Factual background[edit]

This consolidated opinion addresses two cases involving similar issues pertaining to warrantless cell
phone searches incident to arrest.
In the first case, David Leon Riley was pulled over on August 22, 2009, for expired registrations tags.
During the stop, the San Diego Police Officer also found that Riley was driving with a suspended
drivers license. The San Diego Police Departments policy at the time was to tow and impound a
vehicle after stopping a driver with a suspended license in order to prevent the driver from driving
again. Additionally, department policy required the officers to perform an inventory search of the
vehicle, which in this case led to the discovery of two handguns under the hood of the vehicle. Later
ballistic testing would confirm that the handguns were the weapons used in a gangland murder on
August 2, 2009, for which Riley had been a suspect. Although eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed
that Riley could have been one of the shooters, they declined to give a definitive positive
identification of Riley as one of the shooters. However, this was not known by Officer Dunnigan at
the time of Rileys traffic stop. Because of the discovery of the concealed and loaded handguns
along with gang paraphernaliaduring the vehicle search, police placed Riley under arrest and
searched his cell phone without a warrant. The cell phone search yielded information indicating that
Riley was a member of the Lincoln Park gang; evidence included pictures, cell phone contacts, texts
messages, and video clips. Included in the photos was a picture of a different vehicle that Riley
owned, which was also the vehicle involved in the August 2nd gang shooting. Based in part on the
pictures and videos recovered from the cell phone, police charged Riley in connection with the gang
shooting and sought an enhancement based on Riley's gang membership. The Petitioner moved to
suppress the cell phone evidence at the trial level, but the judge permitted this evidence in both the
first trial and on retrial. Ultimately, Riley was convicted and the California Court of Appeal affirmed
the judgment.[3]
In the second case, Brima Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an apparent
drug sale. At the police station, the officers seized two cell phones from Wuries person, including the
"flip phone" at issue in this case. Shortly after arriving at the station, police noticed that the phone
was receiving multiple calls from a source identified as my house on the phone's external screen.
The officers opened the phone, accessed its call log, determined the number associated with the
my house label, and traced that number to what they suspected was Wuries apartment. They
secured a search warrant for the location and, during the ensuing search, found 215 grams of crack
cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, ammunition, and cash. Wurie was subsequently
charged with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search of the apartment, but the District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted. A
divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the
relevant convictions. The court held that cell phones are distinct from other physical possessions
that may be searched incident to arrest without a warrant because of the amount of personal data
cell phones contain and the negligible threat they pose to law enforcement interests.

Procedural history[edit]

Riley's lawyer moved to suppress all the evidence the officers had obtained during the search of his
cell phone on the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court
rejected this argument and held that the search was legitimate under the SITA doctrine. Riley was
convicted. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment based on the recent California Supreme
Court decision People v. Diaz. In Diaz, the court held that the Fourth Amendment "search-incident-
to-arrest" doctrine permits the police to conduct a full exploratory search of a cell phone (even if it is
conducted later and at a different location) whenever the phone is found near the suspect at the time
of arrest.

The Defendant in Diaz sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court. While his petition was pending
the California Legislature passed a bill requiring police to obtain a warrant before searching the
contents of any "portable electronic devices". The court denied the petition after the State brought
this bill to its attention. One week later, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, stating that "courts are
better suited" to decide this issue of Fourth Amendment law.[5]

The California Supreme Court held that seizure of Riley's cell phone was lawful due to the fact that
the seizure occurred during a "search incident to arrest". The court reasoned that historical
precedent had been established from several cases brought to the U.S. Supreme Court; which that
have allowed officers to seize objects under an arrestee's control and perform searches of those
objects without warrant for the purpose of preserving evidence. In doing so, the court applied the
case People v. Diaz, which held that the unwarranted search and seizure of a cell phone on Diazs
person was valid. The Court, with Diaz in mind, contended that only arrest is required for a valid
search of an arrestee's person and belongings. The court then proceeded to apply United States v.
Edwards to hold that the search was valid despite the fact that it had occurred 90 minutes after
arrest. In the Edwards case, an arrestee's clothing was seized 10 hours after arrest in order to
preserve evidence (paint chips) that might be present on the clothes. Given these cases, the state
court concluded that the search and seizure of Riley's cell phone was valid.

Supreme Court review

The case of Riley v. California as heard before the Supreme Court combined two cases, Riley itself
and United States v. Wurie. Petitioner Riley argued, based on the ruling of People v. Diaz, the digital
contents of a smartphone do not threaten the safety of police officers. Therefore, limiting searches to
circumstances where officers have a reasonable belief of evidence of a crime still violates
constitutional rights.[citation needed]

In Riley v. California, Stanford University law professor Jeffrey L. Fisher argued on behalf of
petitioner David Riley. Fisher claimed that at least six courts hold that the Fourth Amendment permits
searches of this type, but that three courts do not. [6] Edward C. DuMont delivered the oral argument
on behalf of the respondent. Michael R. Dreeben acted as the deputy solicitor supporting the
respondent.

Fisher told the justices there are "very, very profound problems with searching a smartphone without
a warrant" and that it was like giving "police officers authority to search through the private papers
and the drawers and bureaus and cabinets of somebody's house." [7] Fisher warned that it could open
up "every American's entire life to the police department, not just at the scene but later at the station
house and downloaded into their computer forever".[7]

Decision[edit]

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, concluding that a warrant is required
to search a mobile phone. [8] Roberts wrote that it fails the warrantless search test established
in Chimel v. California:

"Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or
to effectuate the arrestee's escape. Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical
aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon--say, to determine whether there is
a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and
eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one." [9

Furthermore, Roberts argued that cell phones differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from other
objects in a person's pocket:

"Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all
they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life". The fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."[12]