 plus
interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants, allowing the former to
wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in
such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the clients interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this trust and
confidence is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client
is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias) the Court categorically
declared that a lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is
unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very
unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of clients confidence. The
canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on her obligation. (Emphasis supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their
trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the formers word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and
reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly,
there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns to the proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the
IBPs return directive.
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after
borrowing P900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and
representing conflicting interests. Considering the greater amount involved in this case and
20
respondents continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBPs recommendation to suspend him
indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBPs Resolution insofar as it orders
respondent to return to complainants the amount of P2,500,000.00 and the legal interest
thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. In such
cases, the Courts only concern is the determination of respondents administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate,
distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent
received the P2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration of his
professional services. Hence, the IBPs recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies
beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of
this Decision, with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon receipt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
21
Case No. 7
A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct filed with this Court on
September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester
Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... P146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Ninety One Pesos &
64/100 (Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof. All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already
collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount
in the following manner:
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose
021051200 7802 P20,000.0 Attorney's fees

4 0
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
021261200 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

4

4

4

4
Total Amount: P95,000.0

0
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of
P95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa,
22
Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the
barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment, respondent admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant
agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the total monetary award, on
top of the attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses
respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of P189,491.60, the sum of
P17,226.57 representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance of
P172,275.13. Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and
the balance of P72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25% attorney's
fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after
receiving the amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of P20,000.00
attorney's fees, P17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what
was left to respondent was only P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below
the promised 25% attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of P72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than
what he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses
Lopez the sum of P93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to
complainant, the latter will get a total amount of P110,491.60. This amount, according to
respondent, exceeds the amount of P100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued his Report and Recommendation with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the
penalty of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the
amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees. On
October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139, which
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending
respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the modification that respondent
should restitute the sum of P85,500.00 to the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his
failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional
engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."
Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004
received payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to three months he
had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor
rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and
being implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given
respondent the total amount of P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted
to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said
amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant
brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure
and inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the
money after demand raises the presumption that he converted it to his own use. His unjustified
withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment.
He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez
to his additional 25% attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the
case, in the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of
P95,000.00 the amounts of P20,000.00, P17,000.00, and P2,000.00, what was left to respondent,
to his dismay was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his
self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent's claim
that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed
to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly
incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer's
23
agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any
event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not
exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the
course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel
and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property
and money he has collected for his client." "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's
fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to
make a prompt accounting." Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his
client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees."
In sum, "respondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action."
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer
to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from
the practice of law for two years." Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending
the imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is
already a nonagenarian, the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds
that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for one (1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution,
the net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this
Resolution until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty.
Sanicas' record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 8
A.C. No. 6246
[Formerly CBD No. 00-730]
MARITES E. FREEMAN, Complainant,- versus ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES, Respondent.
November 15, 2011
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman,

seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining
money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the
insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts
she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with
prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.
In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged
that her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October 18, 1998.
She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and
funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent
who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits
and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go
to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all
expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the amount of P50,000.00. As
acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket
to London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check Voucher, issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on
the right margin thereof, the notations in the amount of P50,000.00 and the date 12-5-98 were
written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent the
amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt
bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18,
1998, she went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the
additional amount of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary Receipt bearing said date,
issued by respondents law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa
applications, respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at
banned ka sa Embassy. (It is difficult to railroad the process of securing visa, because you are
24
blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that
to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or grease money to
bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that the ban was
lifted, but the visas would be issued on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to
issue resident visas instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that to expedite the release of
the resident visas, she should again give P20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as
grease money to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After several weeks, respondent told her
that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and that another amount of P18,000.00 was
needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per
Temporary Receipt, dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the former's flight to London,
and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary Receipt dated May 13, 1999, to cover the
expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were issued by respondents law firm.
Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead,
she received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the
deceased. She later learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it.
Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the insurance claims, and
warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's
insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a letter dated March 9, 1999 from one
Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the arrangements
for the funeral and that her late husband was covered by three insurance policies, to wit:
Nationwide Building Society (Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company
(British National Life Policy No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No.
2779512). Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations with the insurance
companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds
soon.
According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA), dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to
follow-up the insurance claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was
not notarized, but another SPA, dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second
SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came across a similar copy of the
SPA, dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally
bearing the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent,
respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the
insurance companies in London.
Complainant discovered that in an undated letter, addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish
Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her husband left no
will and that she had no verified information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the
existence of any property in London that would be subjected to Grant of Representation. Said
letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for probate in the amount of 5231.35
and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added therein that As to the matter of the
installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the
remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with
business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central District, Quezon City, Philippines under the
account name: Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice.
Subsequently, in a letter dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln
Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized
Representative [of the complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999],
replied that she had appended the documents required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth
certificate), in her previous letter, dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that
pursuant to an SPA executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should
be forwarded to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled to
death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount due and the requirements to be complied
with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left no will), she
enclosed an alternative document [referring to the Extrajudicial Settlement dated June 1, 1999,
notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their
sole child (Frank Lawrence Freeman). In the same letter, respondent reiterated that complainant
requests that any amount of monies due or benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account
No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under
Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice.
Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to
return her passport and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of
25
the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with
the Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but she
purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On the supposed
rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech
Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who
assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made her sign an
application for visa and demanded the amount of P3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one
Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask respondent
to return the total amount of P200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998,
complainant, accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina
Bauzon and another woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding
the inheritance of her deceased husband, a British national. She told complainant to submit proof
of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their son, and other documents to support
her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before she accepted the case, she
explained to complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of
P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount of P50,000.00 on a
contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid her the
said amounts. With an SPA, dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA],
having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance
companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received communications from said
insurance companies, she stated that complainant offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her
plane ticket and the hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She
left for London in May 1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status
of her claims.
As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked
her why she had not left for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy
had duped her. She explained to complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who
would handle the visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that when
complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a travel
consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous visa
applications had been denied four times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter,
complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the travel consultant, who charged her
a professional fee of P50,000.00. She added that she had no participation in the foregoing
transactions, other than referring complainant to the said travel consultant.
With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the
existence of the same, and declared that the SPA, dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on
April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for communications with the insurance companies in
London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily representations, was able to
obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary, and never returned the same,
despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she
then had no immediate need of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately report
about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so as to attend to the financial
obligations brought about by her mother's lingering ailment and consequent death. Despite
repeated requests, complainant failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law firm was
prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through
complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively
pursuing her claims. Between January to February 2000, she sent complainant a billing
statement which indicated the expenses incurred by the law firm, as of July 1999; however,
instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade payment of
her obligations.
On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate
Resolution with Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing
the letter dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and
volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was agreed upon
between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses
to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent
fee out of the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a
travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from abroad, respondent never
informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in London that remittances
26
would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason
why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not
solely for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she
gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she
