Civil Law Review I Digest

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SURNAME CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

1 ABRINA TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
2 AQUILINO QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA
3 BACARRA VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA
4 BAET MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM
5 BANOCAG NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBANK
6 BARIA ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA
7 BERMUDO SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
8 BUESER, AM ATENZA V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA
9 BUESER, JM REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
10 CARLOS ZAMORA V. ZAMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO
11 DAVID REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
12 DAYA OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON
13 DE GUZMAN ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA
14 DISTURA AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPEZ
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO to SAGUID
15 GARCIA V. REY
HONTIVEROS V. RTC, BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V.
16 GENUINO DARIO III
17 GEREMIA ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS
18 GONZAGA SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN to
19 GONZALES TAMARGO V. CA
20 GUILLERMO LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA
21 GUTIERREZ PEREZ V. CA to ATOK V. IAC
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN to EVADEL REALTY V.
22 LAYSON SORIANO
NAZARENO V. CA to HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V.
23 MALABANAN CA
24 MARTINEZ SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA
25 MENDOZA VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM
26 MOLINA QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
27 NEPOMUCENO ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY OF ANGELES
28 PATAUEG REPUBLIC V. CA to DKC HOLDINGS V. CA
29 PIO ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG
30 RADOVAN BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI
31 RODRIGUEZ CANEDA V. CA to AZNAR V. GARCIA
32 RONQUILLO UNSON V. ABELLA to CANIZA V. CA
33 SACRAMENTO PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES
34 SITJAR FRANCISCO V. ALFONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO
35 TELOG LLORENTE V. RODRIGUEZ to DIAZ V. IAC
36 TOLENTINO DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA
ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHEZ V.
37 TORRES CA
38 YAMAT NAZARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. PRELIMINARY
TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
II. HUMAN
RELATIONS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 14
III. PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
IV. CIVIL
PERSONALITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- 34
V.
CITIZENSHIP-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 35
VI.
MARRIAGE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- 38
VII. VOID
MARRIAGES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ 50
VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
IX. VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72
X. LEGAL
SEPARATION-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 76
2
XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81
XII. PROPERTY
RELATIONS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
84
XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN
INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
XIV. PATERNITY AND
FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 115
XV.
ADOPTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 135
XVI. PARENTAL
AUTHORITY-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
142
XVII. CASES IN
PROPERTY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
151
XVIII. CASES IN
SUCCESSION-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
192
3
4
1) TAADA VS. TUVERA acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,

G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985 Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations,
Doctrine: except such as have no general applicability;
The publication of presidential issuances "of a [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
that before a person may be bound by law, he importance to be so published; [4] such
must first be officially and specifically documents or classes of documents as may
informed of its contents. be required so to be published by law; and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as
Facts: the President of the Philippines shall
The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to determine from time to time to have general
compel respondent public officials to publish, applicability and legal effect, or which he may
and/or cause the publication in the Official authorize so to be published.
Gazette various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, The clear object of the above-quoted
executive orders, letters of implementation provision is to give the general public
and administrative orders. adequate notice of the various laws which are
The respondents contend that the publication to regulate their actions and conduct as
in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for citizens. Without such notice and publication,
the effectivity of the laws where the laws there would be no basis for the application of
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
thus submitted that since the presidential would be the height of injustice to punish or
issuances in question contain special otherwise burden a citizen for the
provisions as to the date that they are to take transgression of a law of which he had no
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
indispensable for their effectivity based on one.
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
The interpretation of the respondent is in The very first clause of Section I of
accord with the Courts construction of said Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
article. In a long line of decisions, the Court published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
has ruled that publication in the Official word "shall" used therein imposes upon
Gazette is necessary in cases where the respondent officials an imperative duty. That
legislation itself does not provide for an duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
effectivity date - for the date of publication is right of the people to be informed on matters
material in determining its date of effectivity of public concern is to be given substance and
which is the 15th day following its publication - reality. The law itself makes a list of what
but not when the law itself provides for the should be published in the Official Gazette.
date when it goes into effect. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what
Issue: must be included or excluded from such
Whether there is still a need for publication of publication.
the presidential decrees with specified dates
of effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general
Held: applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
Yes, there is still a need for publication. presidential decrees that provide for fines,
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
publication in the Officila Gazette, even if the otherwise impose a burden or the people,
law itself provides for the date of its such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638 provides that: this category. Other presidential issuances
Section 1. There shall be published in the which apply only to particular persons or class
Official Gazette [1] all important legislative of persons such as administrative and
5
executive orders need not be published on the 2. Whether or not the word LAWS refer to all
assumption that they have been circularized laws or only to those of general application.
to all concerned.
3. Where should publication of said laws be
It is needless to add that the publication of made?
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of Held:
due process. It is a rule of law that before a 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
person may be bound by law, he must first be refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
officially and specifically informed of its requirement of publication itself, which cannot
contents. in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law
The Court therefore declares that presidential effective immediately upon approval, or on
issuances of general application, which have any other date, without its previous
not been published, shall have no force and publication.
effect.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
2) TAADA VS. TUVERA the legislature may in its discretion provide
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as
Facts: pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were separate concurrence in the original decision,
invoking due process in demanding the is the Civil Code which did not become
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees effective after fifteen days from its publication
which they claimed had not been published as in the Official Gazette but "one year after
required by law, which is Art. 2 of the Civil such publication." The general rule did not
Code. The government argued that while apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was "otherwise provided," as when It is not correct to say that under the disputed
the decrees themselves declared that they clause publication may be dispensed with
were to become effective immediately upon altogether. The reason is that such omission
their approval. In the decision of the case on would offend due process insofar as it would
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the deny the public knowledge of the laws that
necessity for the publication of some of these are supposed to govern the legislature could
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion validly provide that a law be effective
as follows: immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders after an unreasonably short period after
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
all unpublished presidential issuances which aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
are of general application, and unless so and they would be so not because of a failure
published, they shall have no binding force to comply with but simply because they did
and effect. not know of its existence.
It must be noted at this point the conclusive
2. Petitioners are now moving for a presumption that every person knows the law,
reconsideration/clarification of the which of course presupposes that the law has
aforementioned decision. been published if the presumption is to have
any legal justification at all. It is no less
Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause UNLESS important to remember that Section 6 of the
IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED solely refers to Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
the fifteen-day period and not to the people to information on matters of public
requirement of publication. concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
6
publication is to be made in the Official

2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and Gazette as decided upon in the first Tanada
not only to those of general application, for case, however, the Court made this
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people pronouncement:
in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. There is much to be said of the view
that the publication need not be made in the
Thus, all statutes, including those of local Official Gazette, considering its erratic
application and private laws, shall be releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
published as a condition for their effectivity, newspapers of general circulation
which shall begin fifteen days after could better perform the function of
publication unless a different effectivity date communicating, the laws to the people as
is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule such periodicals are more easily available,
are: have a wider readership, and come out
regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind
a. Presidential decrees and executive of publication is not the one required or
orders promulgated by the President in the authorized by existing law. As far as we know,
exercise of legislative powers whenever the no amendment has been made of Article
same are validly delegated by the 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by not pointed to such a law, and we have no
the Constitution; information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.
b. Administrative rules and regulations, At any rate, the Court is not called
if their purpose is to enforce or implement upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
existing law pursuant also to a valid repeal or modify it if we find it impractical.
delegation; That is not our function. That function belongs
to the legislature. Our task is merely to
c. Charter of a city; interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary government in accordance with the
Board if meant to fill in the details of the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed have no choice but to pronounce that under
to enforce. Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazett and
However, no publication is required for the not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
following: effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided
a. Interpretative regulations and those by the legislature.
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative 3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT
agency and not the public; and SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
b. Letters of instructions issued by EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
administrative superiors concerning the rules RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
or guidelines to be followed by their G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001
subordinates in the performance of their
duties; Doctrine:
All statutes, including those of local
c. Municipal ordinances, which are application and private laws, shall be
covered by the Local Government Code. published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after
3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication unless a different effectivity date
publication at all since its purpose is to inform is fixed by the legislature.
the public of the contents of the laws, and
7
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees portion of their contract. When petitioner
and executive orders promulgated by the refused, they filed a case before the POEA
President in the exercise of legislative powers against petitioner Philsa and its foreign
whenever the same are validly delegated by principal, Al-Hejailan.
the legislature or, at present, directly Several hearings were conducted before the
conferred by the Constitution: Administrative POEA Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the
rules and regulations must also be published case involving money claims arising from the
if their purpose is to enforce or implement employer-employee relations and illegal
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated
Interpretative regulations and those merely August 31, 1988, ordering respondent PHILSA
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE
personnel of the administrative agency and CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly
the public, need not be published. Neither is and severally with its principal Al Hejailan.
publication required of the so-called letter of Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of
instructions issued by the administrative August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to private respondents money claim, POEA
be followed by their subordinates in the issued separate Order dated August 29, 1988
performance of their duties resolving the recruitment violation aspect of
private respondents complaint. In this order,
Facts: POEA found petitioner liable for three (3)
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of
Services Corporation is a domestic contract substitution and one count of
corporation engaged in the recruitment of withholding or unlawful deduction from
workers for overseas employment. Sometime salaries of workers.
in January 1985, private respondents, who From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion
were recruited by petitioner for employment for Reconsideration which was subsequently
in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay denied. After the denial of its motion for
placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the
for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and Secretary of Labor and Employment.
P6,500.00 each for private respondents However, public respondent Secretary of
Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson. Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the
After the execution of their respective work assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Reconsideration but this was likewise denied.
Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be
foreign principal of petitioner. held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983,
were allegedly made to sign a second which enumerated the allowable fees which
contract on February 4, 1985 which changed may be collected from applicants, is void for
some of the provisions of their original lack of publication.
contract resulting in the reduction of some of
their benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985, Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum
their foreign employer allegedly forced them Circular No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack
to sign a third contract which increased their of publication?
work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week
without any corresponding increase in their Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is
basic monthly salary. When they refused to void for lack of publication.
sign this third contract, the services of private In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as
respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan follows:
and they were repatriated to the Philippines. "We hold therefore that all statutes, including
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private those of local application and private laws,
respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa shall be published as a condition for their
the return of their placement fees and for the effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
payment of their salaries for the unexpired
8
publication unless a different effectivity date of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said
is fixed by the legislature. Orders were consistent in mentioning that
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular
and executive orders promulgated by the No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the
President in the exercise of legislative powers imposition of administrative sanctions against
whenever the same are validly delegated by petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that
the legislature or, at present, directly petitioner was held liable under the said
conferred by the Constitution: Administrative provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and
rules and regulations must also be published 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
if their purpose is to enforce or implement promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. the Department of Labor and Employment.
Interpretative regulations and those merely Considering that, as, previously discussed,
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
personnel of the administrative agency and embodying such a schedule of fees never took
the public, need not be published. Neither is effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition
publication required of the so-called letter of of the administrative sanctions against
instructions issued by the administrative petitioner
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to The Office of the Solicitor General likewise
be followed by their subordinates in the argues that the questioned administrative
performance of their duties." circular is not among those requiring
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of publication contemplated by Taada vs.
1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific
the same was never published or filed with group of persons and not to the general
the National Administrative Register. POEA public.
Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 Again, there is no merit in this argument. The
provides for the applicable schedule of fact that the said circular is addressed only to
placement and documentation fees for private a specified group, namely private
employment agencies or authority holders. employment agencies or authority holders,
Under the said Order, the maximum amount does not take it away from the ambit of our
which may be collected from prospective ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil.
Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,
said circular was apparently issued in the administrative circulars questioned
compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of therein were addressed to an even smaller
the Labor Code. group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong
It is thus clear that the administrative circular agencies engaged in the recruitment of
under consideration is one of those issuances workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court
which should be published for its effectivity, ruled therein that, for lack of proper
since its purpose is to enforce and implement publication, the said circulars may not be
an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. enforced or implemented.
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been clear and categorical. Administrative rules
published or filed with the National and regulations must be published if their
Administrative Register, the same is purpose is to enforce or implement existing
ineffective and may not be enforced. law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
The Office of the Solicitor General argues exceptions are interpretative regulations,
however that the imposition of administrative those merely internal in nature, or those so-
sanctions on petitioner was based not on the called letters of instructions issued by
questioned administrative circular but on administrative superiors concerning the rules
Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor and guidelines to be followed by their
Code. subordinates in the performance of their
The argument is not meritorious. The said duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
articles of the Labor Code were never cited, 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of
much less discussed, in the body of the these exceptions.
questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary
9
allowed to enroll because they are allegedly

4) Unciano Paramedical College v CA members of the National Union of Students of
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993 the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of
Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student
Doctrine: organization they organized, and, moreover
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof of
Court is overruled and a different view is these accusations but were not given any.
adopted, the new doctrine is applied On 29 November 1989, the
prospectively, and should not apply to parties students were informed that the President had
who relied on the old doctrine and acted on unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll
the faith thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary and it was up to their parents to request or
mandatory injunction was issued by the trial appeal to the school officials to change their
court with grave abuse of discretion. decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs.
Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school
Facts: officials to request that their children be
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena allowed to enroll . Dr. Moral informed them
Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their that the Board of Trustees will have to decide
mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta on these requests.
Magallanes, respectively, filed before the On 11 December 1989, the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial students were informed that the Board of
Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction Trustees had refused to grant the parents'
and damages with prayer for a writ of request."
preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., The trial court issued a temporary restraining
Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining
Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana petitioner school from not enrolling private
Vitug, they alleged therein that: respondents in its College of Nursing and
1. On July 1989, the above-named setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ
students initiated a petition proposing to the of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
school authorities the organization of a Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still
student council in the school. They solicited ordered the school to allow the students to
support of their petition from the studentry by enroll.
asking the students to endorse the same with The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the
their signatures. They were able to get at RTC and based its the ruling in the recent case
least 180 signatures. of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, ,
2. On August 18, 1989, the students May 20, 1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned
were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and and overruled its decision in Alcuaz and
were admonished not to proceed with the declared thus:
proposal because, according to her, the
school does not allow and had never allowed The contract between the school and the
such an organization. student is not an ordinary contract. It is
3. On October 28, 1989, in imbued with public interest, considering the
compliance with an announcement to see the high priority given by the Constitution to
Dean of Nursing, the above-named students education and the grant to the State of
met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who supervisory and regulatory powers over all
informed them that they would be barred educational institutions. When a student
from enrollment for the second semester registers in a school, it is understood that he
because the school does not allow their is enrolling for the entire school year
students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral 'Every student has the right to enroll in any
advised them to get their Honorable school, college or university upon meeting its
Dismissal. specific requirement and reasonable
4. On November 6, 1989, the regulation: Provided, that except in the case
students again approached Dr. Moral who of academic delinquency and violation of
informed them that they were no longer disciplinary regulation, the student is
10
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for backward, then restore the condition
the entire period he is expected to his preceding the status quo. Private respondents
complete his course without prejudice to his do not possess any clear legal right to re-
right to transfer.' enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged
Hence the instant appeal. legally to re-admit them.
Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be 5) Cui v Arellano University

applied retroactively to govern and invalidate G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
the legal effects of the incidents that took
place prior to its adoption and which incidents Facts:
were proper and valid under the ALCUAZ Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
doctrine prevailing at the time said incident defendant university from the school year
took place. 1948-1949. He finished his law studies in the
defendant university up to and including the
Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be first semester of the fourth year. During all
applied to the instant case. Under the then the time he was studying law in the defendant
prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was university, he was awarded scholarship
promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
between them and private respondents was semestral tuition fees were returned to him
validly terminated upon the end of the first after the end of each semester and when his
semester of school year 1989-1990. scholarship grants were awarded to him. The
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff
Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case to defendant and refunded to him by the
was promulgated much later, or on May 20, latter from the first semester up to and
1990, when the termination of the contract including the first semester of his last year in
between them had long become fait accompli. the college of law or the fourth year, is in total
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this of P1,033.87. However, before defendant
Court is overruled and a different view is awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
adopted, the new doctrine is applied above stated, he was made to sign the
prospectively, and should not apply to parties following contract covenant and agreement
who relied on the old doctrine and acted on which provides that in consideration of the
the faith thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary scholarship granted to him by the University,
mandatory injunction was issued by the trial he waives his right to transfer to another
court with grave abuse of discretion. school without having refunded to the
The ruling in the Non case should not be given University (defendant) the equivalent of his
a retroactive effect to cases that arose before scholarship cash.
its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this
case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it For the last semester of his law studies,
were otherwise, it would result in oppression plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the
to petitioners and other schools similarly Abad Santos University and graduated
situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz therefrom. After graduating in law he applied
case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which to take the bar examination. Plaintiff then
recognized the termination of contract theory. petitioned the defendant university to issue to
The contract between the parties was validly him the needed transcripts. However, the
terminated upon the end of the first semester defendant refused until after he had paid back
of school year 1989-1990, or in October, the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to
1989. This is the status quo. The trial court him as above stated. As he could not take the
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the bar examination without those transcripts,
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
which ordered petitioners to allow private protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks
respondents "to enroll for the first semester of to recover from defendant in this case.
school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by the
Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the
restore the status quo but will go a step contract is valid.
11
Held: No, the stipulation in question is Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be
contrary to public policy and, hence, null and acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts
void. The practice of awarding scholarships rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of
to attract students and keep them in school is Lucero.
not a good custom nor has it received some
kind of social and practical confirmation Held: The appellant was acquitted.
except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
Philippines which implements Section 5 of themselves not laws, are nevertheless
Article XIV of the Constitution with reference evidence of what the law means; this is the
to the giving of free scholarships to gifted reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code
children, does not require scholars to provides that, Judicial decisions applying and
reimburse the corresponding value of the interpreting the laws or the constitution shall
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. form part of the legal system. The
The same goes for leading colleges and interpretation upon a law by the Supreme
universities of the United States after which Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as
our educational practices or policies are of the date the law was originally passed,
patterned. In these institutions scholarships since the courts construction merely
are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant establishes the contemporaneous legislative
students in school for their propaganda mine intent that the law thus construed intends to
but to reward merit or help gifted students in effectuate. The settled rule supported by
whom society has an established interest or a numerous authorities is a restatement of the
first lien. legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the
6) People vs Jabinal written law by a competent court has the
55 SCRA 607 force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero
and in Macarandang was part of the
Facts: jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land,
at the time appellant was found in possession
On September 5, 1964, the accused was of the firearm and when he was arraigned by
found to be in possession of a revolver the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
without the requisite license or permit. He overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a
claimed to be entitled to exoneration doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled
because, although he had no license or and a different view is adopted, the new
permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and should not apply to parties who had relied on
as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial the old doctrine and acted on the faith
Commander, and the said appointments thereof.
expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the said firearm. The Considering that the appellant possessed a
accused further contended that in view of his firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero,
the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in under which no criminal liability would attach
People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. to his possession of said firearm, the appellant
Lucero. should be absolved. The appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was
The trial court found the accused criminally done was held not to be punishable.
liable for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings in
Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed
and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. *The accused were acquitted for through their
appointment as confidential/secret agent they
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court. were deemed to be peace officers. Peace
12
officers had the privilege of carrying firearms Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the
without license. parties has affected the alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines?
**Mapa was convicted although he was a
secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that Held: It is true that owing to the nationality
thelaw did not explicitly provide that principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
secret/confidential agents are among those Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
who are exempted from acquiring a license to the policy against absolute divorces the same
carry a firearm. being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio this case, the divorce in Nevada released
139 SCRA 139 private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which
Doctrine: divorce dissolves the marriage.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy respondent is no longer the husband of
against absolute divorces the same being petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
considered contrary to our concept of public in the case below as petitioner's husband
police and morality. However, aliens may entitled to exercise control over conjugal
obtain divorces abroad, which may be assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
recognized in the Philippines, provided they own country's Court, which validly exercised
are valid according to their national law jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
Facts: representation before said Court from
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
private respondent is a citizen of the United property.
States. They were married in Hongkong in
1972. After the marriage, they established To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
their residence in the Philippines. They begot under our laws, petitioner has to be
two children born on April 4, 1973 and considered still married to private respondent
December 18, 1975, respectively. The parties and still subject to a wife's obligations under
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
1982 and petitioner has re-married also in be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In together with, observe respect and fidelity,
1983, private respondent filed suit against and render support to private respondent. The
petitioner alleging the petitioners business in latter should not continue to be one of her
Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is a conjugal heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
property of the parties and prayed that She should not be discriminated against in her
private respondent be declared with right to own country if the ends of justice are to be
manage said property. Petitioner moved to served.
dismiss the petition on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous 8) QUITA vs. CA
judgement in the divorce proceedings before G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
the Nevada Court. The Court below denied
the motion to dismiss since the property Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both
involved is located in the Philippines so that Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this May 18, 1941, but not blessed with any
case. The denial is now the subject of this children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
certiorari proceeding. Francisco, USA, submitting as evidence their
agreement to live separately from each other
13
and a settlement of their conjugal properties. contending that Merope has a prior subsisting
A decree of divorce was granted on July 23, marriage with Eusebio Bristol. RTC ruled in
1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in favor of Felicitas.
San Francisco, but eventually ended into a
divorce. For the third time, she married again Issue: Whether Felicitas has the personality to
in USA. file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. marriage of Orlando on the ground of bigamy.
August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with
RTC QC a petition for issuance of letters of Held: There is no specific provision as to who
administration concerning the estate of Arturo can file a petition to declare the nullity of
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. marriage under the New Civil Code, which is
Blandina Dandan, surviving spouse of Arturo, the law governing at the time of marriage
and their children opposed the petition. between Orlando and Merope, nor even in the
Later, Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the sole Family Code. however, only a party who can
surviving brother of deceased Arturo, demonstrate proper interest can file the
intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot same. A petition to declare the nullity of
the immediate declaration of heirs of marriage must be prosecuted or defended in
deceased Arturo and distribution of his estate. the name of the real party in interest and
The trial court disregarded the divorce must be based on a cause of action.
between Fe and Arturo, and expressed the In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file
view that their marriage subsisted until the the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
death of Arturo in 1972. cannot be ascertained due to the absence of
the divorce decree and the foreign law
Issues: Whether or not Blandinas marriage to allowing it. Thus, the case is remanded to trial
Arturo was void ab initio. court for reception of additional evidence
Whether or not Fe can be declared the necessary.
primary beneficiary of Arturos estate.
10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
Held: No, Blandinas marriage to Arturo was G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
valid, thus, Fe cannot be declared a
beneficiary to Arturos estate. Facts:
At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree The case involves the settlement of
against Arturo in San Francisco, she was Felicisimos estate. During his lifetime, he
already an alien and no longer a Filipino contracted 3 marriages. First was with
citizen. Hence, the divorce decree is valid in Virginia, who predeceased him. On May 1,
the Philippines, since it is considered valid in 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
Fes national law, which is the USA law. but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a
divorce complaint in Hawaii and was granted.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
Felicidad. Felicisimo died on December 18,
1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and settlement of
9) CATALAN vs. BRAGANZA Felicisimos estate. She filed with RTC Makati a
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007 petition for letters of administration.
Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by
Facts: his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on
Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4, the grounds of improper venue and failure to
1950. They migrated to USA and became state a cause of action, alleging that the
naturalized citizens thereof. On April 1988, petition should have been filed in the Province
they divorced. of Laguna where Felicisimos place of
June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in residence prior to his death, and that Felicidad
Pangasinan. Later, Felicitas filed a petition for has no legal personality to file the petition
declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC because she was only a mistress.
Dagupan against Orlando and Merope,
14
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions
under the Civil Code, considering that of the will of the testator Edward E.
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia filed an
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the opposition, as it deprives her of her legitime
effectivity of the Family Code. as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by the Court as one. The court
Held: The divorce decree allegedly obtained ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
by Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo of the United States of America and of the
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with State of California at the time of his death and
the legal personality to file the present he was domiciled in the Philippines.
petition as the surviving spouse of Felicisimo.
But there is insufficient evidence to prove the Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall
validity of the divorce decree obtained by govern the administration of the will of
Merry, as well as the marriage of Felicidad Edward Christensen.
and Felicisimo under the laws of USA.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law
insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due shall govern the testamentary disposition of
execution must also be presented. Under Edward Christensen.
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the
document may be proven as a public or national law shall govern intestate and
official record of a foreign country by either testamentary successions. National law refers
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof to the private law of the state of which the
attested by the officer having legal custody of decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, the
the document. If the record is not kept in the private law of the State of California. Article
Philippines, such copy must be (a) 94 of the Civil Code of State of California
accompanied by a certificate issued by the refers back the case, when a decedent is not
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the domiciled in California, to the law of his
Philippine foreign service stationed in the domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS
With regard to Felicidads marriage to 20 SCRA 358
Felicisimo solemnized in California USA, she
only submitted photocopies of the Marriated Facts:
Certificate and the annotated text of the Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of
Family Law Act of California. The Court, Texas, United States. He had 5 legitimate
however, cannot take judicial notice of foreign children with his first wife, 3 legitimate
laws as they must be alleged and proved. children with hi second wife, and had 3
Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952, Amos
court for further reception of evidence on the Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. July 8,
divorce decree obtained by Merry and the 1958, Amos died.
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
11) AZNAR VS. GARCIA oppositions to the project of partition on the
7 SCRA 95 ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children of Amos
Facts: Bellis, and therefore, compulsory heirs of the
CIF of Davao directed the executor to deceased. Under the Laws of Texas, there are
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount no forced heirs of legitimes.
of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Issue: Which law must apply Texas Law or
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the Philippine Law?
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, of said
15
Held: The decedents national law, which is Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of
the Texas law, governs the order of the State of Nevada should apply.
succession, the amount of successional rights,
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old
will and the capacity to succeed. Civil Code governs. The old Civil Code
It is not disputed that the decedent was both provides that successional rights to personal
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at property are to be earned by the national law
the time of his death. of the person whose succession is in question.
A provision in a foreigners will to the effect The foreign law, specifically Section 9905,
that his properties shall be distributed in compiled Newada Laws, was introduced as
accordance with Philippine Law and not with evidence. That law can be taken judicial
his national law cannot be ignored in regard notice by the Court, without proof of such law
to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil having been offered at the hearing of the
Code states said national law should govern. project of partition.
Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code,
the will and the amount of successional rights the validity of testamentary dispositions are
are to be determined under Texas Law, the governed by the national law of the testator,
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied and it has been decided without dispute that
to the testacy of Amos Bellis. the national law of the testator is that of the
State of Nevada, which allows a testator to
13) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN vs. dispose of all his property according to his
BOHANAN will.
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
Facts: 14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Bohanans last will and testament, executed
on April 23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the Facts:
testator was born in Nebraska and a citizen of Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy
California, but temporarily stayed in the from March 10, 1927 Septermber 30, 1957)
Philippines for a long period of time. At the and Paula were married on February 22, 1937.
time of his death, he was a citizen of the Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
United States and of the State of Nevada, and Lorenzo went back to the US while Paula
his will was executed in accordance with the stayed in the conjugal home at Camarines
laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was
estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator naturalized as an American citizen. He visited
gave his grandson P90,819.67 and of all the Philippines and discovered that his wife,
shares of stock of several mining companies Paula was pregnant and was living in with his
and to his brother and sister the same brother Ceferino.
amount. To his children, he gave a legacy of On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for
only P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife, and divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
her 2 children opposed the validity of the California and was granted.
testamentary provisions contending that the On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in
will deprived them of their legitime. Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13,
Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in 1981, Lorenzo executed a notarized Last Will
recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the and Testament. On December 14, 1983,
testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the
that divorce should be declared a nullity in probate and allowance of his last will and
this jurisdiction. testament, moving that Alicia be appointed as
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, Special Administratrix of his estate, but was
no right to share in the inheritance in favor of denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On
a divorced wife. The divorce was granted to January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will
the testator on May 20, 1922. to probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died.
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the
16
same court a petition for letters of

administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor, contending that she was Lorenzos
surviving spouse and that the testamentary
provisions in Lorenzos will encroached on her
legitime and share in the conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to

inherit from Lorenzos estate.
Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos

divorce decree with Paula is recognized as
valid.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of them.
The fact is Lorenzo became an American
citizen long before and at the time of 1) his
divorce from Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3)
execution of his will; and 4) death. Issues
arising from these incidents are governed by
foreign law.
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying
Philippine law are erroneous. Heres why:
1) Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided
they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, LORENZOs divorce from PAULA
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as
a matter of comity.
2) LORENZOs will is valid. Article 17 The forms
and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are
executed. In this case, whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The
trial court should not that Congress did not
intend to extend the same succession (system
of legitime) to foreign nationals.
17
II. HUMAN RELATIONS disposed of said insolvent's property depriving

the latter and the Assignee that was latter
15) ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL appointed, of the opportunity to recover said
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956. plane.
FACTS Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the

CALI, a domestic airline corporation, met with Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations,
its creditors to inform them that the provides the following:
corporation was on the verge of insolvency
and had to stop operations. To ensure "Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of
payment of their claims against CALI, the his rights and in the performances of his
creditors agreed that it would be duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
advantageous not to present suits against and observe honesty and good faith".
CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of
its assets, although CALI announced that in It maybe said that this article only contains a
case of non-agreement of the creditors on a mere declaration of principles and while such
pro-rata division of the assets, it would file statement may be is essentially correct, yet
insolvency proceedings. Right after the We find that such declaration is implemented
meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of by Article 21 and sequence of the same
CALIs creditors who was present in the Chapter which prescribe the following:
meeting and who agreed to the pro-rata
division, assigned its credit to its sister "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with or injury to another in a manner that is
a California court an action for collection of contrary to morals, good customs or public
the assigned credit and applied for a writ of policy shall compensate the latter for the
attachment against CALIs Douglas C-54 plane damage".
which was in California. Prior to the meeting
with creditors, CALI had already offered the Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which
plane to Shell Philippine but the offer was compels the return of a thing acquired
rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the other 'without just or legal grounds'. This provision
creditors of CALI, filed this action for damages embodies the doctrine that no person should
against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
that that fraudulent assignment of Shell another, which has been one of the mainstays
Philippines credit to Shall USA prejudiced the of every legal system for centuries. It is most
other creditors and was contrary to the needful that this ancient principle be clearly
agreed pro-rata division of assets. and specifically consecrated in the Civil Code
to the end that in cases not foreseen by the
ISSUE: WON Shell Philippines, taking lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit
advantage of its knowledge of the himself to the prejudice of another. Now, if
existence of CALI's airplane in the US, Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to
acted in bad faith in assigning its credit provide that:
to its sister company effectively
defeating the agreed pro-rata division of "Even if an act or event causing damage to
assets among the creditors of CALI. another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall
HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS be liable for indemnity if through the act or
INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR event he was benefited." with much more
ANY WRONG FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC reason the Defendant should be liable for
REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith
and with betrayal of confidence.
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer
to its sister corporation in the United States, 16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs.
where CALI's plane C- 54 was. By that swift CA
and unsuspected operation efficaciously G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
18
By applying these to the case at hand, it

FACTS: cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court
Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. and the appellate court made a mistake of
Mapa St. Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. lumping the three articles and used them as
As part payment, Albenson was given a check bases for the award of damages in a civil
drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. complaint filed against the petitioners.
However, when the check was presented for Albenson was prompted by its natural instinct
payment, it was dishonored because of lack of and right to file a criminal complaint because
funds. This led Albenson to trace the origin. it was not able to collect the payment of the
This led them to a certain Eugenio Baltao. mild steel plates it had delivered. It had every
They made afterwards an extrajudicial right to exhaust all legal remedies to collect
demand to private respondent Baltao. But he its unpaid credit.
denied that he signed on the check because
Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. 17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO
This led Albenson to file a criminal complaint CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS
for violation of BP 22. However, it was later G.R No. 81262, August 25, 1983
found out that his namesake, Eugenio Baltao
III, his son, was the one who manages E.L. FACTS:
Woodworks located on the ground floor of the Private respondent Tobias was employed by
Baltao Building. Nevertheless, Assistant Fiscal Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a
Sumaway filed the information. But Provincial purchasing agent and administrative
Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to assistant. Petitioner discovered fictitious
dismiss the information. Because of the unjust purchases and other fraudulent transactions
filing of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
complaint for damages against Albenson Tobias was implicated as the number one
Enterprises. The trial court ruled in favor of suspect. Police investigations were conducted
Baltao. The Court of Appeals affirmed the as a result of said anomaly.
decision of the lower court.
The police reports exculpated Tobias from any
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the participation in the offense. Unsatisfied,
criminal complaint by Albenson petitioner still hired private investigators.
Enterprises constituted an abuse of Pending the investigation of the private
right? detectives, petitioner filed a complaint for
estafa against Tobias.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the
negative. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, Later, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed
the following are the requisites for abuse of an action for illegal dismissal. While his case
right: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) awaits resolution, he sought employment with
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole RETELCO. However, petitioner, without being
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for stating that Tobias was dismissed due to
all other provisions of law which do not dishonesty.
especially provide for their own sanction.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages
and has the following elements: 1) There is an anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and
act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to abusive acts of petitioner.
morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should
closer look at the said articles and it can be indemnify private respondent for
revealed that Articles 19 and 21 share a damages.
common element: that the act is intentional.
Article 20, however, does not distinguish. It is HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code known to
dependent on the circumstances of the case. contain what is commonly referred to as the
19
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain

standards which must be observed not only in Therefore, petitioners are liable for damages.
the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards 18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA
are the following: to act with justice; to give G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. Violation of Article 19 can result to FACTS
right to damages pursuant to Article 21 or Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil.
Article 22. Appointed petitioner Barons Marketing Corp
as one of its dealers of electrical wires and
This article was adopted to remedy the cables. As such, petitioner was given by
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so private respondent 60 days credit for its
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even purchases reckoned from the date of delivery.
though they have actually suffered material During the period December 1986 to August
and moral injury. 1987, defendant purchased on credit from
plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they the total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this
did not violate any provision of law since they amount, P300,000 was paid leaving a balance
were merely exercising their legal right to of P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner
dismiss private respondent. demanding payment of its unpaid obligation.
In response, petitioner requests to pay the
Nevertheless, the Court, after examining the amount in monthly installments of P500,000
record and circumstances of the case ruled plus 1% interest. Said offer was rejected by
that petitioners have indeed abused the right respondent. Thereafter, private respondent
that they invoke, causing damage to private filed a complaint before the Pasig RTC against
respondent. petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2,
including interest with 25% attorneys fees,
Notwithstanding the fact that it was private exemplary damages of P100,000 and cost of
respondent Tobias who reported the possible litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted
existence of anomalous transactions, the purchase made but disputed the amount.
petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim
told plaintiff that he was the number one on the ground of abuse of rights since it
suspect and to take a one week vacation suffered injury to its reputation.
leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his table drawers open, and to leave his The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
keys to petitioner Hendry. The high-handed private respondent, which decision was
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible
attitude of petitioners was to continue when ISSUE: Whether or not private
private respondent returned to work after his respondent is guilty of abuse of rights or
one week forced leave. Upon reporting for whether private respondent intended to
work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who prejudice or injure petitioner when it
said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler rejected petitioners offer and filed the
in this company." action for collection.
The imputation of guilt without basis and the HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in
pattern of harassment during the jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
investigations of Tobias transgress the that the burden of proving bad faith rests
standards of human conduct set forth in upon the party alleging the same. In the case
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith
already ruled that the right of the employer to on the part of private respondent.
dismiss an employee should not be confused
with the manner in which the right is Private respondent was driven by legitimate
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and
20
instituting the action for collection before the ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner validly
trial court. As pointed out by private exercised its right under Article 429 of the
respondent. The corporation had its own Civil Code.
cash position to protect in order to pay its
own obligations. Clearly, this would be HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly
inimical to the interests of any enterprise, exercise its right under Article 429 of the Civil
especially profit-oriented one like private Code. A right is a power, privilege, or
respondent. It is plain to see that this is a immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
case of an exercise of rights, not an abuse statute or decisional law, or recognized as a
thereof. As such, private respondent has not result of long usage, constitutive of a legally
acted in a manner contrary to morals, good enforceable claim of one person against the
customs or public policy as to violate Article other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the
21 of the Civil Code. owner of the utility providing water supply to
certain consumers including the respondent,
19) MWSS vs. Act Theater had the right to exclude any person from the
G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004 enjoyment and disposal thereof. However,
the exercise of rights is not without
FACTS: limitations. Having the right should not be
On September 22, 1988, four employees of confused with the manner by which such right
the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, is to be exercised. When a right is exercised
Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel in a manner, which discards these norms
Concha and Modesto Ruales, were resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong
apprehended by members of the Quezon City is committed for which actor can be held
police force for allegedly tampering a water accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed
meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended to act with justice and give the respondent
by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the incident, what is due to it when the petitioner
the respondents water service connection unceremoniously cut off the respondents
was cut off. Consequently, the respondent water service connection.
filed a complaint for injunction with damages
against the petitioner MWSS. 20) Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its
complaint filed with the court a quo that the FACTS:
petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
capriciously, in cutting off the respondents coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon
water service connection without prior notice. Sierra engaged her services for their church
Due to lack of water, the health and wedding. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day,
sanitation, not only of the respondents Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
patrons but in the surrounding premises as bride and her family were billeted. When she
well, were adversely affected. The arrived, several persons were already there.
respondent prayed that the petitioner be Among those present was petitioner Soledad
directed to pay damages. Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
The petitioner insists that in cutting off the
respondents water service connection, the After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went
petitioner merely exercised its proprietary out of the suite. She proceeded to the Maynila
right under Article 429 of the Civil Code, Restaurant where the reception was to be
which provides that the owner or lawful held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude allowance to the band, and went back to the
any person from the enjoyment and disposal suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte
thereof. noticed the people staring at her. It was at
this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered
the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
21
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and universal moral precepts which are designed
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." to indicate certain norms that spring from the
Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to fountain of good conscience and which are
search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after meant to serve as guides for human conduct.
Valmonte left the room to attend to her First of these fundamental precepts is the
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces principle commonly known as "abuse of
of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
room in a paper bag were lost. provides that "Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance
The bags and personal belongings of all the of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
people inside the room were searched. his due and observe honesty and good faith."
Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, One is not allowed to exercise his right in a
interrogated and trailed by a security guard manner which would cause unnecessary
throughout the evening. Later, police officers prejudice to another or if he would thereby
arrived and interviewed all persons who had offend morals or good customs.
access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach
Valmonte was being interrogated by the against respondent was certainly uncalled for
police officers, petitioner kept on saying the considering that by her own account nobody
words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." knew that she brought such kind and amount
Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the
premises was also searched but the search case, she had no right to attack respondent
yielded nothing. with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By
After a futile attempt for a formal apology, openly accusing respondent as the only
Valmonte filed a suit for damages against person who went out of the room before the
Carpio. loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the
guests therein, and ordering that she be
The trial court rendered dismissed Valmontes immediately bodily searched, petitioner
complaint for damages. It ruled that when virtually branded respondent as the thief.
petitioner sought investigation for the loss of True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the
her jewelry, she was merely exercising her identity of the malefactor, but to malign
right and if damage results from a person respondent without an iota of proof that she
exercising his legal right, it is damnum was the one who actually stole the jewelry is
absque injuria. an act which, by any standard or principle of
law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully
The CA reversed, holding that petitioners caused injury to respondent in a manner
verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with which is contrary to morals and good
malice and in bad faith since it was made in customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
the presence of many people without any missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
solid proof except petitioners suspicion. Such respondent. She did not act with justice and
unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an good faith for apparently, she had no other
award of moral damages for she was publicly purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent.
humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21
ISSUE: Should Valmonte be entitled to for which she should be held accountable.
Damages?
21) RCPI VS CA
HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986
omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or FACTS:
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil that the defamatory words on the telegram
law are not only principles of equity but also sent to him not only wounded his feelings but
22
also caused him undue embarrassment and through its employees. Hence the acts of its
affected adversely his business as well employees in receiving and transmitting
because other people have come to know of messages are the acts of the petitioner.
said defamatory words. Defendant-
corporation as a defense, alleges that the To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly
additional words in Tagalog was a private joke for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of
between the sending and receiving operators petitioner's business is to deprive the general
and that they were not addressed to or public availing of the services of the petitioner
intended for plaintiff and therefore did not of an effective and adequate remedy. In most
form part of the telegram and that the cases, negligence must be proved in order
Tagalog words are not defamatory. The that plaintiff may recover. However, since
telegram sent through its facilities was negligence may be hard to substantiate in
received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody some cases, we may apply the doctrine of
other than the operator manned the teletype RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for
machine which automatically receives itself), by considering the presence of facts or
telegrams being transmitted. The said circumstances surrounding the injury.
telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered The decision is affirmed.
to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional
words in Tagalog were never noticed and were 22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
included in the telegram when delivered. G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988
The trial court ruled that in favor of the FACTS:

plaintiff holding that the liability of petitioner- Petitioner Manila Electric Company
company-employer is predicated on Articles (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation
19 and 20 of the Civil Code. The Court of providing electric power for the consumption
Appeals affirmed the decision, upon appeal. of the general public in Metro Manila.
Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner- MERALCO.
company-employer is liable for damages Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana
under Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the
Code. complaint for damages, together with their
children, Isaac Chaves Jr. and Rosendo
HELD: Yes. The cause of action of the private Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and Rosendo
respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac Sr.
New Civil Code. As well as on respondent's And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and
breach of contract thru the negligence of its Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural
own employees. Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves
was a public school teacher.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged Private respondents became the customer of
in the business of receiving and transmitting petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or
messages. Every time a person transmits a about the end of March, 1965, petitioner
message through the facilities of the Yambao went to the residence of private
petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon respondents and presented two overdue bills,
receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner one for January 11 to February 9, 1965, for
undertakes to transmit the message the sum of P7.90, and the other for February 9
accurately. There is no question that in the to March 10, 1965, for the sum of P7.20.
case at bar, libelous matters were included in On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the
the message transmitted, without the consent main office of petitioner but paid only one bill,
or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear for January 11 to February 9, 1965, leaving
case of breach of contract by the petitioner in the other bill unpaid. Thereafter, on April 21,
adding extraneous and libelous matters in the 1965, petitioner caused the electric service in
message sent to the private respondent. As a private respondents residence to be
corporation, the petitioner can act only discontinued and the power line cut off. On
23
the following day, Rosendo went to narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
petitioners main office and paid the unpaid constructed by defendants Santoses along
bill. The power line was restored at about 7:00 their property which is also along the first
pm on the same day. passageway. Defendant Morato constructed
Private respondents filed an action for her adobe fence and even extended said
recovery of damages for embarrassment, fence in such a way that the entire
humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride passageway was enclosed. As a result, the
by reason of the disconnection of their electric tenants left the apartment because there was
service by the petitioner. no longer a permanent access -ingress and
The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of engress to the public street.
private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay The private respondents filed an action for the
private respondent moral damages, grant of an easement of right of way. The trial
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. court ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff
The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial permanent access ingress and egress, to
courts decision. Respondent Court stressed the public street and that in turn, the private
the importance and necessity of 48 hour respondent will pay a sum of Php 8000 to the
advance written notification before the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent
disconnection of service may be effected. use of the passageway. On appeal by the
private respondent to the CA, the latter Court
ISSUE: Whether advance written affirmed the decision of the lower court as to
notification before the disconnection of give a right of way to the private respondents
service may be effected? and awarded the latter actual, moral and
exemplary damages. For this, petitioner
RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility appealed to the SC questioning the award of
having monopoly of the supply of electrical damages.
power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities. Being such, the State may ISSUE: Whether or not the award of
regulate the conditions under which the damages is proper?
manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the
service to delinquent customer. Among Court of Appeals will show that the award of
others, a prior written notice to the customer damages was based solely on the fact that
is required before disconnection of service. the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred
Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
tort. the tenants vacated the leased premises by
reason of the closure of the passageway.
23) CUSTUDIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996. suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
FACTS: damages, there must be both a right of action
Herein private respondents owned a parcel of for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,
land wherein a two-storey apartment building and damage resulting to the plaintiff
was constituted therein, for this, tenants then therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
were occupying the latter building. Such without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
property was surrounded by other action, since damages are merely part of the
immovables (houses) owned by herein remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before breach or wrong. There is a material
reaching the property of the private distinction between damages and injury.
respondents from the P. Burgos St. there were Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
two passage ways in between the said other damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
immovable, but however, they were only results from the injury, and damages are the
narrow paths. recompense or compensation awarded for the
After sometimes, the petitioners constructed damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
adobe fence in the first passageway making it without injury in those instances in which the
24
loss or harm was not the result of a violation

of a legal duty. These situations are often 24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
called damnum absque injuria. In order that a G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.
plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must FACTS:
establish that such injuries resulted from a On 27 October 1987, private respondent,
breach of duty which the defendant owed to without the assistance of counsel, filed with
the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the the aforesaid trial court a complaint for
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person damages against the petitioner for the alleged
causing it. violation of their agreement to get married.
She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22
In the case at bar, although there was years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of
damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to good moral character and reputation duly
the claim of private respondents, petitioners respected in her community; petitioner, on
could not be said to have violated the the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing
principle of abuse of right. In order that the at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
principle of abuse of right provided in Article City, and is an exchange student taking a
21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
essential that the following requisites concur: Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is
(1) The defendant should have acted in a an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette,
manner that is contrary to morals, good Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City and that the
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should parties happened to know each other when
be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury the Manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid the plaintiff; the latter courted and proposed
exercise of their right as owners, hence not to marry her; she accepted his love on the
contrary to morals, good customs or public condition that they would get married; they
policy. The law recognizes in the owner the therefore agreed to get married after the end
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without of the school semester, which was in October
other limitations than those established by of that year; petitioner then visited the
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as private respondent's parents in Baaga,
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval
Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land the petitioner forced her to live with him in
or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
or dead hedges, or by any other means before she began living with him; as a result
without detriment to servitudes constituted of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
thereon. pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff
At the time of the construction of the fence, continued to live with defendant and kept
the lot was not subject to any servitudes. reminding him of his promise to marry her
There was no easement of way existing in until he told her that he could not do so
favor of private respondents, either by law or because he was already married to a girl in
by contract. The fact that private respondents Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed
had no existing right over the said for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay
passageway is confirmed by the very decision her damages in the amount of not less than
of the trial court granting a compulsory right P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
of way in their favor after payment of just expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
compensation. It was only that decision which fees and costs, and granting her such other
gave private respondents the right to use the relief and remedies as may be just and
said passageway after payment of the equitable.
compensation and imposed a corresponding In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
duty on petitioners not to interfere in the claimed that he never proposed marriage to
exercise of said right. or agreed to be married with the private
25
respondent; he neither sought the consent even if he had made a promise to marry, the
and approval of her parents nor forced her to subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
but only told her to stop coming to his place upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
because he discovered that she had deceived Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
him by stealing his money and passport. take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
After trial on the merits, the lower court, basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling
applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered that he does not possess good moral
a decision favoring the private respondent. character. Moreover, his controversial
The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the "common law wife" is now his legal wife as
latter damages and attorney's fees. their marriage had been solemnized in civil
The decision is anchored on the trial court's ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner unlawful cohabitation with the private
and private respondent were lovers, (b) respondent, petitioner claims that even if
private respondent is not a woman of loose responsibility could be pinned on him for the
morals or questionable virtue who readily live-in relationship, the private respondent
submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, should also be faulted for consenting to an
through machinations, deceit and false illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
pretenses, promised to marry private asseverates that even if it was to be assumed
respondent, (d) because of his persuasive arguendo that he had professed his love to
promise to marry her, she allowed herself to the private respondent and had also promised
be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that to marry her, such acts would not be
deceitful promise, private respondent and her actionable in view of the special
parents in accordance with Filipino customs circumstances of the case. The mere breach
and traditions made some preparations for of promise is not actionable.
the wedding that was to be held at the end of The existing rule is that a breach of promise
October 1987 by looking for pigs and to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and Congress deliberately eliminated from the
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such would have made it so. The reason therefor is
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and set forth in the report of the Senate
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from
offended our sense of morality, good customs, which We quote:
culture and traditions. "The elimination of this chapter is proposed.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling. That breach of promise to marry is not
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed actionable has been definitely decided in the
the instant petition. case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the and in England has shown that no other action
Civil Code applies to the case at bar. lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said this experience which has led to the abolition
Article 21 is not applicable because he had of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
not committed any moral wrong or injury or suits in many of the American states .."
violated any good custom or public policy; he This notwithstanding, the said Code contains
has not professed love or proposed marriage a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
to the private respondent; and he has never expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions remedy for the untold number of moral
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since wrongs which is impossible for human
he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. in the statute books.
As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that quasi-delict thus:
26
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage manner contrary to morals, good customs or
to another, there being fault or negligence, is public policy.
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such In the instant case, respondent Court found
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
contractual relation between the parties, is deceptive protestations of love for and
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the promise to marry plaintiff that made her
provisions of this Chapter." is limited to surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
negligent acts or omissions and excludes the and to live with him on the honest and sincere
notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, belief that he would keep said promise, and it
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa was likewise these fraud and deception on
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
an Anglo-American or common law concept. agree to their daughter's living-in with him
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
because it includes not only negligence, but short, the private respondent surrendered her
intentional criminal acts as well such as virginity, the cherished possession of every
assault and battery, false imprisonment and single Filipina, not because of lust but
deceit. because of moral seduction the kind
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal illustrated by the Code Commission in its
system envisioned by the Commission example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, could not be held liable for criminal seduction
intentional and malicious acts with certain punished under either Article 337 or Article
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions private respondent was above eighteen (18)
are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil years of age at the time of the seduction.
Code. In between these opposite spectrums
are injurious acts which, in the absence of We are unable to agree with the petitioner's
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. alternative proposition to the effect that
Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even granting, for argument's sake, that he did
postulated that together with Articles 19 and promise to marry the private respondent, the
20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly latter is nevertheless also at fault. According
broadened the scope of the law on civil to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
wrongs; it has become much more supple and pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
torts. Marcos, the private respondent cannot
In the light of the above laudable purpose of recover damages from the petitioner. The
Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, latter even goes as far as stating that if the
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact private respondent had "sustained any injury
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
love by a woman and his representation to because of her own doing."
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the These statements reveal the true character
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic,
reality, no intention of marrying her and that regard for the private respondent on account
the promise was only a subtle scheme or of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to educational background, poverty and, as
accept him and to obtain her consent to the perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
sexual act, could justify the award of damages Obviously then, from the very beginning, he
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such was not at all moved by good faith and an
promise to marry but because of the fraud honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to circumstanced could not have even remotely
her honor and reputation which followed occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such and promise to marry were empty words
injury should have been committed in a directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing
27
that indeed, he loved her and would want her Marta, the land was inherited by her son
to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor
lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina informed respondents that, for being lessees
who honestly believed that by accepting his of the land for more than twenty (20) years,
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she they would have a right of first refusal to buy
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989,
security. Petitioner clearly violated the without the knowledge of respondents, the
Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly land occupied by them was sold to petitioner
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately
their women. It can even be said that the secure title to the property in her name.
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the
Code which directs every person to act with "Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in
justice, give everyone his due and observe favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his upon their right of first refusal.
rights and in the performance of his The Office of the Building Official issued a
obligations. resolution ordering the demolition of the
No foreigner must be allowed to make a houses of respondents. The following day
mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers
case for while indeed, the private respondent to commence the demolition of respondents'
may not have been impelled by the purest of houses. Due to the timely intervention of a
intentions, she eventually submitted to the mobile unit of the Western Police District, the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, intended demolition did not take place
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is following talks between petitioner Rellosa and
apparent that she had qualms of conscience counsel who pleaded that the demolition be
about the entire episode for as soon as she suspended since the order sought to be
found out that the petitioner was not going to implemented was not yet final and executory.
marry her after all, she left him. She is not, On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. appeal contesting the order of the Office of
Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar the Building Official. On 12 December 1989,
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal petitioners once again hired workers and
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she proceeded with the demolition of respondents'
is merely in delicto. houses.
We should stress, however, that while We find Respondents filed Civil Case before the
for the private respondent, let it not be said Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that
that this Court condones the deplorable petitioners be ordered to pay moral and
behavior of her parents in letting her and the exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
petitioner stay together in the same room in fees, for the untimely demolition of the
their house after giving approval to their houses.
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to The RTC dismissed the complaint of
protect the honor of their daughters and respondents and instead ordered them to pay
infuse upon them the higher values of petitioners moral damages.
morality and dignity. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay
25) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS respondents of moral damages, exemplary
G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001. damages and Attorney's fees.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not there is a

Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, premature demolition
owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate,
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the
the land which, over the years, underwent Court of Appeals that there was a premature
continuous improvements. After the demise of
28
demolition. Hence, the petitioners should pay Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.
damages to the lessees. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity participate as one of the bidders. After the
guaranteed under a constitution, statute or public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid
decisional law, or recognized as a result of was accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was
long usage, constitutive of a legally conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which
enforceable claim of one person against was received by PHIBRO on July 15, 1987.
another. On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to
The exercise of these rights is not without NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon
limitations. The abuse of rights rule plague Australia, the shipment's point of
established in Article 19 of the Civil Code origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's
requires every person to act with justice, to ability to supply the needed coal. From July 23
give everyone his due; and to observe to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised
honesty and good faith. When a right is NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
exercised in a manner which discards these particularly informing the latter that the ship
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal owners therein are not willing to load cargo
wrong is committed for which the actor can unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in
be held accountable. the charter party or the contract of carriage.
At the time petitioners implemented the order In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO
of demolition, barely five days after proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally share
respondents received a copy thereof, the the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR
same was not yet final and executory. The law refused.
provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from
favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of
ruling of the Office of the Building Official but credit. Instead of delivering the coal on or
by the precipitate action of petitioners in before the thirtieth day after receipt of the
demolishing the houses of respondents (prior Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties
to the expiration of the period to appeal), the in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first
latter were effectively deprived of this shipment only on November 17, 1987.
recourse. The fact that the order of demolition Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR
was later affirmed by the Department of once more advertised for the delivery of coal
Public Works and Highways was of no to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO
moment. The action of petitioners up to the participated anew in this subsequent bidding.
point where they were able to secure an order On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR
of demolition was not condemnable but disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-
implementing the order unmindful of the right qualification to bid for not meeting the
of respondents to contest the ruling was a minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry,
different matter and could only be held utterly PHIBRO found that the real reason for the
indefensible. disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy
NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the
delay in the delivery of the first coal
shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for
damages with application for injunction
26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial
PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC. Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint,
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001 PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of
disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding
FACTS: and in all subsequent biddings was tainted
On May 14, 1987, the National Power with malice and bad faith.
Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to
bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000 ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its
metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas right or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, from the public bidding.
29
Alfred was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal,

RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
any contract to approve PHIBRO's pre- the RTC in toto.
qualification requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR
had expressly reserved its right to reject bids ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled
as provided in its Instruction to Bidders found to recover the said properties?
in the "Post-Qualification
Documents/Specifications for the Supply and RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the
Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired negative. The contention of petitioner Frenzel
Thermal Power Plant I. that to bar him from recovering the properties
would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civil
27) FRENZEL vs. CATITO Code on unjust enrichment did not hold water.
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 It must be remembered that a contract which
violates the Constitution and the laws is void
FACTS: and vests no rights and creates no
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian obligations. It does not produce any legal
citizen of German descent who was married to effect. His reliance on Article 22 is misplaced
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as because in this case, the action is proscribed
a pilot for New Guinea Airlines. On the other by the Constitution or the parties are in pari
hand, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito delicto. This is founded on the general
was married to Klaus Muller, a German principles of public policy. It must be
national. She worked as a masseuse in the remembered that Alfred knew all along that
Kings Cross nightclub in Sydney, Australia. he was disqualified from purchasing lands. His
The two met when Alfred went on a vacation contention that he entered into the
in Sydney. They met again and this time, transaction because he was expecting that he
Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop and Ederlina will get married in the future is
working and to go back to the Philippines. not a valid one. He also knew that he cannot
When she returned to the Philippines, she was get married to Ederlina because he still had a
given money by Alfred to put up a beauty valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to
be able to purchase a house and lot in San 28) REYES vs. LIM
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. But since he G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
was aware that aliens were prohibited to
purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as FACTS:
the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim
bank accounts with the Hong Kong and entered into a Contract to sell a parcel of land
Shanghai Banking Corporation in Kowloon, located in F.B. Harrison, St. The parties
Hong Kong. Also, there were subsequent stipulated that Lim shall pay a down payment
purchases of other real and personal of P10 Million of the P28 Million purchase
properties. These were made on the price. On one hand, Reyes shall ensure that
anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and the lessee of the property, Harrison Lumber,
Ederlina will get married soon. However, this shall have vacated the lot upon payment of
failed to materialize because of the fact that the balance.
Ederlina was still married to Klaus. Ederlina The day to consummate the contract arrived
failed to secure a divorce from Klaus. This however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated
exasperated Alfred and eventually their the land. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had
relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred already sold the lot to Line One Food
filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City Corporation. Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for
for recovery of real and personal properties. specific performance and nullification of the
He demanded from Ederlina that she return all subsequent contract of sale plus damages.
the money that were used to purchase the The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in
properties and also the properties which were favor of Lim.
bought, especially the house and lot and Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily
three other lots. However, the complaint of contends that the CA erred in affirming the
30
RTC Decision when it was based on equity. The respondents bid was rejected by
Petitioner argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the petitioner and the Commission on Audit.
Rules on Civil Procedure which should be But since there was no other bidder,
applied. petitioner entered into a negotiated sale with
respondent. After several negotiations,
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of respondent increased its offer to $18.5 million
petitioner is tenable. which was accepted by petitioner.
Accordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the Award to respondent of the sale of the NSCP
case involves an issue left unanswerable due shares and vessels for $18.5 million.petitioner
to silence or insufficiency of the law and the and respondent executed the corresponding
rules of court. At this instance, Article 9 of the Contract of Sale, and the latter acquired
Civil Code expressly mandates the Court to NSCP, its assets, personnel, records and its
make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or three (3) vessels.
insufficiency of the law. This calls for equity After a while, respondent was surprised to
which fills open spaces in the law. receive from the US Department of Treasury,
Before rescission of the contract can be had, Internal Revenue Service (US IRS), a Notice of
the parties must be restored to their status Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency
quo ante. This was ordered by the Court. taxes on gross transportation income derived
To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the from US sources for the years ending 1990,
detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the 1991 and 1992.
Civil Code which provides that no person Anxious that the delay in the payment of the
shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of deficiency taxes may hamper its shipping
another. Article 22 applies to substantive as operations overseas, assumed and paid
well as procedural remedies. petitioners tax liabilities, including the tax
Therefore, the decision of the Court of due for the year 1993.Eventually, respondent
Appeals is affirmed. demanded from petitioner reimbursement for
the amounts it paid to the US IRS. But
29) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY petitioner refused despite repeated demands.
vs. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES Hence, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
CORPORATION Court complaint against petitioner for
G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003 reimbursement and damages
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
FACTS: respondent and against petitioner. The trial
The National Development Company, court found, among others, that even before
petitioner, is a government-owned and the sale, petitioner knew that NSCP had tax
controlled corporation. petitioners Board of liabilities with the US IRS, yet it did not inform
Directors approved the privatization plan of respondent about it.
the NSCP. In May 1993, the Board offered for Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
sale to the public its one hundred percent Decision affirming the trial courts judgment
(100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as its with modification. Hence this petition.
three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V National
Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V National ISSUE:
Dignity). Whether or not petitioner is legally bound to
Consequently, petitioner released to the reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid
public an Information Package containing corresponding to the formers tax liabilities to
NSCPs background, assets, operational and the US IRS.
financial status.
During the public bidding the lone bidder was HELD:
herein respondent, Madrigal Wan Hai Lines The case at bar calls to mind the principle of
Corporation, a domestic private corporation. unjust enrichment Nemo cum alterius
Mr. Willie J. Uy, respondents Consultant, detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall
submitted a bid of $15 million through the be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
Proposal Letter Form. expense of others. This principle of equity
31
has been enshrined in our Civil Code, Article except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all
22 of which provides: of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or that it was committed with evident
performance by another or by any other premeditation.
means, acquires or comes into possession of The Court of First Instance of Camarines
something at the expense of the latter Norte, rendered a decision finding the
without just or legal ground, shall return the accused guilty.
same to him. The petitioners appealed the judgment of
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner conviction to the Court of Appeals. the Court
be held liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision
reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. but with modification
It would be unjust enrichment on the part of hence this petition.
petitioner to be relieved of that obligation.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court
30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, committed a reversible error in requiring the
ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
BEDENIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS complainants after acquitting them from the
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 criminal charge.
FACTS: HELD:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around The extinction of the civil action by reason of
9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the acquittal in the criminal case refers
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa,
above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability
Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David which is also extinguished upon acquittal of
Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, the accused is the civil liability arising from
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., the act as a crime.
Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Extinction of the penal action does not carry
Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by with it extinction of the civil, unless the
confederating and mutually helping one extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
another, and acting without any authority of final judgment that the fact from which the
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, civil might arise did not exist. In other cases,
and feloniously, by means of threats, force the person entitled to the civil action may
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the
family to close their stall located at the Public manner provided by law against the person
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, who may be liable for restitution of the thing
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently and reparation or indemnity for the damage
forcibly opening the door of said stall and suffered.
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
said stall and the furnitures therein by axes liability of the accused for damages only when
and other massive instruments, and carrying it includes a declaration that the facts from
away the goods, wares and merchandise, to which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus,
the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio the civil liability is not extinguished by
Vergara and his family in the amount of acquittal where the acquittal is based on
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
compensatory and moral damages, and 286) as only preponderance of evidence is
further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary required in civil cases; where the court
damages. expressly declares that the liability of the
That in committing the offense, the accused accused is not criminal but only civil in nature
took advantage of their public positions: Roy (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v.
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies
and the rest of the accused being policemen, of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
32
committed by certain relatives who thereby awarding damages despite a judgment of

incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised acquittal.
Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision
not arise from or is not based upon the of the respondent Court of Appeals and
criminal act of which the accused was dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal SO ORDERED.
Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p.
623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides
that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal
is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code
provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages
in the same criminal action. The two can
stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal
operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It
does not, however, extinguish the civil liability
unless there is clear showing that the act from
which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A separate civil action may be warranted
where additional facts have to be established
or more evidence must be adduced or where
the criminal case has been fully terminated
and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a
timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file
a separate action. These do not exist in this
case. Considering moreover the delays
suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
33
III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo

Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of
31) DONATO VS. LUNA Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that private
160 SCRA 441 respondents were the legitimate possessors of
FACTS: a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at
against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their
Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of favor by the former Land Tenure
marriage to petitioner because of a prior Administration ; that under cover of darkness,
marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner petitioner surreptitiously and by force,
claimed that his 2nd marriage was void intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered
because it was solemnized without a valid into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed
marriage license and that violence, intimation bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and
and undue influence were employed by Paz to thereafter began the construction of a house
obtain his consent. thereon;
Prior to the date set for the trial of the After hearing, the municipal court denied the
criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to motion to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as
suspend the proceedings of the case because the issue involved in the case was the
the civil action raises a prejudicial question recovery of physical possession, the court had
which must first be determined before the jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
criminal case can proceed. Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed
before the then Court of First Instance of
ISSUE: Rizal, a petition for certiorari with injunction
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the against public respondent Judge and private
civil case of annulment of marriage on the respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
question? judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment
case until after the resolution of said petition
HELD: Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not the petition, maintaining that the
obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that administrative case did not constitute a
the issue before the JDRC touching upon the prejudicial question as it involved the
nullity of the second marriage is not question of ownership, unlike the ejectment
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or case which involved merely the question of
innocence in the crime of bigamy. possession.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent
herein private respondent Paz Abayan who Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No.
filed the complaint for annulment of the 2nd C-1576 alleging the pendency of an
marriage on the ground that her consent was administrative case between the same parties
obtained through deceit. on the same subject matter and praying that
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the the petition for certiorari be granted, the
judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage ejectment complaint be dismissed and the
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for Office of the Land Authority be allowed to
bigamy. decide the matter exclusively.
32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ISSUE:

ADRIANO OSORIO whether or not the administrative case
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988 between the private parties involving the lot
subject matter of the ejectment case
FACTS: constitutes a prejudicial question which would
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
private respondents Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe HELD:
34
A prejudicial question is understood in law to possession is lost and so would their right to
be that which arises in a case the resolution eject petitioner from said portion.
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue Faced with these distinct possibilities, the
involved in said case and the cognizance of more prudent course for the trial court to
which pertains to another tribunal.The have taken is to hold the ejectment
doctrine of prejudicial question comes into proceedings in abeyance until after a
play generally in a situation where civil and determination of the administrative case.
criminal actions are pending and the issues Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
involved in both cases are similar or so closely jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the
related that an issue must be pre-emptively parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
resolved in the civil case before the criminal possibility of petitioner's right of possession
action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a being upheld in the pending administrative
prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in case is to needlessly require not only the
the criminal case to cause the suspension of parties but the court as well to expend time,
the latter pending final determination of the effort and money in what may turn out to be a
former. sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d
The essential elements of a prejudicial tells us:
question as provided under Section 5, Rule The court in which an action is pending may,
111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon
civil action involves an issue similar or proper application for a stay of that action,
intimately related to the issue in the criminal hold the action in abeyance to abide the
action; and [b] the resolution of such issue outcome of another pending in another court,
determines whether or not the criminal action especially where the parties and the issues
may proceed. are the same, for there is power inherent in
The actions involved in the case at bar being every court to control the disposition of
respectively civil and administrative in causes on its dockets with economy of time
character, it is obvious that technically, there and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally litigants. Where the rights parties to the
apparent, however, is the intimate correlation second action cannot be properly determined
between said two [2] proceedings, stemming until the questions raised in the first action
from the fact that the right of private are settled the second action should be
respondents to eject petitioner from the stayed.
disputed portion depends primarily on the While this rule is properly applicable to
resolution of the pending administrative case. instances involving two [2] court actions, the
For while it may be true that private existence in the instant case of the same
respondents had prior possession of the lot in considerations of Identity of parties and
question, at the time of the institution of the issues, economy of time and effort for the
ejectment case, such right of possession had court, the counsels and the parties as well as
been terminated, or at the very least, the need to resolve the parties' right of
suspended by the cancellation by the Land possession before the ejectment case may be
Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in properly determined, justifies the rule's
their favor. Whether or not private analogous application to the case at bar.
respondents can continue to exercise their If a pending civil case may be considered to
right of possession is but a necessary, logical be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an
consequence of the issue involved in the administrative case, We see no reason why
pending administrative case assailing the the reverse may not be so considered in the
validity of the cancellation of the Agreement proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
to Sell and the subsequent award of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
disputed portion to petitioner. If the GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby
subsequent award to petitioner are voided, ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.
then private respondents would have every SO ORDERED.
right to eject petitioner from the disputed
area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of
35
33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and whether the question of ownership of Lot No.
LEONILO JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No.
FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying
and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL case against petitioners.
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
HELD:
FACTS: We hold that it is.
the above-named accused [herein petitioners A prejudicial question is a question which is
Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio based on a fact distinct and separate from the
Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and crime but so intimately connected with it that
mutually helping with one another, without its resolution is determinative of the guilt or
the knowledge and consent of the owner, innocence of the accused. To justify
ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, suspension of the criminal action, it must
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of appear not only that the civil case involves
the absence or tolerance of the said owner by facts intimately related to those upon which
occupying or possessing a portion of her real the criminal prosecution is based but also that
property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they the decision of the issue or issues raised in
constructed their respective residential the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or
houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, 5
acts of the said accused have deprived the provides:
latter of the use of a portion of her land, to Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question.
her damage and prejudice because despite The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
repeated demands the said accused failed questions are: (a) the civil action involves an
and refused, as they still fail and refuse to issue similar or intimately related to the issue
vacate the premises above-mentioned. raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their resolution of such issue determines whether
arraignment on the ground that there was a or not the criminal action may proceed.
prejudicial question pending resolution in In the criminal case, the question is whether
another case being tried in Branch 27 of the petitioners occupied a piece of land not
same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case belonging to them but to private respondent
No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and and against the latter's will. As already noted,
Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and the information alleges that "without the
Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA
of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. possession of a portion of "her property" by
13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of building their houses thereon and "deprived
the lot in question among them and private [her] of the use of portion of her land to her
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno damage and prejudice.
and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in Now the ownership of the land in question,
1990 by petitioners, three years before May known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre
27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil
was filed against them. Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the
the trial court denied the petitioners' motion RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution,
and proceeded with their arraignment. therefore, of this question would necessarily
Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea be determinative of petitioners criminal
(not guilty) to the charge. liability for squatting.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
but their motion was denied by the court in its respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until
petition. the question of ownership in Civil Case No.
2247-L has been resolved with finality and
ISSUE: thereafter proceed with the trial of the
criminal case if the civil case is decided and
36
terminated adversely against petitioners. The pendency of the case for declaration of
Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal nullity of petitioners marriage is not a
case. prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
SO ORDERED. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to
a criminal action as to cause the suspension
34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE of the latter pending the final determination
334 SCRA 106 of the civil case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the same facts
FACTS: upon which the criminal prosecution would be
Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene based, but also that in the resolution of the
Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
Cubao, Quezon City. After 24 years of would necessarily be determined.
marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226
the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of
nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of purposes of remarriage, the only legally
the Family Code. In her Answer to said acceptable bases for declaring a previous
petition, petitioners wife alleged that it was marriage an absolute nullity is a final
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home judgment declaring such previous marriage
and lived with a certain woman named void, whereas, for purposes of other than
Milagros Salting. She then filed a criminal remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
case for concubinage against petitioner and So, that in a case for concubinage, the
his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial accused, like the herein petitioner need not
Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner, in order to present a final judgment declaring his
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest other than proof of a final judgment declaring
in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the his marriage void for he can adduce evidence
pendency of the civil case for declaration of in the criminal case of the nullity of his
nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial marriage other than proof of a final judgment
question to the determination of the criminal declaring his marriage void.
case. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the With regard to petitioners argument that he
motion, so was with a Motion for could be acquitted of the charge of
Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the concubinage should his marriage be declared
RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the null and void, suffice it to state that even a
Orders issued by Judge Cervantes. The RTC subsequent pronouncement that his marriage
denied the petition also a Motion for is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO
VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO
ISSUE: VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held
Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a that: xxx Assuming that the first marriage
prejudicial question in a criminal case for was null and void on the ground alleged by
concubinage? petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to
HELD: the marriage should not be permitted to judge
The rationale behind the principle of for themselves its nullity, for the same must
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting be submitted to the judgment of the
decisions. It has two (2) essential elements: a) competent courts and only when the nullity of
the civil action involves an issue similar or the marriage is so declared can it be held as
intimately related to the issue raised in the void, and so long as there is no such
criminal action; and b) the resolution of such declaration the presumption is that the
issue determines whether or not the criminal marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
action may proceed. second marriage before the judicial
37
declaration of nullity of the first marriage redeeming the property, the petitioners filed,
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale
bigamy. against the respondent bank and the Sheriff.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held After the expiration of the one-year
that parties to the marriage should not be redemption period, the respondent
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
for the same must be submitted to the property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was
judgment of the competent courts and only issued by the Register of Deeds in its name.
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a
can it be held as void, and so long as there is Petition for Writ of Possession.
no such declaration the presumption is that ISSUE:
the marriage exists for all intents and whether or not the complaint of the
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for
woman not his wife before the judicial annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes question to the petition of the respondent
the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. bank for the issuance of a writ of possession
The lower court therefore, has not erred in in LRC Case No.
affirming the Orders of the judge of the HELD:
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency The contentions of the petitioners have no
of a civil action for nullity of marriage does merit.
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal A prejudicial question is one that arises in a
case of concubinage case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and the cognizance of which pertains to another
LOLITA T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional situation where a civil action and a criminal
Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, action are both pending and there exists in
DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court- the former an issue that must be
Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and preemptively resolved before the criminal
TRUST COMPANY action may proceed, because howsoever the
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004 issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the
FACTS: guilt or innocence of the accused in the
the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita criminal case. The rationale behind the
Pahang, received a short-term loan of one principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
million five hundred thousand pesos conflicting decisions.
(P1,500,000.00) from the respondent In the present case, the complaint of the
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. The loan petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale
was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory is a civil action and the respondents petition
Note and was, likewise, secured by a real for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot
estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered . No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No.
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the 44668 is but an incident in the land
interest and the penalties due thereon, the registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial
respondent foreclosed the real estate question can arise from the existence of the
mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, two actions.
the mortgaged property was sold at public It bears stressing that the proceedings in a
auction to the respondent bank as the petition and/or motion for the issuance of a
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was writ of possession, after the lapse of the
executed by Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the statutory period for redemption, is summary
respondent and was registered with the in nature.The trial court is mandated to issue
Register of Deeds. a writ of possession upon a finding of the
the respondent wrote the petitioners that the lapse of the statutory period for redemption
one-year redemption period of the property without the redemptioner having redeemed
would expire on January 27, 1999. Instead of the property. It cannot be validly argued that
38
the trial court abused its discretion when it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in
merely complied with its ministerial duty to Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them, or in
issue the said writ of possession. the alternative, to hold in abeyance the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition proceedings therein until after the final
is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision determination of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469.
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. However, NUI avers that the rule on
Cost against the petitioners. prejudicial question finds no application
SO ORDERED. between the civil complaint below and the
case before the SEC as the rule presupposes
36) ABACAN vs. NORTHWESTERN the pendency of a civil action and a criminal
UNIVERSITY, INC action; and even assuming arguendo that the
G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005 issues pending before the SEC bear a
similarity to the cause of action below, the
FACTS: complaint of NUI can stand and proceed
Two opposing factions within separately from the SEC case inasmuch as
respondent Northwestern University, Inc. there is no identity in the reliefs prayed for.
(NUI), the Castro and the Nicolas factions,
seek control as the legitimate board thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not there is prejudicial
These two factions are parties to Securities question in this case.
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-
96-5469, which is an action filed by the RULING: Yes. Considering the rationale
Nicolas faction to nullify the election of the behind the principle of prejudicial question,
directors of NUI belonging to the Castro being to avoid two conflicting decisions,
faction and SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 which prudence dictates that we apply the principle
is a counter-suit initiated by the Castro underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.
faction seeking the nullification of several A prejudicial question is that which
board resolutions passed by the Nicolas arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
faction. logical antecedent of the issue involved
On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing therein and the cognizance of which pertains
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued an Order to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
authorizing the Castro faction and the must be determinative of the case before the
Metropolitan Bank Laoag City branch to court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it
withdraw the amount of P2.5M from the must be lodged in another court or tribunal.
account of NUI with said bank. Metrobank thru In the case at bar, the question of
Petitioner Abacan, complied and released P1.4 which between the Castro and the Nicolas
M in favor of the Castro faction. The factions are the de jure board of directors of
Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint
complaint for estafa against the Castro before the RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges
faction as well as the petitioners herein who that petitioners, together with their co-
are officers of Metrobank, however the defendants, comprised of the Castro faction,
criminal case was later dismissed insofar as wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M
petitioners are concerned. from the account of NUI with Metrobank.
Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the
against Castro faction and petitioner on the Nicolas faction is a duly elected member of
ground that the corporate funds of NUI the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to
deposited with said bank in the sum of P1.4 M institute the herein complaint in behalf of the
was withdrawn without the knowledge, NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the
consent or approval of NUI to the grave and case pending before it. It would finally
serious damage and prejudice of the latter. determine whether Castro, et al. legally
Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to withdrew the subject amount from the bank
dismiss alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96- and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the
5469 must take precedence over the civil complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI.
case since it is a logical antecedent to the It is petitioners claim, and we agree, that the
issue of standing in said case. Petitioners then presence or absence of their liability for
39
allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the

account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the
Castro faction is reliant on the findings of
the SEC as to which of the two factions is the
de jure board. Since the determination of the
SEC as to which of the two factions is the de
jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of
the case before the RTC. Hence, the trial court
should suspend its proceedings until the SEC
comes out with its findings.
40
IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial
court predicated the award of damages in the
37) Antonio Gelus v. Court of Appeals sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961 initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This the Court
Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary believes to be error, for the said article, in
damages on account of personal injury or fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it death of a person, does not cover the case of
is easy to see that if no action for such an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
damages could be instituted on behalf of the personality; being incapable of having rights
unborn child on account of the injuries it and obligations.
received, no such right of action could
deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In Since an action for pecuniary damages
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on on account of personal injury or death
behalf of the unborn child, the same was pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no to see that if no action for such damages
transmission to anyone can take place from could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
one that lacked of juridical personality under child on account of the injuries it received, no
Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly such right of action could deliberately accrue
limits such provisional personality by to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
imposing the condition that the child should of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
be subsequently alive. child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone
Reyes, JBL, J. can take place from one that lacked of
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the juridical personality under Article 40 of the
petitioner, a physician, for the first time in Civil Code, which expressly limits such
1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. The provisional personality by imposing the
said physician made three abortions on condition that the child should be
Villanueva on the following circumstances: (1) subsequently alive.
In 1950, when she became pregnant by her
present husband, Oscar Lazo, before they Both the trial court and the Court of
were legally married, and she deisred to Appeals have not found any basis for an
conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) award of moral damages, evidently because
after their marriage, her second pregnancy of Lazos indifference to the previous
proved to be inconvenient as she was then abortions of his wife, also caused by the
working for the COMELEC; and lastly (3) on petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was
February 21, 1955 she was aborted of a 2- unconcerned with the frustration of his
month old fetus for the amount of P50.00. parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of
Upon knowing of the last abortion, the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
Lazo filed a complaint for damages against the appellee Lazo was aware of the second
Geluz, claiming that he did not know of, nor abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
gave his consent, to the abortion. likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of appeared to have taken no steps to
Lazo and against Geluz, ordering the latter to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof,
pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 and secure the punishment of the responsible
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On practitioner. Even after learning of the third
appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the abortion, the appellee does not seem to have
award. taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper. concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
41
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons
"indemnity" claim that, under the with dual citizenship are disqualified from
circumstances of record, was clearly running for any elective position.
exaggerated. The respondent admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
It is unquestionable that the under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-
appellant's act in provoking the abortion of 31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
warrant it, was a criminal and morally father and a Filipino mother. He was born in
reprehensible act, that can not be too the United States, San Francisco, California,
severely condemned; and the consent of the on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
woman or that of her husband does not American citizen under US Laws. But
excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of notwithstanding his registration as an
the act does not justify an award of damage American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
that, under the circumstances on record, have citizenship.
no factual or legal basis. It would appear that respondent Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other
words, he holds dual citizenship.
ISSUE:
V. CITIZENSHIP Whether or not Private Respondent Manzano
is disqualified from the position for which he
38) Mercado vs. Manzano filed his certificate of candidacy.
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
HELD: NO.
Doctrine: He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by
Dual citizenship is different from dual operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
allegiance. The former arises when, as a as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
result of the concurrent application of the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his
different laws of two or more states, a person parents brought him to the Philippines using
is simultaneously considered a national by the an American passport as travel document.
said states. Dual allegiance, on the other His parents also registered him as an alien
hand, refers to the situation in which a person with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, was issued an alien certificate of registration.
loyalty to two or more states. While dual This, however, did not result in the loss of his
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
the result of an individuals volition. Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath
of allegiance to the United States.
FACTS: It is an undisputed fact that when respondent
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private attained the age of majority, he registered
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were himself as a voter, and voted in the elections
candidates for vice mayor of the City of of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The renounced his US citizenship under American
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
The proclamation of private respondent was U.S. citizenship.
suspended in view of a pending petition for Dual citizenship is different from dual
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto allegiance. The former arises when, as a
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent result of the concurrent application of the
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the different laws of two or more states, a person
United States. is simultaneously considered a national by the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and said states. Dual allegiance, on the other
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of hand, refers to the situation in which a person
candidacy of private respondent on the simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under loyalty to two or more states. While dual
42
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is certificate.2 She presented a clearance from

the result of an individuals volition. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. further show the consistency in her use of the
7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must surname "Yu".
be understood as referring to dual Second, she claims that her fathers name in
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co
dual citizenship do not fall under this Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To
disqualification. Unlike those with dual (Co Tian)."
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese
strict process with respect to the termination when it should have been Filipino considering
of their status, for candidates with dual that her father and mother never got married.
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing Only her deceased father was Chinese, while
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect her mother is Filipina. She claims that her
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status being a registered voter attests to the fact
as persons with dual citizenship considering that she is a Filipino citizen.
that their condition is the unavoidable Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her
consequence of conflicting laws of different birth certificate that she was a legitimate
states. child when she should have been described as
The filing of such certificate of candidacy illegitimate considering that her parents were
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, never married.
effectively removing any disqualification he Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified
might have as a dual citizen. that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a that she and her daughters father were never
permanent resident or immigrant of another married because the latter had a prior
country; that he will defend and support the subsisting marriage contracted in China.
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true In this connection, respondent presented a
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does certification attested by officials of the local
so without mental reservation, private civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan,
respondent has, as far as the laws of this Lanao del Norte that there is no record of
country are concerned, effectively repudiated marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To
his American citizenship and anything which from 1948 to the present.
he may have said before as a dual The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of
citizen.Petition dismissed Iligan City, did not present any evidence
although it actively participated in the
proceedings by attending hearings and cross-
examining respondent and her witnesses.
39) Republic v. Chule Lim On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted
G.R. NO. 153883, January 13, 2004 respondents petition and rendered judgment.
Facts: Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should

