THIRDDIVISION

THE OFFICE OF THE G.R.No.177056

SOLICITORGENERAL,
Petitioner, Present:

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.,
versus Chairperson,
CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO,JR.,
AYALA LAND NACHURA,and
INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS PERALTA,JJ.
LAND CORPORATION,
SHANGRILA PLAZA
CORPORATIONandSMPRIME Promulgated:
HOLDINGS,INC.,
Respondents.
September18,2009
xx

DECISION

CHICONAZARIO,J.:

[1]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
RevisedRulesofCourt,filedbypetitionerOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),seeking
[2]
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of
[3]
AppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.76298,whichaffirmedintototheJointDecision dated29
May2002oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMakatiCity,Branch138,inCivilCases
[4]
No. 001208 and No. 001210 and (2) the Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the
appellatecourtinthesamecasewhichdeniedtheMotionforReconsiderationoftheOSG.
The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons
LandCorporation(Robinsons),ShangrilaPlazaCorporation(Shangrila),andSMPrime
Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their
mallstotheirpatronsandthegeneralpublic.

RespondentsAyalaLand,Robinsons,andShangrilamaintainandoperateshopping
mallsinvariouslocationsinMetroManila.Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates,
and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM City,
ManilaSMCenterpoint,Sta.Mesa,ManilaSMCity,North Avenue, Quezon City and
SMSouthmall,LasPias.

Theshoppingmallsoperatedorleasedoutbyrespondentshaveparkingfacilitiesfor
allkindsofmotorvehicles,eitherbywayofparkingspacesinsidethemallbuildingsorin
separatebuildingsand/oradjacentlotsthataresolelydevotedforuseasparkingspaces.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction of their
ownparkingfacilities.RespondentShangrilaisrentingitsparkingfacilities,consistingof
land and building specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the
lessorsaccount.

Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective
parkingfacilities.Theyprovidesecuritypersonneltoprotectthevehiclesparkedintheir
parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the following
parkingfeesfromthepersonsmakinguseoftheirparkingfacilities,regardlessofwhether
saidpersonsaremallpatronsornot:

Respondent ParkingFees

AyalaLand Onweekdays,P25.00forthefirstfourhoursand
P10.00foreverysucceedinghouronweekends,
flatrateofP25.00perday

Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for
everysucceedinghour

Shangrila FlatrateofP30.00perday

SMPrime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the
parkingspaceisoutdoorsorindoors)forthefirst
three hours and 59 minutes, and P10.00 for
everysucceedinghourorfractionthereof

The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the
stipulationthatrespondentsshallnotberesponsibleforanylossordamagetothevehicles
parkedinrespondentsparkingfacilities.

In1999,theSenateCommitteesonTradeandCommerceandonJusticeandHuman
Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the
legalityoftheprevalentpracticeofshoppingmallsofchargingparkingfees(2)assuming
arguendothatthecollectionofparkingfeeswaslegallyauthorized,tofindoutthebasis
andreasonablenessoftheparkingrateschargedbyshoppingmallsand(3)todetermine
thelegalityofthepolicyofshoppingmallsofdenyingliabilityincasesoftheft,robbery,
or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets. Said
SenateCommitteesinvitedthetopexecutivesofrespondents,whooperatethemajormalls
inthecountrytheofficialsfromtheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(DTI),Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA),andotherlocalgovernmentofficialsandthePhilippineMotoristsAssociation
(PMA)asrepresentativeoftheconsumersgroup.

After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December
1999, the aforementioned Senate Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report
[5]
No.225 on2May2000,inwhichtheyconcluded:

Inviewoftheforegoing,theCommitteesfindthatthecollectionofparkingfeesby
shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal.
While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without
specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and
logicalinterpretationoftheCodeisthattheparkingspacesareforfree.Thisinterpretation
isnotonlyreasonableandlogicalbutfindssupportintheactualpracticeinothercountries
like the United States of America where parking spaces owned and operated by mall
ownersarefreeofcharge.

Figuratively speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking
somethingsimilartothesubdivisionlawwhichrequiredeveloperstodevotesomuchof
thelandareaforparks.

Moreover,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9734(ConsumerActofthePhilippines)provides
that it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the consumers, promote the
general welfare and establish standards of conduct for business and industry.
Obviously,acontraryinterpretation(i.e.,justifyingthecollectionofparkingfees)would
begoingagainstthedeclaredpolicyofR.A.7394.

Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the
administrationandenforcementoftheprovisionsoftheCode,includingtheimpositionof
penaltiesforadministrativeviolationsthereoftotheSecretaryofPublicWorks.This set
up,however,isnotbeingcarriedoutinreality.