merely made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00;
that with the use of an SPA [referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her
forged signature, the amount of 10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63], or approximately equivalent to
P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never
turned over to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never
executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but
that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court
proceedings.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the
Revised Penal Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent),
for allegedly barging into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-
off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for the refrigerator, air
conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in an estimated
amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution, dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The
case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure of respondent to appear
during the preliminary investigation of the case.
Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the
information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for
insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information. Consequently, in the Order dated November 27, 2002, the trial court
granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case.
In the Report and Recommendation dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her
dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the approximate amount of
P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that
through deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance
policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under
the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts she received from the
London insurance companies.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166, adopted
and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that
respondent be disbarred.
The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had
sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having
appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself,
as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
it does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the
27
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the
respondent's administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as
moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the
subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be
filed in the regular courts.
In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to
assist her in securing visa applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased
husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to represent
the complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA, dated November 6, 1998, which was not notarized,
showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent her and her son, in order to
protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the
possibility of any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in
the Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA, dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April
30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, in addition to the foregoing
representations, authorized respondent to appear and represent the complainant, in connection
with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks arising
from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the
successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA, also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April
30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the
signatures of two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same
stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of
the records of the case, were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their
genuineness and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her
behalf with regard to the insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as
lawyer, that she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence
to establish a lawyer-client relationship.
Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent
the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the
benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of a client when due or upon demand.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client. In the present case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts
issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably
showed that she received the total amount of P167,000.00 from the complainant, in connection
with the handling of the latter's case. Respondent admitted having received money from the
complainant, but claimed that the total amount of P120,000.00 she received was in accordance
with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accounting or, at
least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the
discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an
agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a formal contract
of legal services.
Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose
of assisting her in claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom
Entry Clearance, dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in
traveling to London was to attend the International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It
is appalling that respondent had the gall to take advantage of the benevolence of the
complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she
needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse,
respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the
nefarious culture of giving grease money or lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00, to the
British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conducting
official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the
dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a
28
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank
account, as shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for the
years 2000-2001), respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a
satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting, on the proceeds of the
insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis--vis the correspondence by
the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following amounts
to the respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter dated November 23, 2000, from one
Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln Financial Group,
addressed to complainant, stating, among others, that An amount of 10,489.57 was paid out
under the Power of Attorney on 27th September 2000), and per letter, dated April 28, 2000, from
one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company
Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating,
among others, that I can confirm that a death claim was made on the policy on 13 October 1999
when an amount of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal
representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City, Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that
the amounts of 10,489.57 and 471.06 were remitted to respondent through other means of
international transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no direct
remittance from the insurance companies in London could be traced to the personal bank
account of respondent, per monthly transaction report, covering January to December for the
years 2000-2001.
A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according
to the facts and the law applicable to each case. Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule
133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal of
a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for
administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely
substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her
was already dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently,
even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the
trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution
failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed.
More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal of the criminal
case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information
and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
In Velez v. De Vera, the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of
the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted
to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach
of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. In Manzano v. Soriano,
therein respondent, found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to
his client) and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn
over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and, to conceal the misdeed,
executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary
public. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross
misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's insurance claim, falsified the check
and made it payable to himself, encashed the same, and appropriated the proceeds.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are
simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public
29
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of
employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking
complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that
should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services,
clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being
so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and
DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This
Decision is immediately executory.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the
personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the
insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and
Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is
approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of
the subject transaction.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 9
A.C. No. 4808 (November 22, 2011)
TERESITA T. BAYONLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PURITA A.
REYES, Respondent.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.- Code of Professional Responsibility.
This canon of professional responsibility is at the center of this administrative complaint for
disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita
A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her client.
Antecedents
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of land situated in
Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter
expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation
compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle,
Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs
granddaughter and son.
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and
breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and Alfredo had engaged the
legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City, agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of
whatever amount would be collected; that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1
million from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be
P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the
balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had
collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty.
Reyes attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00,
and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for
depriving her of her just share.
In her comment dated February 10, 1998, Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had
engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in the expropriation
compensation; that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a
40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her;
that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to the
share of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second
release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by the ATO only her
40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear the expenses for the collection
of their share; that she had incurred travel and other expenses in collecting such share; and that
she should be absolved from liability arising from the complaint.
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner Navarro) rendered a
report, whereby she found and recommended against Atty. Reyes as follows:
30
In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned, the issue hinges only on the complainants
position; one of the heirs of Paz Durban whose legal services of the respondent was not revoked.
The parties were required to submit documents relative to their respective defenses (sic)
specially the actual amounts released by ATO, actual amount due to the complainant as her
share, the remittances made by the respondent to the complainant of her share and receipts to
prove the same.
Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the necessary documents required
of them and attached only a xerox copy of the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya for the
heir of Pedro Durban which had already been previously attached to the records of this case.
In the said computation it appears that for the release on February 17, 1993, the heirs of Durban
received P84,852.00 and for the second release each of them as well as the complainant was
entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that complainant was supposed to received
(sic) P205,971.11 as her share.
Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by evidence instead of ( sic)
complainants allegation of ten [10%] percent; then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as
attorneys fees; leaving a balance of P123,582.66 due to the complainant.
Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was alleged by the complainant is
untenable for she did not submit evidence to prove the same, therefore, as it is complainants
allegation that she received only P79,000.00 for her share as a whole shall be considered for the
moment until such time that proofs to the contrary shall have been submitted.
Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the amount due her which was
P123,582.66 and actually received only P79,000.00; then respondent still has to remit to
complainant the amount of P44,582.66.
From the records of this case respondent alleged that she only collected the 40% attorneys fees
for the second release whereby Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban received the check
from ATO and got a large part of the same. Respondent did not mention how much she got as
attorneys fees against complainants share but on the whole amounting to P496,895.00 which is
unfair to the complainant.
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein should have been advised by the
respondent and given a breakdown of whatever amount was received or came to her knowledge
as complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing, respondent violated Rule 16.01 Canon 16
Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
client.
Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or misgivings (sic) she had done for
her client but she unfortunately failed to do so and did not comply with the Order dated October
29, 1998.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the
respondent be required to render an accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant
of all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount of
P44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended from
the practice of her legal profession.
Respectfully submitted.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner
Navarro through Resolution No. XIII-99-165.
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of Governors
denied her motion for reconsideration through Resolution No. XIV-99-117.
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its Resolution No. XV-2001-
111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reinvestigation
for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the matter had already been endorsed to the Court.
On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report on whether Atty. Reyes
had already accounted for and remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.
On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that per the manifestation
of Bayonlas counsel Atty. Reyes had not yet rendered an accounting and had not yet remitted the
amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.
Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court, Atty. Reyes posed some
queries, as follows: (a) whether she could be compelled to pay the amount of P44,582.66 to
Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on perjured statements; (b) whether the
payment of the amount would operate to dismiss the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she
could deposit the amount of P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.
Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors did not accord to
her the right to confront Bayonla during the investigation conducted by the IBP Board of
31
Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had induced Bayonla to file the estafa charge against her; and
that this had prompted her to initiate a disbarment complaint against Bayonlas counsel.
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of this
case. The recommendation was noted by the Court on June 29, 2010.
Issue
Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were supported by the records, but
we modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty. Reyes.
I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of her client that may come into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or
the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her client is
highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is no
question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the
latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is
obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client.
This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the
lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out
of the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total share
from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as
attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla was
P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00, which was short by
P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of
Governors for her to remit the shortage, Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated
canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money
held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money
belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. Without
doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was
deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust
Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC Resolution dated
February 13, 1992.)
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle to administrative proceeding against
respondent
The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by
Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of Atty. Reyes to render an
accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit
this administrative matter from proceeding on its due course. It is indisputable that the pendency
of any criminal charges between the lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative
32
proceedings against the lawyer. We explained why in Suzuki v. Tiamson, to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa. In this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re
Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondents
administrative liability and our findings herein should not in any way be treated as
having any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may choose
to file against each other. [emphasis supplied]
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza that
xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability
in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent
will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither
will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an administrative case and a
judicial proceeding related to the cause of the administrative case, even if the charges and the
evidence to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness,
or prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the cases. [
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because the IBP Board of
Governors did not permit her to personally confront the complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full due process, for she in
fact participated in all stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law until she has
had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against her, to produce
witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself or counsel. Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence,
however, the IBP Board of Governors was under no legal obligation to conduct a trial-type
proceeding at which she could have personally confronted Bayonla. In other words, the lack of
such proceeding neither diminished her right to due process nor deprived her of the right. A
formal investigation entailing notice and hearing is required in administrative proceedings for
disbarment, but the imperative need of notice and hearing does not always mean the holding of
an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due process is still satisfied when the parties are afforded
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their respective
sides. As the Court said in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the Board of
Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other
motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the
CSC by way of appeal.
33
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a
party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. [bold
emphasis supplied]
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal investigation of the
complaint against Atty. Reyes upon the directive of the Court. In her formal investigation of the
complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed both parties to submit their respective proofs on the
actual amounts released by the ATO, the amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty. Reyes
corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts
showing such remittances. In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written answer, attaching to
the answer the documents supporting her defenses. Commissioner Navarro took all of Atty.
Reyes submissions into good and proper account, as borne out by her report. And even after the
IBP Board of Governors had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its recommendation),
Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the adverse findings by filing her
motion for reconsideration, although such motion was ultimately resolved against her.
IV
Sanction
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer
to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from
the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, the lawyer who withdrew the
rentals pertaining to his client totaling P255,000.00 without the knowledge of the client and who
ignored the demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was suspended from
the practice of law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, the lawyer received P155,000.00 from
the adversary of his clients as partial payment of a final and executory decision in favor of the
clients pursuant to a secret arrangement between the lawyer and the adversary, and deposited
the amount to the lawyers personal bank account without the knowledge of the clients; the
lawyer thereafter refused to surrender the money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for
two years from the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares, a similar
penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the practice of law was imposed on a lawyer
who had failed to file a case for the purpose of which he had received an amount of P80,000.00,
and to return the amount upon demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero, the Court suspended for a period
of two years from the practice of law a lawyer who had failed to immediately account for and to
return P300,000.00 received from a client for the purpose of depositing it in court, after the
lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money in court.
Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the sins thus sanctioned in
the aforementioned precedents, the proper penalty for her is suspension from the practice of law
for two years, with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of
Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution. Although the Court renders this decision
in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the
Philippine Bar, the Courts silence about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning
the clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the
administrative proceeding has already established as the respondents liability. That has been the
reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in
the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, and Small v.
Banares, supra.
In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the
date when she was formally charged with disbarment. This rate of interest was prescribed by the
Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small v. Banares.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a period of two years effective upon receipt of this
Decision, with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days from
receipt of this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with interest of 12% per annum from June 22,
1997, and to render unto the complainant a complete written accounting and inventory of: - (a)
the amounts she had collected from the Air Transportation Office as expropriation compensation;
(b) the total amount due to the complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually remitted to
the complainant; and (d) the amount she had deducted as her contingent fee vis--vis the
complainant.
34
Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, authentic written proof that her accounting, inventory, and payment were
furnished to and received by the complainant in due course.
This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings against Atty.
Reyes.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
with a copy of it to be included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 10
A.C. No. 10568 January 13, 2015[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas
Lerios-Amboy (Atty. Amboy) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27, 2007
in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between the
35
parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latters
engagement, Soliman paid her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer
institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the
partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said
property from the co-owners to the individual owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to her was
then treated as payment for her professional services.
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In the
second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of the
titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents.
Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite
the issuance of the titles for a fee of P80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman
that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00.
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboys bank account as
payment for the real property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount
of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboys bank account as payment for the latters contact in the RD.
On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property
were then only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to
deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property.
On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboys secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was
asking for an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title.
Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty. Amboys secretary.
Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the said titles,
but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty. Amboys
secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked
Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00 as payment for the release of the said titles. Atty.
Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed
that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain
documents.
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents
she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back the P50,000.00 that
was already paid to her.
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied
having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed that
the retainer agreement was not implemented since the partition case was not instituted. She
claimed that she merely undertook to research, gather and collate all documents required in the
partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the individual owners. She denied
having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD which caused the delay in the
processing of the said titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman for P50,000.00 to
facilitate the release of the said titles.
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation,
which recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with Soliman. It also opined that she
failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings for the issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification that the
period of Atty. Amboys suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to
two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated March 21, 2014.
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this
case, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer is
mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence; to never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving P25,000.00 as
payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the
issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked
from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office of the RD in
order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the
payment of P50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title.
36
Instead of procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for
an additional P10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a
client. Atty. Amboys acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and
defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respect the law and legal
processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of P50,000.00
which she paid in order to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon
inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty.
Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her
failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified
withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. "A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to
Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) she received from the
latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. The
respondent is further DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her compliance
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
37
Case No. 11
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina
Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyers oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio
(Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in
need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her
(Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty.
Espejo where they discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as
her godmothers lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same
meeting, Victoria agreed to accommodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter
the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously
issued and turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, Atty.
Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that she was still
waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple
of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check
was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10,
2009 in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the interest which accrued
due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her
dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite
Victorias repeated demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus
lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but
without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her
money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3,
2009.
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on
August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office
which she personally received and continued to ignore Victorias demands. She attended only