Chule Lim claimes that she was born on be changed from Chinese to Filipino?
October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her
birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Held: YES. To digress, it is just as well that the
Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Republic did not cite as error respondents
Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to
Iligan City. She alleged that both her effect what indisputably are substantial
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth corrections and changes in entries in the civil
have four erroneous entries, and prays that register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised
they be corrected. Rules of Court provides the procedure for
During the hearing, respondent testified thus: cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was registry. The proceedings under said rule may
misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in either be summary or adversary in nature. If
all her school records and in her marriage the correction sought to be made in the civil
43
register is clerical, then the procedure to be that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects were never married. As such, she was not
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a required to comply with said constitutional
party, it is deemed substantial, and the and statutory requirements to become a
procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child
our ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically
held that even substantial errors in a civil became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
registry may be corrected and the true facts differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
established under Rule 108 provided the having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
parties aggrieved by the error avail reached the age of majority.
themselves of the appropriate adversary In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
proceeding is one where the trial court has Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare,
conducted proceedings where all relevant a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and
facts have been fully and properly developed, no other act would be necessary to confer on
where opposing counsel have been given him all the rights and privileges attached to
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
case, and where the evidence has been Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
thoroughly weighed and considered.8 Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan
we take it that the Republics failure to cite vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
this error amounts to a recognition that this vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
case properly falls under Rule 108 of the could any act be taken on the erroneous belief
Revised Rules of Court considering that the that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
proceeding can be appropriately classified as citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
adversarial. entitled.13
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the This notwithstanding, the records show that
Republic avers that respondent did not respondent elected Filipino citizenship when
comply with the constitutional requirement of she reached the age of majority. She
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when
the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides right of suffrage and the participation in
that the citizenship of a legitimate child born election exercises constitute a positive act of
of a Filipino mother and an alien father election of Philippine citizenship. 15
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, In its second assignment of error, the Republic
upon reaching the age of majority, the child assails the Court of Appeals decision in
elected Philippine citizenship. 9 Likewise, the allowing respondent to use her fathers
Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of surname despite its finding that she is
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate illegitimate.
children born of Filipino mothers may elect The Republics submission is misleading. The
Philippine citizenship by expressing such Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to
intention "in a statement to be signed and use her fathers surname. What it did allow
sworn to by the party concerned before any was the correction of her fathers misspelled
officer authorized to administer oaths, and surname which she has been using ever since
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. she can remember. In this regard, respondent
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid does not need a court pronouncement for her
statement with the oath of allegiance to the to use her fathers surname.
Constitution and the Government of the Court of Appeals is was correct when it held:
Philippines."10 Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory To bar her at this time from using her fathers
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship surname which she has used for four decades
apply only to legitimate children. These do not without any known objection from anybody,
apply in the case of respondent who was would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of
concededly an illegitimate child, considering
44
the reasons allowed for changing ones name

or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases,
a person is allowed to use a name "by which
he has been known since childhood."
While judicial authority is required for a

change of name or surname,18 there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a
surname which a person has already been
using since childhood.19
The doctrine that disallows such change of
name as would give the false impression of
family relationship remains valid but only to
the extent that the proposed change of name
would in great probability cause prejudice or
future mischief to the family whose surname
it is that is involved or to the community in
general.20 In this case, the Republic has not
shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of
future mischief. In respondents case, the
change in the surname that she has been
using for 40 years would even avoid confusion
to her community in general.
45
VI. MARRIAGE alleged marriage of private respondents

parents. This contention has no merit. In
40) Balogbog vs. CA Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs,
produced a photostatic copy of the record of
FACTS: marriages of the Municipality of Rosario,
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to
are the children of Basilio Balogbog and show that there was no record of the alleged
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting
and 1961, respectively. They had an older of the testimonies of witnesses was held
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, competent to prove the marriage. Indeed,
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private although a marriage contract is considered
respondents Ramonito and Generoso primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
Balogbog brought an action for partition and present it is not proof that no marriage took
accounting against petitioners, claiming that place. Other evidence may be presented to
they were the legitimate children of Gavino by prove marriage. Here, private respondents
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were proved, through testimonial evidence, that
entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929;
estate of their grandparents. In their answer, that they had three children, one of whom
petitioners denied knowing private died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted
respondents. They alleged that their brother until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their
Gavino died single and without issue in their children, private respondents, were
parents residence at Asturias, Cebu. recognized by Gavinos family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
To support their claim, the petitioners
obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Neither is there merit in the argument of the
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that petitioners that the existence of the marriage
office did not have a record of the names of cannot be presumed because there was no
Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was evidence showing in particular that Gavino
prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer and Catalina, in the presence of two
Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no witnesses, declared that they were taking
record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina each other as husband and wife. An exchange
in the Book of Marriages. On the other hand, of vows can be presumed to have been made
the private respondents presented several from the testimonies of the witnesses who
pieces of testimonial evidence to bolster their state that a wedding took place, since the
claim. very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It
ISSUE: would indeed be unusual to have a wedding
Whose claim, as supported by their respective without an exchange of vows and quite
pieces of evidence, will prevail? unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage,
HELD: because the State is interested in the
The claim of the private respondents will preservation of the family and the sanctity of
prevail. Under the Rules of Court, the the family is a matter of constitutional
presumption is that a man and a woman concern.
conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married. This presumption may be 41) VDA. De Jacob V. CA
rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 312 SCRA 772
In this case, petitioners claim that the pieces
of evidence presented by private respondents FACTS:
was belied by the production of the Book of Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special
does not contain any entry pertaining to the Administratix for the various estates of the
46
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed

Marriage Contract between herself and the Issue: Whether the marriage between the
deceased. plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, was valid?
claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented Held:
an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines to collateral attack, while a voidable one may
Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Aware of this fundamental distinction,
During the proceeding for the settlement of Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was
T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose void ab initio, because there was neither a
Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. 9
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his We cannot sustain this contention.
share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues
adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. that the marriage was void because the
Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage parties had no marriage license. This
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive argument is misplaced, because it has been
father Alfredo. established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for together as husband and wife for at least five
Intervention and filed a complaint for years.10 An affidavit to this effect was
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. 11 Clearly
questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir then, the marriage was exceptional in
of Alfredo. character and did not require a marriage
appellant claims that the marriage between license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. 12
her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. The Civil Code governs this case, because the
Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila questioned marriage and the assailed
sometime in 1975. She could not however adoption took place prior the effectivity of the
present the original copy of the Marriage Family Code.
Contract stating that the original document "It is settled that if the original writing has
was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of in court, upon proof of its execution and loss
the original, Tomasa presented as secondary or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract may be proved by a copy or a recital of its
issued in 1978. No copy of the Marriage contents in some authentic document, or by
Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing
the solemnizing officer thus giving the that the document was duly executed and
implication that there was no copy of the subsequently lost, without any bad faith on
marriage contract sent to, nor a record the part of the offeror, secondary evidence
existing in the civil registry of Manila; may be adduced to prove its contents.14
In signing the Marriage Contract, the late The trial court and the Court of Appeals
Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" committed reversible error when they (1)
on said contract purportedly on 16 September excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela
1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2)
Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant disregarded the following: (a) photographs of
Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary
date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor
attesting that both of them lived together as Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner,
[af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the informed the Archbishop of Manila that the
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" wedding had not been recorded in the Book of
was logically "not genuine". In other words, Marriages, and at the same time requested
not of Alfredo Jacobs; the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
47
subsequent authorization issued by the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been]
Archbishop through his vicar general and lost."19
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino In the present case, due execution was
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
and petitioner be reflected through a who was present during the marriage
corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party
and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana to the event. The subsequent loss was shown
stating the circumstances of the loss of the by the testimony and the affidavit of the
marriage certificate. officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as
It should be stressed that the due execution by petitioner's own declaration in court. These
and the loss of the marriage contract, both are relevant, competent and admissible
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the evidence. Since the due execution and the
introduction of secondary evidence of its loss of the marriage contract were clearly
contents, were shown by the very evidence shown by the evidence presented, secondary
they have disregarded. They have thus evidence testimonial and documentary
confused the evidence to show due execution may be admitted to prove the fact of
and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage.
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court The trial court pointed out that on the face of
clarified this misconception thus: the reconstructed marriage contract were
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in certain irregularities suggesting that it had
holding that parol evidence of the execution fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were
of the instrument was barred. The court to agree with the trial court and to disregard
confounded the execution and the contents of the reconstructed marriage contract, we must
the document. It is the contents, . . . which emphasize that this certificate is not the only
may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and
when the instrument itself is accessible. petitioner.
Proofs of the execution are not dependent on Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis
the existence or non-existence of the on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975
document, and, as a matter of fact, such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil
proofs precede proofs of the contents: due Registrar of Manila and in the National Census
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite
as foundation for the introduction of "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three
secondary evidence of the contents. years before registering their marriage.27 On
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial both counts, he proceeds from the wrong
court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by premise. In the first place, failure to send a
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even copy of a marriage certificate for record
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28
by other competent evidence."17 In the second place, it was not the petitioners
Truly, the execution of a document may be duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate
proven by the parties themselves, by the to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and upon the solemnizing officer.29
recognized the signatures of the parties; or The basis of human society throughout the
even by those to whom the parties have civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in
previously narrated the execution thereof.18 this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may it is a new relation, an institution in the
be shown by any person who [knows] the fact maintenance of which the public is deeply
of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in interested. Consequently, every intendment
the judgment of the court, a sufficient of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
examination in the place or places where the Persons dwelling together in apparent
document or papers of similar character are matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
usually kept by the person in whose custody any counterpresumption or evidence special
the document lost was, and has been unable to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
to find it; or who has made any other is that such is the common order of society,
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the and if the parties were not what they thus
48
hold themselves out as being, they would be 1.) Can the Family Code be applied retroactively
living in the constant violation of decency and to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C.
of law. A presumption established by our Code Bobiles and;
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman 2.) Granting that the FC should be applied
deporting themselves as husband and wife retroactively should the adoption in favor of
have entered into a lawful contract of private respondent only, her husband not
marriage." Semper praesumitur pro being a petitioner.
matrimonio Always presume marriage.
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards
marriage is based on the prima facie Held:
presumption that a man and a woman 1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
deporting themselves as husband and wife retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
have entered into a lawful contract of provisions thereof, subject to the qualification
marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even that such retrospective application will not
accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
lived together as husband and wife, 34 we find in accordance with the Civil Code or other
that the presumption of marriage was not laws.
rebutted in this case. A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity and extent does not depend upon
42) Republic Of The Philippines v. CA events foreign to the will of the holder. The
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 term expresses the concept of present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural
Facts: justice should be protected against arbitrary
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles State action, or an innately just and
filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six imperative right which enlightened free
(6) years old and who had been living with her society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
family since he was four (4) months old, individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights
before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. include not only legal or equitable title to the
The petition for adoption was filed by private enforcement of a demand, but also an
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, exemption from new obligations created after
1988, when the law applicable was the right has vested.
Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a private respondent had the right to file a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of petition for adoption by herself, without
the spouses or by both of them. However, joining her husband therein. When Mrs.
after the trial court rendered its decision and Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising
while the case was pending on appeal in the her explicit and unconditional right under said
Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
the Family Code, took effect on August 3, such petition alone and to have the same
1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption proceed to final adjudication, in accordance
by husband and wife is mandatory. with the law in force at the time, was already
Petitioner contends that the petition for vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired
adoption should be dismissed outright for it by the enactment of a new law.
was filed solely by private respondent without When private respondent filed her petition in
joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
of the Family Code which requires joint acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance
adoption by the spouses. It argues that the with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a
Family Code must be applied retroactively to matter of substantive law, the established
the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason determined by the statute in force at the time
Condat by the mere filing of her petition for of the commencement of the action. We do
adoption. not find in the present case such facts as
would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
Issues:
49
2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body,
the Family Code should not apply he consulted several doctors in the United
retroactively, the Court of Appeals should States. He underwent psychological
have modified the trial court's decision by examination, hormone treatment and breast
granting the adoption in favor of private augmentation. His attempts to transform
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her himself to a "woman" culminated on January
husband not being a petitioner. We do not 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
consider this as a tenable position and, reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
accordingly, reject the same. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
one of the petitioners in the petition for surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of medical certificate attesting that he
consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
and expressly made an integral part thereof, procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a
shows that he himself actually joined his wife female and was in fact engaged to be
in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of married. He then sought to have his name in
his written consent and the foregoing his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
testimony in open court, are sufficient to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing,
make him a co-petitioner. Under the jurisdictional requirements were established.
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason No opposition to the petition was made.
of his foreign residence, he must have yielded During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He
to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
on his part sufficed to make him a party to the American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as
petition. This is evident from the text of his witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court
affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its
pedantry in the formal requirements should relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the
yield to and be eschewed in the higher present petition not to evade any law or
considerations of substantial justice. The judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
future of an innocent child must not be unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid making his birth records compatible with his
adherence to procedural rules on the form of present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion
pleadings. that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and
43) SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009 petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the
FACTS physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
a petition for the change of his first name and doing and should not be in any way taken
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial against him. Likewise, the court believes that
Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
civil registrar of Manila as respondent. anybody or the community in granting the
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
born in the City of Manila to the spouses would bring the much-awaited happiness on
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was the realization of their dreams. Finally, no
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes evidence was presented to show any cause or
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth ground to deny the present petition despite
certificate). His sex was registered as "male." due notice and publication thereof. Even the
He further alleged that he is a male State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but interpose any opposition.
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he
had always identified himself with girls since ISSUE
50
Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground marriage license. The petitioner states that
for change of entry in the birth certificate? though she did not categorically state her
petition for annulment of marriage before the
HELD trial court that the inconguinoty in the dates
No, there is no law legally recognizing sex of the marriage license and the celebration of
reassignment and its effect. The sex of a the marriage itself would lead to the
person is determined at birth, visually done conclusion that her marriage to respondent
by the birth attendant (the physician or was void from the beginning, she pointed out
midwife) by examining the genitals of the that these critical dates were contained in the
infant Civil Register Law (Act 3753). If the documents she submitted before the Court.
determination of a persons sex made at the The marriage license was issued one year
time of his or her birth is not attendant by after the ceremony took place. Hence the
error, the same is immutable and may not be marriage was celebrated without the marriage
changed by reason of a sex reassignment license.
surgery.
Petition granted.
44) SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000 45) SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent contracted FACTS:
marriage on November 15, 1973. both were Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and
then 22 years old. Their union was blessed respondent Carmelita Cardenas were
with two children. Respondent left their allegedly married without a valid marriage
conjugal dwelling, since the they lived license. The former contended that his
separately. marriage with the latter was contracted
through machinations, duress and
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation. intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita
Judgment was rendered dissolving their N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
conjugal partnership of gains and approving a Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed Forces of
regime of separation of properties based on the Philippines. That they never applied or
the Memorandum of Agreement executed by obtained a marriage license for their
the spouse. The trial court granted custody of supposed marriage, thus no marriage license
the children to Filipina. was presented to the solemnizing officer. In
support for his contention, petitioner further
Petitioner filed a criminal action for attempted argued that although marriage license no.
parricide against her husband, which RTC 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on
convicted him for lesser offense of slight May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
physical injuries. contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license, Upon
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of verifications made by him through his lawyer,
absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of
of psychological incapacity. RTC denied. CA San Juan, a Certification was issued by Rafael
affirmed. The petitioner for the first time on D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
appeal, the issue with regard to the absence that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
of marriage license. ever issued by said office."
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid? However, Perlita Mercader, Registration
Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan,
HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on the identified the Certificates issued by Rafael
ground that there is no marriage license. Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and
testified that their office failed to locate the
Although, the petitioner raises the issue for book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
the first time on appeal the issue on lack of may have been registered.
51
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P.

ISSUE: Mallion filed a petition with the RTC, Branch
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
a valid marriage license? nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code,
HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that citing respondent's alleged psychological
the certificates issued by the Local Civil incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC
Registrar were not sufficient as to invalidate denied the petition in a decision dated
the marriage license no. 2770792 which had November 11, 1997 upon the finding that
been secured by the parties. It could be easily petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant
implied from the said statement that the evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he
Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not is seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of
exert its best efforts to locate and determine Appeals was likewise dismissed for failure of
the existence of Marriage License No. petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful
2770792 due to its "loaded work and that fees within the reglementary period.
they failed to locate the book in which the
marriage license was entered. Likewise, both After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95
certifications failed to state with absolute attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12,
certainty whether or not such license was 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity
issued. of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City,
this time alleging that his marriage with
This implication is confirmed in the testimony respondent was null and void due to the fact
of the representative from the Office of the that it was celebrated without a valid
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita marriage license. For her part, respondent
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate filed an answer with a motion to dismiss,
the logbook due to the fact that the person in praying for the dismissal of the petition on the
charge of the said logbook had already ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
retired. Further, the testimony of the said
person was not presented in evidence. It does In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC
not appear on record that the former granted respondent's motion to dismiss.
custodian of the logbook was deceased or Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
missing, or that his testimony could not be also denied.
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts
to locate the logbook or prove the material Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed
contents therein, had been exerted. for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
It is required that the custodian of the respondent, the cause of action in the earlier
document is authorize to certify that despite case was distinct and separate from the cause
diligent search, a particular document does of action in the present case because the
not exist in his office or that a particular entry operative facts upon which they were based
of a specified tenor was not to be found in a as well as the evidence required to sustain
register. As custodians of public documents, either were different. Because there is no
civil registrars are public officers charged with identity as to the cause of action, petitioner
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the
book where they are required to enter all second petition. In this connection, petitioner
applications for marriage licenses, including maintains that there was no violation of the
the names of the applicants, the date the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which
marriage license was issued and such other proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
relevant data. On the other hand, respondent, in her
comment counters that while the present suit
46) MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA is anchored on a different ground, it still
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006 involves
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP
FACTS: 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and
52
respondent's marriage, and prays for the part of suitors to the preservation of the
same remedy, that is, the declaration of public tranquility and happiness.
nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus
contends that petitioner violated the rule on Res judicata in this sense requires the
forum shopping. Moreover, respondent concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
asserts that petitioner violated the rule on the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered
multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
this petition could have been raised during matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or
the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. an order on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second actions
ISSUE: identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
The issue before this Court is one of first causes of action.
impression. Should the matter of the invalidity
of a marriage due to the absence of an Petitioner does not dispute the existence of
essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the first three requisites. What is in issue is
the Family Code be raised in the same the presence of the fourth requisite. In this
proceeding where the marriage is being regard, the test to determine whether the
impugned on the ground of a party's causes of action are identical is to ascertain
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of whether the same evidence will sustain both
the Family Code? actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two
HELD: Petitioner insists that because the actions. If the same facts or evidence would
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on sustain both, the two actions are considered
the ground of psychological incapacity and the same, and a judgment in the first case is a
the action for declaration of nullity of bar to the subsequent action.
marriage on the ground of absence of
marriage license constitute separate causes Based on this test, petitioner would contend
of action, the present case would not fall that the two petitions brought by him seeking
under the prohibition against splitting a single the declaration of nullity of his marriage are
cause of action nor would it be barred by the anchored on separate causes of action for the
principle of res judicata. evidence necessary to sustain the first
petition which was anchored on the alleged
The contention is untenable. Res judicata is psychological incapacity of respondent is
defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing different from the evidence necessary to
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or sustain the present petition which is anchored
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to on the purported absence of a marriage
the rule that a final judgment or decree on the license.
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply
privies in all later suits on points and matters invoking different grounds for the same cause
determined in the former suit." of action. By definition, a cause of action is
the act or omission by which a party violates
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every the right of another. In both petitions,
well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is petitioner has the same cause the
founded upon the following precepts of declaration of nullity of his marriage to
common law, namely: (1) public policy and respondent. What differs is the ground upon
necessity, which makes it to the interest of which the cause of action is predicated. These
the State that there should be an end to grounds cited by petitioner essentially split
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the the various aspects of the pivotal issue that
individual that he should be vexed twice for holds the key to the resolution of this
the same cause. A contrary doctrine would controversy, that is, the actual status of
subject the public peace and quiet to the will petitioner and respondent's marriage.
and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the
53
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on First, on September 27, 1994, respondent
the claim that the marriage is null and void judge solemnized the wedding between
because no valid celebration of the same took Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite
place due to the alleged lack of a marriage the knowledge that the groom is merely
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, separated from his first wife.
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that
the marriage had been solemnized and Second, it is alleged that he performed a
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
is now bound by this admission. The alleged Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
absence of a marriage license which his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
petitioner raises now could have been Respondent judge holds office and has
presented and heard in the earlier case. jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The
only as regards every matter offered and wedding was solemnized at the respondent
received to sustain or defeat their claims or judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
demand but as to any other admissible matter which does not fall within his jurisdictional
which might have been offered for that area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
purpose and of all other matters that could Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
have been adjudged in that case. away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot
evade or avoid the application of res judicata Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
by simply varying the form of his action or act of having solemnized the marriage
adopting a different method of presenting his between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
case. It bears stressing that a party cannot separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by
divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit
mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
the issues existing when the suit began. A Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The and his first wife have not seen each other for
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action almost seven years. With respect to the
every ground for relief which he claims to second charge, he maintains that in
exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
successive action to recover for the same paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
wrong or injury. that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY The marriage contract between Gaspar

A.M. No. MTJ-96-108. July 19, 1996 Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite
FACTS: this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
The complainant in this administrative case is solemnized by respondent judge. He
the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del presented in evidence a joint affidavit by
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
evidence in relation to two specific acts subscribed and sworn to before Judge
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Demosthenes C. Duquilla, MTC of Basey,
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants stated
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in
the law. September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children,
Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in
54
Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not According to article 8 of the Familiy Code The
returned nor been heard of for almost seven marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption chambers the judge or in open court, in the
that she is already dead. church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
ISSUE: the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is in cases of marriages contracted on the point
sufficient proof of the wife's presumptive of death or in remote places in accordance
death? with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred parties request the solemnizing officer in
when he solemnized the marriage outside his writing in which case the marriage may be
court's jurisdiction? solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the joint There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del
affidavit is insufficient proof to declare wife's Rosario was at the point of death or in the
presumptive death. remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly was made by only one party, Gemma del
provides that for the purpose of contracting Rosario.
the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute One of the formal requisites of marriage is the
a summary proceeding as provided in this "authority of the solemnizing officer." Article
Code for the declaration of presumptive death 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to
of the absentee, without prejudice to the the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
belief that the absent spouse was already will not invalidate the marriage.
dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary Judges who are appointed to specific
in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
mandatory requirement which has been within said areas and not beyond. Where a
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
discourage subsequent marriages where it is court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
not proven that the previous marriage has irregularity in the formal requisite, which while
been dissolved or a missing spouse is it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
factually or presumptively dead, in may subject the officiating official to
accordance with pertinent provisions of law. administrative liability.
Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
proceeding for the declaration of his first was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
declaration, he remains married to Ida del Norte.
Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of respondent The Supreme Court finds respondent to have
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or principles applicable in the cases brought to
ignorance of the law has resulted in a our attention are elementary and
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge lack of comprehension of the law. Judge
Domagtoy erred when he soemnized the Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of 6
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction. months.
55
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and HELD:

Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta.
there being a subsisting marriage between Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his
Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda. authority to solemnize marriage is only
limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Considering that respondents
48) BESO vs. DAGUMAN Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of
A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000 Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar
only, he was not clothed with authority to
FACTS: solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
On August 28, 1997, the marriage between As provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman was wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a
solemnized by Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place
Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the other than his sala, to wit:(1) when either or
wedding, Yman abandoned Petitioner. both of the contracting parties is at the point
Thereafter, Petitioner found that her marriage of death;(2) when the residence of either
was not registered at the Civil Registry. She party is located in a remote place; (3) where
then filed an administrative complaint against both of the parties request the solemnizing
the Respondent charging him with Neglect of officer in writing in which case the marriage
Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing may be solemnized at a house or place
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of designated by them in a sworn statement to
negligence in not retaining a copy and not that effect. The foregoing circumstances are
registering the marriage contract with the unavailing in the instant case.
office of the Local Registrar.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent
In his Comment, Respondent averred that the Judge neglected his duty when he failed to
civil marriage had to be solemnized outside register the marriage. Such duty is entrusted
his territory because on that date respondent upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
was physically indisposed and unable to Code requiring the same not later than fifteen
report to his station in Sta. Margarita and that days after the marriage. The records show
Beso and Yman unexpectedly came to his that the loss was occasioned by carelessness
house urgently requesting the celebration of on respondent Judge's part. Hence,
their marriage rites since the complainant, Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and
who is an overseas worker, would be out of abuse of authority.
the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse before she could 49) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY
return to the Philippines. He further averred G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
that after handling to Yman the first copy of
the marriage certificate, he left the three FACTS:
remaining copies on top of the desk in his Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a
private office intending later to register the complaint for declaration of nullity of
duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the marriage due to psychological incapacity
fourth in his office but said copies were lost; under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation
that he diligently searched for them and even with Articles 68, 70, and 72, with Fely Ada
subpoenad Yman to further inquire but was Rosal. According to him, they got married in
told that Complainant put the copies of the 1961. The marriage produced five children.
marriage certificate in her bag during the But the marriage faded because Fely was a
wedding party and that Complainant already nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In
left for abroad. 1984, Fely left for the United States. Barely a
year after she left, Crasus received a letter
ISSUE: from her requesting that he sign the divorce
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of papers. But he ignored the request Sometime
Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority? in 1985, he was informed that Fely had
56
already married an American. In 1987, she foreigner divorces his or her Filipino spouse.
came back to the Philippines with her However, in this case, it cannot be applied
American family. In 1990, she came back to because of the simple fact that at the time
attend the wedding of their eldest son, but in Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a
the invitations, she used the surname of her Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed
American husband. She returned in 1992 for before the RTC that she married her American
the operation of their fourth child. In her spouse in 1985 but she also admitted that she
Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that became and American citizen only in 1988.
she was already an American citizen in 1988, Thus, she was still a Filipino citizen and Article
that she was no longer hot-tempered, nagger 15 of the Civil Code applies, she was still
and extravagant and that the only reason she bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
went to the United States was that their duties, status, condition and legal capacity,
income was not enough to sustain their even though she was already living abroad.
family, that it was Crasus who was
irresponsible and in fact living with another 50) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III
woman who bore her a child. She also denied GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005
that she sent a letter requesting him to sign
the divorce papers. After hearing both sides, FACTS:
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros
marriage null and void ab initio under Article Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their
36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of marriage was blessed with a son and a
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower daughter, Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986,
court but this time it had added a Lady Myros left for the US bringing along their
ratiocination, stating that Article 26, 2 nd son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
paragraph of the Family Code is applicable discovered that his wife had been naturalized
also to this case. as an American citizen.
ISSUES: Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his

1. Whether or not there was psychological son that his wife had obtained a divorce
incapacity on the part of Fely? decree and then married an American,
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Innocent Stanley. Thereafter, Cipriano filed
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable? with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
HELD the Family Code. Finding merit on the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic,
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. through the Office of the Solicitor General
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
or inability to take cognizance of and to denied.
assume the basic marital obligations, not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, In this petition, the Republic contends that
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code is not
held in previous rulings that irreconcilable applicable to the instant case because it only
differences, conflicting personalities, applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, marriage celebrated between a Filipino and an
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual alien.
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of ISSUE:Whether or not respondent can remarry
psychological incapacity under the said pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code?
Article.
HELD:
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding
The second paragraph of Article 26 is not that par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should
applicable. As plainly worded, the provision be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
refers to a special situation wherein a has been divorced by a spouse who had
57
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, was thereafter abandoned by Ongkiko

also to remarry. seventeen years ago.
Brillantes claims that when he married
The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the De Castro in Los Angeles, California, he
Family Code are as follows: (1) there is a valid believed in good faith and for all legal
marriage that has been celebrated between a purposes that he was single because his
Filipino citizen and a foreigner and (2) a valid marriage with Ongkiko was celebrated without
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien a license.
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship at ISSUE: Wether a judicial declaration that the
the time of the celebration of marriage, but previous marriage was void is under Article 40
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is of the Family Code required before entering
obtained abroad by the alien spouse into a second marriage.
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case,
when Lady Myros was naturalized as an RULING: YES, respondent argues that the
American citizen, there was still a valid provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does
marriage that has been celebrated between not apply to him considering that his first
her and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife marriage took place in 1965 and was
obtained a divorce capacitating him to governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines,
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites are both while the second marriage took place in 1991
present in the case. Thus, Cipriano, the and governed by the Family Code.
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed Article 40 of the Family Code is
to remarry. applicable to marriages entered into after the
effectively of the Family Code on 3 August
However, for respondents plea to prosper, he 1988 regardless of the date of the first
must prove that his wife was naturalized as an marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
American citizen and must show sufficient Family Code, said article is given retroactive
proof of the divorce decree. Cipriano failed to effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
do this so the petition of the Republic was impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
granted. with the Civil Code or other Laws. This is
particularly true with Article 40 of the Family
51) Atienza vs. Brillantes Code, which is a rule of procedure.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, 29 March 1995 Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article
Quiason, J.: of the Family Code in this case.
FACTS: A complaint file by complainant Lupo >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
A. Atienza (Atienza) for gross immorality and
appearance of impropriety against respondent
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. (Brillantes). 52) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
Atienza has two children with Yolanda A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
De Castrp (De Castro). There was a time
when Atienza chanced upon Brillantes David, Jr. C,.J.:
sleeping on his bedroom and was later on
informed by their houseboy that Brillantes is FACTS: Complainant-petitioner Herminia
cohabiting wioth De Castro. Borja-Manzano (Herminia) was the lawful
Atienza claims that Brillantes was wife of the late David Manzano being married
married to Zenaida Ongkiko (Ongkiko) on 21 May 1966. On 22nd of March 1993, her
whom the latter has five children. husband contracted another marriage with
Brillantes denied having married one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Ongkiko, because it was celebrated without a Judge Roque R. Sanchez (Judge Sanchez).
marriage license, the same incident also That Judge Sanchez should have known that
happened on their second marriage. Brillantes the marriage was a bigamous one as the
58
marriage clearly stated that both contracting

parties were Separate.
Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to
the fact of the previous marriage, and
solemnized their marriage in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held

liable.
RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code

to apply the provision on legal ratification of
marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must apply:
1.) The man and woman have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2.) The parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other;
3.) The fact of absence of legal impediment
between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4.) The parties must execute an affidavit stating
that they lived together for at least five years
and are without legal impediment to marry
each other.
5.) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all this requirement are present in
the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
their separate affidavits executed on 22 nd of
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent
Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
59
VII. VOID MARRIAGES The status of children born in voidable

marriages is governed by the second
53) Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998
Children conceived of voidable marriages
Martinez, J: before the decree of annulment shall be
considered as legitimate
FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio),
son of petitioner Federico Suntay (Federico), The annulment of the marriage by the court
was married to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay abolishes the legal character of the society
(Isabel:) their marriage was celebrated in formed by the putative spouses, but It cannot
the Portuguese Colony of Macao. destroy consequences which marital union
Subsequently it was declared as void ab initio produced during its continuance.
or null and void.
The basis of the Court of First Instance Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
for such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from
a mental aberration known as schizophrenia.
Emilio predeceased his mother, 54) Nial vs. Bayadaog
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Isabel, G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
herein respondent, the daughter of Emilio and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Ynares Santiago, J.:
Regional Trial Court a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of her FACTS: Pepito Nial (Pepito) and Teodulfa
late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Bellones was married on September 26, 1974
Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss whereby petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie
the case on the ground of Article 922 of the and Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Nial were born.
Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to Pepito shot Teodulfa resulting to the latters
succeed by right of representation the death. One year and eight months after the
legitimate relatives of her father or mother. incident Pepito and Norma Bayadog, herein
Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo respondent (Bayadog) got married without
Suntay, respondent Isabels father any marriage license. Pepito and Bayadog
predeceased his mother, the late Cristina executed an affidavit dated December 11,
Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened a path to 1986 state that they had lived together as
succession by representation, as a husband and wife for at least five years thus
consequence of declaration by the Court of exempting them from securing a marriage
First Instance that the marriage of respondent license. Pepito died in a car accident.
Isabels parents is null and void. Making Isabel Thereafter petitioners question the validity of
an illegitimate child and has no right nor the subsequent marriage of Pepito and
interest in the estate of her paternal Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage
grandmother the decedent. license as it was void.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco- ISSUE: Whether the cohabitation of Pepito and
Suntay is a legitimate child despite the Bayadog is that one in contemplation of the
declaration that her parents marriage was law.
void ab initio denying her succession right
from her grandmother. RULING: No, the five year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the
RULING: YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay marriage and it should be a period of
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-
the basis of Article 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code meaning no third part was involved at any
which refers to marriages which are time within the five years and continuity
considered voidable. Being conceived and that is unbroken.
born of a voidable marriage before the decree In this case, at the time of Pepito and
of annulment, she is considered legitimate. respondents marriage, it cannot be said that
60
they have lived with each other as husband (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the
and wife for at least five years prior to this absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first sought to be invoked for purposes of
marriage was dissolved to the time of his contacting a second marriage, the sole basis
marriage with respondent, only about twenty acceptable in law for said projected marriage
months had elapsed. Even assuming that to be free from legal infirmity is a final
Pepito and respondent had started living with judgment declaring previous marriage void.
each other the fact remains that their five In the present case, the second
year period of cohabitation was not the marriage of private respondent was entered
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should into 1979, before Wiegel, at that time the
be in the nature of a perfect union that is prevailing rules was found In Odayat,
valid under the law but rendered imperfect Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
only by the absence of a marriage contract. private respondent being void for lack of
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time license and consent, there was no need for
when he started cohabiting with respondent. judicial declaration of its nullity before he
It is immaterial that when they lived with each could contract a second marriage. In this
other, Pepito had already been separated in case, therefore, we conclude that private
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence respondents second marriage to petitioner
of the marriage even where there was actual was valid.
severance of the filial companionship between
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
either spouse with any third party as being as
husband and wife.
Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 56) Terre vs. Terre

A.M. No 2349, 3 July 1992
55) Ty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000 Per Curiam
Quisumbing, J.: FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met

respondent Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time
FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates;
married in a civil ceremony Anna Maria Regina Dorothy was then married to Merillo
Villanueva thereafter a church wedding was Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty. Jordan went to
celebrated. The marriage was subsequently manila to pursue their education of personal
declared null and void ab initio for lack of choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at Lyceum
marriage license and lack of consent of the Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the
parties. process this time with more persistence.
Even before the decree was Jordan explained to Dorothy that their
issued nullifying the marriage, private marriage is void ab initio due to the reason
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married Ofelia that Dorothy and Merlito were first cousins,
P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4 April 1979. The convince by his explanation and having
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maira secured a favorable advice from her mother
was rendered only on 4 August 1980, while and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty.
his civil marriage to petitioner Ofelia P. Ty took Jordan. In their marriage license Atty. Jordan
place on 4 April 1979. wrote single as her status explaining that
since her marriage was void ab initio, no need
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the to go to court for a declaration. Later on
first marriage is required before a subsequent Dorothy found out that Atty. Jordan was
marriage can be entered into validity. already married to one Helina Malicdem.
When Atty. Jordan prior
RULING: YES, a declaration of absolute nullity marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no
of marriage is now explicitly required either as judicial declaration was obtained as to nullity
a cause of action or a ground for defense. of or any judicial declaration obtained as to
61
nullity of such prior marriage of respondent

with complainant.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be

liable for gross immorality.
RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a

lawyer, knew or should have known that such
an agreement ran counter to the prevailing
case law of the court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first a marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. Even if
we are to assume , arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good
faith, the same result will follow. For if we are
to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his
first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre
must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.
62
VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY inability to give meaning and significance to

the marriage. This psycholigic condition must
57) Santos vs. The Honorable Court of exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Appeals The law does not evidently envision, upon the
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995 other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This
En Banc: conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children
FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos (Leouel), a conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
first lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos The factual setting in the case at
(Julia) were married. The ecstasy did not bench, in no measure at all, can come close to
last long because of the frequent interference the standards required to decree nullity of
of Julias parents into the young spouses marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
family affairs. Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in
Julia left for United States of America to work his present situation. Regrettably, neither law
as a Nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade nor society itself can always provide all the
her. Seven months after her departure, Julia specific answers to every individual problem.
called up Leoule for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
home upon the expiration of her contract in
July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States during a 58) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
training program under the auspices of the G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
Armed Forces of the Philippines, he
desperately tried to locate Julia but his efforts Torres, Jr.:
were in vain.
Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional FACTS: Petitioner Chi Ming Tsos (Petitioner)
Trial Court a complaint for Voiding of and private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. (Respondent) were married at the Manila
Cathedral. They went and proceeded to the
ISSUE: Whether Leouels petition to declare house of petitioners mother and slept
their marriage with Julia void ab initio under together on the same room in the first night
Article 36 of the Family Code will prosper. of their married life. Instead of enjoying the
night of their marriage, petitioner just went to
RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code bed and slept on his side then turned his back
cannot be taken and construed independently and went to sleep. There was no sexual
of, but must stand in conjunction with, intercourse between them during the first
existing precept un our law on marriage. Thus night. The same thing happened on the
correlated, psychological incapacity should second, third and fourth nights.
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) In an effort to have their honeymoon in
incapacity that causes a party to be truly a private place where they can enjoy together
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that during their first week as husband and wife,
concomitantly must be assumed and they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
discharged by the parties to the marriage together with her mother, uncle, his mother
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the and his nephew. They were all invited to join
Family Code, include their mutual obligations them. There was no sexual intercourse
to live together, observe love, respect and between them, since petitioner avoided her
fidelity and render help and support. There is by taking a long walk during siesta time or
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the just by sleeping on a rocking chair located at
law has been to confine the meaning of the living room. Respondent claims that she
psychological incapacity to the most serious never seen her husbands private parts.
cases of personality disorder clearly They submitted themselves to medical
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or examinations, respondent was found to be
63
healthy and still a virgin but petitioner was marriage, observed from his tendency to
told to return but never did. It was found that spend time with his friends and squandering
petitioner is capable of having sexual his money with them, from his dependency
intercourse with a woman. from his parents, and his dishonesty on
Respondent claims that petitioner is matters involving his finances.
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of
show his penis. his job in 1986. Roridel became the sole
breadwinner of the family. In March 1987,
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
declared as null and void ab initio due to proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her
psychological incapacity. and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
RULING: Yes, one of the essential marital On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a
obligations under the Family Code is to verified petition for declaration of nullity of
procreate children based on the universal her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for
principle that procreation of children through Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that
sexual cooperation is the basic end of of two of her friends, a social worker, and a
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, any evidence as he appeared only during the
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of pre-trial conference.
the parties to fulfill the above marital On 14 May 1991, the trial court
obligations is equivalent to incapacity. rendered judgment declaring the marriage
It is sexual intimacy which brings void. The Solicitor General appealed to the
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the
mystery of creation. It is a function which RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting
It appears that there is absence of personalities should be construed as
empathy between petitioner and private psychological incapacity
respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where
experienced not only by having spontaneous psychological incapacity should refer to no
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual less than a mental (not physical) incapacity,
communion. Marital union is a two-way existing at the time the marriage is
process. An expressive interest in each others celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt
feelings at a time is needed by the other can that the intendment of the law has been to
go along way in deepening the marital confine the meaning of psychological
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for incapacity to the most serious cases of
children but for two consenting adults who personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
view the relationship with love, amor gignit an utter insensitivity or inability to give
amore, respect, sacrifice and a continuing meaning and significance to the marriage.
commitment to compromise, conscious of its Psychological incapacity must be
value as a sublime social institution. characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present
59) REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA case, there is no clear showing to us that the
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997 psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a
FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to difficulty, if not outright refusal or
Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, neglect in the performance of some marital
and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
showed signs of immaturity and differences and conflicting personalities in
irresponsibility on the early stages of the no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
64
The Court, in this case, promulgated before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
the guidelines in the interpretation and Branch 87. On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the
removing any visages of it being the most trial court granted.
liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The
burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew
the root cause of psychological incapacity a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
must be medically or clinically identified, petitioner Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two
by expert, and clearly explained in the grounds. First, the second petition fails to
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven state a cause of action. Second, it violates
existing at the time of the celebration of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically 94 on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo
or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana
illness must be grave enough; (6) the filed Additional Arguments in Support of the
essential marital obligation must be embraced Motion.
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to The trial court issued on 18 September
225 of the same code as regards parents and 1996 an Order deferring resolution of the
their children; (7) interpretation made by the Motion until the parties ventilate their
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order a motion for reconsideration. However, the
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal trial court issued on second order denying the
as counsels for the State. motion.
The Supreme Court granted the
petition, and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision; concluding that the Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before
Molina subsists and remains valid. the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts
first order deferring action on the Motion and
the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals agreed with

petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first
order erred in deferring action on the Motion
until after a hearing on whether the complaint
states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial
courts second order corrected the situation
since in denying the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court in effect
60) BARCELONA vs. CA & TADEO R. denied the Motion. The appellate court
BENGZON agreed with the trial court that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003 sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven
to be true. The Court of Appeals also held that
there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94.
To determine the existence of forum shopping,
FACS: On 29 March 1995, private respondent the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a
Tadeo filed a Petition for Annulment of final judgment in one case must amount to
Marriage against petitioner petitioner Diana res judicata in the other. In this case, there is
no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo
65
had caused the dismissal without prejudice of

the first petition before filing the second The complete facts should allege
petition. Neither is there res judicata because the physical manifestations, if any, as
there is no final decision on the merits. are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be
ISSUE: Whether the allegations of the second alleged.
petition for annulment of marriage sufficiently
state a cause of action. Procedural rules apply to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their
HELD: The petition has no merit. Petitioner passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules
Dianas contention that the second petition providing that expert opinion need not be
fails to state a cause of action is untenable. alleged in the petition is that there is also
We find the second petition sufficiently no need to allege the root cause of the
alleges a cause of action. The petition sought psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
the declaration of nullity of the marriage fields of neurological and behavioral sciences
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The are competent to determine the root cause of
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules
petitioner Diana were legally married at the do not require the petition to allege expert
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
as shown by the marriage contract attached follows that there is also no need to allege in
to the petition. The couple established their the petition the root cause of the
residence in Quezon City. The union begot psychological incapacity.
five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November
1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; The second petition states a cause of
Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina action since it states the legal right of
Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
Maria born in February 1978. The petition petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of
further alleged that petitioner Diana was petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.
psychologically incapacitated at the time of
the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and
such incapacity subsists up to the present
time. 61) MARCOS vs. MARCOS
Petitioner Diana argues that the G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
second petition falls short of the guidelines
set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically,
she contends that the second petition is
defective because it fails to allege the root FACTS: Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
The second petition also fails to state that the on, he was transferred to the Presidential
alleged psychological incapacity existed from Security Command in Malacaang during the
the celebration of the marriage and that it is Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos,
permanent or incurable. Further, the second on the other hand, joined the Women's
petition is devoid of any reference of the Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force
grave nature of the illness to bring about the in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
disability of the petitioner to assume the them sought a discharge from the military
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the service.
second petition did not even state the marital
obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly They first met sometime in 1980 when
failed to comply due to psychological both of them were assigned at the
incapacity. Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of
66
President Ferdinand Marcos. Through Sometime in August 1995, she together with
telephone conversations, they became her two sisters and driver, went to him at the
acquainted and eventually became Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
sweethearts. After their marriage on missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 mad. After knowing the reason for their
Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a unexpected presence, he ran after them with
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss a samurai and even beat her driver.
Development Corporation when she was still
single. At the time of the filing of this case,
she and their children were renting a house in
After the downfall of President Marcos, Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
he left the military service in 1987 and then residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
engaged in different business ventures that
did not however prosper. As a wife, she In the case study conducted by Social
always urged him to look for work so that Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their children would see him, instead of her, their father as cruel and physically abusive to
as the head of the family and a good provider. them. The appellee submitted herself to
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
employment, they would often quarrel and as psychological evaluation while the appellant
a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He on the other hand, did not.
would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict The court a quo found the appellant to
physical harm on their children for a slight be psychologically incapacitated to perform
mistake and was so severe in the way he his marital obligations mainly because of his
chastised them. Thus, for several times during failure to find work to support his family and
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. his violent attitude towards appellee and their
In 1992, they were already living separately. children.
All the while, she was engrossed in the CA reversed the RTC and held that
business of selling "magic uling" and psychological incapacity had not been
chickens. When she was discharged from the established by the totality of the evidence
military service, she concentrated on her presented on the basis that there is no
business. Then, she became a supplier in the evidence at all that would show that the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was appellant was suffering from an incapacity
able to put up a trading and construction which was psychological or mental - not
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction physical to the extent that he could not have
Development Corporation. known the obligations he was assuming: that
the incapacity was grave, had preceded the
On October 16, 1994 the spouses had marriage and was incurable."
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in Hence, this Petition.
their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Honorable
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their Court of Appeals could set aside the findings
children left the house and sought refuge in by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
her sister's house. incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply
On October 19, 1994, she submitted because the respondent did not subject
herself [to] medical examination at the himself to psychological evaluation.
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions.
67
2) Whether or not the totality of evidence Article 36 of the Family Code, we

presented and the demeanor of all the stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
witnesses should be the basis of the law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
determination of the merits of the Petition. causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
HELD: 1)The guidelines incorporate the three permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
basic requirements earlier mandated by the the duties and responsibilities of the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
"psychological incapacity must be These marital obligations are those provided
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The the Family Code.
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared Neither is Article 36 to be equated with
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root legal separation, in which the grounds need
cause may be "medically or clinically not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
identified." What is important is the presence on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
of evidence that can adequately establish the corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
the totality of evidence presented is enough abandonment and the like. At best, the
to sustain a finding of psychological evidence presented by petitioner refers only
incapacity, then actual medical examination to grounds for legal separation, not for
of the person concerned need not be resorted declaring a marriage void.
to.
Because Article 36 has been abused as
a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation
2) We rule in the negative. Although this Court in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
is sufficiently convinced that respondent faithfully observed them.
failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical In sum, this Court cannot declare the
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his dissolution of the marriage for failure of
acts does not lead to a conclusion of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity on his part. There is psychological incapacity is characterized by
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
already present at the inception of the and for her failure to observe the guidelines
marriage or that they are incurable. outlined in Molina.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can

be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a 62) REPUBLIC vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-
period of more than six years. It was during HAMANO
this period that he became intermittently G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Thus, his alleged psychological illness her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano,
was traced only to said period and not to the a Japanese national, on the ground of
inception of the marriage. Equally important, psychological incapacity.
there is no evidence showing that his In October 1986, she and Toshio
condition is incurable, especially now that he started a common-law relationship in Japan.
is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
68
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and obligations to his family, and to "observe
stayed there for half of 1987. On November mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. mutual help and support" pursuant to Article
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of appellate court emphasized that this case
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. could not be equated with Republic vs. Court
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of
psychologically incapacitated to assume his Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were
marital responsibilities, which incapacity Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
became manifest only after the marriage. One marriage," the husband being a Japanese
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to national. Hence, this petition,
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After ISSUE: Whether or not the mere
sending money to respondent for two months, abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She insensitivity to them constitute psychological
wrote him several times but he never incapacity.
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
learned from her friends that Toshio visited HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner.
the Philippines but he did not bother to see The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
her and their child. Constitution to protect and strengthen the
The summons issued to Toshio family as the basic autonomous social
remained unserved because he was no longer institution and marriage as the foundation of
residing at his given address. Because Toshio the family. Thus, any doubt should be
failed to file a responsive pleading after the resolved in favor of the validity of the
lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent marriage.
filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to What is important is the presence of
refer the case to the prosecutor for evidence that can adequately establish the
investigation. The trial court granted the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
motion on November 7, 1996. the totality of evidence presented is enough
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor to sustain a finding of psychological
Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that incapacity, then actual medical examination
no collusion existed between the parties. On of the person concerned need not be resorted
February 13, 1997, the trial court granted to.
respondents motion to present her evidence We find that the totality of evidence
ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
abandoned his family. She thereafter offered psychologically incapacitated to assume his
documentary evidence to support her marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
testimony. abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
The trial court rendered a decision but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
declaring the marriage between petitioner to some kind of psychological illness. After
Lolita and Toshio null and void on the basis of respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
the records that respondent spouses failed to his family, no other evidence was presented
fulfill his obligations as husband of the showing that his behavior was caused by a
petitioner and father to his daughter. psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
Respondent remained irresponsible and there was no need for an actual medical
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of examination, it would have greatly helped
his family. respondents case had she presented
The Office of the Solicitor General, evidence that medically or clinically identified
representing herein petitioner Republic of the his illness. This could have been done through
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
but the same was denied. We must remember that abandonment
The appellate court thus concluded is also a ground for legal separation. There
that respondent was psychologically was no showing that the case at bar was not
incapacitated to perform his marital just an instance of abandonment in the
69
context of legal separation. We cannot Petitioner avers that during the

presume psychological defect from the mere marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
fact that Toshio abandoned his family irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
immediately after the celebration of the She had extra-marital affairs with several
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not men: a dentist in the AFP; a Lieutenant in the
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet Presidential Security Command and later a
his responsibility and duty as a married Jordanian national.
person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some Sharon was once confirmed in the
psychological, not physical, illness. There was Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
factor in the person, an adverse integral Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment,
element in the personality structure that Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
effectively incapacitates a person from the Jordanian national named Mustafa
accepting and complying with the obligations Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
essential to marriage. she had two children. When Mustafa Ibrahim
According to the appellate court, the left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner
requirements in Molina and Santos do not bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
apply here because the present case involves Petitioner accepted her back and even
a "mixed marriage," the husband being a considered the two illegitimate children as his
Japanese national. own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,
We disagree. In proving psychological Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim
incapacity, we find no distinction between an in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot Sharon would only return to the country on
be lenient in the application of the rules special occasions.
merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules seeking the declaration of nullity of his
to determine psychological incapacity were marriage on the ground of psychological
formulated on the basis of studies of human incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used Family Code, before the RTC of Makati City,
for determining psychological incapacity Branch 149. Summons was effected by
should apply to any person regardless of publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a
nationality. newspaper of general circulation in the
country considering that Sharon did not reside
and could not be found in the Philippines.
63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A.

Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004 psychological evaluation of petitioner and
found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail
FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
Sharon while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. Eventually, On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared
their relationship resulted in the exchange of that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
September 28, 1966 and followed by civil display of infidelity; that she committed
marriage in a church wedding on May 20, several indiscretions and had no capacity for
1967. The union produced four children. The remorse, even bringing with her the two
conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
neither property nor debt. petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like
70
her repeated acts of infidelity and Until further statutory and

abandonment of her family are indications of jurisprudential parameters are established,
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to every circumstance that may have some
psychological incapacity to perform the bearing on the degree, extent and other
essential obligations of marriage. conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
The trial court declared the marriage that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
between the spouses Dedel null and void on is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
the ground of psychological incapacity on the opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
part of respondent. Respondent Republic of persons with expertise in psychological
the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
appealed alleging that THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A Respondents sexual infidelity can
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE ill to such an extent that she could not have
MOLINA CASE. known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid
The Court of Appeals recalled and set assumption thereof. It appears that
aside the judgment of the trial court and respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to
ordered dismissal of the petition for or at the inception of the marriage. What is,
declaration of nullity of marriage.Petitioners in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful
motion for reconsideration was denied in a marital union at its celebration, later affirmed
Resolution dated January 8, 2002. Hence, the in church rites, and which produced four
instant petition. children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion

and abandonment do not by themselves
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the constitute psychological incapacity within the
evidence presented is enough to sustain a contemplation of the Family Code. Neither
finding that respondent is psychologically could her emotional immaturity and
incapacitated irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the
HELD: No. The petition is DENIED. marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
The other forms of psychoses, if
existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual 64) CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent
of the Family Code. These provisions, Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June
however, do not necessarily preclude the 1973 and before the Catholic Church on
possibility of these various circumstances August 11 1973. After discovering that they
being themselves, depending on the degree could not have a child of their own, the couple
and severity of the disorder, indicia of decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who
psychological incapacity. they named Jeremy.
71
On 25 September 1997, or after capacitated to comply with the basic and

twenty-four (24) years of married life essential obligations of marriage.
together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of The Court of Appeals committed
psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. reversible error in holding that respondent
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The
his wife exhibited an over domineering and psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is
selfish attitude towards him. respondent Manuels own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita person in the best position to gauge whether
alleged that respondent Manuel is still living or not her husband fulfilled the essential
with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, marital obligations of marriage.
Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
his paramour. The trial court denied not constitute psychological incapacity within
respondent Manuels petition for declaration the contemplation of the Family Code. It must
of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita. be shown that respondent Manuels
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC disordered personality, which makes him
decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric completely unable to discharge the essential
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel obligations of the marital state and not merely
and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. due to his ardent wish to have a child of his
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of own flesh and blood. In herein case,
the decision of the Court of Appeals. respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to
have a child at that particular point
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of The psychological report of respondent

evidence presented is enough to sustain a Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the
finding of psychological incapacity against root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel. traceable not from the inception of their
marriage as required by law but from her
experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-
laws disapproval of her as they wanted their
son to enter the priesthood, her husbands
HELD: The petition for review is hereby philandering, admitted no less by him, and
granted. her inability to conceive. Thus, from the
totality of the evidence adduced by both
The presumption is always in favor of parties, we have been allowed a window into
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur the Siayngcoss life and have perceived
pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, therefrom a simple case of a married couple
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his drifting apart, becoming strangers to each
wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies other, with the husband consequently falling
and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts out of love and wanting a way out.
and her controlling nature, and her inability to
endear herself to his parents are grave An unsatisfactory marriage, however,
psychological maladies that paralyze her from is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing
complying with the essential obligations of of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
marriage. Neither is there any showing that personalities in no wise constitutes
these defects were already present at the psychological incapacity.
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist reported
that petitioner was psychologically
72
65) VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON investigation on whether there was collusion
VILLALON between the parties. As a result of the report,
there was no collusion. The OSG opposed to
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005 the petition. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met
respondent sometime in the early seventies
when he applied for a job at Metrobank,
FACTS: Petitioner was married to respondent where respondent was employed as a foreign
for 18 years. Petitioner filed a petition for exchange trader. They began dating in 1975
annulment of his marriage to respondent, and had a romantic relationship soon
citing psychological incapacity on his part as a thereafter. After going steady for about two
ground. Petitioner alleged the psychological years, petitioner and respondent were
disorder as that of Narcissistic Histrionic married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco,
Personality Disorder with Cassanova Manila on April 22, 1978. In the middle of
Complex. 1993, petitioner decided to separate from
respondent because their marriage reached a
point where there was no longer any
communication between them and their
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed relationship became devoid of love, affection,
a petition for the annulment of his marriage to support and respect due to his constant urge
respondent Ma. Corazon before the RTC of to see other women. Moreover, their
Pasig City on the ground of petitioners relationship tended to be one-sided since
psychological incapacity which he claimed respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever
existed even prior to his marriage. showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.
According to petitioner, the Petitioner admitted that on certain
manifestations of his psychological incapacity occasions before his marriage, he had two
were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain girlfriends at the same time. He also saw
harmonious family relations and his lack of other women even when he became engaged
interest in having a normal married life; (b) to and, later on, married respondent.
his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted
to accept the essential obligations of marriage in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised
as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other that it was respondents nature to be silent
women and a life unchained from any spousal and withdrawn.
obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the In January 1994, petitioner left the
fundamental obligations of companionship conjugal abode and moved into an apartment
and consortium towards respondent. located five to ten minutes away. Before he
Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to left, he and his wife spoke to their three
respondent be declared null and void ab initio. children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6
Respondent filed an answer denying years old, respectively. Petitioner consulted a
petitioners allegations. She asserted that her child psychologist before talking to his
18-year marriage to petitioner has been children. He considered himself as a good and
fruitful and characterized by joy, loving father and described his relationship
contentment and hopes for more growth in with the children as great. Despite the
their relationship and that their marital separation, petitioner would regularly visit his
squabbles were normal based on community children who stayed with him on alternate
standards. Petitioners success in his weekends, voluntarily gave monthly support
professional life aided him in performing his to the children and paid for their tuition fees
role as husband, father, and provider. and also shouldered the childrens medical
Respondent claimed that petitioners expenses as well as the maintenance and
commitment to his paternal and marital miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
responsibilities was beyond reproach. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad
On October 7, 1996, the trial court Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his
directed the prosecutor to conduct an alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic
73
Histrionic Personality Disorder with decision but it was denied. Hence this
Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan submitted a petition.
psychological report on both petitioner and
respondent based on clinical interviews and
psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was
learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. indeed psychologically incapacitated to
She discovered that he was having an affair render his marital obligations
with one of her friends who worked as a
trader in her husbands company. The affair HELD: The petition has no merit.
was cut short when the woman left for the The totality of the evidence in this
United States to work. Eventually, she and case does not support a finding that petitioner
petitioner were able to rebuild their is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
relationship and overcome the crisis. marital obligations.
When asked about the womanizing The illness must be shown as downright
ways of her husband, respondent averred that incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
she did not know whether her husbands acts difficulty, much less ill will.
could be deemed womanizing since there Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not
were only two instances of infidelity which sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering
occurred 13 years apart. She also theorized from psychological incapacity. It must be
that petitioner wanted to have their marriage shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
annulled so he could marry her old friend. She manifestations of a disordered personality
stated that she has not closed her doors to which make petitioner completely unable to
petitioner but the latter would have to give up discharge the essential obligations of
his extra-marital relationship. marriage
To controvert the findings of Petitioner failed to establish the
petitioners expert witness, respondent incurability and gravity of his alleged
presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, psychological disorder. He simply fall out of
who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were love and has consequently refused to stay
incomplete because a team approach was married to her. Refusal to comply with the
necessary in evaluating an individuals essential obligations of marriage is not
personality. An evaluation of ones psychological incapacity within the meaning
psychological capacity requires the expertise of law.
of a psychiatrist and social worker.
The trial court declared the marriage 66) A. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS VS. BRIX
between petitioner and respondent null and FERRARIS
void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of petitioner. Thereafter. The
respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
appeal from the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision reversed and set aside the trial
courts decision. Contrary to the trial courts FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of
findings, the appellate court held that Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision
petitioner failed to prove the juridical denying the petition for declaration of nullity
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his of petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris.
alleged psychological incapacity. Petitioners The trial court noted that suffering from
sexual infidelity was made to appear as epilepsy does not amount to psychological
symptomatic of a grave psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
disorder when, in reality, the same merely and the evidence on record were insufficient
resulted from a general dissatisfaction with to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for
the marriage. reconsideration was denied in an Order dated
Petitioner filed a motion for April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated
reconsideration of the appellate courts that there was no evidence that respondent is
74
mentally or physically ill to such an extent quarreled, the violent tendencies during
that he could not have known the obligations epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not abandonment and lack of support, and his
have given valid assumption thereof. preference to spend more time with his band
Petitioner appealed to the Court of mates than his family, are not rooted on some
Appeals, which affirmed in toto the judgment debilitating psychological condition but a
of the trial court on the basis that the mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
evidence on record did not convincingly essential obligations of marriage.
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his defects A mere showing of irreconcilable
were incurable and already present at the differences and conflicting personalities in no
inception of the marriage. The Court of wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayans testimony not enough to prove that the parties failed to
failed to establish the substance of meet their responsibilities and duties as
respondents psychological incapacity; that married persons; it is essential that they must
she failed to explain how she arrived at the be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed some psychological, not physical, illness.
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly The intendment of the law has been to
demonstrate that there was a natal or confine the meaning of psychological
supervening disabling factor or an adverse incapacity to the most serious cases of
integral element in respondents character personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
that effectively incapacitated him from an utter insensitivity or inability to give
accepting and complying with the essential meaning and significance to the marriage.
marital obligations.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration 67) ZAMORA VS. CA and Norma ZAMORA
was denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a G.R. NO. 141917. February 7, 2007
petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. Facts:
Petitioner filed the instant motion for Bernardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were
reconsideration. The Court required married on June 4, 1970. Their union was not
respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment but blessed of a child. Two years after, Norma left
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have the country and went to the US to work as a
waived the opportunity to file comment. nurse. After two years she did come back in
Further, the Court directed the Office of the the Philippines and thereafter she made
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on periodic visits until she was already a US
petitioners motion for reconsideration which citizen.
it complied on March 2, 2006.
Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of
After considering the arguments of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court psychological incapacity of Norma. To
resolves to deny petitioners motion for support his position, he alleged that his wife
reconsideration. was horrified by the mere thought of having
children as evidenced by the fact that she had
not borne him a child. Furthermore, he also
alleged that she abandoned him by living in
ISSUE: Whether or not Brix is psychologically the US and that throughout their marriage
incapacitated as to render his marriage with they live together for not more than three
Amy void. years. He alleged that Art.36 of the Family
Code provides that the marriage contracted
by any party who at that time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
HELD: No. The Court found Brixs alleged to comply with the marital obligations of the
mixed personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
use" attitude whenever he and Amy incapacity becomes manifest only after its
75
solemnization and that one of the essential previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz
marital obligations is to procreate children on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
through sexual cooperation which is the basic still existing; she came to know of the prior
end of marriage. marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from
On the other hand, Norma denied that she January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has
refused to have a child. She portrayed herself been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to
as one who loves children as she is a nurse by come to the Philippines only when she would
profession and that she would from time to avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
time borrow her husbands niece and granted by her foreign employer; since 1983
nephews to care for them. up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for
Issue: support and subsistence; out of her personal
Whether or not Norma was suffering from earnings, she purchased real and personal
psychological incapacity, hence their properties with a total amount of
marriage be declared void? approximately P350,000.00, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto;
Held: sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
No. Norma was not psychologically month vacation, she discovered that he was
incapacitated. cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of
Under the law, the facts alleged in the petition some of her properties without her knowledge
and the evidence presented, considered or consent; she confronted him about this and
totality, should be sufficient to convince the thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
court of the psychological incapacity of the Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of
party concerned. her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said
In the case at bar the petition filed by properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact. The
Bernardino was not sufficient as to petition prayed that a temporary restraining
substantiate his allegations that Norma is order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any
relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and act of administration and ownership over said
to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the properties; their marriage be declared null
records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the and void and of no force and effect; and Delia
acts and behavior of Norma that Bernardino Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
cited occurred during the marriage, and there owner of all properties acquired at the time of
is no proof that the former exhibited a similar their void marriage and such properties be
predilection even before or the inception of placed under the proper management and
the marriage. administration of the attorney-in-fact.
68) DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993 declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If
in the affirmative, whether the same should
FACTS: be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition on
May 29, 1991 before the Regional Trial Court HELD: Yes, a judicial declaration of a void
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of marriage is necessary and it can be filed even
Marriage and Separation of Property" against if not for the purpose of remarriage.
Roberto Domingo. The petition alleged among
others that: they were married on November Under the law, parties to a marriage should
29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as not be allowed to assume that their marriage
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. is void even if such be the fact but must first
1277K-76 with Marriage License issued at secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
76
their marriage before they can be allowed to filed a criminal complaint for concubinage
marry again. against Meynard and his paramour before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: Resolution found probable cause and ordered
"ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous the filing of an Information against them. The
marriage may be invoked for purposes of case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176,
remarriage on the basis solely of a final was filed before the MTC of Makati City.
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." (n). On March 20, 1998, Meynard filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He
the significant clause denotes that such final argued that the pendency of the civil case for
judgment declaring the previous marriage declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
void need not be obtained only for purposes prejudicial question to the determination of
of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive the criminal case.
of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous Issue: Whether or not the pending case
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, involving a declaration of nullity of marriage
such as in case of an action for liquidation, based on article 36 is a prejudicial question to
partition, distribution and separation of a criminal action of concubinage involving
property between the erstwhile spouses, as identical parties.
well as an action for the custody and support
of their common children and the delivery of Held: No. It is not a prejudicial question.
the latter's presumptive legitimes. Under the law, the pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
Therefore, in the instance where a party who marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
has previously contracted a marriage which concubinage case. For a civil case to be
remains subsisting desires to enter into considered prejudicial to a criminal action as
another marriage which is legally to cause the suspension of the latter pending
unassailable, he is required by law to prove the final determination of the civil case, it
that the previous one was an absolute nullity. must appear not only that the said civil case
But this he may do on the basis solely of a involves the same facts upon which the
final judgment declaring such previous criminal prosecution would be based, but also
marriage void. that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
69) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE innocence of the accused would necessarily
PHILIPPINES be determined.
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
In the case at bar, the parties to the marriage
Facts: should not be permitted to judge for
Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix themselves its nullity, for the same must be
were married on June 16, 1973 at the submitted to the judgment of the competent
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in courts and only when the nullity of the
Cubao, Quezon City. They were blessed with marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
four children. After 24 years of marriage, and so long as there is no such declaration
Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage the presumption is that the marriage exists.
on the ground of psychological incapacity Therefore, he who contracts a second
under Article 36 of the Family Code before the marriage before the judicial declaration of
RTC of Quezon City. nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Charmaine Felix answer she alleged that it
was Meyanard who abandoned the conjugal Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
home and lived with a certain woman named his wife before the judicial declaration of
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently
77
nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of provided all its elements concur, two of which
being prosecuted for concubinage. are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it
70) MARBELA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS not been for the existence at the material
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000 time of the first marriage.
FACTS: Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. action against him. The court should then
Without said marriage having been annulled, immediately proceed with the criminal case
nullified or terminated, the same respondent without waiting for the result of the civil case.
contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 71) MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
and allegedly a third marriage with a certain G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy FACTS:
was filed against respondent on February 25, Ma. Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case married in 1991. However, at the time of the
No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, marriage of Tan with Mercado, the latter was
Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime actually a married man, having been in lawful
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity the first marriage he have two children and in
of his first marriage on the ground that it was the second marriage he has one child.
celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy
the proceedings in the criminal case for was filed by Tan against Mercado. A month
bigamy invoking the pending civil case for later, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial Marriage was filed by Mercado against Oliva.
question to the criminal case. The trial judge On May 6, 1993, the trial court declared the
granted the motion to suspend the criminal marriage of Mercado and Oliva as void ab
case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. initio. Nevertheless, the lower court found
accused Mercado guilty of the crime of
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
civil action for declaration of nullity of a Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial decision of the lower court by stating that
question to a criminal case for bigamy. accused Mercado failed to comply with Article
40 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No, it is not a prejudicial question. ISSUE: Whether or not accused Mercado is
guilty of bigamy despite of his having
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of
was effective at the time of celebration of the marriage?
second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage RULING:
before a party may remarry. The clear Yes, Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine Under Article 40 of the Family Code and the
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. rulings enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
Whether or not the first marriage was void for and Domingo vs. Court of Appeals which
lack of a license is a matter of defense expressly state that in order to re-marry, one
because there is still no judicial declaration of must first obtain a judicial declaration of
its nullity at the time the second marriage nullity of the previous marriage.
was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
78
In the case at bar, accused Mercado failed to considering that there was no marriage
comply with the requirement because he ceremony took place with his marriage with
married Tan without first securing a judicial Lucia.
declaration of his marriage with Oliva. He only
filed for such a month after he was charge Held: No, he is not guilty.
with the crime of bigamy.
Under the law, the first element of Bigamy is
Therefore, the crime of bigamy was already that the offender has been legally married
consummated when he contracted a second and under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage while the first was still subsisting. marriage being declared void ab initio, the
The subsequent judicial declaration of the two were never married "from the beginning."
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect.
72) MORIGO V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Lucio and Lucia Barrete
Facts: merely signed a marriage contract on their
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were own. The mere private act of signing a
boardmates four years.. After the school year marriage contract bears no semblance to a
1977-1978 they lost contact with each other. valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
Yet, after some time, when Lucia was in declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio
Singapore she sent a letter to Lucio, their was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus,
friendship was rekindled. They became there is no first marriage to speak of.
sweethearts and on 1986 Lucia returned to
the Philippines. On 1990 they eventually got Therefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme
married. After their marriage celebration, Court from the charge of Bigamy because
Lucia once again left for Canada. After a year, Lucio was not married to Lucia at the time he
Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for contracted his marriage with Maria,
divorce against Lucio which was granted on
January 17, 1992. 73) CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO
In October of the same year, Lucio married G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Maria Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a petition
for nullity of his marriage to Lucia on the Facts:
ground that no marriage ceremony actually On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died
took place. In 1993, an Information for Bigamy intestate, leaving several parcels of land with
was filed against Lucio. He moved for the an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico
suspension of the arraignment alleging that was survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio.
the civil case for judicial nullification of his Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial who had previously been married to James
question in the bigamy case. His motion was William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared
denied. without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
Subsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Court and on appeal, the Court of Appeals Marietta having priorly secured a court
affirmed the conviction of Bigamy. It ruled that declaration that James was presumptively
what is sought to be punished by Article 349 dead.
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y
marriage had been dissolved. Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed
with the Regional Trial Court a petition
Issue: Whether or not Lucio is guilty of entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of
bigamy by contracting a marriage with Maria, the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
79
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas claiming to be the and believed to be so by the spouse present
sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and at the time of contracting such subsequent
that the marriage between the latter and marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly according to articles 390 and 391. The
bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her the three cases until declared null and void by
first marriage with James Bounds had been a competent court.
dissolved due to the latter's absence, his Under the foregoing provisions a judicial
whereabouts being unknown, for more than declaration of absence of the absentee
eleven years before she contracted her spouse is not necessary as long as the
second marriage with Teodorico. Contending prescribed period of absence is met. It is
to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
sought priority in the administration of the exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate
estate of the decedent. of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court."
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed It follows that the burden of proof would be, in
down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia these cases, on the party assailing the second
and declared the latter as the sole heir of the marriage.
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Therefore, it remained undisputed that
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of Mariettas first husband, James Bounds, had
the trial court to the Court of Appeals which been absent or had disappeared for more
ruled in her favor. than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage, Theodorico Calisterio. This second marriage,
having been contracted during the regime of having been contracted during the regime of
the Civil Code, should be deemed valid the civil code should thus be deemed valid.
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James 74) REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
Bounds. 220 SCRA 21
Held: The marriage between the deceased FACTS:

Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on 08 On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio
May 1958. The law in force at that time was Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a
the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took petition for the declaration of presumptive
effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking
the Family Code itself limited its retroactive Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
governance only to cases where it thereby prayed that respondent's wife be declared
would not prejudice or impair vested or presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil the marriage be declared null and void. The
Code or other laws. Republic of the Philippines opposed the
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
instant controversy is Article 83 (2) of the Antique who had been deputized to assist the
New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
marriage subsequently contracted by any Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not
person during the lifetime of the first spouse possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
of such person with any person other than spouse was already dead," 2 and second,
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse annulled in the same proceeding was a
had been absent for seven consecutive years "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on
at the time of the second marriage without marriage. During trial, respondent Nolasco
the spouse present having news of the testified that he was a seaman and that he
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
though he has been absent for less than subject, in a bar in England during one of his
seven years, is generally considered as dead ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
80
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left
respondent on his ship for six (6) months until for England. She further claimed that she had
they returned to respondent's hometown of no information as to the missing person's
San Jose, Antique after his seaman's contract present whereabouts.The trial court granted
expired. Respondent married Janet Monica Nolasco's petition declaring Janet Monica
Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead,
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the without prejudice to her reappearance. The
Cathedral of San Jose. Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that the trial court erred in
Respondent further testified that after the declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
marriage celebration, he obtained another dead because respondent Nolasco had failed
employment contract as a seaman and left his to show that there existed a well founded
wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. belief for such declaration.
Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
his mother informing him that Janet Monica decision. Hence this Petition for Review.
had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-
Antique. Respondent claimed he then founded belief that his wife is already dead.
immediately asked permission to leave his
ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in HELD: Four (4) requisites for the declaration of
November 1983. Respondent further testified presumptive death under Article 41 of the
that his efforts to look for her himself Family Code:
whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 four consecutive years, or two consecutive
Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the years if the disappearance occurred where
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica there is danger of death under the
first met, were all returned to him. He also circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
claimed that he inquired from among friends Code;
but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
cross-examination, respondent stated that he 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
had lived with and later married Janet Monica belief that the absentee is dead; and
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her 4. That the present spouse files a summary
family background. He insisted that his wife proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
continued to refuse to give him such death of the absentee.
information even after they were married. He
also testified that he did not report the matter The Court believes that respondent Nolasco
of Janet Monica's disappearance to the failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
Philippine government authorities. with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-
founded belief" that she is dead.
Respondent presented his mother, Alicia
Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her In the case at bar, the Court considers that
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a the investigation allegedly conducted by
desire to return to England even before she respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
had given birth to Gerry Nolasco. When asked Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to
why her daughter-in-law might have wished to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
leave Antique, respondent's mother replied belief that she was already dead. When he
that Janet Monica never got used to the rural arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet the help of local authorities or of the British
Monica from leaving as she had given birth to Embassy, he secured another seaman's
her son just fifteen days before, but when she contract and went to London, a vast city of
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
81
there. In Respondent's testimony, however, testimony merely tended to show that the
showed that he confused London for Liverpool missing spouse had chosen not to
and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts communicate with their common
to locate his wife in England. The Court of acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
Respondent testified that immediately after
Well, while the cognoscente would readily receiving his mother's letter sometime in
know the geographical difference between January 1983, he cut short his employment
London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
like Gregorio the two places could mean one However, he did not explain the delay of nine
place in England, the port where his ship (9) months from January 1983, when he
docked and where he found Janet. Our own allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
provincial folks, every time they leave home November 1983 when be finally reached San
to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he
or Paraaque, would announce to friends and married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This about her parents and their place of
apparent error in naming of places of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain
destination does not appear to be fatal. Is not why he did not even try to get the help of the
well taken. There is no analogy between police or other authorities in London and
Manila and its neighboring cities, on one Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, circumstances of Janet Monica's departure
which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, and respondent's subsequent behavior make
are around three hundred fifty (350) it very difficult to regard the claimed belief
kilometers apart. We do not consider that that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded
walking into a major city like Liverpool or one.
London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there The spouses should not be allowed, by the
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did simple expedient of agreeing that one of them
can be regarded as a reasonably diligent leave the conjugal abode and never to return
search. again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent
The Court also views respondent's claim that even tried to have his marriage annulled
Janet Monica declined to give any information before the trial court in the same proceeding.
as to her personal background even after she
had married respondent 17 too convenient an While the Court understands the need of
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
same can be said of the loss of the alleged maternal care, still the requirements of the
letters respondent had sent to his wife which law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
respondent claims were all returned to him. satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
Respondent said he had lost these returned petition for a judicial declaration of
letters, under unspecified circumstances. presumptive death must be denied. In fine,
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent failed to establish that he had the
respondent's bare assertion that he had well-founded belief required by law that his
inquired from their friends of her absent wife was already dead that would
whereabouts, considering that respondent did sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
not identify those friends in his testimony. The Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during 74) REPUBLIC VS. LORINO
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In
any case, admissibility is not synonymous FACTS:
with credibility. As noted before, there are Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said her husband, a verified petition with the RTC
82
under the rules on Summary Judicial the appealed decision.

Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in
the Family Code, for a Court declaration that ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
her husband is judicially presumed dead for duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a
the purpose of remarriage. She alleged that: final and executory judgment of the Regonal
A) she and FRANCISCO LORINO, JR. were Trial Court.
married on June 12, 1987 and begot three (3)
children. B) Before they got married she was HELD: No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings
unaware that her husband was a habitual under the Family Code, there is no
drinker, possessed with violent reglementary period within which to perfect
character/attitude, and had the propensity to an appeal, precisely because judgments
go out with friends to the extent of being rendered thereunder, by express provision of
unable to engage in any gainful work. C) Section 247, Family Code, are "immediately
Because of her husbands violent character, final and executory". It was erroneous,
Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
decided to go back to her parents together course to the Republics appeal and order the
with her three (3) children. D) From the time transmittal of the entire records of the case to
of her physical separation from her husband the Court of Appeals. An appellate court
in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment
She had absolutely no communications with which, by express provision of law, is
him, or with any of his relatives. She believes immediately final and executory. The right to
that he is already dead and is now seeking appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of
through this petition for a Court declaration due process, for it is merely a statutory
that her husband is judicially presumed dead privilege." Since, by express mandate of
for the purpose of remarriage. On August 28, Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments
2000, the RTC issued an order directing, the rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
publication of the petition in a newspaper of Family Law are "immediately final and
general circulation. On September 16, 2000, executory", the right to appeal was not
the order for hearing was published in a granted to any of the parties therein. The
newspaper of general circulation in this Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
province once a week for three consecutive petition for declaration of presumptive death,
weeks and be posted in the bulletin boards of should not be treated differently. It had no
the Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San right to appeal the RTC decision of November
Mateo, Rizal. Finding the said petition to be 7, 2001. Nothing is more settled in law than
sufficient in form and substance, the same is that when a judgment becomes final and
hereby set for hearing before the Court on executory it becomes immutable and
September 18, 2000. The trial court ruled unalterable. The same may no longer be
declaring the presumptive death/absence of modified in any respect, even if the
Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the modification is meant to correct what is
New Family Code but subject to all restrictions perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
and conditions provided therein. The fact or law, and whether made by the highest
judgment being immediately final and court of the But, if only to set the records
executory under the provisions of Article 247 straight and for the future guidance of the
of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The bench and the bar, let it be stated that the
judgment of the court shall be immediately RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was
final and executory, Despite the decision of immediately final and executory upon notice
the trial court having become final, the Office to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to
of the Solicitor General, nevertheless filed a file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give
Notice of Appeal. The RTC had the records due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary should have dismissed the appeal outright on
appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised that ground.
Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the
Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed 76) TY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
83
G.R. NO. 127406. November 27, 2000 would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with
FACTS: respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent
As shown in the records of the case, private would be regarded VOID under the law.
respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, At any rate, the confusion under the Civil
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church Code was put to rest under the Family Code.
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel
August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a required a judicial declaration of nullity of
valid marriage license. The church wedding marriage
on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
parties. marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
Even before the decree was issued nullifying judgment declaring such previous marriage
his marriage to Anna Maria, private void.
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner,
on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying
the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically
4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a
Makati, Metro Manila. void marriage is necessary. Thus, we
disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous
Private respondent filed a petition, which marriage during the subsistence of his first
alleged that his marriage with petitioner was marriage. He claimed that his first marriage
void for lack of marriage license and his in 1977 was void since his first wife was
marriage with Anne Maria was still subsisting. already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing
ISSUE: Whether or not nullity of first marriage case law is that for purposes of determining
is required before obtaining 2nd marriage. whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that
HELD: the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held
that there is a need for a judicial declaration In the present case, the second marriage of
of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia private respondent was entered into in 1979,
married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing
another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to Aragon. The first marriage of private
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the respondent being void for lack of license and
ground of her previous valid marriage. The consent, there was no need for judicial
Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, declaration of its nullity before he could
concluded that: contract a second marriage. In this case,
therefore, we conclude that private
There is likewise no need of introducing respondents second marriage to petitioner is
evidence about the existing prior marriage of valid.
her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a 77) CARINO vs. CARINO
judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such 351 SCRA 131
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
84
FACTS: such previous marriage void. Meaning, where

SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
two marriages during his lifetime, the first was sought to be invoked for the purposes of
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
Nicdao, with whom he had two children, and acceptable by law, for said projected marriage
the second was on November 10, 1992, with to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
respondent Susan Yee and had no children at judgment declaring the previous marriage
all in their 10 years of cohabitation. On void. However, for purposes other than
November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Carino remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
passed away in the care of Susan Yee who declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
paid the medical and burial expenses. Both In the case at bar, there is no question
petitioner and respondent filed claims for that the marriage of petitioner and deceased
monetary benefits and financial assistance does not fall within the marriages exempt
pertaining to the deceased from various from the marriage license requirement. A
government agencies, petitioner was able to marriage license, therefore, was indispensible
collect a total of P146,000.00 and respondent to the validity of their marriage. Such being
has collected P21,000.00 the case, the presumed validity of the
On December 14, 1993, respondent marriage of petitioner and deceased has been
filed the instant case for the collection of sufficiently overcome. It then became the
money against petitioner to return to burden of petitioner to prove that their
respondent at least one half of the money she marriage is valid and that they secured the
has collected from the government agencies. valid marriage license.
Petitioner failed to file her answer and was It does not follow from the foregoing
declared in default. Respondent then disposition , however, that since the marriage
admitted that her marriage with the deceased of petitioner and the deceased is declared
took place during the subsistence of, and void ab initio, the death benefits under the
without the judicial declaration of nullity of scrutiny would now be awarded to
the 1st marriage. She also claimed that she respondent. Accordingly, the declaration in
was not aware that the deceased has a the instant case of nullity of the previous
previous marriage and only found out when marriage of the deceased and the petitioner
petitioner introduced herself as the wife. To does not validate the second marriage of the
bolster her action for collection of money, deceased with respondent. The fact remains
respondent contended that the marriage of that their marriage was solemnize without
petitioner with the deceased is void ab initio first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
because the same was solemnized without marriage of petitioner and the deceased void.
the required marriage license. In support Hence, the marriage of respondent and the
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the deceased is likewise, void ab initio. As to the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the death benefits that the deceased obtained
petitioner which bears no marriage license from the government agencies, it should be
number, and 2) a certification dated March 9, given to his legal heirs as it was declared an
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San intestate succession. The children from the
Juan, Metro Manila. first marriage shall be the ones obtaining the
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. And said benefits.
on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court in toto. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two marriages

contracted by the deceased are valid
HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code,

the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
85
IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any
78) ANAYA vs. PALAROAN of the following causes, existing at the time of
36 SCRA 97 the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
FACTS: (4) That the consent of either party was
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were obtained by fraud, unless such party
married on 4 December 1953; that defendant afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground the other as her husband or his wife, as the
that his consent was obtained through force case may be;
and intimidation; that judgment was rendered This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited
therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the exclusively by law to those kinds or species of
complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
of the marriage and granting Aurora's ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4
the amount of the counterclaim was being of the preceding article:
negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of
had divulged to Aurora that several months the contracting parties;
prior to their marriage he had pre-marital (2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of
relationship with a close relative of his; and the other party of a crime involving moral
that "the non-divulgement to her of the turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part imprisonment for two years or more;
of defendant that definitely wrecked their (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at
marriage, which apparently doomed to fail the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by
even before it had hardly commenced ... frank a man other than her husband.
disclosure of which, certitude precisely No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
thru the marriage that was solemnized constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
between them constituted 'FRAUD', in action for the annulment of marriage.
obtaining her consent, within the The intention of Congress to confine the
contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). ground for annulment of marriage to the
She prayed for the annulment of the marriage foregoing three cases may be deduced from
and for moral damages. the fact that, of all the causes of nullity
Failing in its attempt to have the enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only
parties reconciled, the court set the case for one given special treatment in a subsequent
trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed. article within the chapter on void and voidable
Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, marriages. If its intention were otherwise,
the court realized that Aurora's allegation of Congress would have stopped at Article 85,
the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate for, anyway, fraud in general is already
her marriage. The court dismissed the mentioned therein as a cause for annulment.
complaint. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a number 4 of the preceding article," and
wife by her husband of his pre-marital proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
relationship with another woman is a ground (misrepresentation as to identity, non-
for annulment of marriage. disclosure of a previous conviction, and
concealment of pregnancy), making it clear
HELD: that Congress intended to exclude all other
We must agree with the lower court that it is frauds or deceits. To stress further such
not. For fraud as a vice of consent in intention, the enumeration of the specific
marriage, which may be a cause for its frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of other misrepresentation or deceit as to
86
character, rank, fortune or chastity shall defendant claimed that the child was
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for conceived out of lawful wedlock between her
action for the annulment of marriage." and the plaintiff.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre- At the trial, the attorney's for both parties
marital relationship with another woman is appeared and the court a quo ordered
not one of the enumerated circumstances that Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to
would constitute a ground for annulment; and represent the State in the proceedings to
it is further excluded by the last paragraph of prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however,
the article, providing that "no other testified and the only documentary evidence
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" presented was the marriage contract between
shall give ground for an action to annul a the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor
marriage. While a woman may detest such presented any evidence despite the
non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel reservation made by her counsel that he
having been thereby cheated into giving her would present evidence on a later date.
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that
does not assuage her grief after her consent no birth certificate was presented to show
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she that the child was born within 180 days after
entered into an institution in which society, the marriage between the parties, and
and not herself alone, is interested. The holding that concealment of pregnancy as
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it such fraud that would annul a marriage,
agrees with the rule or not. dismissed the complaint. Through a verified
On the merits of this second fraud "petition to reopen for reception of additional
charge, it is enough to point out that any evidence", plaintiff tried to present the
secret intention on the husband's part not to certificates of birth and delivery of the child
perform his marital duties must have been born of the defendant on April 26, 1955,
discovered by the wife soon after the which documents, according to him, he had
marriage: hence her action for annulment failed to secure earlier and produce before the
based on that fraud should have been brought trial court thru excusable negligence. The
within four years after the marriage. Since petition, however, was denied.
appellant's wedding was celebrated in On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court
December of 1953, and this ground was only held that there has been excusable neglect in
pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the
barred. child's birth, through her birth certificate, and
for that reason the court a quo erred in
79) AQUINO vs. DELIZO denying the motion for reception of additional
109 Phil. 21 evidence. On the theory, however, that it was
not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
FACTS: have had sexual intercourse during their
This is a petition for certiorari to review engagement so that the child could be their
a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim
that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal that he did not notice or even suspect that
which dismissed petitioner's complaint for defendant was pregnant when he married her,
annulment of his marriage with respondent the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed
Conchita Delizo. the dismissal of the complaint.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on Plaintiff filed a motion praying that the
September 6, 1955, was based on the ground decision be reconsidered, or, if such
of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, reconsideration be denied, that the case be
that respondent, at the date of her marriage remanded to the lower court for new trial.
to petitioner Aquino, on December 27, 1954, The Court of Appeals denied the motion. From
concealed from the latter that fact that she that order, the plaintiff brought the case to
was pregnant by another man, and sometime this Court thru the present petition for
in April, 1955, or about four months after their certiorari.
marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,
87
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment by alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
the wife of the fact that at the time of the should, therefore, not have denied the motion
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other praying for new trial simply because
than her husband constitutes fraud and is defendant failed to file her answer thereto.
ground for annulment of marriage. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken
as evidence of collusion, especially since a
HELD: provincial fiscal has been ordered to represent
The court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's the Government precisely to prevent such
complaint cannot be sustained. collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the the motion and its annexes, the same can
wife of the fact that at the time of the best be determined only after hearing
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other evidence. In the circumstance, we think that
than her husband constitutes fraud and is justice would be better served if a new trial
ground for annulment of marriage. The were ordered.
defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her 80) JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not 109 PHIL 273
prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was FACTS:
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
According to medical authorities, even on the decree annulling his marriage to the
5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a defendant Remedios Cazares contracted on 3
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, August 1950 before a judge of the municipal
that is to say, the enlargement is limited to court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground
the lower part of the abdomen so that it is that the office of her genitals or vagina was to
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be small to allow the penetration of a male organ
attributed only to fat formation on the lower or penis for copulation; that the condition of
part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th her genitals as described above existed at the
month of pregnancy that the enlargement of time of marriage and continues to exist; and
the woman's abdomen reaches a height that for that reason he left the conjugal home
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of two nights and one day after they had been
the abdomen more general and apparent. If, married. The wife was summoned and served
as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to
merely by looking, whether or not she was the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code,
pregnant at the time of their marriage more the Court directed the city attorney of
so because she must have attempted to Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a
conceal the true state of affairs. Even collusion, to intervene for the State to see
physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a
woman herself who shows and gives her frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
subjective and objective symptoms, can only December 1956 the Court entered an order
claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% requiring the defendant to submit to a
at five months. and 50% at six months. physical examination by a competent lady
The appellate court also said that it was not physician to determine her physical capacity
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have for copulation and to submit, within ten days
had sexual intercourse before they got from receipt of the order, a medical certificate
married and therefore the child could be their on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the
own. This statement, however, is purely defendant was granted additional five days
conjectural and finds no support or from notice to comply with the order of 17
justification in the record. December 1956 with warning that her failure
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to to undergo medical examination and submit
be introduced at the new trial, taken together the required doctor's certificate would be
with what has already been adduced would, in deemed lack of interest on her part in the
our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud
88
case and that judgment upon the evidence by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
presented by her husband would be rendered. submit to a physical examination unless
After hearing, at which the defendant was not compelled to by competent authority. This the
present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a Court may do without doing violence to and
decree annulling the marriage between the infringing in this case is not self-incrimination.
plaintiff and the defendant. The city attorney She is not charged with any offense. She is
filed a motion for reconsideration of the not being compelled to be a witness against
decree thus entered, upon the ground, among herself. "Impotency being an abnormal
others, that the defendant's impotency has condition should not be presumed. The
not been satisfactorily established as required presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
by law; that she had not been physically testimony of the husband that his wife is
examined because she had refused to be physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
examined; that instead of annulling the insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
marriage the Court should have punished her bound them together as husband and wife.
for contempt of court and compelled her to The decree appealed from is set aside and the
undergo a physical examination and submit a case remanded to the lower court for further
medical certificate; and that the decree proceedings in accordance with this decision,
sought to be reconsidered would open the without pronouncement as to costs.
door to married couples, who want to end
their marriage to collude or connive with each
other by just alleging impotency of one of
them. He prayed that the complaint be
dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a
physical examination. Pending resolution of
his motion, the city attorney timely appealed
from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion
for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage in

question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who
claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the
legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In
the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming
at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred because women of this country are
89
X. LEGAL SEPARATION the defendant appears in court and confesses

the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a
81) DE OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960 demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above
FACTS: statement of defendant constituted practically
In 1938, Jose and Serafina were a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there
married and lived together as husband and is evidence of the adultery independently of
wife. They were blessed of several children such statement, the decree may and should
who are now living with plaintiff. In March, be granted, since it would not be based on
1951, Jose discovered on several occasions her confession, but upon evidence presented
that Serafina was maintaining illicit relations by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
with Jose Arcalas. For this reason, Jose sent his judgment based exclusively or mainly on
wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study defendant's confession. If a confession
beauty culture, where she stayed for a year. defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant
However, Jose discovered that his wife, while who opposes the separation will immediately
in Manila was going out with several other confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
men, aside from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina The mere circumstance that
finished her study in 1952, she and her defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also"
husband lived separately. On June 18, 1955, to be legally separated from her husband, is
Jose surprised his wife in the act of having no obstacle to the successful prosecution of
illicit relations with another man by the name the action. When she refused to answer the
of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention complaint, she indicated her willingness to be
of filing a petition for legal separation, to separated. Yet, the law does not order the
which Serafina agreed provided she is will not dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to
be charged with adultery. On July 5, 1955, a continue, it takes precautions against
petition for legal separation was filed by Jose collusion, which implies more than consent or
in conformity with the condition requested by lack of opposition to the agreement.
Serafina.
The Court of Appeals found that in the 82) BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
discovering the illicit happening has
expressed his wish to file a petition for legal FACTS:
separation and defendant readily agreed to William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
such filing. And when she was questioned by Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation
the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He
reiterated her conformity to the legal alleged under oath that while interned by the
separation even as she admitted having had Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the
sexual relations with one Nelson Orzame. University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a wife engaged in adulterous relations with one
confession of judgment the Appellate Court Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct
could not be decreed. only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate separately and later executed a document
court committed a reversible error. liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife
RULING: as her share. The complaint prayed for
Yes. As we understand the article, it confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for
does not exclude, as evidence, any admission custody of the children issued of the
or confession made by the defendant outside marriage; that the defendant be declared
of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for
separation upon a confession of judgment. their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Confession of judgment usually happens when Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court
90
subsequently declared the wife in default, for except within one (1) year from and after the
failure to answer in due time, despite service plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or within five years from and after the date when
his representatives toinvestigate, in such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does
accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, not even contest the correctness of such
whether or not a collusion exists between the findings and conclusion.
parties and to report to this Court the result of
his investigation within fifteen (15) days from It is true that the wife has not interposed
receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
his representative is also directed to intervene courts can take cognizance thereof, because
in the case in behalf of the State. actions seeking a decree of legal separation,
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose or annulment of marriage, involve public
appeared at the trial, and cross-examined interest and it is the policy of our law that no
plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously such decree be issued if any legal obstacles
objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the thereto appear upon the record.
fact that after liberation, Brown had lived
maritally with another woman and had 83) LERMA vs. CA
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while FACTS:
the wife's adultery was established, Brown Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are
had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature husband and wife. Petitioner filed a complaint
that barred his right of action under Article for adultery against the respondent and a
100 of the new Civil Code. certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent a
complaint against the petitioner for legal
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in separation and/or separation of properties,
permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of custody of their children and support, with an
Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, urgent petition for support pendente lite for
who defaulted. her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was
then and until now is in her custody. The
RULING: respondent's complaint for legal separation is
NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross- based on two grounds: concubinage and
examining him with regard to his marital attempt against her life.The petitioner filed
relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, his opposition to the respondent's application
the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the for support pendente lite, setting up as
defaulting wife, "when the power of the defense te adultery charge he had filed
prosecuting officer is limited to finding out against the respondent.Judge Luciano of CFI of
whether or not there is collusion, and if there Rizal granted the respondent's application for
is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at support pendente lite to the following effect:
bar, to intervene for the state which is not the (1) the respondent was declared entitled to
fact in the instant case, the truth of the support pendente lite from the date of the
matter being that he intervened for Juanita filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of
Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is such monthly support was reduced from
private citizen and who is far from being the P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
state. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
and requested for prohibition and preliminary
The court below also found, and correctly held injunction to annul the aforementioned
that the appellant's action was already orders. Court of Appeals gave due course to
barred, because Brown did not petition for the petition and issued a writ of preliminary
legal separation proceedings until ten years injunction to stop Judge Luciano from
after he learned of his wife's adultery, which enforcing said orders. Moreover, on opposition
was upon his release from internment in of the respondent , the Court of Appeals
1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, dismissed such petition of the petitioner.
action for legal separation can not be filed
91
ISSUE: Whether or not adultery is a good Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the

defense against the respondent's claim for United States Navy, was married to defendant
support pendente lite. Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan,
Pangasinan, while on leave. Immediately
RULING: after their marriage, the couple lived with
Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc,
suit for legal separation can be foreseen since Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951,
she is not an innocent spouse, having been Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-
convicted of adultery by the Court of First law and informed her husband by letter that
Instance. It is true that the judgment of she had gone to reside with her mother in
conviction is on appeal in the Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies later moved to Dagupan City to study in a
the standard of provisional showing set by the local college there.
aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong
claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, began receiving letters from Valeriana
the fact that an action for that purpose is filed Polangco and some from anonymous writers
anyway should not be permitted to be used as informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of
a means to obtain support pendente lite, his wife which he did not even care to
which, without such action, would be denied mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to
on the strength of the decisions of this Court Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife
recognizing adultery as a good defense. whom he met in the house of one Mrs.
Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came
that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent along with him and both proceeded to the
such defense would be to file a suit for legal house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the
separation no matter how groundless. plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived
The right to separate support or maintenance, for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife.
even from the conjugal partnership property, Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and
presupposes the existence of a justifiable again passed the night therein as husband
cause for the spouse claiming such right to and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the
the Civil Code, which states that after the truth of the information he received that she
filing of the petition for legal separation the had committed adultery but Leonila, instead
spouses shall be entitled to live separately of answering his query, merely packed up and
from each other. A petition in bad faith, such left, which he took as a confirmation of the
as that filed by one who is himself or herself acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that
guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
legal separation at the instance of the other efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he
spouse, cannot be considered as within the went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his
intendment of the law granting separate wounded feelings".
support. In fact under Article 303 of the same On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong
Code the obligation to give support shall filed in the Court of First Instance of
cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation
or not, has committed some act which gives against his wife. The motion to dismiss was
rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 answered by plaintiff and the Court,
one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is considering only the second ground of the
"when the spouse has given cause for legal motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered
separation." The loss of the substantive right the dismissal of the action.
to support in such a situation is incompatible
with any claim for support pendente lite. ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation
on the part of the husband with respect to the
84) BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ legal separation case on account of adultery
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956 of the wife.
FACTS: RULING:
92
Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's line of granted by the court. On the other hand,
conduct under the assumption that he really Elisea Laperal has also ceased to live with
believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did him. A special procedure for change of name
he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, and /or permission to resume the maiden
he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife name of herein petitioner Elisea Laperal, was
and after finding her they lived together as filed. The petition was opposed on the ground
husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after that the same violates the provisions of Art.
which he says that he tried to verify from her 372 of the New Civil Code. The court however
the truth of the news he had about her granted the petition on the ground that her
infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose continued use of her married name will give
because his wife, instead of answering his rise to confusion in her affairs and in the
query on the matter, preferred to desert him, eventual liquidation of their conjugal assets.
probably enraged for being subjected to such The State appealed.
humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, That in view of the fact that she has been
though in vain. legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
A detailed examination of the testimony of Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live
the plaintiff-husband, especially those with him for many years, it is desirable that
portions quoted above, clearly shows that she be allowed to change her name and/or be
there was a condonation on the part of the permitted to resume using her maiden name
husband for the supposed "acts of rank to ELISEA LAPERAL. In its decision of October
infidelity amounting to adultery" committed 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the
by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code
argument that the infidelities amounting to requires the wife, even after she is decreed
adultery were committed by the defendant, a legally separated from her husband, to
reconciliation was effected between her and continue using the name and surname she
the plaintiff. The act of the latter in employed before the legal separation.
persuading her to come along with him, and
the fact that she went with him and ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the
consented to be brought to the house of his change of name should be granted.
cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they
slept there as husband and wife for one day RULING:
and one night, and the further fact that in the No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a
second night they again slept together in their language that is mandatory, that the wife,
house likewise as husband and wife all even after the legal separation has been
these facts have no other meaning in the decreed should continue using her name and
opinion of this court than that a reconciliation surname employed before legal separation.
between them was effected and that there This is so because her married status is
was a condonation of the wife by the unaffected by the separation, there being no
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the
ten months after he came to know of the acts policy of the law that the wife should continue
of infidelity amounting to adultery. to use the name indicative of her unchanged
There is no merit in the contention of status for the benefit of all concerned.
appellant that the lower court erred in The Supreme Court decided that from the
entertaining condonation as a ground for petition quoted in full at the beginning of
dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in these opinion, the only reason relied upon for
the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because the change of name is the fact that petitioner
in the second ground of the motion to dismiss. is legally separated from her husband and
has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many
85) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether
G.R. No. L- 18008. October 30, 1962 Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the specific
FACTS: provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
After several years of marriage with Enrique with regards to married women legally
Sta. Maria, a decree of legal separation was separated from their husbands. Even,
93
however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the William for his part denied that he ever
fact of legal separation alone which is the only inflicted physical harm on his wife, used
basis for the petition at bar is, in the opinion insulting language against her, or whipped
of the Court, not a sufficient ground to justify the children with the buckle of his belt. RTC
a change of the name of herein petitioner, for rendered its Decision decreeing legal
to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy separation. It found that "it is indubitable that
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had
Article 372. their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding
which made both of their lives miserable and
86) ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG hellish. This is even admitted by the
G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006 defendant when he said that there was no day
that he did not quarrel with his wife.
FACTS: Defendant had regarded the plaintiff
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong negligent in the performance of her wifely
(William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were duties and had blamed her for not reporting
married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin to him about the wrongdoings of their
Church in Manila. They have three children: children." The CA found that the testimonies
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are for Lucita were straightforward and credible
now all of the age of majority. In 1996, Lucita and the ground for legal separation. William
filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging filed a motion for reconsideration which was
that her life with William was marked by denied by the CA.
physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct. ISSUE: Whether a decree of legal separation
Lucita claimed that she and William quarreled should not be granted following Art. 56(4) of
almost every day, with physical violence the FC which provides that legal separation
being inflicted upon her; William would shout shall be denied when both parties have given
invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", ground for legal separation.
"tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull
her hair, bang her head against concrete wall HELD:
and throw at her whatever he could reach A decree of legal separation should be
with his hand; the causes of these fights were granted in this case. The abandonment
petty things regarding their children or their referred to by the Family Code is
business.William would also scold and beat abandonment without justifiable cause for
the children at different parts of their bodies more than one year. As it was established that
using the buckle of his belt; whenever she Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
tried to stop William from hitting the children, such does not constitute abandonment
he would turn his ire on her and box her contemplated by the said provision. As
In 1995, after she protested with Williams correctly observed by the trial court, William
decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to himself admitted that there was no day that
go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
"it is none of your business". In the same his life miserable, and he blames her for being
year, she asked William to bring Kingston negligent of her wifely duties and for not
back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
and William hit her on her head, left cheek, children.
eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave
on the stomach and she bent down because numerous accounts of the instances when
of the pain, he hit her on the head then William displayed violent temper against
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave Lucita and their children; such as: when
the house; she then went to her sisters house William threw a steel chair at Lucita threw
in Binondo where she was fetched by her chairs at their children slapped Lucita and
other siblings and brought to their parents utter insulting words at her use the buckle of
house in Dagupan; the following day, she the belt in whipping the children; pinned
went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Lucita against the wall with his strong arms
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. almost strangling her, and smashed the
94
flower vase and brick rocks and moldings

leaving the bedroom in disarray shouted at
Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of
Linda and the employees of their business,
because he could not find a draft letter on his
table got mad at Charleston for cooking steak
with vetchin prompting William to smash the
plate with steak and hit Charleston, then
slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina
mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado"
when she sided with Charleston.
William also posits that the real motive of
Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is
in order for her side of the family to gain
control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita
was willing to destroy his reputation by filing
the legal separation case just so her parents
and her siblings could control the properties
he worked hard for. The Court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. The claim of
William that a decree of legal separation
would taint his reputation and label him as a
wife-beater and child-abuser also does not
elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would
be such a smear on his reputation then it
would not be because of Lucitas decision to
seek relief from the courts, but because he
gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first
place.
95
XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
HUSBAND AND WIFE has presented herself without sufficient cause
and that it is her duty to return. Moreover,
87) ARROYO vs. DE ARROYO upon examination of the authorities the court
G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921 ruled that it is convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to
FACTS: attempt to compel one of the spouses to
In 1910 Mariano and Dolores married each cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
other and lived together as husband and wife. the other. Of course where the property rights
In 1920 Dolores went away and left their of one of the pair are invalid, an action for
common home with the intention of living restitution of such rights can be maintained.
separately from her husband Mariano. After But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine
failing to convince and induce Dolores to that an order, enforcible by process of
come back and resume her marital contempt, may be entered to compel the
obligations, Mariano filed an action to compel restitution of the purely personal rights of
her to live with him. Dolores answered by consortium.
claiming that her husband was very cruel and At best such an order can be effective
in turn prayed for a decree of separation. The for no other purpose than to compel the
trial judge, upon consideration of the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
evidence before him, reached the conclusion experience of these countries where the court
that the husband was more to blame than his of justice have assumed to compel the
wife and that his continued ill-treatment of cohabitation of married people shows that the
her furnished sufficient justification for her policy of the practice is extremely
abandonment of the conjugal home and the questionable
permanent breaking off of marital relations Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed
with him. from, in respect both to the original complaint
The Court has carefully examined and and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
weighed every line of the proof, and is of the Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from
opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly the marital home without sufficient cause;
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife and she is admonished that it is her duty to
is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy returnNo. The court ruled in the negative. The
towards her husband in an aggravated authorities are convinced that it is not within
degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable the province of the court to compel the wife to
without a doubt the many miseries that have live with her husband because such obligation
attended their married life. During the trial it is purely personal in nature. However the
was found out that the husband was not cruel court can declare her to be absent from the
to the wife. Furthermore, it was the wife who marital home without sufficient cause. She is
was excessively jealous without any proof of further admonished that it is her duty to
infidelity of the husband. Therefore the wife is return.
morally and legally obligated to live with her
husband. 88) PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can be
ordered by the court to live with her husband FACTS:
and failure of which will constitute contempt Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint
of court? against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella
setting forth that on or about the 13th of
RULING: October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was
No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable called to the house of the defendants,
to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival
the unconditional and absolute order for the he was requested by them to render medical
return of the wife to the marital domicile, assistance to their daughter-in-law who was
which is sought in the petitory part of the about to give birth to a child; that therefore,
complaint though he is, without doubt, and after consultation with the attending
96
physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, the plaintiff has no right of action against the
on account of the difficult birth, to remove the defendants, it is needless to declare whether
fetus by means of forceps which operation or not the use of forceps is a surgical
was performed by the plaintiff, who also had operation. From the foregoing it may readily
to remove the afterbirth, in which services he be understood that it was improper to have
was occupied until the following morning, and brought an action against the defendants
that afterwards, on the same day, he visited simply because they were the parties who
the patient several times; that the just and called the plaintiff and requested him to assist
equitable value of the services rendered by the patient during her difficult confinement,
him was P500, which the defendants refuse to and also, possibly, because they were her
pay without alleging any good reason father and mother-in-law and the sickness
therefor; that. occurred in their house. The defendants were
In answer to the complaint counsel for the not, nor are they now, under any obligation by
defendants denied all of the allegation therein virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees
contained and alleged as a special defense, claimed, nor in consequence of any contract
that their daughter-in-law had died in entered into between them and the plaintiff
consequence of the said childbirth, and that from which such obligation might have arisen.
when she was alive she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate 89) ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO
house without any relation whatever with GRN 139789, May 12, 2000
them, and that, if on the day when she gave
birth she was in the house of the defendants, FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of
her stay their was accidental and due to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
fortuitous circumstances Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at
ISSUE: Whether or not father and mother-in- millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer
law may be compelled to pay the fees Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board
concerning the services performed with the and President of Baguio Country Club.
daughter-in-law. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and
Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and
RULING: lived together for a period of thirty (30) years.
No. In the face of the above legal precepts it In 1972, they separated from bed and board .
is unquestionable that the person bound to Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium,
pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
professional services that he rendered to the and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
daughter-in-law of the defendants during her Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
childbirth, is the husband of the patient and hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
not her father and mother- in-law, the Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6)
defendants herein. Father and mother-in-law children.
are strangers with respect to the obligation On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's
that devolves upon the husband to provide arrival from the United States, he stayed with
support, among which is the furnishing of Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
medical assistance to his wife at the time of City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged
her confinement; and, on the other hand, it that during this time, their mother gave
does not appear that a contract existed Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant
between the defendants and the plaintiff drug prescribed by his doctor. As a
physician, for which reason it is obvious that consequence, Potenciano's health
the former can not be compelled to pay fees deteriorated.
which they are under no liability to pay On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the
because it does not appear that they RTC Antipolo City a petition for guardianship
consented to bind themselves. over the person and property of Potenciano
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that Ilusorio due to the latter's advanced age, frail
the first and second errors assigned to the health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
judgment below are unfounded, because, if
97
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate residence and the people he opts to see or
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did live with. The choices he made may not
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at appeal to some of his family members but
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. these are choices which exclusively belong to
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court
petition for habeas corpus to have the of Appeals that he was not prevented from
custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She leaving his house or seeing people.
alleged that respondents refused petitioner's With his full mental capacity coupled with the
demands to see and visit her husband and right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
prohibited Potenciano from returning to the subject of visitation rights against his free
Antipolo City. choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
CA granted visitation rights in favor of right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run
Erlinda though she did not pray for such and against his fundamental constitutional right.
the administration of the Cleveland In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
Condominium private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas exercise of his right.
corpus to compel her husband to live with her No court is empowered as a judicial authority
in conjugal bliss? to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion
HELD: The answer is no. Marital rights of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
including coverture and living in conjugal sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra- is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
ordinary writ of habeas corpus. best left to the man and woman's free choice.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the
person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do,
submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
that behalf.
The evidence shows that there was no actual
and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals
concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty. Likewise, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not request the administrator of
the Cleveland Condominium and not to allow
his wife and other children from seeing or
visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
98
XII. PROPERTY RELATIONS petition for termination of conjugal

partnership for alleged mismanagement and
90) MOISES JOCSON V. C.A dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
170 SCRA 333 In order not to lengthen the proceedings, the
parties entered into a compromise
FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold agreement. However said agreement caused
parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One further litigation due to the question on its
said parcels of land bears and entry in the TCT effectivity. This is material to determine when
Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. and how much certain shares of stock is
These parcels of land are claimed by one of payable.
the surviving heirs of Emilio to have been sold
fictitiously and without any or insufficient ISSUE: When is the effectivity of a
consideration. Futhermore he claimed that compromise agreement entered into by the
when his father sold one of the land, it was husband and wife? Is it when the court
still part of the conjugal property of their approves of the same or when the spouses
parents which has not been liquidated. signed it?
Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale HELD: The compromise agreement separating
was with sufficient consideration and rebutted their properties is given effect only upon the
the allegation that she has no source of approval of the court. Under Article 190 of the
income by alleging she is engaged in playa Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express
buying business. This was not controverted by declaration in the marriage settlements, the
Moises. separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save
ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the
conjugal arise based on the entry in the separation of property is not effected by the
registry which states that the owner is mere execution of the contract or agreement
Married to thereby making it conjugal. of the parties, but by the decree of the court
approving the same. It, therefore, becomes
HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it effective on y upon judicial approval, without
must first be proven that the property was which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of
acquired during the marriage. The description said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal
married to does not vest title but merely partnership is dissolved only upon the
serves to describe the civil status. issuance of a decree of separation of property
Registration does not vest ownership but
merely confirms one already vested. The 92) WONG V. HON. INTERMEDIATE
allegation that the sale is fictitious due to APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO
insufficient consideration must be proven by HENSON
the one who allege the same. In this case 200 SCRA 792
Moises failed to prove this fact which likewise
fails to overcome the presumption that a sale FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina
is with sufficient consideration. Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have three
children but even during the early years of
91) TODA JR V. ROSEMARIE TUASON- their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had
TODA been most of the time living separately. The
153 SCRA 713 former stayed in Angeles City while the latter
lived in Manila. During the marriage or on
FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City
and were blessed with two children. Individual for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L.
differences and the alleged infidelity of Henson with money borrowed from an
Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union officemate.
thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June
December 18, 1979 in the CFI of Rizal, a 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with
99
Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to not been alleged in the complaint and proven
Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at at the trial.
199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the
When Katrina failed to return the pieces of effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal
Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. partnership only when she purchases things
Thereafter Anita and her husband filed an necessary for the support of the family or
action for collection of sum of money. After when she borrows money for the purpose of
trial, the court promulgated a decision in favor purchasing things necessary for the support
of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico of the family if the husband fails to deliver the
Henson to pay the Wongs. proper sum; 32 when the administration of the
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife
Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City all by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and
in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to when the wife gives moderate donations for
Katrina Henson. charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any
of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs
ISSUE: WON the judgment of execution may not bind the conjugal assets to answer
extends to the properties owned by the for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
husband
93) BELCODERO V. CA
HELD: The Court disagrees with the CA that 227 SCRA 303
the said properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. Having been acquired during the FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three
the conjugal partnership even though children. In 1946, he left the conjugal home,
Romarico and Katrina had been living and he started to live instead with Josefa
separately. Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine
properties subsists in the absence of clear, Belcodero.
satisfactory and convincing evidence to On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel
overcome said presumption or to prove that of land on installment basis from the
Romarico exclusively owns the properties. Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he
While there is proof that Romarico acquired indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa
the properties with money he had borrowed R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter
from an officemate, it is unclear where he which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc.,
obtained the money to repay the loan. If he he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in
paid it out of his salaries, then the money is the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The
part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena
his. Proof on this matter is of paramount Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 09
importance considering that in the November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title
determination of the nature of a property No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa
acquired by a person during covertrue, the R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ."
controlling factor is the source of the money On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while
utilized in the purchase. his prior marriage with Juliana was still
The conjugal nature of the properties subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967.
notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may About three years later, or on September
not be paid for with them her obligation not 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a
having been shown by the petitioners to be document of extrajudicial partition and sale of
one of the charges against the conjugal the lot in question, which was there described
partnership. In addition to the fact that her as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased
rights over the properties are merely inchoate Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as
partnership, the consent of her husband and well as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir,
her authority to incur such indebtedness had was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00
100
consideration, thereby completing for herself, It was at the time that 'the adjudication of
along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the ownership was made following Alayo's demise
surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of (not when Alayo merely allowed the property
the property. A new TCT No. 198840 was to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was
issued on June 1974 in the name of Josephine. not intended to be adversarial to Alayo's
On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was
real widow) and her three legitimate children deemed to have been created by operation of
filed with the court a quo an action for law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the
reconveyance of the property. TC ruled in Civil Code.
favor of the plaintiffs. Article 1456. If the property is acquired
CA affirmed. through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS. the person from whom the property comes.
AFFIREMED.
HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that,
simply because the Property was titled in the 94) VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and
thereby be deemed to be its owner. The CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
property unquestionably was acquired by 260 SCRA 221
Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959,
to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez
the latter to have the title to the property were married in January 1971 and had five
transferred to her name. More importantly, children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992,
she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
when, three years after the death of Alayo, marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
she and Josephine executed the deed of code. After the hearing the parties following
extrajudicial partition and sale in which she the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its
asserted a one-half (1/2) interest . decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition,
The property remained as belonging to the declaring among others that (1) the marriage
conjugal partnership of Alayo and his of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Consuelo Gomez-Valdez null and void under
Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
(Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is their mutual psychological incapacity to
presumed to belong to the conjugal comply with their essential marital
partnership, unless it be proved that it obligations; and (2) the petitioner and the
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the respondent are directed to start proceedings
wife." This presumption has not been on the liquidation of their common properties
convincingly rebutted. as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
As regards the property relation and to comply with the provisions of Articles
between common-law spouses, Article 144 of 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty
the Civil Code merely codified the law (30) days from notice of this decision.
established through judicial precedents under Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that
the old code. In both regimes, the co- portion of the decision directing compliance
ownership rule had more than once been with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family
repudiated when either or both spouses Code. She asserted that the Family Code
suffered from an impediment to marry. The contained no provisions on the procedure for
present provisions under Article 147 and the liquidation of common property in "unions
Article 148 of the Family Code did not much without marriage." In an order, the TC made
deviate from the old rules; in any case, its the following clarification: Consequently,
provisions cannot apply to this case without considering that Article 147 of the Family
interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Code explicitly provides that the property
Family Code). acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are
101
presumed to have been obtained through the equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned during the union is prima facie presumed to
by them in equal shares, plaintiff and have been obtained through their joint efforts.
defendant will own their "family home" and all A party who did not participate in the
their properties for that matter in equal acquisition of the property shall be considered
shares. In the liquidation and partition of as having contributed thereto jointly if said
properties owned in common by the plaintiff party's "efforts consisted in the care and
and defendant, the provisions on ownership maintenance of the family household." Unlike
found in the Civil Code shall apply. the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of
The TC said that considering that this Court the couple's separate property are not
has already declared the marriage between included in the co-ownership.
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab Thus, petitioner and private respondent own
initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property the "family home" and all their common
regime of petitioner and respondent shall be property in equal shares, as well as in
governed by the rules on co-ownership. concluding that, in the liquidation and
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner partition of the property owned in common by
submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the them, the provisions on co-ownership under
Family Code should be held controlling. the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family
ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code Code, should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED.
apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated. 95) ESTONINA V. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 627
HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause FACTS: The controversy involves Lot C
thereof, the property relations of the parties situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz,
during the period of cohabitation is governed Laguna with an area of 273 square meters.
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, The said parcel of land was in the name of
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967.
Article 147 provides: Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death,
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI of Manila
capacitated to marry each other, live issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's
exclusively with each other as husband and application for a writ of preliminary
wife without the benefit of marriage or under attachment. Consequently, a notice of
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall attachment was inscribed in favor of Trinidad
be owned by them in equal shares and the Estonina covering all the rights, title, interest,
property acquired by both of them through and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the
their work or industry shall be governed by widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and to
the rules on co-ownership the parcel of land covered by the said title.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago
properties acquired while they lived together Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta,
shall be presumed to have been obtained by namely Ofelia, Remedios, Elvira and Castor all
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling,
be owned by them in equal shares. For transferring and conveying unto the spouses
purposes of this Article, a party who did not Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban their "title,
participate in the acquisition by the other rights, interest and participation which is four
party of any property shall be deemed to have tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229.
the former's efforts consisted in the care and About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second
maintenance of the family and of the wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their
household. children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all
Under this property regime, property acquired surnamed Garcia, followed suit and also sold
by both spouses through their work and to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10)
industry shall be governed by the rules on pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land.
102
On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land.
widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago What could be attached by the spouses
Garcia's son from his first marriage), and their Estonina and later levied on execution and
children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and sold at public auction was only Consuelo
Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five
their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the per cent (55%) of the property.
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. CA: the parcel of land in question was not the
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo
by Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo Garcia, Garcia, but was the former's exclusive
execution pending appeal was made on the property. It was therefore the entire property
parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T- that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate
82229 on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died,
land was sold at a public auction where his nine children and Consuelo Garcia
Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. inherited the said property each to the extent
Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civil of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence,
Case before the IAC which, however, ruled in it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0)
favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon the finality of pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in
the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was question which could be validly attached,
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna levied and sold in execution to satisfy the
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad
issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430.
to Paulino Estonina".
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a ISSUE: WON the land is a conjugal property of
complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and Santiago and Consuelo
transfer certificate of title with damages
before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court HELD: The property involved in this dispute is
(RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, impleading as indeed the exclusive property of the deceased
defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held
Paulino Estonina , Nicanor E. Silvano, that the presumption under Article 160 of the
Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum, the Civil Code that all property of the marriage
Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of belong to the conjugal partnership applies
Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses only when there is proof that the property was
Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel acquired during the marriage. Otherwise
of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. stated, proof of acquisition during the
RTC:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired operation of the presumption in favor of the
during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and conjugal partnership. In the case at bench,
Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be the petitioners have been unable to present
conjugal in nature. Upon the death of any proof that the property in question was
Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his acquired during the marriage of Santiago and
conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on
parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by the fact that when the title over the land in
intestate succession. By the law on intestate question was issued, Santiago was already
succession, his nine children, five by his first married to Consuelo as evidenced by the
wife and four out of the subsequent marriage, registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia
and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and married to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to
widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the
each pro indiviso. The remaining one-half conjugal nature of the property.
(1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of In the case of Jocson v. Court of
Consuelo Garcia. Thus, inasmuch as Consuelo Appeals The fact that the properties were
Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson,
husband's conjugal share in the said property married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as the properties were acquired during the
her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and
103
registration thereof are two different acts. It is given to another person or entity, and the
well settled that registration does not confer husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
title but merely confirms one already erdsting. that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
The words "married to" preceding "Alejandra categorized as falling within the context of
Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the partnership." The contract of loan or services
import from the certificates of title is that is clearly for the benefit of the principal
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, debtor and not for the surety or his family.
the same having been registered in his name
alone, and that he is married to Alejandra FACTS:
Poblete. Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
Being the exclusive property of P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of Investment and Development Corporation
land in question that formed part of his estate (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
and which passed to his ten heirs by extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
compulsory succession upon his death. And as Executive Vice President of PBM, executed
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what security agreements, making himself jointly
could therefore be attached and sold at public and severally answerable with PBM's
auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the indebtedness to AIDC.
one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a
Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The case for sum of money against PBM and
sale at public auction of the disputed property respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the
in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad CFI of Pasig.
Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) After trial, the court rendered judgment
share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void, ordering PBM and respondent-husband
belonging as it does to the other heirs of Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000
Atayan. with interests.
Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a
are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's
residual argument deserves scant putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of
consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner
No. 88430 where the writ of execution over Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Pasig,
the land in question was issued, they cannot caused the issuance and service upon
be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
1985 or six (6) years after the levy on on 3 of their conjugal properties. Petitioner
execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision the properties levied.
finally cancelling the title of their Private respondents filed a case of injunction
predecessors-in-interest and issuing another against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale
one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the judgment against the conjugal partnership
annulment of the sheriffs sale and the levied on the ground that, among others, the
transfer certificate of title with damages subject loan did not redound to the benefit of
immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 the said conjugal partnership. The lower court
cannot be considered as undue delay nor issued a temporary restraining order.
does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the
claim over the disputed property. Court of Appeals, questioning the order of the
lower court enjoining the sale. Court of
96) AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order
SHING enjoining the lower court from enforcing its
GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 Order, thus paving the way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal
DOCTRINE: If the money or services are properties.
104
The auction sale took place. AIDC being the obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. received the money and services to be used
Upon expiration of the redemption period, in or for his own business or his own
petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale profession, that contract falls within the term .
which was registered. . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
ground that the same had become moot and family is apparent at the time of the signing of
academic with the consummation of the sale. the contract. From the very nature of the
Respondents filed their opposition to the contract of loan or services, the family stands
motion arguing, among others, that where a to benefit from the loan facility or services to
third party who claim is ownership of the be rendered to the business or profession of
property attached or levied upon, a different the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
legal situation is presented; and that in this business or profession fails or does not
case, 2 of the real properties are actually in succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party contracts obligations on behalf of the family
to the civil case. business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of that such obligation will redound to the
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ching is not liable for the payment of the (B) On the other hand, if the money or
debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo services are given to another person or entity,
Ching. Thus, the sale on execution null and and the husband acted only as a surety or
void. guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court. alone be categorized as falling within the
context of "obligations for the benefit of the
ISSUE: WON a surety agreement entered into conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or
by the husband in favor of his employer is services is clearly for the benefit of the
within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
Civil Code and considered for the benefit of family. No presumption can be inferred that,
the conjugal partnership? when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for
HELD: the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof
No. The surety agreement entered into by the must be presented to establish benefit
husband in favor of his employer is not redounding to the conjugal partnership.
considered for the benefit of the conjugal The provisions of the Family Code is
partnership. applicable in this case. These provisions
We do not agree with petitioners that there is highlight the underlying concern of the law for
a difference between the terms "redounded to the conservation of the conjugal partnership;
the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one for the husband's duty to protect and
hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it.
They mean one and the same thing. Art. 161 This is the underlying reason why the Family
(1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of the Code clarifies that the obligations entered into
Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both by one of the spouses must be those that
use the term "for the benefit of." On the other redounded to the benefit of the family and
hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that the measure of the partnership's liability
that "The payment of personal debts by the is to "the extent that the family is benefited."
husband or the wife before or during the Here, the property in dispute also involves the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal family home. The loan is a corporate loan not
partnership except insofar as they redounded a personal one. Signing as a surety is
to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, certainly not an exercise of an industry or
the terms are used interchangeably. profession nor an act of administration for the
From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, benefit of the family.
we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal 97) GUIANG VS. CA AND GILDA COPUZ
105
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998 a wife already.

For staying in their house sold by her
DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property husband, spouses Guiang complained before
requires the consent of both the husband and the Barangay authorities for trespassing. The
the wife. The absence of the consent of one parties thereat signed a document for
renders the sale null and void, while the amicable settlement stating that Gilda Corpuz
vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. and her three children must leave voluntarily
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the house without any charge.
the defect. Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay
Captain for the annulment of the settlement.
FACTS: Annulment not having been made, they
Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie stayed put in her house and lot. Spouses
Corpuz are legally married spouses. They Guiang filed a motion for execution of the
have three children, namely: Junie (18 years amicable settlement with the MTC.
old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The couple However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz
bought a 421 sq. meter lot in Koronadal, filed a Complaint against her husband Judie
South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo through a Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and
conditional deed of sale. The consideration Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint
was payable in installment. In 1988, the sought the declaration of a Deed of Transfer of
couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to Right, which involved the conjugal property,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda null and void. The trial court ruled in favor of
Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the one- private respondent. CA affirmed.
half portion and built their house thereon.
They are thus adjoining neighbors of the ISSUE: WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of
Corpuzes. Rights was validly executed.
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work
abroad. Unfortunately, she became a victim of HELD: NO
an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed
able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in was validly executed by the parties in good
Manila. faith and for valuable consideration. The
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie absence of private respondent's consent
Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal merely rendered the Deed voidable under
dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The provision in
place of work. Harriet Corpuz learned that her par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
father intended to sell the remaining one-half consent, i.e., contracts which were entered
portion including their house to Guiangs. She into by a person whose consent was obtained
wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda Corpuz and vitiated through mistake, violence,
replied that she was objecting to the sale. intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this
Harriet, however, did not inform her father instance, private respondent's consent to the
about this; but instead gave the letter to contract of sale of their conjugal property was
Luzviminda Guiang so that she would advise totally inexistent or absent.
her father. The contract falls within the ambit of Article
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, 124 of the Family Code, which provides that
Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale. He sold "...In the absence of such authority or
to Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
of Rights" remaining one-half portion of their be void..."
lot and the house. Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud
Gilda returned home. She found her children and the intimidation referred to by petitioners
staying with other households. Only Junie was were perpetrated in the execution of the
staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were document embodying the amicable
with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial
together and stayed at their house. Her that barangay authorities made her sign said
husband was nowhere to be found. She was document through misrepresentation and
informed by her children that their father had coercion. In any event, its execution does not
106
alter the void character of the deed of sale In her Complaint for payment of conjugal
between the husband and the petitioners- improvements, sum of money, and accounting
spouses. The fact remains that such contract with prayer for injunction and damages,
was entered into without the wife's consent. petitioner alleged that she is the widow of
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), half-brother of
premised on the absence of private respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter
cause, object, and consent, the last element acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan
being indubitably absent in the case at bar. with the Social Security System (SSS) to build
Doctrinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. improvements thereon, including a residential
By Art.1390 of the Civil Code, the Deed to house and a two-door apartment building. It
Transfer of Rights cannot be ratified, even by was during their marriage that payment of the
an amicable settlement. loan was made using the couples conjugal
Neither can the amicable settlement be funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner
considered a continuing offer that was posited, they constructed a warehouse on the
accepted and perfected by the parties, lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that
following the last sentence of Article 124. The respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
order of the pertinent events is clear: after the apartment building, as well as the warehouse;
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for however, in September 1991, he stopped
trespassing against private respondent, after paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had
which the barangay authorities secured an acquired ownership over the property by
"amicable settlement" and petitioners filed virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo
before the MTC a motion for its execution. The in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael
settlement, however, does not mention a and their spouses.
continuing offer to sell the property or an It is petitioners contention that when her
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its husband was already bedridden, respondents
tenor was to the effect that private Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a
respondent would vacate the property. By no document, purported to be his last will and
stretch of the imagination, can the Court testament. The document, however, was a
interpret this document as the acceptance Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the
mentioned in Article 124. improvements thereon.
Petition denied. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed
with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the
said sale against respondents. The RTC
dismissed the same. The RTC found that the
terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
and public policy, and should be complied
with by the parties in good faith, there being
no compelling reason under the law to do
otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
98) FERRER VS. FERRER Further, in support of her Complaint,
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006 petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision
of the RTC, which stated, that in determining
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation which property is the principal and which is
to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the the accessory, the property of greater value
spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as shall be considered the principal. In this case,
the case may be. the lot is the principal and the improvements
the accessories. Since Article 120 of the
FACTS: Family Code provides the rule that the
ownership of accessory follows the ownership
107
of the principal, then the subject lot with all its the case, it appears that the complaint herein
improvements became an exclusive and fails to state a cause of action against the
capital property of Alfredo with an obligation petitioners, the latter not being the proper
to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the parties against whom the subject action for
cost of improvements at the time of reimbursement must be directed to. xxx
liquidation of [the] conjugal partnership. Albeit the respondent herein has the legal
Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the right to be reimbursed of the cost of the
subject property by himself without need of improvements of the subject property, it is not
Josefas consent. the petitioners but the estate of her deceased
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC husband which has the obligation to pay the
shows that, when Alfredo died she had the same. The complaint herein is therefore
right to be reimbursed for the cost of the dismissible for failure to state a cause of
improvements on Alfredos lot. Hence, one- action against the petitioners. Needless to
half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by say, the respondent is not without any further
respondents as they are now the registered recourse as she may file her claim against the
owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that estate of her deceased husband.
respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge In light of the foregoing, we find that the
about the fact that the improvements were public respondent committed grave abuse of
constructed using conjugal funds as they had discretion in denying the petitioners motion
occupied one of the apartment buildings on to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals to action.
petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals
Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no rendered a Resolution denying the motion.
cause of action against them, and that the Hence, the present recourse.
cause of action was barred by prior
judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not he Court of Appeals
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to erred in dismissing petitioners Complaint for
Dismiss. According to the RTC, no failure to state a cause of action.
pronouncement as to the improvements
constructed on Alfredos lot has been made HELD:
and the payment of petitioners share in the NO.After a reading of the allegations
conjugal partnership constitutes a separate contained in petitioners Complaint, we are
cause of action. A subsequent Order was convinced that the same failed to state a
issued by the RTC, denying respondents cause of action.
Motion for Reconsideration. According to petitioner, while the RTC
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to recognized that the improvements
the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion Alfredos exclusive and capital property, the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on court also held that petitioner, as Alfredos
the RTC in denying the dismissal. spouse, has the right to claim reimbursement
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting from the estate of Alfredo. It is argued by
the Petition. It held that petitioners petitioner that her husband had no other
Complaint failed to state a cause of action. property, and his only property had been sold
The appellate court rationalized as follows: to the respondents; hence, she has the legal
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not right to claim for reimbursement from the
the proper action for the respondent to respondents who are now the owners of the
enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost lot and the improvements thereon. In fine,
of the improvement[s] on the subject petitioner asseverates that the Complaint
property. As correctly pointed out by the cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure
petitioners, the same should be made and to state a cause of action because the
directed in the settlement of estate of her respondents have the correlative obligation to
deceased husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant to pay the value of the improvements.
Article 129 of the Family Code. Such being
108
Petitioner was not able to show that there is Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that
an obligation on the part of the respondents their refusal to reimburse constituted a
to respect or not to violate her right. While violation of petitioners rights. As has been
we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the
made a reference to the right of the spouse as respondents under the law exists. Petitioners
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Complaint failed to state a cause of action
Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the against the respondents, and for this reason,
improvements, the obligation to reimburse the Court of Appeals was not in error in
rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of dismissing the
the entire property is vested. There is no same.
obligation on the part of the purchaser of the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
property, in case the property is sold by the
owner-spouse. 99) DOCENA VS. HON. RICARDO
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in LAPESURA
determining the ownership of the GR NO. 140153, MARCH 28, 2001
improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses at the expense of the FACTS:
partnership or through the acts or efforts of On June 1, 1977, private respondent,
either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the
of the improvement and any resulting recovery of a parcel of land against lessees,
increase in value are more than the value of petitioner-spouses Docena. The petitioners
the property at the time of the improvement, clamed ownership of the land based on
the entire property of one of the spouses shall occupation since time immemorial. A certain
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a
reimbursement of the value of the property of decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial
the owner-spouse at the time of the court ruled in favor of petitioners and the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of
be retained in ownership by the owner- Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of court and ordered the petitioners to vacate
the cost of the improvement. The subject the land they have leased from plaintiff-
property was precisely declared as the appellant.
exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a
Article 120 of the Family Code. Motion for Execution of the above decision
What is incontrovertible is that the which has already become final and
respondents, despite the allegations executory. The above motion was granted by
contained in the Complaint that they are the judge Lapesura and a Writ of Execution was
buyers of the subject premises, are not issued therefore. An alias Writ of Demolition
petitioners spouse nor can they ever be was then filed by the Sheriff.
deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
obligation to reimburse petitioner for her was filed by the petitioners eith the Court of
costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the obligation to reimburse the conjugal the part of the trial court judge in issuing the
partnership or the spouse who expended the orders and the sheriff in issuing the Alias Writ
acts or efforts, as the case may be. of Demolition. CA dismissed the petition on
Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the grounds that the petition was filed beyond
the obligation to respect petitioners right to the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of
be reimbursed. Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
It can be said, thus, that respondents Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803
act of acquiring the subject property by sale and that the certification of non-forum
was not in violation of petitioners rights. The shopping attached thereto was signed by the
same can also be said of the respondents husband alone. the The Motion for
objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no reconsideration was also denied.
correlative obligation exists on the part of the Hence this petition.
respondents to reimburse the petitioner.
109
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals Ereno. She made a definite offer to buy the
erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa
and Prohibition. with the knowledge and conformity of his
wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the
HELD: YES. Under the New Civil Code, the presence of the real estate broker.
husband is the administrator of the conjugal After Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo
partnership. In fact, he is the sole delivered to him two checks as down
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a payments. The contracts were given to
matter of right to join him in this endeavor. Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife's
The husband may defend the conjugal signature. However, the following day,
partnership in a suit or action without being petitioner received a call from respondent
joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some
alone may execute the necessary certificate provisions of the contracts. To accommodate
of non-forum shopping to accompany the her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her
pleading. The husband as the statutory lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the
administrator of the conjugal property could real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.
have filed the petition for certiorari and During the meeting, handwritten notations
prohibition alone, without the concurrence of were made on the contracts to sell, so they
the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the arranged to incorporate the notations and to
conjugal prperties may be filed by the meet again for the formal signing of the
husband alone, with more reason, he may contracts.
sign the certficate of non-forum shopping to When petitioner met again with respondent
be attched to the petition. spouses and the real estate broker at
Under the Family Code, the Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of
administration of the conjugal property Norma's signature, she was surprised when
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. respondent spouses informed her that they
However, an act of alienation or encumbrance were backing out of the agreement because
where the consent of both spouses is they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of
required, joint management or administration the consideration. Petitioner reminded
does not require that the husband and wife respondent spouses that the contracts to sell
always act together. Each spouse may validly had already been duly perfected and Norma's
exercise full power of management alone, refusal to sign the same would unduly
subject to the intervention of the court in prejudice petitioner.
proper cases as provided under Article 124 of
the Family Code. It is believed taht even ISSUE: Whether or not the husband
under the provisions of the Family Code, the may validly dispose of a conjugal property of
husband alone could have filed the petition the without the wifes written consent.
for certiorari and prohibition to contests the
writs of demolition issued against the conjugal HELD: NO.
property with the Court of Appeals without The law requires that the disposition of a
being joined by his wife. The signing of the conjugal property by the husband as
attached certificate of non-forum shopping administrator in appropriate cases requires
only by the husband is not a fatal defect. the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the
Family Code provides:
100) MANALO VS. CAMAISA Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment
GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002 of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
FACTS: disagreement, the husband's decision shall
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
buying the two properties of Spouses wife for a proper remedy, which must be
Camaisa. So she negotiated for the purchase availed of within five years from the date of
through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso the contract implementing such decision.
110
wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa

The properties subject of the contracts in this Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan
case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts together with her husband, from petitioner.
to sell to be effective, the consent of both She claimed, however, that said loan was
husband and wife must concur. payable on a staggered basis so she was
Even granting that respondent Norma actively surprised when petitioner demanded
participated in negotiating for the sale of the immediate payment of the full amount.
subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law In his separate Answer, respondent admitted
for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but
admits that Norma refused to sign the claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was
contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may never intended as loan of defendant. It was
have been aware of the negotiations for the his share of income on contracts obtained by
sale of their conjugal properties. However, defendant.
being merely aware of a transaction is not
consent. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA
reversed.
101) CARLOS VS. ABELARDO
GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002 ISSUE: Whether or not the loan is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.
DOCTRINE:
The loan is the liability of the conjugal HELD:
partnership Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal
partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the
FACTS: Family Code:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
him and requested him to advance the liable for:
amount of US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for (2) All debts and obligations contracted during
the purchase of a house and lot. To enable the marriage by the designated administrator-
and assist the spouses conduct their married spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
life independently and on their own, partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by
petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a one of them with the consent of the other;
check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo,
seller of the property, who acknowledged (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
receipt thereof. spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in benefited; If the conjugal partnership is
July 1991 as to the status of the amount he insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities,
loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
obligation but pleaded that they were not yet unpaid balance with their separate properties.
in a position to make a definite settlement of
the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed While respondent did not and refused to sign
violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the acknowledgment executed and signed by
the amount to the extent of making various his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to
death threats against petitioner. the benefit of the family because it was used
to purchase the house and lot which became
Despite formal demand for the payment of the conjugal home of respondent and his
the said loan, spouses were unable to pay family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged
their obligation. Hence, this prompted lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21
petitioner to institute a collection suit against of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable
respondent and his wife. As they were for such loan together with his wife.
separated in fact for more than a year prior to
the filing of the complaint, respondent and his
111
Early in time, it must be noted that payment and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal,
of personal debts contracted by the husband if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
or the wife before or during the marriage shall Relucio. On December 8, 1993, a Motion to
not be charged to the conjugal partnership Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein
except insofar as they redounded to the petitioner on the ground that private
benefit of the family. The defendants never respondent has no cause of action against
denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was her.An Order dated February 10, 1994 was
used to purchase the subject house and lot. issued by herein respondent Judge denying
They do not deny that the same served as petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the
their conjugal home, thus benefiting the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary
family. or indispensable party because some of the
subject properties are registered in her name
On the same principle, acknowledgment of and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
the loan made by the defendant-wife binds Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
the conjugal partnership since its proceeds petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of
defendant-husband and defendant-wife are Appeals promulgated a decision denying the
jointly and severally liable in the payment of petition.
the loan.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for
appointment as sole administratrix of the
conjugal property, accounting, etc. against
her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a
102) RELUCIO VS. ANGELINA MEJIA cause of action against petitioner.
LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 138497 January 16, 2002 HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved
wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
FACTS: allegations does it appear that relief is sought
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for against petitioner. Respondent's causes of
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF action were all against her husband. The first
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, cause of action is for judicial appointment of
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto respondent as administratrix of the conjugal
Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Angelina partnership or absolute community property
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Lopez, who is legally married to her, Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause
abandoned the latter and their four legitimate of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers
children; that he arrogated unto himself full only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without
and exclusive control and administration of just cause abandons the other or fails to
the conjugal properties, that defendant Lopez comply with his or her obligations to the
maintained an illicit relationship and family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the
cohabited with petitioner since 1976. It was court for receivership, for judicial separation
further alleged that defendant Lopez and of property, or for authority to be the sole
petitioner Relucio, during their period of administrator of the conjugal partnership
cohabitation have amassed a fortune property xxx". The administration of the
consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez- property of the marriage is entirely between
owned or controlled corporations, residential, them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
agricultural, commercial lots, houses, Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
apartments and buildings, cars and other husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is
motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty
These properties, which are in the names of relation between petitioner and respondent
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly that can possibly support a cause of action.
or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have The second cause of action is for an
been acquired principally if not solely through accounting "by respondent husband." The
the actual contribution of money, property accounting of conjugal partnership arises from
112
or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to

nothing to do with the marriage between obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
of action can exist against petitioner on this spouses Dailos house and lot. Gesmundo
ground. Respondent's alternative cause of was able to obtain a loan from petitioner and
action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' as security executed a Real Estate Mortgage
share in the co-owned property "acquired on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
during his illicit relationship and cohabitation
with [petitioner]" and for the "dissolution of Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and
the conjugal partnership of gains between as a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]." foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
The third cause of action is essentially for property.
forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property
co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not After the death of her husband, during one of
involve the issue of validity of the co- her visits to the subject property, respondent
ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and learned that petitioner had already employed
petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises
in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
there be, in property co-owned by him with because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to within the premises.
forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share
alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender
such share, assuming the trial court finds in Claiming that she had no knowledge of the
respondent's favor, results in a breach of an mortgage constituted on the subject property,
obligation to respondent and gives rise to a which was conjugal in nature, respondent
cause of action. Such cause of action, instituted a case for Nullity of Real Estate
however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
petitioner. The respondent also sought Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
support. Support cannot be compelled from a Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
stranger. The action in Special Proceedings M- Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In
3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' the latters Answer with Counterclaim,
own words, one by "an aggrieved wife against petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
her husband." complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
103) Homeowners Savings & Loan
Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent, and upon elevation, the Court of
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005 Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to rebut the presumption that the subject
property was conjugal in nature. Hence, the
Facts appellate court declared as void the mortgage
on the subject property because it was
During their marriage, respondents Miguela C. constituted without the knowledge and
Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a consent of respondent, in accordance with
house and lot with the Deed of Absolute Sale Article 124 of the Family Code. With respect
executed only in favor of the late Marcelino to the damage to respondents car, the
Dailo, Jr. as vendee. appellate court found petitioner to be liable
because it is responsible for the
Without the knowledge and consent of consequences of the acts or omissions of the
respondent Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. person it hired to accomplish the assigned
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in task. All told, the appellate court affirmed the
trial courts Decision, but deleted the award
113
for damages and attorneys fees for lack of of relative community or conjugal partnership
basis. of gains governed the property relations
between respondent and her late husband.
As a response to above decision, petitioner With the effectivity of the Family Code on
filed a petition for review on certiorari August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was
which affirmed with modification the made applicable to conjugal partnership of
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner gains already established before its effectivity
argues that although Article 124 of the Family unless vested rights have already been
Code requires the consent of the other spouse acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the
framers of the law could not have intended to The rules on co-ownership do not even apply
curtail the right of a spouse from exercising to the property relations of respondent and
full ownership over the portion of the conjugal the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a
property pertaining to him under the concept suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
of co-ownership. Thus, petitioner would like partnership of gains is a special type of
the Court to uphold the validity of the partnership, where the husband and wife
mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino place in a common fund the proceeds,
Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership. products, fruits and income from their
In addition, petitioner imposes the liability for separate properties and those acquired by
the payment of the principal obligation either or both spouses through their efforts or
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
conjugal partnership to the extent that it property wherein the rules on co-ownership
redounded to the benefit of the family. apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in
Issues the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of
1. Whether or not the mortgage constituted by respondent and her late husband shall be
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
undivided share. suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
2. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
liable for the payment of the loan obtained by partnership apply only when the Family Code
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having is silent on the matter.
redounded to the benefit of the family.
The basic and established fact is that during
his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Held constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their
On the first issue, the Court cited the case, conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Guiang v. Court of Appeals, where it was held Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence
that the sale of a conjugal property requires of (court) authority or written consent of the
the consent of both the husband and wife and other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance
the same principle shall squarely applies to of the conjugal property shall be void.
the instant case.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. with respect to the share of the spouse who
were married on August 8, 1967. In the makes the disposition or encumbrance in the
absence of a marriage settlement, the system same manner that the rule on co-ownership
114
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Facts

Where the law does not distinguish, courts Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial respondent Helmut Muller were married in
court and the appellate court are correct in Germany. The couple resided in Germany at a
declaring the nullity of the real estate house owned by respondents parents but
mortgage on the subject property for lack of decided to move and reside permanently in
respondents consent. the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in
On the second issue, the Court cited that Germany from his parents which he sold and
under Article 121 of the Family Code, The used the proceeds for the purchase of a
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . parcel of land in Antipolo Rizal at the cost of
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
spouse without the consent of the other to the amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo
extent that the family may have been property was registered in the name of
benefited; . . . . For the subject property to petitioner.
be held liable, the obligation contracted by Due to incompatibilities, respondent filed a
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have petition for separation of properties before the
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal Regional Trial Court.
partnership. There must be the requisite The trial court rendered a decision which
showing then of some advantage which terminated the regime of absolute community
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. of property between the petitioner and
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respondent. It also decreed the separation of
respond for a liability that should appertain to properties between them and ordered the
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate equal partition of personal properties located
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to within the country, excluding those acquired
show the utmost concern for the solidarity by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
and well-being of the family as a unit. regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds
The burden of proof that the debt was of the respondent. However, it ruled that
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal respondent cannot recover his funds because
partnership of gains lies with the creditor- the property was purchased in violation of
party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the by either spouse during the marriage shall be
loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. excluded from the community property. The
to finance the construction of housing units real property, therefore, inherited by
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of respondent-petitioner in Germany is excluded
his family, without adducing adequate proof, from the absolute community of property of
does not persuade this Court. Other than the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds
petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing of the sale of said real property as well as the
from the records of the case to compel a personal properties purchased thereby,
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the belong exclusively to the respondent-
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the petitioner. However, the part of that
benefit of the family. Consequently, the inheritance used by the respondent-petitioner
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for for acquiring the house and lot in this country
the payment of the principal obligation. cannot be recovered by the respondent-
petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary
104) In Re: Petition For Separation Of succession, no private lands shall be
Property Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
Helmut Muller corporations or associations qualified to
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006 acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
115
The law will leave the parties in the situation part. To allow reimbursement would in effect
where they are in without prejudice to a permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
voluntary partition by the parties of the said property which he is not allowed to own.
real property. In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the
Hence, as regards the property situated in Decision of the Court of Appeals to be
Antipolo and the improvements thereon, the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
Court shall not make any pronouncement on the Regional Trial Court terminating the
constitutional grounds. regime of absolute community between the
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
which rendered the assailed decision separation of property between them and
modifying the trial courts Decision. It held ordering the partition of the personal
that respondent merely prayed for properties located in the Philippines equally,
reimbursement for the purchase of the is REINSTATED.
Antipolo property, and not acquisition or
transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered petitioners ownership over the
property in trust for the respondent. As
regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled
that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. 105) Agapay vs. Palang
Issue:Whether or not the respondent is 276 SCRA 341

entitled to reimbursement of the amount used
to purchase the land as well as the costs for
the construction of the house.
Facts
Held
The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage
in holding that an implied trust was created with private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
and resulted by operation of law in view of Vallesterol in 1949. A few months after the
petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. The trial
the exception provided in cases of hereditary court found evidence that as early as 1957,
succession, respondents disqualification from Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Hawaii.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old
of its express provision, no trust can result in Miguel contracted his second marriage with
favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein
hold otherwise would allow circumvention of petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17,
the constitutional prohibition. 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
Invoking the principle that a court is not only Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
a court of law but also a court of equity is agricultural land located in Pangasinan.
likewise misplaced. He who seeks equity Consequently, a Transfer Certificate of Title
must do equity, and he who comes into equity covering said rice land was issued in their
must come with clean hands. Thus, in the names.
instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly
bought the property despite the constitutional by Erlinda as the sole vendee. A Transfer
prohibition. Certificate of Title covering said property was
Further, the distinction made between later issued in her name.
transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery
of funds is a futile exercise on respondents
116
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Issue Whether or not petitioner can be
Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form considered as the rightful co-owner of the
of compromise agreement to settle and end a riceland and the house and lot.
case filed by the latter. The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only
child, Herminia Palang. Held
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a The Court held that under Article 148 of the
son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Family Code, providing for cases of
Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon cohabitation when a man and a woman who
Carlinas complaint and two years later, are not capacitated to marry each other live
Miguel died. exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her a void marriage, only the properties acquired
daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein by both of the parties through their actual
private respondents, instituted an action for joint contribution of money, property or
recovery of ownership and possession with industry shall be owned by them in common
damages against petitioner before the in proportion to their respective contributions.
Regional Trial Court. Private respondents It must be stressed that actual contribution is
sought to get back the riceland and the house required by this provision. If the actual
and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during contribution of the party is not proved, there
his cohabitation with petitioner. will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended
that while the riceland is registered in their In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already her testimony that she is engaged in the
given her half of the property to their son business of buy and sell and had a sari-
Kristopher Palang. She added that the house sari store but failed to persuade the Court
and lot is her sole property, having bought the that she actually contributed money to buy
same with her own money. Erlinda added that the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact
Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
properties since the latter had already 1973, petitioner was only around twenty
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. years of age and Miguel Palang was already
sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
After trial on the merits, the lower court Government. Considering her youthfulness, it
rendered its decision dismissing the complaint is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
after declaring that there was little evidence contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
to prove that the subject properties pertained purchase price of subject property, there
to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel being no proof of the same.
Palang.
Petitioner again claims that the riceland was
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
courts decision. The Court of Appeals actually cohabited. In the nature of an
declared the plaintiffs-appellants as the afterthought, said added assertion was
owners of the riceland and the house and lot intended to exclude their case from the
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his operation of Article 148 of the Family
cohabitation with defendant appellee. Code. Proof of the precise date when they
commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, the Court cannot state
definitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In
any case, even assuming that the subject
117
property was bought before cohabitation, the years without the payment of any rent; that it
rules of co-ownership would still apply and was agreed upon that after a few months,
proof of actual contribution would still be defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay
essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
she contributed money to the purchase price promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as
of the riceland, the Court finds no basis to rental, which agreement was not complied
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the with by the said defendants; that they have
same. Consequently, the riceland should demanded several times for the defendants to
revert to the conjugal partnership property of vacate the premises, as they are in need of
the deceased Miguel and private respondent the property for the construction of a new
Carlina Palang. building; and that they have also demanded
payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7)
allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on years and payment of P143,600.00 from
when she was only 22 years old. The Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven
testimony of the notary public who prepared (7) years, but the said demands went
the deed of conveyance for the property unheeded.
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel who filed an answer to the complaint. She
Palang provided the money for the purchase averred therein that the Fernandez spouses
price and directed that Erlindas name alone had no cause of action against her, since she
be placed as the vendee. is a co-owner of the subject premises as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was
The transaction was properly a donation made stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was in question together with Respondent Mario
clearly void and inexistent by express Fernandez. Thus, she asked for the dismissal
provision of law because it was made of the complaint.
between persons guilty of adultery or After an unfruitful preliminary conference, the
concubinage at the time of the donation, MTC required the parties to submit their
under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, affidavits and other evidence on the factual
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly issues defined in their pleadings within ten
provides that the prohibition against (10) days from receipt of such order and
donations between spouses now applies to thereafter promulgated its judgment.
donations between persons living together as Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the
husband and wife without a valid marriage. two other defendants alleged in their
memorandum on appeal that Respondent
Mario Fernandez and Petitioner Guillerma had
an amorous relationship, and that they
acquired the property in question as their
106) Tumlos vs. Fernandez love nest. It was further alleged that they
lived together in the said apartment building
330 SCRA 718 with their two (2) children for around ten (10)
years, and that Guillerma administered the
Facts property by collecting rentals from the lessees
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an of the other apartments, until she discovered
action for ejectment filed before the MTC of that Respondent Mario deceived her as to the
Valenzuela against herein Petitioner Guillerma annulment of his marriage.
Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their In the same memorandum, petitioner and the
complaint, the said spouses alleged that they two other defendants further averred that it
are the absolute owners of an apartment was only recently that Toto Tumlos was
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III; that temporarily accommodated in one of the
through tolerance they had allowed the rooms of the subject premises while Gina
defendants-private respondents to occupy the Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In
apartment building for the last seven (7) short, their presence there was only transient
118
and they were not tenants of the Fernandez two (2) children. Attached to her
spouses. memorandum on appeal are the birth
The RTC subsequently rendered a decision certificates of the said children. Such
affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. contentions and documents should not have
The petitioner and the two other defendants been considered by the RTC, as they were not
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging presented in her affidavit/position paper
that the decision of affirmance by the RTC was before the MTC. Even if the said allegations
constitutionally flawed for failing to point out and documents could be considered, the
distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and claim of co-ownership must still fail as
law on which it was based vis--vis the Respondent Mario Fernandez is validly
statements of issues they have raised in their married to Respondent Lourdes Fernandez as
memorandum on appeal. They also averred per Marriage Contract. Guillerma and Mario
that the Contract to Sell presented by the are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus,
plaintiffs which named the buyer as Mario P. the property relations governing their
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. supposed cohabitation is that found in Article
Fernandez, should not be given credence as 148 of the Family Code. It is clear that actual
it was falsified to appear that way. According contribution is required by this provision.
to them, the Contract to Sell originally named Hence, if actual contribution of the party is
Guillerma Fernandez as the spouse of not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC in its no presumption of equal shares.
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued In the instant case, no proof of actual
by the sellers naming the respondents as the contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the
buyers after the latter presented their purchase of the subject property was
marriage contract and requested a change in presented. Her only evidence was her being
the name of the vendee-wife. Such facts named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was Respondent Mario Fernandez. Since she failed
really a co-owner thereof, and that the to prove that she contributed money to the
respondents manipulated the evidence in purchase price of the subject apartment
order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and building, the Court finds no basis to justify her
use the property as recognized by law. co-ownership with Respondent Mario. The said
The RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract property is thus presumed to belong to the
to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses conjugal partnership property of Mario and
appeared not to be authentic, as there was an Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired during
alteration in the name of the wife of the subsistence of their marriage and there
Respondent Mario Fernandez. Hence, the being no other proof to the contrary.
contract presented by the respondents cannot The RTC also found that Respondent Mario has
be given any weight. The court further ruled two (2) children with Guillerma who are in her
that Guillerma and Respondent Mario custody, and that to eject them from the
acquired the property during their apartment building would be to run counter
cohabitation as husband and wife, although with the obligation of the former to give
without the benefit of marriage. From such support to his minor illegitimate children,
findings, the court concluded that Petitioner which indispensably includes dwelling. Such
Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the finding has no leg to stand on, it being based
subject property and could not be ejected on evidence presented for the first time on
therefrom. appeal.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The Even assuming arguendo that the said
CA ruled that from the inception of the instant evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed
case, the only defense presented by private to consider that the need for support cannot
respondent Guillerma is her right as a co- be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code
owner of the subject property, which was not expressly provides that the obligation to give
satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. It was only support shall be demandable from the time
on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she the person who has a right to receive the
cohabited with the petitioner-husband without same needs it for maintenance, but it shall
the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him not be paid except from the date of judicial or
119
extrajudicial demand. Article 148 of the Family Code provides that