InthepositionpapersubmittedbytheMetropolitanManilaDevelopmentAuthority
(MMDA),itschairman,JejomarC.Binay,accuratelypointedoutthattheSecretaryofthe
DPWHisresponsiblefortheimplementation/enforcementoftheNationalBuildingCode.
After the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units
(LGUs) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of the DPWH. Hence, in the
locallevel,theBuildingOfficialsenforceallrules/regulationsformulatedbytheDPWH
relative to all building plans, specifications and designs including parking space
requirements.Thereis,however,nosinglenationaldepartmentoragencydirectlytasked
tosupervisetheenforcementoftheprovisionsoftheCodeonparking,notwithstandingthe
[6]
nationalcharacterofthelaw.


SenateCommitteeReportNo.225,thus,containedthefollowingrecommendations:

Inlightoftheforegoing,theCommitteesonTradeandCommerceandJusticeand
HumanRightsherebyrecommendthefollowing:

1.TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralshouldinstitutethenecessaryactiontoenjoin
thecollectionofparkingfeesaswellastoenforcethepenalsanctionprovisionsof
theNationalBuildingCode.The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise
studyhowrefundcanbeexactedfrommallownerswhocontinuetocollectparking
fees.

2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
7394,otherwiseknownastheConsumerActofthePhilippinesshouldenforcethe
provisions of the Code relative to parking. Towards this end, the DTI should
formulatethenecessaryimplementingrulesandregulationsonparkinginshopping
malls, with prior consultations with the local government units where these are
located. Furthermore, the DTI, in coordination with the DPWH, should be
empoweredtoregulateandsupervisetheconstructionandmaintenanceofparking
establishments.

3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to
expresslyprohibitshoppingmallsfromcollectingparkingfeesbyatthesametime,
 [7]
prohibitthemfrominvokingthewaiverofliability.


Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate
Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of
Manila,QuezonCity,andLasPiasintendedtoinstitute,throughtheOSG,anactionto
enjoinrespondentSMPrimeandsimilarestablishmentsfromcollectingparkingfees,and
toimposeuponsaidestablishmentspenalsanctionsunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1096,
otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building
Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the threatened action
against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory
[8]
Relief underRule63oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,againsttheDPWHSecretaryand
localbuildingofficialsofManila,QuezonCity,andLasPias.SaidPetitionwasdocketed
asCivilCaseNo.001208andassignedtotheRTCofMakatiCity,Branch138,presided
over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime
prayedforjudgment:

a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
NationalBuildingCodeasultravires,hence,unconstitutionalandvoid

b)Declaring[hereinrespondentSMPrime]sclearlegalrighttoleaseparking
spacesappurtenanttoitsdepartmentstores,malls,shoppingcentersandothercommercial
establishmentsand

c) Declaring the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing
RulesandRegulationsasineffective,nothavingbeenpublishedonceaweekforthree(3)
consecutiveweeksinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation,asprescribedbySection211of
PresidentialDecreeNo.1096.

[RespondentSMPrime]furtherpraysforsuchotherreliefsasmaybedeemedjust
[9]
andequitableunderthepremises.


Theverynextday,4October2000,theOSGfiledaPetitionforDeclaratoryRelief
and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
[10]
Injunction) against respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00
1210andraffledtotheRTCofMakati,Branch135,presidedoverbyJudgeFranciscoB.
Ibay(JudgeIbay).PetitionerprayedthattheRTC:

1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminaryinjunctionbeissuedrestrainingrespondentsfromcollectingparkingfeesfrom
theircustomersand

2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of
respondents in charging parking fees is violative of the National Building Code and its
ImplementingRulesandRegulationsandisthereforeinvalid,andmakingpermanentany
injunctivewritissuedinthiscase.

[11]
Otherreliefsjustandequitableunderthepremisesarelikewiseprayedfor.


On23October2000,JudgeIbayoftheRTCofMakatiCity,Branch135,issuedan
OrderconsolidatingCivilCaseNo.001210withCivilCaseNo.001208pendingbefore
JudgeMarellaofRTCofMakati,Branch138.

As a result of the pretrial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the
[12]
RTCissuedaPreTrialOrder ofevendatewhichlimitedtheissuestoberesolvedin
CivilCasesNo.001208andNo.001210tothefollowing:

1.Capacityoftheplaintiff[OSG]inCivilCaseNo.001210toinstitutethe
present proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy in the collection of
parkingfeesbymallownersisamatterofpublicwelfare.

2.Whetherdeclaratoryreliefisproper.

3. WhetherrespondentAyalaLand,Robinsons,ShangriLaandSMPrime
are obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the
publicingeneral,freeofcharge.