one (1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of
two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victorias chagrin, the said
check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-
affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was
submitted for resolution without Atty. Espejos participation. Victoria thereafter filed the instant
administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through
Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order directing Atty. Espejo to submit
her Answer to Victorias administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The
warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties
to appear for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-
appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her right to participate in further
proceedings.
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order noting Atty. Espejos failure to appear
during the mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was
declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper,
which she filed on June 11, 2010.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of
Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
38
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear
on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondents acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated
demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for
preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her
for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary
action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejos suspension from five
(5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP
250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time
the demand was made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest
reckoned from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to
Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this case.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part. Atty. Espejo did not
deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to
pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial
obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered
no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both
verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he
acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor
shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent
must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay
his financial obligations.
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in several cases, a
lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the
Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit
and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is
exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyers low regard for her
commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken
when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he
was convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate
failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same
sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found guilty of
39
gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was
only entrusted to him by the complainant.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders
of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts
to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must
maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted
authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the
IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the
mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him
another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this
directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct
unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal
processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also
to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01;
Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 A LAWYER
SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by
the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBPs
recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainant.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons
1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded
in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
40
Case No. 12
A.C. No. 8826, March 25, 2015
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, Complainant, v. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON, Respondent.
Before the Court is an administrative Complaint dated September 14, 2010 filed by complainant
Shirley Olayta-Camba (complainant) against respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon (respondent),
praying that the latter be disbarred and be directed to return the amount of P112,449.55 that he
received from the former.
The Facts
In her complaint, complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties
of the late Bernabe Olayta, situated in the Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan, both in the
province of Albay. In connection therewith, she claimed to have given the aggregate amount of
P112,499.55 to respondent, broken down as follows: (a) P20,000.00 as partial payment for legal
services; (b) P162.00 as payment for certification fees; (c) P5,000.00 as advance payment for the
reconstitution of titles; (d) P30,000.00 as payment for land taxes and titling of properties; (e)
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; (f) P19,337.55 as payment for documentary stamps on the estate
of Bernabe Olayta; and (g) P28,000.00 as payment for Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Taxes.
Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to update complainant regarding the status of the
matters referred to him. Thus, complainant terminated her engagement with respondent and
demanded for the return of P112,499.55, but to no avail. Hence, she filed the instant complaint
before the Court.
In his defense, respondent asserts, inter alia, that he only received P55,000.00 and that the rest
of the money was received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an employee of
his law firm. Further, respondent averred that he had already offered to return the amount of
P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already earned the fees for legal services in the
amount of P20,000.00 for having studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.
The Court, in a Resolution dated August 15, 2011, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and, accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months; and (b) directed to return the
amount of P55,000.00 to complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged respondents services
for the purpose of reconstituting four (4) titles as well as preparing the Deed, and that the latter
41
received legal fees in connection therewith. Despite this, respondent did not perform his
undertaking in accordance with the engagement and likewise failed to return complainants
money despite demands. The foregoing acts were deemed to be in violation of the lawyers oath,
as well as the CPR, thus, rendering respondent administratively liable for the same. However, in
view of respondents old age, his condition of having undergone a triple heart bypass surgery,
and considering that this is his first offense, the Investigating Commissioner opted to mitigate
the administrative penalties imposed upon respondent.
In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. On motion for
reconsideration of respondent, his period of suspension was further decreased to one (1) month
in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014. To date, respondent has not filed a petition for review before
the Court.
liable for the acts complained of.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyers neglect of
a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, complainant engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate
properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as preparing the Deed, and in connection
therewith, allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which the latter admitted the
receipt of only P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the preparation of the
Deed were delayed due to the Deeds several revisions; and that Bernabe Olaytas surviving
heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure their presence, much less obtain
their signatures to the said Deed.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00 that he personally received from complainant despite
repeated demands, viz.:
client.
xxxx
demand. x xx.
xxxx
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the
client. As such, a lawyers failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is
a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment and,
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondents administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed on him.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at
the same time, failed to return the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v.
Lawsin, the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to
42
him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino, the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer
who failed to render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for
such purpose. These pronouncements notwithstanding, there have been instances where the
Court tempered the penalty imposed upon a lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable
considerations. In view of the foregoing, and taking into consideration respondents advanced
age, medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense, the Court finds it appropriate to
sustain the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
month.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Shirley Olayta-Camba the
amount of P55,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Resolution. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondents personal record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
43

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Canon 16

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CANON 16

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Courts Ruling

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Issue Before the Court

The Courts Ruling

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount

Check No. Date Amount Payee

The IBP Report and Recommendation

Respondent sought a reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however,

The Issue Before the Court

The Courts Ruling

Respondents receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by

021051200 7802 P20,000.0 Attorney's fees

02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

021261200 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

041021200 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

041061200 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

041301200 7977 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment

Total Amount: P95,000.0

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman,

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