the administration of the property amounts to
Issues a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there
1. Whether or not the petitioner is a co-owner of is no basis for petitioners claim of co-
the property pursuant to Article 148 of the ownership. The property in question belongs
Family Code. to the conjugal partnership of respondents.
2. Whether or not the petitioners claim for Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in
support bar the subject ejectment suit. ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the
premises.
Held On the second issue, the Court disagree with
On the first issue, the Court held that it the petitioner that the childrens right to
cannot accept petitioners submission that support, which necessarily includes shelter,
she is a co-owner of the disputed property prevails over the right of respondents to eject
pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As her. The Court emphasized that the case at
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is bar is an ejectment suit whereby respondents
not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article seek to exercise their possessory right over
148 of the Family Code. Under Article 148 of their property. It is summary in character and
the Family Code, a man and a woman, who deals solely with the issue of possession of
are not legally capacitated to marry each the property in dispute and it has been shown
other, but who nonetheless live together that they have a better right to possess it
conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a than does the petitioner, whose right to
property acquired during the cohabitation possess is based merely on their tolerance.
only upon proof that each made an actual Further, Article 298 of the Civil Code expressly
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere provides that the obligation to give support
cohabitation without proof of contribution will shall be demandable from the time the person
not result in a co-ownership. who has a right to receive the same need it
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a for maintenance, but it shall not be paid
relationship between a man and a woman, except from the date of judicial and
who are not incapacitated to marry each extrajudicial demand. In this case, none was
other, or to one in which the marriage of the made.
parties is void from the beginning. It does not
apply to a cohabitation that amounts to 107) Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira
adultery or concubinage, for it would be Castillo
absurd to create a co-ownership where there 333 SCRA 628
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful Facts
wife. On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio
Based on evidence presented by respondents, Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
as well as those submitted by petitioner and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share,
herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Accounting and Damages" against respondent
Fernandez was incapacitated to marry Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that
petitioner because he was legally married to petitioner and respondent, both married and
Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as with children, but separated from their
readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited respective spouses, cohabited after a brief
with Mario in a state of concubinage. courtship sometime in 1979 while their
Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is respective marriages still subsisted. During
inapplicable. their union, they set up the Superfreight
In this case, petitioner fails to present any Customs Brokerage Corporation, with
evidence that she had made an actual petitioner as president and chairman of the
contribution to purchase the subject property. board of directors, and respondent as vice-
Likewise, her claim of having administered the president and treasurer. The business
property during the cohabitation is flourished and petitioner and respondent
unsubstantiated and in any event, this fact by acquired real and personal properties which
itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in were registered solely in respondent's name.
120
In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been
couple separated. Petitioner demanded from repealed by the Family Code which now
respondent his share in the subject properties, allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership
but respondent refused alleging that said even though a man and a woman living
properties had been registered solely in her together are not capacitated to marry each
name. other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied
In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted trust was constituted when he and respondent
that she engaged in the customs brokerage agreed to register the properties solely in the
business with petitioner but alleged that the latter's name although the same were
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation acquired out of the profits made from their
was organized with other individuals and duly brokerage business. Petitioner invoked
registered with the Securities and Exchange Articles 1452 and 1453 of the Civil Code.
Commission in 1987. She denied that she and On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered
petitioner lived as husband and wife because its decision granting respondent's motion for
the fact was that they were still legally summary judgment. It ruled that an
married to their respective spouses. She examination of the pleadings shows that the
claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real issues involved were purely legal. The trial
personal properties involved in petitioner's court also sustained respondent's contention
action for partition on the ground that they that petitioner's action for partition amounted
were acquired entirely out of her own money to a collateral attack on the validity of the
and registered solely in her name. certificates of title covering the subject
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a properties. It held that even if the parties
Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance really had cohabited, the action for partition
with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She could not be allowed because an action for
contended that summary judgment was partition among co-owners ceases to be so
proper, because the issues raised in the and becomes one for title if the defendant, as
pleadings were sham and not genuine. in the present case, alleges exclusive
The respondent contended that even if she ownership of the properties in question. For
and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner these reasons, the trial court dismissed Case.
could not validly claim a part of the subject On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the
real and personal properties because Art. 144 case remanded to the court of origin for trial
of the Civil Code, which provides that the on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque
rules on co-ownership shall govern the v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect
properties acquired by a man and a woman that an action for partition is at once an action
living together as husband and wife but not for declaration of co-ownership and for
married, or under a marriage which is void ab segregation and conveyance of a determinate
initio, applies only if the parties are not in any portion of the properties involved. If the
way incapacitated to contract marriage. In defendant asserts exclusive title over the
the parties' case, their union suffered the property, the action for partition should not be
legal impediment of a prior subsisting dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve
marriage. Thus, the question of fact being the case and if the plaintiff is unable to
raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the
together as husband and wife, was irrelevant court should dismiss the action, not because
as no co-ownership could exist between them. the wrong remedy was availed of, but
Further, respondent maintained that because no basis exists for requiring the
petitioner cannot be considered an defendant to submit to partition. Resolving
unregistered co-owner of the subject the issue whether petitioner's action for
properties on the ground that, since titles to partition was a collateral attack on the validity
the land are solely in her name, to grant of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals
petitioner's prayer would be to allow a held that since petitioner sought to compel
collateral attack on the validity of such titles. respondent to execute documents necessary
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for to effect transfer of what he claimed was his
Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the share, petitioner was not actually attacking
case presented genuine factual issues and the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized
121
their validity. Finally, the appellate court acquired after the Family Code took effect on
upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of August 3, 1988. With respect to the property
the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 acquired before the Family Code took effect if
of the Family Code. it is shown that it was really acquired under
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be
decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequently, excluded.
the Court of Appeals granted respondent's
motion and reversed its previous decision. 108) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716, OCTOBER 23, 2003
Issue: Whether or not the fact that the
petitioner and respondent indeed cohabited is Facts
material to determine co-ownership of This case arose from a petition for declaration
properties between the parties. of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the
Held essential marital obligations under Article 36
The Court held that although Art. 144 of the of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna
Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr
man and a woman live together as husband before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in
and wife without the benefit of marriage March 1997.
provided they are not incapacitated or are After due proceedings, the trial court declared
without impediment to marry each other, or in the marriage between petitioner and
which the marriage is void ab initio, provided respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of
it is not bigamous, therefore, does not cover the Family Code and ordered the dissolution
parties living in an adulterous relationship. of their conjugal partnership of property.
Art. 148 of the Family Code, however, Custody over the two minor children was
provides for a limited co-ownership in cases awarded to petitioner.
where the parties in union are incapacitated After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of
to marry each other. properties submitted by both parties, the
It was error for the trial court to rule that, Court finds the following properties to be
because the parties in this case were not excluded from the conjugal properties:
capacitated to marry each other at the time a) The Bacolod property, considering that the
that they were alleged to have been living same is owned by petitioners parents; and
together, they could not have owned b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium,
properties in common. The Family Code, in considering that the same was purchased on
addition to providing that a co-ownership installment basis by respondent with his
exists between a man and a woman who live exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as
together as husband and wife without the evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26,
benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if 1983.
the parties are incapacitated to marry each In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG
other, properties acquired by them through Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE
their joint contribution of money, property or PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly,
industry shall be owned by them in common petitioner was directed to transfer ownership
in proportion to their contributions which, in of Suite 204 in the name of respondent.
the absence of proof to the contrary, is The Petitioner and Respondent are further
presumed to be equal. There is thus co- enjoined to jointly support their minor
ownership even though the couples are not children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their
capacitated to marry each other. education, uniforms, food and medical
In this case, there may be a co-ownership expenses.
between the parties. Consequently, whether Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and respondent cohabited and said Order with respect to the adjudication of
whether the properties involved in the case Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support
are part of the alleged co-ownership, are of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite
genuine and material. All but one of the 204 was purchased on installment basis at the
properties involved were alleged to have been time when petitioner and respondent were
122
living exclusively with each other as husband credence to petitioners submission that Suite
and wife without the benefit of marriage, 204 was acquired during the parties
hence the rules on co-ownership should apply cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of
in accordance with Article 147 of the Family the Family Code, said property should be
Code. governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Resolving said motion, the trial court held that Article 147 applies to unions of parties who
since the marriage between petitioner and are legally capacitated and not barred by any
respondent was declared void ab intio, the impediment to contract marriage, but whose
rules on co-ownership should apply in the marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at
liquidation and partition of the properties they bar. This provision creates a co-ownership
own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the with respect to the properties they acquire
Family Code. The court, however, affirmed its during their cohabitation.
previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies
Condominium was acquired prior to the when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
couples cohabitation and therefore pertained impediment to marry each other, so
solely to respondent. exclusively live together as husband and wife
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning under a void marriage or without the benefit
the order of the trial court but subsequently of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
withdrew the notice and instead filed a special provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with refers to the legal capacity of a party to
the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
of the trial court. the age of eighteen years or upwards not
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition under any of the impediments mentioned in
for certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
motion for reconsideration of said Decision, Under this property regime, property acquired
which was also denied by the appellate court. by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on
Issue:Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
Condominium should be governed by the during the union is prima facie presumed to
rules on co-ownership and what rules should have been obtained through their joint efforts.
be applied in the settlement of the common A party who did not participate in the
properties? acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto
Held jointly if said partys "efforts consisted in the
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial care and maintenance of the family
court, that in March 1983, after two years of household."
long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and
City and moved in with respondent in the the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
latters residence in Metro Manila. Their each other; (2) live exclusively with each
relations bore fruit and their first child, other as husband and wife; and (3) their union
Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, is without the benefit of marriage or their
1983. The couple got married on March 14, marriage is void. All these elements are
1985. In the meantime, they purchased on present in the case at bar. It has not been
installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at shown that petitioner and respondent suffered
LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a any impediment to marry each other. They
Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed lived exclusively with each other as husband
by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos and wife when petitioner moved in with
Commercial Corporation as the seller. respondent in his residence and were later
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, united in marriage. Their marriage, however,
using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon was found to be void under Article 36 of the
completion of payment, the title to the Family Code because of respondents
condominium unit was issued in the name of psychological incapacity to comply with
petitioner. essential marital obligations.
In light of these facts, the Court gave more The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
123
Condominium, was purchased on installment Private respondent stated that she had a total
basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when of P35,465.00 share in the joint account
petitioner and respondent were already living deposit which she and the petitioner
together. Hence, it should be considered as maintained. Gina declared that said deposits
common property of petitioner and were spent for the purchase of construction
respondent. Further, the Court held that the materials, appliances and other personal
property regime of the parties should be properties.
divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the
expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income. He
averred that private respondents meager
income as fish dealer rendered her unable to
contribute in the construction of said
109) Saguid vs. Rey house. Petitioner further contended that Gina
did not work continuously in Japan from 1992
to 1994. When their house was repaired and
G.R. No. 150611.JUNE 10, 2003 improved sometime in 1995-1996, private
respondent did not share in the expenses
because her earnings as entertainer were
spent on the daily needs and business of her
Facts parents. Petitioner further claimed that his
savings from his income in the fishing
Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de business were the ones used in purchasing
facto from her husband, when she met the disputed personal properties.
petitioner Jacinto Saguid sometime in July
1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided The respondent was allowed to present
to cohabit as husband and wife in a house evidence ex parte after the trial court
built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. declared the petitioner as in default for failure
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner filed a
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the motion for reconsideration but was denied.
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but Subsequently, a decision was rendered in
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan favor of the private respondent.
from 1992 to 1994. In 1996, the couple
decided to separate. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals except for the award for
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a moral damages.
complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against
the petitioner. She alleged that from her
salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to Issue
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of
their unfinished house. Also, from her own
earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, What provision of the Family Code shall
she was able to acquire and accumulate governed the property regime of the
appliances, pieces of furniture and household petitioner and private respondent?
effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be
declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, Held
representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to The Court held that the property regime of
her. Jacinto and Gina, who was validly married to
another man at the time of her cohabitation
124
with the former, should be governed by Article contribution in the construction thereof. While
148 of the Family Code, as it applies to for the personal properties, her participation
adulterous relationships and under this should be limited only to the amount of
regime, proof of actual contribution is P55,687.50.
required.
In the case at bar, although the adulterous

cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1987, which is before the date of the
effectivity of the Family Code, Article 148 still
applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the
Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation
or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on

the house and personal properties of the
parties. Private respondent alleged in her
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for
the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the
extent of her contribution. What appears in
the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials in the total
amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the

money used to purchase the disputed
personal properties came partly from their
joint account. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof
of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the
parties respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the
disputed personal properties were valued at
P111,375.00, the existence and value of
which were not questioned by the
petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, which is P 55,687.50
each.
On the basis of the evidence established, the

extent of private respondents co-ownership
over the disputed house is only up to the
amount of P11,413.00, her proven
125
XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION was not passed upon by the trial court. That
petitioners claim for damages was barred by
110) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo prescription with respect to claims before
City & Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros & 1984; that there were no rentals due since
Teodora Ayson private respondent Hontiveros was a
G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999 possessor in good faith and for value; and
that private respondent Ayson had nothing to
Facts: do with the case as she was not married to
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and
complaint for damages against private did not have any proprietary interest in the
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora subject property. Private respondents prayed
Ayson before the RTC Iloilo City. for the dismissal of the complaint and for an
order against petitioners to pay damages to
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners private respondents by way of counterclaim,
of a land located at the town of Jamindan, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to
Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0- private respondent.
2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court which modified Issue: Whether or not the RTC palpably
decision of CFI Capiz, in a land registration erred in dismissing the complaint on the
case filed by private respondent Gregorio ground that it does not allege under
Hontivero. Also, that they were deprived of oath that earnest efforts toward a
income from the land as a result of the filing compromise were made prior to filing as
of the land registration case. The income required by Art. 151 of FC.
consisted of rentals from tenants of the land
in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from Held:
1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year No. This rule shall not apply to cases which
thereafter; and that private respondents filed may not be the subject of compromise under
the land registration case and withheld the Civil Code.
possession of the land from petitioners in bad Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of
faith. the Family Code does not apply in this case
since the suit is not exclusively among family
Private respondents denied that they were members. Petitioners claim that whenever a
married and alleged that private respondent stranger is a party in a case involving family
Hontiveros was a widower while private members, the requisite showing of earnest
respondent Ayson was single. They denied efforts to compromise is no longer
that they had deprived petitioners of mandatory. They argue that since private
possession of and income from the land. respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to
They alleged that possession of the property the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered
in question had already been transferred to by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family
petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a Code.
writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of
by the clerk of court of the RTC Capiz, private respondent Ayson as defendant and
Mambusao, the return thereof having been petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes
received by petitioners counsel. Since then, the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
petitioners have been directly receiving Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
rentals from the tenants of the land. The members of the same family refers to the
complaint failed to state a cause of action husband and wife, parents and children,
since it did not allege that earnest efforts ascendants and descendants, and brothers
towards a compromise had been made, and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
considering that petitioner Augusto In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of
Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio brothers and sisters as members of the
Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-
IAC in Land Registration Case was null and law. In that case, then Chief Justice
void since it was based upon a ground which Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law
126
(hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged
under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as defect since he did not file any motion to
members of the same family. Since Art. 150 dismiss nor attack the complaint on this
of the Family Code repeats essentially the ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-
same enumeration of members of the trial conference, that the relationship of
family, we find no reason to alter existing petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando
jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello,
the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Jr.
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert Guerrero claims that since brothers by affinity
earnest efforts towards a compromise before are not members of the same family, he was
filing the present suit. not required to exert efforts towards a
Religious relationship and relationship by compromise.
affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Issue: Whether brothers by affinity are
Ayson, who is described in the complaint as considered members of the same family
the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as
the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
family, for purposes of Art. 151. towards a compromise before a suit
Petitioners finally question the between them may be instituted and
constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code maintained.
on the ground that it in effect amends the
Rules of Court. This, according to them, Held:
cannot be done since the Constitution No. The reason for the requirement that
reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted
power to promulgate rules of pleadings and before a complaint is given due course is
procedure. Considering the conclusion we because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and
have reached in this case, however, it is more tragic spectacle than a litigation
unnecessary for present purposes to pass between members of the same family. It is
upon this question. Courts do not pass upon necessary that every effort should be made
constitutional questions unless they are the toward a compromise before a litigation is
very lis mota of the case. allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family. It is known that a lawsuit between
111) Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, close relatives generates deeper bitterness
Judge Luis Bello & Pedro Hernando than between strangers. A litigation in a
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994 family is to be lamented far more than a
lawsuit between strangers .
Facts: In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of
brothers and sisters as members of the same
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana family does not comprehend sisters-in-law.
against private respondent, this case The attempt to compromise as well as
assumed another dimension when it was inability to succeed is a condition precedent
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground to the the filing of a suit between members of
that the parties being brother-in-law the the same family.
complaint should have alleged that earnest Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats
efforts were first exerted towards a essentially the same enumeration of
compromise. "members of the family", we find no reason to
alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling
the parties exerted earnest efforts towards a that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-
compromise and that the same failed. law of private respondent Hernando, was
However, private respondent Pedro G. required to exert earnest efforts towards a
127
compromise before filing the present suit. parties who are strangers to the family
Also, Guerreros wife has no actual interest are involved in the suit.
and participation in the land subject of the
suit, which the petitioner bought, before he Held:
married his wife. Yes. The Code Commission that drafted
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article
112) Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. 151 of the Family Code was taken explains: it
vs. Hon. Edmundo Acua, RTC Judge is difficult to imagine a sadder and more
Caloocan City and Alberto Moreno tragic spectacle than a litigation between
G.R. no. 154132 August 31, 2006 members of the same family. It is necessary
that every effort should be made toward a
Facts: compromise before a litigation is allowed to
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan breed hate and passion in the family. It is
City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and known that a lawsuit between close relatives
Loan Bank, his wife Remedios, the spouses generates deeper bitterness than between
Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of strangers.
Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of In Magbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved
mortgage. Respondent Moreno contends that brothers and a stranger to the family, the
he did not secure any loan from petitioner, alleged owner of the subject property. The
nor did he sign or execute any contract of Court, taking into consideration the
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in explanation made by the Code Commission in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, its report, ruled that: These consideration s do
who were the ones that benefited from the not however weigh enough to make it
loan, made it appear that he signed the imperative that such efforts to compromise
contract of mortgage; that he could not have should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
executed the said contract because he was maintenance of an action whenever a
working abroad. stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because It is not always that one who is alien to the
private respondent failed to comply with family would be willing to suffer the
Article 151 of the Family wherein it is provided inconvenience of; much less, relish the delay
that no suit between members of the same and the complications that wrangling between
family shall prosper unless it should appear or among relatives more often than not entail.
from the verified complaint or petition that Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have the determination of the rights of a stranger
been made, but that the same have failed. to the family who just happened to have
Petitioner contends that since the complaint innocently acquired some kind of interest in
does not contain any fact or averment that any right or property disputed among its
earnest efforts toward a compromise had members should be made to depend on the
been made prior to its institution, then the way the latter would settle their differences
complaint should be dismissed for lack of among themselves. 22 x x x.
cause of action. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a
suit involving members of the same family,
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, it held that the law no longer makes it a condition
earnest efforts towards a compromise is not precedent that earnest efforts be made
required before the filing of the instant case towards a compromise before the action can
considering that the above-entitled case prosper.
involves parties who are strangers to the Petition is Dismissed.
family.
Issue: Whether or not lack of earnest

efforts toward a compromise is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss in suits
between husband and wife when other
128
FAMILY HOME of a cultural minority was not approved by the

proper government agency. An opposition
113) Modequillo vs. Breva thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Issue: Whether or not a final judgment of
Facts: the Court of Appeals in an action for
In 1988, a judgment was rendered by the damages may be satisfied by way of
Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. execution of a family home constituted
vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. finding the under the Family Code.
defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to Held:
plaintiffs-appellants as compensation for the Yes. Under the Family Code, a family home is
death of Audie Salinas for hospitalization deemed constituted on a house and lot from
expenses of Renato Culan- Culan. The said the time it is occupied as a family residence.
judgment having become final and executory, There is no need to constitute the same
a writ of execution was issued by the RTC judicially or extrajudicially as required in the
Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the
goods and chattels of the defendants Jose premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
Davao del Sur. should take the necessary precautions to
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential protect their interest before extending credit
land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del to the spouses or head of the family who
Sur containing an area of 600 square meters owns the home.
with a market value of P34,550.00 and Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt
assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax from execution, forced sale or attachment
Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in except:
the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of (1) For non-payment of taxes;
the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution
a parcel of agricultural land located at of the family home;
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
containing an area of 3 hectares with a premises before or after such constitution;
market value of P24,130.00 and assessed and
value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87- (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
08-01848 registered in the name of Jose architects, builders, material men and others
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial who have rendered service or furnished
Assessor of Davao del Sur. material for the construction of the building.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of The exemption provided as aforestated is
execution was filed by defendant Jose effective from the time of the constitution of
Modequillo alleging that the residential land the family home as such, and lasts so long as
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the any of its beneficiaries actually resides
family home is built since 1969 prior to the therein.
commencement of this case and as such is In the present case, the residential house and
exempt from execution, forced sale or lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the family home whether judicially or
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment a family home by operation of law only under
debt sought to be enforced against the family Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
home of defendant is not one of those constituted as a family home upon the
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
Code. As to the agricultural land although it is 1988 not August 4, one year after its
declared in the name of defendant it is publication in the Manila Chronicle on August
alleged to be still part of the public land and 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
the transfer in his favor by the original The contention of petitioner that it should be
possessor and applicant who was a member considered a family home from the time it
129
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1989 which triggered the attachment of a
1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of parcel of land in Quezon City owned by
the Family Code, it is provided that "the Manacop Construction President Florante F.
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern Manacop, herein petitioner.
existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean The petitioner insists that the attached
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a property is a family home, having been
retroactive effect such that all existing family occupied by him and his family since 1972,
residences are deemed to have been and is therefore exempt from attachment.
constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the RTC held that the subject property is not
Family Code and are exempt from execution exempt from attachment.
for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 Issue: Whether or not the property of
simply means that all existing family Florante Manacop is exempt from
residences at the time of the effectivity of the attachment.
Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits Held:
accorded to a family home under the Family No. The debt or liability which was the basis
Code. Article 162 does not state that the of the judgment arose or was incurred at the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a time of the vehicular accident on March 16,
retroactive effect. 1976 and the money judgment arising
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from therefrom was rendered by the appellate
execution of the money judgment aforecited? court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
the judgment arose or was incurred at the 1988. This case does not fall under the
time of the vehicular accident on March 16, exemptions from execution provided in the
1976 and the money judgment arising Family Code.
therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the The contention of petitioner that it should be
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, considered a family home from the time it
1988. This case does not fall under the was occupied by petitioner and his family in
exemptions from execution provided in the 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of
Family Code. the Family Code, it is provided that "the
As to the agricultural land subject of the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
execution, the trial court correctly ruled that existing family residences insofar as said
the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on provisions are applicable." It does not mean
whatever rights the petitioner may have on that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
the land. retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been
114) Manacop vs. CA and F.F. CRUZ & constituted as family homes at the time of
CO., INC., their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992 Family Code and are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before
Facts: the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract simply means that all existing family
cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed residences at the time of the effectivity of the
between petitioner's corporation and private Family Code, are considered family homes
respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a accorded to a family home under the Family
prayer for preliminary attachment, against the Code. Article 162 does not state that the
former. As a consequence of the order on July provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the retroactive effect.
provisional remedy was issued on August 11,
130
115) Manacop vs. CA and E & L Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and
MERCANTILE INC. executory judgment issued before the
227 SCRA 57 effectivity of the Family Code be executed on
a house and lot constituted as a family home
Facts: under the provision of said Code?
On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. HELD
Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased a Yes. [The Court of Appeals committed no
446-square-meter residential lot with a reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision
bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The and Resolution are supported by law and
property is located at Commonwealth Village, applicable jurisprudence.]
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred
Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed in holding that his residence was not exempt
a complaint against petitioner and F.F. from execution in view of his failure to show
Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC that the property involved has been duly
Pasig to collect an indebtedness of constituted as a family home in accordance
P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, with law. He asserts that the Family Code
petitioner and his company entered into a and Modequillo require simply the occupancy
compromise agreement with private of the property by the petitioner, without
respondent. need for its judicial or extrajudicial
constitution as a family home.
On July 15, 1986, E & L Mercantile filed a
motion for execution which the lower court. Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under
However, execution of the judgment was the Family Code which took effect on August
delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on 3, 1988, the subject property became his
several vehicles and other personal properties family home under the simplified process
of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the embodied in Article 153 of said Code.
judgment debt, these chattels were sold at However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said
public auction for which certificates of sale provision of the Family Code does not have
were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. retroactive effect. In other words, prior to
August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to the Civil Code had to be followed for a family
quash the alias writs of execution and to stop home to be constituted as such. There being
the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on absolutely no proof that the subject property
the ground that the judgment was not yet was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
executory. a family home, it follows that the laws
protective mantle cannot be availed of by
Private respondent opposed the motion petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was
alleging that the property covered by TCT No. incurred and the assailed orders of the trial
174180 could not be considered a family court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the
home on the grounds that petitioner was petitioner cannot be shielded by the
already living abroad and that the property, benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home Petitioner contends that he should be deemed
to exempt it from execution. residing in the family home because his stay
in the United States is merely temporary. He
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. It asserts that the person staying in the house is
held that petitioners residence was not his overseer and that whenever his wife
exempt from execution as it was not duly visited this country, she stayed in the family
constituted as a family home, pursuant to the home. This contention lacks merit.
Civil Code.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of
CA affirmed. the family home either by the owner thereof
or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual.
131
That which is actual is something real, or the subject property executed in its favor by
actually existing, as opposed to something petitioners, it discovered a notice of levy on
merely possible, or to something which is execution was annotated on the title in
presumptive or constructive. Actual connection with Ledesma's obligation to a
occupancy, however, need not be by the certain Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of
owner of the house specifically. Rather, the P214,284.00. Because of this annotated
property may be occupied by the encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said
beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of Real Estate Mortgage and refused to release
the Family Code. the P2M loan of petitioners. When private
respondent presented Ledesma's check for
116) Versola vs. Ong payment, the same was dishonored for the
G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006 reason that the account was already closed.
Subsequently, when private respondent
Facts: presented for payment the check issued by
Private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh petitioners, the said check was likewise
granted a loan to a certain Dolores Ledesma dishonored because there was a stop
in the amount of P1M. As a security for said payment order. With the dishonor of the
loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release
check for the same amount dated 10 February the P2M loan of petitioners, private
1993 and promised to execute a deed of real respondent came away empty-handed as she
estate mortgage over her house and lot did not receive payment for the P1.5M loan
located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City which she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by
did not materialize. petitioners. As a result, private respondent
filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against
Subsequently, Ledesma sold the said house Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust.
and lot to petitioners for P2.5M. Petitioners
paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment, with the RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh. CA
remaining balance of P1.5M to be paid in affirmed withmodification.
monthly installments of P75,000. Petitioners,
however, were only able to pay the amount of Private respondent filed a Motion for
P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise the full Execution with the RTC. The property in the
amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners name of Spouses Versola were subsequently
applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. levied upon. On 5 August 2002, private
(Asiatrust) in the amount of P2M. In the respondent filed with the trial court an Ex-
course of the application for said loan, parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of
petitioners, private respondent, and Ledesma Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo
convened with Asiatrust to arrive at a scheme and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed the said
to settle the obligation of Ledesma to private motion on the following grounds: (1) the
respondent and the obligation of petitioners property sold at the public auction is the
to Ledesma. family home of petitioners which is exempt
from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the
In keeping with the foregoing agreement, Family Code; and (2) no application was made
private respondent granted Ledesma an by private respondent for the determination of
additional loan of P450,000.00. Ledesma, in the value of their family home to be subjected
turn, executed a Deed of Sale transferring the to execution, as required under Article 160 of
title of the subject property to petitioners. the Family Code.
Private respondent then delivered the title of
the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of Petitioners maintain that said objection to the
Sale was registered and the title in the name sale was based on the fact that there was no
of Ledesma was cancelled and a new one was order or clearance from the trial court for the
issued in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, sheriff to proceed with the auction sale, in
Asiatrust approved the loan application of clear violation of Article 160 of the Family
petitioners. However, when Asiatrust tried to Code, which requires an application by the
register the Real Estate Mortgage covering creditor and a determination of the actual
132
value of the family home by the court On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died
ordering the sale of property under execution. intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons,
Issue: Whether or not petitioners timely Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
raised and proved that their property is Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties
exempt from execution. he left was a parcel of land with a residential
house and a pre-school building. On August
Held: 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides: private respondent, extrajudicially settled the
The family home is deemed constituted on a estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter,
house and lot from the time it is occupied as petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally
the family residence. From the time of its advised private respondent of their intention
constitution and so long as its beneficiaries to partition the subject property and
resides therein, the family home continues to terminate the co-ownership. Private
be such and is exempt from execution, forced respondent refused to partition the property
sale or attachment except as hereinafter hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted
provided and to the extent of the value an action for partition.
allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is The RTC ordered the partition and the sale of
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the property by public auction. The Court of
the time it is occupied as a family residence; Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition
there is no need to constitute the same filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack
judicially or extrajudicially. of merit. It held that the family home should
The settled rule is that the right to exemption continue despite the death of one or both
or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family spouses as long as there is a minor
Code is a personal privilege granted to the beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
judgment debtor and as such, it must be partition the property unless the court found
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The
himself before the sale of the property at appellate court also held that the minor son of
public auction. It is not sufficient that the private respondent, who is a grandson of
person claiming exemption merely alleges spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
that such property is a family home. This Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family
claim for exemption must be set up and home.
proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the Issue: Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV,
exception. the minor son of private respondent, can be
considered as a beneficiary under Article 154
In the instant case, it was only after almost of the Family Code.
two years from the time of the execution sale
and after the "Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was Held:
issued did petitioners rigorously claim in their No. Article 154 of the Family Code
Opposition to private respondent's Ex-parte enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a
Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an
Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa unmarried person who is the head of a family;
Versola that the property in question is and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
exempt from execution. Even then, there was descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
no showing that petitioners adduced evidence the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
to prove that it is indeed a family home. who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal
117) Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III support.
and CA
G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be
Facts: among the relationships enumerated in Art.
133
154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the dependent on legal support, and who must
family home; and (3) they are dependent for now establish his own family home separate
legal support upon the head of the family. and distinct from that of his parents, being of
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of legal age.
the family home are: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.
The term descendants contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include
the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondents minor son, who is also the
grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries
must be actually living in the family home to
avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as
Ino, the son of private respondent and
grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario,
has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him.
The liability for legal support falls primarily
on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents,
especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of
legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on
legal support not from his grandmother, but
from his father. Thus, despite residing in the
family home and his being a descendant of
Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he
did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal
support. It is his father whom he is
134
XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION physically impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the first one
118) Andal vs. Macaraig hundred and twenty days of the three
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951 hundred next preceding the birth of the child.
Impossibility of access by husband to wife
FACTS: would include (1) absence during the initial
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of period of conception, (2) impotence which is
land in question having acquired it from his patent, continuing and incurable, and (3)
mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
donation propter nuptias executed by the cohabitation took place through corrupt
latter in favor of the former on the occasion of violation of prison regulations. Since the boy
his marriage to Maria Dueas. Emiliano Andal was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano
had been in possession of the land from 1938 Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano
advantage of the abnormal situation then and his wife, he having been born within three
prevailing, entered the land in question. hundred (300) days following the dissolution
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in of the marriage. There was no evidence
January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his presented that Emiliano Andal was absent
brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help during the initial period of conception,
him work his farm. His sickness became worse especially during the period comprised
that on or about September 10, 1942, he between August 21, 1942 and September 10,
became so weak that he could hardly move 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the
and get up from his bed. On September 10, 300 next preceding the birth of the child
1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is
Felix, and both went to live in the house of enough evidence to show that during that
Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife
May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual were still living under the marital roof, or at
intercourse and treated each other as least had access one to the other. Even if
husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Felix, the brother, was living in the same
Emiliano died without the presence of his house, and he and the wife were indulging in
wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does
June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano
boy, who was given the name of Mariano and his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was
Andal. If the son born to the couple is deemed already suffering from tuberculosis and his
legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the condition then was so serious that he could
land in question. If otherwise, then the land hardly move and get up from bed does not
should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as show that this does not prevent carnal
the next of kin entitled to succeed him under intercourse. He was not impotent. The fact
the law. The lower court rendered judgment in that Maria Dueas has committed adultery
favor of the plaintiffs. can not also overcome this presumption.
Therefore, presumption of legitimacy under
ISSUE: Whether or not the child born by the Civil Code in favor of the child has not
Maria is considered as the legitimate son of been overcome.
Emiliano.
119) Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B.
HELD: Catotal
Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
children born after the one hundred and
eighty days next following that of the FACTS:
celebration of marriage or within the three Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional
hundred days next following its dissolution or Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan
the separation of the spouses shall be City, a petition for the cancellation of the
presumed to be legitimate. This presumption entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil
may be rebutted only by proof that it was Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed
135
as Special Proceedings No. 3046. From the sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals
petition filed, Presentacion asserted that she held that the evidence adduced during trial
is the only surviving child of the late spouses proved that petitioner was not the biological
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 no evidence was presented to show that
respectively. On September 20, 1996 a baby Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It
girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of further observed that she was already 54
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and years old at the time, and that her last
without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941.
Guinto, the mother of the child and a The CA noted that the supposed birth took
housemaid of spouses Eugenio and place at home, notwithstanding the advanced
Hermogena Babiera, caused the age of Hermogena and its concomitant
registration/recording of the facts of birth of medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's
her child, by simulating that she was the child Birth Certificate was not signed by the local
of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and civil registrar, and the signature therein,
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made which was purported to be that of
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by Hermogena, was different from her other
forging her signature. Petitioner, then 15 signatures.
years old, saw with her own eyes and
personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth ISSUE: Whether or not Teofista is the
to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by legitimate child of spouses Eugenio Babiera
"hilot". The birth certificate of Teofista Guinto and Hermogena Cariosa.
is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth, signature of informant forged, and it HELD:
contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that,
made to appear as the legitimate child of the the child's filiation can be impugned only by
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena the father or, in special circumstances, his
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of heirs. Respondent has the requisite standing
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) of the Rules of Court, provides that a real
The family name Babiera is false and unlawful party in interest is one "who stands to be
and her correct family name is Guinto, her benefited or injured by the judgment in the
mother being single; d) Her real mother was suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate suit. The interest of respondent in the civil
child. The natural father, the carpenter, did status of petitioner stems from an action for
not sign it. Also, the respondent Teofista partition which the latter filed against the
Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, former. The case concerned the properties
and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it inherited by respondent from her parents.
is clinically and medically impossible for the Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is
supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 not applicable to the present case. A close
because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, reading of this provision shows that it applies
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last to instances in which the father impugns the
child birth was in the year 1941, the year legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already however, presupposes that the child was the
65 years old, that the void and simulated birth undisputed offspring of the mother. The
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the present case alleges and shows that
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
the estate. The trial court ruled in favor of the other words, the prayer herein is not to
petitioner therein. Teofista averred "that she declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child
was always known as Teofista Babiera and not of Hermogena, but to establish that the
Teofista Guinto and that plaintiff is not the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the
only surviving child of the late spouses present action does not impugn petitioner's
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
for the truth of the matter is that they are Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
136
impugn in the first place. Also, the of administering his estate. The parties
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of further exchanged reply and rejoinder to
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the buttress their legal postures. Petitioner tried
action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not to prove that she is the only legitimate child
prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
initio. A birth certificate may be ordered Chipongian. She submitted documentary
cancelled upon adequate proof that it is evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of
fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3)
shows that the mother was already fifty-four Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
years old at the time of the child's birth and Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
which was signed neither by the civil registrar naming her as his daughter; and (4) School
nor by the supposed mother. Because her Records. She also testified that the said
inheritance rights are adversely affected, the spouses reared and continuously treated her
legitimate child of such mother is a proper as their legitimate daughter. On the other
party in the proceedings for the cancellation hand, private respondents tried to prove,
of the said certificate. mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the
said spouses failed to beget a child during
120) Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of their marriage and that the late Isabel, then
Appeals thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. The
FACTS: trial court decided in favor of the petitioner.
The facts show that the spouses Vicente However, the Court of Appeals, reversed the
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various said decision of the trial court.
properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on
April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the
grave on November 13, 1989. He died legitimate child and thus the surviving heir of
intestate.The fight for administration of the spouses Benitez.
Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24,
1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez- HELD:
Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170
sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. and 171 of the Family Code will show that
Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo they do not contemplate a situation, like in
City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed the instant case, where a child is alleged not
for the issuance of letters of administration of to be the child of nature or biological child of
Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern
Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
survived by no other heirs or relatives either denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, it is
any ascendants or descendants, whether the husband who can impugn the legitimacy
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted. of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
Also, despite claims or representation to the impossible for him to have sexual intercourse,
contrary, petitioners can well and truly with his wife within the first 120 days of the
establish, given the chance to do so, that said 300 days which immediately preceded the
decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had other scientific reasons, the child could not
earlier been settled extra-judicial, were have been his child; (3) that in case of
without issue and/or without descendants children conceived through artificial
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez- insemination, the written authorization or
Badua who was raised and cared by them ratification by either parent was obtained
since childhood is, in fact, not related to them through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
not a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the speak of the prescriptive period within which
petition and alleged that she is the sole heir the husband or any of his heirs should file the
of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
137
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly
when it refused to apply these articles to the be that of the alleged father.
case at bench for it is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that 122) Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, Appeals
their clear submission is that petitioner was G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Factual finding
of the appellate court that petitioner was not FACTS:
the biological child or child of nature of the Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Chipongian is meritorious. There was strong Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the
and convincing evidence that Isabel clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions,
Chipongian never became pregnant and, she and petitioner took lunch together.
therefore, never delivered a child. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a
business of her own as Namarco distributor,
121) Jao vs. Court of Appeals met petitioner again who was engaged in the
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 same business and they renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her
FACTS: his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he
Petitioner, assisted by her mother, filed courted her more than four years. Their
a case for recognition and support against relationship became intimate and with his
Perico Jao. The latter denied paternity thus promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua,
the parties agreed to a blood grouping test Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La
conducted by the National Bureau of Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas
Investigation. The result indicated that the Telephone Company branch office, of which
petitioner could not have been the offspring he is the president and general manager. He
of the latter and her mother, Arlene. The came home to her three or four times a week.
lower court found the test conclusive The apartment was procured by Melencio
however, upon a second motion for Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
reconsideration the trial resulted on the Telephone Company branch office. He also
declaration of the petitioner being the child of took care of the marketing and paid rentals,
Perico and is entitled to support. The latter lights and water bills. Unable to speak the
questioned said decision to the Court of local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by
Appeals where it reversed said decision of the Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
lower court. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month
for their expenses at home. In June, 1962,
ISSUE: Whether or not the results of the Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was
blood grouping test are admissible and fetched by petitioner and they transferred to
conclusive to prove non-paternity. San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she
delivered a still-born female child at the
HELD: Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was
Yes. The use of blood typing in cases of signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they
disputed percentage has already become an were living at Highway 54, Makati, private
important legal procedure. There is now respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on
almost universal scientific agreement that December 30, 1963 also at the Manila
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non- Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as
paternity, although inconclusive to paternity. Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of
This is because the fact that the blood type of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio
a child is a possible product of the mother and Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued
alleged father does not conclusively prove by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she
that the child is born by such parents. On the was confined there from December 30, 1963
other hand, if the blood type of the child is not until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs.
a possible blood type when the blood of the Leoncia Ilano. The support by petitioner for
mother and that of the alleged father are Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the
138
form of cash personally delivered by him, thru ISSUE: Whether or not Merceditas is the child
Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru of Artemio and is entitled to support.
Merceditas herself. Sometimes in the form of
a check like Manila Banking Corporation HELD:
Check No. 81532, the signature appearing Yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of
thereon having been identified by Leoncia as the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those
that of petitioner because he often gives her who are conceived and born out of wedlock
checks which he issues at home and saw him were generally classified into two groups: (1)
sign the checks. During the time that Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were
petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband those born outside of lawful wedlock of
and wife, he showed concern as the father of parents who, at the time of conception of the
Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I child, were not disqualified by any
at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed impediment to marry each other and (2)
her Report Card for the fourth and fifth Spurious, whether incestuous, were
grading periods as her parent. Those disqualified to marry each other on account of
signatures were both identified by Leoncia certain legal impediments. Since petitioner
and Merceditas because he signed them in had a subsisting marriage to another at the
their residence in their presence and of time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of
discernment, he was already the one whom the Civil Code provides that illegitimate
she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her children other than natural in accordance with
as a father would to his child. He would bring Article 269 and other than natural children by
home candies, toys, and anything a child legal fiction are entitled to support and such
enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at successional rights as are granted in the Civil
restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. In Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to
May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of them because the transgressions of social
Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She conventions committed by the parents should
accompanied her aunt when she started not be visited upon them. They were born
having labor pains in the morning of with a social handicap and the law should
December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after help them to surmount the disadvantages
five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse facing them through the misdeeds of their
came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was parents. However, before Article 287 can be
still unconscious so it was from petitioner that availed of, there must first be a recognition of
the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch paternity either voluntarily or by court action.
as it was already past seven o'clock in the The Court finds that there is sufficient
evening, the nurse promised to return the evidence of recognition on the part of
following morning for his signature. However, petitioner. The evidences submitted like the
he left an instruction to give birth certificate signature in the report cards, testimonies, and
to Leoncia for her signature, as he was other pieces of evidence shows that petitioner
leaving early the following morning. Prior to indeed recognized Merceditas as his child and
the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to thus entitles her to support.
accompany her aunt and sometimes with
petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium 123) Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of
for prenatal check-up. At times, she used to Appeals
go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
Manila, upon his instructions to get money as
support and sometimes he would send notes FACTS:
of explanation if he cannot come which she in Private respondent is the mother and legal
turn gave to her aunt. They stayed at 112 guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by
Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 the father of the petitioner, the late Atty.
before they finally transferred to Gagalangin Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner is the known
in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, administratrix of the real and personal
1971 when he stopped coming home. properties left by her deceased father, said
Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles
139
City on September 28, 1983. Private illegitimate child.

respondent has been estranged from her
husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now HELD:
and during which time, she and Atty. Ricardo Yes. Although petitioner contends that the
Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with complaint filed by herein private respondent
each other that, as a consequence thereof, merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan
they begot a child who was christened Chad is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire actually a claim for inheritance, from the
and behest of said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the allegations therein the same may be
son of private respondent by the late Atty. considered as one to compel recognition.
Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles Further that the two causes of action, one to
City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, compel recognition and the other to claim
showered with exceptional affection, fervent inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
love and care by his putative father for being not new in our jurisprudence. Also, the action
his only son as can be gleaned from has not yet prescribed. The applicable law is
indubitable letters and documents of the late Article 285 of the Civil Code which states that
Atty. Ocampo to herein private respondent. the action for the recognition of natural
The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although children may be brought only during the
illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
in the intestate estate left by his deceased the following cases: (1) If the father or mother
father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the died during the minority of the child, in which
surviving heirs. The deceased Atty. Ricardo case the latter may file the action before the
Ocampo, at the time of his death was the expiration of four years from the attainment
owner of real and personal property, located of his majority. The Court holds that the right
in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the of action of the minor child has been vested
Province of Pampanga with approximate value by the filing of the complaint in court under
of several millions of pesos. The estate of the the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been effectivity of the Family Code. We herein
inventoried by the petitioner and the adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic
inheritance of the surviving heirs including of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
that of said Chad has not likewise been where we held that the fact of filing of the
ascertained. The only known surviving heirs of petition already vested in the petitioner her
the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his right to file it and to have the same proceed
children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. to final adjudication in accordance with the
Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and law in force at the time, and such right can no
said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
instant complaint is filed. Private respondent enactment of a new law.
has no means of livelihood and she only
depends on the charity of friends and 124) John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs.
relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, Court of Appeals
such that it is urgent, necessary and G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
imperative that said child be extended
financial support from the estate of his FACTS:
putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Several Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and
demands, verbal and written, have been guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro
made for petitioner to grant Chad's lawful Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez,
inheritance, but despite said demands, the met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco
latter failed and refused and still fails and Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee
refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend
against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo. his week-ends regularly at said courts, where
Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her
ISSUE: Whether or not Chad is entitled to two sons. She claimed that they started their
inherit from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after
140
their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the Claro fall short of the evidence required to
birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, prove paternity. The baptismal certificates of
1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know petitioner Claro naming private respondent as
that Carlito was married until the birth of her his father has scant evidentiary value. There
two children. She averred they were married is no showing that private respondent
in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, participated in its preparation. The certificates
however, she discovered that the marriage of live birth of the petitioners identifying
license which they used was spurious. private respondent as their father are not also
Petitioners presented the following competent evidence on the issue of their
documentary evidence: their certificates of paternity. Again, the records do no show that
live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as private respondent had a hand in the
their father; the baptismal certificate of preparation of said certificates. Also, there is
petitioner Claro which also states that his no proof that Father Fernandez is a close
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private
Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner respondent which should render
Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and unquestionable his identification of the
Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. private respondent during petitioner Claro's
In defense, respondent Carlito denied baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are
Violeta's allegations that he sired the two not prepared to concede that Father
petitioners. He averred he only served as one Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal
of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner ceremonies day in and day out can remember
Claro. This claim was corroborated by the the parents of the children he has baptized.
testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an
officemate of respondent Carlito who also 125) Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of
stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during Appeals
his baptism. G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
ISSUE: Whether or not Claro Antonio and John FACTS:

Paul are children of Carlito and are entitled for Florencias version was that she was the
support. mother of private respondent who was born
on September 9, 1982 and that she was the
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that one supporting the child. She recounted that
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may after her husband left her in the early part of
be reviewed by this court only under 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
exceptional circumstances. One such situation Occidental to look for work and was
is when the findings of the appellate court eventually hired as petitioners household
clash with those of the trial court as in the help. It was while working there as a maid
case at bench. It behooves us therefore to that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle her to Bacolod City where they checked in at
the issue of whether the ruling of the the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse.
appellate court that private respondent is not Petitioner promised to support her if she got
the father of the petitioners is substantiated pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered
by the evidence on record. The evidence she was carrying petitioners child 27 days
offered by the petitioners is insufficient to after their sexual encounter. The sexual
prove their filiation. Petitioners cannot rely on intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in
the photographs showing the presence of the San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that
private respondent in the baptism of Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent
petitioner Claro. These photographs are far her home. But petitioner instead brought her
from proofs that private respondent is the to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a
father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted
private respondent, he was in the baptism as by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan,
one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. The Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private
pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing respondent Camelo Regodos.
private respondent showering affection to Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was
141
that he was a sugar planter and a

businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, HELD:
he hired Florencia as a servant at home. No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of
During the course of her employment, she the factual findings of the two lower courts. As
would often go home to her husband in the a general rule, factual issues are not within
afternoon and return to work the following the province of this Court. Factual findings of
morning. This displeased petitioners wife, the trial court, when adopted and confirmed
hence she was told to look for another job. In by the Court of Appeals, become final and
the meantime, Florencia asked permission conclusive and may not be reviewed on
from petitioner to go home and spend New appeal. However, the Court is convinced that
Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on this case falls within one of the exceptions.
board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City Time and again, this Court has ruled that a
and invited her to dinner. While they were high standard of proof is required to establish
eating, she confided that she was hard up and paternity and filiation. An order for recognition
petitioner offered to lend her save money. and support may create an unwholesome
Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City situation or may be an irritant to the family or
and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he the lives of the parties so that it must be
felt something jerking and when he asked her issued only if paternity or filiation is
about it, she told him she was pregnant with established by clear and convincing evidence.
the child of her husband. They went home the The applicable provisions of the law are
following day. In March 1982, Florencia, then Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which
already working in another household, went to states that: the filiation of legitimate children
petitioners house hoping to be re-employed is established by any of the following: (1) The
as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was record of birth appearing in the civil register
in need of one, she was re-hired. However or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was legitimate filiation in a public document or a
bulging and inquired about the father of the private handwritten instrument and signed by
unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the parent concerned. In the absence of the
the baby was by her husband. Because of her foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
condition, she was again told to go home and shall be proved by: (1) The open and
they did not see each other anymore. continuous possession of the status of a
Petitioner was therefore surprised when legitimate child; or (2) Any other means
summons was served on him by Florencias allowed by the Rules of Court and special
counsel. She was demanding support for laws; Illegitimate children may establish their
private respondent Camelo Regodos. illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged the same evidence as legitimate children.
paternity. He insisted she was already Private respondents copy of his birth and
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going baptismal certificates, the preparation of
to Bacolod City with her and checking in at which was without the knowledge or consent
the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and purportedly identifying the putative father is
renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod not competent evidence of paternity when
City. there is no showing that the putative father
The trial court gave probative weight to the had a hand in the preparation of said
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery certificate. The local civil registrar has no
that she misrepresented herself as a widow authority to record the paternity of an
when, in reality, her husband was alive. On illegitimate child on the information of a third
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the person. Also, while a baptismal certificate
ruling of the trial court. may be considered a public document, it can
only serve as evidence of the administration
ISSUE: Whether or not Camelo should be of the sacrament on the date specified but not
entitled to support as Camelo Cabatanias the veracity of the entries with respect to the
child. childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued by
the local civil registrar and baptismal
142
certificates are per se inadmissible in On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario, Basilisa,
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel) filed
be admitted indirectly as circumstantial for partition of the estate of Teodoro and
evidence to prove the same. Private Isabel, which was opposed by Delia, Edmundo
respondent failed to present sufficient proof of and Doribel, who claimed successional rights
voluntary recognition. On the other hand, the to the estate. Likewise, Delia, Edmundo and
fact that Florencias husband is living and Doribel filed their own complaint for the
there is a valid subsisting marriage between partition of Eleno and Rafaelas estate
them gives rise to the presumption that a through representation.
child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption Both cases were decided in favor of
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a the private respondents. Judge Rafael
declaration in the statute but is based on the declared that Delia and Edmundo were the
broad principles of natural justice and the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel
supposed virtue of the mother. The Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption.
presumption is grounded on the policy to Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
protect innocent offspring from the odium of evidenced by her birth certificate.
illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and Consequently, the three children were entitled
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
extremely subjective test of physical representation. On the other case, Judge
resemblance or similarity of features will not Saez held that being the legitimate heirs of
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
filiation before the courts of law. aforementioned evidence, the same excluded
the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
126) SAYSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals modified the
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992 decision in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson
are disqualified from inheriting from the
Cruz, J.: estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, but affirmed all other
respects. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari.
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five
children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952
and Rafaela in 1976. ISSUE: Whether or not the private
respondents are entitled to inherit from their
parents and their grandparents.
One of their children, Teodoro married to

Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro,
Isabel then after died in 1981. The properties HELD: A challenge to the validity of the
of the couple Teodoro and Isabel were left with adoption cannot be made collaterally in an
private respondents Delia, Edmundo and action for partition but in a direct proceeding
Doribel, who were their children. frontally addressing the issue.
143
On the question of Doribel's above, she is entitled to the share her father
legitimacy, the findings of the trial courts as would have directly inherited had he survived,
affirmed by the respondent court must be which shall be equal to the shares of her
sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a grandparents' other children.
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners But a different conclusion must be
stress, that the birth certificate offers reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may whom the grandparents were total strangers.
be refuted by contrary evidence. However, While it is true that the adopted child shall be
such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of between only the adopting parents and the
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and adopted child and does not extend to the
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the blood relatives of either party.
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the
following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
127) LIYAO vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other 378 SCRA 563
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of FACTS: This is a petition for compulsory
the adopting parents in the same manner as a recognition of William Liyao Jr. as the
legitimate child. illegitimate (spurious) child of the late Willima
Liyao against Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao (children and wife of William).
The philosophy underlying this article

is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends
to his parents and thereafter spreads among According to Corazon G. Garcia,
his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that William Liyao Jr.s mother and representative,
one of his purposes in acquiring properties is she was married to but living separately from
to leave them eventually to his children as a Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years
token of his love for them and as a provision and cohabited with late William Liyao from
for their continued care even after he is gone 1965 to the time of Williams untimely demise
from this earth. on December 2, 1975. They lived together
with the knowledge of William Liyaos
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both
employed at the Far East Realty Investment,
There is no question that as the Inc. of which Corazon and William were the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the vice president and president, respectively. On
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William
has a right to represent her deceased father Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he had been in
in the distribution of the intestate estate of continuous possession and enjoyment of the
her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted status of a recognized and/or acknowledged
144
child of William Liyao by the latters direct and and born has no bearing to the legitimacy of
overt acts which among others, the payment the child. While the physical impossibility for
of medical and hospital expenses, food and the husband to have sexual intercourse with
clothing and bringing him to vacations and his wife is one of the grounds in impugning
various social gatherings as evidenced by the the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis
pictures taken on the said occasions. that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the Civil
Code may only be invoked by the husband or
in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions
On the other hand, according to Linda set forth under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William therefore clear that the present petition
Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally initiated by petitioner, to compel recognition
married. She grew up and lived with her by respondents of petitioner William Liyao Jr.,
parents at San Lorenzo Village , Makati until as the illegitimate son of late William Liyao
she got married. Her parents were not cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
separated legally or in fact and that there was within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate
no reason why any of her parents would even though the mother may have declared
institute legal separation proceedings in against its legitimacy or may have been
court. Her father came home regularly even sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot
during out of town to change cloths until he allow petitioner to maintain his present
suffered from two strokes before the fatal petition and subvert the clear mandate of the
attack which led to his death on December 2, law that only the husband, or in exceptional
1975. She further testified that she knew cases, his heirs could impugn the legitimacy
Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo of a child born in a valid and subsisting
and was not legally separated from her marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
husband and the records from Local Civil own filiation. If the husband presumed to be
Registrar do not indicate that the couple the father does not impugn the legitimacy of
obtained any annulment of their marriage. the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testimony was similar to and the latter cannot choose to be the child of
Ms. Linda that their parents were legally his mothers alleged paramour.
married and had never been separated. They
resided at San Lorenzo Village until the time
of their fathers death.
128) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DIZON
366 SCRA 499

The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the William, Jr. and Corazon. Vitug, J.:
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the trial court and ruled in favor of
Juanita, Pearl and Linda.
FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de
Issue: Whether or not William, Jr. is entitled Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
to inherit. petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07

June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
Court of Appeals stating that the fact that own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Corazon had been living separately from Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
Ramon at the time petitioner was conceived March 1992, leaving behind considerable
145
assets consisting of shares of stock in various HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children,
corporations and some real property. It was on like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the strength of his notarized the record of birth appearing the civil register
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of
complaint for "Partition with Inventory and legitimate filiation in a public document or a
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the private handwritten and signed by the parent
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuos possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means
Respondents, the surviving spouse allowed by the Rules of Court and special
and legitimate children of the decedent Juan laws. The due recognition of an
G. Dizon, including the corporations of which illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
the deceased was a stockholder, sought the will, a statement before a court or
dismissal of the case, arguing that the record, or in any authentic writing is, in
complaint, even while denominated as being itself, a consummated act of
one for partition, would nevertheless call for acknowledgement of the child, and no
altering the status of petitioners from being further court action is required. In fact,
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo any writing is treated not just a ground for
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus recognition that does not require a separate
and deceased Juan Dizon. action for judicial approval. Where, instead,
a claim for recognition is predicted on
other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court
The trial court denied, due to lack of or record or an authentic writing, judicial
merit. However. the appellate court upheld action within the applicable statue of
the decision of the lower court and ordered limitations is essential in order to
the case to be remanded to the trial court for establish the child's acknowledgement.
further proceedings. The Trial Court decreed
that the declaration of heirship could only be
made in a special proceeding inasmuch as
petitioners were seeking the establishment of
a status or right. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish
their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
In the instant petition for review This step cannot be aptly done because the
on certiorari, the petitioners maintain that law itself establishes the legitimacy of
their recognition as being illegitimate children children conceived or born during the
of the decedent, embodied in an authentic marriage of the parents. The presumption
writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the
status as such and does not require a child born in wedlock, and only the
separate action for judicial approval. father, or in exceptional instances the
latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
ISSUE: Whether an action for partition is when the legitimacy of a child has been
proper to ascertain the question of paternity & successfully impugned that the paternity
filiation or whether it should be taken in an of the husband can be rejected.
independent suit.
The rule that the written
acknowledgement made by the deceased
146
Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover from
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining
instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate possession upon Jose's death.
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been
first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Respondents alleged that Jose's share
Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. in the property belongs to them by operation
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the of law, because they are the only legal heirs
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law of their brother, who died intestate and
cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can without issue. They claimed that the
only be repudiated or contested in a direct purported sale of the property made by their
suit specifically brought for that brother to petitioner sometime in March
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such 1979 was executed through petitioner's
wedlock shall be considered legitimate machinations and with malicious intent, to
although the mother may have declared enable her to secure the corresponding
against its legitimacy or may have been transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in
sentenced as having been an adulteress. petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of

sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose
129) LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO affixed his thumbmark thereon but
respondents averred that, having been able to
G.R. No. 132305; December 4, 2001 graduate from college, Jose never put his
thumb mark on documents he executed but
Quisumbing, J.: always signed his name in full.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed

that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as
FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago.
land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . Alleging She claimed not to know any person by the
that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be
name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his
(now respondents herein) sued Jose for share in the subject property. She maintained
recovery of 2/3 share of the property. that she had always stayed on the property,
ever since she was a child. She argued that
the purported sale of the property was in fact
a donation to her, and that nothing could
have precluded Jose from putting his
The trial court in that case decided in thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his
favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of signature. She pointed out that during his
ownership over portions of the property. The lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
Register of Deeds of Manila was required to respondents' claim over the property such
include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in that respondents had to sue to claim portions
the certificate of title to said property. thereof. She lamented that respondents had
to disclaim her in their desire to obtain
ownership of the whole property.
Jose died intestate. The respondents Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
filed a complaint for recovery of title, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ownership, and possession against herein
147
Besides, such a challenge to the validity of

the adoption cannot be made collaterally but
ISSUES: (1) whether or not respondents may in a direct proceeding.
impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for
recovery of title and possession; and (2) Petitioner, who claims to be Ida
whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida
1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be
respondents, through succession, sale, or a mere coincidence.
donation.
During her testimony before the trial
court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia
Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the
HELD: Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her
the Civil Code is misplaced. This article should petition before this Court, however, she stated
be read in conjunction with the other articles that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
in the same chapter on paternity and filiation Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made
in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said conflicting statements that affect her
chapter would reveal that it contemplates credibility and could cast along shadow of
situations where a doubt exists that a child is doubt on her claims of filiation.
indeed a man's child by his wife, and the
husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies Thus, we are constrained to agree with
the child's filiation. It does not refer to the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
situations where a child is alleged not to be petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
the child at all of a particular couple. Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary
to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and
Article 263 refers to an action to Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose,
impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert it follows that petitioner can not inherit from
and prove that a person is not a man's child him through intestate succession. It now
by his wife. However, the present case is not remains to be seen whether the property in
one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. dispute was validly transferred to petitioner
Respondents are asserting not merely that through sale or donation.
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, Jose did not have the right to transfer
the present action is one for recovery of title ownership of the entire property to petitioner
and possession, and thus outside the scope of since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Article 263 on prescriptive periods. Petitioner could not have given her consent to
the contract, being a minor at the
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is time. Consent of the contracting parties is
likewise improper. The factual milieu present among the essential requisites of a contract,
in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. including one of sale, absent which there can
What was being challenged by petitioners be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner
in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption admittedly did not pay any centavo for the
of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased property, which makes the sale void. Article
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While
asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is
have been validly adopted since Doribel had void, but the act may be shown to have been
already been born to the Sayson couple at the in reality a donation, or some other act or
time, petitioners at the same time made the contract.
conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child
of the couple. The Court ruled in that case Neither may the purported deed of sale be a
that it was too late to question the decree of valid deed of donation.
adoption that became final years before.
148
130) ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. To support his claim that he is an

LOCSIN acknowledged natural child of the deceased,
respondent submitted a machine copy of his
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001 Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City which
contains the information that respondent's
father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was
the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures. To prove the
FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" existence and authenticity of Certificate of
Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, Live Birth, respondent presented the Local
1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent also
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a offered in evidence a photograph showing him
"Petition for Letters of Administration" praying and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of
that he be appointed Administrator of the a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body.
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged The photograph, respondent claims, shows
that he is an acknowledged natural child. The that he and his mother have been recognized
trial court issued an order setting the petition as family members of the deceased.
for hearing which order was duly published,
thereby giving notice to all persons who may
have opposition to the said petition.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of
Before the scheduled hearing, the Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a
heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth
Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro
claiming to be the lawful heirs of the Manila indicating that the birth of respondent
deceased, filed an opposition. They averred was reported by his mother, Amparo
that respondent is not a child or an Escamilla, and that the same does not contain
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They
Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed observed as anomalous the fact that while
"Sr." in his name. respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and
his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
On January 5, 1993, another however, his Certificate of Live Birth was
opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised
Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. form.
De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes
C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a
natural child is barred by prescription or the
statute of limitations. The trial court found that the
Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph
are sufficient proofs of respondent's
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals
Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also affirmed in toto the order of the trial court.
entered its appearance in the estate Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while
proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. respondent filed a motion for execution
This was followed by an appearance and pending appeal. Both motions were denied by
opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another the Appellate Court.
sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that
there is no filial relationship between herein
respondent and the deceased.
ISSUE: Which of the two documents

Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
149
and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form
"8") is genuine. dated December 1, 1958 could have been
used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years
earlier.
HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of
access thereto by interested parties is the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar
obviously easier. Thus, in proving the General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form
authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no
evidence than those considered by the trial irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to
court should have been presented by assume that the 1956 forms would continue
respondent. to be used several years thereafter. But for a
1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
The event about which she testified on

March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's There are other indications of
birth which took place on October 22, 1956, irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back
on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local
Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is
G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge merely pasted with the bound volume, not
of respondent's birth record allegedly made sewn like the other entries.
and entered in the Local Civil Registry in
January, 1957 was based merely on her
general impressions of the existing records in
that Office. The documents bound into one
volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is
a carbon copy of the alleged original and
sticks out like a sore thumb because the
When entries in the Certificate of Live entries therein are typewritten, while the
Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary records of all other certificates are
from those appearing in the copy transmitted handwritten. Unlike the contents of those
to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not
Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be indicate important particulars, such as the
clarified in more persuasive and rational alleged father's religion, race, occupation,
manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's address and business. The space which calls
explanation not convincing. for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is
blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there
is a purported signature of the alleged father,
but the blanks calling for the date and other
details of his Residence Certificate were not
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth filled up.
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a
1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer
answered that "x x x during that time, maybe When asked to explain the torn back
the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no
the former Civil Registrar had requested for a answer except to state, "I am not aware of
new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised this because I am not a bookbinder."
Form." The answer is a "maybe", a mere
supposition of an event. It does not
150
The records of the instant case

adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8"
for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit 131) EDGARDO TIJING & BIENVENIDA
"D", should have been given more faith and TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
credence by the courts below.
(G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001)
In this connection, we echo this
Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Quisumbing, J.:
Civil Registrar that:
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife.

"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of They have six children. The youngest is
the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27,
prohibit, not only the naming of the father of 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered
the child born out of wedlock, when the birth nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila .
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
made by him, but also, the statement of any laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
information or circumstances by which he Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila .
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, According to Bienvenida in August
when signed only by the mother of the latter, 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her
is incompetent evidence of fathership of said for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida
child." was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. under the care of Angelita as she usually let
Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a Angelita take care of the child while
birth certificate not signed by the alleged Bienvenida was doing laundry.
father (who had no hand in its preparation) is
not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of Upon her return, Angelita and

evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
and Article 172 of the Family Code for proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo,
purposes of recognition and filiation. Manila , but did not find them there. Angelita's
However, birth certificate offers only prima maid told Bienvenida that her employer went
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come
by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth back later. She returned to Angelita's house
cannot be sustained where there exists after three days, only to discover that
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its Angelita had moved to another place.
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Bienvenida then complained to her barangay
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the chairman and also to the police who seemed
records of the Local Civil Registry (from which unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the
badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic Four years later or in October 1993,
copy on file in that office was removed and Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
Birth. husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
151
Bienvenida lost no time in going to The sheriff implemented the order of

Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw the trial court by taking custody of the minor.
her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita
four years. She claims that the boy, who was peacefully surrendered the minor and he
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a turned over the custody of said child to
brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already petitioner Edgardo Tijing.
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
The Court of Appeals reversed and
expressed its doubts on the propriety of
the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to
petition for habeas corpus with the trial court establish that she was the mother of the
in order to recover their son. Petitioners minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in
presented two witnesses. The 1st, witness is declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Vasquez who testified that she assisted in the Thomas Lopez are one and the same person.
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27,
1989 at her clinic. The 2 nd, Benjamin Lopez
who declared that his brother admitted to him
that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted ISSUES: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is
son and that he and Angelita were not blessed the proper remedy?
with children.
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person
and is the son of petitioners?
For her part, Angelita claimed that she
is the natural mother of the child. She asserts
that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas
Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, HELD: The writ of habeas corpus extends to
Manila . She added, though, that she has two all cases of illegal confinement or detention
other children with her real husband, Angel by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas or by which the rightful custody of any person
was registered by her common-law husband, is withheld from the person entitled
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to
Manila on August 4, 1989. enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody
of a third person of his own free will. It may
even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
On March 10, 1995, the trial court restraint of liberty is not the underlying
concluded that since Angelita and her rationale for the availability of the writ as a
common-law husband could not have remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas purpose of determining the right of custody
Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also over a child. It must be stressed too that
held that the minor and Bienvenida showed in habeas corpusproceedings, the question of
strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled identity is relevant and material, subject to
that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas the usual presumptions including those as to
Lopez are one and the same person who is identity of the person.
the natural child of petitioners.
A close scrutiny of the records of this
case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
152
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,

Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no

longer bear children. From her very lips, she 132) AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
admitted that after the birth of her second AND PROLLAMANTE
child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
Second, there is strong evidence which
directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer Corona, J.:
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez
declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was
sterile because of the accident and that
Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son
Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin,
Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen for support and support pendente lite before
years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City .
with private respondent for fourteen years, In their complaint, respondents alleged that
they also bore no offspring. Third, we find Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
unusual the fact that the birth certificate of entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
instead of the midwife. Under the law, the birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite
attending physician or midwife in attendance Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided
at birth should cause the registration of such otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
birth. Only in default of the physician or wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the
midwife, can the parent register the birth of Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City . The
his child. Fourth, the trial court observed babys birth certificate was purportedly
several times that when the child and signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
strong similarities in their faces, eyes, expenses but later refused Fes repeated
eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance requests for Martins support despite his
between a minor and his alleged parent is adequate financial capacity and even
competent and material evidence to establish suggested to have the child committed for
parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered
conclusion should be given high respect, it the child.
having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez
testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's Arnel denied having sired Martin
giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
Unlike private respondent, she presented allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
clinical records consisting of a log book, conception. He claimed that Fe had at least
discharge order and the signatures of one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that
petitioners. their relationship started in 1993 but "he
never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
All these considered, we are scheming and overly demanding and
constrained to rule that subject minor is possessive. Unable to bear the prospect of
indeed the son of petitioners. The writ losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody the affair although he still treated her as a
of said child. friend such as by referring potential
153
customers to the car aircon repair

shop" where she worked. Later on, Arnel
found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support
lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family can be converted to a petition for recognition
went to the United States for a vacation. Upon and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be
their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that ordered in a proceeding for support without
Fe was telling people that he had impregnated violating petitioners constitutional right to
her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as privacy and right against self-incrimination.
his because their "last intimacy was sometime
in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001,
Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot to demand that he HELD: The assailed resolution and order did
acknowledge Martin as his child. According to not convert the action for support into one for
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the recognition but merely allowed the
discussion became so heated that he had no respondents to prove their cause of action
"alternative but to move on but without against petitioner who had been denying the
bumping or hitting any part of her authenticity of the documentary evidence of
body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
signature and the community tax certificate resolution and order effectively integrated an
(CTC) attributed to him in the action to compel recognition with an action
acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate for support, such was valid and in accordance
were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of
his marital status as single when he was Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an
actually married and that his birth year was action to compel recognition with an action to
1965 when it should have been 1964. claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child,

to be entitled to support and successional
rights from the putative or presumed parent,
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance must prove his filiation to the latter. We also
of an order directing all the parties to submit said that it is necessary to allege in the
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant complaint that the putative father had
to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate
opposed said motion by invoking his child because such acknowledgment is
constitutional right against self-incrimination. essential to and is the basis of the right to
He also moved to dismiss the complaint for inherit. There being no allegation of such
lack of cause of action, considering that his acknowledgment, the action becomes one to
signature on the birth certificate was a forgery compel recognition which cannot be brought
and that, under the law, an illegitimate child after the death of the putative father. The
is not entitled to support if not recognized by ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
the putative father. He attached the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
certification of the Philippine National Police petitioner to allege the fact of
Crime Laboratory that his signature in the acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
birth certificate was forged. prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to

the case at bar, although petitioner contends
The trial court denied the motion to that the complaint filed by herein private
dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties respondent merely alleges that the minor
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of deceased and is actually a claim for
Appeals affirmed the trial court. inheritance, from the allegations therein the
same may be considered as one to compel
154
recognition. Further, that the two causes of bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v.

action, one to compel recognition and the Caizares,34 we even authorized the
other to claim inheritance, may be joined in examination of a womans genitalia, in an
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. action for annulment filed by her husband, to
verify his claim that she was impotent, her
Although the instant case deals with orifice being too small for his penis. Some of
support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, these procedures were, to be sure, rather
the basis or rationale for integrating them invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
remains the same. Whether or not respondent constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its
Martin is entitled to support depends results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now
completely on the determination of filiation. A similarly acceptable.
separate action will only result in a multiplicity
of suits, given how intimately related the main
issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag,
the declaration of filiation is entirely In no uncertain terms, we also
appropriate to these proceedings. underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance
On the second issue, petitioner posits public service and the common good...
that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a Intrusions into the right must be accompanied
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also by proper safeguards that enhance public
contends that compulsory testing violates his service and the common good.
right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no
merit. 133) In re: Petition for Change of Name
of Julian Lim
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
The kernel of the right is not against Facts:

all compulsion, but against testimonial On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin
compulsion. The right against self- Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
incrimination is simply against the legal mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for
process of extracting from the lips of the change of name and/or cancellation of entry
accused an admission of guilt. It does not in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
apply where the evidence sought to be Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of name and have his registered name changed
object evidence. from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan

to stay in Singapore for a long time because
Over the years, we have expressly
they will let him study there together with his
excluded several kinds of object evidence sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born
taken from the person of the accused from
in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle
the realm of self-incrimination. These include names or the maiden surname of the mother
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily
are not carried in a persons name, they
substances.30We have also declared as anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will
constitutional several procedures performed
be discriminated against because of his
on the accused such as pregnancy tests for current registered name which carries a
women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of
middle name. Julian and his sister might also
morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing be asking whether they are brother and sister
of ones foot to determine its identity with
155
since they have different surnames. surname causes embarrassment and there is
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores no showing that the desired change of name
Mandarin language since they do not have the was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as change of name would prejudice public
L. It is for these reasons that the name of interest.
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang. In the case at bar, the only reason
advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
The RTC rendered a decision denying the middle name is convenience. However, how
petition. The trial court found that the reason such change of name would make his
given for the change of name sought in the integration into Singaporean society easier
petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be and convenient is not clearly established.
discriminated against when studies in That the continued use of his middle name
Singapore because of his middle namedid would cause confusion and difficulty does not
not fall within the grounds recognized by law. constitute proper and reasonable cause to
The trial court ruled that the change sought is drop it from his registered complete name.
merely for the convenience of the child. Since
the State has an interest in the name of a In addition, petitioner is only a minor.
person, names cannot be changed to suit the Considering the nebulous foundation on which
convenience of the bearers. Under Article his petition for change of name is based, it is
174 of the Family Code, legitimate children best that the matter of change of his name be
have the right to bear the surnames of the left to his judgment and discretion when he
father and the mother, and there is no reason reaches the age of majority. As he is of
why this right should now be taken from tender age, he may not yet understand and
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a appreciate the value of the change of his
minor. The trial court added that when name and granting of the same at this point
petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, may just prejudice him in his rights under our
he could then decide whether he will change laws.
his name by dropping his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle

name of a minor child is contrary to Article
174 of the Family Code
Held: The touchstone for the grant of a 134) Briones vs. Miguel
change of name is that there be proper and G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
reasonable cause for which the change is
sought. To justify a request for change of Facts:
name, petitioner must show not only some Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
proper or compelling reason therefore but also Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to
true and official name. Among the grounds obtain custody of his minor child Michael
for change of name which have been held Kevin Pineda. Later, petitioner filed an
valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or the mother of the minor, as one of the
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a respondents.
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
when one has continuously used and been respondent Loreta P. Miguel.
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and The petitioner further alleges that he caused
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere the minor child to be brought to the
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs Philippines so that he could take care of him
of former alienage, all in good faith and and send him to school. That respondents
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came
156
to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City petitioner in Japan because the latter was
on the pretext that they were visiting the allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with
minor child and requested that they be another woman until his deportation.
allowed to bring the said child for recreation Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the
at the SM Department store. They promised custody of her minor child be given to her and
him that they will bring him back in the invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family
afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the
However, the respondents did not bring him Philippines.
back as promised by them. The petitioner
went several times to respondent Maricel P. Issue: Who Should Have Custody of
Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was the Child?
informed that the child is with the latters
mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When Held: Under the Family Code there are only
he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel two classes of children -- legitimate (and
told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her those who, like the legally adopted, have the
daughter at Tuguegarao City. rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate.
He sought the assistance of the police and the All children conceived and born outside a
Department of Social Welfare to locate his son valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law
and to bring him back to him, but all his itself gives them legitimate status.
efforts were futile. Hence, he was constrained Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate,"
to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus. under the Family Code) child, as there is
The petitioner prays that the custody of his nothing in the records showing that his
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as parents were suffering from a legal
his biological father and as he has impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
demonstrated his capability to support and Both acknowledge that Michael is their son.
educate him. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article
The respondents filed their Comment, in their 176, parental authority over him resides in his
Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding
denies the allegation of the petitioner that he his fathers recognition of him.
was the one who brought their child to the There is thus no question that Respondent
Philippines and stated that she was the one Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
who brought him here pursuant to their parental authority over the minor, is entitled
agreement. She likewise denies petitioners to have custody of him. She has the right to
allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel keep him in her company. She cannot be
and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who deprived of that right, and she may not even
took the child from the petitioner or the renounce or transfer it "except in the cases
latters parents. She averred that she was the authorized by law.
one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the Article 213 of the Family Code that, generally,
petitioner when she returned to the no child under seven years of age shall be
Philippines and that the latter readily agreed separated from the mother, except when the
and consented. court finds cause to order otherwise.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the Only the most compelling of reasons, such as
petitioner was deported from Japan under the the mothers unfitness to exercise sole
assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he parental authority, shall justify her deprivation
was found to have violated or committed an of parental authority and the award of
infraction of the laws of Japan. She further custody to someone else. In the past, the
stated that since the time the petitioner following grounds have been considered
arrived in the Philippines, he has not been ample justification to deprive a mother of
gainfully employed. The custody of the child custody and parental authority: neglect or
was entrusted to petitioners parents while abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
they were both working in Japan. She added habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
that even before the custody of the child was maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
given to the petitioners parents, she has affliction with a communicable disease.
already been living separately from the
157
135) de Santos vs. Hon. Angeles and petitioner and private respondent, as the
Conchita Talag de Santos heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995 reconsideration of said order but this was
denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition
Facts: for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de that since only natural children can be
Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time,
Issue: Can natural children by legal fiction be
their relationship became strained to the
legitimized?
breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love
with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private Held: Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal states:
dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
Art. 269. Only natural children can be
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of
Aware that said decree was a worthless scrap parents who, at the time of the conception of
of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as the former, were not disqualified by any
now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio impediment to marry each other, are natural.
proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
In other words, a child's parents should not
private respondent, with whom he had been
have been disqualified to marry each other at
cohabiting since his de facto separation from
the time of conception for him to qualify as a
Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On
"natural child."
March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less
than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio In the case at bench, there is no question that
and private respondent contracted a marriage all the children born to private respondent
in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine and deceased Antonio de Santos were
laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died conceived and born when the latter's valid
intestate leaving properties with an estimated marriage to petitioner's mother was still
value of P15,000,000.00. subsisting. That private respondent and the
decedent were married abroad after the latter
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to
obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce
court asking for the issuance of letters of
from his legitimate wife does not change this
administration in her favor in connection with
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not
the settlement of her late husband's estate.
recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.
She alleged, among other things, that the
Evidently, the decedent was aware of this
decedent was survived by twelve legitimate
fact, which is why he had to have the
heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
children, and petitioner. There being no
Philippines. It may be added here that he was
opposition, her petition was granted.
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo
After six years of protracted intestate marriage for after his legitimate, though
proceedings, however, petitioner decided to estranged wife died, he hastily contracted
intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed she another marriage with private respondent,
argued that private respondent's children this time here in Tagaytay.
were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter
admitted during the hearing that all her
children were born prior to Sofia's death in
1967.
After approval of private respondent's account
of her administration, the court a quo passed
upon petitioner's motion. The court declared
private respondent's ten children legitimated
and instituted and declared them, along with
158
XV. ADOPTION Issue: Can the Family Code be applied

retroactively to the petition for adoption filed
by Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the
Family Code should not apply retroactively,
136) Republic vs CA and Zenaida Bobiles should the CA have modified the trial courts
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent only, her husband not
Facts: being a petitioner?
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza

Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat,
then six (6) years old and who had been living Held:
with her family since he was four (4) months Article 246 of the Family Code provides
old, before the Regional Trial Court. for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification
that such retrospective application will not
The trial court rendered the minor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal in accordance with the Civil Code or other
obligations of obedience and maintenance laws.
with respect to his natural parents, and be, to
all intents and purposes, the child of the A vested right is one whose existence,
spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and effectivity and extent does not depend upon
the surname of the child be changed to events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested
"Bobiles" which is the surname of the rights include not only legal or equitable title
petitioner. to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after
the right has vested.
The petition for adoption was filed by
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
February 2, 1988, when the law applicable
private respondent had the right to file a
was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
petition for adoption by herself, without
and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
joining her husband therein. When Mrs.
petition for adoption may be filed by either of
Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising
the spouses or by both of them. However,
her explicit and unconditional right under said
after the trial court rendered its decision and
law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
while the case was pending on appeal in the
such petition alone and to have the same
Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209,
proceed to final adjudication, in accordance
the Family Code, took effect on August 3,
with the law in force at the time, was already
1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption
vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired
by husband and wife is mandatory.
by the enactment of a new law.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner When private respondent filed her petition in
contends that the petition for adoption should Special Proceeding, the trial court acquired
be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by jurisdiction there over in accordance with the
private respondent without joining her governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
husband, in violation of Article 185 of the substantive law, the established rule is that
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the spouses. It argues that the Family Code the statute in force at the time of the
must be applied retroactively to the petition commencement of the action.
filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not
acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not
by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. named as one of the petitioners in the petition
for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of
159
consent attached to the petition and took an American wife and thus became a
expressly made an integral part thereof, naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he
shows that he himself actually joined his wife divorced his American wife and never
in adopting the child. Those declarations, and remarried.
his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
While in the United States, petitioner worked
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-
in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00
petitioner. Under the circumstances then
to P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was
obtaining, and by reason of his foreign
remitted to the Philippines for his children's
residence, he must have yielded to the legal
expenses and another, deposited in the bank
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
in the name of his children.
sufficed to make him a party to the petition.
This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private
Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
the formal requirements should yield to and Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother
be eschewed in the higher considerations of and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
substantial justice. The future of an innocent Proceedings for the adoption of the three
child must not be compromised by arbitrary minor Cang children before the Regional Trial
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural Court. The petition bears the signature of then
rules on the form of pleadings. 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband
had "evaded his legal obligation to support his
137) Cang vs. CA children; that her brothers and sisters
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping
her in taking care of the children; that
Facts: because she would be going to the United
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna States to attend to a family business, leaving
Marie Clavano who were married on January the children would be a problem and would
27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, naturally hamper her job-seeking venture
born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on abroad; and that her husband had long
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born forfeited his parental rights over the children.
on January 3, 1981.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption,
During the early years of their marriage, the petitioner immediately returned to the
Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
However, Anna Marie learned of her alleging that, although private respondents
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. financially capable of supporting the children
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit while his finances were "too meager"
liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal compared to theirs, he could not "in
separation with alimony pendente lite with conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations parental authority over his beloved children."
Court which rendered a decision approving
Pending resolution of the petition for
the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire
providing that they agreed to live separately
custody over his children alleging that Anna
and apart or from bed and board.
Marie had transferred to the United States
Petitioner then left for the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to
where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie private respondents. The Regional Trial Court
before the Second Judicial District Court of the issued an order finding that Anna Marie had,
State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce in effect, relinquished custody over the
decree that also granted sole custody of the children and, therefore, such custody should
three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving be transferred to the father. The court then
rights of visitation at all reasonable times and directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over
places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner the minors to petitioner.
160
Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted United States, he was not remiss in his natural
without the written consent of a natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
parent on the ground that the latter has for his children. He maintained regular
abandoned them? communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to
Held:
send packages by mail and catered to their
It is evident that notwithstanding the whims.
amendments to the law, the written consent Wherefore, the questioned Decision and
of the natural parent to the adoption has Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as
remained a requisite for its validity. The the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
written consent of the natural parent is Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the
indispensable for the validity of the decree of petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
written consent can be dispensed with if the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
parent has abandoned the child or that such Clavano.
parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate.
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the 138) In the matter of the petition for a
case even without the written consent of the writ of habeas corpus of a minor Angelie
parents or one of the parents provided that Anne Cervantes, Nelson Cervantes and
the petition for adoption alleges facts Zenaida Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon
sufficient to warrant exemption from Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo
compliance therewith. G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
However, in cases where the father opposes
the adoption primarily because his consent Facts:
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether This is a petition for a writ of Habeas
he had abandoned his child becomes a proper Corpus filed with this Court over the person of
issue for determination.The issue of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent
is a preliminary issue that an adoption court The minor was born on 14 February
must first confront. Only upon failure of the 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and
oppositor natural father to prove to the Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband
satisfaction of the court that he did not and wife. Respondents offered the child for
abandon his child may the petition for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-
adoption be considered on its merits. In its in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
ordinary sense, the word abandon means to Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes,
forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce spouses, who took care and custody of the
utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child child when she was barely two (2) weeks old.
by his parent, the act of abandonment An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the
imports any conduct of the parent which child by herein petitioners, was also executed
evinces a settled purpose to forego all by respondent Gina Carreon
parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child. It means neglect or The appropriate petition for adoption
refusal to perform the natural and legal was filed by petitioners over the child before
obligations of care and support which parents the Regional Trial Court and rendered a
owe their children. decision granting the petition. The child was
In the instant case, records disclose that then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The
petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled court ordered that the child be freed from
purpose to forego all parental duties and parental authority of her natural parents as
relinquish all parental claims over his children well as from legal obligation and maintenance
as to constitute abandonment. Physical to them and that from now on shall be, for all
estrangement alone, without financial and legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie
moral desertion, is not tantamount to Anne Cervantes, a child of petitioners and
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner capable of inheriting their estate .
was physically absent as he was then in the
161
Thereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and almost three years but who eventually left her
Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne
respondents demanding to be paid the C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they father is not her true father, could also affect
would get back their child. Petitioners refused the moral outlook and values of said minor.
to accede to the demand. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are
legally married appear to be morally,
As a result, while petitioners were out at work, physically, financially, and socially capable of
the respondent Gina Carreon took the child supporting the minor and giving her a future
from her yaya at the petitioners' residence on better than what the natural mother who is
the pretext that she was instructed to do so not only jobless but also maintains an illicit
by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon relation with a married man, can most likely
brought the child to her house. Petitioners give her.
thereupon demanded the return of the child,
but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had Besides, the minor has been legally adopted
no desire to give up her child for adoption and by petitioners with the full knowledge and
that the affidavit of consent to the adoption consent of respondents. A decree of adoption
she had executed was not fully explained to has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
her. She sent word to the petitioners that she authority vested in natural parents over the
will, however, return the child to the adopted child, except where the adopting
petitioners if she were paid the amount of parent is the spouse of the natural parent of
P150,000.00. the adopted, in which case, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
Issue: Who has the right to the custody of both spouses. The adopting parents have the
Angelie Ann Cervantes? right to the care and custody of the adopted
child and exercise parental authority and
Held: responsibility over him.
In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the The custody and care of the minor Angelie
latter's welfare is paramount. The provision Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to
that no mother shall be separated from a child petitioners to whom they properly belong, and
under five (5) years of age, will not apply respondents are ordered (if they still have
where the Court finds compelling reasons to not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding immediately upon notice hereof.
the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social 139) Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo
welfare of the child concerned, taking into and Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA and Hon.
account the resources and moral as well as Rubio and Victor Bunduc and Clara
social standing of the contending parents. Bunduc
Never has this Court deviated from this G.R. No.85044 June 3, 1992
criterion.
Facts:
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado On 20 October 1982, Adelberto
Fajardo is legally married to a woman other Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
than respondent Gina Carreon, and his Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
relationship with the latter is a common-law injuries which resulted in her death.
husband and wife relationship. His open Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon was filed with the Regional Trial Court by
will not accord the minor that desirable petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
atmosphere where she can grow and develop adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso
into an upright and moral-minded person. and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had parents against respondent spouses Victor
previously given birth to another child by and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
another married man with whom she lived for with whom he was living at the time of the
162
tragic incident. controlling and disciplining of the child.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December The civil liability imposed upon parents for the
1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura torts of their minor children living with them,
had filed a petition to adopt the minor may be seen to be based upon the parental
Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
before the then Court of First Instance. This parents. The civil law assumes that when an
petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 unemancipated child living with its parents
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had commits a tortious acts, the parents were
shot and killed Jennifer. negligent in the performance of their legal
and natural duty closely to supervise the child
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, who is in their custody and control. Parental
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result liability is, in other words, anchored upon
of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed parental authority coupled with presumed
that not they, but rather the adopting parents, parental dereliction in the discharge of the
namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa duties accompanying such authority. The
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the parental dereliction is, of course, only
action since parental authority had shifted to presumed and the presumption can be
the adopting parents from the moment the overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
successful petition for adoption was filed. by proof that the parents had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since prevent the damage.
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
had not ceased nor been relinquished by the Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
mere filing and granting of a petition for parental authority was still lodged in
adoption. respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus
The trial court dismissed petitioners' follow that the natural parents who had then
complaint, ruling that respondent natural actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
indispensable parties to the action.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a
Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals minor child is the relationship existing
on a petition for mandamus and certiorari between the parents and the minor child
questioning the trial court's Decision. The living with them and over whom, the law
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling presumes, the parents exercise supervision
that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. and control.
Issue: Whether or not Adelbertos natural We do not consider that retroactive effect
parents are indispensable parties to the may be giver to the decree of adoption so as
action? to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting
Held: This principle of parental liability is a parents had no actual or physically custody
species of what is frequently designated as over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed perhaps be given to the granting of the
negligence, where a person is not only liable petition for adoption where such is essential
for torts committed by himself, but also for to permit the accrual of some benefit or
torts committed by others with whom he has advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the
a certain relationship and for whom he is instant case, however, to hold that parental
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a authority had been retroactively lodged in the
natural or logical consequence of the duties Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
and responsibilities of parents their parental liability for a tortious act that they could not
authority which includes the instructing, have foreseen and which they could not have
163
prevented (since they were at the time in the the Court should now hold that the action for
United States and had no physical custody rescission of the adoption decree, having
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
would be inconsistent with the philosophical pursued.
and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no Interestingly, even before the passage of the
presumption of parental dereliction on the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
was not in fact subject to their control at the would lose the right to revoke the adoption
time the tort was committed. decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive
140) LAHOM vs. SIBULO period is a condition that could not fulfill the
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged that
Facts: a person has no vested right in statutory
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita privileges. While adoption has often been
Lahom filed in 1971 a petition to adopt Melvin referred to in the context of a "right," the
Sibulo, Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate
petition was granted in 1972. Hence, the or fundamental but rather a right merely
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name created by statute. It is a privilege that is
"Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest
However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a and welfare of the child.
petition to rescind the adoption on the ground
of the continuous refusal of the respondent to While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly
change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom and withdrawn from an adopter a consequential
for his indifference towards the petitioner by right to rescind the adoption decree even in
failing to visit her in Naga. cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains,
In 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
into effect which deleted from the law the the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of law have to live with. It is still noteworthy,
adoption. however, that an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always
Issue: Whether or not the adoption of for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
respondent may still be revoked or rescinded certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
by an adopter. undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may
Held: The new law withdrew the right of an deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and a will and testament, may freely exclude him
gave to the adopted child the sole right to from having a share in the disposable portion
sever the legal ties created by adoption. of his estate.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the
8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
revoke the decree of adoption granted in
1975. By then, the new law, had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
164
141) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION

OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives
and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is
Facts: distinguished from other individuals and, also,
as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie with him. It is both of personal as well as
Nathy Astorga Garcia alleging that Stephanie public interest that every person must have a
has been using her mother's middle name name.
and surname and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga
be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surname,
and that her surname Garcia be changed to The name of an individual has two parts: (1)
Catindig, his surname . the given or proper name and (2) the
surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or
The trial court granted the adoption and ruled family name is that which identifies the family
that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE to which he belongs and is continued from
NATHY CATINDIG. parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed
by law.
The petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle
but was denied by the trial court ruling that Name '
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
As correctly submitted by both parties, there

is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
may use the surname of her mother as her known as 'An Act Allowing Illegitimate
middle name when she is subsequently Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,
adopted by her natural father. is silent as to what middle name a child may
use.
Held: We find merit in the petition.