[13]
4.Entitlementofthepartiesof[sic]awardofdamages.

On29May2002,theRTCrendereditsJointDecisioninCivilCasesNo.001208
andNo.001210.

The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can
initiateCivilCaseNo.001210underPresidentialDecreeNo.478andtheAdministrative
 [14]
Codeof1987. Italsofoundthatalltherequisitesforanactionfordeclaratoryrelief
werepresent,towit:

The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable
controversy (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse (c) the
partyseekingthereliefhasalegalinterestinthecontroversyand(d)theissueinvolvedis
ripeforjudicialdetermination.

SM,thepetitionerinCivilCaseNo.0011208[sic]isamalloperatorwhostands
tobeaffecteddirectlybythepositiontakenbythegovernmentofficialssuednamelythe
Secretary of Public Highways and the Building Officials of the local government units
whereitoperatesshoppingmalls.TheOSGontheotherhandactsonamatterofpublic
interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued. The
constructionofnewandbiggermallshasbeenannounced,amatterwhichtheCourtcan
take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether mall operators should provide
[15]
parkingfacilities,freeofchargeneedstoberesolved.


Astothethirdandmostcontentiousissue,theRTCpronouncedthat:

The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and
Regulationsdonotimposethatparkingspacesshallbeprovidedbythemallownersfree
ofcharge.Absent such directive[,] Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangrila and SM [Prime]
areundernoobligationtoprovidethemforfree.Article1158oftheCivilCodeisclear:

Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable and
shallberegulatedbythepreceptsofthelawwhichestablishesthemandas
towhathasnotbeenforeseen,bytheprovisionsofthisBook(1090).[]

xxxx

The provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like shopping floor
area or customer area found in Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
cannot be construed as a directive to provide free parking spaces, because the enabling
law,theBuildingCodedoesnotsoprovide.xxx.

TocompelAyalaLand,Robinsons,ShangriLaandSM[Prime]toprovideparking
spaces for free can be considered as an unlawful taking of property right without just
compensation.

Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use, the mall
operatorscollectfees.The legal relationship could be either lease or deposit. In either
case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect money which translates into income.
Shouldparkingspacesbemadefree,thisrightofmallownersshallbegone.This,without
justcompensation.Further,lossofeffectivecontrolovertheirpropertywillensuewhich
 isfrowneduponbylaw.

The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in another light. They can be
looked at as necessary facilities to entice the public to increase patronage of their malls
because without parking spaces, going to their malls will be inconvenient. These are[,]
however[,] business considerations which mall operators will have to decide for
themselves.Theyarenotsufficienttojustifyalegalconclusion,astheOSGwouldlike
theCourttoadoptthatitistheobligationofthemallownerstoprovideparkingspacesfor
[16]
free.


The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for
damages.

TheRTCfinallydecreedinits29May2002JointDecisioninCivilCasesNo.00
1208andNo.001210that:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc.,
RobinsonsLandCorporation,ShangrilaPlazaCorporationandSMPrimeHoldings[,]Inc.
are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or
publicingeneral,freeofcharge.

AllcounterclaimsinCivilCaseNo.001210aredismissed.

[17]
Nopronouncementastocosts.


[18]
CAG.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG and
[19]
respondentSMPrime filedwiththeCourtofAppeals.Thesoleassignmentoferrorof
theOSGinitsAppellantsBriefwas:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING
CODE DID NOT INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE[]
[20]


whilethefourerrorsassignedbyrespondentSMPrimeinitsAppellantsBriefwere:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE
 IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES, HENCE,
UNCONSTITUTIONALANDVOID.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.

III

THETRIALCOURTERREDINFAILINGTODISMISSTHEOSGSPETITIONFOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVEREMEDIES.

IV

THETRIALCOURTERREDINFAILINGTODECLARETHATTHEOSGHASNO
LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL PARTYIN
[21]
INTERESTINTHEINSTANTCASE.


RespondentRobinsonsfiledaMotiontoDismissAppealoftheOSGontheground
thatthelone issue raised therein involved a pure question of law, not reviewable by the
CourtofAppeals.

TheCourtofAppealspromulgateditsDecisioninCAG.R.CVNo.76298on25
January 2007. The appellate court agreed with respondent Robinsons that the appeal of
the OSG should suffer the fate of dismissal, since the issue on whether or not the
National Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall operators to
provideparkingfacilitiestothepublicforfreewasevidentlyaquestionoflaw.Evenso,
since CAG.R. CV No. 76298 also included the appeal of respondent SM Prime, which
raised issues worthy of consideration, and in order to satisfy the demands of substantial
justice,theCourtofAppealsproceededtoruleonthemeritsofthecase.

InitsDecision,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedthecapacityoftheOSGtoinitiate
[22]
CivilCaseNo.001210beforetheRTCasthelegalrepresentativeofthegovernment,
andastheonedeputizedbytheSenateoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesthroughSenate
CommitteeReportNo.225.

TheCourtofAppealsrejectedthecontentionofrespondentSMPrimethattheOSG
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The appellate court explained that an
administrativereviewisnotaconditionprecedenttojudicialreliefwherethequestionin
dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done.

The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity of the IRR of the
NationalBuildingCode,assuchissuewasnotamongthosethepartieshadagreedtobe
resolvedbytheRTCduringthepretrialconferenceforCivilCasesNo.001208andNo.
001210.Issuescannotberaisedforthefirsttimeonappeal.Furthermore,theappellate
courtfoundthatthecontroversycouldbesettledonothergrounds,withouttouchingonthe
issue of the validity of the IRR. It referred to the settled rule that courts should refrain
from passing upon the constitutionality of a law or implementing rules, because of the
principle that bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, unless the resolution
thereofisindispensabletothedeterminationofthecase.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and needed no further construction. Said
provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and
structures.Intheabsenceofanyexpressandclearprovisionoflaw,respondentscouldnot
beobligedandexpectedtoprovideparkingslotsfreeofcharge.

Thefalloofthe25January2007DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED.
[23]
Accordingly,appealedDecisionisherebyAFFIRMEDintoto.


InitsResolutionissuedon14March2007,theCourtofAppealsdeniedtheMotion
for Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the grounds relied upon by the latter had
alreadybeencarefullyconsidered,evaluated,andpasseduponbytheappellatecourt,and
therewasnostrongandcogentreasontomodifymuchlessreversetheassailedjudgment.

TheOSGnowcomesbeforethisCourt,viatheinstantPetitionforReview,witha
singleassignmentoferror:

THECOURTOFAPPEALSSERIOUSLYERREDINAFFIRMINGTHERULINGOF
THE LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE
[24]
FREEPARKINGSPACESTOTHEIRCUSTOMERSORTHEPUBLIC.


TheOSGarguesthatrespondentsaremandatedtoprovidefreeparkingbySection
803oftheNationalBuildingCodeandRuleXIXoftheIRR.

AccordingtoSection803oftheNationalBuildingCode:

SECTION803.PercentageofSiteOccupancy

(a)Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction,
andheightofthebuildingandtheuse,area,nature,andlocationofthesiteandsubjectto
the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and
regulationspromulgatedbytheSecretary.


[25]
Inconnectiontherewith,RuleXIXoftheoldIRR, provides:

RULEXIXPARKINGANDLOADINGSPACEREQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirementsshallbeobserved:

1.Theparkingspaceratingslistedbelowareminimumoffstreetrequirements
forspecificuses/occupanciesforbuildings/structures:

1.1Thesizeofanaverageautomobileparkingslotshallbecomputedas
2.4 meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking,
2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus
parking/loadingslotshallbecomputedataminimumof3.60meters
by12.00meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the
totalnumberofwhichshallbeindicatedontheplansandspecified
whether or not parking accommodations, are attendantmanaged.
(SeeSection2forcomputationofparkingrequirements).

xxxx

1.7Neighborhoodshoppingcenter1slot/100sq.m.ofshoppingfloor
area


TheOSGaversthattheaforequotedprovisionsshouldbereadtogetherwithSection
102oftheNationalBuildingCode,whichdeclares:

SECTION102.DeclarationofPolicy

ItisherebydeclaredtobethepolicyoftheStatetosafeguardlife,health,property,
andpublicwelfare,consistentwiththeprinciplesofsoundenvironmentalmanagementand
controlandtothisend,makeitthepurposeofthisCodetoprovideforallbuildingsand
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.


Therequirementoffreeofchargeparking,theOSGargues,greatlycontributestotheaim
ofsafeguardinglife,health,property,andpublicwelfare,consistentwiththeprinciplesof
sound environmental management and control. Adequate parking spaces would
contributegreatlytoalleviatingtrafficcongestionwhencomplementedbyquickandeasy
access thereto because of freecharge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and
controltheuse,occupancy,andmaintenanceofbuildingsandstructurescarrieswithitthe
powertoimposefeesand,conversely,tocontrolpartiallyor,asinthiscase,absolutely
theimpositionofsuchfees.

TheCourtfindsnomeritinthepresentPetition.