The middle name or the mother's surname is
only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law surnames between ascendants and
165
descendants, in which case, the middle name and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
or the mother's surname shall be added. adoption) provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to the future.
what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that 'an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Moreover, records show that Stephanie and
Code, enumerating the legal effects of her mother are living together in the house
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana,
thus: San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be attached to both her mother and father. She
deemed to be a legitimate child of the calls them 'Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are
adopters and both shall acquire the one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her
the relationship of parent and child, including middle name will not only sustain her
the right of the adopted to use the continued loving relationship with her mother
surname of the adopters; but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In

Favor of the Adopted Child ' Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption
One of the effects of adoption is that the

adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of It is a settled rule that adoption statutes,
the adopter for all intents and purposes being humane and salutary, should be
pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her compassionate objectives of the law.
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides
and her mother, as discussed above. that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, lawmaking body intended right and justice to
Stephanie's continued use of her mother's prevail.
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code
166
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an

illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mother's surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use
her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle
name.
167
XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the
142) DAVID vs. CA child shall be given to the child.
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Held: Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court
Facts: provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
secretary of private respondent Ramon R. detention by which any person is deprived of
Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
respondent is a married man and the father of any person is withheld from the person
four children, all grown-up. After a while, the entitled thereto."
relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals
as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was observed, that the determination of the right
born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. to the custody of minor children is relevant in
was followed by two more children, both girls, cases where the parents, who are married to
namely Christine and Cathy Mae. each other, are for some reason separated
from each other. It does not follow, however,
The relationship became known to private that it cannot arise in any other situation.
respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J. to Villar's house in Angeles City In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an
and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After illegitimate child since at the time of his
this, the children of Daisie were freely brought conception, his father, private respondent
by Villar to his house as they were eventually Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
accepted by his legal family. In the summer of woman other than the child's mother. As such,
1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
J., then six years of age, to go with his family Christopher J. is under the parental authority
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said consequence of such authority, is entitled to
he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy have custody of him. Since, admittedly,
Family Academy for the next school year. petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
Hence, Daisie filed a petition for habeas custody of her child by private respondent,
corpus on behalf of Christopher J. she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner ruling that the custody of the child The fact that private respondent has
shall be given to the mother and directing recognized the minor child may be a ground
respondent to give a temporary support of P for ordering him to give support to the latter,
3,000.00 a month. The Court of Appeals but not for giving him custody of the child.
reversed the RTC`s judgment holding that Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
habeas corpus case was not the proper under seven years of age shall be separated
remedy in that the latter contemplate a from the mother unless the court finds
situation where the parents are married to compelling reasons to order otherwise."
each other but are separated. Moreover, it Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-
ruled that in an adulterous relationship, the off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
question of custody shall be brought in a custody of her children, especially considering
case singularly filed for the purpose and that that she has been able to rear and support
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them on her own since they were born.
the other minor children. It ruled that it is for Petitioner is a market vendor earning from
the best interest of Christopher J. That he P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the
should temporarily remain under the custody RTC decision was rendered. She augments her
of respondent until the issue on custody and income by working as secretary at the
support shall have been determined in a Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a
proper case. Hence, this petition. monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
168
arrangement with her employer so that she year-old first year commerce student of the
can personally attend to her children. She University of San Carlos, Cebu City while
works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi
make up for time lost during the day. That she who was then a minor between 18 and 19
receives help from her parents and sister for years of age living with his parents.
the support of the three children is not a point
against her. Cooperation, compassion, love Julie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were
and concern for every member of the family sweethearts until after two years when Julie
are characteristics of the close family ties that Ann broke up with Wendell after she
bind the Filipino family and have made it what supposedly found him to be sadistic and
it is. irresponsible. During the first and second
Although the question of support is proper in weeks of their break up, Wendell kept
a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of pestering Julie Ann with demands of
support in this case is justified by the fact that reconciliation but the latter persited with her
private respondent has expressed willingness refusal prompting the former to resort to
to support the minor child. The order for threats against her. Hence, Julie Anne stayed
payment of allowance need not be at the house of her bestfriend to avoid
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of Wendell. Julie Ann and Wendell died each from
the child. a single gunshot wound inflicted with the sme
firearm, a revolver licensed in the name of
In the case at bar, as has already been petitioner Cresencio Libi which was recovered
pointed out, Christopher J., being less than from the scene of the crime inside the
seven years of age at least at the time the residence of private respondents.
case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken
from the mother's custody. Even now that the Private respondent submitted that Wendell
child is over seven years of age, the mother's caused their daughter`s death by shooting
custody over him will have to be upheld her with the firearm and then turning the gun
because the child categorically expressed on himself to commit suicide. Petitioner`s,
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. however contended that an unknown third
213 of the Family Code, courts must respect person, whom Wendell may have displeased
the "choice of the child over seven years of or antagonized by reason of his work as
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and narcotics informer must have caused their
here it has not been shown that the mother is death.
in any way unfit to have custody of her child.
Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, Julie Ann`s parents filed a case to recover civil
he should not condition the grant of support damages arising from the vicarious liability of
for him on the award of his custody to him Wendell`s parents under Art. 2180 of the Civil
(private respondent). Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable
Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent for vicarious liability.
is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher
J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the Held: In imposing sanctions for the so-called
herein petitioner, and to give him temporary vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent
support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending court cites Fuella cs Callado, et al. Which
the fixing of the amount of support in an supposedly holds that the subsidiary liability
appropriate action. of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
143) Libi vs IAC Civil Code covers obligation arising from both
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992 quasi-delicts and criminal offenses, followed
by an extended quotation ostensibly from teh
Facts: same case explaining why under Article 2180
Respondent spouses are the legitimate of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was an 18- Revised Penal Code parents should assume
169
subsidiary liability for the damage cause by

their minor children. Now, we do not have Facts:
any objection to the doctrinal rule holding Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and
the parents liable, but the categorization of respondent Teresita Masauding first met
their liability being subsidiary, and not sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
primary, in nature requires a hard second look Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
considering previous decisions of this court on Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
the matter which warrant comparative nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left
analysis. Our concern stems from our for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse.
readings that if the liability of the parents for She was able to acquire immigrant status
crimes or quasi-delict of their minors is sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent
subsidiary, then the parents can neither by his employer, the National Steel
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
defense that they acted with diligence of a liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then
good father of the family to prevent damages. began to maintain a common law relationship
On the other hand, if such liability imputed to of husband and wife. Subsequently, Rosalind
the parents is considered direct and primary, Therese was born. While they were on a brief
that diligence could constitute a valid and vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and
substantial defense. Teresita got married, and upon their return to
the U.S.A., Reginald Vince was born.
We believe that the civil liability of the parents
for quasi-delicts of their minor children is The relationship of the couple deteriorated
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply until they decided to separate sometime in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the up, stating he was always nagging her about
persons responsible for the act or omission , money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
in this case the minor and the father , in cas contended that Teresita was a spendthrift,
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are buying expensive jewelry and antique
solidary liable. furniture instead of attending to household
expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the
Under the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that children and went back to California. She
the parents are and should be held primarily claims, however, that she spent a lot of
liable for the civil liability arising from criminal money on long distance telephone calls to
offenses committed by theri minor children keep in constant touch with her children.
under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that Reynaldo brought his children home to the
the former acted with the diligence of a good Philippines, but because his assignment in
father of the family to prevent such damages. Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was
sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He
In the case at bar, whether the death of had to leave his children with his sister, co-
hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendel
Libi, respondent court did not err in holding Teresita claims that she did not immediately
petitioner liable for damages arising follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
therefrom. Subject to the preceding criminal case for bigamy against her and she
modifications of the premises relied upon by it was afraid of being arrested. Teresita,
therefor and on the bases of the legal meanwhile, decided to return to the
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin with Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
its findings that said petitioners failed to duly habeas corpus against herein two petitioners
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris to gain custody over the children.
familias to prevent such damages. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus suspendeding Teresita's parental
144) Espiritu vs.CA authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995 declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
170
authority over them but with rights of kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house
visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed the and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to
trial court's decision. Hence, this petition. talk to her mother even on the telephone. She
tended to be emotionally emblazed because
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is of constant fears that she may have to leave
entitled to the custody of the two children. school and her aunt's family to go back to the
United States to live with her mother.
Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by At about the same time, a social welfare case
the Family Code to take into account all study was conducted for the purpose of
relevant considerations. If a child is under securing the travel clearance required before
seven years of age, the law presumes that the minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer
mother is the best custodian. The Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. Rosalind refused to go back to the United
It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". States and be reunited with her mother. She
If a child is over seven, his choice is felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was
paramount but, again, the court is not bound more attached to her Yaya who did everything
by that choice. In its discretion, the court may for her and Reginald. The child was found
find the chosen parent unfit and award suffering from emotional shock caused by her
custody to the other parent, or even to a third mother's infidelity.
party as it deems fit under the circumstances. Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that
In the present case, both Rosalind and the 7-year age reference in the law applies to
Reginald are now over seven years of age. the date when the petition for a writ of
Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a
August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
same age on January 12, 1995. Both are Considerations involving the choice made by
studying in reputable schools and appear to a child must be ascertained at the time that
be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of either parent is given custody over the child.
thoughtfully determining the parent with The matter of custody is not permanent and
whom they would want to live. Once the unalterable.
choice has been made, the burden returns to Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind
the court to investigate if the parent thus and Reginald are now over 7 years of age.
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority They understand the difference between right
and custodial responsibility. and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant
immorality. Their best interests would be
We are inclined to sustain the findings and better served in an environment
conclusions of the regional trial court because characterized by emotional stability and a
it gave greater attention to the choice of certain degree of material sufficiency. There is
Rosalind and considered in detail all the nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo
relevant factors bearing on the issue of is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the
custody. Family Code.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Teresita does not deny that she was legally
Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, married to Roberto Lustado on December 17,
Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the 1984 in California. Less than a year later, she
effects of uprooting her from the Assumption had already driven across the continental
College where she was studying. Four United States to commence living with
different tests were administered. The results another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in
of the tests are quite revealing. The responses Pittsburgh. The two were married on October
of Rosalind about her mother were very 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage
negative causing the psychologist to delve on her part, this matter of her having
deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the contracted a bigamous marriage later with
things revealed by Rosalind was an incident Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as
where she saw her mother hugging and a rapist, alleging further that she told
171
Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986.
the occasion when she was raped by Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released
Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
such tale. And even if this story were given he had been in the care and custody of his
credence, it adds to and not subtracts from maternal grandparents, private respondents
the conviction of this Court about Teresita's Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
values. Rape is an insidious crime against
privacy. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place
Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of latter's parents, the respondent spouses
flirting from one man to another does not fall Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all
under "compelling reasons" is neither the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent
meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not support of the boy because petitioner could
only are the children over seven years old and not afford to do so. Julia Bedia-Santos left for
their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
immoral activities of the mother had already that he is not aware of her whereabouts and
caused emotional disturbances, personality his efforts to locate her in the United States
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral proved futile. PR`s claim that although
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending
mention her conviction for the crime of financial support to them for her son. PR`s
bigamy, which from the records appears to contended that petitioner abducted the boy
have become final. when petitioner along with his two brothers
visited the Bedia household, where three-year
The law is more than satisfied by the old Leouel Jr. was staying.
judgment of the trial court. The children are
now both over seven years old. Their choice The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for
of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
clear from the record. From all indications, Leouel Santos Jr., before the RTC which was
Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two granted on the same day and was affirmed by
requirements found in the first paragraph of the CA.
Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of Issue: Whether or not the custody of minor
said article no longer applies as the children Leouel Santos, Jr. shall be awarded to the
are over seven years. petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Held: The father and mother, being the
The decision of the Court of Appeals is natural guardians of unemancipated children,
reversed and set aside, and the decision of are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the their custody and company.The child's
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in welfare is always the paramount
Quezon City and presided over by the consideration in all questions concerning his
Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case care and custody.
No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the
minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their The law vests on the father and mother joint
father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No parental authority over the persons of their
special pronouncement is made as to costs. common children. In case of absence or death
of either parent, the parent present shall
145) SANTOS vs. CA continue exercising parental authority. Only in
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority
Facts: be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army The situation obtaining in the case at bench is
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr.,
172
is working in the United States while the dated November 13, 1992 are hereby
father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the
only are they physically apart but are also minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
emotionally separated. There has been no legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel
decree of legal separation and petitioner's Santos, Sr.
attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological 146) NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT
incapacity of his wife has failed. OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the 255 SCRA 661
trial court and the appellate court to award ROMERO, J.
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law,
the Bedia spouses on the ground that under FACTS:
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of
parental authority of the grandparents is medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner
proper only when both parents are dead, Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse. They
absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, were married on December 6, 1986. After six
according to him, has not been successfully miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk
shown by private respondents. pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray
II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who
We find the aforementioned considerations began work in the US in October 1988, used
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental part of her earnings to build a model house
authority and the concomitant right to have in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., medical attention for her successive
particularly since he has not been shown to miscarriages in New York. In February 1992,
be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private petitioner became a resident alien. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection respondent stayed with her in the US twice
for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate and took care of her when she became
father is still preferred over the grandparents. pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, only a tourist visa and was not employed. In
particularly because there is no proof that at January 1993, the couple and their baby
the present time, petitioner is in no position to arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
support the boy. The fact that he was unable Nerissa returned to the US. When Nerissa
to provide financial support for his minor son came home a few days before Ray IIs first
from birth up to over three years when he birthday, the couple was no longer on good
took the boy from his in-laws without terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her
permission, should not be sufficient reason to in-laws and rely solely on her husbands
strip him of his permanent right to the child's meager income of P 5,000.00. She longed to
custody. While petitioner's previous be with her only child but her husband was
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the keeping him away from her. On the other
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable could raise his son even as he practiced his
decision against him and his efforts to keep profession. Petitioner was forced to move to
his only child in his custody may be regarded her parents home in Mandaue. Nerissa filed a
as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent
To award him custody would help enhance the to surrender the custody of their son to her.
bond between parent and son. It would also The court a quo issued an Order awarding
give the father a chance to prove his love for custody of the one year old child to his
his son and for the son to experience the mother, citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the
warmth and support which a father can give. Family Code which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The from the mother, unless the Court finds
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals compelling reasons to order otherwise. On
dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts order
173
and awarded custody of the boy to his father. Bonifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C.
Holding that granting custody to the boys Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in US
father would be for the childs best in 1986. Reeder had a common-law wife,
interest and welfare. Helen Belmes, with whom he had two kids,
Valerie & Vincent. Bonifacia instituted
ISSUE: As between father and mother, who guardianship proceedings over person &
should have rightful custody of a child who properties of Valerie (6 yrs old) & Vincent (2
bears in his person both their genes? yrs old). Estate consists of proceeds from their
dads pension benefits worth P100k. RTC Cebu
HELD: appointed Bonifacia as legal & judicial
When the parents of the child are separated, guardian.
Article 213 of the Family Code is the Natural mother Helen opposed claiming she
applicable law. already filed a similar petition for
Since the Code does not qualify the word guardianship. She later on filed a motion for
separation to mean legal separation Removal of Guardian &Appointment of New
decreed by a court, couples who are One claiming that shes the natural mom in
separated in fact, such petitioner and private actual custody of & exercising parental
respondent, are covered within its terms. authority over children. She further asserted
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, USA
similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 & that shes a naturalized US citizen. Regional
(Adoption and Custody of Minors). The Trial Court rejected & denied motion.
provisions of law mandate that a child under 7 The Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225:
years of age shall not be separated from his parents, father or in his absence, mother are
mother unless the court finds compelling considered as natural guardian of minor
reasons to order otherwise. The use of the children. Revised ROC Rule 93 Sec. 7 confirms
word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code designation of parents as ipso facto guardian
and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of of their minor kids w/o need of court
Court connotes a mandatory character. appointment & such can only be transferred
The general rule that a child under 7 years of to another person for a good reason. CA found
age shall not be separated from his mother no reason why biological mom should be
finds its raison d' etre in the basic need of a deprived of her legal right. Affirming RTC
child for his mothers loving care. Only the would abdicate & violate the very basic
most compelling reasons shall justify the fundamental tenets in civil law & the
courts awarding the custody of such a child constitution on family solidarity. Bonifacia
to someone other than his mother, such as claims that she should be appointed as the
her unfitness to exercise sole parental guardian based on the undisputed proof
authority. In the past the following grounds that Helens live-in partner has raped Valerie
have been considered ample justification to seven times while under Helens custody.
deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect, abandonment, ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacia should be
unemployment and immorality, habitual appointed as the guardian
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity and being sick with a HELD:
communicable disease. It has long been No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is
settled that in custody cases, the foremost moot. Valerie since already turned 18 on Sept.
consideration is always the welfare and best 2, 1998. Only thing in dispute is guardianship
interest of the child. of Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father & mother
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.) shall jointly exercise parental authority over
their common children. Fathers decision shall
147) VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES prevail in cases of disagreement unless
G.R. No. 132223 theres a judicial order to the contrary. Thus,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. Helen, being the natural mom of Vincent has
the natural & legal right to his custody. Such
FACTS: right is inherent & not created by
174
state/decision of courts but derives from In February 1995, defendant-appellant St

nature of parental relationship (Sagala-Eslao Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
vs. CA). Art. 214 (FC) allows substitute enrollment drive for the SY 1995-96.Part of
parental authority of surviving grandparent the campaign was the visitation of schools
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability from where prospective enrollees were
of parents. Helen is very much alive & has studying. A student of that school and part of
continuously exercised parental authority the campaign, Sherwin Carpitanos along
over Vincent. Helens unfitness was only w/other high school students were riding in a
asserted Valerie & since shes already of Mitsubishi jeep driven by James Daniel II, a 15
major age, such cannot be appreciated year old student of the same school. En route
anymore. Even if Helen were unfit, Bonifacia to Larayan Elem School, it was alleged that
still wont qualify considering that shes a US minor James drove the jeep in a reckless
citizen & resident. She wont be able to manner and as a result the jeep turned
perform the responsibilities &obligations turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of
required of a guardian. Most probably shell the injuries he sustained from the accident.
just delegate those duties to another person The Regional Trial Court held St Marys liable
who might not be qualified. Shes been out of for indemnification for loss of Sherwins life,
the country since 1987 and considering that actual damages for burial and so-related
shes old & was previously convicted of libel, expenses, attorneys fees and moral
its not likely that shell come back here to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
fulfill her duties. Besides, only2 yrs are left for decision but absolved from any liability the
her to exercise guardianship over child. True driver-minor James and jeeps owner Vivencio
that law does not require courts to only Villanueva. St. Marys appealed. The Court of
appoint residents as guardians but court Appeals reduced actual damages to PhP25K
should not appoint guardians who are not but affirmed the rest of its previous decision.
within our courts jurisdiction for it will be School filed Motion for Reconsideration but
difficult to protect the wards in was denied. Hence, this appeal.
such instances.
ISSUES:
VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
recognizes deep ties that bind parent & child. erred in holding St. Marys liable for said
Parents are placed 1st in rank in matters of death
parental authority. Childs legitimacy doesnt 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
affect the order of priority in exercise of erred in affirming the award of moral
parental authority. FC176 states that damages against the school
illegitimate child shall be under parental
authority of mom who should be entitled for HELD:1. Yes.CA held school liable under Arts
the childs custody. 218 & 219 FC, pointing out that petitioner was
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.) negligent in
allowing a minor to drive in the campaign to
visit public schools to solicit enrollment.
148) ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM School was also liable in not having a teacher
CARPITANOS accompany the minor students in the jeep.
However, for petitioner to be liable, it must
G.R. No. 143363 be shown that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence, must
PARDO, J. have a causal connection to the accident.
But respondent-spouses Daniel and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of the school
FACTS: or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep. This was confirmed by the testimony
175
of the traffic investigator who instituted a and children to seek, apparently for financial
report of the accident. Hence, reliance on Art reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month,
219 FC that those given the authority and they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
responsibility under Art 218 shall be Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then
principally and solidarily liable for damages with her brother Noel Daban. After some time,
caused by acts oromissions of the they rented an apartment only to return later
unemancipated minor was unfounded. to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court
Liability, whether caused by the negligence of aptly observed, the sisters and their mother,
the minor-driver or mechanical detachment of from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen
the jeeps steering wheel guide, must be (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The to another not their own. It appears that from
negligence of St Marys was only a remote the start of their estrangement, Lea did not
cause of the badger her husband Edward for support,
accident, an event that the school had no relying initially on his commitment
control over. memorialized in a note dated December 10,
1975 to give support to his daughters. As
2. Yes. Incidentally, there was no question things turned out, however, Edward reneged
that the registered owner of the vehicle was on his promise of support, despite Leas
respondent Villanueva for he even admitted efforts towards having him fulfill the same.
this fact. The Court has held that the Lea would admit, though, that Edward
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not occasionally gave their children meager
used for public service, would primarily be amounts for school expenses. Through the
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for years and up to the middle part of 1992,
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave
was being driven on the highways or streets. small amounts to help in the schooling of
It is not the schools but the registered owned Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls
for damages for the death of Sherwin College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995
Carpitanos. Judgment reversed. Case when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed
remanded to TC for determination of liability a complaint against Edward for support before
of defendants excluding St Marys. the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.) 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as
amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother,
149) LACSON vs. LACSON averred that their father Edward, despite
being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, has not provided
G.R. No. 150644 them support since 1976. They also alleged
that, owing to years of Edwards failure and
GARCIA, J.: neglect, their mother had, from time to time,
borrowed money from her brother Noel
Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much
FACTS: as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. As applied for
and after due hearing, the trial court granted
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support
Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month,
daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and subject to the schedule of payment and other
his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born conditions set forth in the courts
on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little corresponding order of May 13, 1996.
less than a year later. Not long after the birth Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26,
of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters,
in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother as represented by their mother. In that
176
judgment, the trial court, following an

elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered
their defendant father Edward to pay them a
specific sum which represented 216 months,
or 18 years, of support in arrears.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals

erred in the grant of support in arrears from
1976 to 1994
HELD:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb
the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court
respecting the demand Lea made on the
petitioner to secure support for the
respondents. As a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, factual findings of the CA
are accorded respect, if not finality, save for
the most compelling and cogent reasons. Not
one of the well-recognized exceptions to this
rule on conclusiveness of factual findings
appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the
Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a
review of the CAs findings bearing on the
actuality that, as basis for an award of
support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for
support had been made on the petitioner as
evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note
adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for
review, as here, is generally limited to
correction of errors of law. Complementing
that postulate is the rule that the Court is not
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, except when, as earlier
indicated, compelling reasons demand a
review of the factual conclusions drawn from
such evidence.
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
177
CASES IN PROERTY indebtedness secured by the mortgage,

Leung Yee secured judgment for that amount,
150) LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. levied execution upon the building, bought it
FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY in at the sheriff's sale on or about the 18
and J. G. WILLIAMSON, defendants- December 1914, and had the sheriff's
appellees certificate of sale duly registered in the land
G.R. No. L-11658 registry of the Province of Cavite. At the time
CARSON, J. when the execution was levied upon the
building, the machinery company, which was
FACTS: in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn
The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought rice- statement setting up its claim of title and
cleaning machinery from the machinery demanding the release of the property from
company, and executed a chattel mortgage the levy. The Court gave judgment in favor of
thereon to secure payment of the purchase the machinery company, relying upon Article
price. It included in the mortgage deed the 1473 and the fact that the company had its
building of strong materials in which the title to the building registered prior to the
machinery was installed, without any date of the registry of plaintiffs certificate.
reference to the land on which it stood. The Hence, the appeal.
indebtedness secured by this instrument not
having been paid when it fell due, the ISSUE:
mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff, in Whether or not the plaintiff to recover
pursuance of the terms of the mortgage possession of the building from the machinery
instrument, and was bought in by the company
machinery company. The mortgage was
registered in the chattel mortgage registry, HELD:
and the sale of the property to the machinery The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
company in satisfaction of the mortgage was with costs against the appellant. Building
annotated in the same registry on 29 separate from land does not affect character
December 1913. On 14 January 1914, the as real property; Registry of chattel mortgage
"Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed does not affect character of the building and
of sale of the land upon which the building the machineries installed therein. The Chattel
stood to the machinery company, but this Mortgage Law contemplates and makes
deed of sale, although executed in a public provision for mortgages of personal property;
document, was not registered and made no and the sole purpose and object of the chattel
reference to the building erected on the land mortgage registry is to provide for the registry
and would appear to have been executed for of "Chattel mortgages," mortgages of
the purpose of curing any defects which might personal property executed in the manner
be found to exist in the machinery company's and form prescribed in the statute. The
title to the building under the sheriff's building of strong materials in which the
certificate of sale. The machinery company machinery was installed was real property,
went into possession of the building at or and the mere fact that the parties seem to
about the time when this sale took place, that have dealt with it separate and apart from the
is to say, the month of December 1913, and it land on which it stood in no wise changed its
has continued in possession ever since. At or character as real property. It follows that
about the time when the chattel mortgage neither the original registry in the chattel
was executed in favor of the machinery mortgage registry of the instrument
company, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the
executed another mortgage to Leung Yee building and the machinery installed therein,
upon the building, separate and apart from nor the annotation in that registry of the sale
the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the mortgaged property, had any effect
of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung whatever so far as the building was
Yee under a contract for the construction of concerned. Possession before sheriffs sale,
the building. Upon the failure of the not Article 1473 (on good faith), controlling as
mortgagor to pay the amount of the to ownership of property. The ruling cannot be
178
sustained on the ground of Article 1473, Lands a Request for Amendment of their Free
second paragraph, but on the ground that the Patent applications over several parcels of
agreed statement of facts discloses that land including Lot No. 2029 (PIs-61). In this
neither the purchase of the building by request they renounced, relinquished and
plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff's waived all their rights and interests over Lot
certificate of sale in his favor was made in No. 2029 (Pls-61) in favor of Jesusa Christine
good faith, and that the machinery company Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto, respondents
must be held to be the owner of the property herein. This second mortgage also included
under the third paragraph of the above cited Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) as security for the
article of the code, it appearing that the Olidiana spouses financial obligation with
company first took possession of the property; petitioner. Thereafter, for failure of Santiago
and further, that the building and the land and Oliva Olidiana to comply with the terms
were sold to the machinery company long and conditions of their promissory notes and
prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the mortgage contracts, petitioner extrajudicially
plaintiff. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.) foreclosed all their mortgaged properties.
However, when petitioner tried to register the
sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to
have the tax declaration transferred in its
name it was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had
already been divided and covered in the name
of Jesusa Christine Chupuico, while the other
half known as Lot 2029-B was covered by the
151) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE same in the name of Mylo 0. Quinto. Since
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF there was no showing that the sales
APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA application was approved before the property
CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondent. was mortgaged, the trial court concluded that
the Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners
G.R. No. 109946 in fee simple when they mortgaged the
property. The lower court also said that with
BELLOSILLO, J. the subsequent issuance of the Free Patent by
the Bureau of Lands for the respondents.
Therefore petitioner could not have acquired a
valid title over the subject property by virtue
FACTS: of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at
public auction. Resultantly, the trial court
Development Bank of the Philippines filed this declared the following as null and void.
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Petitioner then appealed to the Court of
decision of the Court of Appeals holding that Appeals which likewise ruled in favor of
the mortgages in favor of the bank were void respondents, hence the instant petition.
and ineffectual because when constituted the
mortgagors, who were merely applicants for
free patent of the property mortgaged, were
not the owners thereof in fee simple and
therefore could not validly encumber the ISSUE: Whether the land in dispute could
same. Petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00 have been validly mortgaged while still the
to the spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva subject of a Free Patent Application with the
Olidiana. To secure the loan the Olidiana government
spouses executed a real estate mortgage on
several properties. At the time of the HELD:
mortgage the property was still the subject of Petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over
a Free Patent application filed by the Olidianas the land in dispute because it was public land
with the Bureau of Lands but registered under when mortgaged to the bank. The Court
their name in the Office of the Municipal cannot accept petitioners contention that the
Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.The lot in dispute was no longer public land when
Olidiana spouses filed with the Bureau of mortgaged to it since the Olidiana spouses
179
had been in open, continuous, adverse and other mineral claims, was sold by A.I.
public possession thereof for more than thirty Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the
(30) years. Meanwhile the government still earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge
remained the owner thereof, as in fact the Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale
application could still be canceled and the executed on November 2, 1931. Since then
land awarded to another applicant should it petitioner Atok has been in continuous and
be shown that the legal requirements had not exclusive ownership and possession of said
been complied with. What divests the claim up to the present. Atok has paid the
government of title to the land is the issuance realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia
of the sales patent and its subsequent mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim
registration with the Register of Deeds. It is together with other mineral claims owned by
the registration and issuance of the certificate Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration
of title that segregate public lands from the No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential
mass of public domain and convert it into Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was
private property. Since the disputed lot in the filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral
case before us was still the subject of a Free claim.
Patent Application when mortgaged to On the other hand, private respondent Liwan
petitioner and no patent was granted to the Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr.
Olidiana spouses. Thus, since the disputed Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He
property was not owned by the Olidiana constructed a house thereon sometime in
spouses when they mortgaged it to petitioner, 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration
the contracts of mortgage and all their No. 9462. When he first constructed his house
subsequent legal consequences as regards below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it
the subject lot are null and void. It is essential was not necessary for him to obtain a building
requisite for the validity of a mortgage that permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
the mortgagor be the absolute owner of a prohibited him from entering the land so he
property mortgaged, and it appearing that the was constructing a house thereon. It was only
mortgage was constituted before the issuance in January 1984 when private respondent
of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage Consi repaired the said house that people
in question must of necessity be void and came to take pictures and told him that the
ineffective. For the law explicitly requires an lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi
imperative for the validity of a mortgage that has been paying taxes on said land which his
the mortgagor be the absolute owner of what father before him had occupied. On January
is mortgaged. 1984, the security guards of Atok informed
Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that
152) ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, a construction was being undertaken at the
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
and LIWAN CONSI, respondents. respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes
G.R. No. 88883 instructed the cashier to go and take pictures
PARAS, J. of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself
and other security guards went to the place of
FACTS: the construction to verify and then to the
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and
located sometime between December 25, detainer against Liwan Consi. On January 29,
1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial
(6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with Court of Itogon. This case against Liwan
the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. Petitioner
1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional
1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet. the
The said Declaration of Location of mineral Court of Appeals denied the motion for
claim was duly recorded in the Office of the reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK.
Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, Hence, the petition.
1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with
180
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual's long

term occupation of land of the public domain ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have
vests him with such rights over the same as overthrown the presumption that the lands
to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim are part of the public domain?
HELD: HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet and The petition for confirmation of
Atok had secured a patent for as held in the imperfect title was filed four (4) years short of
Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all the required thirty (30) year period possession
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is requirement under PD 29 and RA 6940.
not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining The respondents period of occupancy over
laws; his possessory right, for all practical the subject land 26 years at the time of the
purposes of ownership, is as good as though filing of the petition, four (4) years short of
secured by patent. the required 30-year period possession
requirement under the law.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record
pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully Prior to its declaration as alienable land in
complied with all the requirements of the law 1965, any occupation or possession thereon
regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia cannot be considered in the counting of the
Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining 30-year possession requirement.
claim converted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed it
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect
from the public domain. By such act, the
titles do not apply unless and until the land
locators acquired exclusive rights over the
classified as forest land is released in an
land, against even the government, without
official proclamation to that effect so that it
need of any further act such as the purchase
may form part of the disposable agricultural
of the land or the obtention of a patent over
lands of the public domain.
it. As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to
154) Isaguirre vs. De Lara
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet
332 SCRA 803
and Atok. With this ruling enunciated by the
Court, it can further be declared and held that
FACTS:
petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the
Alejandro De Lara was the original
property in question. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
applicant-claimant for Miscellaneous Sales
Application on 1942. He was succeeded by his
153) Republic vs. De Guzman, et.al.
wife, respondent Felicitas De Lara upon his
326 SCRA 574
death.
FACTS:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of On said land stood a 2-story commercial and
imperfect title was filed by Norma Almanzor residential apartment in the name of private
against respondents over lands located in respondents sons.
Silang, Cavite.
Sometime on 1960, a Deed of Sale and
It is undisputed that the lands were released Special Cessation of Rights and Interests was
as agricultural land on 1965 and that the executed in favor of the petitioner, Cornelio.
Petition for Confirmation of Imperfect Title Subsequently, an OCT was executed in his
was filed by the respondents on 1991. name.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Meanwhile, an OCT was issued to the
respondents. respondent anent the sales application.
The CA affirmed such ruling.
181
Petitioner then filed an action for Quieting of

Title and Damages against herein respondent. The lower court ruled in favor of the
respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. same and ordered the petitioners to
reimburse the respondents for the value of
The CA reversed the same. It ruled that the the house and the improvements.
transaction that was entered into was an
equitable mortgage and not a sale thus, the The CA affirmed the RTC.
petitioners OCT is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were
Respondents motion for execution was builders in good faith or mere lessees.
granted by the trial court and was affirmed by
the CA. HELD:
Being mere lessees, the respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is knew that their occupation of the premises
entitled to retain possession of the property would continue only for the life of the lease.
until payment of the loan and the value of the Thus, they cannot be considered as
necessary and useful improvements made possessors or builders in good faith.
upon such property.
Article 448 of the Civil Code in relation to
HELD: Article 546 of the Civil Code applies only to
As the sole owner, the respondent has possessors in good faith. It does not apply
the right to enjoy her property without any where ones only interest is that of a lessee
other limitations than those established by under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
law. always be in the power of the tenant to
improve his landlord out of his property.
As a general rule, the mortgagor retains 156) Tecnogas vs. CA
possession of the mortgaged property. A G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997
mortgage is merely a lien.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a domestic corporation and a
Possession is an essential attribute of
registered owner of the subject land located in
ownership. It would be redundant for the
San Dionisio, Paranaque. It purchased the
respondent to go back to court to establish
subject land from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970
her right to possess the property.
with the buildings, improvements and the wall
existing thereon.
155) Geminiano et. al. vs. CA
259 SCRA 344
Dedendant Eduardo Uy was the registered
FACTS: owner of the land adjoining petitioners land.
The subject lot was originally owned by
petitioners mother Paulina. An unfinished Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy the portion
bungalow was constructed on the lot by the of the latters land occupied by the portion of
petitioners. The said bungalow was sold by its buildings and wall. Uy refused.
petitioners to respondent in 1978.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is
Meanwhile, a contract of lease over the lot considered a builder in bad faith because he
was earlier entered into by the petitioners is presumed to know the metes and bounds of
mother in favor of the respondents for a his property as described in the Certificate of
period of 7 years. Title.
HELD: The plaintiff purchased the land with

Petitioners, after having the lot registered in
the structures already in existence.
their names, filed a case for unlawful detainer
and damages against the respondents.
182
Article 527, Civil Code presumes good faith HELD: Kee was in good faith. At the time he
since no proof exists to show that the built improvements of Lot 9, Kee believed that
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped said lot was what he bought from petitioner.
portion of the respondents land was done in The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis--vis each
bad faith by the builder of the encroaching other, as builder in good faith and owner in
structures. good faith respectively are regulated by law
(448, 546, 548, Civil Code).
It is presumed that possession continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was 158) Benitez vs. CA
acquired, until the contrary is proved. 266 SCRA 242
Thus, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into FACTS:

the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of
ownership over the land sold, including the Sometime on 1986, petitioners
right to compel the defendant to exercise purchased a lot from Cavite Development
either of the options under Art. 448, Civil Bank. Subsequently, the respondents bought
Code. the same.
Plaintiff must also pay rent for the property Respondents then bought another property
occupied by its building but only up to the adjacent to that of petitioners land.
date the respondent serves notice of its Thereafter, the former then filed a case
option upon plaintiff and the trial court if such against the latter for ejectment upon
option is for the respondent to appropriate the discovery of the former that the latters house
encroaching structure. encroached on the formers land.
157) Pleasantville Dvt. Corp. vs. CA MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The
253 SCRA 10 RTC and CA affirmed the same.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not possession of a lot

Robillo purchased from petitioner Lot 9 in encroached upon by a part of anothers house
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In be recovered in an action for ejectment.
1975, respondent Jardinico bought the rights
from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. HELD: Yes, within 1 year from last demand.
Meanwhile, on 1974, respondent That petitioners occupied the land prior to

Wilson Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of said respondents purchase thereof does not
subdivision from CTTEI (exclusive real agent negate the latters case for ejectment.
of petitioner). Prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can be acquired by material
Said agent, through one of its occupation, by the fact that a thing is subject
employees, accompanied Kees wife to to the action of ones will or by the proper
inspect lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land acts and legal formalities established for
pointed to was Lot 9. acquiring such right.
159) Evadel Realty vs. Soriano

Kee then constructed improvements on said
April 20, 2001
property. Jardinico then filed an ejectment
case against Kee.
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a
ISSUE: Whether or not a lot buyer who
Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer
constructs improvements on the wrong
over a parcel of land which is part of a huge
property erroneously delivered by the owners
tract of land known as the Imus Estate.
agent, a builder in good faith?
183
Upon payment of the first installment, the by him. However, it was protested by private
petitioners introduced improvements thereon respondents. The petitioners claim that the
and fenced off the property with concrete subject land is private land being an accretion
walls. to his titled property, applying Article 457 of
the Civil Code.
Thereafter, the respondents discovered that
the area fenced off by the petitioners ISSUE: Whether or not Article 457 of The Civil
exceeded the area subject of the contract by Code applies.
2,450 square meters.
HELD: No. The following requites should all
A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was concur in order for accretion to apply as a
filed by respondents against petitioner. mode of acquiring property under Article 457
of the Civil Code: (1) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and
The trial court, by way of a summary
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
judgment, ruled in favor of respondents.
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding
is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
petitioners good faith or bad faith as a
coast).
builder should have been peremptorily
disposed of by the trial court.
Petitioners admit that the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and
HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended
other filling materials on portions of the
Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
the TCT of respondents.
bounding their land. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the accumulation of such
With this admission, petitioner can no longer boulders, soil and other filling materials was
claim that it was a builder in good faith. gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the
Moreover petitioner, as a real estate Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
developer is presumed to be experienced in Absence of the first and second requisites,
business and ought to have sufficient they cannot claim the rights of a riparian
technical expertise to correctly determine the owner.
metes and bounds of the land it acquires.
Article 457 excludes all deposits caused by
160) NAZARENO et al. vs. COURT OF human intervention. Alluvion must be the
APPEALS exclusive work of nature. When a land was not
257 SCRA 589 formed solely by the natural effect of the
water current of the river bordering said land
FACTS: but as a consequence of the direct and
A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, deliberate intervention of man, it man-made
Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed accretion and, as such, part of the public
as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried- domain.
up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of
the Cagayan river by Sun Valley Lumber Co. 161) NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE
Private respondents Jose Salasanan and Reo APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF
Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their SINFOROSO PASCUAL
houses stood from Petitioner Antonio G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997
Nazareno. For refusal to pay rentals,
respondents were ejected. FACTS:
Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25)
his title over the accretion area being claimed hectares of foreshore land in Sibocon,
184
Balanga, Bataan. The Director of Fisheries, which is adjacent to the property belonging to
gave due course to his application but only to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion
the extent of seven (7) hectares of the caused by the action of the two rivers.
property as may be certified by the Bureau of
Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso

Pascual filed an application to register and
confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in 162) ROBLES et al vs. CA
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed 328 SCRA 97
that this land is an accretion to his property,
situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, FACTS:
Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the Leon Robles primitively owned a land which
accretion as the riparian owner. he occupied the same openly and adversely
as early as 1916 and paid its taxes. When
Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Leon died his son Silvino Robles inherited
Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that land, took possession and paid taxes. Upon
the land sought to be registered has always Silvinos death, his widow Maria de la Cruz
been part of the public domain, it being a part and his children inherited the property, took
of the foreshore of Manila Bay. He was a adverse possession and paid taxes. However,
lessee and in possession of a part of the the task of cultivating the land was assigned
subject property by virtue of a fishpond to Lucio Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the
permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and
confirmed by the Office of the President and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
also that he had already converted the area
covered by the lease into a fishpond. In 1962, the tax declaration in Silvinos name
was canceled and transferred Hilario Robles
ISSUE: Is land be considered as foreshore and his wife. In 1966, Andrea Robles secured
land? a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc.,
using the tax declaration as security. When
HELD: Yes. The third requisite of accretion is the mortgage debt was unpaid, it was
absent in the case at bar. It states that auctioned for sale and Rural Bank was the
alluvium must be deposited on the portion of highest bidder. Consequently the spouses
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river Robles failed to redeem property. Thus, title
bank. was transferred in the name of Rural Bank.
Then Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses
Here private respondents' own land lies Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in
front of their land on the northern side lies the In 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and
disputed land where before 1948, there lay attempted to redeem the property, but was
the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be unsuccessful. The spouses Santos also took
attributed to the action of either or both of the possession of the property and secured a free
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium patent in their names. Hence a petition for
should have been deposited on either or both quieting of title to the land was filed.
of the eastern and western boundaries of
private respondents' own tract of land, not on ISSUE: Will the petition prosper?
the northern portion thereof which is adjacent
to the Manila Bay.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a

river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used
to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which
adjoined private respondents own tract of
land on the northern side. Hence, the land
185
HELD: Yes. Hilario mortgaged the plaintiffs over said portion.

disputed property to the Rural Bank of
Cardona in his capacity as a mere co- ISSUE: Will the remedy of quieting of title
owner thereof. The said transaction did apply for settling a boundary dispute?
not divest the plaintiff of title to the
property at the time of the institution of HELD:
the complaint for quieting of title. No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy
for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
An action to quiet title is a remedy for the uncertainty with respect to title to real
removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty property. To avail of the remedy of quieting of
on the title to real property. It is essential for title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
an equitable title to or interest in the real proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
property which is the subject matter of the doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's
action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or title to or interest in real property.
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on
plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact However, the Agreement of Partition executed
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie by private respondent and his brothers
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (including the petitioners' father and
predecessor-in-interest), in which their
Also, there is an irregularity when the tax respective shares in the inherited property
declaration of Silvino was cancelled since were agreed upon, and the Deed of Sale
there was no instrument or deed of evidencing the redemption by petitioner
conveyance evidencing its transfer to Hilario Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject
Robles. property in a foreclosure sale are in no way
documents that constitute a cloud or cast a
163) De Aviles vs. CA doubt upon the title of petitioners. In fact, the
264 SCRA 473 uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to
situate and fix the boundary between their
FACTS: respective properties.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the
afore-described property since 1957. In fact The construction of the bamboo fence
he mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank enclosing the disputed property and the
and Philippine National Bank. When the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds"
property was inspected by a bank or "doubts" which can be removed in an
representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the action for quieting of title. An action to quiet
presence of the boundary owners, namely, title or to remove cloud may not be brought
defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and for the purpose of settling a boundary
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed to the dispute.
inspector the existing earthen dikes as the
boundary limits of the property and nobody 164) DEL CAMPO vs. CA
objected. When the real estate mortgage was 351 SCRA 1
foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' FACTS:
mother and the land was subsequently Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia,
transferred and declared in her name. Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales,
were the original co-owners of 27, 170 sq. m.
On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles lot known as Lot 162 under OCT No. 18047.
asserted a color of title over the northern The lot was divided in aliquot shares among
portion of the property with an area of the eight co-owners.
approximately 1,200 square meters by
constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162
moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad
and disturbing the peaceful possession of the Daynolo immediately took possession of the
186
land and built a house thereon. A few years her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical
later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio effect of the second disposition is to
Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad
162 as security for a debt to Jose Regalado, as co-owner of the land. Needless to say,
Sr. Then three of the eight co-owners of Lot these rights are preserved notwithstanding
162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado's
Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot name in 1977.
to Jose Regalado, Sr.
165) Rodil Enterprises vs. CA
Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who G.R. No. 129609; November 29, 2001
had since died, paid the mortgage debt and
redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 FACTS:
from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. is the lessee
executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in of the Ides O'Racca Building since 1959. It
favor of Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio was a "former alien property" over which the
Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo- Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership
Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold by virtue of RA 477. In 1972, the lease
the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC
to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del was renewed for another 15 years. In 1980,
Campo and Salvacion Quiachon. RODIL entered into a sublease contract with
respondents Carmen Bondoc, et al. members
ISSUE: Is the sale by a co-owner of a physical of the Ides O'Racca Building Tenants
portion of an undivided property held in Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION). In 1982,
common be valid? authorization of the sale of "former alien
properties" classified as commercial and
HELD: industrial, and the O'RACCA building was
Yes. Salome's right to sell part of her classified as commercial property. In
undivided interest in the co-owned property is 1987,RODIL offered to purchase the subject
absolute in accordance with the well-settled property. In 1997, ASSOCIATION also offered
doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of to lease the same building.
his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute In May 18, 1992, RODIL signed a renewal
another person in its enjoyment. Since contract which would extend the lease for 10
Salome's clear intention was to sell merely years from 1 September 1987. A supplement
part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our to the renewal contract was subsequently
view no valid objection can be made against it entered into on May 25, 1992 where rentals
and the sale can be given effect to the full on the previous lease contract were
extent. increased. In September 1992: spouses
Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez,
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of
his, the sale will affect only his own share but the President a letter-appeal assailing the
not those of the other co-owners who did not authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal
consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is contract of May 18, 1992 with RODIL, and
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of claiming the right to purchase the subject
the entire property by one co-owner will only property. ASSOCIATION instituted another Civil
transfer the rights of said co-owner to the Case praying for the setting aside of the
buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner renewal contract of 18 May 1992 as well as
of the property. the supplementary contract of May 25, 1992.
Finally in 1993, RODIL filed an action for
In this case, Regalado merely became a new unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear
co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the (private respondents) and a similar action
shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo against Chua Huay Soon (also private
could validly convey. Soledad retained her respondents).
rights as co-owner and could validly transfer
187
The lower court dismissed the action filed by Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent
the ASSOCIATION. The Office of the President ASSOCIATION.
then denied the letter-appeal of the spouses
Alvarez but nullified the renewal contract of Since the occupation of respondents was
18 May 1992 and the supplementary contract merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of
of 25 May 1992. Metropolitan Trial Court of possession of the latter remained
Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for
Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. The RTC respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate
affirmed MTC decision. However the appellate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a
court declared the renewal contract between contract of lease entered into on 18 May
RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void. 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to
file the action for unlawful detainer against
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic being the respondents as one from whom possession of
owner has freedom to dispose of a thing. property has been unlawfully withheld.
HELD: 166) Heirs of Roman Soriano V. CA

Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001
dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. Every owner FACTS:
has the freedom of disposition over his The land in question was originally owned by
property. It is an attribute of ownership, and Adriano Soriano, upon his death, it passed on
this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC to his heirs who leased the same to the
being the owner of the disputed property spouse De Vera for a period of 15 years.
enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease Roman Soriano as one of the children of
contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus Adriano Soriano, acts as the caretaker. The
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC property was subdivided into two lots, lot 1
has the right to eject usurpers of the leased was sold to respondent spouses Abalos. As a
property where the factual elements required co-owner of lot 2, Roman ownes , the of
for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are which was also sold to the spouses Abalos. He
present. was ousted as caretaker of the land.
The contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May Roman Soriano filed a case for reinstatement
1992 are valid. CA invalidated the contracts and reliquidation. The agrarian court
because they were supposedly executed in authorized the ejectment, but on appeal the
violation of a temporary restraining order CA reversed. Subsequently the parties
issued by the RTC. CA however failed to note entered into an agreement allowing Roman to
that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from sublease the property. The spouses Abalos
awarding the lease contract only as regards filed an application for registration of the title
respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner of lot 1 and the of lot 2, which was
RODIL. granted. The petitioner filed with DARAB for
Security of Tenure with prayer for
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff preliminary injunction.
need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that The lower court ruled that the spouses Abalos
they have not entered into any lease contract are the real owner of the land. They filed an
with the REPUBLIC and that their continued application for the writ of execution of the
occupation of the subject property was merely decision, and to oust Roman Soriano and the
by virtue of acquiescence. The records clearly sub-lessee. However there was a pending
show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC case with DARAB.
merely issued a "temporary occupancy
permit" which was not even in the name of ISSUE: Whether or not the winning party in
the respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, the land registration case can effectively oust
188
the possessor whose security of tenure rights advantage of the fact that Quirico was
are still pending with DARAB. paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the
lands in question and took possession thereof.
HELD: In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase
No. The prevailing party in land registration the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter
case cannot be placed in possession of the filed a case against Simeon Recasa for
area while it is occupied by the one claiming recovery of possession of the lands.
to be an agricultural tenant, pending RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA
declaration that the latters occupation was reversed on appeal.
lawful. Judgement of ownership does not
include possession as a necessary incident. ISSUE: Whether the there was acquisitive
Possession and ownership are distinct legal prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa?
concepts.
HELD: No, there was no acquisitive
There is ownership when a thing pertaining to prescription. Acquisitive prescription of
one person is completely subjected to his will dominion and other real rights may be
in a manner not prohibited by law and ordinary or extraordinary. In the case at bar,
consistent with the right of others. Ownership respondent claim ordinary prescription
confers certain rights to the owner, among through adverse possession of the property
which are the rights to enjoy the thing owned for more than Ten (10) years under Art. 1134
and the right to exclude other person from of the Civil Code.
possession. While possession is the holding of However, for purposes of prescription,
the thing or enjoyment of a right. A person respondent was not able to prove his just title
may be declared owner but may not be or good faith required by acquisitive
entitled to possession. It may be in the hand if prescription, as he did not acquire possession
another as a lessee or a tenant. of the property through the modes recognized
by the Civil Code for acquisition of ownership
167) SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS or other real rights, namely:
G.R. 135602 April 28, 2000 1. Occupation
2. Intellectual creation
FACTS: 3. Law
The lots in question were originally owned by 4. Donation
Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in 5. Succession
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When 6. Tradition in consequence of certain contracts
Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his 7. Prescription
intestate estate was partitioned into three
parts to his corresponding heirs in his Three Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a
(3) marriages during his lifetime. piece of land cannot be acquired by
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the occupation, nor can respondent claim that he
representing the heirs first marriage) sold acquired his right through succession because
their share to Dominador Recasa he was an heir to the original owner,
(representing heirs in the second marriage). In remember that the property was validly
1950, Dominador sold their share to Quirico partitioned and the subject lots are not part of
and Purificacion Seraspi. those which he inherited, and lastly, he
In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from cannot be considered in good faith as he
Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land entered the property without the knowledge
being the security, however, they failed to and permission of the original owner, thus
pay the loan and the property was foreclosed making him a mere usurper.
and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and When the property belonging to another is
subsequently sold the same to Manuel Rata unlawfully taken by another, the former has
(brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who the right of action against the latter fir the
allowed Quirico to administer the same. recovery of the property and such right may
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa be transferred by the sale or assignment of
(Marcelinos heir by his third marriage) took
189
the property and the transferee can maintain neighbors that they saw him working on the
such action against the wrongdoer. lot. As oppose to the tax declarations of the
respondents showing they own the land.
*1974-1983 in only 9 years. Possession be mere tolerance cannot ripen
into ownership even if such possession have
168) CATAPUSAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS been for a long period of time. Also, the
G.R. 109262 November 21, 1996 declaration of ownership made by the RTC in
favor of respondents is proper because
FACTS: ownership must be decided first before
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to partition may be granted.
Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of
Dominga Piguing, their (4) children are the 169) VERDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
private respondent in the case at bar. G.R. 109972 April 29, 1996
Narcissa died in 1910, Bonifacio got married
for the second time, and the children in the FACTS:
second marriage are the petitioners in this Macaria Atega was married twice during her
case. lifetime, first with Angel Burdeos, and second
Bonifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in with Canuto Rosales. She owned a land in
1974, petitioners filed an action for partition Butuan City about 248 sq. m., Macaria died in
of the lot in question located in Wawa, Tanay, 1956.
Rizal. Petitioners claim that the Wawa Lot is The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad,
the property of their father (Bonifacio) who purchased the lot in question for
therefore it is co-owned by the heirs of the P23,000.00 from heirs of Macarias son
first and the second marriage. As proof of (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife
their claim, they have presented tax of the deceased David Rosales who died some
declarations of the four (4) adjacent land time after his mother Macaria died) found out
owners stating in such document that the in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to
owner of the subject lot is Bonifacio Verdad, she sought intervention of the Lupong
Catapusan. Witnesses were also presented Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of
and testified that they saw Bonifacio working P23,000.00 was refused because the current
on the lot. value of the property is higher.
Respondent on the other hand, argues October 16, 1987, no settlement was
that the Wawa lot was originally owned by reached, thus a case was filed by Socorro
Dominga Piguing and inherited by Narcissa (private respondent) for Legal Redemption
Tanjuatco as her paraphernal property; hence with Preliminary Injunction, which the RTC
petitioners have no right over the lot. As denied stating that redemption period already
evidence, theyve presented tax declarations lapse.
in their names and also alleged that they On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it
have been in open, continuous and reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro
uninterrupted possession of the said lot for has the right to redeem the property.
more than 50 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents ISSUE: Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De
declaring them as owner of the property, and Rosales is capacitated to redeem the property
such decision was affirmed by the Court of even if she is only related by affinity to
Appeals except for Attorneys fees. Macaria Atega and not an heir?
ISSUE: Whether Bonifacio is the owner of the HELD: Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make
lot? the redemption. Even if she is not an heir to
Macaria, she is an heir to David Rosales who
HELD: No, He is not an owner. inherited a share of his mothers estate.
Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of
The tax declarations of neighbors stating that legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not illegitimate and their descendants, whether
conclusive, so as the testimonies of the legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse
190
shall inherit, without prejudice to the rights of adjacent to the land in question and that he
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, have personal knowledge that the land in
should there be any, under article 1001. question had been in the possession of the
The right to redeem spawned from the non- heirs of Esteban Abad.
disclosure of the sale to all co-owners when RTC ruled that owner of the property is
the sale is in favor of a third person. In fact, the respondents, which was upheld by the CA
written notice is required under Article 1623, on appeal.
and the redemption period is 30 days from
receipt of such notice. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in
In the case at bar, no notice was given, declaring respondents as owner of the land in
hence, the 30 day period stared from the time question?
of discovery of the sale on March 30, 1987,
and stayed by the proceedings in the Punong HELD: Yes, Court of Appeals was correct.
Tagapamayapa. The totality of evidence presented
There was clear intent to redeem at leans heavily in favor of herein private
that time but the offer was rejected by respondents. They have been able to adduce
Verdad. evidence which support their claim that they
have been in open, continuous, and
170) TABUSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS uninterrupted possession for more than 60
G.R. 108558 June 21, 2001 years. Also, in view of the size of the land
which is 11,927 square meters, it is
FACTS: unbelievable for an alleged owner such as
The lot in question is an unregistered Tabuso to build only a barong-barong (small
parcel of land in Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an house) in the lot, which was latter shown to
area of 3,267 square meters, which latter be allowed by mere tolerance by a letter
turned out to be in fact 11,927 square meters. addressed to plaintiff asking them to vacate
A case was initiated to declare the property within 3 months time.
ownership of the land in question. Herein Also, petitioners are bound by the
petitioners claim ownership of the land testimony of Atty. Gonzales even if he is
through succession from Ignacio Montes and counsel for the private respondent because
presented tax declarations from 1944 1947 he was presented by the plaintiff themselves
in the name of Ignacio Montes, but were only as hostile witness.
paid in 1981. Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claim to Petitioners possesses the land as
be a successor in interest of Andrea Elaba mere holders, distinguished from possession
(daughter of Maria Montes [Maria is the Sister in the concept of an owner, being a mere
of Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house holder acknowledges another superior right
built on the lot by Marcelo Tabuso (father of over the property he possess.
Andrea Tabuso).
Private respondent however, alleged *Petitioners also raised an issue
that the land was originally owned by Maria regarding the adjudication of 11,927 square
Montes, but she donated it to Isabel Elaba as meters to private respondent when the tax
supported by a document executed on declarations only state 3,267 square meters.
September 24, 1923, thereafter Isabel sold This is untenable, because what defines a
the lot to Esteban Abad in 1948. Various tax piece of land is not the numerical data
declarations were also presented by indicated as its area, but the boundaries or
respondent showing that from 1948 1982 metes and bounds specified in its
tax has been paid on the lot by respondents description as enclosing the land indicating its
predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban limits.
Abad. Also, part of the lot is being rented by
one Valentin Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir
of Esteban) as evidenced by a lease contract.
During trial, petitioners also presented 171) DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
as witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose G.R. 116854 November 19, 1996
Gonzales, who testified that he owns a lot
191
FACTS: and does not determine ownership with

Aida Dizon mortgaged the subject lot to finality.
Monte de Piedad Bank on October 23, 1980
and failed to pay the loan obligation, hence
the house and lot mortgage was thereafter
foreclosed. The bank told Dizon that she can
repurchase the property, having no means to
pay the amount at the moment, she asked 172) CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
Elizabeth Santiago to repurchase the property G.R. 137944 April 6, 2000
in the amount of P550,000.00 on May 28,
1987. The TCT of Dizon was cancelled and a FACTS:
new one was issued in favor of Santiago in The land subject of the dispute has an area of
view of the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by 1,728 square meters and situated in barangay
Dizon in Favor of Santiago, also, an Option to Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal.
Buy Back was signed by the same parties Respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the
giving Dizon the option to buy back the said only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza, while
property from Santiago within a period of petitioner Cequena is the daughter of
Three (3) months, with the stipulation that if Margarito Mendoza. Sinforoso and Margarito
Dizon failed to used the option within the are brothers.
agreed period, Dizon shall vacate the property The subject lot was declared for tax purposes
in favor of Santiago. by Sinforoso since 1926. When he died in
The period lapse without Dizon 1930, his wife and daughter continuously
exercising her option to buy, thereafter, possessed the land, and when respondent
Santiago asked Dizon to vacate the premises. was of age in 1948, she paid the taxes for the
Dizon refused, which prompted Santiago to lot from 1932-1948. Margarito acquired joint
file an Ejectment case before the MTC. After possession from 1952, and by a virtue of an
trial, MTC ordered Dizon to vacate the affidavit signed allegedly by respondents
property. RTC reversed and ordered the mother, transferred tax declaration in the
cancellation of the TCT in favor of Dizon. CA name of Margarito Mendoza starting 1954,
affirmed on appeal, but reversed itself upon who thereafter cultivated part of the land with
MR of Santiago. his heirs from 1953-1985 until they were
ousted by respondents.
ISSUE: Whether Dizon is entitled to The dispute over who has a better right of
possession of the subject property? possession was raised in the trial court, which
decided in favor of the petitioners. The Court
HELD: No, Dizon is not entitled to possession. of Appeals reversed the said decision and
The title of the property held by the private declared the respondents as lawful owner and
respondent is enough proof to hold them as possessor.
the rightful possessor upon default of Dizon to
exercise her right to redeem the property. ISSUE: zhether respondents are the lawful
Also, the stipulation that Dizon, upon failure to owner and possessor of the land in question?
buy back the property within the specified
period, shall vacate the property is a binding HELD: Yes, respondent is the lawful owner
agreement, thus, Santiago is already entitled and possessor of the land.
to possession after the lapse of the said By acquisitive prescription of the
period. property under Article 1134 of the New Civil
This is ofcourse without prejudice to Code, ownership and other real rights over
Dizons right to file another action to immovable property may be acquired by
determine the ownership of the property, ordinary prescription through possession of
which she interposed as a defense alleging Ten (10) years. In the case at bar, respondent
that the sale was an equitable mortgage. The acquired their rights over the property
RTC made an error in ordering the through tax declaration of Sinforoso, when he
cancellation of the TCT because Ejectment died in 1930 respondents continued to
cases only dwell on the rightful possession possess the property and paid taxes from
192
1932-1948 in the concept of an owner. Such P1,430,000.00 in favor of the petitioner (DBP),
possession was not disturbed until 1952 when no ocular inspection of the land was made.
Margarito took joint possession of the land, In 1978 private respondent applied for
however, the possession of respondent which loan from DBP mortgaging the 19.4 hectares
is public, peaceful, and uninterrupted already giving as evidence of ownership tax
ripened to ownership. declarations and a certification of the Clerk of
Court of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
*The affidavit that allowed the transfer that no civil, land registration or cadastral
of tax declaration from Sinforoso to Margarito case has been filed or instituted before the
was doubtful to say the lease, because one of court affecting the validity of the Tax
the alleged signatories is the respondent Declaration on the 19.4 hectare land. Private
mother of Honorata who testified that she was respondent approved the loan, however after
illiterate and could not have signed the releasing the money petitioner found out that
document. the land mortgaged by private respondent
was included in the land covered by TCT
*Possession of petitioners cannot ripen #10101, hence, petitioner immediately
into ownership because such possession was cancelled the loan and demanded immediate
not exclusive as they possess the property at payment. Private respondent repaid the loan.
the same time respondent are also living Spouses Beduya failed to pay their
therein from 1952-1985. 1985 respondent loan and the land in TCT #10101 was
ousted petitioner from the property. forclosed. In 1985 during the foreclosure sale,
DBP was the highest bidder, and as spouses
173) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE Beduya failed to redeem the property,
PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS petitioner consolidated its ownership.
G.R. 129471 April 28, 2000 In 1986, petitioner found out that
Cajes is occupying a part of the land in TCT
FACTS: #10101, DBP demanded that Cajes vacate
The land in dispute has an area of 19.4 the property but private respondent refused,
hectares located in San Miguel, Province of hence, DBP filed a case for Recovery of
Bohol whose original ownership rest with Possession against him. RTC ruled in favor of
Ulpiano Mumar as evidenced by Tax DBP, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
Declaration since 1917. decision declaring Cajes the lawful owner of
In 1950, Mumar sold the subject the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101.
property Carlos Cajes (herein private
respondent) who was issued tax declaration in ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in
the same year. He occupied and cultivated adjudicating that the 19.4 hectares included
the land, planting cassava and camote in in TCT #10101 is owned by private
certain portions of the land. respondent Carlos Cajes?
In 1969, unknown to private
respondent, Jose Alvarez was able to register HELD: Yes, Court of Appeals is correct.
a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468 Acquisitive prescription already vested in
square meters and OCT #546 was issued in Carlos Cajes ownership of the 19.4 hectares of
the same year in his name. In 1972 Alvarez land he was paying tax on since he has been
sold the property to spouses Beduya to whom in open public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and
TCT #10101 was issued, the former and the adverse possession of the said property in the
latter never occupied the said lot the property concept of an owner since 1950. Ordinary
included in it the 19.4 hectares owned by prescription requires only such possession for
Cajes. Ten (10) years. Thus, in 1969, when the
In the same year, 1972, spouse spouses Beduya were able to register their
Beduya acquired a loan from DBP and land under TCT #10101, the private
mortgage the the land under TCT #10101 for respondent Cajes already acquired ownership
P526,000.00, and in 1978 it was again over the 19.4 hectares he acquired from
mortgage for another loan in the amount of Mumar who have been in possession as an
owner since 1917. Surely, private respondents
193
possession together with Mumars possession shares of four of the heirs of Felipe, namely,
and occupation of the 19.4 hectares is more Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar,
than Thirty (30) years required under Act no. spouse of Benito, was purchased by Leon as
496. evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed on
Although the initial case is recovery of August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971.
possession of real property, and collateral Leon sometime in July 1970, executed a sale
attack is not allowed in to defeat the and partition of the property in favor of his
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, the counter own children, herein petitioners. By virtue of
claim of the private respondent when he such Deed of Partition, private respondents
raised the counterclaim of ownership plus had succeeded in obtaining Original
damages, was in fact a direct attack on the Certificate of Title (OCT) No. C-256. On April
title. 25, 1975, petitioners managed to secure
DBP cannot be considered a separate and independent titles over their
mortgagor in good faith because being a pro-indiviso shares in their respective names.
bank, it is required to exercise due diligence Private respondents then filed a case for
in its dealings as such are impress with public partition with annulment of documents and
concern. It appears from the facts that it did reconveyance with the Regional Trial Court of
not conduct inspection of the property of Kalibo, Aklan, Private respondents contended
spouses Beduya when they applied for loan. that the sale in favor of Leon was fraudulently
Also, even when it has knowledge since 1978 obtained through m the Regional Trial Court of
that the private respondent has a claim in the Kalibo rendered its decision in Civil Case No.
land covered by TCT #10101, it still bought 2389, declaring "the defendants the legal
the land in question in the foreclosure sale in owners of the property in question through
1985 ignoring the fact that would normally machinations and false pretenses. On appeal
raise suspicion because private respondent is The CA Reversed the Trial courts ruling.
occupying a part of the said lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court
erred in failing to declare action by the private
respondents to recover the property in
question barred by laches, estoppel,
prescription.
RULING:
174) VILLANUEVA VS CA
G.R. No. 108921 April 12, 2000 Laches is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the
FACTS: presumption that the party entitled to assert
Petitioners are the legitimate children of Leon it has either abandoned or declined to assert
Villanueva, Concepcion Macahilas vda. de it. Its essential elements are: (1) conduct on
Villanueva is his widow. Leon was one of eight the part of the defendant, or of one under
(8) children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor- whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
in-interest of the parties in the present complained of; (2) delay in asserting
case.Private respondents are related by blood complainant's right after he had knowledge of
to the petitioners as descendants of Felipe. the defendant's conduct and after he has an
. The remaining undivided portion of the opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or
land was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs. notice on the part of the defendant that the
During Leon's lifetime, his co-heirs made complainant would assert the right on which
several seasonable and lawful demands upon he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to
him to subdivide and partition the property, the defendant in the event relief is accorded
but for one reason or another, no subdivision to the complainant.
took place.
At the time of signing of the Deed of Sale of
After the death of Leon in August 1972, August 26, 1948, private respondents ,
private respondents discovered that the Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not
194
be faulted for their failure to file a case to Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were
recover their inheritance from their uncle awarded a homestead patent over a parcel of
Leon, since up to the age of majority, they land. Upon their death, private respondent
believed and considered Leon their co-heir Luis Duaman, one of their children, inherited a
and administrator. It was only in 1975, not in four-hectare portion of the homestead. On 21
1948, that they became aware of the July 1976, in order to expedite the loan
actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon application of his two (2) sons, Ernesto and
learning of their uncle's actions, they filed an Elpidio Duaman, with the Development Bank
action for recovery. of the Philippines, private respondent
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to transferred to them the ownership of his share
petitioners' assertion. Under the in the homestead.
circumstances of the instant case, we do not On 8 August 1985, in view of the imminence
think that respondent appellate court erred in of foreclosure of the said lot by the bank,
considering private respondents' action. The Ernesto and Elpidio sold the two-hectare
action was not too late. portion thereof to Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr. for
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an P30,000.00. The vendee named in the deed of
implied trust was created by operation of law sale was Ellen M.T. Fontanilla. . Sometime
between Felipe's children and Leon, their later, private respondent informed Eduardo
uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon's Fontanilla of his desire to repurchase the
fraudulent titling of Felipe's 1/6 share was a subject lot.
betrayal of that implied trust Private respondent filed a case with the RTC of
Neither is the action barred by prescription, Cauayan Isabela against petitioners for the
we held that an action for reconveyance of a "Repurchase of the Homestead. Upon motion
parcel of land based on implied or filed by petitioners, the lower court dismissed
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the private respondent's complaint for failure to
point of reference being the date of state a cause of action
registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title of the On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the
property. Here the questioned Deed of Sale trial court.The CA held that private
was registered only in 1971. Private respondent could still exercise the right to
respondents filed their complaint in 1975, repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
hence well within the prescriptive period. Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended) despite the fact that it was not him
We held that a land registration case is an but his sons who conveyed the subject lot to
action in rem binding upon the whole world, petitioners.
and considering that the private respondents
failed to object to the registration of the realty ISSUE: Whether private respondent, not being
in question, then res judicata had set in. True, the vendor in the sale of the subject lot to
but notwithstanding the binding effect of the petitioners, could no longer exercise his right
land registration case upon the private to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
respondents, the latter are not deprived of a Land Act against petitioners.
remedy. While a review of the decree of
registration is no longer available after the RULING:
expiration of the one-year period from entry
thereof, an equitable remedy is still available. Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired
Those wrongfully deprived of their property under the free patent or homestead
may initiate an action for reconveyance of the provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
properly. repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years from
175) Eduardo Fontanilla vs Court of the date of conveyance.(Commonwealth Act
Appeals 141)
G.R. No. 119341, November 29, 1999 these homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the "
FACTS: State to land-destitute citizens for their home
195
and cultivation." 2 Further, the plain intent of 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private
Section 119 is "to give the homesteader or respondent's complaint for the repurchase of
patentee every chance to preserve for himself the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June
and his family the land that the State had 1989, was not time-barred as not more than
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its
labor in cleaning and cultivating it. conveyance to petitioners.
Petitioners argue that private respondent
could no longer avail himself of the right to 176) Quimen Vs. CA and Yolanda
repurchase under Section 119 because he Oliveros
was not the vendor of the subject lot. Only the G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996
vendor allegedly has the right to repurchase.
Petitioners claim is without merit, Facts:
Our pronouncement in Madarcos that only Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together
the vendor has the right to repurchase was with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio
taken out of context by petitioners. Said and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property
pronouncement may not be sweepingly situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to
applied in this case because of a significant subdivide the property equally among
factual difference between the two cases. In themselves, as they did, with the shares of
Madarcos, we ruled that Cantain (petition Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
herein) cannot repurchase the share of abutting the municipal road.
Francisca, his co-heir, because the homestead
had already been partitioned and distributed In February 1982 Yolanda purchased a part of
among them as heirs. In other words, in that the lot from her uncle Antonio through her
case, we held that Catain could not avail aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
himself of the right granted under Section 119 administratrix. According to Yolanda, when
because he was not entitled to repurchase the petitioner offered her the property for sale she
share of his co-heir in the homestead. Upon was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a
the other hand, in this case, private public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her
respondent is precisely seeking to repurchase to buy the lot with the assurance that she
from petitioners his own share in the would give her a right of way on her adjoining
homestead that he inherited from his parents. property for P200.00 per square meter.
There is nothing in Section 119 which Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on
provides that the applicant, his widow, or the lot she bought using as her passageway
legal heirs" must be the conveyor of the to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's
homestead before any of them can exercise property. But when Yolanda finally offered to
the right to repurchase. Rather, what said law pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia
plainly provides is that the "applicant, his refused to accept the payment. In fact she
widow, or legal heirs" shall be entitled to was thereafter barred by Anastacia from
repurchase the homestead within (5) years passing through her property. In February
from the date of conveyance. In this case, 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of
there is no dispute that private respondent is Antonio Quimen, located directly behind the
the legal heir of spouses Crisanto and property of her parents who provided her a
Feliciana Duaman, the homesteaders. pathway Although the pathway leads to the
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private municipal road it is not adequate for ingress
respondent to his sons does not fall within the and egress. The municipal road cannot be
purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows reached with facility because the store itself
that the five-year period to repurchase cannot obstructs the path so that one has to pass
be reckoned from the date of said through the back entrance and the facade of
conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance the store to reach the road.
for the purpose of counting the five-year On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action
period to repurchase under Section 119 is that with the trial court praying for a right of way
alienation made to a third party outside of the through Anastacia's property. The trial court
family circle which in this case was the dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on action.
196
Golf. The other half is supposed to be owned

On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court by Hacienda Benito with whom Valley Golf
of Appeals reversed the lower court and held entered into an agreement, whereby it was
that she was entitled to a right of way on agreed that Hacienda Benito and Valley Golf
petitioner's property will own jointly Victoria Valley Blvd, one of the
provisions provide that the right of way shall
ISSUE: Whether Yolanda is entitled to a right be owned and maintained jointly by Hacienda
of way on her property Benito and Valley Golf.
Thereafter, Hacienda Benito transferred
RULING: ownership and all its rights and interests over
the road lots covering half of the Victoria
YES, she is entitled. Yolanda sufficiently Valley Blvd. to herein plaintiff-appellee Valley
established the presence of the ff: Land by virtue of a Mutual Agreement Valley
1. her estate (dominant estate) is Golf treated and recognized Valley Land as its
surrounded by other immovable without an alleged new co-owner over Victoria Valley
adequate outlet to public highway; Blvd., sharing half of all the proceeds of the
2. she is willing to pay the proper grant of right of way over the boulevard.
indemnity; However, in a subsequent review of the
3. the isolation was not due to the acts of agreement between Valley Golf and Hacienda
Yolanda; and Benito, Valley Golf discovered that there is
4. the right of way being claimed is at a actually no existing co-ownership between
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. them over Victoria Valley Blvd. Valley Golf
retained exclusive ownership over the road
The criterion of least prejudicial to the lots forming part of Victoria Valley Blvd.
servient estate must prevail over the criterion notwithstanding their agreement, and that the
of shortest distance. Where the easement other half of the boulevard is no longer under
may be established on any of several the name of either Hacienda Benito or Valley
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, Land as the same has been disposed of
the one where the way is shortest and will already and is registered in favor of the Active
cause the least damage should be chosen. Realty & Dev't. Corp.
However, if these 2 circumstances do not
concur, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used even if it will not be Based on said discovery, Valley Golf sought to
the shortest. In this case, Anastacias recover the sum of money which it allegedly
property is least prejudicial since it will not remitted by mistake to Valley Land which
entail the demolition of a sari-sari store which represents the supposed share of the latter in
is made of strong materials. the grant of right of way. Valley Land in turn
sought the cancellation of Valley Golf s titles
As between a right of way that would over the road lots forming half of Victoria
demolish a store of strong materials to Valley Blvd. The cases were filed before the
provide egress to a public highway, and Regional Trial Court of Antipolo and
another right of way which although longer consolidated therein. In due time, the assailed
will require an avocado tree to be cut down, decision was rendered and brought to this
the second alternative should be preferred. Court on appeal by Valley Golf
177) Valley Land Resources vs Valley ISSUE: Whether Valley Golf is the sole owner
Golf Club of the subject road lots, or Valley Land is a co-
G.R. No. 126584. November 15, 2001 owner thereof
Facts: RULING: Valley Golf is the sole owner of the

Victoria Valley Blvd is composed of road lots road lots.
which connects Ortigas Avenue and Sumulong
Highway. Half of the Boulevard is made up of The TCTs which are the subject of the road
road lots owned by defendant-appellant Valley right of way and all the rest of the other
197
certificates of title covering the road lots are taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's
solely in the name of Valley Golf. fragile condition, caused the execution of the
Consequently, there can be no question that deeds of donation, and, that the documents
Valley Golf is the owner of the road lots. As are void for failing to comply with the
such owner, Valley Golf has the right to enjoy provisions of the Civil Code regarding
and dispose of the same without any formalities of wills and testaments,
limitations other than those established by considering that these are donations mortis
law. causa. Respondents prayed that they be
declared as co-owners of the properties in
However, Valley Golf made the mistake of equal shares, together with Nicolas
sharing the proceeds of the right of way with Cabatingan.
Valley Land. Considering that when the said
amount was given to Valley Land, it did not RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of
have the right to receive the amount as Valley respondents by declaring the 4 Deeds of
Golf delivered it under the mistaken belief Donation as null and void for being a Donation
that Valley Land was a co-owner of the lands, Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with
thus Valley Land was under obligation to formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of
return the amount of P1,585,962.96. the New Civil Code; declaring respondents as
co-owners of the properties of Conchita
178) Cabatingan vs heirs of Corazon
Cabatingan ISSUE: Whether or not the donations are
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002 mortis causa or inter vivos
FACTS: RULING: The Donations in this case are