The explicit directive of the aforequoted statutory and regulatory provisions,
garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhoodshoppingcenters,shouldprovideparkingandloadingspaces,inaccordance
withtheminimumratioofoneslotper100squaremeters[Oneare,a]ofshoppingfloor
area.There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or noncollection) of parking
feesbyrespondents.Infact,thetermparkingfeescannotevenbefoundatallinthe
entireNationalBuildingCodeanditsIRR.

Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be
 [26]
given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since
Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention
parkingfees,thensimply,saidprovisionsdonotregulatethecollectionofthesame.The
RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code,
whichstates:

Art.1158.Obligationsderivedfromlawarenotpresumed.Onlythoseexpressly
determinedinthisCodeorinspeciallawsaredemandable,andshallberegulatedbythe
preceptsofthelawwhichestablishesthemandastowhathasnotbeenforeseen,bythe
provisionsofthisBook.(Emphasisours.)


Hence,inordertobringthematterofparkingfeeswithintheambitoftheNational
BuildingCodeanditsIRR,theOSGhadtoresorttospeciousandfeebleargumentation,in
whichtheCourtcannotconcur.

TheOSGcannotrelyonSection102oftheNationalBuildingCodetoexpandthe
coverageofSection803ofthesameCodeandRuleXIXoftheIRR,soastoincludethe
regulationofparkingfees.TheOSGlimitsitscitationtothefirstpartofSection102of
the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which
reads,andtothisend,makeitthepurposeofthisCodetoprovideforallbuildingsand
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and
controltheirlocation,site,design,qualityofmaterials,construction,use,occupancy,and
maintenance. While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays
downtheStatepolicy,itisthesecondpartthereofthatexplainshowsaidpolicyshallbe
carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building
officialsinthenameoflife,health,property,andpublicwelfare.Onthecontrary,itlimits
the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and
requirementsforallbuildingsandstructures,assetforthintheNationalBuildingCode,
arecompliedwith.

 Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that
such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge.If Rule XIX is not
coveredbytheenablinglaw,thenitcannotbeaddedtoorincludedintheimplementing
rules.Therulemakingpowerofadministrativeagenciesmustbeconfinedtodetailsfor
regulatingthemodeorproceedingstocarryintoeffectthelawasithasbeenenacted,and
itcannotbeextendedtoamendorexpandthestatutoryrequirementsortoembracematters
not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
theprovisionsofthelawbecauseanyresultingdiscrepancybetweenthetwowillalways
[27]
beresolvedinfavorofthebasiclaw.

FromtheRTCallthewaytothisCourt,theOSGrepeatedlyreferredtoRepublicv.
[28] [29]
Gonzales andCityofOzamisv.Lumapas tosupportitspositionthattheStatehas
the power to regulate parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the
publicanditisbyvirtueofsaidpowerthatrespondentsmayberequiredtoprovidefree
parkingfacilities.TheOSG,though,failedtoconsiderthesubstantialdifferencesinthe
factualandlegalbackgroundsofthesetwocasesfromthoseofthePetitionatbar.

In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants of two
parcelsoflandofthepublicdomaintogivewaytoaroadwideningproject.Itwasinthis
contextthattheCourtpronounced:

Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was
prevalentthis,ofcourse,causedthebuildupoftrafficinthesurroundingareatothegreat
discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion
constitutesathreattothehealth,welfare,safetyandconvenienceofthepeopleanditcan
onlybesubstantiallyrelievedbywideningstreetsandprovidingadequateparkingareas.


The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed with full
powertocontrolandregulateitsstreetsforthepurposeofpromotingpublichealth,safety
andwelfare.TheCitycanregulatethetime,place,andmannerofparkinginthestreets
andpublicplacesandchargeminimalfeesforthestreetparkingtocovertheexpensesfor
supervision,inspectionandcontrol,toensurethesmoothflowoftrafficintheenvironsof
thepublicmarket,andforthesafetyandconvenienceofthepublic.

RepublicandCityofOzamis involved parking in the local streets in contrast, the
presentcasedealswithprivatelyownedparkingfacilitiesavailableforusebythegeneral
public. In Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local governments regulated
parkingpursuanttotheirpowertocontrolandregulatetheirstreetsintheinstantcase,the
DPWHSecretaryandlocalbuildingofficialsregulateparkingpursuanttotheirauthorityto
ensure compliance with the minimum standards and requirements under the National
BuildingCodeanditsIRR.Withthedifferenceinsubjectmattersandthebasesforthe
regulatory powers being invoked, Republic and City of Ozamis do not constitute
precedentsforthiscase.

Indeed,RepublicandCityofOzamisbothcontainpronouncementsthatweakenthe
position of the OSG in the case at bar. In Republic, the Court, instead of placing the
burdenonprivatepersonstoprovideparkingfacilitiestothegeneralpublic,mentionedthe
trend in other jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments themselves took the
initiative to make more parking spaces available so as to alleviate the traffic problems,
thus:

UndertheLandTransportationandTrafficCode,parkingindesignatedareasalong
public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking
spacesservesausefulpurpose.Inotherjurisdictionswheretrafficisatleastasvoluminous
ashere,theprovisionbymunicipalgovernmentsofparkingspaceisnotlimitedtoparking
alongpublicstreetsorhighways.Therehasbeenamarkedtrendtobuildoffstreetparking
facilitieswiththeviewtoremovingparkedcarsfromthestreets.Whiletheprovisionof
offstreet parking facilities or carparks has been commonly undertaken by private
enterprise,municipalgovernmentshavebeenconstrainedtoputupcarparksinresponseto
public necessity where private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public
demand.Americancourtshaveupheldtherightofmunicipalgovernmentstoconstructoff
[30]
streetparkingfacilitiesasclearlyredoundingtothepublicbenefit.


InCityofOzamis,theCourtauthorizedthecollectionbytheCityofminimalfees
fortheparkingofvehiclesalongthestreets:sowhythenshouldtheCourtnowpreclude
respondents from collecting from the public a fee for the use of the mall parking
facilities?Undoubtedly,respondentsalsoincurexpensesinthemaintenanceandoperation
of the mall parking facilities, such as electric consumption, compensation for parking
attendantsandsecurity,andupkeepofthephysicalstructures.

ItisnotsufficientfortheOSGtoclaimthatthepowertoregulateandcontrolthe
use,occupancy,andmaintenanceofbuildingsandstructurescarrieswithitthepowerto
impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the
imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to
imposeareregulatoryfees.Ithasbeensettledlawinthisjurisdictionthatthisbroadand
allcompassinggovernmentalcompetencetorestrictrightsoflibertyandpropertycarries
with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of
specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as
[31]
betweenprivatepartiesandthepoliticalsociety. True,iftheregulatoryagencieshave
thepowertoimposeregulatoryfees,thenconversely,theyalsohavethepowertoremove
the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the
imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondentsbutthecollectionbyrespondentsofparkingfeesfrompersonswhousethe
mallparkingfacilities.Secondly,assumingarguendothattheDPWHSecretaryandlocal
buildingofficialsdohaveregulatorypowersoverthecollectionofparkingfeesfortheuse
of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection
arbitrarilyorwhimsically.Whetherallowingorprohibitingthecollectionofsuchparking
fees,theactionoftheDPWHSecretaryandlocalbuildingofficialsmustpassthetestof
classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the
[32]
endssoughttobeaccomplished.

Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and propriety of
measuresormeans,theCourtnotesthatSection803oftheNationalBuildingCodefalls
under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to
regulate site occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation in every
building.Pursuantthereto,RuleXIXoftheIRRrequiresthatabuilding,dependingonits
specificuseand/orfloorarea,shouldprovideaminimumnumberofparkingspaces.The
Court, however, fails to see the connection between regulating site occupancy to ensure
properlightandventilationineverybuildingvisvisregulatingthecollectionbybuilding
ownersoffeesfortheuseoftheirparkingspaces.ContrarytotheavermentoftheOSG,
the former does not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court
how lighting and ventilation conditions at the malls could be affected by the fact that
parkingfacilitiesthereatarefreeorpaidfor.

TheOSGattemptstoprovidethemissinglinkbyarguingthat:

UnderSection803oftheNationalBuildingCode,complimentaryparkingspaces
are required to enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic congestion in areas
surroundingthebuilding,whichcertainlyaffectstheventilationwithinthebuildingitself,
whichotherwise,theannexedparkingspaceswouldhaveserved.Freeofchargeparking
avoidstrafficcongestionbyensuringquickandeasyaccessoflegitimateshopperstooff
street parking spaces annexed to the malls, and thereby removing the vehicles of these
[33]
legitimateshoppersoffthebusystreetsnearthecommercialestablishments.


The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code regulates buildings, by
setting the minimum specifications and requirements for the same. It does not concern
itselfwithtrafficcongestioninareassurroundingthebuilding.Itisalreadyastretchto
saythattheNationalBuildingCodeanditsIRRalsointendtosolvetheproblemoftraffic
congestionaroundthebuildingssoastoensurethatthesaidbuildingsshallhaveadequate
lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has
apparentlydone,thatthetrafficcongestioninareasaroundthemallsisduetothefactthat
respondentschargefortheirparkingfacilities,thus,forcingvehicleownerstojustparkin
thestreets.TheCourtnotesthatdespitethefeeschargedbyrespondents,vehicleowners
stillusethemallparkingfacilities,whichareevenfullyoccupiedonsomedays.Vehicle
ownersmaybeparkinginthestreetsonlybecausetherearenotenoughparkingspacesin
themalls,andnotbecausetheyaredeterredbytheparkingfeeschargedbyrespondents.
Free parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect from what the OSG
envisioned: more people may be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own
vehicles,insteadoftakingpublictransport,tothemallsasaresult,theparkingfacilities
wouldbecomefullsooner,leavingmorevehicleswithoutparkingspacesinthemallsand
parkedinthestreetsinstead,causingevenmoretrafficcongestion.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operatorsofsuchfacilitiesofparkingfeesfromthepublicfortheusethereof.The
Courtfinds,however,thatintotallyprohibitingrespondentsfromcollectingparkingfees
fromthepublicfortheuseofthemallparkingfacilities,theStatewouldbeactingbeyond
theboundsofpolicepower.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulatingtheuseoflibertyandproperty.Itisusuallyexertedinordertomerelyregulate
theuseandenjoymentofthepropertyoftheowner.Thepowertoregulate,however,does
notincludethepowertoprohibit.Afortiori, the power to regulate does not include the
powertoconfiscate.Policepowerdoesnotinvolvethetakingorconfiscationofproperty,
withtheexceptionofafewcaseswherethereisanecessitytoconfiscateprivateproperty
inordertodestroyitforthepurposeofprotectingpeaceandorderandofpromotingthe
general welfare for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
[34]
opiumandfirearms.

Whenthereisatakingorconfiscationofprivatepropertyforpublicuse,theStateis
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain.EminentdomainenablestheStatetoforciblyacquireprivatelandsintendedfor
[35]
publicuseuponpaymentofjustcompensationtotheowner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriationoftitleto,andpossessionof,theexpropriatedpropertybutnocogentreason
appearswhythesaidpowermaynotbeavailedofonlytoimposeaburdenupontheowner
[36]
of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that
neitheracquisitionoftitlenortotaldestructionofvalueisessentialtotaking.Itisusually
in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his
property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of
rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power.
Similarly,apoliceregulationthatunreasonablyrestrictstherighttousebusinessproperty
forbusinesspurposesamountstoatakingofprivateproperty,andtheownermayrecover
[37]
therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/swithrespondents,theprohibitionagainsttheircollectionofparkingfeesfromthe
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of
theirproperties.TheStateisnotonlyrequiringthatrespondentsdevoteaportionofthe
latterspropertiesforuseasparkingspaces,butisalsomandatingthattheygivethepublic
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a
portionoftheirpropertiesastheywish,theyarefurtherprohibitedfromprofitingfromits
useorevenjustrecoveringtherefromtheexpensesforthemaintenanceandoperationof
therequiredparkingfacilities.

[38]
TherulingofthisCourtinCityGovernmentofQuezonCityv.JudgeEricta is
edifying. Therein, the City Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging
privatecemeterieswithinitsjurisdictiontosetasideatleastsixpercentoftheirtotal area
for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to the Court, the
ordinance in question was null and void, for it authorized the taking of private property
withoutjustcompensation:

Thereisnoreasonablerelationbetweenthesettingasideofatleastsix(6)percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of' health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people.Theordinanceisactuallyatakingwithoutcompensationofacertainareafroma
privatecemeterytobenefitpauperswhoarechargesofthemunicipalcorporation.Instead
of'buildingormaintainingapubliccemeteryforthispurpose,thecitypassestheburdento
privatecemeteries.

'The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
coveredbySection12(t)ofRepublicAct537,theRevisedCharterofQuezonCitywhich
empowersthecitycounciltoprohibittheburialofthedeadwithinthecenterofpopulation
of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of
generallawregulatingburialgroundsandcemeteries.WhentheLocalGovernmentCode,
 BatasPambansaBlg.337providesinSection177(q)thatasangguniangpanlungsodmay
"providefortheburialofthedeadinsuchplaceandinsuchmannerasprescribedbylaw
orordinance"itsimplyauthorizesthecitytoprovideitsowncityownedlandortobuyor
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and
practiseinthepast.Itcontinuestothepresent.Expropriation,however,requirespayment
of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiringownersofsubdivisionstosetasidecertainareasforstreets,parks,playgrounds,
and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessitiesofpublicsafety,health,andconvenienceareveryclearfromsaidrequirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesomeenvironments.Thebeneficiariesoftheregulation,inturn,aremadetopayby
thesubdivisiondeveloperwhenindividuallotsaresoldtohomeowners.


Inconclusion,thetotalprohibitionagainstthecollectionbyrespondentsofparking
feesfrompersonswhousethemallparkingfacilitieshasnobasisintheNationalBuilding
CodeoritsIRR.TheStatealsocannotimposethesameprohibitionbygenerallyinvoking
policepower,sincesaidprohibitionamountstoatakingofrespondentspropertywithout
paymentofjustcompensation.

Giventheforegoing,theCourtfindsnomoreneedtoaddresstheissuepersistently
raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the
IRR.Inaddition,thesaidissuewasnotamongthosethattheparties,duringthepretrial
conferenceforCivilCasesNo.1208andNo.001210,agreedtosubmitforresolutionof
the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an
ordinanceoranactwillnotberesolvedbycourtsifthecontroversycanbe,asinthiscase
[39]
ithasbeen,settledonothergrounds.

WHEREFORE,theinstantPetitionforReviewonCertiorariisherebyDENIED.
TheDecisiondated25January2007andResolutiondated14March2007oftheCourtof
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May
2002oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,Branch138,inCivilCasesNo.001208
andNo.001210areherebyAFFIRMED.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.




MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson






PRESBITERIOJ.VELASCO,JR.ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice






DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice


ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
beforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
ChairpersonsAttestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecision
werereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionof
theCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo,pp.2643.
[2]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeMyrnaDimarananVidalwithAssociateJusticesJoseL.Sabio,Jr.andJoseC.Reyes,
concurringrollo,pp.4558.
[3]
PennedbyJudgeSixtoMarella,Jr.rollo,pp.250260.
[4]
Rollo,pp.5960.
[5]
Id.at410431.
[6]
Id.at420421.
[7]
Id.at421422.
[8]
Id.at6489.
[9]
Id.at8687.
[10]
Id.at9095.
[11]
Id.at9394.
[12]
PennedbyJudgeSixtoMarella,Jr.,id.,at6163.
[13]
Id.at6263.
[14]
Section1ofPresidentialDecreeNo.478andSection35,Chapter12,TitleIIIoftheAdministrativeCodeof1987,
enumeratethepowersandfunctionsoftheOSG.
[15]
Rollo,p.252.
[16]
Id.at258260.
[17]
Id.at260.
[18]
Id.at263272.
[19]
Id.at461516.
[20]
Id.at263.
[21]
Id.at462.
[22]
Citing Section 35, Chapter XII, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
AdministrativeCodeof1987,whichprovide:
SECTION35.PowersandFunctions.TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralshallrepresent
theGovernmentofthePhilippines,itsagenciesandinstrumentalitiesanditsofficialsandagentsin
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
officeoftheGovernmentand,assuch,shalldischargedutiesrequiringtheservicesofalawyer.It
shallhavethefollowingspecificpowersandfunctions:
xxxx
(3)Appearinanycourtinanyactioninvolvingthevalidityofanytreaty,law,executive
order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or
whenrequestedbytheCourt.
xxxx
(11)ActandrepresenttheRepublicand/orthepeoplebeforeanycourt,tribunal,bodyor
commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the
peopleastheendsofjusticemayrequirexxx.

[23]
Rollo,p.57.
[24]
Id.at33.
[25]
ARevisedIRRtookeffecton30April2005.RuleXIXoftheoldIRRwasreproducedinTableVII.4(Minimum
Required OffStreet (OffRROW)cumOnSite Parking Slot, Parking Area and Loading/Unloading Space
RequirementsbyAllowedUseorOccupancy)oftheRevisedIRR.
[26]
Soriav.Desierto,490Phil.749,754(2005).
[27]
LandBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,327Phil.1048,1052(1996).
[28]
G.R.No.4533839,31July1991,199SCRA788,793.
[29]
160Phil.33(1975).
[30]
Republicv.Gonzales,supranote28at793.
[31]
Republicv.PhilippineRabbitBusLines,143Phil.158,163(1970).

[32]
AcebedoOpticalCompany,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,385Phil.956,969(2000).
[33]
Rollo,pp.3637.
[34]
SeeCityGovernmentofQuezonCityv.JudgeEricta,207Phil.648,654(1983).
[35]
Acuav.Arroyo,G.R.No.79310,14July1989,175SCRA343,370.
[36]
RepublicofthePhilippinesv.PhilippineLongDistanceTelephoneCompany,136Phil.20,29(1969).
[37]
SeeJ. Romeros Dissenting Opinion in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.
CommissiononElections,352Phil.153,191(1998).SeealsoPeoplev.Fajardo,104Phil.443,447448(1958).
[38]
Supranote34at656657.
[39]
Tyv.Trampe,G.R.No.117577,1December1995,250SCRA500,520.