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan Mortis Causa.
executed in favor of her brother, petitioner In a Donation Mortis Causa, "the right of
Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of disposition is not transferred to the donee
Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" while the donor is still alive." In determining
covering () portion of the former's house whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
and lot located at Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other following characteristics must be taken into
deeds of donation were subsequently account:
executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January
14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the
Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - transferee before the death of the transferor;
one located in Cogon, Cebu and the other, a transferor retains ownership (full or naked)
portion of a parcel of land in Masbate. (b) and control of the property while alive;
petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a (2) Before his death, the transfer should be
parcel of land located in Masbate (and (c) revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of (3) The transfer should be void if the
the Masbate property These deeds of transferor should survive the transferee.
donation contain similar provisions:
"That for and in consideration of the love and In the present case, the nature of the
affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the
the DONOR transfers, conveys, by way of fact that the donations do not contain any
donation, unto the DONEE the above clear provision that intends to pass
property, to become effective upon the death proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
of the DONOR xxx Cabatingan's death. It establishes the donor's
intention to transfer the ownership and
Upon learning of the existence of these possession of the donated property to the
donations, respondents filed with the RTC an donee only after the former's death. The
action for Annulment And Declaration of phrase "to become effective upon the death
Nullity of Deed of Donations and Accounting. of the DONOR" admits of no other
Respondents allege that petitioners, through interpretation but that Cabatingan did not
their sinister machinations and strategies and intend to transfer the ownership of the
198
properties to petitioners during her lifetime. when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
the donations as mortis causa in the following
Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code
found in the subject deeds of donation, "That provides that "in order that the donation of an
the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
donation mortis causa. public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the
179) GONZALES vs. CA charges which the donee must satisfy." Article
G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001 709 of the same Code explicitly states that
"the titles of ownership, or other rights over
FACTS: immovable property, which are not duly
The deceased spouses Ignacio inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the property shall not prejudice third persons.
registered owners of two parcels of From the foregoing provisions, it may be
agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, inferred that as between the parties to a
Cabanatuan City, Herein petitioners are the donation of an immovable property, all that is
successors-in-interest or the children and required is for said donation to be contained
grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On in a public document. Registration is not
the other hand, private respondents are the necessary for it to be considered valid and
farmers and tenants of said spouses who have effective. However, in order to bind third
been cultivating the parcels of land even persons, the donation must be registered in
before World War II either personally or the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land
through their predecessors-in-interest. Titles and Deeds). Although the non-
registration of a deed of donation shall not
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died affect its validity, the necessity of registration
intestate and appointed as administratrix of comes into play when the rights of third
her estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
to the partition of said estate, Ignacio It is undisputed in this case that the donation
Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation on July executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
12, 1972 conveying his share of the property. grandchildren, although in writing and duly
notarized, has not been registered in
When Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) accordance with law. For this reason, it shall
took effect on October 21, 1972, the not be binding upon private respondents who
landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were did not participate in said deed or had no
placed under Operation Land Transfer by actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the
virtue of said decree, and private respondents deed of donation is valid between the donor
were accordingly issued the corresponding and the donees, such deed, however, did not
Certificates of Land Transfer and bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties
Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, the to the donation. From the foregoing, the
administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the
application for retention with the then Ministry unregistered deed of donation cannot operate
of Agrarian Reform, requesting that their to exclude the subject land from the coverage
property be excluded from the coverage of of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27,
Operation Land Transfer. Department of which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule
Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution dated otherwise would render ineffectual the rights
February 23, 1983 recommending that the and interests that the tenants-farmers
land subject of the deed of donation, or Lot immediately acquired upon the promulgation
No. 551-C, be exempt from Operation Land of P.D. No. 27.
Transfer.
180) Republic vs. Leon Silim
ISSUE:Whether the property subject of the G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001
deed of donation which was not registered
FACTS:
199
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Not satisfied with the decision of the trial
Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, court, respondents appealed in which the
donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, trial court and declared the donation null and
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur void on the grounds that the donation was not
(BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents properly accepted and the condition imposed
imposed the condition that the said property on the donation was violated.
should "be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only."1 This donation was ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of HELD: Donations, according to its purpose or
Acceptance and Confirmation of Donation. cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or
Through a fund raising campaign simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory;
spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. An
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school onerous donation is that which imposes upon
building was constructed on the donated land. the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be
However, the Bagong Lipunan school building more precise, this is the kind of donation
that was supposed to be allocated for the made for a valuable consideration, the cost of
donated parcel of land in Barangay which is equal to or more than the thing
Kauswagan could not be released since the donated. Unlike the other forms of donation,
government required that it be built upon a the validity of and the rights and obligations
one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this of the parties involved in an onerous donation
predicament, Assistant School Division are completely governed not by the law on
Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga donations but by the law on contracts (Article
del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District 733 Civil Code). The donation involved in the
Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for present controversy is one which is onerous
the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old since there is a burden imposed upon the
school site of Kauswagan Elementary School donee to build a school on the donated
to a new and suitable location which would fit property.
the specifications of the government.
Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia In accordance to Art. 745 & 749, there was a
and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of valid acceptance of the donation in this case.
Exchange whereby the donated lot was The written acceptance of the donation
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the having been considered by the trial court in
latter.. arriving at its decision, there is the
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his presumption that this exhibit was properly
surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was offered and admitted by the court. Also, a
constructing a house on the donated land, he school building was immediately constructed
asked the latter why he was building a house after the donation was executed. Silim had
on the property he donated to BPS. Vice knowledge of the existence of the school
Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is building put up on the lot.
already the owner of the said property.
Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop The condition for the donation in this case
the construction of the house on the donated was not violated when the lot donated was
property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma exchanged with another one. The purpose for
advised him to just file a case in court. the donation remains the same - for the
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a establishment of a school. The exclusivity of
Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of the purpose was not altered or affected. In
Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of fact, the exchange of the lot for a much
Exchange and Recovery of Possession and bigger one was in furtherance and
Ownership of Real Property with damages enhancement of the purpose of the donation.
against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma before the The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the
RTC of Pagadian City which dismissed the way for the release of funds for the
complaint for lack of merit. construction of Bagong Lipunan School Bldg
200
which could not be accommodated by the will, the trial court ruled that respondents'
limited area of the donated lot. deed of extrajudicial settlement cannot be
registered.
181) QUILALA V. ALCANTARA On appeal, the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 13268, December 3, 2001 rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property action without prejudice to the filing of
Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. will and testament.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page ISSUE: validity of the donation executed by
contains the deed of donation itself, and is Catalina in favor of Violeta
signed on the bottom portion by Catalina
Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, HELD: Article 749 of the Civil Code, the
and two instrumental witnesses. The second donation of an immovable must be made in a
page contains the Acknowledgment, which public instrument in order to be valid,
states merely that Catalina Quilala personally specifying therein the property donated and
appeared before the notary public and the value of the charges which the donee
acknowledged that the donation was her free must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring
and voluntary act and deed. There appear on ownership, donation results in an effective
the left-hand margin of the second page the transfer of title over the property from the
signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the donor to the donee,and is perfected from the
witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the moment the donor knows of the acceptance
signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other by the donee, provided the donee is not
witness. disqualified or prohibited by law from
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. accepting the donation. Once the donation is
Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. accepted, it is generally considered
Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
surviving son of Violeta Quilala.. absolute owner of the property. The
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, acceptance, to be valid, must be made during
Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.It
Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving may be made in the same deed or in a
relatives within the fourth civil degree of separate public document, and the donor
consanguinity, executed a deed of must know the acceptance by the donee.
extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing In the case at bar, the deed of donation
and adjudicating unto themselves the subject contained the number of the certificate of title
property. as well as the technical description of the real
The trial court found that the deed of property donated. It stipulated that the
donation, although signed by both Catalina donation was made for and in consideration of
and Violeta, was acknowledged before a the "love and affection which the DONEE
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of
Consequently, there was no acceptance by liberality and generosity."
Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, Below the terms and stipulations of the
thus rendering the donation null and void. donation, the donor, donee and their
Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere witnesses affixed their signature. However,
in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that the Acknowledgment appearing on the second
Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, page mentioned only the donor, Catalina
Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted Quilala.
child, but there was no positive evidence that The second page of the deed of donation, on
the adoption was legal. On the other hand, which the Acknowledgment appears, was
the trial court found that respondents were signed by the donor and one witness on the
first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, left-hand margin, and by the donee and the
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a other witness on the right hand margin.
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Surely, the requirement that the contracting Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122,
parties and their witnesses should sign on the owned by the Jacinto family, on the
left-hand margin of the instrument is not northwest.
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is On February 17, 1992, Respondent spouses
to ensure that each and every page of the Fajardo filed a complaint against petitioner
instrument is authenticated by the parties. Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida
The requirement is designed to avoid the Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
falsification of the contract after the same has easement of right of way. Respondents
already been duly executed by the parties. alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded
Simply put, the specification of the location of by properties belonging to other persons,
the signature is merely directory. The fact that including those of the petitioners; that since
one of the parties signs on the wrong side of respondents have no adequate outlet to the
the page does not invalidate the document. provincial road, an easement of a right of way
The purpose of authenticating the page is passing through either of the alternative
served, and the requirement in the above- petitioners properties which are directly
quoted provision is deemed substantially abutting the provincial road would be
complied with. respondents only convenient, direct and
In the same vein, the lack of an shortest access to and from the provincial
acknowledgment by the donee before the road; that respondents predecessors-in-
notary public does not also render the interest have been passing through the
donation null and void. The instrument should properties of petitioners going to and from
be treated in its entirety. It cannot be their lot; that petitioners' mother even
considered a private document in part and a promised respondents' predecessors-in-
public document in another part. The fact that interest to grant the latter an easement of
it was acknowledged before a notary public right of way as she acknowledged the
converts the deed of donation in its entirety a absence of an access from their property to
public instrument. The fact that the donee the road; and that alternative petitioners,
was not mentioned by the notary public in the despite respondents request for a right of way
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, and referral of the dispute to the barangay
it is the conveyance that should be officials, refused to grant them an easement.
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In Thus, respondents prayed that an easement
any event, the donee signed on the second of right of way on the lots of defendants be
page, which contains the Acknowledgment established in their favor.
only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a
forth on the first page of the notarized deed of motion to dismiss on the ground that the
donation, was made in a public instrument. lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the
case since plaintiffs failed to refer the matter
182) SPOUSES STA. MARIA V. to the barangay lupon. The lower court,
COURT OF APPEALS however, in its Order dated May 18, 1992,
G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998 denied said motion on the premise that there
was substantial compliance with the law.
FACTS: Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo The trial court found that based on the Ocular
are the registered owners of a piece of land, Inspection Report there was no other way
Lot No. 124, located at Paco, Obando, through which the private respondents could
Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a Deed establish a right of way in order to reach the
of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 1992 provincial road except by traversing directly
executed by the vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et the property of the petitioners.
al. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by a court that the private respondents had
fishpond on the northeast portion thereof; by sufficiently established the existence of the
Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the four requisites for compulsory easement of
southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of right of way on petitioners' property, to wit:
Lot 6-b, owned respectively by Spouses Cesar (1) private respondents' property was, as
and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. revealed by the Ocular inspection Report,
202
surrounded by other immovables owned by the one where the way is shortest and will
different individuals and was without an cause the least damage should be chosen.The
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) the conditions of "least damage" and "shortest
isolation of private respondents' property was distance" are both established in one
not due to their own acts, as it was already tenement petitioners' property.
surrounded by other immovables when they As to the "daang tao" at the back of private
purchased it; (3) petitioners' property would respondents' property, it must be stressed
provide the shortest way from private that under Article 651 the width of the
respondents' property to the provincial road, easement of right of way shall be that which
and this way would cause the least prejudice is sufficient for the needs of the dominant
because no significant structure would be estate, and may accordingly be changed from
injured thereby; and (4) the private time to time. Therefore, the needs of the
respondents were willing to pay the dominant estate determine the width of the
corresponding damages provided for by law if easement.The needs of private respondents'
the right of way would be granted. property could hardly be served by this
"daang tao" located at the back and which is
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY bordered by a fishpond.
RIGHT OF WAY CAN BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS 183) CRISTOBAL V. COURT OF APPEALS
291 SCRA 122
HELD: In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals have correctly found the existence of FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot
the requisites. Private respondents' property situated at Visayas Avenue Extension,
is landlocked by neighboring estates Quezon City, where they have been residing
belonging to different owners. from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar
Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner
The petitioners try to convince the Court that of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas
there are two other existing passage ways Avenue which once included the disputed
over the property of Cruz and over that of residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2, located
Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for private adjacent to petitioners' property. Lots 1 and 2
respondents' use. But the examination of the were originally part of a private road known
records yields otherwise. Said lots of Cruz and as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar
Jacinto do not have existing passage ways for Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using Road Lot
the private respondents to use. Moreover, the 2 in going to and from the nearest public
Ocular Inspection Report reveals that the road. When Visayas Avenue became
suggested alternative ways through Cruz's or operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar
Jacinto's properties are longer and "circuitous" Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC
than that through petitioners' property. This is of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road
also clear from the Sketch Plan submitted by Lot 2 into residential lots. The petition was
the private respondents wherein it is readily granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted
seen that the lots of Cruz and Jacinto are only into residential lots designated as lot 1 and lot
adjacent to that of private respondents unlike 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold
that of petitioners which is directly in front of both lots to Macario Pacione. In turn, Macario
private respondents' property in relation to Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and
the public highway. dauhter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the Lerma Pacione.
easement of right of way shall be established When the Pacione spouses, who intended to
at the point least prejudicial to the servient build a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this 1987, they found out that the lot was
rule, where the distance from the dominant occupied by a squatter named Juanita
estate to a public highway may be the Geronimo and a portion was being used a
shortest. Where there are several tenements passageway by petitioners to and from
surrounding the dominant estate, and the Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses
easement may be established on any of them, complained about the intrusion into their
203
property to the Barangay Office. When the outlet was determined by the court a quo to
parties failed to arrive at an amicable be sufficient for the needs of the dominants
settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot estate, hence petitioners have no cause to
1 with a concrete fence. complain that they have no adequate outlet
Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging to Visayas Avenue.
that their property was bounded on all sides Further, no evidence was adduced by
by residential houses belonging to different petitioners to prove that the easement they
owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet seek to impose on private respondents'
to Visayas Avenue except through the property is to be established at a point least
property of the Paciones. As their protests prejudicial to the servient estate. For
went unheeded, petitioners instituted an emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters
action for easement of right of way. and an improvident imposition of the
At the instance of the parties, the trial court easement on the lot may unjustly deprive
ordered an ocular inspection of the property. private respondents of the optimum use and
The trial court dismissed the complaint enjoyment of their property, considering that
holding that one essential requisite of a legal its already small area will be reduced further
easement of right of way was not proved, i.e., by the easement. Worse, it may even render
the absence of an alternative adequate way the property useless for the purpose for which
or outlet to a public highway, in this case, private respondents purchased the same.
Visayas Avenue. It must also be stressed that, by its very
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals nature, and when considered with reference
rendered its assailed decision affirming the to the obligations imposed on the servient
findings of the trial court. estate, an easement involves an abnormal
restriction on the property rights of the
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are entitled servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
to a compulsory easement of encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it
right of way is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant
estate to establish by clear and convincing
HELD: To be entitled to a compulsory evidence the presence of all the preconditions
easement of right of way, the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this
Code must be established. These are: (1) that regard.
the dominant estate is surrounded by other On the question of adequacy of the
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a existing outlet, petitioners allege that the
public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has path walk is much longer, circuitous and
been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one has
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a
estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at private road, then enter, then vacant lot, and
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate turn right again to exit from the vacant lot
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, until one reaches petitioners' property.
where the distance from the dominant estate We find petitioners' concept of what is
to a public highway may be the shortest.The "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the
burden of proving the existence of these well-entrenched doctrine that in order to
prerequisites lies on the owner of the justify the imposition of an easement of right
dominant estate. of way there must be a real, not ficititious or
In the present case, the first element is artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience
clearly absent. As found by the trial court and for the dominant estate is not what is required
the Court of Appeals, an outlet already exist, by law as the basis for setting up a
which is a path walk located at the left side of compulsory easement. Even in the face of
petitioners' property and which is connected necessity, if it can be satisfied without
to a private road about five hundred (500) imposing the easement, the same should not
meters long. The private road, in turn, leads be imposed
to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters Admittedly, the proposed right of way
wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This over private respondents' property is the most
204
convenient, being the shorter and the more Among the improvements for removal were
direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is the power lines and electric posts belonging
not enough that the easement be where the to petitioner.
way is shortest. It is more improtant that it be Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground
where it will cause the least prejudice to the that petitioner was not a party to the case
servient estate. As discussed elsewhere, and therefore not bound by the judgment of
petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate the trial court and that it had subsisting right-
that the proposed right of way shall be at a of-way agreements over said property.
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The trial court proceeded with the hearing
despite the fact that petitioner had no counsel
present. Thus, only Vines Realty presented its
evidence.
184) CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC On the same date, November 27, 1992, the
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) V. trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
COURT OF APPEALS demolition.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition
345 SCRA 85 with restraining order and preliminary
injunction and the same was granted.
On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued
FACTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste another order directing the National Power
filed with the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, a Corporation sub-unit in Camarines Norte to
complaint for collection of a sum of money shut off the power lines .
and foreclosure of mortgage against On the same day, December 11, 1992,
Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, electric posts professedly using a chainsaw
the trial court declared PSC in default and and resulting in a loud blast affecting the
allowed plaintiff Leviste to present evidence area.
ex-parte. Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan
On November 23, 1989, the trial court at San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. desist from proceeding with the demolition
When the decision became final and due to a restraining order but to no avail.
executory, the trial court issued a writ of On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an
execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. alias writ of demolition
Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land
issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty
of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land demolished the remaining electric posts
were sold at public auction in favor of Vines resulting in the cutting off of power supply to
Realty Corporation. On April 25, 1990, the various business establishments and
Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, barangays.
issued a Certificate of Sale which Judge Luis Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of
D. Dictado, in his capacity as executive judge, Appeals, promulgated a decision dismissing
approved. the petition for lack of merit.
On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent
issuance of a writ of possession over said basic need, petitioner re-constructed its
property. On June 25, 1992, the trial court power lines along the provincial road leading
granted the motion. to the Port of Osmea upon authority of DPWH.
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner
possession was served on petitioner as owner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating
of the power lines standing on certain that Vines Realty was the owner of the
portions of the subject property. Later, on roadside and that petitioner could not
August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an construct power lines therein without its
amended motion for an order of demolition permission. Petitioner promptly replied that
and removal of improvements on the subject the power lines were constructed within the
land.
205
right of way of the provincial road leading to it was taken by the Government are the
the port of Osmea as granted by the District criteria for determining just compensation. No
Engineer of DPWH. matter how commendable petitioners purpose
Hence this petition. is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be
compensated the fair and full equivalent for
ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to retain the taking of its property, which is the
possession of the power lines located in the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
land sold at public auction as a result of extra- would accrue to the expropriating entity.
judicial foreclosure of mortgage
185) VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO
HELD: The most basic tenet of due process is
the right to be heard. A court denies a party 346 SCRA 99
due process if it renders its orders without
giving such party an opportunity to present its
evidence. This Court finds that petitioner FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the
was denied due process. Petitioner could have registered owner of the parcel of land in
negated private respondents claims by Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking
showing the absence of legal or factual basis Corporation, the mortgagee of said property.
therefor if only the trial court in the exercise The bank had acquired it from the spouses
of justice and equity reset the hearing instead Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction
of proceeding with the trial and issuing an on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought
order of demolition on the same day. the parcel of land there was a small house on
The trial court failed to appreciate the its southeastern portion. It occupied one
nature of electric cooperatives as public meter of the two-meter wide easement of
utilities. right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to
The acquisition of an easement of a the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
right-of-way falls within the purview of the private respondents, in a Contract of
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion Easement of Right of Way.
finds support in easements of right-of-way Unknown to petitioner, even before he
where the Supreme Court sustained the bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed
award of just compensation for private the aforementioned small house that
property condemned for public use. encroached upon the two-meter easement.
However, a simple right-of-way Petitioner was also unaware that private
easement transmits no rights, except the respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley
easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement,
and it is not totally deprived of the use of the damages and with prayer for a writ of
land. It can continue doing what it wants to do preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
with the land, except those that would result against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-
in contact with the wires. interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to
The acquisition of this easement, enforce the contract of easement.
nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued
nature and effect of the installation power a temporary restraining order. On August 13,
lines, the limitations on the use of the land for 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary
an indefinite period deprives private mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to
respondents of its ordinary use. For these provide the right of way and to demolish the
reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of small house encroaching on the easement. On
just compensation, which must be neither August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion
more nor less than the money equivalent of for reconsideration which was also denied.
the property. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
Just compensation has been understood to be and upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision
the just and complete equivalent of the loss, became final and executory on July 31, 1992.
which the owner of the res expropriated has On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso
to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued an
value of the land and its character at the time Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the
206
sheriff tried to demolish the small house ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs
pursuant to the writ. the easement in view of the needs of private
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition respondents estate.
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals Petitioners second proposition, that he is not
asserting that the existence of the easement bound by the contract of easement because
of right of way was not annotated in his title the same was not annotated in the title and
and that he was not a party to the Civil Case. that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to enforce the easement was not recorded
for lack of merit and denied the with the Register of Deeds, is obviously
reconsideration. unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in
the nature of legal easement that the servient
ISSUE: whether the easement on the estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to
property binds petitioner provide the dominant estate (of private
respondents in this case) ingress from and
HELD: The subject easement (right of way) egress to the public highway.
originally was voluntarily constituted by Petitioners last argument that he was not a
agreement between the Gabriels and the party to Civil Case and that he had not been
Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the given his day in court, is also without merit
Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant under Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a of Court.
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by Simply stated, a decision in a case is
necessity or a legal easement. A legal conclusive and binding upon the parties to
easement is one mandated by law, said case and those who are their successor in
constituted for public use or for private interest by title after said case has been
interest, and becomes a continuing property commenced or filed in court. In this case,
right. As a compulsory easement, it is private respondents, Julio Sebastian and
inseparable from the estate to which it Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case on May 8,
belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of 1991, against the original owners, the
the Civil Code. spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in
The essential requisites for an easement to be the name of petitioner was entered in the
compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he
surrounded by other immovables and has no bought the property from the bank which had
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the decision in Civil Case binds petitioner. For,
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor although not a party to the suit, he is a
of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way successor-in-interest by title subsequent to
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the the commencement of the action in court.
servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the 186) COSTABELLA CORPORATION V. CA
distance from the dominant estate to a public 193 SCRA 332
highway may be the shortest. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals have declared the FACTS: petitioner owns the real estate
existence of said easement (right of way). properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago,
This finding of fact of both courts below is Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a
conclusive on this Court, hence there is no resort and hotel. The private respondents, on
need to further review, but only to re-affirm, the other hand, are the owners of adjoining
this finding. The small house occupying one properties.
meter of the two-meter wide easement Before the petitioner began the construction
obstructs the entry of private respondents of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter going to and from their respective properties
is insufficient for the needs of private and the provincial road, passed through a
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs passageway which traversed the petitioner's
of the dominant estate determine the width of property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the
the easement. Conformably then, petitioner aforementioned passageway when it began
207
the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless passageway as they (private respondents)
opened another route across its property had another existing and adequate access to
through which the private respondents, as in the public road through other properties. With
the past, were allowed to pass. Sometime in respect to the dike it allegedly constructed,
August, 1982, when it undertook the the petitioner stated that what it built was a
construction of the second phase of its beach breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its
hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus property and not a dike as claimed by the
closing even the alternative passageway and private respondents. Moreover, contrary to
preventing the private respondents from the private respondents' accusation, the said
traversing any part of it. construction had benefitted the community
As a direct consequence of these closures, an especially the fishermen who used the same
action for injunction with damages was filed as mooring for their boats during low tide. The
against the petitioner by the private quantity of flotsam and debris which had
respondents on September 2, 1982. In their formed on the private respondents' beach
complaint, the private respondents assailed front on the other hand were but the natural
the petitioner's closure of the original and unavoidable accumulations on beaches
passageway which they (private respondents) by the action of the tides and movement of
claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" the waves of the sea.
that had been existing before World War II and After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
since then had been used by them, the on March 15, 1984 finding that the private
community, and the general public, either as respondents had acquired a vested right over
pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going the passageway in controversy based on its
to and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other long existence and its continued use and
parts of the country. The private respondents enjoyment not only by the private
averred that by closing the alleged road right respondents, but also by the community at
of way in question, the petitioner had large. The petitioner in so closing the said
deprived them access to their properties and passageway, had accordingly violated the
caused them damages. private respondents' vested right.
In the same complainant, the private The respondent Appellate Court held as
respondents likewise alleged that the without basis the trial court's finding that the
petitioner had constructed a dike on the private respondents had acquired a vested
beach fronting the latter's property without right over the passageway in question by
the necessary permit, obstructing the passage virtue of prescription. The appellate court
of the residents and local fishermen, and pointed out that an easement of right of way
trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. is a discontinuous one which, under Article
They also claimed that the debris and flotsam 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be
that had accumulated prevented them from acquired by virtue of a title and not by
using their properties for the purpose for prescription.
which they had acquired them. The complaint
this prayed for the trial court to order the re- ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the
opening of the original passageway across the respondent appellate court is grossly
petitioner's property as well as the erroneous and not in accord with the
destruction of the dike. provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
In its answer, the petitioner denied the Code on easements and the prevailing
existence of an ancient road through its jurisprudence on the matter
property and counter-averred, among others,
that it and its predecessors-in-interest had HELD: The petition is meritorious.
permitted the temporary, intermittent, and It is already well-established that an
gratuitous use of, or passage through, its easement of right of way, as is involved here,
property by the private respondents and is discontinuous and as such can not be
others by mere tolerance and purely as an act acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as
of neighborliness. At any rate, the petitioner the appellate court adhered to the foregoing
alleged, the private respondents were not precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after
entirely dependent on the subject making the correct pronouncement, the
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respondent Appellate Court did not order the the imposition of an easement or right of way,
reversal of the trial court's decision and the "there must be a real, not a fictitious or
dismissal of the complaint after holding that artificial necessity for it."
no easement had been validly constituted Further, the private respondents failed to
over the petitioner's property. Instead, the indicate in their complaint or even to manifest
Appellate Court went on to commit a during the trial of the case that they were
reversible error by considering the willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the
passageway in issue as a compulsory right of way to be established over its
easement which the private respondents, as property. Neither have the private
owners of the "dominant" estate, may respondents been able to show that the
demand from the petitioner the latter being isolation of their property was not due to their
the owner of the "servient" estate. personal or their predecessors-in-interest's
Based on Article 649 and 650 of the Civil own acts. Finally, the private respondents
Code, Based on the foregoing, the owner of failed to allege, much more introduce any
the dominant estate may validly claim a evidence, that the passageway they seek to
compulsory right of way only after he has be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to
established the existence of four requisites, to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner
wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded operates a hotel and beach resort in its
by other immovables and is without adequate property, it must undeniably maintain a strict
outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment standard of security within its premises.
of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and
not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) safety of its clients and patrons would be
the right of way claimed is at a point least compromised. That indubitably will doom the
prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, petitioner's business. It is therefore of great
the burden of proving the existence of the importance that the claimed light of way over
foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the petitioner's property be located at a point
the dominant estate. least prejudicial to its business.
Here, there is absent any showing that the As also earlier indicated, there must be a real
private respondents had established the necessity therefor, and not mere convenience
existence of the four requisites mandated by for the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an
law. For one, they failed to prove that there is existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the
no adequate outlet from their respective highway, the "dominant" estate can not
properties to a public highway. On the demand a right of way, although the same
contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its may not be convenient. Of course, the
answer to the complaint, and confirmed by question of when a particular passage may be
the appellate court, "there is another outlet said to be "adequate" depends on the
for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the circumstances of each case.
main road." Thus, the respondent Court of The isolation of the dominant estate is also
Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old dependent on the particular need of the
road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the re- dominant owner, and the estate itself need
opening of the old passageway on the ground not be totally landlocked. What is important to
that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is consider is whether or not a right of way is
inconvenient to the plaintiff." On this score, it necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by
is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost the owner
sight of the fact that the convenience of the But while a right of way is legally
dominant estate has never been the gauge demandable, the owner of the dominant
for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be estate is not at liberty to impose one based
sure, the true standard for the grant of the on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the
legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is Code, it shall be established upon two criteria:
already an existing adequate outlet from the (1) at the point least prejudicial to the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if servient state; and (2) where the distance to a
the said outlet, for one reason or another, be public highway may be the shortest. "The
inconvenient, the need to open up another court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to
servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify establish what is the shortest; a longer way
209
may be established to avoid injury to the property to be added to the existing pathway
servient tenement, such as when there are so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his
constuctions or walls which can be avoided by utter consternation, his request was turned
a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of down by the two widows and further attempts
the dominant owner, such as when the at negotiation proved futile.
shortest distance would place the way on a Petitioner then instituted an action seeking
dangerous decline." the issuance of a writ of easement of a right
of way over an additional width of at least two
187) ENCARNACION V. CA (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-
195 SCRA 74 meter parcel of land.
During the trial, the attention of the lower
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and court was called to the existence of another
private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters
Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of away from the dominant estate. On December
two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment
Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant dismissing petitioner's complaint.
estate. Private respondents co-own the 405- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
square-meter servient estate which is decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987
bounded on the North by the National and rejected petitioner's claim for an
Highway, on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, additional easement. The Appellate Court took
on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the into consideration the presence of a dried
West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the river bed only eighty (80) meters away from
servient estate stands between the dominant the dominant estate and conjectured that
estate and the national road. petitioner might have actually driven his jeep
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was through the river bed in order to get to the
not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, highway, and that the only reason why he
persons going to the national highway just wanted a wider easement through the De
crossed the servient estate at no particular Sagun's estate was that it was more
point. However, in 1960 when private convenient for his business and family needs
respondents constructed a fence around the
servient estate to provide access to the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has
highway. One-half meter width of the path sufficiently established his claim for an
was taken from the servient estate and the additional easement of right of way
other one-half meter portion was taken from
another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No HELD: While there is a dried river bed less
compensation was asked and non was given than 100 meters from the dominant
for the portions constituting the pathway. tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.
It was also about that time that petitioner Generally, the right of way may be
started his plant nursery business on his land demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no
where he also had his abode. He would use access to a public highway, and (2) when,
said pathway as passage to the highway for even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous
his family and for his customers. to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present
Petitioner's plant nursery business through case, the river bed route is traversed by a
sheer hard work flourished and with that, it semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress
became more and more difficult for petitioner nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to
to haul the plants and garden soil to and from reach the level of the highway, it must
the nursery and the highway with the use of literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up.
pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was Moreover, during the rainy season, the river
able to buy an owner-type jeep which he bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it
could use for transporting his plants. can only be used at certain times of the year.
However, that jeep could not pass through the With the inherent disadvantages of the river
roadpath and so he approached the servient bed which make passage difficult, if not
estate owners and requested that they sell to impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their
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Where a private property has no access to a The private respondents are also co-owners of
public road, it has the right of easement over lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. the petitioners. Lot 272-B was later
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that subdivided into two lots where Lot 272-A was
"(t)he width of the easement of right of way assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs pursuant to a memorandum agreement
of the dominant estate, and may accordingly executed by and between them. They are also
be changed from time to time." This is taken owners of another lot at the upper portion of
to mean that under the law, it is the needs of Lot 272-B .
the dominant property which ultimately By virtue of an agreement entered
determine the width of the passage. And intobetween the owners of the contiguous lots
these needs may vary from time to time. and the members of the Quezon City
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right
operator, he and his family could easily make of way was granted over Howmart Road which
do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to is a private road traversing the contiguous
the national highway. But the business grew lots owned by the petitioners, among others,
and with it the need for the use of modern in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for
means of conveyance or transport. Manual its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the
hauling of plants and garden soil and use of petitioners for this right of way. The private
pushcarts have become extremely respondents are bona fide members of the
cumbersome and physically taxing. To force QCIEA.
petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, In order to have access to Howmart Road,
exposed to the elements and to the risk of there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq.
theft simply because it could not pass through m. lot fronting Howmart Road and another
the improvised pathway, is sheer gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the
pigheadedness on the part of the servient subdivision of Lot 272, the private
estate and can only be counter-productive for respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B
all the people concerned. Petitioner should also fronting Howmart Road which is now the
not be denied a passageway wide enough to gate in question.
accomodate his jeepney since that is a On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of
reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced
nursery business. the digging of holes in a parallel line and
The Court is aware that an additional one and afterwards put up steel posts in front of the
one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the newly constructed gate of private
pathway will reduce the servient estate . But respondents amidst the latter's
petitioner has expressed willingness to protestations.The petitioners claim that the
exchange an equivalent portion of his land to surreptitiously constructed gate opened
compensate private respondents for their directly into the house of Maxima Dionisio,
loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents exposing them to air and noise pollution
to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But arising from the respondents' delivery trucks
unless and until that option is considered, the and service vehicles.
law decrees that petitioner must indemnify On November 7, 1989, the private
the owners of the servient estate including respondents instituted a civil action for
Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot damages against the petitioners. The
1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original complaint sought the immediate issuance of a
path several years ago. writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
petitioner to remove the barricade erected by
188) DIONISIO V. ORTIZ them in front of the iron gate. The same was
204 SCRA 745 granted.
Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the
FACTS: The petitioners are co-owners of lots barricade in front of the gate of the private
contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio respondents.
of Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
City. on the ground that the issue has already
211
become moot and academic since the The records show that there are two (2) gates
petitioners have already complied with the through which the private respondents may
Order of the lower court. pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) the
northern gate which opens directly to EDSA;
ISSUE: whether or not the private and (2) the southern gate along Howmart
respondents have an easement of right of Road. The records also disclose that the
way over Howmart Road petitioners and the other lot owners
previously prohibited and prevented members
HELD: The private respondents' claim that of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim
they have every right to use Howmart Road as that they were forced to open a new gate by
passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact reason of the subdivision of Lot 272 where a
that public respondents are bonafide wall was constructed between these 2 lots is
members of the QCIEA which has a standing untenable. The private respondents can not
oral contract of easement of right of way with assert a right of way when by their own or
the petitioners. The contract is still subsisting voluntary act, they themselves have caused
even after its alleged expiration in December, the isolation of their property from the access
1988 as evidenced by the two (2) letters road.
signed by Maxima Dionisio and Atty. In such a The fact that the barricade constructed by the
case, it is alleged that the petitioners did not petitioners was already removed upon the
have the right to put the barricade in question issuance of the questioned preliminary
in front of the private respondents' gate and injunction does not make the petition moot
stop them from using said gate as and academic as ruled by the Court of
passageway to Howmart Road. Appeals. The Court of Appeals has the power
There is no question that a right of way was to recallor lift the writ of preliminary
granted in favor of the private respondents mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that
over Howmart Road but the records disclose the party is not so entitled. But as earlier
that such right of way expired in December, found, the private respondents are not
1988. The continued use of the easement entitled to the injunctive relief considering
enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private that they have no clear right over Howmart
respondents is by the mere tolerance of the Road.
owners pending the renegotiation of the
terms and conditions of said right of way. This 189) ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. CA
is precisely shown by the two letters to the 198 SCRA 300
QCIEA requesting for an increase in
compensation for the use of Howmart Road. FACTS:
Absent an agreement of the parties as to the Private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
consideration, among others, no contract of complaint for nullification of deed of donation,
easement of right of way has been validly rescission of contract and reconveyance of
entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. real property with damages against
Thus, the private respondents' claim of an petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao
easement of right of way over Howmart Road and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,
has no legal or factual basis. Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
Not having any right, the private respondents Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial
are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted Court. Private respondents alleged that on
by the lower court. August 23, 1930, spouses Eusebio de Castro
The Court has held in several cases that in and Martina Rieta, now both deceased,
order to be entitled to an injunctive writ, one executed a deed of donation in favor of
must show an unquestionable right over the therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop
premises and that such right has been of Manila covering a certain parcel of land, Lot
violated. No. 626located at Kawit, Cavite. Said lot
In the case at bar, the private respondents consists of an area of 964 square meters. The
have not shown that there is an urgent and deed of donation allegedly provides that the
paramount necessity for the issuance of the donee shall not dispose or sell the property
writ of preliminary injuction. within a period of one hundred years from the
212
execution of the deed of donation, otherwise propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
such would render ipso facto null and void the propriety is sustained, the decision of the
deed of donation and the property would court will be merely declaratory of the
revert back to the estate of the donors. revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, act.
1980, and while still within the prohibitive
period to dispose of the property, petitioner 190) REPUBLIC v. DAVID REY GUZMAN
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, executed a 326 SCRA 90
deed of absolute sale of the property n in
favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. FACTS:
Ignao for P114,000. 00. A Transfer Certificate David Rey Guzman, a natural-born
of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds of American citizen, is the son of Simeon
Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and
said petitioner spouses. Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen.
In 1968 Simeon died. He left to his sole heirs
ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of action had Helen and David an estate consisting of
already prescribed. several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
HELD: No. Article 764 of the Civil Code Thereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed
provides that "The donation shall be revoked of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
at the instance of the donor, when the donee Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to
fails to comply with any of the conditions themselves all the property. The document of
which the former imposed upon the latter," extrajudicial settlement was registered in the
and that "this action shall prescribe after four Office of the Register of Deeds. The the
years from the non-compliance with the parcels of land were accordingly registered in
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David
the donor, and may be exercised against the Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares. Later,
donee's heirs. Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning,
Although it is true that under Article 764 of transferring and conveying to David her
the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a undivided 1/2 interest. Since the document
donation must be brought within four years appeared not to have been registered, Helen
from the non-compliance of the conditions of executed another document, a Deed of
the donation, the same is not applicable in the Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of
case at bar. The deed of donation involved quitclaim as well as modifying the document
herein expressly provides for automatic to encompass all her other property in the
reversion of the property donated in case of Philippines. A signed letter was sent to the
violation of the condition therein, hence a Office of the Solicitor General together with
judicial declaration revoking the same is not documents showing that David's ownership of
necessary. the 1/2 of the estate of Simeon Guzman was
When a deed of donation, as in this case, defective. On the basis thereof, the
expressly provides for automatic revocation Government filed a Petition for Escheat
and reversion of the property donated, the praying that 1/2 of David's interest in the
rules on contract and the general rules on subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor.
prescription should apply, and not Article 764 David prayed that said petition be dismissed.
of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said The trial court dismissed the petition holding
Code authorizes the parties to a contract to that the two deeds of quitclaim executed by
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and Helen had no legal force and effect and that
conditions not contrary to law, morals, good the ownership of the properties remained with
customs, public order or public policy, we are her. The Government appealed. The appellate
of the opinion that, at the very least, that court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, ISSUE : Whether or not David, being an
without prior judicial action for that purpose, American citizen could validly acquire 1/2
is valid subject to the determination of the interest in each of the subject parcels of land
213
by way of the two deeds of quitclaim as they mortis causa, in favor of the Private
are in reality donations inter vivos. Respondent Mercedes. All deeds contained
the reservation of the rights of the donors (1)
RULING: Yes. There are three (3) essential to amend, cancel or revoke the donation
elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage,
the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in or encumber the properties donated during
the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.
intent to do an act of liberality or animus Later, Diego Danlag, with the consent
donandi. When applied to a donation of an of his wife, executed a deed of donation inter
immovable property, the law further requires vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of
that the donation be made in a public land plus two other parcels, again in favor of
document and that there should be an private respondent. This deed of donation
acceptance thereof made in the same deed of contained two conditions, first, that the
donation or in a separate public document. In Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the
cases where the acceptance is made in a fruits of the land during their lifetime, and
separate instrument, it is mandated that the second, that the donee can not sell or dispose
donor should be notified thereof in an of the land during the lifetime of the spouses,
authentic form, to be noted in both without their prior consent and approval.
instruments. Not all the elements of a Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels'
donation of an immovable property are tax declaration to her name and paid the
present in the instant case. The transfer of the taxes thereon.
property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim However, spouses Danlag later sold parcels 3
executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of and 4 to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa.
her patrimony as donor and the consequent They also executed a deed of revocation
increase in the patrimony of David as donee. recovering the 6 parcels of land subject of the
However, Helen's intention to perform an act deed of donation inter vivos. Consequently,
of liberality in favor of David was not private respondent filed with the RTC a
sufficiently established. However, the petition for quieting of title over the above
inexistence of a donation does not render the parcels of land against the Gestopas and the
repudiation made by Helen in favor of David Danlags. She alleged that she was an
valid. There is no valid repudiation of illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that
inheritance as Helen had already accepted she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial
her share of the inheritance when she and services to Diego and his mother, Maura
David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In
Settlement. By virtue of such extrajudicial recognition of the services she rendered,
settlement the parcels of land were registered Diego executed a Deed of Donation conveying
in their name in undivided equal share and for to her the six parcels of land. She accepted
eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the donation in the same instrument, openly
the concept of owner. Nevertheless, the and publicly exercised rights of ownership
nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto over the donated properties, and caused the
operate to convert the parcels of land into res transfer of the tax declarations to her name.
nullius to be escheated in favor of the However, through machination, intimidation
Government. The repudiation being of no and undue influence, Diego persuaded the
effect whatsoever the parcels of land should husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy
revert to their private owner, Helen, who, two of the six parcels covered by the deed of
although being an American citizen, is donation. Said donation inter vivos was
qualified by hereditary succession to own the coupled with conditions and, according to
property subject of the litigation. Mercedes, since its perfection, she had
complied with all of them; that she had not
191) GESTOPA VS. COURT OF APPEALS been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that
342 SCRA 105 respondent Diego had no legal basis in
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag revoking the subject donation and then in
were the owners of six parcels of unregistered selling the two parcels of land to the
land. They executed three deeds of donation Gestopas. However, petitioners averred that
214
the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 FACTS:

was null and void because it was obtained by
the private respondent through machination On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora
and undue influence. RTC ruled that the both Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria
the donations mortis causa and inter vivos as Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow,
revoked, and therefore have no legal effect. respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo,
The trial court also declared the spouses extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot
Danlag as the absolute owners of the disputed 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
lands. However, CA reversed the decision of Zambales, which was said to have an area of
the RTC upon appeal. 66,530 square meters. Directos share was
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294
ISSUES: square meters, and the remaining 41,810
Whether or not the donation in this square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the
case is inter vivos or mortis causa to same date, Directo donated 625 square
determine whether the donor intended to meters of her share to Noceda, who is also
transfer the ownership over the properties her nephew. However, on August 17, 1981,
upon the execution of the deed. another extrajudicial settlement-partition of
Whether or not the revocation is valid Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo,
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the
HELD: said land went to Maria Arbizo while Directo
On the first issue, the court held that and Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said
the donation was inter vivos and that the extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in
donor intended to transfer the ownership of the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in
the properties. First, Diego Danlag donated the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said
the properties in consideration of love and parcel of land was said to have an area of only
affection for the donee.. Second, the 29,845 square meters.
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that
the donor intended to transfer the naked Noceda later constructed his house on
ownership over the properties. As correctly the land donated to him by Directo. Directo,
posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the on the other hand, fenced the portion allotted
need for such reservation if the donor and his to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
spouse remained the owners of the excluding the donated portion, and
properties? Third, the donor reserved constructed thereon three huts. However said
sufficient properties for his maintenance in fence was later removed by Noceda, occupied
accordance with his standing in society, the three huts and fenced the entire land of
indicating that the donor intended to part with Directo without her consent. Directo
the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee demanded that Noceda vacate her land, but
accepted the donation. A limitation on the the latter refused. Thus, Directo filed the a
right to sell during the donors life implied complaint for the recovery of possession and
that ownership had passed to the donees and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation was already effective during the donation.
donors lifetime.
No. A valid donation, once accepted,
becomes irrevocable, except on account of During the trial, the lower court
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121
with the charges imposed in the donation, or be conducted. The engineer found that the
ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial
any of these reasons in the deed of settlement-partition was smaller than the
revocation. actual area of said lot which is 127,298 square
meters. He further subdivided Lot 1121,
192) NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS excluding the portions occupied by third
313 SCRA 504 persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone
and the road lot, on the basis of the actual
occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial
215
settlement-partition. The portion statement in the extrajudicial settlement of

denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of
square meters was the share of defendant Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is
Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of not conclusive because it was found out, after
Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a the relocation survey was conducted on Lot
portion of which was donated to defendant 1121, that the parties therein occupied an
Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 area larger than what they were supposed to
square meters, went to Maria Arbizo. possess per the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981. Although in the
The trial court declared valid the extra- extrajudicial settlement dated August 17,
judicial partition and further held that the 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned
deed of donation revoked. It further ordered only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform
the defendant to vacate and reconvey that with the area declared under tax declaration
donated portion to the plaintiff, and to remove 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually
the house built inside the donated portion at occupying a bigger portion the total area of
the his expense or pay a monthly rental of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This
P300.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada
decision of the trial court. in his report. The survey conducted on Lot
1121 was only a confirmation of the actual
areas being occupied by the heirs taking into
account the percentage proportion
adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their
ISSUES: August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.
Whether or not said lot should be As to the second issue, the court holds
partitioned in accordance with the extra- proper the judgment of respondent CA.
judicial settlement Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that:
The action granted to the donor by reason of
Whether or not the Court of Appeals ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance.
erred in revoking the deed of donation This action prescribes within one year to be
counted from the time the donor had
knowledge of the fact and it was possible for
him to bring the action. As expressly stated,
HELD: the donor must file the action to revoke his
donation within one year from the time he
The Supreme Court sees no cogent had knowledge of the ingratitude of the
reason to disturb the findings of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was
respondent Court as follows: The possible for the donor to institute the said
discrepancies between the extrajudicial action within the same period. The
settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, concurrence of these two requisites must be
defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar
1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the present action. Defendant Noceda failed
the latter was intended to supersede the to do so. He reckoned the one year
former. The signature of defendant Noceda in prescriptive period from the occurrence of the
the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo
1981 would show his conformity to the new in the first week of September, 1985, and not
apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of from the time the latter had the knowledge of
the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda
defendant Noceda occupied the portion failed to prove that at the time plaintiff
allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation,
as well as the donated portion of the share of it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute
plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge an action for revocation of her donation.The
of the extent of boundaries of the portion of action to revoke by reason of ingratitude
Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the prescribes within one (1) year to be counted
216
from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of recognized the legality and validity of the
the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated
petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of 1,000-square meter portion of the donated
these two conditions in order that the one (1) land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a
year period for bringing the action be bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio.
considered to have already prescribed. No In case of Leoncios death, it was also agreed
competent proof was adduced by petitioner to that the balance of the deposit will be
prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
having the burden of proof must establish his In the meantime, Leoncio died, leaving
case by preponderance of evidence. He who only two heirs, herein petitioner, and an
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor
a mere allegation is not evidence.Factual substituted for Leoncio in the case, and
findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by moved for execution of judgment, which was
substantial evidence on record are final and granted by the court. Fifteen years thereafter,
conclusive on the parties and carry even more Victor died single and without issue, survived
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon,
factual findings of the trial court; for it is not who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed
the function of this Court to re-examine all land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving
over again the oral and documentary as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and
evidence submitted by the parties unless the Teresa Villalon.
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa
supported by the evidence on record or the filed a complaint for annulment of the
judgment is based on the misapprehension of donation. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the
facts. The jurisdiction of this court is thus ground of res judicata, by virtue of the
limited to reviewing errors of law unless there compromise judgment, which was granted by
is a showing that the findings complained of the trial court. The Court of Appeals however,
are totally devoid of support in the record or reversed the trial courts order and remanded
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to the case for further proceedings.
constitute serious abuse of discretion. We find Consequently, Cesar and Teresa filed an
no such showing in this case. amended complaint in the same case, for
Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession, seeking the
193) ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
APPEALS affecting the above property, on grounds of
316 SCRA 393 fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that
FACTS: petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the
Leoncio Imperial was the registered donation by taking undue advantage of the
owner of a parcel of land also known as Lot 45 latters physical weakness and mental
of the Cadastral Survey of Albay, which he unfitness, and that the conveyance of said
later sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged property in favor of petitioner impaired the
natural son, petitioner herein, who then legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural
acquired title over the land and proceeded to brother and predecessor-in-interest.
subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and RTC held that it is a donation, and is
private respondents admit that despite the hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it
contracts designation as one of Absolute affected the legitime of the late Victor
Sale, it was in fact a donation. Two years Imperial, which share is inherited by the
after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs
for annulment of the said deed, on the ground are ordered to be given by defendant a
that he was deceived by petitioner into portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
signing the said document. The dispute, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
however, was resolved through a compromise RTC.
agreement, which provides that: (1) Leoncio
217
ISSUES: property at the time of his death, the RTC

Whether or not the private respondents had a computed the legitime of Victor based on the
right to question the donation and; area of the donated property. Hence, in its
Whether or not the donation was inofficious dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the
and should be reduced. property to private respondents as Victors
legitime. This was upheld by the Court of
HELD: Appeals. Our rules of succession require that
The court held yes. Article 772 of the before any conclusion as to the legal share
Civil Code provides that: Only those who at due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the
the time of the donors death have a right to following steps must be taken: (1) the net
the legitime and their heirs and successors in estate of the decedent must be ascertained,
interest may ask for the reduction of by deducting all the payable obligations and
inofficious donations. As argued by petitioner, charges from the value of the property owned
when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was by the deceased at the time of his death; (2)
entitled to question the donation. However, the value of all donations subject to collation
instead of filing an action to contest the would be added to it. Having ascertained this
donation, Victor asked to be substituted as action as one for reduction of an inofficious
plaintiff and even moved for execution of the donation, we cannot sustain the holding of
compromise judgment therein. No both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
renunciation of legitime may be presumed that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty
from the foregoing acts. It must be years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code.
remembered that at the time of the The sense of both courts that this case is a
substitution, the judgment approving the real action over an immovable allots undue
compromise agreement has already been credence to private respondents description
rendered. Victor merely participated in the of their complaint, as one for Annulment of
execution of the compromise judgment. He Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
was not a party to the compromise Possession of Property, which suggests the
agreement. More importantly, our law on action to be, in part, a real action enforced by
succession does not countenance tacit those with claim of title over the disputed
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires land. Unfortunately for private respondents, a
an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, claim for legitime does not amount to a claim
under Article 1051 of Civil Code: The of title. The rationale for this is that the
repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in donation is a real alienation which conveys
a public or authentic instrument, or by ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any
petition presented to the court having increase in value or any deterioration or loss
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
proceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted What, then, is the prescriptive period for an
Leoncio upon the latters death, his act of action for reduction of an inofficious donation?
moving for execution of the compromise The Civil Code specifies the following
judgment cannot be considered an act of instances of reduction or revocation of
renunciation of his legitime. He was, donations: (1) four years, in cases of
therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
subsequently seeking the reduction of the adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victors compliance with conditions of the donation;
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the
so, as their right to do so is expressly donor and his relatives entitled to support, for
recognized under Article 772, and also in failure of the donor to reserve property for his
Article 1053: If the heir should die without or their support. Interestingly, donations as in
having accepted or repudiated the the instant case, the reduction of which
inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to hinges upon the allegation of impairment of
his heirs. legitime, are not controlled by a particular
As to the second issue, the court also prescriptive period, for which reason we must
rules in the affirmative. The donation is resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
inofficious because Leoncio had no other Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
218
upon an obligation created by law must be Claiming that his signature to the deed
brought within ten years from the time the of donation was a forgery and that, she was
right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year unworthy of his liberality, Calapine brought
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to suit against Doria, the Calauan Christian
reduce inofficious donations, required under Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses
Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent Eduarte and asked to revoke the donation
that they impair the legitime of compulsory made in favor of Doria to declare null and to
heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be void the deeds of donation and sale that she
reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian
SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses. The
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, trial court granted held in favor of Calapine.
recognized that the cause of action to enforce Spouses Eduarte appealed, which as
a legitime accrues upon the death of the dismissed.
donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only
then that the net estate may be ascertained
and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined. It took private respondents 24 ISSUE: Whether or not the deeds of donation
years since the death of Leoncio to initiate should be revoked.
this case. The action, therefore, has long
prescribed.
194) EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

253 SCRA 391 HELD: Anent the revocation of the first deed
of donation, petitioners submit that paragraph
(1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not
apply in this case because the acts of
ingratitude referred to therein pertain to
FACTS: offenses committed by the donee against the
person or property of the donor. Petitioners
Pedro Calapine was the registered argue that as the offense imputed to herein
owner of a parcel of land located in San donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public
Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of document - is neither a crime against the
12,199 square meters. He later executed a person nor property of the donor but is a
deed of donation inter vivos, ceding one-half crime against public interest under the
portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Revised Penal Code, the same is not a ground
Later, another deed identically entitled was for revocation.
purportedly executed by Calapine ceding unto
Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land. In support of this contention,
Doria then donated a portion of the parcel of petitioners cite the following portions found in
land to the Calauan Christian Reformed Tolentinos Commentaries and Jurisprudence
Church, Inc., on the basis of which said on the Civil Code:
transfer certificate of title was cancelled and
TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name
covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T- Offense against Donor - x x x. The
24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria covering crimes against the person of the donor would
the remaining portion of 12,042 square include not only homicide and physical
meters. injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and
coercion; and those against honor include
offenses against chastity and those against
Doria then sold, transferred and the property, include robbery, theft,
conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. (5
Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. Manresa 175-176).
T-24445, save the portion of 700 square
meters on which her house was erected.
This assertion, however, deserves
scant consideration. The full text of the very
219
same commentary cited by petitioners belies

their claim that falsification of the deed of 195) CITY OF ANGELES vs. CA
donation is not an act of ingratitude, to wit: G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996
Offense Against Donor. All crimes FACTS:

which offend the donor show ingratitude and In an Amended Deed of Donation,
are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, private respondent donated to the City of
therefore, that the donee who commits Angeles 51 parcels of land. Said deed
adultery with the wife of the donor, gives provides that the properties donated shall be
cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. devoted and utilized solely for the site of the
The crimes against the person of the donor Angeles City Sports Center. Petitioners then
would include not only homicide and physical started the construction of a drug
injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, rehabilitation center on a portion of the
and coercion; those against honor include donated land. Upon learning thereof, private
offenses against chastity; and those against respondent protested such action for being
the property, include robbery, theft, violative of the terms and conditions of the
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. amended deed and prejudicial to its interest
[Manresa 175-176]. (Italics supplied). and to those of its clients and residents.
Private respondent also offered another site
Obviously, the first sentence was for the rehabilitation center. However,
deleted by petitioners because it totally petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining
controverts their contention. As noted in the that the construction was not violative of the
aforecited opinion all crimes which offend terms of the donation. The alternative site
the donor show ingratitude and are causes for was rejected because, according to
revocation. Petitioners attempt to categorize petitioners, the site was too isolated and had
the offenses according to their classification no electric and water facilities.
under the Revised Penal Code is therefore Consequently, private respondent filed
unwarranted considering that illegal a complaint, alleging breach of the conditions
detention, threats and coercion are imposed in the amended deed of donation
considered as crimes against the person of and seeking the revocation of the same. The
the donor despite the fact that they are trial court issued a temporary restraining
classified as crimes against personal liberty order to enjoin the petitioners from further
and security under the Revised Penal Code. proceeding with the construction of the
center. The RTC further ordered that the
defendants perpetually cease and desist from
Petitioners also impute grave error to constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or
respondent Court of Appeals in finding that any other building or improvement on the
the second deed of donation dated July 26, Donated Land. It also declared the amended
1984 was falsified. Petitioners deplore the fact Deed of Donation revoked and rescinded and
that more credence was given to the ordered defendants to peacefully vacate and
testimony of the NBI handwriting expert who return the Donated Land to plaintiff.
found Pedro Calapines signature in the Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal.
second deed of donation to be a forgery However, while the appeal was pending,
despite the existence of controverting petitioners inaugurated the Drug
testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Rehabilitation Center. The respondent Court
Chief Document Examiner which petitioners rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
adduced as evidence on their part. ruling of the trial court. Subsequently, the
petitioners motion for reconsideration was
We are not persuaded. Respondent also denied for lack of merit.
Court of Appeals and the trial court cannot be
faulted for giving more weight and credence ISSUE: Whether a donor of open spaces in a
to the testimony of the NBI handwriting residential subdivision can validly impose
expert considering that the examination of conditions on the said donation; whether the
the said witness proved to be complete, city government as donee can build and
thorough and scientific.
220
operate a drug rehabilitation center on the build and operate a sports complex on the
donated land intended for open space; and non-buildable open space so donated; and
whether the said donation may be validly petitioners, for constructing a drug
rescinded by the donor. rehabilitation center on the same non-
buildable area. Inasmuch as the construction
HELD: The general law on donations does not and operation of the drug rehabilitation center
prohibit the imposition of conditions on a has been established to be contrary to law,
donation so long as the conditions are not the said center should be removed or
illegal or impossible. In regard to donations of demolished. After due consideration of the
open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among circumstances, we believe that the fairest and
other things that the recreational areas to be most equitable solution is to have the City of
donated be based, as aforementioned, on a Angeles, donee of the subject open space
percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total and, ostensibly, the main beneficiary of the
area of the subdivision depending on whether construction and operation of the proposed
the subdivision is low-, medium-, or high- drug rehabilitation center, undertake the
density. It further declares that such open demolition and removal of said center, and if
space devoted to parks, playgrounds and feasible, recover the cost thereof from the city
recreational areas are non-alienable public officials concerned.
land and non-buildable. However, there is no
prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 Property:Action for Cancellation of Title
against imposing conditions on such donation.
We hold that any condition may be imposed in 196) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the donation, so long as the same is not represented by the DIRECTOR OF LAND,
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public petitioner,
order or public policy. The contention of vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
petitioners that the donation should be IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her
unconditional because it is mandatory has no husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE
basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA,
the donation of the open space for parks and respondents.
playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996
that it should be so is tantamount to
unlawfully expanding the provisions of the MENDOZA, J.:
decree. Private respondents contention that
the construction of said drug rehabilitation Note: This is a petition for review of the
center is violative of the Amended Deed of decision of the CA reversing the decision of
Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of the the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free
New Civil Code and stipulation no. 8 of the Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of
amended deed, private respondent is Title No. P-8817 in the name of Irene
empowered to revoke the donation when the Bullungan null and void so far as the portion
donee has failed to comply with any of the of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this case
conditions imposed in the deed. We disagree. is concerned.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides
that: If the act in which the unlawful or FACTS:
forbidden cause consists does not constitute a Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied
criminal offense, the following rules shall be for a FREE PATENT covering lots situated in
observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of Angadanan, Isabela. The lots included a
both contracting parties, neither may recover portion of lot (Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 between
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764) which Vicente
demand the performance of the others Carabbacan claimed. (Vicente Carabbacan in
undertaking; comes into play here. Both this case is the present possessor and
petitioners and private respondents are in cultivator of the land in dispute).
violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating
and accepting a donation of open space less BASIS FOR HER APPLICATION OF FEE
than that required by law, and for agreeing to PATENT (w/c is false): In her application
221
however, Irene Bullungan stated that the land reconveyance on 1972. The cases were
applied for by her was not claimed or thereafter tried jointly.
occupied by any other person and that it was
public land which had been continuously CFIs DECISION: The court rendered a
occupied and cultivated by her since 1925. decision, DISMISSING the complaint of
Vicente Carabbacan and ordering him to
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS DECISION: vacate the land and upheld the ownership of
Upon certification of Assistant Public Land Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been
that Irene Bullungan had been in actual, in possession of the land in question, was
continuous open, notorious, exclusive and finally ousted on December 10, 1981.
adverse possession of the land since 1925,
the Director of Lands approved Bullungan's RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION:
application for free patent and an OCT was Meanwhile, in the investigation conducted by
issued in her name. the Director of lands, it was found out that
STEPS TAKEN BY THE OPPOSITOR Vicente Carabbacan had been in actual
cultivation of the land since 1947, having
THE PROTEST: Alleging that a portion of Lot acquired the same from Tomas Tarayao. The
No. 1, Psu-150801 (lot in dispute) covered by land investigator stated that due to a big
the free patent issued to Irene Bullungan flood which occurred in December 1947, the
overlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Cagayan River changed its course by
Lot No. 764, which he was occupying, Vicente moving north-east, resulting in the
Carrabacan, (the actual possessor of the land) emergence of a piece of land, which is
filed a protest to the Director of Lands on the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan
1961. The latter only ordered an investigation took possession of the land and cultivated it.
on 1982. He was in the continuous, peaceful, open and
adverse occupation and cultivation of the land
from December 1947 until 1981 when he
was ejected by virtue of the decision in Civil
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE (1st) & Case.
CANCELLATION OF FEE PATENT: Vicente
Carabbacan also brought an action for the
reconveyance of the portion of the lot in
dispute and the cancellation of free patent THE PETITIONER: In view of the
against Irene Bullungan before the CFI on investigation, the Republic, as represented by
1961. the Solicitor General, filed a COMPLAINT
FOR THE CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT
issued in favor of Irene Bullungan on the
ground of fraud and misrepresentation.
DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE
COURT: but this was dismissed by the court
without prejudice.
RTC: Complaint for Cancellation of Free
Patent was GRANTED, thus the court ruled in
favor of petitioner, Republic and justified the
The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to reversion of the land in question as an
RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LAND in an assertion of a governmental right. It
action filed in CFI on 1972. declared that the Free Patent was null and
void insofar as the portion of Lot subject to
dispute. BASIS: The lower court found that
Irene Bullungan made misrepresentations by
claiming in her application for a free patent
2nd ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE: On the that she was in possession of the disputed
other hand, refusing to give up his claim, portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in fact
Vicente Carabbacan filed again a case for
222
Vicente Carabbacan was occupying and was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida
cultivating the land. Tarayao.
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial

court's finding in this case that Irene
CA: GRANTED the appeal of private Bullungan committed fraud and
respondent, thus REVERSING the lower courts misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely on
decision. BASIS: on the ground that, after the the ground that after the lapse of one year
lapse of one year from the date of issuance of from the date of issuance of a free patent an
the patent, the State could no longer bring an action for the cancellation of patent and title
action for reversion. The appellate court held on ground of fraud and misrepresentation can
that the certificate of title issued in the name no longer be maintained.
of Irene Bullungan became incontrovertible
and indefeasible upon the lapse of one year GENERAL RULE: It is settled that once a
from the issuance of the free patent. patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now
P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes
PETITIONER-REPUBLIC ARGUMENT: The private property over which the Director of
Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Lands will no longer have either control or
Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the
indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar basis of a free patent or homestead patent
the filing of an action for cancellation of title becomes as indefeasible as one which was
and reversion of land even if more than one judicially secured upon the expiration of one
year has elapsed from the issuance of the free year from date of issuance of patent as
patent in case of fraud in obtaining patents. provided in P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUE: Whether or not doctrine of EXCEPTION: However, as held in Director of
indefeasibility of Torrens Title bars the filing of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of
an action for cancellation of title, on the one year, the State may still bring an action
ground of fraud, if more than one year has for the reversion to the public domain of lands
elapsed from the issuance of the free patent. which have been fraudulently granted to
private individuals. This has been the
HELD: NO. The SC agreed as to the argument consistent ruling of this Court.
of petitioner-Republic.
To begin with, there is no question that

Free Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificate
of Title P-8817 were obtained through fraud. FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION: In the
The trial court found that Irene Bullungan case at bar, the failure of Irene Bullungan to
falsely stated in her application for a free disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in
patent that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not possession of the portion of land in dispute
claimed or occupied by any other person. The constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and
trial court found that a portion of the lot in is a ground for annulling her title. Where
question had been in the possession and public land is acquired by an applicant
cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since through fraud and misrepresentation the
December 1947. Indeed private respondents State may institute reversion proceedings
admit that before Irene Bullungan filed her even after the lapse of the one-year period.
application for a free patent, she had filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Public policy demands that one who obtains
Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which title to a public land through fraud should not
was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of be allowed to benefit therefrom. Vicente
Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed precisely Carabbacan had been in possession of the
because the court found that Carabbacan had land even. before Irene Bullungan bought the
been in possession of the land long before it possessory rights to the land. It was therefore
223
a misrepresentation for her to state in her

application for a free patent that she had
been in possession of the lot in question when
the fact is that Carabbacan had been there
ahead of her.
224
CASES IN SUCCESSION
197) MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to

vs.MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION the SC, defendant claimed that plaintiff has
NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, already relinquished her rights when she
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO expressly renounced any future property she
NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants. was to inherit from her husband. It was also
G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953 claimed that the provisions of the New Civil
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Code, giving status and rights to natural
children, should be given a retroactive effect
Note: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY so that the illegitimate children of Del Rosario
OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of will be entitled to the inheritance.
five (5) parcels of land situated in the
Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria
del Rosario and her four children named
Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and ISSUE 1:
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of
minor age, before the Court of First Instance May Maria Unson validly renounce her
of Pangasinan. future inheritance?
FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 HELD 1:
left the lands involved in this litigation.
Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson,
widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff-lawful plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
wife claims that when Faustino Nebreda died Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of
in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del lands litigated in the present case. There is
Rosario took possession illegally of said lands likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one
thus depriving her of their possession and of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
enjoyment. common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda
with whom she had four illegitimate children,
DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their her now co-defendants. It likewise appears
answer set up as special defense that on that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code.
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed With this background, it is evident that when
a public document whereby they agreed to Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels
separate as husband and wife and, in of land he was seized of at the time passed
consideration of their separation, Maria Uson from the moment of his death to his only heir,
was given a parcel of land by way of alimony his widow Maria Uson.
and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by Applying Article 657 of the old Civil
her husband upon his death. (waiver of future Code, Court ruled that the property belongs
inheritance) to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for
the same before his death. The right of
RTC: Trial court rendered decision ruling in ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
favor of the lawful wife and ordering the question became vested in 1945 upon the
defendants (common-law-wife & kids) to death of her late husband and this is so
restore to the plaintiff the ownership and because of the imperative provision of the law
possession of the lands in dispute. which commands that the rights to succession
225
are transmitted from the moment of death may have occurred under the prior legislation,
(Article 657, old Civil Code). provided said new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested or acquired right, of the
The claim of the defendants that Maria same origin." As already stated in the early
Uson had relinquished her right over the lands part of this decision, the right of ownership of
in question because she expressly renounced Maria Uson over the lands in question
to inherit any future property that her became vested in 1945 upon the death
husband may acquire and leave upon his of her late husband and this is so because
death in the deed of separation they had of the imperative provision of the law which
entered into on February 21, 1931 cannot be commands that the rights to succession are
entertained for the simple reason that future transmitted from the moment of death (Article
inheritance cannot be the subject of a 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized
contract nor can it be renounced. The decision by the new Civil Code in favor of the
appealed from is affirmed. illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of
the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands
ISSUE 2: in dispute.
Whether or not the illegitimate children of
del Rosario are entitled to the inheritance. VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that
Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was
HELD 2: lying in state, in a gesture of pity or
NO. compassion, agreed to assign the lands in
Defendants contend that, while it is true question to the minor children for the reason
that the four minor defendants are illegitimate that they were acquired while the deceased
children of the late Faustino Nebreda and was living with their mother and Maria Uson
under the old Civil Code are not entitled to wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she
any successional rights, however, under the has done to them, this much can be said;
new Civil Code which became in force in June, apart from the fact that this claim is disputed,
1950, they are given the status and rights of we are of the opinion that said assignment, if
natural children and are entitled to the any, partakes of the nature of a DONATION
successional rights which the law accords to OF REAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as it involves
the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new no material consideration, and in order that it
Civil Code), and because these successional may be valid it shall be made in a public
rights were declared for the first time in the document and must be accepted either in the
new code, they shall be given retroactive same document or in a separate one (Article
effect even though the event which gave rise 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this
to them may have occurred under the prior essential formality has not been followed, it
legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code). results that the alleged assignment or
There is no merit in this claim donation has no valid effect.
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF
VESTED RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: Article
2253 above referred to provides indeed that
rights which are declared for the first time
shall have retroactive effect even though the Succession as a Mode of Transferring
event which gave rise to them may have Ownership
occurred under the former legislation, BUT
this is so only when the new rights do 198) ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A.
not prejudice any vested or acquired CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL,
right of the same origin. Thus, said article ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself
provides that "if a right should be declared for and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as
the first time in this Code, it shall be effective attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL,
at once, even though the act or event which FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA
gives rise thereto may have been done or BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
226
vs. executed and consummated right there and

THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. then).
ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA
ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as 2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE
attorney-in-fact, respondents. SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however,
G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996 upon having the property registered in their
MELO, J.: name, sold it to Catalina Mabanag for a higher
price (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and
Note: The petition before us has its roots in a rescinded the contract with Ramona by
COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC depositing the amount of down payment to a
PERFORMANCE to compel herein petitioners bank, in trust for Ramona.
(except the last named, Catalina Balais
Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel
of land with its improvements located along
Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for
by the parties sometime in January 1985 for specific performance was filed by the
the price of P1,240,000.00. Concepcions against the Coronels.
FACTS:
1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents
Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the Conceptions. Judgment for specific
sons and daughters of the decedent performance is hereby rendered ordering
Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred to defendant-Coronels to execute in favor of
as Coronels) executed a document entitled plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that
Receipt of Down Payment in favor of parcel of land
plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The
document provided that for the total amount
of P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of
P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels CA: Affirmed the same.
bind themselves to effect the transfer in their
names the certificate of title of the house and The petitioners claim that there could been no
lot they inherited from their father. They also perfected contract on January 19, 1985
promised that upon the transfer of the TCT in because they were then not yet the absolute
their names, they will immediately execute owners of the inherited property.
the deed of absolute sale of the property,
and the other party Ramona will pay the
balance of P1,190,000.00. ISSUE 1:
Whether or not petitioners were already
(Note: The agreement could not have been a the owners of the inherited property when
contract to sell because the sellers herein they executed the contract with respondents.
made no express reservation of ownership or
title to the subject parcel of land. HELD 1:
Furthermore, the circumstance which Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines
prevented the parties from entering into an Succession as a mode of transferring
absolute contract of sale pertained to the ownership as follows:
sellers themselves (the certificate of title was
not in their names) and not the full payment
of the purchase price. Under the established Art. 774. Succession is a mode of
facts and circumstances of the case, the acquisition by virtue of which the property,
Court may safely presume that, had the rights and obligations to the extent and value
certificate of title been in the names of of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
petitioners-sellers at that time, there would through his death to another or others by his
have been no reason why an absolute will or by operation of law.
contract of sale could not have been
227
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale.
the sons and daughters of the decedent
Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs ISSUE 2:
who were called to succession by operation of Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct
law. Thus, at the point their father drew his in unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale
last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes between the latter and Ramona Alcaraz, the
insofar as the subject property is concerned, buyer.
such that any rights or obligations pertaining
thereto became binding and enforceable upon HELD 2:
them. It is expressly provided that rights to We do not agree with petitioners that
the succession are transmitted from the there was a valid rescission of the contract of
moment of death of the decedent. sale in the instant case. We note that these
supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission,
MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted are mere allegations found only in their
that petitioners claim that succession may responsive pleadings, which by express
not be declared unless the creditors have provision of the rules, are deemed
been paid is rendered moot by the fact that controverted even if no reply is filed by the
they were able to effect the transfer of the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of
title to the property from the decedents Court). The records are absolutely bereft of
name to their names. any supporting evidence to substantiate
petitioners' allegations. We have stressed
ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are time and again that allegations must be
precluded from raising their supposed lack of proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs.
capacity to enter into an agreement at that Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs.
time and they cannot be allowed to now take Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation
a posture contrary to that which they took is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79
when they entered into the agreement with Phil. 376 [1947]).
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P.
Civil Code expressly states that: Art. 1431. Alcaraz was in the United States of America
Through estoppel an admission or on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify
representation is rendered conclusive upon petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and
the person making it, and cannot be denied or extradicially rescinding the contract of sale,
disproved as against the person relying there being no express stipulation authorizing
thereon. Having represented themselves the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the
as the true owners of the subject contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA
property at the time of sale, petitioners 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132
CANNOT claim now that they were not SCRA 722 [1984])
yet the absolute owners thereof at that Moreover, petitioners are estopped from
time. raising the alleged absence of Ramona P.
Alcaraz because although the evidence on
The sale of the subject parcel of land between record shows that the sale was in the name of
petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers
perfected. had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz,
Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in
PEITIONERs ARGUMENT: Petitioners also behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own
contend that although there was in fact a behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made
perfected contract of sale between them and by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own
Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her personal check for and in behalf of Ramona P.
reciprocal obligation when she rendered Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that
impossible the consummation thereof by petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's
going to the United States of America, without authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz
leaving her address, telephone number, and when they accepted her personal check.
Special Power of Attorney for which reason, so Neither did they raise any objection as
petitioners conclude, they were correct in regards payment being effected by a third
228
person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are Jose C. Vitug, explains:

concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P.
Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract The governing principle is prius tempore,
of sale. potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge by the first buyer of the second
ISSUE 3: sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights
Between the Alcaraz and Catalina except when the second buyer first registers
Mabanag, who between them is the owner of in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs.
the property subject to dispute? Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
HELD 3: first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
It belongs to Alcaraz. register, since knowledge taints his
registration with bad faith (see also Astorga
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26
been sold to different vendees, the ownership December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
shall be transferred to the person who may 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has
have first taken possession thereof in good held that it is essential, to merit the
faith, if it should be movable property. protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph,
that the second realty buyer must act in good
Should if be immovable property, the faith in registering his deed of sale (citing
ownership shall belong to the person Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99,
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02
in Registry of Property. September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and
Should there be no inscription, the ownership Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the In a case of double sale, what finds
absence thereof to the person who presents relevance and materiality is not whether or
the oldest title, provided there is good faith. not the second buyer was a buyer in good
faith but whether or not said second buyer
The record of the case shows that the registers such second sale in good faith, that
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as is, without knowledge of any defect in the title
proof of the second contract of sale was of the property sold.
registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a As clearly borne out by the evidence in
new certificate of title in the name of Catalina this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have
B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second in good faith, registered the sale entered into
paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply. on February 18, 1985 because as early as
The above-cited provision on double sale February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had
presumes title or ownership to pass to the been annotated on the transfer certificate of
first buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the title in the names of petitioners, whereas
second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale
ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there sometime in April, 1985. At the time of
be no inscription by either of the two buyers, registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag
when the second buyer, in good faith, knew that the same property had already
acquires possession of the property ahead of been previously sold to private respondents,
the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer or, at least, she was charged with knowledge
satisfies these requirements, title or that a previous buyer is claiming title to the
ownership will not transfer to him to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot
prejudice of the first buyer. close her eyes to the defect in petitioners'
title to the property at the time of the
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an registration of the property.
accepted authority on the subject, now a
distinguished member of the Court, Justice If a vendee in a double sale registers that
229
sale after he has acquired knowledge that share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share; and INES
there was a previous sale of the same DE GUZMAN, share
property to a third party or that another
person claims said property in a pervious sale, Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in
the registration will constitute a registration in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for
bad faith and will not confer upon him any reconveyance of the said land.
right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349
[1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed,
Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; including the counterclaim of Viardo.
Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.) Defendant is the legal owner of the land in
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of question and the right of redemption of the
land between petitioners and Ramona P. plaintiff of said land had already elapsed.
Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior
to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his
Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo
upheld by both the courts below. appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals,
199) ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff- Bartolome Driz died. His children of age
appellee, substituted him in the appeal.
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer
SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, defendants- of Viardo, eventually became final and
appellants. executory. The CFI issued a writ of execution.
G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962 Prior to the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her
interest in the land to Isidoro Mercado.
FACTS: Mercado then filed a third-party complaint
The spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar against Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte.
Belmonte were defendants in a case where a CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome could not
writ of execution was issued and levied upon be held liable personally for judgment
rights and interests the spouses have over a rendered against them. Hence, this appeal.
disputed land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome
By virtue of the writ of execution as above Driz can be held personally liable for the
mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution judgment rendered against their father?
of the lots subject of controversy. This was
was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest HELD:
bidder.. The spouses failed to redeem the NO. The only ground of appellant for this
property within the statutory period of one contention is that the present owners of these
year from the date of sale. A final bill of sale lots are the children of the spouses Pilar
was issued to buyer Viardo, and a co-owner's Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in
copy of the certificate of title was likewise civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of
issued to him. Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the
appeal in civil case No. 161, these children
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First were substituted as parties. This assignment
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration of error is without merit.
Case acting upon a verified petition of Leon C.
Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and The substitution of parties was made
for Nueva Ecija, to cancel Original Certificate obviously because the children of Bartolome
of Title and to issue another in lieu thereof in Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could
the name of and in the proportion as follows: properly represent and protect whatever
LEONOR BELMONTE share; FELISA interest he had in the case on appeal. But
BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8 such a substitution did not and cannot have
the effect of making these substituted parties
230
personally liable for whatever judgment might proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla
be rendered on the appeal against their in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This
deceased father. motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and
by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the
Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: intestate estate
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue
of which the property, rights and obligations CFI : issued an order denying the motion.
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, Hence, this appeal to the SC.
of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others either by his will or by ISSUE: Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor,
operation of law. may go after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the
intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla Sr.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that
Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil HELD:
case No. 161, the real party in interest being NO. The creditors of the heirs of a
his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in deceased person is entitled to collect his
litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the claim out of the property which pertains by
parcel of land described in original certificate inheritance to said heirs, ONLY AFTER all
of title No. 3484, which appears to be debts of the testate or intestate succession
paraphernal property. have been paid and when the net assets that
are divisible among the heirs known. The
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that debts of the deceased must first be paid
the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was before his heirs can inherit.
to proceed against the estate of Bartolome
Driz. Judgment MODIFIED. A person who is not a creditor of a deceased,
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT to
intervene either in the proceedings brought in
200) Intestate of the late AGUSTIN connection with the estate or in the
MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a settlement of the succession.
movant-appellant,
vs. An execution cannot legally be levied upon
AGUSTIN B. MONTILLA, JR., administrator- the property of an intestate succession to pay
appellee; the debts of the widow and heirs of the
CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee. deceased, until the credits held against the
G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952 latter at the time of his death shall have been
PARAS, C.J.: paid can the remaining property that pertains
to the said debtors heirs can be attached.
FACTS:
In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of 201) SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA
Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,
a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the vs.
payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,
interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In defendants-appellants.
due time, a writ of execution was issued, but G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938
no property of Claudio Montilla was found
which could be levied upon. VILLA-REAL, J.:
In order to satisfy the said judgment
Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of Note: This case is an appeal taken by the
the CFI of Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo
of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and
praying that the interest, property and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court
participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the of First Instance of Occidental Negros, making
heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's the heirs of their deceased father solidary
intestate estate be sold and out of the liable as to the indebtedness incurred by their
231
deceased father instituted by the plaintiff- the last installment of the promisorry note has
creditor in the Intestate Estate of Eusebio, already prescribed.
their grandfather and not in the Intestate
Estate of Quitco, their father. HELD 1:
YES. According to the promissory note
FACTS: executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco,
Defendants in this case are the heirs of their on January 21, 1922, the last installment of
deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco. P1,500 should be paid two years from the
date of the execution of said promissory note,
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in
1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived the present case was filed on June 26, 1934,
maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the that is, more than ten years after the
latter was still single, of which relation, lasting expiration of the said period. The fact that the
until the year 1921, was born a daughter who plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In August 26, 1933, with the committee on
1921, it seems hat the relation between claims and appraisal appointed in the
Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend
to an end. the running of the prescriptive period of the
judicial action for the recovery of said debt,
Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed because the claim for the unpaid balance of
acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco the amount of the promissory note should not
Ledesma as his natural daughter. have been presented in the intestate of
Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being
THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo the one who executed the same, but in the
issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should
Ledesma a promissory note for or on behalf of have been instituted by the said Socorro
his indebtedness amounting to 2,000 w/c is to Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the
be paid on installment. Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor
to institute said case through the appointment
THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: of an administrator for the purpose of
Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita collecting his credit. More than ten years
McLachlin. They had four (4) children, who are having thus elapsed from the expiration of the
the other defendants. period for the payment of said debt of P1,500,
the action for its recovery has prescribed
DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil
died predeceasing his father, but, still later, Procedure.
that is, on December 15, 1932, his father
Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left ISSUE 2:
real and personal properties upon his death. Whether or not the properties inherited
by the defendants from their deceased
Administration proceedings of said properties grandfather by representation are subject to
were instituted in this court, the said case the payment of debts and obligations of their
being known as the "Intestate of the deceased father, who died without leaving
deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 any property
of this court.
HELD 2:
In order to satisfy the remaining value of the NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of
PN, Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of the amount of the PN should have been
Eusebio Quitco, to claim the indebtedness of presented in the intestate of Lorenzo and not
his debtor-deceased son Lorenzo. in the intestate of Eusebio, the formers
father.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the action for the
recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing
232
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the

true that under the provisions of articles 924 latter as a potential warehouse site.
to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents
his father or mother who died before him in THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a
the properties of his grandfather or CONTRACT OF LEASE W/ OPTION TO BUY
grandmother, this right of representation with Encarnacion Bartolome (plaintiff
does not make the said child answerable deceased mother). DKC was given the option
for the obligations contracted by his to a.) lease or b.) lease with purchase the
deceased father or mother, because, as subject land w/c must be exercised within a
may be seen from the provisions of the Code period of two (2) years counted from the
of Civil Procedure referring to partition of signing of the contract.
inheritances, the inheritance is received with
the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the 1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC
heirs only answer with the properties received regularly paid its dues to Encarnacion until
from their predecessor. The herein her death. DKC coursed its payment to Victor
defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion.
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Victor refused to accept these payments.
Quitco, are not bound to pay the
indebtedness of their said father from whom THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER
they did NOT inherit anything. THE LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the
The appealed judgment is reversed, and properties of Encarnacion, including the
the DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register
complaint, with the costs to the appellees of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title
No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of
202) DKC HOLDINGS Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor
CORPORATION,petitioner, Bartolome.
vs. 2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor,
BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS via registered mail, notice that it was
FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, exercising its option to lease the property,
respondents. tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent
G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000 for the month of March. Again, Victor refused
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. to accept the tendered rental fee and to
surrender possession of the property to
Note: This is a petition for review on petitioner.
certiorari seeking the reversal Decision of the
CA entitled "DKC Holdings Corporation vs. DKC deposited its payments at China Bank.
Victor U. Bartolome, et al.", affirming in toto DKC filed a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC
the Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela, which PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES against
dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 and Victor, praying among others the surrender
ordered petitioner to pay P30,000.00 as and delivery of possession of the subject land
attorney's fees. in accordance with the Contract terms.
FACTS: RTC: dismissed the complaint filed by DKC,

THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the thus ruling in favor of Victor Bartolome.
controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel CA: affirmed in toto.
of land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party
Manila which was originally owned by private thereto to the contract entered into between
respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased his deceased mother and plaintiff.
mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 of the ISSUE 1:
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. Whether or not the Contract of Lease
This lot was in front of one of the textile plants with Option to Buy entered into by the late
233
Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was parties, the agreement is of a personal

terminated upon her death or whether it binds nature, and terminates on the death of the
her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. party who is required to render such service."
Stated differently, whether or not Contract of
Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the TEST:It has also been held that a good
late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner is measure for determining whether a contract
transmissible to his sole heir. terminates upon the death of one of the
parties is whether it is of such a character
that it may be performed by the promissor's
HELD 1: personal representative. Contracts to perform
YES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by personal acts which cannot be as well
contracts entered into by their predecessors- performed by others are discharged by the
in-interest except when the rights and death of the promissor. Conversely, where the
obligations arising therefrom are not service or act is of such a character that it
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) may as well be performed by another, or
stipulation or (3) provision of law. (Art 1311 where the contract, by its terms, shows that
CC) performance by others was contemplated,
death does not terminate the contract or
In the present case, there is neither excuse nonperformance.
contractual stipulation nor legal provision
making the rights and obligations under the NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, there
Contract intransmissible. More importantly, is no personal act required from the late
the nature of the rights and obligations Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation
therein are, by their nature, transmissible. of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver
possession of the subject property to
The nature of intransmissible rights as petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of
explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent its option to lease the same may very well be
civilist, is as follows: performed by her heir Victor.
Among contracts which are intransmissible
are those which are purely personal, either by ISSUE 2:
provision of law, such as in cases of Whether or not Victor Bartolome as sole
partnerships and agency, or by the very heir is not a party to the contract executed by
nature of the obligations arising therefrom, his deceased mother. The property subject of
such as those requiring special personal the contract was inherited by Victor.
qualifications of the obligor. It may also be
stated that contracts for the payment of HELD 2:
money debts are not transmitted to the heirs Victor cannot insist that he is not a party
of a party, but constitute a charge against his to the Contract because of the clear provision
estate. Thus, where the client in a contract for of Art 1311. Being an heir of Encarnacion,
professional services of a lawyer died, leaving there is PRIVITY OF INTEREST between him
minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of and his deceases mother. He only succeeds
presenting his claim for professional services to what rights his mother had and what is
under the contract to the probate court, valid and binding against her is also valid and
substituted the minors as parties for his binding as against him.
client, it was held that the contract could not
be enforced against the minors; the lawyer The subject matter of the Contract is lease,
was limited to a recovery on the basis of which is a property right. Hence, the death
quantum meruit. of a party DOES NOT excuse non-performance
of a contract which involves a property right,
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts and the rights and obligations thereunder
stipulated in a contract require the exercise of pass to the personal representatives of the
special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, deceased. Non-performance is NOT excused
experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or by the death of the party when the other
other personal qualification of one or both
234
party has a property interest in the subject The action was not yet barred,
matter of the contract. notwithstanding the fact that it was brought
when the putative father was already
203) ARUEGO VS CA deceased, since Antonia was then still a minor
254 SCRA 711 when it was filed an exception to the
general rule under Art 285 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship 204) LORENZO VS POSADAS
with Luz Fabian, out of which was born 64 PHIL 353
Antonia and Evelyn Aruego.
A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Doctrine:
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the
by the two children, represented by their time of the predecessor's death,
mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the notwithstanding the postponement of the
following: actual possession or enjoyment of the estate
a. That Antonia and Evelyn be declared by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by
the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose; the value of the property transmitted at that
b. That petitioners be compelled to time regardless of its appreciation or
recognize and acknowledge them as the depreciation.
compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose; Facts:
c. That their share and participation in It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas
the estate of Jose be determined and ordered Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga,
delivered to them. leaving a will and considerable amount of real
The main basis of the action for compulsory and personal properties. On june 14, 1922,
recognition is their alleged open and proceedings for the probate of his will and the
continuous possession of the status of settlement and distribution of his estate were
illegitimate children. begun in the Court of First Instance of
RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter Zamboanga. The will was admitted to
of Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered probate.
petitioners to recognize Antonia and to deliver The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
to the latter her share in the estate of Jose. considered it proper for the best interests of
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial the estate to appoint a trustee to administer
Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the real properties which, under the will, were
the part of the trial court by virtue of the to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the
advent of the Family Code. Said motion was two executors named in the will, was, on
denied. CA affirmed. March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took
his oath of office and gave bond on March 10,
ISSUE: WON the application of the Family 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29,
Code will prejudice or impair any vested right 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff
of Antonia such that it should not be given herein was appointed in his stead. During the
retroactive effect. incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee,
Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
HELD: assessed against the estate of Hanley an
YES. The action brought by Antonia for inheritance tax together with the penalties for
compulsory recognition and enforcement of delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid the
successional rights which was filed before the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said
advent of the Family Code must be governed protest and refused to refund the same.
by Art 285 of the Civil Code and NOT by Art CFI held that the real property of Thomas
175, par.2 of the Family Code. Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive Hanley, from the moment of death of the
effect as its application will prejudice the former, and that from that time, the latter
vested right of Antonia. The right was vested became the owner thereof.
to her by the fact that she filed her action
under the Civil Code.
235
Issue: Whether an heir succeeds immediately does the mechanical work of writing the will is
to all of the property of his or her deceased a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore,
ancestor? that in this case the will was typewritten in
the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of
Held: no consequence. The English text of section
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation
governed by the statute in force at the time of found in the first Spanish edition of the code
the death of the decedent. The taxpayer can have been corrected in the second.
not foresee and ought not to be required to (2) To establish conclusively as against
guess the outcome of pending measures. The everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is was executed with the formalities required by
taxable at the time of the predecessor's law and that the testator was in a condition to
death, notwithstanding the postponement of make a will, is the only purpose of the
the actual possession or enjoyment of the proceedings under the new code for the
estate by the beneficiary, and the tax probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in
measured by the value of the property such proceedings determines and can
transmitted at that time regardless of its determine nothing more. In them the court
appreciation or depreciation. The mere fact has no power to pass upon the validity of any
that the estate of the deceased was placed in provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
trust did not remove it from the operation of for example, that a certain legacy is void and
our inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the another one valid. It could not in this case
payment of the inheritance tax. The make any decision upon the question whether
corresponding inheritance tax should have the testratrix had the power to appoint by will
been paid to escape the penalties of the laws. a guardian for the property of her children by
This is so for the reason already stated that her first husband, or whether the person so
the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in appointed was or was not a suitable person to
esse delivery of the same estate to the cestui discharge such trust.
que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A All such questions must be decided in some
trustee is but an instrument or agent for the other proceeding. The grounds on which a will
cestui que trust. When Moore accepted the may be disallowed are stated the section 634.
trust and took possesson of the trust estate Unless one of those grounds appears the will
he thereby admitted that the estate belonged must be allowed. They all have to do with the
not to him but to his cestui que trust. personal condition of the testator at the time
of its execution and the formalities connected
205) CASTAEDA vs. ALEMANY therewith. It follows that neither this court nor
3 PHIL 426 the court below has any jurisdiction in his
proceedings to pass upon the questions raised
Issue: Whether or not the will of Doa Juana by the appellants by the assignment of error
Moreno was duly signed by herself in the relating to the appointment of a guardian for
presence of three witnesses, who signed it as the children of the deceased.
witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and It is claimed by the appellants that there was
of each other. It was therefore executed in no testimony in the court below to show that
conformity with law. the will executed by the deceased was the
Held: same will presented to the court and
There is nothing in the language of section concerning which this hearing was had. It is
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which true that the evidence does not show that the
supports the claim of the appellants that the document in court was presented to the
will must be written by the testator himself or witnesses and identified by them, as should
by someone else in his presence and under have been done. But we think that we are
his express direction. That section requires (1) justified in saying that it was assumed by all
that the will be in writing and (2) either that the parties during the trial in the court below
the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign that the will about which the witnesses were
it, that it be signed by some one in his testifying was the document then in court. No
presence and by his express direction. Who suggestion of any kind was then made by the
236
counsel for the appellants that it was not the caused it to be signed by some other person,
same instrument. In the last question put to at his express direction, in the presence of
the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is three witnesses, and that they attested and
used by the counsel for the appellants. In subscribed it in his presence and in the
their argument in that court, found on page presence of each other. But the absence of
15 of the record, they treat the testimony of such form of attestation shall not render the
the witnesses as referring to the will probate will invalid if it is proven that the will was in
they were then opposing. fact signed and attested as in this section
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, provided.
eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el Act No. 2645 has amended section 618
cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make
todas sus partes." The costs of this instance said section read as follows:
will be charged against the appellants. SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will,
except as provided in the preceding section,
206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
39 PHIL 23 personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect
FACTS: known by the testator and signed by him, or
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will by the testator's name written by some other
made in the month of January, 1908, in which person in his presence, and by his express
he disposed of an estate valued at more than direction, and attested and subscribed by
P35,000. The will was duly executed in three or more credible witnesses in the
accordance with the law then in force, presence of the testator and of each other.
namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil The testator or the person requested by him
Procedure. The will was not executed in to write his name and the instrumental
accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
said section 618, prescribing certain aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on
additional formalities for the signing and the left margin, and said pages shall be
attestation of wills, in force on and after July numbered correlatively in letters placed on
1, 1916. In other words, the will was in the upper part of each sheet. The attestation
writing, signed by the testator, and attested shall state the number of sheets or pages
and subscribed by three credible witnesses in used, upon which the will is written, and the
the presence of the testator and of each fact that the testator signed the will and every
other; but was not signed by the testator and page thereof, or caused some other person to
the witnesses on the left margin of each and write his name, under his express direction, in
every page, nor did the attestation state the presence of three witnesses, and the
these facts. The new law, therefore, went into latter witnessed and signed the will and all
effect after the making of the will and before pages thereof in the presence of the testator
the death of the testator, without the testator and of each other.
having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements. The Court of First Instance for the province of
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Albay rendered its decision on December 29,
Procedure reads: 1917 disallowing the will of Jose Riosa.
No will, except as provided in the
preceding section, shall be valid to pass any ISSUE: The issue which this appeal presents is
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect whether in the Philippine Islands the law
the same, unless it be in writing and signed existing on the date of the execution of a will,
by the testator, or by the testator's name or the law existing at the death of the
written by some other person in his presence, testator, controls.
and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible RULING:
witnesses in the presence of the testator and The rule prevailing in many other
of each other. The attestation shall state the jurisdictions is that the validity of the
fact that the testator signed the will, or execution of a will must be tested by the
237
statutes in force at the time of its execution testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de
and that statutes subsequently enacted have Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs.
no retrospective effect. This doctrine is Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones,
believed to be supported by the weight of supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the
authority. It was the old English view; in Will of Bibiana Diquia [1918], R. G. No.
Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will.
280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
that "the general rule as to testaments is, that The strongest argument against our
the time of the testament, and not the accepting the first two rules comes out of
testator's death, is regarded." It is also the section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure
modern view, including among other decisions which, in negative terms, provides that a will
one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the
which State many of the sections of the Code first being "if not executed and attested as in
if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of
relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. course, become part and parcel of the Code of
Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.) Civil Procedure. The will in question is
Of the numerous decisions of divergent admittedly not executed and attested as
tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as
Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to
St., 209) is regarded to be the best observe that the general principle in the law
considered. In this opinion is found the of wills inserts itself even within the provisions
following: of said section 634. Our statute announces a
Retrospective laws generally if not positive rule for the transference of property
universally work injustice, and ought to be so which must be complied with as completed
construed only when the mandate of the act at the time of the execution, so far as the
legislature is imperative. When a testator act of the testator is concerned, as to all
makes a will, formally executed according to testaments made subsequent to the
the requirements of the law existing at the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not
time of its execution, it would unjustly effective as to testaments made antecedent
disappoint his lawful right of disposition to to that date.
apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, To answer the question with which we
though before his death. began this decision, we adopt as our own the
It is, of course, a general rule of second rule, particularly as established by the
statutory construction, as this court has said, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of
that "all statutes are to be construed as Jose Riosa is valid.
having only a prospective operation unless The order of the Court of First Instance
the purpose and intention of the Legislature to for the Province of Albay of December 29,
give them a retrospective effect is expressly 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is
declared or is necessarily implied from the reversed, and the record shall be returned to
language used. In every case of doubt, the the lower court with direction to admit the
doubt must be resolved against the said will to probate, without special findings
restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. as to costs. So ordered.
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil.,
220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. 95 SCRA 627
[1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found
in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 FACTS:
thereof provides that "laws shall not have a On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho
retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 executed a document purporting to be his
gives no indication of retrospective effect. Last Will and Testament. He died on January
Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
on cases having special application to Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a
238
petition for its probate in the Court of First which must be entirely written, dated and
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, signed by the testator himself and need not
who would inherit the estate of the deceased be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the
if he left no will, filed opposition. time the subject document was executed in
1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died
During the hearing one of the attesting in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted,
witnesses, the other two being dead, testified and the law at the time imposed certain
without contradiction that in his presence and requirements for the execution of wills, such
in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father as numbering correlatively each page (not
Sancho wrote out in longhand the subject folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left
document in Spanish which the testator spoke hand margin by the testator and by the three
and understood; that he (testator) signed on attesting witnesses, requirements which were
the left hand margin of the front page of each not complied with in the subject document
of the three folios or sheets of which the because the back pages of the first two folios
document is composed, and numbered the of the will were not signed by any one, not
same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed even by the testator and were not numbered,
his name at the end of his writing at the last and as to the three front pages, they were
page, all this, in the presence of the three signed only by the testator.
attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code
signed their names on the last page after the expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to
attestation clause in his presence and in the its form depends upon the observance of the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not law in force at the time it is made." The above
submit any evidence. provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to the affect that the
The learned trial court found and declared the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
subject document to be a holographic will; enforce at the time of the testator's death or
that it was in the handwriting of the testator at the time the supposed will is presented in
and that although at the time it was executed court for probate or when the petition is
and at the time of the testator's death, decided by the court but at the time the
holographic wills were not permitted by law instrument was executed. One reason in
still, because at the time of the hearing and support of the rule is that although the will
when the case was to be decided the new operates upon and after the death of the
Civil Code was already in force, which Code testator, the wishes of the testator about the
permitted the execution of holographic wills, disposition of his estate among his heirs and
under a liberal view, and to carry out the among the legatees is given solemn
intention of the testator which according to expression at the time the will is executed,
the trial court is the controlling factor and and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
may override any defect in form, said trial becomes a completed act.
court admitted to probate the subject From the day of the death of the testator, if he
document, as the Last Will and Testament of leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
Father Sancho Abadia. devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the
constitution against a subsequent change in
ISSUE: the statute adding new legal requirements of
Whether or not the provisions of the execution of wills which would invalidate such
Civil Code allowing holographic wills should be a will. By parity of reasoning, when one
applied. executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death
HELD: he should be regarded and declared as having
No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit
No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides by intestate succession, and no subsequent
that a person may execute a holographic will law with more liberal requirements or which
239
dispenses with such requirements as to succeeded in acquiring all of the property that
execution should be allowed to validate a I now possess, it is my wish that the
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of distribution of my property and everything in
their vested rights in the estate by intestate connection with this, my will, be made and
succession. The general rule is that the disposed of in accordance with the laws in
Legislature cannot validate void wills. force in the Philippine islands, requesting all
of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
from is reversed, and the subject document is disposition found in this will favorable to the
denied probate. person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is
208) Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, conditional, and the condition is that the
JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE instituted legatees must respect the testator's
BRIMO will to distribute his property, not in
50 PHIL 867 accordance with the laws of his nationality,
but in accordance with the laws of the
FACTS: Philippines.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed
a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the ISSUE: Whether or not the condition imposed
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The by the decedent in his will is void being
court, however, approved it. contrary to law.
The appellant's opposition is based on the
fact that the partition in question puts into HELD:
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will The Supreme Court held that the said
which are not in accordance with the laws of condition is void, being contrary to law, for
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they article 792 of the Civil Code provides that
are void as being in violation or article 10 of Impossible conditions and those contrary to
the Civil Code. law or good morals shall be considered as not
But the fact is that the oppositor did not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
prove that said testamentary dispositions are legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, should the testator otherwise provide.
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence Moreover, the said condition is contrary to
showing what the Turkish laws are on the law because it expressly ignores the testator's
matter, and in the absence of evidence on national law when, according to article 10 of
such laws, they are presumed to be the same the civil Code above quoted, such national
as those of the Philippines. law of the testator is the one to govern his
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record testamentary dispositions.
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Therefore, the condition, in the light of the
Brimo was violated in the testamentary legal provisions above cited, is considered
dispositions in question which, not being unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
contrary to our laws in force, must be said will is unconditional and consequently
complied with and executed. lawphil.net valid and effective even as to the herein
As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as oppositor.
a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the The second clause of the will regarding the
persons designated as such in will, it must be law which shall govern it, and to the condition
taken into consideration that such exclusion is imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
based on the last part of the second clause of being contrary to law.
the will, which says: that although by law, I Therefore, the orders appealed from are
am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having modified and it is directed that the
been conferred upon me by conquest and not distribution of this estate be made in such a
by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the manner as to include the herein appellant
other hand, having resided for a considerable Andre Brimo as one of the legatees.
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I
240
209) BELLIS vs BELLIS the Civil Code, it applied the national law of
20 SCRA 358 the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a
citizen of the State of Texas and of the United Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, should apply in the said partition.
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward, George, (who pre-deceased Held: YES.
him in infancy), Henry, Alexander and Anna In the present case, it is not disputed that the
Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet decedent was both a national of Texas and a
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three domicile thereof at the time of his death. So
legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate rule providing that the domiciliary system
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis (law of the domicile) should govern, the same
and Miriam Palma Bellis. would not result in a reference back (renvoi)
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas
Philippines, in which he directed that after all law. Rather, they argue that their case falls
taxes, obligations, and expenses of under the circumstances mentioned in the
administration are paid for, his distributable third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
estate should be divided, in trust, in the Article 16 of the Civil Code.
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil
to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) Code, render applicable the national law of
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after order of succession; (b) the amount of
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
children by his first and second wives in equal to succeed.
shares. 1wph1.t Appellants would however counter that Art.
Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate that Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
in the Court of First Instance their acts or property, and those which have
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as for their object public order, public policy and
executor of the will, paid all the bequests good customs shall not be rendered
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. or by determinations or conventions agreed
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate upon in a foreign country.
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of
and Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and correct. It is evident that whatever public
Testament divided the residuary estate into policy or good customs may be involved in
seven equal portions for the benefit of the our System of legitimes, Congress has not
testator's seven legitimate children by his first intended to extend the same to the
and second marriages. succession of foreign nationals. For it has
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
filed their respective oppositions to the amount of successional rights, to the
project of partition on the ground that they decedent's national law. Specific provisions
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate must prevail over general ones.
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
the deceased. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
The lower court, issued an order overruling U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
the oppositions and approving the executor's are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
final account, report and administration and since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the will and the amount of successional rights
241
are to be determined under Texas law, the on the other hand, testified on the due
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied execution and testamentary capacity of the
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. decedent.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent,
hereby affirmed in toto. also claimed that the will was obtained by
fraud considering that they were excluded
210) Bugnao v. Ubag therefrom.
14 PHIL 163
ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the
FACTS: appellants is sufficient to prove that the
The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag testator lacked testamentary capacity at the
was admitted for probate. It was signed by time of the execution of the will or that he
him in the presence of three subscribing and was induced by fraud in making the same
attesting witnesses and appears upon its face
to have been duly executed in accordance HELD:
with the provisions of the Code of Civil That the testator was mentally capable of
Procedure on the making of wills. The making the will is in our opinion fully
instrument was propounded by his widow established by the testimony of the
Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary. subscribing witnesses who swore positively
The order admitting the will was appealed by that, at the time of its execution, he was of
the appellants who are brothers and sisters of sound mind and memory. It is true that their
the deceased and would be entitled to share testimony discloses the fact that he was at
in the distribution of his estate, if probate that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage
were denied, as it appears that the deceased of tuberculosis complicated with severe
left no heirs in the direct ascending or intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was
descending line. They contend that Ubag was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
not of sound mind and memory, and was needed assistance even to rise himself to a
physically and mentally incapable of making a sitting position; and that during the
will. paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject
The appellants pointed out that one of the he could not speak; but all this evidence of
attesting witnesses stated that the decease physical weakness in no wise establishes his
sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary
and that after its execution food was given capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
him by his wife; while the other testified that subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished
he was assisted into a sitting position, and them by the testator in preparing the will, and
was given something to eat before he signed his clear recollection of the boundaries and
his name. physical description of the various parcels of
Appellants also contended that the decedent land set out therein, taken together with the
was physically incapacitated to make the will fact that he was able to give to the person
because he was then suffering from an who wrote the will clear and explicit
advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he instructions as to his desires touching the
was too weak to stand or even sit up unaided, disposition of his property, is strong evidence
and that he could not speak when he had of his testamentary capacity.
asthma attacks. Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact
Of the four witnesses appellant presented that the alleged will leaves all the property of
who tried to prove that the attesting the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to
witnesses were not present during the signing make any provision for his brothers or sisters,
of the will by the decedent, two of the indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and
witnesses stand to inherit from the decedent undue influence; and because of the inherent
if the will were denied probate. These two improbability that a man would make so
witnesses, on direct cross-examination, later unnatural and unreasonable a will, they
admitted that they were not even in the contend that this fact indirectly corroborates
house of the decedent at the time of the their contention that the deceased never did
execution of the will. The attesting witnesses, in fact execute the will. But when it is
242
considered that the deceased at the time of 22 PHIL 227

his death had no heirs in the ascending or FACTS:
descending line; that a bitter family quarrel The testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or
had long separated him from his brothers and 15 years prior to the time of his death
sisters, who declined to have any relations suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his
with the testator because he and his wife body; that a few years prior to his death his
were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and hearing became impaired and that he lost the
that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of
brothers or sisters, although some of them certain muscles his head fell to one side, and
lived in the vicinity, were present at the time saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use
of his death or attended his funeral; we think of his right hand, however, and was able to
the fact that the deceased desired to leave write fairly well. Through the medium of signs
and did leave all of his property to his widow he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife
and made no provision for his brothers and and to other members of his family.
sisters, who themselves were grown men and
women, by no means tends to disclose either At the time of the execution of his will, four
an unsound mind or the presence of undue testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin
influence on the part of his wife, or in any Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio,
wise corroborates contestants' allegation that and attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino
the will never was executed. Ramos.The testator, wrote out on pieces of
For the purposes of this decision it is not paper notes and items relating to the
necessary for us to attempt to lay down a disposition of his property, and these notes
definition of testamentary capacity which will were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who
cover all possible cases which may present transcribed them and put them in form. The
themselves, because, as will be seen from witnesses testify that the pieces of paper
what has already been said, the testator was, upon which the notes were written are
at the time of making the instrument under delivered to attorney by the testator; that the
consideration, endowed with all the elements attorney read them to the testator asking if
of mental capacity set out in the following they were his testamentary dispositions; that
definition of testamentary capacity which has the testator assented each time with an
been frequently announced in courts of last affirmative movement of his head; that after
resort in England and the United States; and the will as a whole had been thus written by
while is some cases testamentary capacity the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the
has been held to exist in the absence of proof presence of the testator and the witnesses;
of some of these elements, there can be no that Seor Marco gave the document to the
question that, in the absence of proof of very testator; that the latter, after looking over it,
exceptional circumstances, proof of the signed it in the presence of the four
existence of all these elements in sufficient to subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn
establish the existence of testamentary signed it in the presence of the testator and
capacity. each other.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction The executrix and widow of the decedent,
which the testator is engaged at the time, to Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the
recollect the property to be disposed of and will of Paguio.It was opposed by Isidro Paguio,
the person who would naturally be supposed son of the deceased and several
to have claims upon the testator, and to grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter
comprehend the manner in which the being the children of a deceased daughter.
instrument will distribute his property among Their opposition is based on the ground that
the objects of his bounty. the will was not executed according to the
The order probating the will affirmed. formalities and requirements of the law, and
further that the testator was not in the full of
211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs- enjoyment and use of his mental faculties to
appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan admits the
AL., defendants-appellants. will to probate. Hence, this appeal.
243
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you

ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE found him the last time you attended him, do
REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY you think he was in his right mind?
EXECUTE A WILL?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED right mind, but I noted some mental disorder,
Upon this point considerable evidence was because when I spoke to him he did not
adduced at the trial. One of the attesting answer me.
witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the
right mind, and that although he was substance of his testimony is that the testator
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his had suffered a paralysis and that he had
head what his wishes were. Another of the noticed some mental disorder. He does not
attesting witnesses stated that he was not say that the testator was not in his right mind
able to say whether decedent had the full use at the time of the execution of the will, nor
of his mental faculties or not, because he had does he give it at his opinion that he was
been ill for some years, and that he (the without the necessary mental capacity to
witnesses) was not a physician. The other make a valid will. He did not state in what way
subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in this mental disorder had manifested itself
the lower court as a witness for the other than that he had noticed that the
opponents. He was unable to state whether or testator did not reply to him on one occasion
not the will was the wish of the testator. The when he visited him.
only reasons he gave for his statement were
the infirmity and advanced age of the testator Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never
and the fact that he was unable to speak. The seen the testator, but his answer was in reply
witness stated that the testator signed the to a hypothetical question as to what be the
will, and he verified his own signature as a mental condition of a person who was 79
subscribing witness. years old and who had suffered from a malady
such as the testator was supposed to have
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting had according to the testimony of Doctor
witness, stated that he was present when the Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had
will was executed and his testimony was heard. He replied and discussed at some
cumulative in corroboration of the manner in length the symptoms and consequences of
which the will was executed and as to the fact the decease from which the testator had
that the testator signed the will. This witness suffered; he read in support of his statements
also stated that he had frequently transacted from a work by a German Physician, Dr.
matters of business for the decedent and had Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a
written letters and made inventories of his direct question, he stated that he would be
property at his request, and that immediately unable to certify to the mental condition of a
before and after the execution of the will he person who was suffering from such a
had performed offices of his character. He disease.
stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The We do not think that the testimony of these
testimony of this witness clearly indicates the two physicians in any way strengthens the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the contention of the appellants. Their testimony
testator. Among other witnesses for the only confirms the fact that the testator had
opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa been for a number of years prior to his death
and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of
he had attended the testator some four or five which his physician and mental strength was
years prior to his death and that the latter greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted
had suffered from a cerebral congestion from to state what was the mental condition of the
which the paralysis resulted. The following testator at the time he executed the will in
question was propounded to Doctor Basa: question. There can be no doubt that the
testator's infirmities were of a very serious
244
character, and it is quite evident that his mind clearly what the nature of the business was in
was not as active as it had been in the earlier which he was engaged. The evidence show
years of his life. However, we cannot include that the writing and execution of the will
from this that he wanting in the necessary occupied a period several hours and that the
mental capacity to dispose of his property by testator was present during all this time,
will. taking an active part in all the proceedings.
Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
The courts have been called upon frequently reasonable and its dispositions are those of a
to nullify wills executed under such rational person.
circumstances, but the weight of the authority
is in support if the principle that it is only 212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-
when those seeking to overthrow the will have appellant, vs. ENCARNACION
clearly established the charge of mental NEYRA, defendant-appellee
incapacity that the courts will intervene to set 76 PHIL 333
aside a testamentary document of this
character.In this jurisdiction the presumption FACTS:
of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties
testator and the burden is upon the and two children, by his first marriage, named
contestants of the will to prove the lack of Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and
testamentary capacity. The rule of law relating other children by his second marriage; That
to the presumption of mental soundness is after the death of Severo Neyra, the two
well established, and the testator in the case sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
at bar never having been adjudged insane by Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in
a court of competent jurisdiction, this connection with the properties left by their
presumption continues, and it is therefore deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a
incumbent upon the opponents to overcome complaint against her sister, Encarnacion
this legal presumption by proper evidence. Neyra, in CFI Manila, for the recovery of of
This we think they have failed to do. There are a property left by their deceased father, and
many cases and authorities which we might demanding at the same time of the rents
cite to show that the courts have repeatedly collected on the said property by the
held that mere weakness of mind and body, defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in
induced by age and disease do not render a favour of Trinidad but at the same time
person incapable of making a will. The law ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of
does not require that a person shall continue P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said
in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed from
physical and mental powers in order to the said decision, to the Court of Appeals.
execute a valid will The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal
In the above case the will was sustained. In on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by
the case at bar we might draw the same virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty.
contrast as was pictured by the court in the Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent
case just quoted. The striking change in the Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since
physical and mental vigor of the testator November 4, 1942, and other relatives of
during the last years of his life may have led hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a motion
some of those who knew him in his earlier for reconsideration, claiming that the alleged
days to entertain doubts as to his mental compromise or agreement, dated November
capacity to make a will, yet we think that the 3, 1942, could not have been understood by
statements of the witnesses to the execution Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then
of the will and statements of the conduct of at the threshold of death, and that as a
the testator at that time all indicate that he matter of fact she died the following day; and
unquestionably had mental capacity and that that if it had been signed at all by said
he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing
the execution of the will it does not appear on said document must have been affixed
that his conduct was irrational in any thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against
particular. He seems to have comprehended Encarnacion's will.
245
Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion witnesses were not present, as they were in
became seriously ill and was advised by her the caida.
religious adviser, Fr. Garcia to reconcile with
her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sisters ISSUES:
home and they reconciled while Encarnacion 1. WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND
was lying in bed. In the course of their MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL AND THE
conversation which they also talked about the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
properties left by their father and their 2. WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN
litigations which had reached the Court of THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter
dismissed, on the condition that the property HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED
involved therein should be given exclusively 1.It has been conclusively shown that
to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4,
her share in the rents of said property 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48,
collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad after an illness of about two (2) years.
had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her
Attorney Panis prepared said document of cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in
compromise as well as the new will and the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he
testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion
Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, Neyra talked to her that they understood each
pursuant to Encarnacion's express other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix
instructions, and the two documents were was really of sound mind, at the time of
prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signing and execution of the agreement and
signature, since the morning of November 3, will in question.
1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded
compromise and last will and testament to that the mental faculties of persons suffering
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in
in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad the fact that, on account of the sleep they
Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
their terms were in accordance with her physical and mental rest. And that like
wishes, or if she wanted any change made in patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia
said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did or diabetes, they preserve their mental
not suggest any change, and asked for the faculties until the moments of their death.
pad and the two documents, and, with the Judging by the authorities above cited, the
help of a son of Trinidad, placed her logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra
thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two was of sound mind and possessed the
documents, in duplicate, on her bed in necessary testamentary and mental capacity,
the sala, in the presence of attesting at the time of the execution of the agreement
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. and will, dated November 3, 1942.
Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after 2.The contention that the attesting witnesses
which said witnesses signed at the foot of the were not present, at the time Encarnacion
will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will
and of each other. The agreement was also in question, on her bed, in the sala of the
signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is
M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a untenable. It has been fully shown that said
protege, as witnesses. witnesses were present, at the time of the
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and signing and execution of the agreement and
Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the will in question, in the sala, where the
thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is
to the agreement in question, dated not whether they actually saw each other at
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her the time of the signing of the documents, but
bed in the sala; and that the attesting whether they might have seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so; and the
246
attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this Such a result based upon solidly established
case. And the thumbmark placed by the facts would be the same whether or not it be
testatrix on the agreement and will in technically held that said will, in order to be
question is equivalent to her signature. valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect;
whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect
213) In re estate of Piraso, deceased. is a cultivated language and used as a means
SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant, of communication in writing, and whether or
vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents- not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano
appellees. dialect well enough to understand a will
52 PHIL 660 written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat,
that it is quite certain that the instrument
FACTS: Exhibit A was written in English which the
The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of supposed testator Piraso did not know, and
the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last this is sufficient to invalidate said will
will and testament of the deceased Piraso. according to the clear and positive provisions
The will was written in English; that Piraso of the law, and inevitably prevents its
knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, probate.
although imperfectly, and could make himself
understood in that dialect, and the court is of 214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-
the opinion that his will should have been appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET
written in that dialect. AL., defendants-appellees.
5 PHIL 541
ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?
FACTS:
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED Macario Jaboneta executed under the
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, following circumstances the document in
strictly provides that: question, which has been presented for
"No will, except as provides in the preceding probate as his will:
section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in
a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the
present Code of Civil Procedure went into document in question be written, and calling
effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo
or personal, nor charge or affect the Jena as witnesses, executed the said
same, unless it be written in the language or document as his will. They were all together,
dialect known by the testator," and were in the room where Jaboneta was,
Nor can the presumption in favor of the will and were present when he signed the
established by this court in Abangan vs. document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as
Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the a witness, at his request, and in his presence
testator is presumed to know the dialect of and in the presence of the other two
the locality where he resides, unless there is witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a
proof to the contrary, even he invoked in witness in the presence of the testator, and in
support of the probate of said document as a the presence of the other two persons who
will, because, in the instant case, not only is it signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo
not proven that English is the language of the Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat
City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso and left the room. As he was leaving the
lived and where the will was drawn, but that house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand
the record contains positive proof that said and put himself in position to sign the will as a
Piraso knew no other language than the witness, but did not sign in the presence of
Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had
that is, he did not know the English language left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as
in which then will is written. So that even if a witness in the presence of the testator and
such a presumption could have been raised in of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
this case it would have been wholly The last will and testament of Macario
contradicted and destroyed. Jaboneta, deceased, was denied probate
247
because the lower court was of the opinion it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses
from the evidence adduced at the hearing are together for the purpose of witnessing the
that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did execution of the will, and in a position to
not attach his signature thereto in the actually see the testator write, if they choose
presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the to do so; and there are many cases which lay
witnesses, as required by the provisions of down the rule that the true test of vision is
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.. not whether the testator actually saw the
witness sign, but whether he might have seen
ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH him sign, considering his mental and physical
RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT condition and position at the time of the
OF WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo.,
PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER 579.)
HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED 215) EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-

We can not agree with so much of the above appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN
finding of facts as holds that the signature of RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors
Javellana was not signed in the presence of Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-
Jena, in compliance with the provisions of appellants
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 42 PHIL 45
The fact that Jena was still in the room when
he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in FACTS:
the act of affixing his signature to the will, Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the
taken together with the testimony of the will of one Esteban Garcia; contest was made
remaining witnesses which shows that by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the
Javellana did in fact there and then sign his latter in the capacity of guardian for the
name to the will, convinces us that the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The
signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. proponent of the will introduced one of the
The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and three attesting witnesses who testified that
that his back was turned while a portion of the the will was executed with all necessary
name of the witness was being written, is of external formalities, and that the testator was
no importance. He, with the other witnesses at the time in full possession of disposing
and the testator, had assembled for the faculties. Upon the latter point the witness
purpose of executing the testament, and were was corroborated by the person who wrote
together in the same room for that purpose, the will at the request of the testator. Two of
and at the moment when the witness the attesting witnesses were not introduced,
Javellana signed the document he was nor was their absence accounted for by the
actually and physically present and in such proponent of the will. The attorney for the
position with relation to Javellana that he opposition introduced a single witness whose
could see everything which took place by testimony tended to show in a vague and
merely casting his eyes in the proper indecisive manner that at the time the will
direction, and without any physical was made the testator was so debilitated as
obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore to be unable to comprehend what he was
we are of opinion that the document was in about.
fact signed before he finally left the room. The trial judge found that the testator at the
The purpose of a statutory requirement that time of the making of the will was of sound
the witness sign in the presence of the mind and disposing memory and that the will
testator is said to be that the testator may had been properly executed. He accordingly
have ocular evidence of the identity of the admitted the will to probate.Hence this appeal
instrument subscribed by the witness and
himself, and the generally accepted tests of ISSUES:
presence are vision and mental apprehension. 1. whether a will can be admitted to probate,
(See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30, p. 599, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
and cases there cited.) single attesting witness, without producing or
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) accounting for the absence of the other two;
248
2. whether the will in question is rendered every part thereof, it can make no possible
invalid by reason of the fact that the signature difference whether the names appear on the
of the testator and of the three attesting left or no the right margin, provided they are
witnesses are written on the right margin of on one or the other.
each page of the will instead of the left The controlling considerations on the point
margin. now before us were well stated In Re will of
Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court,
HELD: lower court affirmed speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a
1. While it is undoubtedly true that an case where the signatures were placed at the
uncontested will bay be proved by the bottom of the page and not in the margin,
testimony of only one of the three attesting said:
witnesses, nevertheless in The object of the solemnities surrounding the
Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this execution of wills is to close the door against
court declared after an elaborate examination bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o
of the American and English authorities that will and testaments and to guarantee their
when a contest is instituted, all of the truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on
attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive this subject should be interpreted in such a
and within reach of the process of the court. way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
In the present case no explanation was made on the other hand, also one must not lose
at the trial as to why all three of the attesting sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
witnesses were not produced, but the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
probable reason is found in the fact that, right to make a will. So when an
although the petition for the probate of this interpretation already given assures such
will had been pending from December 21, ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
1917, until the date set for the hearing, which that adds nothing but demands more
was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
entered until the very day set for the hearing; frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
and it is probable that the attorney for the disregarded.
proponent, believing in good faith the probate In the case before us, where ingenuity could
would not be contested, repaired to the court not suggest any possible prejudice to any
with only one of the three attesting witnesses person, as attendant upon the actual
at hand, and upon finding that the will was deviation from the letter of the law, such
contested, incautiously permitted the case to deviation must be considered too trivial to
go to proof without asking for a postponement invalidate the instrument.
of the trial in order that he might produce all
the attesting witnesses.Although this 216) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE
circumstance may explain why the three ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
witnesses were not produced, it does not in VILLACORTE.
itself supply any basis for changing the rule CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
expounded in the case above referred to; and vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE
were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
this court would probably be compelled to 11 SCRA 423
reverse this case on the ground that the
execution of the will had not been proved by a FACTS:
sufficient number of attesting witnesses. A special proceeding was commenced on
2. We are of the opinion that the will in question October 2, 1958 for the allowance and
is valid. It is true that the statute says that the admission to probate of the original will of
testator and the instrumental witnesses shall Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
sign their names on the left margin of each appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as
and every page; and it is undeniable that the executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a
general doctrine is to the effect that all daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition.
statutory requirements as to the execution of Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also
wills must be fully complied with. So far as filed a manifestation adopting as his own
concerns the authentication of the will, and of Natividad's opposition to the probate of the
249
alleged will. Proponent subsequently filed a that page three (3) was signed in his
motion for the admission of an amended and presence.
supplemental petition, alleging that the The court issued the order admitting the will
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with and its duplicate to probate. From this order,
all the legal requirements, and that he was, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court
on that date, submitting the signed duplicate ,
which he allegedly found only on or about ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE
May 26, 1959. oppositors Natividad Icasiano ABSENCE OF A WITNESS SIGNATURE IN ONE
de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their PAGE
joint opposition to the admission of the
amended and supplemental petition, but by HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
order, the court admitted said petition. On the question of law, we hold that the
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his
the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the signature to one page of a testament, due to
City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the
June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte course of signing, is not per se sufficient to
executed a last will and testament in justify denial of probate. Impossibility of
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. substitution of this page is assured not only
Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, the fact that the testatrix and two other
Manila, published before and attested by witnesses did sign the defective page, but
three instrumental witnesses, namely: also by its bearing the coincident imprint of
attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. the seal of the notary public before whom the
Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will testament was ratified by testatrix and all
was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the three witnesses. The law should not be so
said three instrumental witnesses on the strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize
same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, the testatrix on account of the inadvertence
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; of a single witness over whose conduct she
and that the will was actually prepared by had no control, where the purpose of the law
attorney Fermin Samson, who was also to guarantee the identity of the testament
present during the execution and signing of and its component pages is sufficiently
the decedent's last will and testament, attained, no intentional or deliberate
together with former Governor Emilio Rustia deviation existed, and the evidence on record
of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little attests to the full observance of the statutory
girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil.
to the execution of the decedent's last will vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479
and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may
were in the Philippines at the time of the sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it
hearing, and both testified as to the due or the attestation clause".
execution and authenticity of the said will. So That the failure of witness Natividad to sign
did the Notary Public before whom the will page three (3) was entirely through pure
was acknowledged by the testatrix and oversight is shown by his own testimony as
attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which
Samson, who actually prepared the bears a complete set of signatures in every
document. The latter also testified upon cross page. The text of the attestation clause and
examination that he prepared one original the acknowledgment before the Notary Public
and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will likewise evidence that no one was aware of
and testament at his house in Baliuag, the defect at the time.
Bulacan, but he brought only one original and This would not be the first time that this Court
one signed copy to Manila, retaining one departs from a strict and literal application of
unsigned copy in Bulacan. the statutory requirements, where the
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied.
to sign page three (3) of the original, admits Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
that he may have lifted two pages instead of Court has held that a testament, with the only
one when he signed the same, but affirmed page signed at its foot by testator and
250
witnesses, but not in the left margin, could An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. considered as an act of the witnesses, since
Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the the omission of their signatures at the bottom
requirement for the correlative lettering of the thereof negatives their participation.
pages of a will, the failure to make the first The petitioner and appellee contends that
page either by letters or numbers is not a signatures of the three witnesses on the left-
fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). hand margin conform substantially to the law
These precedents exemplify the Court's policy and may be deemed as their signatures to the
to require satisfaction of the legal attestation clause. This is untenable, because
requirements in order to guard against fraud said signatures are in compliance with the
and bid faith but without undue or legal mandate that the will be signed on the
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary left-hand margin of all its pages. If an
privilege. attestation clause not signed by the three
witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted
217) Testate estate of the late VICENTE as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner- clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and
appellee, vs. in the absence of the testator and any or all of
PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors- the witnesses
appellants.
92 PHIL 1033 218) BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. NARCISA
FACTS: RIMANDO, defendant-appellant..
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors 18 PHIL 450
from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Samar, admitting to probate the will FACTS:
allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died The lower court admitted the instrument
in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February propounded therein as the last will and
14, 1949. testament of the deceased, Pedro
The main objection insisted upon by the Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision,
appellant in that the will is fatally defective, contending that it one of the witnesses was
because its attestation clause is not signed by not present during the signing of the will by
the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the the testator and of the other subscribing
three witnesses to the will do not appear at witnesses. one of the witnesses was the
the bottom of the attestation clause, although outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small
the page containing the same is signed by the room connected by a doorway from where the
witnesses on the left-hand margin. The will was signed ,across which was hung a
petitioner and appellee contends that curtain which made it impossible for one in
signatures of the three witnesses on the left- the outside room to see the testator and the
hand margin conform substantially to the law other subscribing witnesses in the act of
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attaching their signatures to the instrument.
attestation clause.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES
COMPLIANCE WHEN THE WITNESSES WAS IN ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE
SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE LEFT MARGINS SIGNING OF THE WILL
BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE
HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED
HELD: CFI REVERSED In the case just cited, on which the trial court
We are of the opinion that the position taken relied, we held that:
by the appellant is correct. The attestation The true test of presence of the testator and
clause is 'a memorandum of the facts the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
attending the execution of the will' required whether they actually saw each other sign,
by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, but whether they might have been seen each
and it must necessarily bear their signatures. other sign, had they chosen to do so,
251
considering their mental and physical

condition and position with relation to each Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will
other at the moment of inscription of each of Mateo on the ground that on the date
signature. stated in the will, the testator was already of
But it is especially to be noted that the poor health and could not have executed the
position of the parties with relation to each will. They likewise questioned the
other at the moment of the subscription of genuineness of the signature of the testator in
each signature, must be such that they may the said will.
see each other sign if they choose to do so.
This, of course, does not mean that the The probate court allowed the will. On appeal,
testator and the subscribing witnesses may the petitioners contended that the Attestation
be held to have executed the instrument in Clause was fatally defective for failing to state
the presence of each other if it appears that that the testator signed in the presence of the
they would not have been able to see each witnesses and the witnesses signed in the
other sign at that moment, without changing presence of the testator and of one another.
their relative positions or existing conditions.
The trial courts decision merely laid down the Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the
doctrine that the question whether the probate courts decision and held that there
testator and the subscribing witnesses to an was substantial compliance with Art. 805.
alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause
proof of the fact that their eyes were actually contained in the last will complies with the
cast upon the paper at the moment of its requirements of Art. 805 and 809?
subscription by each of them, but that at that
moment existing conditions and their position HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills,
with relation to each other were such that by the attestation clause need not be written in a
merely casting the eyes in the proper language or dialect known to the testator
direction they could have seen each other since it does not form part of the disposition.
sign. To extend the doctrine further would The language used in the attestation clause
open the door to the possibility of all manner likewise need not even be known to the
of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art.
defeat the purpose for which this particular 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the
condition is prescribed in the code as one of Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to said
the requisites in the execution of a will. witnesses.
219) CANEDA VS CA An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an

222 SCRA 781 ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed
FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower before them and to the manner of the
without any children. He executed a will in the execution of the same. It is a separate
presence of three witnesses. He was assisted memorandum of the facts surrounding the
by his lawyer and a notary public in the conduct of execution of the same.
preparation of his will. Under the said will, the
testator disposed of his properties to persons Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things
without blood relation to the testator. The to be stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack
testator himself submitted the will to the of which would result in the invalidity of the
probate court but the testator passed away will:
even before his petition could be heard. a) The number of pages
b) That the testator signed or
The petitioners, who claimed to be the expressly caused another to sign, the will and
nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for every page thereof in the presence of the
the settlement of the intestate estate of attesting witnesses and
Mateo. The probate proceedings and special c) That the attesting witnesses
proceedings filed were consolidated. witnessed the signing by the testator of the
252
will and all of its pages, and that said end thereof and at the left margin of each
witnesses also signed the will and every page page by the three attesting witnesses, it
thereof in the presence of the testator and of certainly cannot be conclusively inferred
one another. therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against respective signatures in the presence of the
any interpolation or omission of some of its testator and of each other, since the presence
pages, whereas the subscription of the of such signatures only establishes the fact
signatures of the testator and the attesting that it was indeed signed, but it does not
witnesses is made for the purpose of prove that the attesting witnesses did
authentication and identification, and thus subscribe to the will in the presence of the
indicates that the will is the very instrument testator and of one another.
executed by the testator and attested to by
the witnesses. By attesting and subscribing to The execution of a will is supposed to be one
the will. The witnesses thereby declare that act so that where the testator and the
due execution of the will as embodied in the witnesses sign on various days or occasions
Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause and in various combinations, the will cannot
provides strong legal guaranties for the due be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
execution of a will and to ensure the In a situation like in the case at bar, the
authenticity thereof. It needs to be signed defects is not only in the form or language of
only by the witnesses and not the testator, the Attestation Clause but the total absence
absence of the signature of the former of a specific element requires by Art. 805.
invalidates the will.
In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects
In the case at bar, the will was comprised of must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced
three pages, all numbered correlatively, with supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar,
the left margin of each page bearing the proof of the acts requires to have been
respective signatures of the testator and the performed by the attesting witnesses san be
three attesting witnesses. The testamentary supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof.
dispositions were expresses in Cebuano- Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA.
Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by
the testator. The Attestation Clause was recite
in English and is likewise signed at the end of
three attesting witnesses. 220) AZNAR VS GARCIA
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading 7 SCRA95
of the Attestation Clause herein is the fact
that while it recites that the testator indeed FACTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to
signed the will and all its pages in the probate the will of the deceased Edward
presence of three attesting witnesses and Christensen giving to Helen Christensen 3,
stated as well the number of pages that were 600 pesos while Lucy all the remainder of his
used, the same does not expressly state property which was opposed by Helen
therein the circumstance that said witnesses because it deprives her legitime as an
subscribed their respective signatures to the acknowledged natural children hence she is
will in the presence of the testator and of entitled to of the estate but CFI opposes
each other. What is clearly lacking is the the final accounting of the executor.
statement that the witnesses signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled to share of
testator and of one another. The absence of the estate?
that statement is a fatal defect which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for
will. partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. The citizenship of the
As to the substantial compliance rule under deceases was never lost by his stay in the
Art. 809, while it may be true that the Philippines, hence the meaning of national
Attestation Clause is indeed subscribed at the law in Art 16 is the conflict of law rules in
253
California. However, ART 946 of California Civil three credible witnesses to act as such and of
Code authorizes the return of the question to Art 806 which requires that the testator and
the law of the testators domicile, The the required number of witnesses must
Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine court appear before the notary public to
should not refer back it to California. acknowledge the will. The result woukd be, as
Court of domicile is bound to apply its own has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared
law as directed in conflict of law rule of before the notary public for that purpose.
decedent state.
222) KALAW VS RELOVA
221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR 132 SCRA 237
54 SCRA 31
FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to
FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a be the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad
petition for probate of the will of Valente Cruz Kalaw, filed for a petition to admit to probate
with the CFI which was opposed by the the holographic will of his sister. In such will,
petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground that private respondent Gregorio was named as
the one of the three witnesses is at the same the sole heir of all the properties left behind
time the Notary Public before whom the will by the testatrix and was also named as the
was supposed to have been acknowledged. executor of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister
in accordance with Art. 805 and 806? of the testatrix, who claims to have been
originally instituted as the sole heir. She
HELD:The notary public before whom the will alleged that the holographic will contained
was acknowledged cannot be considered as alterations, corrections and insertions without
the third instrumental witness since he cannot the proper authentication by the full signature
acknowledge before himself his having signed of the testatrix as requires by Art 814 of the
the will. To acknowledge before means to Civil Code.
avow or to own as genuine, to assent and
before means in front or preceding in space The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a
or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness Petition for Review on Certiorari.
were the notary public himself, he would have
to avow assent, or admit his having signed ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered
the will in front of himself. text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for
The function of a notary public is, among lack of authentication by the full signature of
others, to guard against any illegal or immoral the testatrix, should be probated or not, with
arrangements. That function would be her as sole heir.
defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of
he would be interested in sustaining the erasures, correction made by the testator on a
validity of the will as it directly involves holographic will not be noted under his
himself and the validity of his own act. It signature, hence the will is not invalidated as
would place him in an inconsistent position a whole but as most only as respects the
and the very purpose of the particular words erased or corrected.
acknowledgement, which is to minimize fraud
would be thwarted. However in this case, the holographic will in
dispute had only one substantial provision,
To allow the notary public to act as third which was altered by substituting the original
witness, or one of the attesting and heir with another, but which alteration did not
acknowledging witnesses, would have the carry the requisite of full authentication by
effect of having only two attesting witnesses the full signature of the testator, the effect
to the will which would be in contravention of must be that the entire Will is voided or
the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least revoked for the simple reason that nothing
254
remains in the Will after that which could (4) whether the execution of the will and its
remain valid. To state that the will as first signing were voluntary acts of the decedent
written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its
be given effect because she failed to requirement affects the validity of the
authenticate it in the manner required by law dispositions contained in the holographic will,
by affixing her full signature- the intention of but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
the testator could not be ascertained. and date some of the dispositions, the result
However, there is clear showing of the is that these dispositions cannot be
testators intention to revoke the institution of effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
Rosa as her sole heir. render the whole testament void.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and
the decision of the respondent judge is In the case at bar, unless, the
affirmed. unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testators signature,
223) AJERO VS CA their presence does not invalidate the will
236 SCRA 488 itself. The lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes.
FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named
as devisees the petitioner, Roberto and In addition to, courts in probate are limited to
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, will. However, exception, Courts are not
Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose powerless to do what the situation constrains
Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed for them to do and pass upon certain provisions
the allowance of decedent holographic will of the will that Cabadbaran property is in the
contending that the latter was of sound mind name of her late father John Sand which Dr
and not acting under duress. Private Ajero question her conveyance.
Respondent opposed it that the testament
body and signature was not decedents 224) LABRADOR VS CA
handwriting and such properties, the 184 SCRA 170
decedent is not the sole owner. RTC admitted
the will while CA reversed it that the will fails FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a
to meet the requirements for its validity under parcel of land and his children as heirs. He
Art 813 and 814 because the dispositions allegedly executed a holographic will. The
were either unsigned and undated or signed holographic will was submitted for probate by
but not dated and erasure had not been petitioner Sagrado, the devisee of the parcel
authenticated by decedent. of the land.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid? Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of
the will on the ground that the will has been
HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a extinguished or revoked by implications of
holographic will to probate, the only issues to law, when the testator, before his death, sold
be resolved are: the parcel of land to the oppositors. The said
transaction was evidenced by the new TCT
(1) whether the instrument submitted is the issued in the name of the oppositors and the
decedents will Deed of Sale executed by the testator.
(2) whether said will was executed in Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a
accordance with formalities prescribed by law 3rd person, Sagrado sought to have the Deed
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary of Sale annulled on the ground that it was
testamentary capacity at the time the will was fictitious.
executed and
255
LC allowed the probate of the will and testament containing the same provisions as
declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA that of the will of her husband.
reversed the judgment and disallowed the To wit: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and
probate of the will on the ground that it was I shall die under such circumstances that
undated. there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of our deaths, then it shall be
ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is presumed that he predeceased me, and my
dated? estate shall be administered and distributed
in all respects, in accordance with such
HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears presumption.
that the date when the testator made the will
was stated in the body of the complaint, on Later, the entire family perished in a fire that
the 2nd page of the will gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
and this is the day in which we named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate
agreed that we are making the partitioning probate proceedings of the wills.
and assigning the respective assignment of
the said fish pond, and this being in the Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a
month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
and this decision and or instruction of mine is opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir
the matter to be followed, and the one who according to New York law. He contended that
made this writing is no other that MELECIO since the wills were executed in New York,
LABRADOR, their father. New York law should govern. He further
The law does not specify a particular location argued that, by New York law, he and his
where the date should be placed in the will. brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as
The only requirements are that the date be in such entitled to notice of the reprobate
the will itself and executed in the hand of the proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
testator. These requirements are present in
the subject will. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir
of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills
225) PEREZ VS TOLETE were in accordance with New York law. But
232 SCRA 722 before she could present evidence to prove
the law of New York, the reprobate court
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez- already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
Cunanan are husband and wife, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the
U.S.A, with their children, Jocelynm18; wills should be allowed
Jacqueline,16; and Josephine,14.
Each executed a will also in New York, HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan
containing provisions on presumption of spouses, who were American citizens, will
survivorship (in the event that it is not known only be effective in this country upon
which one of the spouses died first, the compliance with the following provision of the
husband shall be presumed to have Civil Code of the Philippines:
predeceased his wife).
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
To wit: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, produces effect in the Philippines if made with
and I shall die under such circumstances that the formalities prescribed by the law of the
there is not sufficient evidence to determine place in which he resides, or according to the
the order of our deaths, then it shall be formalities observed in his country, or in
presumed that I predeceased her, and my conformity with those which this Code
estate shall be administered and distributed, prescribes.
in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Cunanan executed her own last will and Philippine laws is imperative.
256
also cause copies of the notice of the time

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or and place fixed for proving the will to be
allowance of wills which have been probated addressed to the designated or other known
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
the due execution of the will in accordance testator, . . . "
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the petitioner reasonable time within which to
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the submit evidence needed for the joint probate
laws of a foreign country on procedure and of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
needed evidence. pleadings pertinent to the probate
proceedings.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the
foreign laws upon which the probate in the 226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN
foreign country is based is impelled by the 106 PHIL. 997
fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of them. FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska
and therefore a citizen of that state.
This petition cannot be completely resolved Notwithstanding his long residence in the
without touching on a very glaring fact - Philippines, he continued and remained to be
petitioner has always considered herself the a citizen of the United States and of the state
sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of
because she does not consider herself an heir his days in that state. His permanent
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to residence or domicile in the United States
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. depended upon his personal intent or desire,
Thus, even in the instant petition, she only and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a therefore at the time of his death, he was a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely citizen of that state.
a nominal or formal party.
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and
The rule that the court having jurisdiction her two children, question the validity of the
over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice executor/testator C.O. Bohanans last will and
thereof to be given as in case of an original testament, claiming that they have been
will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the
of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with form concede to them.
regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for Another, is the claim of the testator's children,
the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require received legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000
publication and notice by mail or personally to each only, and, therefore, have not been
the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of given their shares in the estate which, in
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to accordance with the laws, should be two-
the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are thirds of the estate left by the testator.
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.

Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are ISSUE: WON the testamentary dispositions of
entitled to notices of the time and place for the testator is valid: as to Magdalena
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 Bohanan and second to his children?
of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall
257
no last wiil and testament was left they

HELD: The first issue refers to the share that iniateda an intestate proceeding for the
the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. settlement of their aunt's estate. While the
Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The case was still in progress, the parties
will has not given her any share in the estate executed an agreement of extrajudicial
left by the testator. It is argued that it was settlement of Adriana's estate. The
error for the trial court to have recognized the agreement provided for the division of the
Reno divorce secured by the testator from his estate into four equal parts among the
Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that parties. They then presented the extrajudicial
said divorce should be declared a nullity in settlement agreement to the trial court for
this jurisdiction. The court refused to approval.
recognize the claim of the widow on the Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma
ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated
of all of his properties without requiring him to January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last
leave any portion of his estate to his former will and testament of Adriana. It
(or divorced) wife. No right to share in the Significantly, the appellate court while finding
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists as inconclusive the matter on whether or not
in the State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can the document or papers allegedly burned by
no longer claim portion of the estate left by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto
the testator. Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the
testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted
With regards the second issue, the old Civil itself and found that the will had been
Code, which is applicable to this case because revoked. The respondent court stated that the
the testator died in 1944, expressly provides presence of animus revocandi in the
that successional rights to personal property destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been
are to be earned by the national law of the sufficiently proven. The appellate court based
person whose succession is in question, thus its finding on the facts that the document was
the two-third rule is not enforceable. not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by
the testatrix going to the residence of Atty.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator, Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the
C.O Bohanan was at the time of his death a latter's possession, and, her seeking the
citizen of the United States and declares that services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new
his will and testament is fully in accordance will drawn up.
with the laws of the State of Nevada and
admits the same to probate. ISSUE: Whether or not the will was revoked
by Adriana.
The validity of Testamentary dispositions are
to be governed by the national law of the HELD:
testator and as it has been decided and it is It is clear that the physical act of destruction
not disputed that the national law of the of a will, like burning in this case, does not per
testator is that State of Nevada, which allows se constitute an effective revocation, unless
the testator to dipose his properties according the destruction is coupled with animus
to his will, like in the case at bar. revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
Thus the order of the court approving the imperative that the physical destruction be
project partition made in accordance to done by the testator himself. It may be
testamentary provisions must be affirmed. performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the
227) Testate Estate of Maloto testator. Of course, it goes without saying that
158 SCRA 451 the document destroyed must be the will
itself.
FACTS: In this case, while animus revocandi or the
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that
and nephews, the petitioners believing that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone
258
would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only ISSUE: Whether the previous will was
one of the necessary elements for the annulled even if the subsequent will, with
effective revocation of a last will and revoking clause, was disallowed.
testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of HELD:
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling A subsequent will containing a clause
the will carried out by the testator or by revoking a previous will, having been
another person in his presence and under his disallowed for the reason that it was not
express direction. There is paucity of evidence executed in conformity with the provisions of
to show compliance with these requirements. section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
For one, the document or papers burned by to making of wills, cannot produce the effect
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, said revocatory clause is void
much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have Execution of Wills
been done under the express direction of
Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her 229) Tolentino v Francisco
presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and 57 PHIL 749
Eladio, were one in stating that they were the
only ones present at the place where the FACTS:
stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita
in which the papers proffered as a will were Francisco, but she predeceased him years
burned. Nowhere in the records before us ago. The pair had no children with a number
does it appear that the two witnesses, of his wifes kin as survivors. However,
Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, strained relations, resulting from grave
both illiterates, were unequivocably positive disagreements, developed between Tolentino
that the document burned was indeed and the Francisco relations and he determined
Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed to make a new will in which, apart from
that the papers she destroyed was the will certain legacies in favor of a few individuals,
only because, according to her, Adriana told the bulk of his estate, worth probably about
her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his P150,000, should be given to Adelaida
information that the burned document was Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.
the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, To this end, Tolentino went to the office of
his testimony on this point is double hearsay. Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and
informed him that he wanted to make a new
228) Molo vs. Molo will and desired Repide to draft it for him.
90 PHIL 37 After the necessary preliminary inquiries had
been made, the attorney suggested to him to
FACTS: bring a copy of the will previously made which
was reduced to itsproper form. As the
The deceased died leaving no forced heir in instrument was taking shape Tolentino stated
the descending or ascending line, however he that he wanted the will to be signed in
was survived by his weife and and his nieces Repide's office, with the latter as one of the
and nephews who were the legitimate attesting witnesses. For the other two
children of his deceased brother, during his witnesses Tolentino requested that two
lifetime he executed two wills, one executed attorneys attached to the office, namely,
at 1918 and the subsequent one in 1939. The Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico,
latter will contains a clause which revokes the should serve.
will in 1918. The said will containing the When the instrument had been reduced to
clause revoking the previous will, however, proper form, changes were made by Tolentino
was disallowed. with regards to the attesting witnesses.
Pursuant to these instructions Repide made
the desired changes in the will and just before
twelve o'clock noon of the next day Tolentino
259
returned to Repide's office and received from repudiated their participation in the execution
him the criminal document with a carbon copy of the will at the time and place stated; and
thereof. Repide advised the testator that the while admitting the genuineness of their
copy should be executed with the same signatures to the will, pretended that they had
formality as the original in order that the severally signed the instrument, at the
intention of the testator should not be request of the testator, at different places.
frustrated by the possible loss or destruction Thus Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed
of the original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the that the testator brought the will to Syyap's
office of Repide not to number the house on the afternoon of October 21 a time,
consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting be it remembered, when the will had not yet
machine, the duty of numbering the pages left the hands of the draftsman and upon
being left to the testator himself. learning that Syyap could not be present at
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents the time and place then being arranged for
from his pocket saving that it was his last will the execution of the will, he requested Syyap,
and testament, done in duplicate, and he as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign the
proceeded to read the original to the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has
witnesses. After this had been completed, another story to tell of isolated action,
Legarda himself took the will in hand and read claiming that he signed the will in the evening
it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de
who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, Dios in Intramuros.
to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina We are unable to give any credence to the
Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then testimony of these two witnesses on this
paged the duplicate copy of the will in the point, the same being an evident fabrication
same way. He next proceeded to sign the designed for the purpose of defeating the will.
original will and each of its pages by writing In the first place, the affirmative proof
his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. showing that the will was properly executed is
Following this, each of the three witnesses adequate, consistent, and convincing,
signed their own respective names at the end consisting of the testimony of the third
of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, attesting witness, Vicente Legarda,
and in the left margin of each page of the corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana
instrument. During this ceremony all of the Rivera, two disinterested individuals,
persons concerned in the act of attestation employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were
were present together, and all fully advertent present in Legarda's office when the will was
to the solemnity that engaged their attention. executed and who lent a discerning attention
After preliminary explanations had been to what was being done. In the second place,
made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the each of the seven signatures affixed to his will
will overnight in his safe, In this connection by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have
the testator stated that he did not wish to been made by using the same pen and ink
take the will to his home, as he knew that his that was used by Legarda in signing the will.
relatives were watching him and would take The same is also probably true of the seven
advantage of any carelessness on his part to signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could
pry into his papers. hardly have happened if the signatures of
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as
Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, they now pretend, at different times and
having perished by the hands of an assassin. places. In the third place, Both Syyap and
Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of
ISSUE: Whether the will was executed and contradictory statements made by them on
attested in the manner required by law different occasions prior to their appearance
as witnesses in this case. In this connection
HELD: we note that, after the murder of Gregorio
The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the Tolentino, and while the police authorities
trial of this proceeding for the probate of the were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez,
will of the decedent, two of the attesting a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned
witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, him concerning his relations with the
260
deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated ISSUE: Whether the will is can be presumed
that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, to be genuine?
that it had been executed at the office of La
Previsora Filipina under the circumstances HELD: Yes, it is.
already stated, and that he himself had A criminal action for falsification of will, will
served as one of the attesting witnesses. not lie after its admission to probate. This is
These circumstances and other incidents the effect of the probate of a will.
revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a
in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
have entered into a conspiracy between publication as a prerequisite to the allowance
themselves, and in concert with the of a will is constructive notice to the whole
opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio world, and when probate is granted, the
Tolentino although they are well aware that judgment of the court is binding upon
said will was in all respects properly executed; everybody, even against the State.
and the trial court, in our opinion, committed The probate of a will by the probate court
no error in admitting the will to probate. having jurisdiction thereof is considered as
When a will is contested it is the duty of the conclusive as to its due execution and
proponent to call all of the attesting validity, and is also conclusive that the
witnesses, if available but the validity of the testator was of sound and disposing mind at
will in no wise depends upon the united the time when he executed the will, and was
support of the will by all of those witnesses. A not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
will may be admitted to probate undue influence, and that the will is genuine
notwithstanding the fact that one or more of and not a forgery.
the subscribing witnesses do not unite with The will in question having been probated by
the other, or others, in proving all the facts a competent court, the law will not admit any
upon which the validity of the will rests. proof to overthrow the legal presumption that
(Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is it is not a forgery.
sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the A criminal action will not lie against a forger of
proof that the will was executed and attested a will which had been duly admitted to
in the manner required by law. In this case we probate by a court of competent jurisdiction in
feel well assured that the contested will was view of the provisions of sections 306, 333,
properly executed and the order admitting to and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
it probate was entirely proper.
231) Testate Estate of Biascan vs.
SUCCESSION Probate of Wills Biascan
347 SCRA 621
230) Mercado vs. Santos
57 Phil. 749 FACTS:
In 1975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a
FACTS: petition for her appointment as the
Petitioner Mercado applied for the probate of administratrix of the intestate estate of
the will of his deceased wife. There was no Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. The
opposition to it. The court then admitted the court issued an order appointing her as the
will to probate. After more than a year, the regular administrator. Maria Biascon was the
relatives of his wife filed a complaint against legal wife of Florencio and filed an opposition
Mercado on the ground of falsifaction or to the appointment. On April 2, 1981, the
forgery of the will probated. A motion to court issued an order resolving that Maria as
quash was filed by Mercado stating that the legal wife, and Rosalina and her brother as
will has already been admitted to probate. It the natural children of Florencio, are the legal
is therefore conclusively presumed to be heirs of the deceased and upheld the
genuine. appointment of Rosalina as the administratrix.
RTC: For respondent. Motion denied. On June 6, 1981 or 58 days after the receipt of
CA: Affirms RTC. the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On November
15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of
261
Manila was completely gutted by fire. The special character of this appointment, the
records of the settlement proceedings were Rules deem it not advisable for any party to
among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January appeal from said temporary appointment.
2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2,
Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal
delay caused by the fire and the in a special proceeding. In special
reconstitution of the records, it was only on proceedings, the period of appeal from any
April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order decision or final order rendered therein is
denying Marias June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thirty days. The appeal period may only be
thereafter, Maria died and her lawyer Atty. interrupted by the filing of a motion for a new
Lopez was appointed as interim special trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal
administrator. Notice of this April 30, 1985 period expires without an appeal or a MFR or
Order allegedly came to the attention of new trial being perfected, the decision or
Marias lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her order becomes final. Considering that this was
lawyers thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal and only on June 6, 1981 or a full 58 days after the
Record of Appeal on September 20, 1996. The receipt of the order that the MFR was filed, it
TC issued an order denying the appeal on the is clear that the same was filed out of time.
ground that it was filed out of time. A petition There was no more appeal period to interrupt
for certiorari was filed with the CA which was as the Order had already become final.
likewise denied. It is well settled that judgments or orders
become final and executory by operation of
ISSUE: Whether the appeal was filed on time? law and not by judicial declaration. Thus,
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon
HELD: the lapse of the reglementary period of
No, it was not. appeal if no appeal is perfected or MFR or new
Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates trial is filed. The TC need not even pronounce
the orders and judgments in special the finality of the order as the same becomes
proceedings which may be the subject of an final by operation of law. Being final and
appeal. An appeal is allowed in these cases as executory, the TC can no longer alter, modify
these orders, decrees or judgments issued by or reverse the questioned order. The
a court in a special proceeding constitute a subsequent filing of the MFR cannot disturb
final determination of the rights of the parties the finality of the judgment order.
so appealing. The ruling of the TC that Maria, The Order of the trial court denying
Rosalina and her brother were entitled to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
participate in the settlement proceedings falls April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April 30,
squarely under paragraph b of section 1, Rule 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made
109 as the proper subject of appeal. By so aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August
ruling, the TC has effectively determined that 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court
the three persons are the lawful heirs of the about the status of the case. Giving
deceased. As such, the same may be the petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had
proper subject of an appeal. indeed received notice of the order denying
Similarly, the ruling of the TC denying Marias its motion for reconsideration on August 21,
motion to set aside the order appointing 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until
Rosalina as the regular administratrix of the the following day or on August 22, 1996
estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a within which to perfect the appeal.
proper subject of appeal. The order of the TC At this point, we note with disapproval
appointing a regular administrator of a petitioners attempt to pass off its Notice of
deceased persons estate is a final Appeal as having been filed on August 22,
determination of the rights of the parties 1996. In all its pleadings before this Court
thereunder and is thus appealable. This is in and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists
contrast with an order appointing a special that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day
administrator which is appointed only for a after it secured the August 21, 1996
limited time and for a specific purpose. Certification from the trial court. While the
Because of the temporary character and Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August
262
22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial the court on the same issue of the instrinsic
court that the same was received only on validity of or nullity of the will. The result
September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order would be a waste of time, effort, expense,
dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court plus added anxiety. These practical
denying petitioners appeal, the court clearly considerations induce the SC to meet head-on
stated that the Notice of Appeal with the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the
accompanying Record on Appeal was filed on will in question, there being a justiciable
September 20, 1996. controversy.
Considering that it is clear from the records The deceased left no descendants, legitimate
that petitioners notice of appeal was filed on or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
September 20, 1996, the same was clearly direct ascending line, her parents. Her will
filed out of time as it only had until August 22, does not explicitly disinherit them but simply
1996 within which to file the said pleading. omits their names altogether. Said will rather
than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is
232) Nuguid vs. Nuguid, clearly one in which the said forced heirs
17 SCRA 449 suffer from preterition. There is no other
provision in the will except the institution of
FACTS: Remedios as the universal heir. Such
Rosario Nuguid died and was survived by her institution by itself is null and void and,
parents, brothers and sisters. Petitioner intestate succession ensues. The disputed
Remedios, her sister, filed for the probate of order declares the will in question a complete
her holographic will a year after her death. nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
Remedios was instituted as the universal heir merely nullifies the institution of the heir.
in the said will. The parents opposed this, The will however, provides for the institution
claiming that they were preterited by the of the petitioner as the universal heir and
institution of Remedios as the sole heir nothing more. The result is the same. The
thereby invalidating the will. The trial court entire will is null.
declared the will to be a complete nullity and Preterition consists in the omission in the
therefore creating an intestacy of the estate testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
of Rosario. them, either because they are not mentioned
therein or though mentioned, they are neither
ISSUE: Whether the parents were preterited instituted as heirs nor are expressly
creating intestacy of Rosarios estate? disinherited. Disinheritance in turn is a
testamentary disposition depriving any
HELD: compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
Yes, they were. for a cause authorized by law. The effects
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the flowing from preterition are totally different
courts area of inquiry is limited to an form those of disinheritance. Preterition under
examination of, and resolution on, the Article 854 shall annul the institution of an
extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the
thereof; the testatrixs testamentary capacity; will there are, in addition, testamentary
and the compliance with the requisites or dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.
solemnities prescribed by law. In the case at In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918,
bar however, a peculiar situation exists. The such disinheritance shall also annul the
parties shunned aside the question of whether institution of the heirs but only insofar as it
or not the will should be allowed probate. may prejudice the person disinherited, which
They questioned the intrinsic validity of the last phrase was omitted in the case of
will. Normally, this comes only after the court preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is
has declared that the will has been duly limited to that portion of the estate of which
authenticated. But if the case were to be the disinherited heirs have been illegally
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will deprived.
be gained. In the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, the probability exists 233) Caniza vs. CA
that the case will come up once again before 268 SCRA 641
263
permission. That permission was

FACTS: subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was
Caniza was 94 years old and was declared her right; and it is immaterial that the
incompetent because of her advanced years. withdrawal was made through her judicial
She was represented in this case by guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed
Evangelista, her guardian. Caniza previously with authority to do so. Nor is it of any
allowed the spouses and their relatives to consequence that Caniza executed a will
occupy the house without paying any rent out bequeathing the disputed property to the
of the goodness of her heart. However, she Estradas, that circumstance did not give them
needed money for her support, maintenance the right to stay on the premises after
and medical treatment. A demand by demand to vacate on the theory that they
Evangelista was made on the Estradas to might in the future become owners thereof.
vacate the house but refused contending that The Estradas right of ownership being at best
they would inherit the house as stated in inchoate, no transfer of ownership being
Canizas holographic will. Evangelista then possible unless and until the will is duly
moved to eject the spouses from the probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any
premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of Caniza assertion of possession by them would be
which was reversed by the RTC on the ground premature and inefficacious.
that the "action by which the issue of A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time
defendants' possession should be resolved is prior to the testator's death, it may be
accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and changed or revoked; and until admitted to
legal situation ** demanding adjudication by probate, it has no effect whatever and no
such plenary action for recovery of possession right can be claimed thereunder, the law
cognizable in the first instance by the being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either
Regional Trial Court." This was affirmed by the real or personal property unless it is proved
CA. Caniza died during the pendency of the and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
appeal. Court." An owner's intention to confer title in
the future to persons possessing property by
ISSUE: Whether the Estradas may rightfully his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the
claim the property through the holographic former's taking back possession in the
will? meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient
HELD: cause for the owner's resumption of
No, they cannot. possession is apparent: she needed to
It is settled that in an action for unlawful generate income from the house on account
detainer, it suffices to allege that the of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising
defendant is unlawfully withholding from her extreme age.
possession from the plaintiff is deemed While it is indeed well-established rule that
sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful the relationship of guardian and ward is
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the necessarily terminated by the death of either
withholding of possession or the refusal to the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no
vacate is unlawful without necessarily advantage to the Estradas. Amparo
employing the terminology of the law. The Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one
only issue that could legitimately be raised of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
under the circumstances was that involving other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
the Estradas possession by tolerance, i.e., Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact
incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in
for Caiza is not ejectment but accion place of the deceased, in accordance with
publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The
action that is one for recovery of the right to heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
possession de jure. substituted for the deceased, without
The Estradas possession of the house requiring the appointment of an executor or
stemmed from the owners express administrator and the court may appoint
264
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. To be not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or whim of
sure, an ejectment case survives the death of the moment as there was sufficient proof that
a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish Lorenzo indeed rendered services for the
the desahucio suit instituted by her through decedent even prior to 1914, and was the
her guardian. That action, not being a purely decedents administrator and manager of her
personal one, survived her death; her heirs affairs in the last years of her life.
have taken her place and now represent her Second issue: Defect in the Attestation
interests in the appeal at bar. Clause
Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure
234) PECSON VS. AGUSTIN CORONEL provides that: The attestation shall state the
G.R. No. L-20374, 11 October 1923 number of sheets or pages used, uponwhich
the will is written, and the fact that the
FACTS: testator signed the will in each and every
Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and page thereof, or caused some other person to
without issue. She appointed as sole heir her write his name, under his express direction, in
nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, wife of her niece the presence of three witnesses, and the
Angela Coronel, for the services he rendered latter witnessed and signed the will and all
for the decedent. He was also appointed as the pages thereof in the presence of the
executor thereof, and in his absence, testator and of each other. However, the
decedents grandson Vincent Pecson. As she attestation clause of the decedents will
cannot read and write, he asked Vicente stated that it was signed in the presence of
Francisco to write the will and sign it in her others. In resolving the same, the Court
behalf. In the attestation clause, it stated that relied on in its decision in In Re Will of
the will was signed by each of (them) us Abangan whereby it ruled that the object of
signed these presents in the presence of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
others and of the testatrix... is to close the door against bad faith and
Decedents relatives opposed the probate of fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
the will, contending that the will could not be testaments and to guarantee their truth and
valid because first, it is not natural in our authenticity. Hence, the laws on this subject
culture to exclude a persons blood relatives should be interpreted in such a way as to
from her vast estate and hence at most, the attain these primordial ends. However, one
decedent merely intended to appoint Lorenzo must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
as executor; and second, that the attestation the object of the law to restrain and curtail
clause failed to comply with the provisions of the exercise of the right to make a will. So
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as when an interpretation already given assures
amended by Act No. 2645. such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
ISSUES: Whether or not the relatives more requisite entirely unnecessary, useless
exclusion in the will amounts to preterition? and frustrative of the testators will, must be
1. Whether or not the defect in the attestation disregarded. The phrase is then construed to
clause invalidates the will? mean as of the other and is a mere
grammatical error. Grammatical or clerical
RULINGS: errors are not usually considered of vital
First issue: Relatives Exclusion from the importance when the intention is manifest in
Will the will.
Their exclusion in the will does not amount to
preterition. The liberty to dispose of ones 235) ACAIN VS. IAC
estate by will when there are no forced heirs G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987
is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in
the Philippines since 1889 which provides: FACTS:
Any person who has no forced heirs may Nemesio Acain died testate, leaving
dispose by will all of his property or any part the following as heirs: his wife Rosa Diongson
of it in favour of any person qualified to Vda. de Acain, his legally adopted daughter
acquire it. The preference given to Lorenzo is Virginia Fernandez, and his nephews and
265
nieces from his brother Segundo Acain. In his amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
will, he bequeathed all of his property to was written.
Segundo, and in case the latter predecease
him, all his property will pass on to Segundos 236) NERI VS. AKUTIN
children. As Segundo predeceased Nemesio, G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941
the formers children moved for the probate of
the will. Nemesios widow and daughter filed FACTS:
a motion to dismiss, contending that they Agripino Neri died on 12 December
were preterited. The trial court denied their 1931 leaving 6 children from his first wife, and
motion. On appeal, the IAC reversed and 5 children from his second wife Ignacia Akutin.
ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate In his will, he stated that his children by the
of the will. first marriage shall have no longer any
participation in his estate as they had already
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosa and Virginia had received their corresponding shares during his
been preterited? lifetime. However, during the hearing for
declaration of heirs, the court found that
RULING: Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code contrary to what Agripino declared in his will,
provides that: The preterition or omission of that all his children by the first and second
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in marriages are intestate heirs of the deceased
the direct line, whether living at the time of without prejudice to one-half of the
execution of the will or born after the death of improvements introduced in the properties
the testator, shall annul the institution of the during the existence of the last conjugal
heir; but the devisese and legacies shall be partnership which should belong to Ignacia
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the Akutin. The Court of Appeals modified the
omitted compulsory heir should die before the decision and ruled that the will was valid with
testator, the institution shall be effectual, respect to the two-thirds part which the
without prejudice to the right of testator can freely dispose of.
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the
testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of children by the first wife annuls the institution
them either because they are not mentioned of the children by the second wife as sole
therein , or even though mentioned, they are heirs of the testator?
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution RULING: Yes. Preterition consists in the
of an heir and annulment throws open to omission in the testators will of the forced
intestate succession the entire inheritance, heirs or anyone of them, either because they
except those legacies and devices, unless it are not mentioned therein, or, though
impairs the legitime of the heirs. mentioned, they are neither instituted as
In the case of Rosa, preterition shall heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In this
not apply as she does not ascend nor descend case, while the children of the first marriage
from the testator, although she is a were mentioned in the will, they were not
compulsory heir. There is no preterition accorded any share in the hereditary
because she is not in the direct line. However, property, without expressly being
in the case of Virginia, preterition applies disinherited. The omission of a forced heir or
because as a legal adoptee, she is vested with anyone of them, whether voluntary or
the same rights and duties as that of a involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the disinherit is not expressly made or is not at
adoptee the legal heir of the adopter. least manifest. Except as to legacies and
The universal institution of the devises which shall remain valid insofar as
petitioner and his siblings to the entire they are not officious, preterition avoids the
inheritance of the testator results in totally institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate
abrogating the will because the nullification of succession. The will in this case, there being
such institution of universal heirs-without any no legacies or devises, is void.
other testamentary disposition in the will-
266
237) VIADO NON VS. CA FACTS:

G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000 Ana Maria Alcantara died testate. The
pertinent provisions of her will are as follows:
FACTS: NINTH. Being single and without forced heir,
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law,
owned, among others, a house and lot Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my
pertained to as the Isarog property. Virginia nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara xxx as my
died on 20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 sole and universal heiress to the remainder of
years later. Left as heirs were their children my estate xxx
namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo TENTH. Should my heiress Carmen
Viado, and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Garchitorena dies, I order that my whole
Leah died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left as heirs estate shall passu unimpaired to her surviving
his wife Alicia and their 2 children. children; and should any of these die, his
The children of spouses Viado lived in share shall serve to increase the portions of
the Isarog property together with Nilos widow his surviving brothers (and sisters) by
and children. However, a dispute arose when accretion, xxx the estate shall never pass out
Rebecca Viado Non asked that the property be of the hands of my heiress or her children
divided equally between the 2 families to insofar as it is legally permissible.
make room for their growing children. Nilos Among Ana Marias properties is a
wife and children claimed absolute ownership deposit amounting to Php 21,428.23 with La
over the property evidence by a deed of Urbana. Mariano Garchitorena held a
donation executed by Julian in favour of Nilo, judgment for Php 7, 872.23 against Joaquin,
covering his conjugal share, and a deed of Carmens husband. He attached the La
extrajudicial partition settlement in which Urbana deposit to satisfy his claims. Carmen
Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of secured an injunction restraining the
Nilo all their interests and rights over their execution.
share of the property inherited from Virginia. Garchitorena contends that the same
Both documents were registered 5 years after can be levied because Carmen is a universal
its execution, and a new TCT is issued by the heiress. Carmen contends that the deposit
Register of Deeds in Nilos favor. belongs to Carmens children as
Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria.
Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of
the extrajudicial settlement, and hence ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case is a
amounts to preterition which should invalidate fideicommissary substitution?
the settlement. Both the trial court and CA
ruled in favor of Nilos wife and children. RULING: Yes. Manresa provides 3 requisites
Hence this appeal. for fideicommissary:
1. First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of
ISSUE: Whether or not Delias exclusion from the estate;
the extrajudicial settlement amounts to 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to
preterition? preserve and transmit to a 3rd person the
whole or a part of the estate;
RULING: 3. Second heir.
Yes. However, in the absence of bad Applying the foregoing to the case, Carmen
faith and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code was called to the enjoyment of the estate
must apply which, in essence, provides that according to the 9th clause of the will. Clause
where the preterition is not attended by bad 10th which provides that the whole estate
faith and fraud, the partition shall not be shall pass unimpaired to her (Carmens)
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid surviving children, thus, instead of leaving
the value of the share pertaining to her. Carmen at liberty to dispose of the estate by
will, or by living the law to take its course in
238) PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA case she dies intestate, the said clause not
G.R. No. L-31703, 13 February 1930 only disposes of the estate in favour of the
disposition thereof in case she should die
267
after the testatrix. The children of Carmen are Article 883 provides that when without the
referred to as second heirs. Hence, the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in
deposit does not belong to Carmen as her the preceding article cannot take effect in the
absolute property, but also to her children, exact manner stated by the testator, it shall
from the moment of death of Ana Maria. It be complied with in a manner most analogous
cannot be attached by Mariano. to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner
239) RABADILLA VS. CA prescribed in article 882 is known as an
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000 institucion sub modo or modal substitution. In
a modal substitution, the testator states:
FACTS: 1. The object of the institution;
Alejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making 2. Purpose or application o the property left by
Jorge Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil the testator;
provides that she is bequeathing No. 1392 of 3. Charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
the Bacolod Cadastre and that should Dr. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir
Rabadilla predecease her, the lot will go to his or legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of
wife and children. She also stated that it shall his rights to the succession. In a conditional
be Dr. Rabadillas obligation to deliver in testamentary disposition, the condition must
favour of Marlina Coscolluela 75 piculs of happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
Export sugar and 35 piculs of domestic sugar, be entitled to succeed the testator. The
until Marlinas death. In case of Dr. Rabadillas condition suspends but not obligate; and the
death, his heir shall fulfil such obligation. In mode obligates but does not suspend.
the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall In this case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla
later sell, lease, mortgage the Lot, the buyer, to inherit the property. She likewise imposed
lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the an obligation on him and to his heirs to
obligation to respect and deliver to Marlina deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Marlina.
yearly 100 piculs of sugar ever December. However, Alejandra did not make Dr.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was Rabadillas inheritance and effectivity of his
survived by his wife and children. His son institution as a devisee, dependent on the
Johnny is herein petitioner. Marlina then filed performance of the said obligation. Should the
a complaint against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla obligation be not complied with, the property
for the enforcement of the Codicil. The parties shall be turned over to Alejandras near
came up with a Memorandum of Agreement descendants. The institution of Dr. Rabadilla is
whch was, however, not complied with by the evidently modal in nature because it imposes
heirs. The RTC dismissed the complaint. a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such
ISSUE: Whehter or not Dr. Rabadillas institution. Since testamentary dispositions
institution in the Codicil is in the nature of a are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
modal institution? imposed upon the heirs should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly
RULING: appears from the Will itself that such was the
Yes. Article 882 of the New Civil Code intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
provides that the statement of the object of institution should be considered as modal
the institution or the application of the institution.
property left by the testator, or the charge
imposed on him, shall not be considered as a 240) MORENTE VS. DE LA SANTA
condition unless it appears that such was his G.R. No. L-3891, 19 December 1907
intention. That which has been left in this
manner may be claimed at once provided that FACTS:
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for Consuelo Morente died testate. In her
compliance with the wishes of the testator will, her husbnd Gumersindo de la Santa was
and for the return of anything he or they may made sole heir, subject to the condition that
receive, together with its fruits and interests, he shall not remarry, remain to live with her
if he or they should disregard this obligation. brothers, and that should he have children
268
with anyone, the 2/3 of the estate shall Irena appealed, contending that as the
remain for her brother Vicente, or the latters surviving spouse of Carterio, she is
children, and the remaining 1/3 is subject to compulsory heir of Petra together with her
Gumersindos disposal. son. The court denied her plea. Hence this
Gumersindo married again 4 months petition.
after his wifes death. Consuelos sister asked
for the annulment of the legacy in the will on ISSUE: Whether or not a widow (surviving
the ground of remarriage. She contends that spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-
the mere act off remarriage of Gumersindo law?
strips him off of his rights acquired from the
will. RULING:
No. Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulelos intention divided into two: those who inherit in their
that Gumersindos remarriage would forfeit own right (as in the order of intestate
the legacy? succession provided for in the Civil Code), and
those who inherit by right of
representation as provided in Article 981 of
RULING: the Civil Code.
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code There is nothing in the Civil Code
provides that testamentary provisions may be which states that a widow (surviving spouse)
made confidential and Article 798 provides is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
that a prohibition against another marriage provisions of the Code which relates to
may in certain cases be validly imposed upon intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
the widow or widower. enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
In this case, there was nothing in the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State
will which would mean that it was Consuelos as the final intestate heir.
intention that Gumersindos remarriage would Article 887, from which Irenea bases
strip him of his rights from the legacy. There is her claim refers to the estate of the deceased
no express condition attached to that legacy spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
in references to the 2nd marriage, as the will compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
simply said he will not marry again. No estate of the parent-in-law. The surviving
condition was attached in case of non- spouse is considered as a 3rd person as
compliance. regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
The estate in this case is that of Petra
241) ROSALES VS. ROSALES Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from
No L-40789, 27 February 1987 Petras estate that Macikequerox draws a
share of the inheritance by right of
FACTS: representation as provided in Article 981.
Petra Rosales died intestate, leaving as Article 971 explicitly declares that
heirs her husband Fortunato and their 2 Macikequerox is called to succession by law
children. Carterio Rosales, also a child of because of his blood relationship. He does not
Spouses Rosales, predeceased her, and left as succeed his father Carterio who predeceased
heirs his son Macikequerox and widow Irenea. his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
The estimated gross value of Petras estate whom his father would have succeeded.
was about Php 30, 000.00. Irenea cannot assert the same right of
Magna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, representation as she has no filiation by blood
filed for intestate proceedings and was later with her mother-in-law.
on appointed as administratrix. The court
then declared the following as Petras legal
heirs, and their respective shares: 242) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-
1. Fortunato Rosales (husband) ; ALFONSO
2. Magna Rosales Acebes (daughter) ;
3. Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) ;
4. Antonio Rosales (son) . G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001
269
FACTS: ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be

deprived of her share in the estate of her
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter deceased father by a simulated contract
Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio transferring the property of her father to his
Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now illegitimate children?
both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand,
are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco HELD:
with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with
whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio The Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan
Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two was simulated. There was no consideration for
parcels of residential land, situated in the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, family friend of the Franciscos, testified that
covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not
When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in have any source of income in 1983, when
1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that they bought the property, until the time when
the certificates of title of his property were in Felicitas testified in 1991.
the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual
testified that she was engaged in operating a
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night
inquired about the certificates of title from her Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready
half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior
had sold the land to them on August 15, thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her
1983. After verification, Aida learned that father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not
there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in withdraw money from her bank account at the
favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay
Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio for the property. She had personal savings
executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, other than those deposited in the bank. Her
whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two gross earnings from the RTW for three years
parcels of land to Regina Francisco and was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night
Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the at the club.
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-
59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a
to Zenaida Pascual. market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional the property from the deceased for
Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against P15,000.00. She had no other source of
petitioners for annulment of sale with income.The testimonies of petitioners were
damages. She alleged that the signature of incredible considering their inconsistent
her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the statements as to whether there was
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August consideration for the sale and also as to
15, 1983, was a forgery. whether the property was bought below or
above its supposed market value. They could
In their joint answer to the complaint, not even present a single witness to the
petitioners denied the alleged forgery or kasulatan that would prove receipt of the
simulation of the deed of sale. After due purchase price. Since there was no cause or
proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court consideration for the sale, the same was a
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. simulation and hence, null and void.
The Court of Appeals Reversed the decision of
the RTC. Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it
still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar
as the transaction affected respondents
legitime. The sale was executed in 1983,
when the applicable law was the Civil Code,
270
not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was two parcels of land above-mentioned passed
Gregorios way to transfer the property to his to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by
illegitimate daughters at the expense of his intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco
legitimate daughter. The sale was executed Deocampo married the herein defendant
to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born
her legitime and rightful share in said Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
property. Before his death, Gregorio had a Francisco Deocampo died on August 15,
change of heart and informed his daughter 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the
about the titles to the property. defendants herein, took possession of the
parcels of land in question, under the claim
According to Article 888, Civil Code: that the said son, the defendant Jose
Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same,
The legitime of legitimate children and ab intestate, from his deceased father.
descendants consists of one-half of the On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff
hereditary estate of the father and of the herein, claiming to be an acknowledged
mother. natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva,
instituted the present action for purposes of
recovering from the defendants the parcels of
The latter may freely dispose of the land in question, particularly described in
remaining half subject to the rights of Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking
illegitimate children and of the surviving the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
spouse as hereinafter provided.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is an
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other acknowledged natural daughter of the
property. If indeed the parcels of land deceased Juliana Nieva and if an illegitimate
involved were the only property left by their relative within the third degree is entitled to
father, the sale in fact would deprive the reserva troncal provided for by article 811
respondent of her share in her fathers of the Civil Code.
estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the
estate of her father as his only legitimate HELD:
child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio The lower court held that, even granting,
Francisco must be determined in proper without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
testate or intestate proceedings for acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana
settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir Nieva, she was not entitled to the property
can not be deprived of her share in the estate here in question because, in its opinion, an
save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. illegitimate relative has no right to the
reserva troncal under the provisions of article
811 of the Civil Code and which reads as
follows:
243) NIEVA vs. ALCALA Any ascendant who inherits from his
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920 descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other
FACTS: ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
Juliana Nieva, the alleged obliged to reserve such of the property as he
natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria may have acquired by operation of law for the
Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said benefit of relatives within the third degree
marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana belonging to the line from which such
Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and property came.
her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from SC held that the object is to protect the
her, ab intestate, the parcels of land patrimony of the legitimate family, following
described in Paragraphs V and X of the the precedents of the foral law. And it could
complaint. not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and legitimate parents the right to succeed the
without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the natural child and viceversa, from which it
271
must be deduced that natural parents neither where she, her son, and her sister lived. In
have the right to inhering from legitimate due time, the titles of all these properties
ones; the law in the article cited established a were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
barrier between the two families; properties of During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more
the legitimate family shall never pass by than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia
operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. and some close friends his plan to place his
pp. 251-252.) estate in a foundation to honor his mother
Article 943, above referred to provides as and to help poor but deserving students
follows: obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he
A natural or legitimated child has no died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate without having set up the foundation.
children and relatives of the father or mother Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and
who has acknowledged it; nor shall such Celedonia talked about what to do with
children or relatives so inherit from the Esteban's properties. Celedonia told
natural or legitimated child. Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
To hold that the appellant is entitled to estate in a foundation to be named after his
the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo mother, from whom his properties came, for
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a the purpose of helping indigent students in
fragrant violate of the express provision of the their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out
foregoing article (943). the plan of the deceased.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment Celedonia was appointed as the
of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without administratix of the estate and later on the
any finding as to costs. So ordered. court adjudicated her as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded
244) SOLIVIO vs. CA to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990 JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978,
FACTS: Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion
This case involves the estate of the late for reconsideration of the court's order
novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban,
first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing Jr., because she too was an heir of the
the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without deceased. On September 3, 1984, the said
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
nephews or nieces. His only surviving 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-
relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Villanueva.
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the ISSUE: Whether or not the property of the
private respondent, Concordia Javellana- deceased was subject to reserve troncal.
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
Esteban Javellana, Sr. He was a posthumous HELD:
child. His father died barely ten (10) months The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's
after his marriage in December, 1916 to argument that the estate of the deceased was
Salustia Solivio and four months before subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains
Esteban, Jr. was born. to her as his only relative within the third
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal degree on his mother's side. The reserva
properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in
Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had Article 891 which reads as follows:
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), descendant any property which the latter may
but no conjugal property was acquired during have acquired by gratuitous title from another
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr. ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all reserve such property as he may have
her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, relatives who are within the third degree and
272
who belong to the line from which said Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
property came. de Javellana Foundation, and therefore,
The persons involved in reserva troncal are: Concordia is obligated to honor her
1. The person obliged to reserve is the commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
reservor (reservista)the ascendant who The petition for review was granted. The
inherits by operation of law property from his decision of the trial court and the Court of
descendants. Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
2. The persons for whom the property is Villanueva is declared an heir of the late
reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his
relatives within the third degree counted from estate. However, comformably with the
the descendant (propositus), and belonging to agreement between her and her co-heir,
the line from which the property came. Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the
3. The propositusthe descendant who deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia
received by gratuitous title and died without Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by which both the petitioner and the private
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, respondent shall be trustees, and each shall
Vol. II, 1956 Ed.) be entitled to nominate an equal number of
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of
Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for the Foundation which shall administer the
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the same for the purposes set forth in its charter.
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio,
from whom he inherited the properties in 245) SUMAYA vs. IAC
question. Therefore, he did not hold his G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative FACTS:
within the third degree on his mother's side. Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2)
The reserva troncal applies to properties different ascendants the two (2) sets of
inherited by an ascendant from a descendant properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third
who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land
brother or sister. It does not apply to property situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945;
the reverse of the situation covered by Article and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-
891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands
Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single,
should apply in the distribution of his estate without any issue, and leaving only his
are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo,
which provide: as his sole surviving heir to the real properties
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, above-mentioned. On November 3, 1952,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall described properties in an Affidavit entitled
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul
in accordance with the following articles. Balantakbo."
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers Consuelo then sold some properties to
nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, Mariquita H. Sumaya and Villa Honorio
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to Development Corporation which the latter in
the estate. turn transferred and assigned all its rights to
The latter shall succeed without distinction of the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-
lines or preference among them by reason of Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
relationship by the whole blood. On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
However, It is true that by the agreement, she Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo,
did not waive her inheritance in favor of Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of
273
Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, property) is reserved have no title of
also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving ownership or of fee simple over the reserved
children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., property during the lifetime of the reservor.
another brother of the first named Only when the reservor should die before the
Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil reservees will the latter acquire the reserved
cases to recover the properties described in property, thus creating a fee simple, and only
the respective complaints which they claimed then will they take their place in the
were subject to a reserva troncal in their succession of the descendant of whom they
favor. are relatives within the third degree (See
Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078,
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties sold March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
were subject to a reserva troncal and if it is extinguished upon the death of the reservor,
necessary to reserve and annotate the same. as it then becomes a right of full ownership on
the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
HELD: reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this
The trial court rendered a decision in right if not exercised within the time for
favor of the Balantakbos and the Coust of recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years
Appeals affirmed said decision. under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see
The SC Held that consistent with the rule in Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October
reserva viudal where the person obliged to 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years
reserve (the widowed spouse) had the under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The
obligation to annotate in the Registry of actions for recovery of the reserved property
Property the reservable character of the was brought by herein private respondents on
property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from
ascendant who inherited from a descendant the death of the reservor. Therefore, private
property which the latter inherited from respondents' cause of action has not
another descendant) has the duty to reserve prescribed yet.
and therefore, the duty to annotate also. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation questioned decision of the Intermediate
in the Registry of Property of the right Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
reserved in real property subject of reserva modification on the necessity to annotate the
viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva reversable character of a property subject of
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva reserva troncal.
viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the 246) RIOSA vs. ROCHA
second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926
which provides that: "The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey or affect FACTS:
the land insofar as third persons are Maria Corral was united in marriage
concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied) with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her
The properties involved in this case are first and only marriage and during which time
already covered by a Torrens title and unless she bore him three children named Santiago,
the registration of the limitation is effected Jose and Severina. The latter died during
(either actual or constructive), no third infancy and the other two survived their
persons shall be prejudiced thereby. father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now
The respondent appellate court did not err in deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who
finding that the cause of action of the private bore him two children named Magin and
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased,
of action of the reservees did not commence married Marcelina Casas and they had one
upon the death of the propositus Raul child who died before the father, the latter
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left
death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de a will dividing his property between his two
Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the
the third degree in whose favor the right (or latter the eleven parcels of land described in
274
the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa contract of partition with Maria Corral,
he left a will in which he named his wife, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to
Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted
was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact the contracts of sale of these parcels of land
that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the
in the will, on account of the preterition of latter to himself. These facts, together with
Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose the relationship existing between Maria Corral
Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the
Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of former a daughter-in-law and the latter a
the filing of the will for probate, entered into a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the
contract by which they divided between conclusion that both of them knew that these
themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, parcels of land had been inherited by Maria
the eleven parcels of land described in the Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa
complaint being assigned to Maria Corral. who had inherited them, by will, from his
Maria Coral then sold some parcels of father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
land to Marcelina Casas and the latter to property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral
Pablo Rocha. However some of the parcels of of recording the reservable character of lots
land were returned by Pablo to Marcelina 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo
alleging that the said parcels of land were Rocha and the reservees have an action
erroneously transferred by Maria to Marcelina. against him to compel him to comply with this
An action was brought by Magin Riosa, obligation. The judgment appealed from is
for whom the property should have been modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record
reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it in the registry of deeds the reservable
was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this
and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 complaint.
and 11. The complaint prays that the property
therein described be declared reservable 247) DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO
property and that the plaintiffs Jose and G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that
this reservation be noted in the registry of FACTS:
deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa,
valid only in so far as it saves the right of Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, grandaunt and granduncles and having a
and that this right of reservation be also common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who
noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco),
of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by
subject to reserva troncal necessitates the her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
recording of which in the registry of deeds. legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay
HELD: D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the four (4)
The Supreme Court held that Marcelina parcels of land as the inheritance of her said
Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
reservable character of the property when Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
they bought it. They had knowledge of the legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
provisions of the last will and testament of (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3)
was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina parcels of land now covered by Transfer
Casas was the one who entered into the Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of
275
the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were HELD:

adjudicated as the inheritance of the late The Supreme Court, speaking through
Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs.
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) Baldovino,, declared the principles of
parcels of land devolved upon her two intestacy to be controlling,
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Reversion of the reservable property being
Trinidad Dizon in equal governed by the rules on intestate
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro- held without any right thereto because, as
indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded
Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received from the succession by his niece, the
the said property subject to a reserva troncal defendant-appellant, although they are
which was subsequently annotated on the related to him within the same degree as the
Transfer Certificates of Title. latter. The court, therefore, held, and so rule,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her that under our laws of succession, a
rights and interests in the parcels of land decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed
abovementioned were inherited by her only ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko- the decedent survive and are willing and
Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of qualified to succeed.
her surviving husband, defendant Primo Had the reversionary property passed
Tongko. directly from the praepositus, there is no
Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have
only legitimate descendant, defendant been excluded by the defendant-appellant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. under the rules of intestate succession. There
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now is no reason why a different result should
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels obtain simply because "the transmission of
of land abovementioned as her inheritance the property was delayed by the interregnum
from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving
claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the rise to the reservation before its transmission
said seven (7) parcels of land to the reservatario.
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also entirety of the reversionary property to the
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the
one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio complaint is dismissed.
Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights
(3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of 248) LLorente vs. Rodriguez, et. Al.
their being also third degree relatives of G.R. NO. L-3339, MARCH 26, 1908
Faustino Dizon.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not all relatives of the
praepositus within the third degree in the Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had
appropriate line succeed without distinction to during her marriage four legitimate children
the reservable property upon the death of the named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all
reservista, or, as asserted by the defendant- with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the
appellant, the rights of said relatives are will executed by her on the 31st of December,
subject to, and should be determined by, the 1900, she instituted as her sole and general
rules on intestate succession. heirs her three first-named children, Jacinta,
276
Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late If Jacinta Llorente had survived her
Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente. mother, Martina Avalle, she would have
inherited from her, and in what she inherited
Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa
the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several Llorente would have participated, in
legitimate children with the surname of conjunction with her legitimate children, from
Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a the day in which the succession became
natural daughter named Rosa Llorente. operative, because she would then appear by
virtue of her own right to inherit from her
The said Rosa Llorente, the natural mother the legal quota that pertained to her;
daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to but, not because she has said right, would she
become a party in the proceedings for the also be entitled to that of representation,
probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the inasmuch as there is no legal provision
legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa
objected thereto on the ground that they were Llorente might and should inherit from her
the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, natural mother is one thing, and that she
the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, should have the right to inherit from her who
Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party would be called her natural grandmother,
thereto. representing her natural mother, is quite
another thing. The latter right is not
The Court of First Instance of Cebu, recognized by the law in force.
where the will was admitted for probate, held
that Rosa Llorente had no right whatever to Therefore, the judgment appealed
the inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and from is hereby affirmed.
denied her all right to intervene in the
proceedings regarding the estate of the said 249) FILOMENA PECSON, as
deceased. administratix of the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson, et al.
vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion 28 PHIL. 81
which Martina Avalle left in her will to her
legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and FACTS:
which the latter had not been able to possess Some time prior to the 17th day of
because of her death before that of the September, 1910, the last will and testament
testatrix, should also pass to her natural of Florencio Pecson was presented to the
daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay
legitimate children. for probate.
HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law,
has the right to inherit from the father or opposed the legislation of the will on the
mother who acknowledged him, conjointly ground that it had not been authorized nor
with the other legitimate children of either of signed by the deceased. However, after
them, it does not follow that he has the right hearing the respective parties, the court
to represent either of them in the succession found that the will had been signed and
to their legitimate ascendants; his right is executed in accordance with the provisions of
direct and immediate in relation to the father law.
or mother who acknowledged him, but it
cannot be indirect by representing them in
the succession to their ascendants to whom On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said
he is not related in any manner, because he Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso
does not appear among the legitimate family Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a
of which said ascendants are the head. motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and
Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of
the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a
daughter of the testator; that the said
277
granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, disinheritance shall be established by the

was disinherited by her grandfather, the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited
testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause person deny it." It would appear then that if
3 of the will, because she failed to show him the person disinherited should deny the
due respect and on a certain occasion raised truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he
her hand against him. might be permitted to support his allegation
by proof. The right of the court to inquire
On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he whether or not the disinheritance was made
disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she for just cause is also sustained by the
was grossly disrespectful to me and because provisions of article 851, which in part
on one occasion, when it was I do not provides that:Disinheritance made without
remember, she raised her hand against me. statement of the reason, or for a cause the
Therefore it is my will that she, the said truth of which, if contradicted, should not be
Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my proven . . . shall annul the designation of
property." heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire
into the cause of the disinheritance and With reference to the second assignment of
decide whether there is a ground for such error, The Supreme Court held that the right
disinheritance. of representation shall always take place in
the direct descending line, but never in the
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take
place only in favor of the children of brothers
of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by
or sisters, whether they be of the whole or
representation. half blood.
HELD: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides It will be remembered that the whole
that disinheritance shall only take place for argument of the appellants with reference to
one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In the first assignment of error was that Rosario
accordance with the provisions of that article Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court
(848) we find that articles 756 and 853 evidently believed that there were no
provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; "legitimate children, descendants of the
or, in other words, the cases or causes in deceased, surviving," and that therefore the
which the ancestors may by will disinherit father or mother of said legitimate children
their heirs. would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a descendant in the
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could
disinheritance can only be effected by the not ascend, and for the reason the lower court
testament, in which shall be mentioned the committed an error in declaring that Basiliso
legal grounds or causes for such Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of
disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be the estate that would have belonged to
disinherited only by will, and for causes Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to
follow that the courts might properly inquire Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part
whether the disinheritance has been made of the judgment of the lower court nullifying
properly and for the causes provided for by and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is
law. hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment
which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half
The right of the courts to inquire into the of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to
causes and whether there was sufficient Teresa Pecson and which would have been
cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been
be supported by express provisions of the surviving, is hereby revoked.
Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof
of the truthfulness of the reason for
278
And without any findings as to costs, it is Issue: May a last will and testament admitted
hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
to the lower court. order that has become final and executory
still be given effect?
250) DOROTHEO vs CA Held: The petition is without merit.
320 SCRA 12
It should be noted that probate
FACTS: proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
Private respondents were the legitimate validity of the will sought to be probated,
children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta particularly on three aspects:
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her whether the will submitted is indeed,
estate being settled. Alejandro died the decedents last will and testament;
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to compliance with the prescribed
have taken care of Alejandro before he died, formalities for the execution of wills;
filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the testamentary capacity of the
the court issued an order admitting testator;
Alejandros will to probate. Private and the due execution of the last will
respondents did not appeal from said order. In and testament.
1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the Under the Civil Code, due execution
motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes includes a determination of whether the
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro testator was of sound and disposing mind at
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and the time of its execution, that he had freely
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as executed the will and was not acting under
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the he was of the proper testamentary age and
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta that he is a person not expressly prohibited by
Reyes, whose respective estates shall be law from making a will.
liquidated and distributed according to the
The intrinsic validity is another matter
laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
and questions regarding the same may still be
other taxes due to the government.
raised even after the will has been
Petitioner moved for reconsideration authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily
arguing that she is entitled to some follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
compensation since she took care of testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if
Alejandro prior to his death although she the will was validly executed, if the testator
admitted that they were not married to each provides for dispositions that deprives or
other. Upon denial of her motion for impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the rightful inheritance according to the laws on
Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed succession,i[13] the unlawful
for failure to file appellants brief within the provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be
extended period granted. This dismissal given effect. This is specially so when the
became final and executory on February 3, courts had already determined in a final and
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment executory decision that the will is intrinsically
was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals void. Such determination having attained
on May 16, 1989. that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not
Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
Appeals upholding the validity of the January valid, but that a final and executory decision
30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic of which the party had the opportunity to
invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier challenge before the higher tribunals must
admitted to probate.
279
stand and should no longer be reevaluated. respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the
Failure to avail of the remedies provided by nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
law constitutes waiver. And if the party does Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan
not avail of other remedies despite its belief Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo.
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who
and is satisfied with the decision or order had children, one of whom was Pascasio
Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are
the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the thus grandchildren, the relatives within the
will, as she precisely appealed from an fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as The other petitioners are the children of
the only heirs do not bind those who are not Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.
parties thereto such as the alleged The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte,
illegitimate son of the testator, the same aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio,
constitutes res judicata with respect to those Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed
who were parties to the probate proceedings. Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo,
Petitioner cannot again raise those matters Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are
anew for relitigation otherwise that would Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa.
amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the These other petitioners are thus grandchildren
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and relatives within the fifth degree of
and his spouse should be distributed consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio
according to the laws of intestate succession. Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
No intestate distribution of the estate can Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought
be done until and unless the will had failed to this case in the Regional Trial Court for the
pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-
the will is extrinsically void, the rules of Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares,
intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan
next test is to determine its intrinsic validity Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by
that is whether the provisions of the will are purchase. Private respondent claimed to be
valid according to the laws of succession. In the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground
this case, the court had ruled that the will of that the latter died without issue. He
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he
intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant,
the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held refused to give him (private respondent) his
by the trial court. share of the harvest. He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. hectare land which Justa had inherited from
her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case
251) URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and was substituted by his heirs. In their
and BENEDICTO ESTRADA
answer, the heirs denied they were mere
284 SCRA 511
tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled
to her entire land.
FACTS:
They claimed that the entire land, subject of
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro
the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private
Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It was
respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of
allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan
Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza,
Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a
Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had
holographic will executed by Ambrocio in
another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private
280
1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of rights to the disputed estate as the
the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs decedent's lawful descendants.
claimed that the land had always been in their Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
possession and that in her lifetime Justa never complaint, this time for the accounting and
asserted exclusive right over the property but partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
only received her share of the harvest from it. Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four
They alleged that private respondent did not surviving children. The complainants asserted
have any right to the property because he the defense, that Delia and Edmundo were
was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the the adopted children and Doribel was the
original owner of the property. legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's
ISSUE: Whether a nephew is considered a share in his parents' estate by right of
collateral relative who may inherit if no representation.
descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the
decedent ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of
Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to
HELD: YES. Petitioners misappreciate the inherit Teodoros share by right of
relationship between Justa and private representation?
respondent. As already stated, private
respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister HELD:NO! There is no question that as the
Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
nephew is considered a collateral relative who granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel
may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or has a right to represent her deceased father
spouse survive the decedent. That private in the distribution of the intestate estate of
respondent is only a half-blood relative is her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him above, she is entitled to the share her father
from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of would have directly inherited had he survived,
Appeals correctly pointed out, "The which shall be equal to the shares of her
determination of whether the relationship is of grandparents' other children.
the full or half blood is important only to But a different conclusion must be reached in
determine the extent of the share of the the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
survivors. grandparents were total strangers. While it is
true that the adopted child shall be deemed
252) SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS to be a legitimate child and have the same
205 SCRA 321 right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship
FACTS: created by the adoption is between only the
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, adopting parents and the adopted child and
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios does not extend to the blood relatives of
and Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952, and Rafaela either party.
on 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel
Bautista, died on 1972. His wife died nine 253) Bagunu vs. Piedad
years later, on, 1981. Their properties were G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be Doctrine: The rule on proximity is a concept
their children. that favors the relatives nearest in degree to
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, the decedent and excludes the more distant
and Remedios, together with Juana C. ones except when and to the extent that the
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for right of representation can apply. By right of
partition and accounting of the intestate representation, a more distant blood relative
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and to the same place and degree" of relationship
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. In the direct line, right of
281
representation is proper only in the Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any
descending, never in the ascending, line. In direct descendants or ascendants.
the collateral line, the right of representation Respondent is the maternal aunt of the
may only take place in favor of the children of decedent, a third-degree relative of the
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a
children survive with their uncles or aunts. first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree
The right of representation does not apply to relative of the decedent. The right of
"other collateral relatives within the fifth civil representation does not apply to "others
degree" (to which group both petitioner and collateral relatives within the fifth civil
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order degree" (to which group both petitioner and
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
children and descendants, secondly, the of preference following, firstly, the legitimate
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, children and descendants, secondly, the
the illegitimate children and descendants, legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly,
fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the the illegitimate children and descendants,
brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the
fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives,
of the decedent concurring with their uncles except only in the case of nephews and nieces
or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in of the decedent concurring with their uncles
Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in
absolute rule. In determining the degree of Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
relationship of the collateral relatives to the absolute rule. In determining the degree of
decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives relationship of the collateral relatives to the
direction. decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction. Respondent, being a relative
Facts: within the third civil degree, of the late
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a
Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in relative of the fifth degree, from
Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the succeeding an intestato to the estate of
matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the the decedent.
Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, 254) DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR,
of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share RODRIGO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO
petitioner assailed the finality of the order of SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE
the trial court awarding the entire estate to APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
respondent Pastora Piedad contending that JARDIN, respondents
the proceedings were tainted with procedural 182 SCRA 427
infirmities, including an incomplete
publications of the notice of hearing, lack of FACTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a
irregularity in the disbursements of Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI
allowances and withdrawals by the of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The
administrator of the estate. Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of among other things, that the corresponding
the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside letters of Administration be issued in her favor
respondent, a collateral relative of the third and that she be appointed as special
civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of Administratrix of the properties of the
proximity in intestate succession find deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
application among collateral relatives?
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
282
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe well as in the intestate estates of Pascual
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her
married Simon Jardin and out of their union to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona
were born Felisa Pamuti and another child Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for
and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial
Santero was the only legitimate son of his court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Court reversed the decision of the trial court
Vda. de Santero. and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere
Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero in the proceeding for the declaration of
died in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
death was survived by his mother Simona de Santero.
Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate
and two minor children with Felixberta children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Pacursa. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Vda, de Santero.
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers
Before the trial court, there were 4 solely to the intestate estate of Simona
interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate
Letters of Administration of the intestate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is
Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for the the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code
Letters of Administration of the Intestate which reads as follows:
Estate of Pascual Santero; Petition for
Guardianship over the properties of an ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
Santero; and Petition for Settlement of the children and relatives of his father or mother;
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
Santero. the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(943a)
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not
of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
as guardian of her minor children, filed her illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa
Pamuti from further taking part or intervening Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
in the settlement of the intestate estate of barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and the illegitimate child and the legitimate
Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for children and relatives of the father or mother
her minor children. of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between
Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or the legitimate family and the illegitimate
intervening in the settlement of the intestate family there is presumed to be an intervening
283
antagonism and incompatibility. The Francisco died pending the probate. The RTC
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down denied the oppositions filed by the two
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in brothers. Hence, this appeal
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the ISSUE: WON oppositor brothers, John and
former, and the resources of which it is Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina
the illegitimate child nothing but the product Udan.
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken
in life; the law does no more than recognize HELD:
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of The Court ruled that the court below correctly
resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot held that they were not, for at the time of her
represent their father Pablo Santero in the death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco
succession of the letter to the intestate estate Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion
of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. of her brothers under Articles 988 and 1003 of
de Santero, because of the barrier provided the governing Civil Code of the Philippines in
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code. force at the time of the death of the testatrix
It decreed that collateral relatives of one who
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the died intestate inherit only in the absence of
New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as concur with the widow or widower under
the word "relative" includes all the kindred of Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are
the person spoken of. The record shows that excluded by the surviving children, legitimate
from the commencement of this case the only or illegitimate (Art. 1003). The trial court
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs committed no error in holding that John and
of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the
Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since probated John and Rustico are excluded by its
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions terms from participation in the estate; and if
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants
Appellate Court did not commit any error in will be excluded by the illegitimate son,
holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the operation of law.
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The death of Francisco two years after his
mother's demise does not improve the
255) WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner- situation of appellants. The rights acquired by
appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO the former are only transmitted by his death
G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. to his own heirs at law not to the appellants,
G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965 who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for
the reason that, as correctly decided by the
REYES, J.B.L., J. court below, the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
FACTS: This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear
her illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan, and from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share
and share alike. During the probate of the will, 256) ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs.
opposition was made by her two brothers on THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
the ground that the will was not attested and and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA,
executed as required by law, that the testatrix respondents.
was incapacitated to execute it; and that it G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
was procured by fraud or undue influence.
284
CRUZ, J.: testator. In all of these cases, since there is a

FACTS: vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July children or descendants of thefiliation of
3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta,
properties to her three surviving children, who claims successional rights to the estate
Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given of her alleged grandmother. person
the free portion in addition to her legitime and represented to succeed by right of
was appointed executrix of the will. representation.
Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for The law is clear that there is representation
the probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two only when relatives of a deceased person try
claimed that their mother was already senile to succeed him in his rights which he would
at the time of the execution of the will and did have had if still living.
not fully comprehend its meaning, that the Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta,
properties listed in the inventory of her estate her son Vicente had the right to inherit from
belonged to them exclusively. her directly or in his own right. No right of
Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the representation was involved, nor could it be
lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death,
the CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt which came after his own mother's death. It
Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter would have been different if Vicente was
granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to already dead when Dominga Revuelta died.
the CA. Vicente died during the pendency of Carmelita could then have inherited from her
the appeal, prompting her to move for the in representation of her father Vicente,
dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion assuming the private respondent was a lawful
for the payment to her of a monthly allowance heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita
as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente is barred from inheriting from Dominga
de la Puerta. The said motion was granted by because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which
the probate court granted the motion, lays down the barrier between the legitimate
declaring that Carmelita was a natural child of and illegitimate families. This article provides
Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the quite clearly:
amounts claimed for her support. CA affirmed Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
this order of the lower court. Hence, this inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
petition wherein the petitioner's main children and relatives of his father or mother;
argument is that Carmelita was not the nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was the same manner from the illegitimate child.
married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would
remained his wife until his death in 1978. still be barred from inheriting from Dominga
Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial Revuelta for there would be no natural
and Gloria Jordan. kindred ties between them and consequently,
no legal ties to bind them either.
ISSUE: WON respondent Carmelita de la Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente
Puerta, can claim successional rights to the de la Puerta, has successional rights to the
estate of her alleged grandmother. intestate estate of her father but not to the
estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for
HELD: support and inheritance should therefore be
The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did filed in the proceedings for the settlement of
not predecease his mother and Carmelita is a her own father's estate and cannot be
spurious child. It is settled that in considered in the probate of Dominga
testamentary succession, the right of Revuelta's will.
representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person 257) BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO
represented dies before the testator; second, MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
when the person represented is incapable of MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
succeeding the testator; and third, when the ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
person represented is disinherited by the BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
285
NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, instruments. The trial court dismissed the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, complaint holding that petitioners, not being
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother
BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-
respondents. interest to institute the suit. The motion for
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995 reconsideration filed by the petitioners was
denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition
VITUG, J.: for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
The property involved in this petition for ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled to
review on certiorari is the inheritance left by inherit in the intestate estate of their
an illegitimate child who died intestate illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.
without any surviving descendant or
ascendant. RULING:
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses The Court ruled that the petitioners are not
Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of
suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under
had an extra-marital affair with Ursula ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right
Bautista. From this relationship, a child named to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the children and relatives of his father or mother;
illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza nor shall such children or relative inherit in
Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a the same manner from the illegitimate child.
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, The principle of absolute separation between
with an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in the legitimate family and the illegitimate
favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. family wherein such doctrine rejects
Two other parcels of land, were later bought succession ab intestato in the collateral line
by Juan and registered in his name. The between legitimate relatives, on the one
couple were not blessed with a child that is hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other
why they took private respondent Modesta hand, although it does not totally disavow
Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised such succession in the direct line. Since the
her as their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, rule is predicated on the presumed will of the
Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa decedent, it has no application, however, on
Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro testamentary dispositions.
over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate
Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. family from members of the legitimate family
Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also wherein the legitimate brothers and sisters as
passed away. A month after the death of well as the children, whether legitimate or
Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters,
Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.
parcels of land. Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an
Following the registration of the document of intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without
adjudication with the Office of the Register of the benefit of formal/judicial adoption, is
Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
Manuel were canceled and new titles, were Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners
issued in the name of Modesta Manuel- seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-
Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her co- Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three
respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed
Renunciation and Quitclaim over the of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed
that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel by the trial court.
under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed
before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking
286
their uncle. On September 30, 1987,

petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary
Rights.
Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted
Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON Article 992 excludes recognized

258) OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. natural children from the inheritance of the
PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. deceased.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C.
PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. Ruling:
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. The Court dismissed the instant petition for
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., lack of merit and affirmed the assailed
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. It
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC,
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the
VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL- Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE intestato between the illegitimate child and
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL the legitimate children and relatives of the
S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, father or mother of said legitimate child. They
Metro Manila, respondents. may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and
PARAS, J.: illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
Facts: intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
Pascual are the acknowledged natural down upon by the legitimate family; the
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter family is in turn hated by the illegitimate
being the full blood brother of the decedent child; the latter considers the privileged
Don Andres Pascual. condition of the former, and the resources of
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October which it is thereby deprived; the former, in
12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
children. blemish broken in life; the law does no more
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed grounds of resentment.
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Special Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but
Proceeding for administration of the intestate petitioners are his illegitimate children.
estate of her late husband. On October 16, Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not
1985, all the heirs entered into a err in holding that petitioners herein cannot
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners succession of the latter to the intestate estate
Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
The Compromise Agreement had been brother of their father.
entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion
of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes 259) MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-
Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-
the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, appellee.
287
G.R. No. L-7768 November 14, having appeared to claim the inheritance,
1912 they, as the nearest of kin, exclude a remote
relative like a grandnephew.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS: 260) CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and
Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT
Montesa are allegedly the owners of a parcel OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO,
of land apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of respondents.
corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
Respondent Candia claims ownership over the
land having purchased the same from REGALADO, J.:
Villarosa, the vendee of Apolinario. Petitioners FACTS:
claim on the other hand, that as nieces and This case involves an action for reconveyance
nephews,they are the collateral heirs of filed by herein petitioners against herein
Apolinario, through the latters brothers and private respondent before the Regional Trial
sisters. Sarita, however, is the grandnephew Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as
of Apolinario. the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a
The RTC absolved the defendant from the parcel of land with a house and apartment
complainant, on the grounds that, with regard thereon located at San Francisco del Monte,
to the animals and real property sued for, Quezon City and which was originally owned
there was no proof whatever that they were in by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora
possession of the spouses at the time of their Dezoller Guerrero.
death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller
the defendant was the possessor in good faith are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the
continuously and was presumed to hold under deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
just title so long as the contrary should not be the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes
proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on
their alleged predecessors in interest made March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
demand for it during the period of twenty-six descendant, and was survived only by her
years, since the ownership thereof was husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes,
Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to
it being that during this very long period of inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by
time they did not obtain possession of the right of representation.
property. Records revealed that upon the death of
Hence, the judgment having been appealed Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
through a bill exceptions. spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto
ISSUE: WON grandnephews have a right of himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in
representation over the estate of the dispute which is covered by Transfer
deceased. Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a
consequence of which Transfer Certificate of
HELD: Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of
The Court ruled that the right of Martin Guerrero. Martin Guerrero then sold the
representation is limited to nephews and lot to herein private respondent Teodora
nieces who are children of brothers and Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate
sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita who of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's
joins as the representative of his grandfather name.
in a complaint with others, who are brothers After Martin Guerreros death, Petitioners filed
and nephews of the predecessor in interest, an action for reconveyance claiming that they
lacks such right of representation, for it are entitled to inherit one-half of the property
belongs in the collateral line only to the in question by right of representation.
nephews and not to the grandnephews. Both the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to
Hence, sister and nephews of the deceased evidence and dismissed the complaint for
288
reconveyance and declared that the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial
documentary evidence presented by herein notice and admissions, relieve the proponent
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, from presenting evidence on the facts he
family picture, and joint affidavits are all alleged and such facts are thereby considered
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and as duly proved.
establish filiation. Second is the question regarding their
Hence, this appeal. filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so
ISSUE: WON petitioners failed to meet the hold, that the present case is one instance
quantum of proof required by Article 172 of where the general requirement on evidence
the Family Code to establish legitimacy and aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are
filiation claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the
HELD: declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
The Court ruled for the petitioners and Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece,
reversed and set aside the questioned is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals. of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact
Petitioners and Private Respondent were that there was no other preliminary evidence
declared co-owners of the subject property thereof, the reason being such declaration is
with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three- rendered competent by virtue of the necessity
fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively. of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
The Court considered two points: of justice. More importantly, there is in the
First is the issue on petitioner's present case an absolute failure by all and
legitimacy. sundry to refute that declaration made by the
The documentary evidence adduced by decedent.
petitioners, taken separately and From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus
independently of each other, are not per se be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the
sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of decedent's declaration and without need for
pedigree. It seems that the lower courts have further proof thereof, that petitioners are the
regrettably overlooked the universally niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
recognized presumption on legitimacy. There Guerrero.
is no presumption of the law more firmly Applying the general rule in the present case
established and founded on sounder morality would nonetheless produce the same result.
and more convincing reason than the For while the documentary evidence
presumption that children born in wedlock are submitted by petitioners do not strictly
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the conform to the rules on their admissibility, we
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked are however of the considered opinion that
collaterally. the same may be admitted by reason of
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners private respondent's failure to interpose any
are the legitimate children of Hermogenes timely objection thereto at the time they were
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in being offered in evidence.
the present action for reconveyance. This is
aside, of course, from the further 261) ZOSIMA VERDAD vs. CA
consideration that private respondent is not G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption VITUG, J.:
consequently continues to operate in favor of FACTS:
petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. Petitioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a
Indubitably, when private respondent opted 248-square meter residential lot at
not to present countervailing evidence to Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St.,
overcome the presumption, by merely filing a Butuan City. Private respondent Socorro
demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a
impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. right of legal redemption over the subject
Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the property and traces her title to the late
289
Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died The Court denied the petition. On the
intestate on 08 March 1956. contention of petitioner as to the capacity of
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two Socorro to initiate the redemption
marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and proceedings, the Court ruled that Respondent
the second, following the latter's death, with possess the capacity to ask for a redemption.
Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or,
Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is
Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;
Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first however, Socorro's right to the property is not
marriage and her children of the second because she rightfully can claim heirship in
marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of
Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales her husband, David Rosales, part of whose
(notice that other respondents in this case are estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
the children from the 2nd marriage). Socorro is David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his
the wife of David Rosales who sometime after mother's death. When Macaria died on 08
the death of Macaria, died intestate without March 1956 her estate passed on to her
issue. surviving children, among them David
It was discovered that the heirs of Ramon Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of
Buderos sold the lot in question to petitioner the property. When David Rosales himself
in an instrument dated 14, June 1982 (for later died, his own estate, which included
P55,460) and another instrument on 14 Nov his undivided interest over the property
1982 (this time a duly notarized deed of sale inherited from Macaria, passed on to his
for P23,000), which sale was later discovered widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to
by respondent Socorro on 30 Mar 1987. the law on succession(Art 995 and 1001).
Settlement was attempted at the Failure of Socorro and herein private respondents, along
settlement at the Lupong Tagapamayapa with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon
prompted the Respondent to initiated a case became co-owners of the property that
for the "Legal Redemption with Preliminary originally descended from Macaria.
Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of As to the timeliness of the filing of the
Butuan City. petition, the Court ruled that such was
RTC decided that the private respondents' exercised on time. Concededly, no written
right to redeem the property had already notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos
lapsed. On appeal by respondents, Court of heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required
Appeals reversed the lower courts decision under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Hence,
declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to
Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance commence when private respondent Rosales
rights (Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share sought to exercise the right of redemption on
(Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the
Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of
Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) Butuan City, or when the case was initiated,
DAYS from finality hereon, unless written on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.
notice of the sale and its terms are received in The written notice of sale is mandatory. This
the interim, under the same terms and Court has long established the rule that
conditions appearing under Exhibit "J" and notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
after returning the purchase price of owner, the latter is still entitled to a written
P23,000.00 within the foregoing period. notice from the selling co-owner in order to
Hence, this petition. remove all uncertainties about the sale, its
terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
ISSUE: WON respondents may initiate and status.
redemption proceedings over the lot, her not
being a legal co-heir, as well as the timeliness 262) FILOMENA ABELLANA DE
of that the said case was instituted. BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,
HELD: CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
290
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the

FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees. other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965 called to the succession.
Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
FACTS: inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City spouse, while other collaterals succeeded
until 1937 when she transferred to only after the widower or widow. The present
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
resided in Manilacontinuously until 1944. spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces
More than ten (10) years having elapsed since and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
the last time she was known to be alive, she without altering the preferred position of the
was declared presumptively dead for latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
purposes of opening her succession and Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may
distributing her estate among her heirs. not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. and nieces of the decedent survive and are
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no willing and qualified to succeed.
surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral 263) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA
relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's
father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Facts:
Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda
Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were Barcenas having three children: Perpetua,
the children of Melodia's only brother of full Igmedia and Ignacio. When Sisenda died,
blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her Simeon married Silvestra producing two
(the decedent). children: Felipa and Maura.
The trial court ruled that the appellees, as The subject matter of the complaint concerns
children of the only predeceased brother of the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic
the decedent, are nearer in degree than the in the 5 parcels of land which she inherited
appellant since nieces and nephews succeed from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso.
by right of representation. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint,
namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of
ISSUE: Who amongst the claimants are Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of
entitled to the inheritance? Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic,
daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of
HELD: Laguna and San Pablo City against the
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
the deceased she is as far distant as the Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
since in the collateral line to which both kinds After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties
of relatives belong degrees are counted by passed on to Cristela Almanza who took
first ascending to the common ancestor and charge of the administration of the same.
then descending to the heir. Appellant is Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and
likewise right in her contention that nephews requested for the partition of their aunt's
and nieces alone do not inherit by right of properties. However, they were prevailed
representation (i.e., per stripes) unless upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the
concurring with brothers or sisters of the properties yet as the expenses for the last
deceased. illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when been paid. Having agreed to defer the
it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other out the subject again sometime in 1959 only.
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the
etc.) from the succession. Under Article 1009, request as the debts, accordingly, had already
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and been paid. Unfortunately, she died without
291
the division of the properties having been Malate and Paco. She made a will and later on
effected, thereby leaving the possession and added a codicil to said will. The will contained
administration of the same to the defendants. provisions for the establishment of a
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of "Capellania de Misas"; that the first chaplain
plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro
inherit from Maura by right of representation. del Castillo; that said will contained a
The appellate court certified the case to the provision for the administration of said
Supreme Court. property in relation with the said "Capellania
de Misas" succeeding administration should
Issue: Whether the nephews and nieces from continue perpetually. In 1672, Ana Sarmiento
the brothers and sisters whether full or half died. For more than two hundred years,
blood has the right to inherit respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, through his various agencies, has
Held: administered said property.
Yes. The nephews and nieces from the Petitioner city of Manila filed an action before
brothers and sisters whether full or half blood the CFI to have declared escheated to the city
has the right to inherit. of Manila the mentioned property. The theory
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, was the owner of said property and died in
Art. 1003 of the NCC provides that collateral the year 1668 without leaving "her or person
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of entitled to the same." However, the
the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic respondent opposed alleging that it has
died intestate without an issue, and her rightfully and legally succeeded to the
husband and all her ascendants had died possession and administration of the property
ahead of her, she is succeeded by the in accordance with the terms and provisions
surviving collateral relatives, namely the of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten The trial court denied the petition.
(10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters
of half blood in accordance with the provision ISSUE: Whether the property can be
of Art. 975 of the NCC. escheated in favor of City of Manila.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which
makes no qualification as to whether the HELD: No
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when
paternal line and without preference as to property may be declared escheated. It
whether their relationship to the deceased is provides, "when a person dies intestate,
by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole seized of real or personal property . . . leaving
blood of the deceased does not exclude the no heir or person by law entitled to the
ten nephews and n of half blood. The only same," that then and in that case such
difference in their right of succession is property under the procedure provided for by
provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Art. sections 751 and 752, may de declared
1006 of the NCC, which provisions, in effect, escheated.
entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not
double that of the nephews and nieces of half die intestate. She left a will. The will provides
blood. for the administration of said property by her
nephew as well as for the subsequent
administration of the same. She did not die
without an heir nor without persons entitled to
administer her estate. It further shows that
264) CITY OF MANILA VS. ARCHBISHOP she did not die without leaving a person by
G.R. No. L-10033 / August 30, 1917 law entitled to inherit her property. Therefore,
the property in question cannot be declared
FACTS: In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with escheated.
her husband in the City of Manila. She owned The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally
properties consisted of five parcels of land in defines and designates what disposition shall
292
be made of the property in question. The heir the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente
mentioned in said will evidently accepted its F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his
terms and permitted the property to be part, but a special incapacity due to the
administered in accordance therewith. And, so accidental relation of guardian and ward
far as the record shows, it is still being existing between the parties.
administered in accordance with the terms of Accretion takes place in a testamentary
said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary success when two or more persons are called
as was intended by the original owner. to the same inheritance or the same portion
thereof without special designation of shares
265) TORRES vs. LOPEZ and secondly, when one of the persons so
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, called dies before the testator or renounces
1926 the inheritance or is disqualified to receive it.
In the case before us we have a will calling
FACTS: Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
incapable of taking care of himself and had special designation of shares. In addition to
been placed under the care of his cousin this, one of the persons named as heir has
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will predeceased the testator, this person being
instituted as universal heirs of all his property also disqualified to receive the estate even if
his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno and cousin he had been alive at the time of the testator's
Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from the time the death by reason of his being then the legal
will was made and the testator died about a guardian of the testator with accounts
month thereafter. The time the will was made unsettled, does not make a case for intestate
Lopez had not presented his final accounts as succession as to his part of the estate. This
guardian, and no such accounts had been article (982) is the exact application to the
presented by him at the time of his death. case and its effect is to give to the survivor,
Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided
relative of the decedent, filed a case claiming half which she would have received in
half of the estate of Tomas by intestate conjunction with her father if he had been
succession as next of kin and nearest heir. alive and qualified to take, but also the half
Luz, on the other hand, claims the same by which pertained to him. There was no error
accretion and in the character of universal whatever, therefore in the order of the trial
heir under the will of Tomas. Appellant court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to
contends that there has supervened a partial the whole estate.
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate
which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and 266) NEPOMUCENO vs. IAC
that this half has descended to the appellant. 139 SCRA 206
The trial court ruled in favor of Luz.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not one-half of the estate On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a
of Tomas Rodriquez should go to Margarita will. In the said will, the testator named and
Lopez being the next of kin and nearest heir appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
of Vicente Lopez or to his daughter by Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of
accretion? his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that
the testator was legally married to a certain
HELD: Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952,
declares that, with certain exceptions in favor he had been estranged from his lawfully
of near relatives, no testamentary provision wedded wife and had been living with
shall be valid when made by a ward in favor petitioner as husband and wife. The estate
of his guardian before the final accounts of was devised to his legal heirs, except the free
the latter have been approved. This provision portion which was devised to petitioner.
is of undoubted application to the situation Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of
before the court and the provision made in the will but was denied by the court on the
293
opposition of the legal heirs on the ground

that petitioner admitted her living in 267) PASTOR vs. CA
concubinage with the testator, thus, she is 122 SCRA 885
wanting in integrity and letters testamentary
should not be issued to her. FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish
The Court of Appeals declared the will to be subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966,
valid except that the devise in favor of the survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who
petitioner is null and void, Petitioner contends also died), their two legitimate children Alvaro
that the lower court has no jurisdiction in Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de
passing upon the question of the intrinsic Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not
validity of the will. natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito
Quemada (QUEMADA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may
pass upon the provisions of the will. QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of
HELD: NO. PASTOR, SR., which contained a legacy in
The respondent court acted within its favor of Quenada consisting of 30% of Pastor
jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be Sr.s 42% share in the operation of Atlas
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the Mining.
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. PASTOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the
owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
The general rule is that in probate inheritance Thus, Quemada appointed as
proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is special administrator filed for reconveyance of
limited to an examination and resolution of said claims of alleged properties including the
the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, subject of legacy.
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court ISSUE: Whether the probate order resolved
is not powerless to do what the situation with finality the questions of ownership.
constrains it to do and pass upon certain Whether the probate ordere resolved the
provisions of the will. The fact that the intrinsic validity of the will.
probate court declared a devise made in a will
null and void will be sustained where no HELD:
useful purpose will be served by requiring the In a special proceeding for the probate of a
filing of a separate civil action and restricting will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity extrinsic validity of the will, As a rule, the
of the will. There is no useful purpose that question of ownership is an extraneous
would be served if we remand the nullified matter which the Probate Court cannot
provision to the proper court in a separate resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
action for that purpose simply because, in the determining whether a certain property
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily should or should not be included in the
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code such determination is provisional, not
is against the making of a donation between conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
persons who are living in adultery or in a separate action to resolve title.
concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even Probate court erred in assuming in its
assuming that the recipient may receive. The implementing order that the probate order
very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy adjudged the issues of ownership. In case of
because the testator admitted he was death of one of the spouses, their respective
disposing the properties to a person with rights must be liquidated and the debts paid
whom he had been living in concubinage. in the succession proceedings for the
294
deceased spouse. Certiorari is proper where court and that the same having been
probate court issued erroneous implementing seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the
orders of its probate order. Legacy made in a ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals
will cannot be distributed without a prior reversed the trial court and declared the
liquidation of the decedents estate and modified compromise agreement valid and
payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a binding. Petitioners contend that, because the
debt of the estate for which a writ of compromise agreement was executed during
execution may issue. An order of execution the pendency of the probate proceedings,
that varies the terms of a final order can be judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with
questioned in a certiorari proceeding. validity.
268) SANCHEZ vs. CA Issue: Whether or not the compromise

G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997 agreement entered by the parties during the
pendency of probate proceedings is valid and
FACTS: binding.
Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the
only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code
Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn defines a compromise agreement as "a
L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the contract whereby the parties, by making
legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all put an end to one already commenced." Being
surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the
children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia filed a meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial
petition for letters of administration over the approval is not required for its perfection.
estate of her mother following her death and Petitioners' argument that the compromise
the estate of her father, Juan, who was at the was not valid for lack of judicial approval is
time in a state of senility. But before the not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs.
administration proceedings could formally be Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: It is
terminated and closed, Juan died. Such that alleged that the lack of judicial approval is
petitioners as heirs of Juan, filed a petition for fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a
letters of administration over the intestate consensual contract. As such, it is perfected
estate of Juan, which petition was opposed by upon the meeting of the minds of the parties
Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and petitioners to the contract. And from that moment not
executed a Compromise Agreement wherein only does it become binding upon the parties,
they agreed to divide the properties it also has upon them the effect and authority
enumerated therein of the late Juan Sanchez. of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if
Petitioners filed a Motion to require not judicially approved . In the case before
administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly
24 hectares and/or to set aside compromise and freely entered into a valid compromise
agreement. Private respondent Rosalia and agreement. Adequately assisted by their
petitioners entered into and executed a respective counsels, they each negotiated its
memorandum of agreement which modified terms and provisions for four months; in fact,
the compromise agreement. Nine years later, said agreement was executed only after the
petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself,
submit a new inventory and to render an the first and second drafts were prepared
accounting over properties not included in the successively in July, 1969; the third draft on
compromise agreement. They likewise filed a September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft,
motion to defer the approval of the which was finally signed by the parties on
compromise agreement, in which they prayed October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
for the annulment of the compromise compromise agreement was the result of a
agreement on the ground of fraud. long drawn out process, with all the parties
The trial court declared the compromise ably striving to protect their respective
agreement void and unenforceable, the same interests and to come out with the best they
not having been approved by the intestate could, there can be no doubt that the parties
295
entered into it freely and voluntarily. are petitioners in this case, while Romeo and
Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To his wife are respondents.
be valid, it is merely required under the law to
be based on real claims and actually agreed Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired
upon in good faith by the parties thereto. properties in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable the ownership of some of these properties
settlement that is not only allowed but also that is in question in this case.
encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the
Civil Code mandates that a "court shall It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr.
endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of
case to agree upon some fair compromise."In Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of
opposing the validity and enforcement of the his fathers estate. In the course of the
compromise agreement, petitioners harp on proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and parents executed several deeds of sale
Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, conveying a number of real properties in favor
they contend that the court's approval is of his sister, Natividad. This involved 6 lots in
necessary in compromises entered into by QC one of which is a lot occupied by Romeo
guardians and parents in behalf of their wards and his wife. This lot was later sold by
or children. However, we observe that Natividad to Maximino Jr.
although denominated a compromise
agreement, the document in this case is Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Maximino Sr., a case for annulment of sale
Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides with damages against Natividad and
that "[e]very act which is intended to put an Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees were void for lack of consideration. Trial Court
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, rendered judgement declaring the nullity of
although it should purport to be a sale, an the deed of sale. CA modified RTC, ordered
exchange, a compromise, or any other lots cancelled and restored to the estate of
transaction."For a partition to be valid, Maximino Sr.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
requires the concurrence of the following ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased
conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) spouses their estate alone can seek the
the decedent left no debts, or if there were annulment of said sale? Whether the sale is
debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and valid?
liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors,
the latter are represented by their judicial HELD
guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public The petition is without merit.
instrument or affidavit duly filed with the The fact that other properties had allegedly
Register of Deeds. We find that all the been sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. and
foregoing requisites are present in this case. Aurea does not necessarily show that the
We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' deed of sale made in favor of Natividad is
compromise agreement/partition in this case. valid.
269) NAZARENO VS. CA The trial court and CA found that the
343 SCRA 637 Nazareno spouses transferred their properties
to their children by fictitious sales in order to
FACTS avoid payment of inheritance taxes. It was
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete also found out that Natividad had no means to
were husband and wife. Aurea died on April pay for the six lots subject of the deed of sale.
15, 1970 , while Maximo Sr. died on
December 18, 1980 . They were survived by The estate of Maximino alone cannot contest
their children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico the validity of the deed of sale because the
and Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo Jr. and Natividad
296
estate of Aurea has not been settled. CA not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the Civil Code
decision affirmed. is clear, the petition, must be dismissed
without prejudice to the institution of a new
270) ZARAGOZA VS. CA proceeding were all the indispensable parties
341 SCRA 309 are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime.
FACTS
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It
of certain parcels of land situated at the is not allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The
municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and certificate, in absence of fraud, is eveidence
Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, of title and shows exactly the real interest of
Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentina and Alberta . On the owner. The title once registered. Should
Decemeber 1964 he died without a will. not be thereafter impugned, altered or
changed except in direct proceeding
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint permitted by law.
against Florentino for delivery of her
inheritance share, consisting of lots 943 and 271) MENDOZA VS CA
871 and for payment of damages. She claims 199 SCRA 778
that, his father in his lifetime partitioned the
said properties among his children. The FACTS
shares of her brothers and sisters were given Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI
to them in advance by way of deed of sale, of Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real
but without valid consideration. Her share, property against private respondents spouses
lots 943 and 871 were not conveyed then. Samonte. Petitioners are legitimate children of
She averred that because of her marriage, deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their mother
she became an American citizen and was sold a parcel of land to respondents spouses
prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines Samonte. Petitioners aver that they are
except by hereditary succession. entitled to legal redemption.
Petitioners denied that there was partition of According to the plaintiff, the sale of the
the estate of their father during his lifetime. disputed property in favor of the defendants
The trial court ruled and ordered adjudication was null and void on the ground that, as a
lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim for mere co-owner of an undivided estate,
lot 943 is dismissed. Ca reversed RTC in so far Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divide the
as lot 943 is concerned, ordered Alberta as estate into parts and then convey a part
owner of lot 943. thereof by metes and bounds to a third
person, since there had never been any
ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by partition, judicial or extra judicial, of the
Flavio Zaragoza of his properties which estate among the heirs of their late father,
includes lot 871 and 943 valid? Arcadio.
2. Whether the validity of the sale and
consequently, the TCT over lot 943 registered The trial court dismissed the the petitioners
in the name of Petitioners Florentina be a complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the
valid subject matter of the entire proceeding trial court.
for the delivery of the inheritance share.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void?
HELD Whether petitioners can still exercise the right
This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 of legal redemption?
and 943 were inheritance shares of
respondent, based on documentary evidence HELD:
and testimonial evidence. Partition during the Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half
lifetime of Flavio zaragoza is valid. It is basic (1/2) of said lot but only to the share of one
in the law of succession that a partition inter legitimate child or 1 and 1/3 rights and
vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are interest, citing article 996 of the Civil Code.
297
participated and were made parties thereto

The deed of sale is void insofar as it affects were not the heirs of Crisanta.
the rights and interests of other petitioners
because petitioner Trinidad can only sell her 1 This claim even if true would not warrant
1/3 rights and interest over the said lot and no rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil
more than that. Corollary, the remaining Code as to parties who were allegedly not
petitioners can still exercise the right of legal heirs, article 1105 is in point.
redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of
the civil code. Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute
sale is a notarized document. As such, it has
272) AZNAR BROTHERS REALT CO. VS CA in its favor the presumption of regularity and
327 SCRA 359 it carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution. It is
FACTS admissible in evidence without further proof
Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 of authenticity. Decision of RTC reinstated.
square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu
Lapu City was acquired By Aznar from the 273) RALLA VS. UNTALAN
heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an L-63253-54 APRIL 27 1989
extrajudicial Partition of real estate with deed
of absolute sale. FACTS
Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for
Private respondents were allegedly allowed to the probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In
occupy portions of lot 4399 provided that they his will he left his entire estate to his son,
leave the land in the event that the company Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by heirs),
would use the property for its purpose. Later, leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta.
Lucia Realty for development of the subject At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the
lot into a multi-million peso housing partition of the estate of their mother, Paz.
subdivision and beach resort. With this case, the brothers agreed to
amicably compromise via project partition,
When demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed whereby sixty-three parcels of land,
with MTCC a case for unlawful detainer and apparently forming the estate of their
damages. Private Respondents alleged that deceased mother was divided between them.
they are the successors and descendants of
the eight children of the late Crisanta and that In the course of the proceeding for the
they had been residing in the concept of probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to
owner since the time of their parents and dismiss the petition for probate on the ground
grandparents. They claim that the deed of that he was no longer interested in the
absolute sale was simulated and fraudulent. allowance of the will of his late father for its
Thus files with RTC a complaint seeking to probate would no longer be beneficial to him.
declare the subject document null and void. This motion was denied, it was also denied at
the CA. In its decision the CA said, indeed the
MTCC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. petitioner stood to gain if the testate
CA reversed and set aside RTC and declared proceedings were to be dismissed because
Private Respondents as the rightful then he would not be compelled to submit for
possessors. inclusion in the inventory of the estate of
Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land from
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial partition with which he alone had been collecting rentals
deed of absolute sale is valid. and receiving income, to the exclusion and
prejudiced of hi s brother who was being
HELD: deprived of his successional rights.
Private respondents claim that not all the Consequently, the court declared Pedro and
known heirs participated in the extrajudicial Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo who should
partition, and that two persons who share equally upon the division of the latters
298
estate and thereupon converted the testate

proceedings into one of intestacy. 274) FELIX BALANAY, Jr. vs. Martinez
L-39247 June 27, 1975
After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco
brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for the FACTS
probate of the same will of Rosendo on the Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she
ground that the decedent owed him P5000. was survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr.
The petition for probate was granted. and by their 6 children, Felix Jr., Avelina,
Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of Pablo was Beatriz, Carolina Delia and Emilia.
appointed special administrator, over and
above the objections of the heirs of Pedro. In Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for
taking possession, Teoderico also took the probate of his mothers notarial will. In the
possession of the 63 parcels of land subject of said will, it was declared that, 1.) She was the
the partition earlier. owner of the southern half of the nine
conjugal lots, 2.) That it was her desire that
Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of her properties should not be divided among
land should be included in the proceedings for her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She
the settlement of the estate of Rosendo and devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as
thereafter proceed as probate proceedings. if they were all owned by her. She disposed of
After 2 years, Judge Untalan reconsidered his in the will her husbands one half share of the
order and held that the project partition is conjugal assets.
respected and upheld.
Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the ground of lack of testamentary capacity,
the instant case. undue influence preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partitioned of the
ISSUE: Whether the partition should be conjugal estate. They claim that Felix Jr.
regarded or respected in view with the should collate certain properties which he had
probate proccedings of the estate of Rosendo received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in his reply
attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr
HELD: waiving and renouncing hereditary rigts in the
Verily, the rule that there can be no valid estate of his wife in favor of their children.
partition among the heirs till after the will has Avelina contended that the affidavit was void.
been probated. This, of course, presupposes Lower court denied and gave effect to the
that the properties to be partitioned are the affidavit and conformity of Felix Sr.
same properties embraced in the will. Thus
this rule invoked, is inapplicable in the instant In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared
case where there are two separate cases each claiming to be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a
involving the estate of two different person motion to withdraw the probate and to
comprising dissimilar properties. proceed by intestae estae proceeding. The
lower court adopted the view of Atty ,
The project partition is valid and binding upon Montana that the will was void. So, it
the brothers as well as upon their heirs dismissed the petition for probate and
especially as this was accompanied by converted the testate proceeding into an
delivery of possession to them of their intestate proceeding.
respective shares. They are duty bound to
respect the division agreed upon by them and ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in
embodied in the document of partition. passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal
Thus the petitioner could no longer question validity, and declaring it void.
the exclusion of the lands subject of the
partition from the proceedings for the HELD
settlement of the estate of Rosendo. Petition
dismissed.
299
We are of the opinion that in view of certain partnership, had assented to her
unusual provisions of the will, which are of testamentary partition of the conjugal estate,
dubious legality, and because of the motion to such partition has become valid assuming
withdraw the petition for probate. The trial that the will may be probated.
court acted correctly in passing upon the wills In the instant case, the preterited heir was the
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion
had been established. But the probate court did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he
erred in declaring the will was void and in signified his conformity to his wifes will and
converting the testate proceeding into an renounced his hereditary rights.
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that in its order it gave effect to the surviving Hearing for the petition for probate affirmed.
husbands conformity to the will and to his 275) Amorante Plan vs. IAC
renunciation of his hereditary rights which L-65656 February 28,1985
presumably included in one-half share of the
conjugal estate. FACTS
The rule is that the invalidity of one of In the intestate proceeding for the settlement
several dispositions contained in a will does of Regino Bautistas estate, his widow filed a
not result in the invalidity of the other motion dated December 9, 1964 for authority
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that to sell to Plan the two lots and theater for not
the testator would not have made such other less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion
not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some was set for hearing. It was indicated that the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be children were notified through one child
separated from the invalid without defeating Milagros Bautista.
the intention of the testator or interfering with
the general testamentary scheme, or doing Judge Jimenez of the probate court granted
injustice to the beneficiaries. the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate
of the deceased for not less than P140,000 so
The provision of the will of the testatrix should as to pay the obligations of the estate,
not be divided among her heirs during her appearing that all heirs have conformed
husbands lifetime but should be kept intact thereto.
and that the legitimes should be paid in cash
is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary obligations for the two lots. A motion to
rights and his one-half share of the conjugal approve the sale was filed. Judge signed the
partnership (Art. 179 and Art 1041 CC) but original deed of sale under the word approved
insofar as said renunciation partakes of a to indicate that the sale was okayed by
donation of his hereditary rights and his one- probate court.
half share in the conjugal estate (1061 CC) it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to
in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A portion of the agreement of absolute sale was filed by
the estate should be adjudicated to the Federico Bautista child of the deceased.
widower for his support and maintenance or Federicos counsel did not file any objection to
at least his legitime should be respected. the project of partition as per order by the
Judge. The reason is not hard to surmise. The
In the instant case there is no doubt that the estate sought to be partitioned had already
testatrix and her husband intended to been sold to Plan.
partition the conjugal estate in the manner
set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true Federico contended that because there was
that she could dispose of by will only her half no compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the
of the conjugal estate but since the husband, Rules of Court the sale was void. Instead of
after the dissolution of the conjugal asking the court to act on his petition for relief
300
from the orders authorizing and approving the the disputed parcels of lan. Maria howeve,
sale, Federico filed a separate action against maintains that she acquired these two
Plan to nullify the sale. Judge dismissed the parcels of land from deceased spouses Bidaya
action. He ruled that the nullity of the sael as and since then until the present, had been in
to Federicos 1/16 share should be resolved in open, public, peaceful and contionous,
the intestae proceeding. He filed three times adverse possession and enjoyment in the
same action, all have been dismissed. concept of absolute owner. Maria further
claims that Cristina never shared or
Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void contributed to the payment of taxes of said
the agreement to sell based on article 1088 of two parcels of land.
the Civil Code.
The trial court stated that the provision in the
ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a deed of sale (Maria subscribed that the
separate action, instead of an intestate property is inherited from her father) was in
proceeding his fathers estate, the sale of two the nature of trust provision in favor of
conjugal lots made by his mother, with Cristina as co-owner and co-heir.
authorization and approval of the probate
court. ISSUE: Who has ownership rights over the
litigated parcels of land
HELD
We hold that the appellate court erred in HELD: We agree with the trial court. By
ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed admitting that the cornland is inherited
property to Federico. Said judgment is bereft property, Maria in effect recognized Critinas
of factual and legal basis. Federico did not rights thereto as a co-owner co-heir.
pray for reconveyance he prayed for
receivership for nullification of the agreement Having established that Critinas co-ownership
to sell and the sale itself. Article 1088 of the rights, maria nonetheless insists that
Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in Cristinas rights are barred by prescription
this case because it refers to the sale of under secs 40 and 42 of act 190 / art 1116 of
hereditary rights, and not to specific the Civil Code where the longest period of
properties, for the payment of the debts of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription is
the decedents estate as to which there is no ten years. In the present case, Cristina, it is
legal redemption. alleged, asserted her claims 34 yers after her
right of action accrued. On Marias claims of
In the instant case we agree with the decision acquisitive prescription, the trial court held
of the Judges that Federicos remedy is in the that Maria was a trustee with respect to
intestate proceeding where his petition for Cristinas share. As such, prescription, as a
relief has been pending for nearly twenty mode of acquiring title, could not apply.
years. An action for partition implies that the thing is
still owned in common. If a co-owner holds
276) Maria Bicarme vs. CA and Cristina the property in exclusive adverse possession
Bicarme as owner, asserting the property in exclusive
L-51914 June 6, 1990 dominion for a required period, he can acquire
90 sole title to it as against co-heirs or co-
FACTS owners. The imprescriptibly of an action for
Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the partition cannot thus be invoked when one of
only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and the co-owners has possessed the property as
entitled in equal shares over the parcel of exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to
lands (cornland and Riceland) in litigation. acquire it by prescription. From the moment
Spouses Bicarme died intestate and were one of the co0owners claims that he is
survived by children, Maria and Victoria absolute owner and denies other any question
(mother of Cristina). Cristina instituted this involve is no longer of partition but of
action for partition, because her aunt, Maria ownership.
refused to share with her the yearly fruits of
301
Acquisitive prescription cannot apply in this ownership, it is not borne out of clear and
case. complete evidence that he exercise acts of
possession which unequivocally constitute an
A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his ouster of the other co-owners. Cristinas rights
receipt of rents fruits or profit from the to partition will therefore prosper
property cannot serve as proof of exclusive
302
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

SURNAME CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,

publication is to be made in the Official

allowed to enroll because they are allegedly

Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be 5) Cui v Arellano University

Facts: 14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

same court a petition for letters of

Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to

Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos

II. HUMAN RELATIONS disposed of said insolvent's property depriving

FACTS Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the

By applying these to the case at hand, it

principle of abuse of rights, sets certain

The trial court ruled that in favor of the FACTS:

loss or harm was not the result of a violation

FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not there is a

Alfred was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal,

committed by certain relatives who thereby awarding damages despite a judgment of

III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo

32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ISSUE:

allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the

citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is certificate.2 She presented a clearance from

Facts: Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should

the reasons allowed for changing ones name

While judicial authority is required for a

VI. MARRIAGE alleged marriage of private respondents

deceased by virtue of a reconstructed

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P.

47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY The marriage contract between Gaspar

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and HELD:

ISSUES: Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his

acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, was thereafter abandoned by Ongkiko

marriage clearly stated that both contracting

ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held

RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code

VII. VOID MARRIAGES The status of children born in voidable

Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 56) Terre vs. Terre

Quisumbing, J.: FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met

nullity of such prior marriage of respondent

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be

RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a

VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY inability to give meaning and significance to

The Court of Appeals agreed with

had caused the dismissal without prejudice of

2) Whether or not the totality of evidence Article 36 of the Family Code, we

Verily, the behavior of respondent can

context of legal separation. We cannot Petitioner avers that during the

63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A.

her repeated acts of infidelity and Until further statutory and

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion

On 25 September 1997, or after capacitated to comply with the basic and

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of The psychological report of respondent

FACTS: Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use

Held: The marriage between the deceased FACTS:

under the rules on Summary Judicial the appealed decision.

FACTS: such previous marriage void. Meaning, where

ISSUE: Whether or not the two marriages

HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code,

IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES the Civil Code, which provides:

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage in