EN BANC
8 in
MAJOR GENERAL G.R. No. 165835 CARLOS F. GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus-
SANDIGANBAYAN and, the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.
Promulgated: June 22, 2005
x ------------------------------------------------------------------ x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public
respondent Sandiganbayans Resolution[1] dated 29 October
2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment[2] dated 2 November
2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and
Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any
action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8,
in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
[3]
violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation
of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law.
Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No.
1379,[4] Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec.
relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.
[5]
Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three
sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed
Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A.
No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits,
dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating,
using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with
Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment[6] against petitioner, his wife, and three
sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties
under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled Republic of the
Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, et al. It was alleged
that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting an
inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal
cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against
Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold
such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia,
since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he
acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his
other lawful income, if any.[7]
Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a
bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as
respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] in Civil Case No.
0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is
without jurisdiction over the civil action for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379,
maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the
Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2[9] of the law,
and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions
pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and
cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606,[10] as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.)
Nos. 14[11] and 14-A.[12]
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or
the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal
court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions,
petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquinos issuances
after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14 which
amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No.
1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No.
14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and
R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No.
1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his family
and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that
the Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over
the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions
were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A.
No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or
indemnification for consequential damages or other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. According
to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606
and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has
been vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than
those filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.
[13]
Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any
separate civil action against him, even if such separate civil
action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for
forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2,
R.A. No. 1379, [14] namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm of
the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that
there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been
violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty thereof;
and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.[15] He argues that only
informations for perjury were filed and there has been no
information filed against him for violation of R.A. No. 1379.
Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of
the Ombudsman to certify that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a violation of the said law had been committed
and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also supposedly
bereft of the required certification which should be made by
the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to
the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should
have been the Office of the Solicitor General which filed the
petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this case.
The petition being fatally defective, the same should have been
dismissed, petitioner concludes.
In their Comment,[16] respondents submit the contrary, noting
that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these have
been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan[17] which
categorically ruled that there is no issue that jurisdiction over
violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the
Sandiganbayan.[18] Respondents argue that under the
Constitution[19] and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is
vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, as the prevailing law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher ranks;
.
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public
positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for
forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioners
argument that the petition for forfeiture is civil in nature and
the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil
actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition, since
the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these
cases are civil or criminal in nature. The petition for forfeiture
should not be confused with the cases initiated and
prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A,
as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof.
[20]
Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A
exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired
property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies. It
would also not be accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture
as a civil case, since it has been held that petitions for
forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it is only the
proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature.[21]
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,
[22]
likewise relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture filed against petitioner. The Ombudsman explains
that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the
amendments of
R.A. No. 7975[23] and R.A. No. 8294[24], although it came to be
limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as
enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher rank,
to which petitioner belongs.[25]
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and
initiate forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of
the Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution [26] and R.A.
No. 6770.[27] The constitutional power of investigation of the
Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its
power to investigate any act of a public official or employee
which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as
defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) [28] of
R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition
of wealth. This authority of the Ombudsman has been
affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan.[29]
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioners
allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him
failed to comply with the procedural and formal requirements
under the law. It asserts that all the requirements of R.A. No.
1379 have been strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation was conducted by a Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman. The participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be
necessary, is actually no longer required since the Office of
the Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate
and prosecute the case as discussed above.[30]
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the
present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-
shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as
regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No.
0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the
Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the
instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though
the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending
resolution. Worse, it appears that the Motion to Dismiss and
the instant Petition were filed on the same day, 17 November
2004.
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply[31] and
enunciates that the Sandiganbayans criminal jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been
removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring
such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a
special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, the
clear intent of which is to separate the prima
facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the
litigation of the civil action. This intent is further
demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary
investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and
the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor
General.
Petitioner also points out in his Reply[32] to the Comment of the
Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase
violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 in P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are principally
criminal or penal in nature because the concept of violation of
certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of
imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence, when
reference was made to violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379,
the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is
criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby
highlighting respondent Sandiganbayans lack of jurisdiction
over the civil case for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth. Of course,
petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime carries
with it the corresponding civil liability such that when the
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of
the civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court
having jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires
jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner
argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not
the ancillary civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is an independent
civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats
of independent civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec.
4 thereof:
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding
by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the
charge of forum-shopping.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No.
1379; (b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions
for forfeiture; and (c) whether petitioner is guilty of forum-
shopping.
The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan[33] squarely
rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative
history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of
jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No.

3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor
General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province
where the public officer or employee resides or holds office,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the creation of the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486,[34] original and
exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the
said court.[35] P.D. No. 1606[36] was later issued expressly
repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil
actions brought in connection with crimes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of said court. [37] Such civil actions
removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include
those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of
instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture
proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.[38]
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[39] abolished
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts and expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such
offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this
change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before
the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable
by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its
equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature, P.D.
No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 [40] and
eventually by P.D. No. 1861.[41]
On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan.
[42]
It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No.
7975[43] and R.A. No. 8249[44] since both statutes which also
amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet
enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments only serve to
buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan indeed has
jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379.
Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested
with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of
the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c)
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of
the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of
Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and
local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.[45]
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present
state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it being civil
in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no
jurisdiction over civil actionscollapses completely.
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first
recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: [T]he rule is
settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and,
therefore, civil in nature.[46] Then, Almeda, Sr.
v. Perez,[47] followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A.
No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in
favor of the State. It noted that the
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that
provided for in a civil action.[48]
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of
illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a penalty.
In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,[49] the Court cited voluminous
authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal or
penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property
without compensation, in consequence of a default or an
offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A
forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment
not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the
lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It
is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain
the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of
such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer
the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign
power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be
'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of
money as the consequence of violating the provisions
of some statute or refusal to comply with some
requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty
imposed for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs.
French, 114 S.W. 255.)
.
"Generally peaking, informations for the forfeiture of
goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment
against any person are deemed to be civil
proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in
nature to the extent that where the person using the
res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it the
forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
They have been held to be so far in the nature of
criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several
counts in an information is upheld if one count is
good. According to the authorities such proceedings,
where the owner of the property appears, are so far
considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve
the owner from being a witness against himself and to
prevent the compulsory production of his books and
papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612)
 . constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. No.
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to
be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The
statute providing that no judgment or other
proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or
reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to
them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties
and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes
of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
declares that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against
the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to
be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is
sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368)
[50]
Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v.
Perez.[51] The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down
in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the
forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial
rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right
against self-incrimination.[52] This was reaffirmed and
reiterated in
Republic v. Agoncillo[53] and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.[54]
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled An Act Declaring Forfeiture
In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing For the Proceedings Therefor. What acts would
1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited
acts the commission of which would necessitate the
imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for
forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property.[55] Section 12[56] of the law
provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public
officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully
acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee
for making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed
in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of
the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent
public officer or employee.[57]
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No.
1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more
obvious when we consider that the respondent in such
forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the
violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the
respondent officer or employees incumbency and in relation to
his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation
of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the
urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.[58]
Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore
abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies.

We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to investigate, file and prosecute petitions for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the main issue
resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[59]
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor
General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No.
1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture
proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special
Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases.
This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of
the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture
under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction
and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
Prosecutor, respectively.[60] An implied repeal is one which
takes place when a new law contains some provisions which
are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former
law.[61] As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored and
will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist,
it must be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions
deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. The language used in the latter
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what
had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short
of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a
manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.[62]
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which
provides that [A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.[63] This is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that
a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
laws.[64]
The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379
refers to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and the
authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486
grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then
Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise
concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such cases. Hence,
P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with
each other and the former should be deemed to have repealed
the latter.
On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was
enacted, P.D. No. 1487[65] creating the Office of the
Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed.
The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being
vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly
repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date was P.D. No.
1607[66] which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to
investigate administrative complaints[67] and created the Office
of the Chief Special Prosecutor.[68]P.D. No. 1607 provided said
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority
to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and
control the prosecution of said cases.[69] P.D. No. 1607 also
removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file
actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.[70]
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a
prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From this it may
fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a
law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. [71] Hence,
the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily
revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition
for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of
the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of
the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the
preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that
time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
Prosecutor.[72]
The Tanodbayans authority was further expanded by P.D. No.
1630[73] issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things, the
Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct
and control the prosecution of said cases. [74] The power to
conduct the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute
the corresponding criminal and administrative cases before
the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative
agency against any public personnel who has acted in a
manner warranting criminal and disciplinary action or
proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special
Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.[75]
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and
1861[76] which granted the Tanodbayan the same authority.
The present Constitution was subsequently ratified and then
the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which continued to exercise its powers except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the Constitution.[77] The Office of the Ombudsman was
officially created under R.A. No. 6770.[78]
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A.
No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution,
include the authority, among others, to:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases;[79]
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution
of the parties involved therein.[80]
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition
for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsmans
exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate
the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.
[81]
As regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date,
the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the
Sandiganbayan such forfeiture actionsince the authority to file
forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 belongs
to the Solicitor Generalalthough he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February
1986, pursuant to the Ombudsmans
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.
[82]
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the
Ombudsman acted well within its authority in conducting the
investigation of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in
filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention
that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379 were not complied with no longer deserve consideration
in view of the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-
shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party
repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely
by, some other court.[83] It has also been defined as an act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered
in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[84] Considered a pernicious evil, it
adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it
clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and
human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks
judicial processes.[85] Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is
a ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory
pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of
court, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, which
may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the
forum-shopping is found.[86]
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of
forum-shopping. The present petition was filed accompanied
by the requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping[87] in which petitioner made the following
representation:
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency,
involving the same issues as that in the above-
captioned case.
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has
been commenced or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report that fact to this
Honorable Court within five (5) days from knowledge
thereof.
However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he
had filed a Motion to Dismiss[88] in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this
motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A
scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised
substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs
therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the
Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioners
thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in
the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural
requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the
annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29
October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2
November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only
superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same
intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against
petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is
incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel and party
concerned.[90] The brazenness of this attempt at forum-
shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day,
17 November 2004. Petitioner should have waited for the
resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the
petition at hand.
important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct
which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration
thereof contravenes his oath of office.[91] Atty. De Jesus failed
to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal
profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this,
he should be penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers who
engaged in forum-shopping range from severe censure to
suspension from the practice of law.[92] In the instant case, we
deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to
be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of
his naked abuse of the judicial process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in
CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days
from the finality of this Decision. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand G.R. No. 154473
PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
Respondent.

Petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

Jesus, needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist
PHOTOKINA MARKETING G.R. No. 155573
the courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the CORPORATION, Promulgated: April 24, 2009
court, his duties to the court are more significant and Petitioner,
 - versus -
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R.
No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002[1]and the June 23, 2002[2] Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25,
2002[3] and the September 18, 2002 [4] Orders of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual
settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the
Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines held
at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus,
Quezon City.[5] The speech was subsequently published in the February 4
and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.[6]
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
respondent when he stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing
a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have
been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt
even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no
contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to
hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to
the government that it offends common sense to say that it
would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.[7]
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint [8] for
libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the
jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).
[9]
Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information [10] for libel
against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,
[11]
contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not
impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary
was made possible through the recommendation of respondents father-in-
law. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the
other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of
G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved
for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus,
could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency;
and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with
the Sandiganbayan.[12]
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order [13] dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and considering as moot and academic
petitioners motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no
longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed
by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent
in relation to his officehe delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had
jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it
was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of
law, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in
relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED
THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS;
II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED
IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE; AND
III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.[16]
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC
Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show Point
Blank, hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23
channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled COMELEC
Wars.[17] In that episode, the following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are
being used for a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are
saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina
funds. You know, admittedly, according to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the
U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is whats
been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent
in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about
120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell me,
you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think its
pretty obvious.[18]
Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and, through its
authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit [19] for libel.
Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. [20] The
City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109406 by filing the corresponding Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar
arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an
impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible,
jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.[22]
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order [23] dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,
[24]
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[25]
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably
filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for
Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT
HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE
TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT
OUTRIGHT.[27]
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same
issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the
Clerk of Court,[28] consolidated the cases.[29]
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all
other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings
on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are
committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the
resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which courtthe
RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The
Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise.
The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to
identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or
written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine
whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.[30] Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),[31] as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on which court has
jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
xxx.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours.]
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,
[34]
acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically
designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory
provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required
is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.[35]
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations
is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court further declared that
jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed
by similar means,[37] and despite the fact that the phrase by similar means is
not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. [38] In these cases, and in
those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement
that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be
exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we
explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is]
lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in
G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and
Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was
raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level
courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA
7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judges orders
were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent
Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995,
and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is
enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is
commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
disposition.
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving
the matter:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no
reversible error committed by public respondent Court of
Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested
the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases
cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by
imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and
two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which
imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial
Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]),
said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72
SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261,
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the
rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive
jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts
cannot be applied to libel cases.
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case
for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged
dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction
of first level courts, said law is of a general character.Even if it is a
later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the
RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction
exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and
should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general
law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically
override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC
must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the
MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no
manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If
there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly
so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for
an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a
substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior
laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In
the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts,
there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from
taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been
priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the
RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first
sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency
referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to
cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October
1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence settled the matter with finality:
RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR
KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER
HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN
LIBEL CASES.
C LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION
OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS.(Underscoring supplied)[40]
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we
must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at
present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law
defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the
absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in
writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office,
similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the
RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation
cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to
office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, [44] cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC.[45]
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC
without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on
whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion
reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous
acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional
Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds
unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-
109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-
intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an
act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being
challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.Petitioner Panfilo
Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against
them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings
and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to
be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)
headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the
Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This
panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding
that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges
against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among
those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder [2] before
the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,
[3]
the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1,
1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan,
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was dropped
from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused
are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations
has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27.
[8]
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May
9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,
[9]
the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the
cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and
even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the
amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 [10] and No.
1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 [12] (sponsored by
Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal
accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No.
8249[13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It
took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution[14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special
Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its
March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering
the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and
Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has
already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP
Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in
fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take
cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to
2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by
the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting,
retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No.
8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way
the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial
Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again
made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were
under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7,
to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them,
thus making it an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural
due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than
defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-
title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that
while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7
in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and
an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in
the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They
further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right
to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under
R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed
separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the
petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the
People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged
in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the
following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
1486[21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on
the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,
[22]
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No.
1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with
the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending
in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2
of R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not
otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has
not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the
word principal before the word accused appearing in the above-quoted
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this
deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, [29] contends that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
 A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of
(a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), [30] (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), [31] or (e)
other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e)
is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to
the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged
with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense
is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph
b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase
other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is
charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does
not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law [33] because its enactment
was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in
the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No
concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences. [36] In the first instance,
evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the
parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, [37] it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a
different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving"
certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all
cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors
arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that
the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
 In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is
premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two
Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the
said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed
strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the
committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the
word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was
acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had
against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not
constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary
by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court
of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it
whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex
post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in
R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
[46]
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; [47] or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. [49] Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered
appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been
rejected by the court several times [50] considering that the right to appeal
is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is
not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory
statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete
out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.
[52]
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
[53]
It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to
the Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the
intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review
to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-
subject provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the
wording in the title of the law that it defines the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title [57] is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of the
law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution
itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now
determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is
the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case.Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information, [61] and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and
intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4
requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in
relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction
over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by
public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law. This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of
multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance of his official functions. [65] This intimate relation between
the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in
the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the
charge is the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal
charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information.[68]
 The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]\
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that
are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we
find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and
intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations [71] for
murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman
hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP
RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO
F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3
WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO
F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using
firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO
M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF
INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police
are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime
herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein
at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early
dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
 While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
principal accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their public
office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of
the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the
amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said
accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention
of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the
victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse,
the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim
by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far away
from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not
see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accuseds
official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused
is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information
that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to
his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended
information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups
of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen
and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols
and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which
is under his command x x x supervision and control where his co-
defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted
the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor
of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of
the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have
been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no
personal motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and
not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the
phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific
factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby
directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70,
Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C.
GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State
Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today
than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands
accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already
been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately
impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments
against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long
as the contrary has not been proved. Like any other person accused
of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the
Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the
respondent judge denying his motion to quash the informations for
rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall
treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to
obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested
the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including
the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on
August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an
"invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation
at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on
Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately
taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified
by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both
executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay
of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed
on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon
his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This
warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A.
Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713.
Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations
charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,
Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama
with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court
issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the
petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his
apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere
in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an
employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to
Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge
Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to
include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition.
On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge
denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him
should be quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present
evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman
had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless
arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction
over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from
the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory
because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia;
and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we
required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of
five days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may
consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the
respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his
petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall
disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition
on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the
petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present
counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that his client
was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or
countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is
concerned, We are not going to submit any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit
because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all
these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come
up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent
Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-
affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished
the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies
of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he
could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The
following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuo: For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn
statement of witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn
statement of SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission
of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo: Yes.
ACSP Zuo: So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez
is concerned, this case is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent
manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the
inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with
the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and
Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits dated August
15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the
petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993, was not
Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned
Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he
remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It
was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself
and would now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides
that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does
not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the
preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present
counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial
court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or
reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in
abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw
no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her
factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that
the proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and
void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it
is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to
conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like
him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph
(1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or
omission of any public official. However, as we held only two years
ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in.
respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended
information filed in this case needed the approval of the
Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman.
However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all.
In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court held that
the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to
a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any
public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the
office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any
adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the
Department of Justice, in connection with the charge of
sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
in ill-gotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as
the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the
same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough
that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna,
by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad
requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13
this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to
attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person
invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however,
such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance.
Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the
country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been
lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the
same can be easily taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which
it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can
only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military
official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military
camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a
command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he
expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he
went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with
the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the
requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a
person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner
was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and
Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state
witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the
petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any
personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor
because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of
Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of
Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six
days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense
had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it
issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it
was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find
that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information,
but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other
grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that
objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that
court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was
unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest
against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos.
93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the
issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first
warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges,
and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a
person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at
least deny him the right to be released because of such
defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section
4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground
that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their
return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically
naming her had been issued, thus validating her detention. While
frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the
new warrant of arrest complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the particular
description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the
petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by
her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid warrant,
returning her to the same prison she will just have left. This Court will
not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the
Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven
separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these
cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this
wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must
be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with
homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape,
thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character
as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and
functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special
complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is
in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with
the suspension of the application of the death penalty by the
Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and
R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one
rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of
the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta
instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In
other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was
raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in
abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust
satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for
actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely
assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven
successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven
attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the
seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not
make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus
hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the
non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the
informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those
who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be
compelled to include in the information a person against whom he
believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of
the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by
the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the
Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the
Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of
a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the
precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to
call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition. 22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the party
seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same
case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the
filing of a motion for such inclusion. 23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges
have been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against
the petitioner and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were
incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the alleged
commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular
courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall
discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D.
No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or
a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands
charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals
with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph
(2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of
the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in
relation to the office" as follows: [T]he relation between the crime and
the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct
and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot
exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as,
for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six,
Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life
is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator. being a public functionary took advantage of his office,
as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that
the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of
rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor
because public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under
the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with
murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree"
investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a
senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the
ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing
them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation
to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was
not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an
intimate connection between the office and the offense, as alleged in
the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense
"committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said: It is apparent from these
allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime
of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense therein charged
is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it
had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was
their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no
allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the
petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as
municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between
the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the
Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner
are not supported by the facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence,
the respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases
against the petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith
without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision
on the merits of the criminal cases being tried below. These will have
to be decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the
evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis
for judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution
against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based
only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of
101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez [3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18,
them with deliberate dispatch.
2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in particular, former Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance
SO ORDERED. Co., Inc. (Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip
Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur. Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers
of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez,
Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz,
Narvasa, C.J., took no part. Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche,
Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie
Bellosillo, J., is on leave. Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John
Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
FIRST DIVISION
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled
planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) a wholly owned subsidiary of
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, G.R. No. 184800 Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco
VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO Group of Companies (YGC) who had previously purchased traditional
PERECHE, SR., Present: pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
Petitioners, benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, RTC.
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the
BERSAMIN, and educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, VILLARAMA, JR., planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies
BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Promulgated: by maintaining a website on the internet under the address
Respondents. May 5, 2010 of www.pepcoalition.com.
x-------------------------------------------------- Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the
-x internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
DECISION group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites
CARPIO MORALES, J.: in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he was
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and
Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly
Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan. [8] He cited an article
which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005
which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang
mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done
prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is
worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is
the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL
CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND
WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado,
congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances
and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin
natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC
and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the
same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga
ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there
was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA
ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY
WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006, [10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office,
finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate
Informations[11] charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off
to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees
of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they
hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is
of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another together with
John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and
for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and
contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos.
Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation.
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be
ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the
next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as
published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as
Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and
publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as
trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the
accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory
articles that the article in question was posted and published with
the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before
the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by
a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June
20, 2007,[13]reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed
the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice
Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the
public respondent, a Motion to Quash[16] the Information in Criminal Case
No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati
RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the
Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged
and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the
Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that
the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory
material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit
finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin
v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the
offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the
complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the
alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the
Information,[20] insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.
Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not
allege verbatim that the libelous publication was printed and first published
in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office
in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged
that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a
formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration,
contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases,
any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere
matter of form that may be cured by amendment.[22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public
prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended
Information dated March 20, 2007,[24] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25 th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and
publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John
Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public
hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an
injurious and defamatory article, which was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which,
they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent
because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first
published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid
the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent,
applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the
public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the
present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent
for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE
DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE
INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment [28] to the petition, the issues are: (1)
whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render
the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended
the public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy
of courts,[29] as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. [30] A
regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC
and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. [31] The
rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought
before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.
[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its
discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the
review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving
jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC
whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for
written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish,
exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in
case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x
x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the
crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires
even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended,
specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani
v. Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this
Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in
the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal
action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should likewise be
alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first
published is used as the basis of the venue of the
action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where
the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article
was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.
In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest
jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the
rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v.
Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of
venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by
Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the
criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless
of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the
courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action
for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was
written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule,
the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice
of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended
party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror
and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and
Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace
court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil.
933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means
of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became
Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965,
pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA
303, 311)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to
Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing
more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of
the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person
of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the
need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices
in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-
condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains
to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first
publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first
publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of
the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much
imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein
could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently
vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory
article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit
being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by
Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements
in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to
abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must
file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first
publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would
also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule
in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no
convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These
limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to
file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of
residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a
quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter
was printed and first published.
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order
of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby
DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No.
06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P.
MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to
the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable
him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of
information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and
videos, for the general public or for special audiences like
associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases
and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government
agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card
companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-
mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and
billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses
of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current
generation for greater information and facility of communication. But
all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of
persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for
mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter
by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through
false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for
illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless
children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace
and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak
or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of
indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or
computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They
accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites
that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to
prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law
for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these
cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9,
2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing
the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions
of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would
enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These
provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer
Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles
353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems: (1) Illegal Access. The access to the
whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental
rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an
American constitutional construct,1 useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that
calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. 4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of
ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques
used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target
systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target
systems security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities
they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied.
Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come
into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records. 5
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an
agreement between them as to the extent of the search, the methods
to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the
"get out of jail free card." 6Since the ethical hacker does his job with
prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him
from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration,
damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that,
while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the
area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. 7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying
without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message.
Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private
documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent
chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to
step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the
State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of
fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing
socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free
exercise of ones constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy
burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section
4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(6) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems:
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the
internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and
deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the
domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other
than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the
equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will
cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those
who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any
other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well
known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law
would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such
name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who
registers the name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between
the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo"
which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it
is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law
condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the
domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or
deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
b) Computer-related Offenses:
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition,
use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights
to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized
in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 But the
Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v.
Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept
known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the
Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio
v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to
privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused
by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the
right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and
"everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the
right against unreasonable searches16 and seizures, which is the
basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy,
a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his
name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his
place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation,
and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth
doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do
not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this
section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or
deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of
the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the
unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure
information about him that could be published. But this is not the
essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish.
Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an
illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating
information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a
form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the
part of the perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of
news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a
special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is
required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or
operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor
or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression
clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or
consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal
code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in
cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious
kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a
token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This
meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts.
The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the
bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on
this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper
perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to
penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private
persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to
some."23 The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime
law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to
constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish
cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography,
i.e., by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of sexual organs
or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes
"obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who
"maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction,
scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money,
profit, or any other consideration.27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the
State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy
the market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed
the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private
property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and
destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through
internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be
balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery
and the exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of
jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30 The Court will
not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the
business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or
indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity
with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(2) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined
and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree
higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from
invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of
child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably,
no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the
crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since
the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and
there is rational basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for
uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography
when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful
for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of
child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons
who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to
punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on
paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally
liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the
idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his
ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be
considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply
commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now the
Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not
successfully challenged.
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(c) Content-related Off enses:
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of
commercial electronic communication with the use of computer
system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and
services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or
administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users,
subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:(aa) The commercial
electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way
for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial
electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of
the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information in
any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the
message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced
in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who
repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
"spam." The term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in
which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam"
when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out
that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a
nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet
service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and
technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his
property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy
since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain
without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech
enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that
unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers."
Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have
already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have
never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in
such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not
opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their
recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person
the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. 36 The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code
provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme
incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
Section 4(c)(4) reads:
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt.
offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public
(c) Content-related Offenses: official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay
official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference
on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to
through a computer system or any other similar means which may be
convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended
devised in the future.
party is a public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. 44
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code 37 and, in
effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest
in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual malice or malice
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual
in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel
malice" as a basis for conviction. 38 Petitioners argue that inferring
against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court
"presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by
found the presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to
make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel
cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there
should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good
was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law,
jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as
the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact,
the Court has done in Fermin v. People 39 even where the offended
as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the
parties happened to be public figures.
electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
to utterances against public figures in the above case, cinema and
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 40
television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment
to just a fine of P6,000.00.
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact 41 when the offender makes
the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 42 The reckless
need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes
disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness
its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
assailed statement.45For his defense, the accused must show that he
conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to
has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in
fact true.46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the
Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They
point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, 47 the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General
Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include
the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the
defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing
defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but
under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making
the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that
the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not
constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall
have been made against Government employees with respect to
facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation
made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as
petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that
defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle
freedom of expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although
everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not
absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary
and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime
law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.
Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the
penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated
with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling,
anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world apart in
terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements
posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by
the networking site as well as by the speed with which such
reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.
Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the
internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the
cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal
with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an
offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who
willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this
Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders
criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated
as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of
jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects
the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail
themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing
laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding
or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General
argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient
to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law. 51 The
legislature is not required to define every single word contained in
the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and
application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in
destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or
interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers, 54 his action is
essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as
criminal in character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend
themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier
and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or
abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and
unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33%
of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a year, translating to
about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines
ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social
networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among
people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or
real-life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As
of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests use Facebook to
get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or
an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and
exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they
update their profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a
video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending
on the users privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and
not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can react to the posting,
clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the programs
screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that
the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post
online his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!"
When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will
appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible
to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and
microblogging service that enables its users to send and read short
text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as
"Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of
digital contentwhich could be in the form of text, pictures, links,
short videos, or other mediaon the internet. Instead of friends, a
Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this particular
users posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those
whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their
posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available
only to his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to
the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting.
Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another persons tweet
without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who
originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like
Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or
Sun; d) the internet caf that may have provided the computer used
for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment
on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog
site.60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on
WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to
access her blog so she subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet
Service Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a
certain married public official has an illicit affair with a movie star.
Linda, one of Marias friends who sees this post, comments online,
"Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Marias original post is
then multiplied by her friends and the latters friends, and down the
line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger
to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it interesting
and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her
Twitter account. Nenas "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that
blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons "Retweet"
of Nenas original tweet and posts this on her Facebook account.
Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends start Liking and making
Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even press the
Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting
into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly
defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with
others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical
world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that
says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If
Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be
libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and
noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No,
for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster.
He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting
libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social
networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or Followers,
availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share"
reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex
world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable
for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest
(those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-
jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their
response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or
abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining
hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the
criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who
should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be
a square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel.
Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account
its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a
chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of
communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right
to freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union,61 a case involving the constitutionality
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1)
the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications
device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18
years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive computer
service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of
age or to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms
"patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First
Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech for being overbroad.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),
47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a matter of special concern for two reasons.
First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The
vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I
concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium
and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with
penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation.
The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to
remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful
words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this increased
deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement
of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns
than those implicated by certain civil regulations.
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S.
223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls
outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the
coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers
whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That
danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be
overly broad. The CDAs burden on protected speech cannot be
justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.
(Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with
just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and
travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often
goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his
relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still,
a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this
cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected
freedoms.62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what
sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise
robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and
with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 63 The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages.64Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a
facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully
delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 65 "we must view these
statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as
these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal
statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of
his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground absence
of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the
statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance
mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if
he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute
where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on
protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad
or vague law thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive
medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat
of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a
chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression
of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex
web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers
such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility
of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful
conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or
not one netizens comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while
another comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original
posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against
Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be
considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the
penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of
defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations
that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy
relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity
and tension between social or economic groups, races, or religions,
exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google
procures, stores, and indexes child pornography and facilitates the
completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child
pornography," does this make Google and its users aiders and
abettors in the commission of child pornography crimes? 68 Byars
highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography that
the Cybercrimes law lacksthe exemption of a provider or notably a
plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child
pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable
for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. 69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he
effectively republishes it whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does this
make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child
pornography? When a user downloads the Facebook mobile
application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his
contact details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third
parties and unsolicited commercial communication could be
disseminated on the basis of this information. 70 As the source of this
information, is the user aiding the distribution of this communication?
The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of
annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the
petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable
unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel,
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes
under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3)
on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)
(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these
offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is
for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance
have done all that is necessary to illegally access another partys
computer system but the security employed by the systems lawful
owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained
access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these
because the system supervisor is alerted. 72 If Section 5 that punishes
any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is
not upheld, the owner of the username and password could not file a
complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The
hacker should not be freed from liability simply because of the
vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and
could cover the innocent.73 While this may be true with respect to
cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any
attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section
4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)
(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)
(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such
acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit
tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the
innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the
use of information and communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special
laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the
internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points
out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed
through the use of information and communications technology and
similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology
in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to
reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction,
therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act
shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the
settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and
penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the
Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online
child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of
the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the
published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online
or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online
libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the
computer system as another means of publication. 75 Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section
4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs definition
of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would
likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the
punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at
least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5)
shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical
infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum
amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be
imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of
prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one
(1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if
committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor
or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not
exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower
than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections
4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses;
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a)
is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)
(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in
the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a
rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a
measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not
diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the
act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just
have been connected with another crime. 77 Judges and magistrates
can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or
revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking
body.78
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement
authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record
by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated
with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination,
route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not
content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a
court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law
enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-
stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and
the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or
is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or
to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power
to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil
liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that
data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are,
and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their
senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners
invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into the messages or information that
they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper
governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure of
matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that
such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the
law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and
that the provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations
affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate
concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees. 81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the
cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous
activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do this, it is within the
realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic
data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording
of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities
with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating
crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business.
Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention
on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative
measures to empower state authorities to collect or record "traffic
data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And
this is precisely what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement
agencies in this country to collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene of the
crime after it has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes
and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose?
Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a
computer system without right, 84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously
exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily
evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical
location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital
age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere:
from internet cafs, from kindred places that provide free internet
services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors.
Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with
unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither
be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals
can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography
could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement
authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only
real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent
recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can
succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are
too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing
legal boundaries and invading the peoples right to privacy. The
concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v.
Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create
zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and
that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such
right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all
freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe, 90 the United States
Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional
privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the
right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational
privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording
of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to
the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first
is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual
or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second
is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be
one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in
relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners
challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment
of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of
privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view.
Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have
no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who
courses his communication through a service provider, must of
necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed
for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT
user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user must
furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the
cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent.
It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting
communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly
addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal
service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will
read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the internet in
packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or
things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any
one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each
of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the
traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet
originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video,
internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the
packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other
packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet
at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only
their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from
one computer system to another where their contents are pieced
back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into
the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the
sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his
cellphone, the service providers communications system will put his
voice message into packets and send them to the other persons
cellphone where they are refitted together and heard. The latters
spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected
by the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to
the service provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals
the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of
communicating electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users in the 70s
must realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the
telephone company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that
even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should
remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot
communicate or exchange data with one another over cyberspace
except through some service providers to whom they must submit
certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace
communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the
private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them
an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that
when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk,
pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities
which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under
surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to
determine a persons close associations, religious views, political
affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely
beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls
within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the
procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly
enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause,"
to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no
precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due
cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the
Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the
meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through
statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel
situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due
cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should
mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure."
But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not
even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus
justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general
search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data
collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the
traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be
used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data
be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too
sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection
should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies
holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their
sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those
"associated with specified communications." But this supposed
limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications.
The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities
to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize
collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get
a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a
"moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police
officers determination of probable cause that a crime has been
committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that
unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be
searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not
provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12
provides minimal protection to internet users and that the procedure
envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more
robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law enforcement
authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not
enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications
in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being
violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth
doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by
this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its
own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore,
such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the
government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place
them under surveillance in ways that have previously been
impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a technological age
x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society." 96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking
to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity
and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic
data and subscriber information relating to communication services
provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum
period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content
data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of
receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for
another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data
preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as
evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of
the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be
deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the
termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep
confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an
undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data
preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a
form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and
disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the
internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be
considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service
provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as
they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data
and subscriber information relating to communication services for at
least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating
to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for
their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it
crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service provider has
never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its
keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that
service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities
are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of
such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper
the normal transmission or use of the same.
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 14 provides: Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law
enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue
an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or
submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and
assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and
relevant for the purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the
issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power
to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a
duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of
law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions.
The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an
unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial intervention.
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 15 provides:
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data.
Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law
enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and
duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct
interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage
medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data
storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the
accessed computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any
person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer
system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data
therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to
enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to
complete the examination of the computer data storage medium and
to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty
(30) days from date of approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will
supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face,
however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been
seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do
not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were
taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and
seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 17 provides: Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data.
Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15,
service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may
be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data
subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of
preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of
the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as
necessary to clear up the service providers storage systems and
prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly
concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of
previous preservation or examination violates the users right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already
stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require
the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely
for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should
have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or
received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy
before it is deleted.
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a
computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions
of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to
such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression
and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be
unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed
violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code,
including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio,
or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of
property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer
data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute
personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service providers systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to
be secure in ones papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the
computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant.
The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search
warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such
a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of
expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are
protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to
seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant,
it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates
some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner
all rolled into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it
also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine
the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the
dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the
clear and present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation
of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any
penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression
and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 20 provides: Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply
with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder.
The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a
legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-
compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20 necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If
Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and
of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue
or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period,
or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of
the following acts
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be
done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial
determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General
assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be
raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions
of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There
is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this
Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy
coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and
enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate
assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its
power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative
power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the
CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also,
contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users assets. 104 This definition
serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with
the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by
facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This policy is clearly
adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered
as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise
valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of
unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data
in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system
without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including
transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or
acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith
to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of
identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes
defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of
information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require
service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information
as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of
computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved
computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to
cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the
commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only
in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section
4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6)
on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2)
on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1wphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of
the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175
to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and
representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City),
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA
and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La.
Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of
Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition
for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos,
Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents)
are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc.
(TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit 4 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the
respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. 5 The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation 6 to secure a license
to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their
joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits
7
allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any
counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the
corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-
8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T.
Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City
Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a
motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. 9 The petitioner and
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition 10 and
comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, 11 the RTC denied the motion to
withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to
hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an
omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of
the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC
denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole
judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement
of the warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with
motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a
fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the
RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause
to hold the respondents for trial.16
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent
Alamils motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had
already found probable cause against the respondents in the August
1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration
and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or
partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with
a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no
standing to seek relief from the RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited
herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamils motion
for reconsideration and the petitioners motion to expunge. The case
was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D.
Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
21
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamils
motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for
judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable
cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the
respondents gave any false information to secure a license to
operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction
through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the
RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of
arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing
the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and
that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the
RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion
for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the
public prosecutors conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated
arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered
the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have
the public prosecutors conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 25
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
petitioners notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the
case.26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to
appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents
fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him. 27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners
notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of
the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of
the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC
ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May
10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, 29 the CA dismissed outright the
petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to
represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner
was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a
victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere
competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied 30 the motion
for reconsideration31 that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and
a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and
prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no
legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive
from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute
lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the
petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public
prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition
for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf
of the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the
avails of the suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. 34 By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a
real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." 37 In appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section
explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof
in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in petitioner.
the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in
several cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine. SO ORDERED.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be Republic of the Philippines
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf 39 (as when
there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does Supreme Court
not apply in the present case.
Manila
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence
of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his
alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to
SECOND DIVISION
cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 172035
respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains Petitioner,
exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. 40 - versus -
THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs SANDIGANBAYAN,
jurisdiction Respondent. July 4, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------x
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the DECISION
consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the BRION, J.:
court.41 Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65[1] filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions[2] of the
of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioners
jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioners
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. 42 motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of
the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007
 On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M.
Lucido and other local officials[3] of Koronadal City, South
Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the
petitioner, among others,[5] with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services
for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the
construction supervision and management of the proposed
Koronadal City public market (project).[6]
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed
the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit.
On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the
petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.[7] In its July 29, 1999
resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against
the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.[8]
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding
informations with the Sandiganbayan.[9] The information for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his
capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his
official functions, committingthe offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring
and confederating with the private [individuals]
xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said
[accused], by inviting them to participate in the
prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction
Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal
Public Market, without causing the publication of said
invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from participating in said
prequalification.[10] (Emphases and underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-
accused,[11] the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On
August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed
suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave
the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-
affidavit with the OSP.[12]
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner
asked[13] the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to
submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the
extension requested, the petitioner asked[14] the OSP for an
additional thirty-day period to file his counter-
affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the
petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension
period.[15]
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner
failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived
his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001
resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto approved the resolution.[16]
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.[17]
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and
granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On
February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioners motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination of
the reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure to
submit his counter-affidavit.[18] The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he
pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.[19]
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the
petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner
filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and fatal
defect of the [i]nformation in failing to allege that the giving
of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[20]
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed resolution[21] suspending the petitioner pendente
lite
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions
Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby orders
the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City
Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any other
public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a
period of ninety (90) days only.[22]
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a
pre-suspension hearing.[23] The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion,[24] prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
challenge the validity of his suspension order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the
failure of the information to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was
made through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the phrases evident
bad faith and manifest partiality actually refers not to him,
but to his co-accused,[25] rendering the information fatally
defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the
issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v.
Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,[26] he claims that [n]owhere in the
records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution
requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered suspended. [27]For the
petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can
only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual
hearing to settle the defect in the information.
THE OSPS COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since
all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts.These
elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal,
South Cotabato at the time material to the acts complained
of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith when he invited only his co-accused
private individuals to participate in the prequalification of
consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a
newspaper of general circulation; and
3. The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his
office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-
accused.[28]
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the
Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the information,
by conveniently failing to cite the phrase acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality when the petitioner quoted
the relevant portions of the information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,[29] the OSP argues that while no actual
pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events
preceding the issuance of the suspension order already
satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension
hearing i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to
preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by
the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation
with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner
was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner
already moved to quash the information, although
unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived
his right to submit countervailing evidence in the
reinvestigation by the OSP.[30]
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-
suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order
against the petitioner.
THE COURTS RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
resolutions.
The information for
violation of R.A. No.
3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules)[32] requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules
requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.[33]
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime
is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity
with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an
information validly charges an offense depends on whether
the material facts alleged in the complaint or information
shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged
as defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in
the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.[34]
In arguing against the validity of the information, the
petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a person of
common understanding in appreciating the import of the
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.
A reading of the information clearly reveals that the
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality
was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the
acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe
that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the
information[35] when, in his reaction to the OSPs comment,
what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of
the phrases position, in relation with the other averments in
the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, the remedy of the
petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars
and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently
alleges the elements of the offense charged.[36]
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads: Section 13. Suspension
and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should
he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision
is mandatory,[37] the suspension requires a prior hearing to
determine the validity of the information[38] filed against
him, taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official
even before his conviction.[39] The accused public officials
right to challenge the validity of the information before a
suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading
to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety
of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do
not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the petitioner relied
upon, the Court required, by way of broad guidelines for the
lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension, that
(c) upon the filing of such information, the trial court
should issue an order with proper notice requiring
the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the
Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a
motion for an order of suspension or the accused in
turn files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no longer be necessary.
What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the
validity of the information or withholding such suspension in
the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a
fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for
which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of
the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause
order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in
office was ordered. As clear as the day,
however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial
court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking
the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been
submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to
determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can
have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss
the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash.[42]
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the
accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.
[44]
With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind,
the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be
determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court considered
the opposition of the accused (to the prosecutions motion to
suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the
need to actually set the prosecutions motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,[46] where
the Court ruled: In the case at bar, while there was no pre-
suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we
believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against
them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to
due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by
the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties'
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official is
given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible
defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No.
3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain
that no actual hearing was conducted. [47] It is well settled
that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due
process exists.[48]
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his
Vigorous Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse
ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him,
and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration.[49] Given this opportunity, we find that the
petitioners continued demand for the conduct of an actual
pre-suspension hearing based on the same alleged defect in
the information,[50] which we have found wanting has legally
nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioners
position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019;
it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a
strict construction against the State. [51] The suspension
required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during his suspension. [52]
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 is a mere preventive measure[53] that arises from
the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended,
he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused.[54]
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere
preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed
ninety (90) days,[55] the adequacy of the opportunity to
contest the validity of the information and of the
proceedings that preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the
defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the
absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to
be heard on ones defenses, however unmeritorious it may
be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and
sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused
and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by
law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a
public office is a public trust. [56] In light of the constitutional
principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension
of a public officer charged under a valid information and the
nature of this suspension, the petitioners demand for a trial-
type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly
frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy
dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision 1 in this case
finding accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual
assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts
of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to an
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
:from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.2
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on
December 20, 2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received a
letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of
accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our
directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on
November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate 4 of
accused-appellant.
Clearly, accused-appellants demise on August 16, 2012 transpired
before the promulgation of this Courts Decision on November 14,
2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when
accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it
pending resolution. aside.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and
dismiss the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his death.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on
August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the
case against accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.

xxxx ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is

In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation
wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be
resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused-
appellants demise as follows:
SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on account of
accused-appellant's demise.
SO ORDERED.

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as Associate Justice
his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, Republic of the Philippines
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto Supreme Court
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Manila

EN BANC
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No. 192565
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When PHILIPPINES and DESI
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and TOMAS, Petitioners,,
unresolved.1wphi1 The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only - versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Promulgated: February
because it was not immediately informed of his death.
28, 2012

Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts DECISION

Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos
BRION, J.:
conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No.
09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for
perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13 th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-
00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood.[2]
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the
second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, [3] citing two grounds. First, she
argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court
(where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used)
and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the
other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in
another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged
with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the
Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it
has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.
[5]
The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for
reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-
Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition
on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of
[Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with
respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated
the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the
subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,]
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said
territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not
amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to
try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On
the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio
v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was
not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the
introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents
before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours) The RTC-
Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave
abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-
Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different
from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-
Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the
petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case.
The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend
that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling
in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They argued that the facts
in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the
false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the
perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General
Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners
view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we
hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also
relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the
deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the
evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent
to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-
Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted,
but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and
try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
[12]
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the
necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.
[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal
cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where
the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information
is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction
over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement
under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief;
it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory
pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement
under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent
person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report
that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of
perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the
truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard
against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made
a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
[15]
(emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal
case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the
complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of
the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have
been committed in MakatiCity. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements
under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate
falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed
in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of
the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of
merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines
has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was
allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were
not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is
the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in
the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case
that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn
to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The
question posed was: which court
(Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and
hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were
in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions
were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as
jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so
long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist
of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila,
but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis
and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper
venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect
the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate
material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury,
and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been
made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look
at the historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically,
Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and
181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC);
and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on
the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an
untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the
rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The
cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to
the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC
took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a
1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based
on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information
charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion
accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was
rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23] for
the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed
is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years;
and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public
office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands
until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
5392[24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No.
1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided
that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was
committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was
committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place
where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act
that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their
textbook on the RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury
provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act
No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art.
154 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was
taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans
Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with
art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act
1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn
was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act
2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321
of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718
expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the
Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes
false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false
testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3
of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of
the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed
in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as
defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony are more
severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the
RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied;
emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under
oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making
a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any
material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC
in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit,
not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil.
From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath
was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication,
the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the
SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity.
With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission
of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No.
1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and
other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of
false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the
same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably,
the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the court
or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit
was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the
Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a
situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of
duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the
sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities
of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities where
the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the
issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of
Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue. [31] To the
Court, whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions
were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of
perjury being the intentional giving of false statement, [32] citing Caet as
authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present
confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the
considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two
situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony
in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the
basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the
petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling
would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used
in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because
the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears
in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the
making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion
refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for
the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality
is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was
made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject
to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by
Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule
106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions
and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by
the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue
of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the
place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was
made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza
B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on
the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the
offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a
duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy
Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at
the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at
that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony
under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn
statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In
all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been
pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists
during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year
old patient born with an imperforate anus.1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, 3 enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. 5 Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr.
Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). 6 During the operation,
Gerald experienced bradycardia,7 and went into a coma.8 His coma
lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a
month.10 He could no longer see, hear or move.11
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz
Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila
against the attending physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed
an information solely against Dr. Solidum,13alleging:
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng
Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the
anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the
former having been born with an imperforate anus [no anal opening]
and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through
operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail
and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment
would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his said
carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic
encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain,
thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of
moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), 15 where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.
FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and
TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita
So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider
their solidary liability,18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability
as to the damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr.
Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days
of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly and
severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo
the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled.19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum,20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to
undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused
himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure
that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate
anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to
reveal that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that
could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature
of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally
led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis
except to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper
administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this
case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321
SCRA 584
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from
its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred
but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act
or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act
complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook
rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court
the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness
or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the
case. People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal
cases. Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need not
offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the
opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he
has no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower
court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his
motion on May 7, 2010.22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
ON THE TRIAL COURTS OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS
A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF
CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS
THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE
DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO
OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC
AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE
ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT
AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN
ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT
SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF
ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO
EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a)
whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein;
and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where
the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care."24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types
of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the
absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence
of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of
common knowledge."25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule
of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence
against the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in
proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in
Ramos v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court said
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this
doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the
circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a
character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence
cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to
determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter
of law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act
or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule
on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters
clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified
to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and
surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a
reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any
one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where
the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without
the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where
common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred
but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act
or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the
following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the
patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of
the wrong part of the body when another part was intended,
knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anesthetic for
the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff
was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an
operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has
been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all
cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of
proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction
must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those
skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against
a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of
a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his
peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only
showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was
not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in
the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond
the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the
untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was
of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without
difficulty that the second and third elements were present,
considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were
exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient,
being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably
wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his
physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate
anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his
submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia
during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain
that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the
patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any
of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had
sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could
have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to
administer atropine to the patient.30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in
Swanson v. Brigham,31 relevant portions of the decision therein being
as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall
Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis.
The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and some
breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was
restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His
inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in
satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having
respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered
and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25
a.m., the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor that the
patient was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be
administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the
physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts
to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the
patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient
died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a
sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air
passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes
prior to death. He did not know what caused the air passage to
suddenly close.
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that
is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury
rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably
caused by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App.
298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to
warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d
737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case
Res Ipsa Loquitur 24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is
insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute closing of the patients air
passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short
period of time. Under these circumstances it would not be
reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was no
palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not
suggest that death would not be expected without negligence. And
there is no expert medical testimony to create an inference that
negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
Court next determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act
from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act.33
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his
failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In
affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He
affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report except for an
observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the
storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of
information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent
administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in
reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it
should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record A portion of the chart in the
record was marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the
administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract A portion of this record that reads
as follows was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B Approximately 1
hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient was
noted to have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was
immediately administered. However, the bradycardia
persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the patient
was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of
ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did not
respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated and the
surgeons were immediately told to stop the operation. The
patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while
continuously doing cardiac massage still with no cardiac
rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given
and after 45 secs, patients vital signs returned to normal.
The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The
surgeons were then told to proceed to the closure and the
childs vital signs throughout and until the end of surgery
were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22
cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that
the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of
ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or
another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the
anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he
could only sheepishly note I cant understand the number. There are
no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic
agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan
was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a
nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent
and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation began,
bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off
and the patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be
apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read
in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after
something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was
reduced or shut off.
The key question remains what was the quantity of halothane used
before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum
stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the
assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never
leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the
call of nature but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs.
Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he
administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving
corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should
be enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was
therefore conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that
they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration
of the agent during the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidums interpretation of the anesthesia
record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his
affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time
intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions the concentration of
halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the
complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) The numbers
indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that
only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo
for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this
case which is only one percent cannot be summated because
halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during
the entire operation.
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC
argued that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the question of the
dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate
the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane
used was not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless
unaware of the implications of the change in his testimony. The court
observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child as
hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the
results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing central
nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in
heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are
manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why would there be
deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used?
Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or halothane was the object
of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable,
and they can only be led to one conclusion if the application of
anesthesia was really closely monitored, the event could not have
happened.34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence
beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the
CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of
inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila
Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at
least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.
It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession
but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls
below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries
involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such
breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St
Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of
liability for the death of the complainants wife and newborn baby,
this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or
administrative calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence
each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient
relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or
standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by
the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable
standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably
close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission
and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the
patient.36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the
patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as
standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of
the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a
particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most
medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with
special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the
knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the
standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined
from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist
(like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the
specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and
exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The
specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct
of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured,
and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physicians own
knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court
may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both
plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of
fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the
testimony of all medical experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on
what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an
anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the
Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr.
Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had
conducted the investigation.39 Even then, the report of his Committee
was favorable to Dr. Solidum,40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old
male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered
general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at
the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and
pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia.
The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the
triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it
but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest
ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were
administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in
less than five (5) minutes and that oxygen was continuously being
administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest,
patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the
administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were
all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical
care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part
of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution
witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical
examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the
following portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General
Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the
conduction of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane was used as a
sole anesthetic agent.
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned
that after one hour and 45 minutes after the operation, the patient
experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor,
would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of
the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there
was a bradycardia of time because is some reason one way or
another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that
is a possibility, were talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that
situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you
about the slowing of heart rate, now what is the immediate cause of
the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is
slowing of the heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex in the neck
wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the
neck, when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate
that produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the
deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also
cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate,
if there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the
normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a
to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general
anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications
probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on
his interpretation of the anesthesia record and the factors that could
have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will
you kindly read to this Honorable court your last paragraph and if you
will affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane
probably will be contributory to the production of Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this
Court Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a
doctor but will you kindly look at this and tell me where is 100%, the
word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor, this
Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this
representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-
0 and if there is, you just call me and even the attention of the
Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA Im asking you, just answer my question, did you see
there 100% and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS Im trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we
request also temporarily, because this is just a xerox copy presented
by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the Halothane
administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we
request that this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this
anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane also
be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said
that there are so many factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that
correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors
that contributed to what you call hypoxia and according to you, when
this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might lead
to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other,
some or it might be due to operations being conducted by the doctor
at the time when the operation is being done might also contribute to
that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to
this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this
Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to
some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained
that Geralds operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major
operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same
condition.43 He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane
had been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100%
oxygen.44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications."45However, the foregoing circumstances,
taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not
preclude the probability that other factors related to Geralds major
operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had
then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly
concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist
followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still
hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the
hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt
as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A
reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It
is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy
for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept
the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant
is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the
faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you
may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the
possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot
now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances
that have been established here do not present the factual and legal
bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing
how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not
necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly
liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not
allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil
liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly
liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed
in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to
that arising from the offense charged. 48 It is puzzling, therefore, how
the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the
obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not
been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted
capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns
that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to
express the following observations for the instruction of the Bench
and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings.
Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the
outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a
party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when
subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems
far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to
Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be
shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The
term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public
hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely
in charitable and humanitarian work. 50Secondly, assuming that
Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum
must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution
against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries;
and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191240, July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. PHILLIP R.
SALVADOR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails
the Decision1 dated February 11, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to
the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador
had been acquitted of the crime of estafa.
Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador
were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a)
of the Revised Penal Code in an Information2 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in
the City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain
and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the
amount of US$100,000.00 in the following manner, to wit:
Respondents convinced the complainant to invest into the
remittance business in the name of accused PHILLIP R.
SALVADOR in Hongkong, representing to her that they will
personally take charge of the operations and marketing of
the said business, assuring her with huge profits because of
the popularity of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing
very well that the said manifestations/representations and
fraudulent manifestations were false and were intended only
to exact money from the Complainant, and by reason of the
said false representations made by both accused, the
Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount
of US$100,000.00 as seed money to start the operations of
the business and the said accused, once in the possession of
the said amount of money, misappropriated, misapplied
and/or converted the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Complainant in
the aforementioned amount of US$100,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon their arraignment, respondent and his brother Ramon
pleaded not guilty4 to the offense charged.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in
real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and
trading business.5 She met respondent through a common
friend in December 2000 and became close since then.
Respondent had told her that his friends, Jinggoy Estrada
and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and
remittance business and that Jinggoy even brought him to
Hong Kong and Singapore to promote the former's
business.6 Petitioner eventually met respondents brother
and manager, Ramon Salvador, to whom she volunteered to
financially help respondent in his bid for the Vice-Mayoralty
race in Mandaluyong.7 It was also in the same meeting that
they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight and
remittance business.8 Respondent enticed petitioner to go
to Hong Kong to see for herself the viability of such business
and Ramon suggested to use respondents name to attract
the overseas contract workers.9cralawred
In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with
respondent and a certain Virgilio Calubaquib went to Hong
Kong and they witnessed respondents popularity among the
Filipino domestic helpers.10 In April 2001, the same group,
with Ramon this time, went to Bangkok where respondents
popularity was again shown among the overseas
Filipinos.11 In both instances, respondent promoted their
prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid for all
the travel expenses and even gave respondent
US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong Kong trip and
another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip.12 Her
accountant introduced her to a certain Roy Singun who is
into the freight and money remittance business.13 In August
2001, respondent initiated a trip to Palau, to observe
Singuns business thereat to which petitioner
acceded.14 Petitioner paid for the travel expenses and even
gave respondent US$20,000.00.15 In October 2001, she
and respondent had a training at Western Union at First
World Center in Makati City.16cralawred
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and
since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a
father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she
agreed to embark on the remittance business. In December
2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida G. Bondoc
(Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the
Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International
Limited registered on December 27, 2001. 17 A Memorandum
of Articles of Incorporation and a Certificate of Incorporation
were issued.18 They also rented an office space in
Tsimshatsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong which they registered as
their office address as a requirement for opening a business
in Hong Kong, thus, a Notification of Situation of Registered
Office was also issued.19 She agreed with respondent and
Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be
equally divided among them and that respondent would be
in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while
Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in
the Philippines and she would be financing the
business.20cralawred
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still
raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the
actual operation.21 When petitioner already had the money,
she handed the same to respondent in May 2002 at her
mothers house in Las Pias City, which was witnessed by
her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico).22 She also
gave respondent P100,000.00 in cash to be given to Charlie
Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment for the
heart-shaped earrings she bought from him while she was
there. Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May
2002. However, the proposed business never operated as
respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When
she asked respondent about the money and the business,
the latter told her that the money was deposited in a
bank.23 However, upon further query, respondent confessed
that he used the money to pay for his other
obligations.24 Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not
returned at all.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell
deeply in love with respondent and was convinced that he
truly loved her and intended to marry her once there would
be no more legal impediment;25 that she helped in
financing respondents campaign in the May 2001
elections.26 As she loved respondent so much, she gave him
monthly allowances amounting to hundreds of thousands of
pesos because he had no work back then.27 She filed the
annulment case against her husband on November 21, 2001
and respondent promised her marriage.28 She claimed that
respondent and Ramon lured her with sweet words in
going into the freight and remittance business, which never
operated despite the money she had given
respondent.29 She raised the US$100,000.00 by means of
selling and pawning her pieces of diamond
jewelry.30cralawred
Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent
which made her follow all the advice given by him and his
brother Ramon, i.e., to save money for her and
respondents future because after the annulment, they
would get married and to give the capital for the remittance
business in cash so as not to jeopardize her annulment
case.31 She did not ask for a receipt for the US$100,000.00
she gave to respondent as it was for the operational
expenses of a business which will be for their future, as all
they needed to do was to get married. 32 She further
testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not returned,
she still deposited the amount of P500,000.00 in
respondents UCPB bank account33 and also to Ramons
bank accounts.34 And while respondent was in the United
States in August
2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00 as evidenced by a
Prudential Telegraphic Transfer Application35dated August
27, 2003.
Petitioners mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughters
testimony that she was with her and Ramon when they
went to Hong Kong in December 2001 to register the freight
and remittance business.36 She heard Charlie Chau, her
daughter's friend, that a part of his office building will be
used for the said remittance business.37 Enrico Tan, also
corroborated her sister's claim that she handed the money
to respondent in his presence.38cralawred
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close
friends and eventually fell in love and had an affair.39 They
traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw
how popular he was among the Filipino domestic helpers, 40
which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although
hesitant, he has friends with such business.41 He denied
that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 when he went to
Hong Kong and Bangkok.42 In July 2001, after he came back
from the United States, petitioner had asked him and his
brother Ramon for a meeting.43 During the meeting,
petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but
Ramon told her that they should make a study of it
first.44 He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money
remittance business in Pasay City.45 Upon the advise of
Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon
went to Palau in August 2001.46 He denied receiving
US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was
petitioner who paid for the plane tickets.47 After their Palau
trip, they went into training at Western Union at the First
World Center in Makati City..48 It was only in December
2001 that Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong
Kong to register the business, while he took care of
petitioners children here.49 In May 2002, he and Ramon
went back to Hong Kong but denied having received the
amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then
admitted receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 which
petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for
the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, 50 which
Chau had duly acknowledged.51 He denied Enricos
testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of
US$100,000.00 in his mothers house.52 He claimed that no
remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had
no license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same.53 Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never
asked him about the business as she never gave him such
amount.54 In October 2002, he intimated that he and
petitioner even went to Hong Kong again to buy some goods
for the latters boutique.55 He admitted that he loved
petitioner and her children very much as there was a time
when petitioners finances were short, he gave her
P600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very
expensive schools.56 It is also not true that he and Ramon
initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips.57cralawred
Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who
introduced petitioner to him.58 He learned of petitioners
plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and even told her
that they should study it first.59 He was introduced to Roy
Singun who operates a remittance business in Pasay and
who suggested that their group observe his remittance
business in Palau. After their Palau trip, petitioner decided
to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him
who suggested to use respondents name because of name
recall.60 It was decided that he would manage the operation
in Manila and respondent would be in charge of promotion
and marketing in Hong Kong, while petitioner would be in
charge of all the business finances. 61 He admitted that he
went to Hong Kong with petitioner and her mother to
register said business and also to buy goods for petitioners
boutique.62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau to
offer a part of his office building for the remittance business
because there was no more space to accommodate it. 63 He
and respondent went to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine
the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of
Rudy Fernandez thereat who also offered to help. 64 He then
told Chau that the remittance office should be in Central
Park, Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong
Kong live there.65 He concluded that it was impossible for
the business to operate immediately because they had no
office, no personnel and no license permit. 66 He further
claimed that petitioner never mentioned to him about the
US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent, 67 and that he even
traveled again with petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002,
and in August 2003.68 He denied Enricos allegation that he
saw him at his mothers house as he only saw Enrico for the
first time in court.69cralawred
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, 70 the
dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon
(sic) correctional (sic) maximum as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum
and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or
its equivalent in Philippine currency.
With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.71
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties
filed their respective pleadings, after which, the case was
submitted for decision.
On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision
reversing the decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of
which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of
Branch 202 of the RTC of Las Pias City, dated April 21,
2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused
appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the
crime of Estafa.72chanrobleslaw
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the
case alleging that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE
RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST
RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONER.73chanrobleslaw
We find no merit in the petition.
To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the
consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is for the same act or omission. x x
x.75
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent
was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the
CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had
been committed by appellant, the general presumption,
that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in
his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the
elements of estafa are present in this case as would
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness
herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how
appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to
convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing
into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining
circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her
submissions.76
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v.
National Bookstore, Inc.,77we explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.78
The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount
of US$100,000.00 is factual. While we are not a trier of
facts, there are instances, however, when we are called
upon to re-examine the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after considering the
records of the case, which of the conflicting findings is more
in accord with law and justice.79 Such is the case before us.
In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave
respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that:
(1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the
money in such a short period of time and even gave
conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2)
petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so
she could have a record of the transaction and offered no
plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried
to Hong Kong; (3) petitioners claim of trust as reason for
not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent
with the way she conducted her previous transactions with
him; and (4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation
of someone who had been swindled.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its
findings.
Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money
allegedly given to respondent. She testified that from
December 2001 to May 2002, she was raising the amount
of US$100,000.00 as the capital for the actual operation of
the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International
Limited in Hong Kong,80 and that she was able to raise
the same in May 2002.81 She
did so by selling82 or pawning83 her pieces of diamond
jewelry. However, there was no documentary evidence
showing those transactions within the period mentioned.
Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where
she got the money, she then said that she had plenty of
dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong Kong and
Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and Star
Mall.84 Such testimony contradicts her claim that she was
still raising the money for 5 months and that she was only
able to formally raise the money in May 2002.
There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was
given by petitioner to respondent. Petitioner in her
testimony, both in the direct and cross examinations, said
that the US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the
actual expenses for setting up the office and the operation
of the business in Hong Kong.85 She claimed that she
treated the freight and remittance business like any of her
businesses;86 that she, respondent, and the latters brother
even agreed to divide whatever profits they would have
from the business;87 and that giving US$100,000.00 to
respondent was purely business to her.88 She also said that
she kept records of all her business, such that, if there are
no records, there are no funds entrusted89. Since petitioner
admitted that giving the money to respondent was for
business, there must be some records of such transaction
as what she did in her other businesses.
In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent
for some documents evidencing the latter's receipt of
money for the purpose of business as this was done in her
previous business dealings with respondent. She had asked
respondent to execute a real estate mortgage on his
condominium unit90 for the P5 million she loaned him in
August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave respondent an
additional loan of P10 million in December 2001, for the
latter to redeem the title to his condominium unit from the
bank, she had asked him to sign an acknowledgment receipt
for the total amount of P15 million he got from her.91 She
had done all these despite her testimony that she trusted
respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until
the day he ran away from her in August 2003. 92cralawred
Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any
acknowledgment receipt from respondent, because the
latter told her not to have traces that she was giving money
to him as it might jeopardize her then ongoing annulment
proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would belie
such claim of respondent being cautious of the annulment
proceedings. She declared that when she and her husband
separated, respondent stood as a father to her
children.93 Respondent attended school programs of her
children,94 and fetched them from school whenever the
driver was not around.95 In fact, at the time the annulment
case was already pending, petitioner registered the freight
and remittance business under respondents name and the
local branch office of the business would be in petitioner's
condominium unit in Makati.96 Also, when petitioner went
with her mother and Ramon to Hong Kong to register the
business, it was respondent who took care of her children.
She intimated that it was respondent who was insistent in
going to their house.
Pias where Enrico had submitted his affidavit. Enrico did
not submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly
witnessed the giving of the money to respondent as
petitioner told him that he could just testify for the other
case. However, when the other case was dismissed, it was
then that petitioner told him to be a witness in this case.
Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity
if he indeed had personal knowledge of the alleged giving of
money to respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness
only after the other case was dismissed would create doubt
as to the veracity of his testimony.

Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The
of P500,000.00 to respondent's account with United Decision dated February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July 2003. 97 Also, when in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED.
respondent was in New York in August 2003, petitioner sent
him the amount of US$2,000.00 by telegraphic SOORDERED.
transfer.98 Petitioner's act of depositing money to
respondent's account contradicted her claim that there Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Brion,* Villarama,
should be no traces that she was giving money to Jr.,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
respondent during the pendency of the annulment case.

Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a

manager's check in US dollars from the bank or send the
money by bank transfer, but she did not do so on the claim Republic of the Philippines
that there might be traces of the transaction. 99 However, the SUPREME COURT
alleged US$100,000.00 was supposed to be given to Manila
respondent because of the freight and remittance business;
thus, there is nothing wrong to have a record of the same, FIRST DIVISION
specially since respondent had to account for the valid
expenses he incurred with the money.100cralawred
G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012
The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that
he was present when petitioner gave respondent the LILY LIM, Petitioner,
US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico testified that when vs.
petitioner filed the instant case in September 2004, another KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
case was also filed by petitioner against respondent and his
brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office in Las x-----------------------x
 G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LILY LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages, while appealing
the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the
separate Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lims (Lim) Petition for Review 1 assails the October 20, 2005
Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which
ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396),
Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily Lims] appeal,
alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against
forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present.
This Court agrees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 4 FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags
On the other hand, Charlie Cos (Co) Petition for Review 5 assails the
April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP
No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-shopping were not
met in this case.7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator
of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal
authorities9 for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-
Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the
number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from
the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is
valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by
FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P 3.15 million
or P 63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these
withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P 64.00 per bag
or a total of P 3.2 million.11
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from
of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities,
covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim
clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods
once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser
quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the
problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion
was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San
Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse
of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim
cash money in the amount of P 2,380,800.00 as payment for the
37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags
of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use
and benefit the said amount of P 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite
demands, the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to
the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount
of P 2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.12
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her
money amounting to P 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal
interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154,
rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for
insufficiency of evidence. The criminal courts Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused
is being charged and prosecuted were not established by the
prosecutions evidence.
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of
estafa for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as
above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the
case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence. 15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of estafa charged against him under the present
information for insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set
this case for the reception of his evidence on the matter on
December 11, 2003 at 8:30 oclock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City
RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004
Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to the private
complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she
has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa
against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 20 dated February 21,
2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal 21 on the civil
aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in
the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal
authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia
Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of
contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of
cement of P 64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months from
the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said
agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co P 3.2 Million while Charlie Co
delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing
50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed
the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a six-month period
from date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The
Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February
1999 or 23 February 1999. The Withdrawal Authorities were first
issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned
them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal
Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of
assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw
cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the
fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags
of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month
period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly within
the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities
issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to
withdraw the remaining bags of cement on account of FR Cements
unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim
37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her the
current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the
amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it
issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price
adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal
Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original
holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured
Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored. They are
liable to make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Cos acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may
be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily
Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without
justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing
honesty and good faith, all violative of the law, more specifically
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made
by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporations unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal
Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR
Cement Corporations act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement
despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment
because FR Cement Corporation acquired income through an act or
performance by another or any other means at the expense of
another without just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the
Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borjas false assurances
that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of
cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x
Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said
amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have come into
possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal
ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
22
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by
delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with
FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value.
She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her
for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the
cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their
abuse of their rights.23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance
and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case 24 and
Lims appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No.
85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue,
which is Cos liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of
cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and
forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV
No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Cos motion
and dismissed Lims appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case.
In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division
held that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims
appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the
same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of
cement.27 Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lims appeal for
forum shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lims motion for
reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-
112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there
was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the
two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is
based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict,
whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case
arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of
the Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R.
SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the
civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA
Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements
of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two
proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action. 34
The CA denied35 Cos motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 179160.
Upon Cos motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.38
Kou Co Pings arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is
asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the
appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in
Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Cos violation of her right to
receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both
cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of
cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of
presenting her case a criminal action for estafa and a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages should not
detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same cause
of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu
and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities
are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising
from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and
going over the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in
one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim
is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No.
05-112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lims appeal from the
trial courts decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).42
Lily Lims arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same
set of facts because they arose from only one transaction. 43 She is
quick to add, however, that a single act or omission does not always
make a single cause of action. 44 It can possibly give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) ex delicto or
civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or
those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat
provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission.45 Because the law allows her two independent causes of
action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them. 46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved
in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is
based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lims right to be protected
against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw
37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him.
This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that
they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he
promised.47 On the other hand, Lims cause of action in Civil Case
No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lims rights as a
buyer in a contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags
of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of the
sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition. 49 In
G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of
forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal
Case No. 116377 to the CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the
civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender51 (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from
the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,-
52
and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be
pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent
civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of
the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort 53). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the
acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial
is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the
civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense.54 If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior
to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings
are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. 55 The
civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing
the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from
the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided
in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of
civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res
judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In
the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner
is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct
from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being
deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of
action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal
of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-
shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same
act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on
different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on
culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on
culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. 59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other
sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed
independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue
hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil
obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other.
The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a
contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In
her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale
contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200
bags of cement at the rate of P 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full
payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by
FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal
authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates
written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached
their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under
the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her
to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to
fix the price at P 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal
authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal
authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation
under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim.
From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce
the defendants contractual obligations, given that she has already
performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either
honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their
breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were
committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without
regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These
allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of
rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising
from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case
involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense
charged. They present different causes of action, which under the
law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" 62 from each
other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to
the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in G.R. No.
175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of
the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lims appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE
DISPATCH.
Charlie Cos Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April
10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya
(Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the
civil case.
 On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the
motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final
order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise
that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure
error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may
think and believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x
[T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a
criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the other
hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to
be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal
case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending
criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously
and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which
the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue
that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil
action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict
is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved
party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out
that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil
action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of
the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally
defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question
the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy
of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
 In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition
raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since
they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to
refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with
prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an
action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65.Section
1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order
is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing
the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
[8]
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from
the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The
criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These
articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he
proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage
because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under
these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to
file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-
shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a
separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the
offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same
act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-
delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the
criminal action the right to bring such action.Otherwise, such civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused/
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
(b)
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not
a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action
based on these articles of the Civil Code.The prescriptive period on
the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues
to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate,
distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the
option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto
by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make
such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action
may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a
separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be
filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If
the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the
criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon
the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action
filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the
filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the
rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-
delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action.Section 2
of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement
of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover
damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo,
who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a
separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal
case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the
amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring
an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal
action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may
not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling
in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused
therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer
with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court
noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on
impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences
and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard
any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party
after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the
new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect
will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the
resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused
is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in
a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused
to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent
civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising
from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same
act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of
the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for
the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This
is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not
file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may
set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-
delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the
criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in
the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of
the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the
trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always
been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the
concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code,
expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court
declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of
the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent
from the criminal action although arising from the same act or
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the
criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear
of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent
than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules
of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took
effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August
24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN L.
ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L.
Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez from the Joint Judgment [1] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, convicting each of them
of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, for widescale swindling,
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the
amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00), with
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, starting
September 14, 1989, until fully paid, and to pay ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), as moral damages.
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M.
Brocoy filed with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, an
Information against the two (2) accused for estafa, [2] as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the General Manager and Operation Manager which
solicit funds from the general public for investment, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, by means
of deceit and false pretense, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz by
convincing the latter to invest his money in the amount of
P150,000.00 with a promise return of 800% profit within 21 days and
in the process caused the issuance of Butuan City Rural Rural [sic]
Bank Check No. 158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount
of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00)
Philippine Currency, that upon presentation of said check to the
drawee bank for payment the same was dishonored and that
notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to pay
and/or change the check to cash, they consistently failed and
refused and still fail and refuse to pay or redeem the check, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforestated amount
of P1,200,000.00.[3]
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court
another information against the two (2) accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, arising from the issuance of the same check. [4]
On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,[5] Butuan City, where they pleaded
not guilty to both informations.
The prosecution presented its evidence on January 10, 1991,
with complainant, Ernesto A. Ruiz, and Daphne Parrocho, the
usher/collector of the corporation being managed by accused,
testifying for the prosecution.
On August 12, 1991, the defense presented its only witness,
accused Martin L. Romero.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint stipulation
of facts, signed only by their respective counsels. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision.
On March 30, 1993, the trial court promulgated a Joint
Judgment dated March 25, 1993. The trial court acquitted the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3806[6] based on reasonable doubt,
but convicted them in Criminal Case No. 3808 [7] and accordingly
sentenced each of them, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment,
finding or declaring -
(a) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez innocent on
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 3806, for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22;
(b) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C .Rodriguez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 3808 for estafa under
P.D. 1689 for wide scale [sic] swindling and accordingly sentences
them to suffer life imprisonment (Section 1 P.D. 1689) and ordered
jointly and severally to return to Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon
at the rate of Twelve percent (12%) per annum starting from
September 14, 1989 until fully paid and to pay the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages.
In the service of their sentence, the accused pursuant to R.A. 6127,
shall be credited for the preventive imprisonment they have
undergone (PP vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil 941; PP vs. Gabriel, No. L-
13756, October 30, 1959, cited in Gregorios Fundamentals of
Criminal Law Review, P. 178, Seventh Edition, 1985). [8]
On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which
the trial court gave due course on April 5, 1993. On March 16, 1994,
this Court ordered the accused to file their appellants brief.
Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while
the Solicitor General filed the appellees brief on March 8, 1996.
During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997,
accused Ernesto Rodriguez died.[9] As a consequence of his death
before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were
extinguished.[10]
Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio
DXRB, Butuan City. In August, 1989, he came to know the business
of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation
(SAIDECOR), when he interviewed accused Martin Romero and
Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the corporations investment operations
in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte.Romero was the president and
general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations
manager.
 SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a
marketing business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and
investments from the public. The corporation guaranteed an 800%
return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21)
days. Investors were given coupons containing the capital and the
return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon.It stopped
operations in September, 1989.
On September 14, 1989, complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to
SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment,
accompanied by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection
agent Daphne Parrocho. After handing over the amount of one
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) to Ernesto Rodriguez,
complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check
instead of the usual redeemable coupon. The check indicated
P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures
was for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Complainant
did not notice the discrepancy.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment on
October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as
evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank. [11]Both
accused could not be located and demand for payment was made
only sometime in November 1989 during the preliminary
investigation of this case. Accused responded that they had no
money.
Daphne Parrocho,[12] testified that on September 14, 1989,
complainant, with his friend Jimmy Acebu, approached her to invest
the amount of P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her
quota, and therefore, no longer authorized to receive the amount,
she accompanied them to the office of SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu
District, Butuan City. Accused Ernesto Rodriguez accepted the
investment and issued the check signed by him and Martin Romero.
For their defense, accused Martin Romero [13] testified that on
September 14, 1989, he issued a check in the amount of
P1,200,000.00 corresponding to the total of the P150,000.00
investment and the 800% return thereon. He claimed that the
corporation had a deposit of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00)
at the time of the issuance of the check and four million pesos
(P4,000,000.00) at the time SAIDECOR stopped operations. Romero
knew these things because he used to monitor the funds of the
corporation with the bank. He was not aware that the check he
issued was dishonored because he never had the occasion to meet
the complainant again after the September 14, 1989 transaction. He
only came to know about this when the case was already filed in
court sometime in the second or third week of January 1990. [14]
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant
made an investment with SAIDECOR in the amount of
P150,000.00. However, they denied that deceit was employed in the
transaction. They assigned as errors: (1) their conviction under P.D.
1689 due to the prosecutions failure to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial courts failure to consider the joint
stipulation of facts in their favor.[15] There is no merit in this
appeal. We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885,
[16]
the elements of estafa are: (1) a check was postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the
payee thereof.[17] The prosecution has satisfactorily established all
these elements.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.[18] It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated.[19]
Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any
false representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches
and misleads another, to his hurt. Deceit excludes the idea of
mistake.[20] There is deceit when one is misled, either by guide or
trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really false.
[21]
In this case, there was deception when accused fraudulently
represented to complainant that his investment with the corporation
would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days.
 Upon receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero
issued a postdated check. Although accused-appellant contends that
sufficient funds were deposited in the bank when the check was
issued, he presented no officer of the bank to substantiate the
contention. The check was dishonored when presented for payment,
and the check return slip submitted in evidence indicated that it was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check was
dishonored without any fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the
drawer, the latters failure to cover the amount within three days after
notice creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud.[22]
Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds as evidenced by the check return slip; (2) complainant notified
accused of the dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the
check within three days. Presumption of deceit remained since
accused failed to prove otherwise. Complainant sustained damage in
the amount of P150,000.00.
Accused-appellant also contends that had the trial court
admitted the Admission and Stipulation of Facts of November 9,
1992, it would prove that SAIDECOR had sufficient funds in the
bank.
Accused-appellant relies on the fact that there was a
discrepancy between the amount in words and the amount in figures
in the check that was dishonored. The amount in words was
P1,000,200.00, while the amount in figures was P1,200,000.00. It is
admitted that the corporation had in the bank P1,144,760.00 on
September 28,1989, and P1,124,307.14 on April 2, 1990. The check
was presented for payment on October 5, 1989. The rule in the
Negotiable Instruments Law is that when there is ambiguity in the
amount in words and the amount in figures, it would be the amount in
words that would prevail.[23]
However, this rule of interpretation finds no application in the
case. The agreement was perfectly clear that at the end of twenty
one (21) days, the investment of P150,000.00 would become
P1,200,000.00. Even if the trial court admitted the stipulation of facts,
it would not be favorable to accused-appellant.
The factual narration in this case established a kind of Ponzi
scheme.[24] This is an investment swindle in which high profits are
promised from fictitious sources and early investors are paid off with
funds raised from later ones. It is sometimes called a pyramid
scheme because a broader base of gullible investors must support
the structure as time passes.
In the recent case of People vs. Priscilla Balasa,[25] this Court
held that a transaction similar to the case at hand is not an
investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as
long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining
the scheme. It is difficult to sustain over a long period of time
because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to
continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea
behind this type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money
from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before
anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, these schemes only
last weeks, or months at most, just like what happened in this case.
The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto
Rodriguez, died pending appeal. Pursuant to the doctrine
established in People vs. Bayotas,[26] the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.[27]
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining
accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero. The trial court considered the
swindling involved in this case as having been committed by a
syndicate[28] and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment based
on the provisions of Presidential Decree 1689, which increased the
penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa. [29] However, the
prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a
syndicate, as defined under the law. The penalty of life imprisonment
cannot be imposed. What would be applicable in the present case is
the second paragraph of Presidential Decree No. 1689, Section 1, exemplary damages are awarded against him in the amount of
which provides that: fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00).[35]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty MODIFICATION the appealed judgment. The Court hereby
imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer an
amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos. indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code on complex penalties of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in
provides that whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with
the forms specially provided for in this Code, theperiods shall be interest thereon at six (6%) per centum per annum from September
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules, that is, those in 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
Articles 61 and 76.[30] Hence, where as in this case, the penalty as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as
provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 for estafa exemplary damages, and the costs.
under Articles 315 and 316 of the Code is reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, the minimum period thereof is twelve SO ORDERED.
(12) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years of reclusion
Davide, Jr., C.J.,Melo, and Kapunan , JJ., concur.
temporal; the medium period is sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to
Ynares-Santiago, J. no part.
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and the maximum period
is reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
has been alleged or proved. Applying the rules in the Revised Penal
Code for graduating penalties by degrees [31] to determine the proper THIRD DIVISION
period,[32] the penalty for the offense of estafa under Article 315, 2(d)
as amended by P.D. 1689 involving the amount of P150,000.00 is the
medium of the period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that
is, sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. This
penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance FRANCISCOMAGESTRADO,Petitioner,
with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general G.R. No. 148072
prescription under the law, shall be the maximum range of the - versus -
indeterminate sentence.[33] The minimum thereof shall be taken, as
aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand ELENA M.
is, prision mayor. LIBROJO

To enable the complainant to obtain means, diversion or Respondents.

amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings
undergone by him, by reason of the failure of the accused to return Promulgated: July
his money, moral damages are imposed against accused-appellant
Martin L. Romero in the amount of twenty thousand pesos x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(P20,000.00).[34] To serve as an example for the public good, - - - - - - -x
 DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1)
Resolution[1] dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco Magestrado v. Hon.
Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the
Philippines and Elena M. Librojo, which dismissed petitioner
Francisco Magestrados Petition for Certiorari for being the
wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of the
same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal
complaint[3] for perjury against petitioner with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as
I.S. No. 98-3900.
After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings,
the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information
for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z.
Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the
information are hereby quoted as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath
upon a material matter before a competent officer
authorized to receive and administer oath and which
the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe
and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public
Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168,
Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry,
falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate
Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document
was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New
Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28,
1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to
which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and
swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book
No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B.
Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing
fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and
petition are false, the truth of the matter being that
the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena
M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount
of P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said
title to the property was surrendered by him to the
said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, making
untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M.
Librojo.[4]
The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43,
where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90721
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado.
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion [5] for suspension
of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner
alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery
of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98-
34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title
and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No.
90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases
are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the
criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order [6] denying petitioners
motion for suspension of proceedings, thus:
Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed by the
[herein petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the Comment and
Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds
the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it
appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled
on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.
On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an Order [8] dated 19
October 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 90721.
On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:
Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases
abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY,
this Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question
involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to
await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally
for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner
and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the
criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the
wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition
for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163.
Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal
case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note
that the affidavit of loss was executed in support of the petition for
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163
which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.[10]
Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[11] but this was
denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[12] dated 21 December 2000.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge
Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorariin Civil Case
No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of
petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721,
as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed [14] the Petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been
an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition
for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and
appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant
petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus
cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral
and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the
instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.[15]
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration[16] in a Resolution[17] dated 3 May 2001.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada
dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioners Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her
subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section
10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and
petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration on the
ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.
After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues
raised by petitioner, we find the instant petition to be
without merit.
The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper
remedy which petitioner should have availed himself of
before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition
for certiorari. Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned
RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal of his Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private
respondent and public respondent People of
the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper
remedy.
We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in
dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2
of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal,
not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because
RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal was a final order from
which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au
contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the
case completely, but leaves something to be done as
regards the merits of the latter.[18] RTC-Branch 83s Order
dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioners Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally disposes of
the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with
the case.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of
appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in
Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to
deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of
error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of
judgment which the trial court might have committed.But
petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again reminded members of the
bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is
no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[19] Certiorari cannot be allowed when
a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy,[20] certiorari not being a
substitute for lost appeal.[21]
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we
have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of appeals
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to
perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final
and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that
the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a
mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Neither can
petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must
yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While
every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]
 The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. [23] A party
cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availability of the special civil action
for certiorari.[24] As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista[25]:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a
final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not
certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of
certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available,
it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would
be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly
relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order
complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and
ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute
for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is
occasioned by the petitioners own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.
On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the
Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition
for Certiorariin Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had
until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of Appeals
cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As
petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83s
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final
and executory.
For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly
denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner
before it.
Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying
the instant Petition on the merits.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive
issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury
pending before MeTC-Branch 43 based on a prejudicial
question still to be resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
(for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-
34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending
before other trial courts.
For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner
in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for
cancellation of mortgage) and that of private respondent in
her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of
a sum of money).
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of
Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed on 8 May
1988 by petitioner against private respondent with RTC-
Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163
thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process
of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of
Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed
of Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already signed by a
certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor
Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded
from private respondent a special power of attorney and
authority to sell, but the latter failed to present
one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to
deliver the certificate of title of the land despite execution
and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the
consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the
services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed,
for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against
private respondent; to deliver to petitioner the certificate of
title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in
possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr.,
did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from
petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr.
Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he
discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage
which he allegedly signed in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the
mortgage document and it was private respondent who
falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful withholding
of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed
for:
1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2,
1997 as null and void;
2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 to [herein petitioner];
3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of
a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;
b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and
d) Cost of suit.
4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable
under the premises.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a complaint
for a sum of money with a motion for issuance of a writ of
attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14
May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges that
petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42
with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As security for
payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under TCT No. N-
173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said
obligation, to which respondent agreed. But private respondent
discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed an
affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on
the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that
she also discovered that petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-
10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his
obligation, but the latter refused to do so. Resultantly, private
respondent prayed for the following:
A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of
attachment and a preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ
of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the
Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner] property sufficient to answer [herein
private respondents] claim in this action;
B. That after due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered in [private respondents] favor
as against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the
former the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon
at 5% per month from September 1997 up to the
date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums
of P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of
the complaint; P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
twenty (20%) of the principal claim as attorneys fees
plus P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium;
and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this
Honorable Court.
[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice
and equity. As to whether it is proper to suspend
Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final
outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case
No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections
6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.
A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or
the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.[27]
A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused.[28]
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.[29]
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does
not involve a prejudicial question.[30] Neither is there settling the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the
a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, parties before the court are entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination
according to law, proceed independently of each other.[31] of their case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in another
case. After all, procedure was created not to hinder and delay but to
However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of facilitate and promote the administration of justice.[34]
sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold
the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in
another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues
litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly
raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised
determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the
in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases
second action should be stayed.[32]
would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case
court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its
No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-
time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must
34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the
be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving
courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend
the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal
the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound
Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of
discretion.[33]
whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to
support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
N-173163.

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority

is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
North American Co., the burden of making out the justice and wisdom from
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil
the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an
cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the
unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to
criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his
which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare circumstances will
execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on
a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another,
whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of
loss of TCT No. N-173163.
MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that
the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancellation
of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-
98-34349 for collection of a sum of money before RTC-
Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in
Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not
err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No.
91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Court Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby
directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due a prejudicial question.Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
process. Costs against petitioner. the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
SO ORDERED against him before the RTC Quezon City.

SECOND DIVISION The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 [3] holding that
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060 Petitioner, the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
Present: question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The
- versus - RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated: are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
OF THE PHILIPPINES, tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in
Respondents. September 13, 2010 question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
for lack of merit, DENIED. SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,
[5]
the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the
RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of
the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts
of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting
the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is
that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The
rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to
RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of
receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392
on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-
7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case
for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
[10]
A prejudicial question is defined as: x x x one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse. [13] The relationship between the offender and
the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.
[15]
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
he was still married to respondent.
[17]
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that
the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x
x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the
Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.[19]
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H.
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Resolutions1dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648. The CA Resolution of March 9, 2006
dismissed petitioners' petition for review, while the CA Resolution dated May 22, 2006
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila.
On February 11, 2004, an Information for falsification of public documents was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Manila against herein petitioners.2
On April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on
Absence of Probable Cause.3
After respondent's Comment/Opposition4 was filed, the MeTC issued an Order5 dated
July 9, 2004 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause.
Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.6
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment setting aside the July 9, 2004 Order of
the MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to trial.7
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.
On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its presently assailed
Resolution8 dismissing the petition.
The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in nature
and, thus, is not appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in
its Resolution9 dated May 22, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in outrightly dismissing the
Petition for Review on the ground that the remedy availed of by
petitioners is improper.
Strict enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the
purposes of justice so require.10
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the Decision of
the RTC is final as it disposes with finality the issue of whether the
MeTC erred in granting their Motion to Dismiss.
The Court does not agree.
The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by
the CA in dismissing petitioners' petition for review is the latter's
failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, 11 Rule 42
of the Rules of Court. While petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, they, however, failed to comply with these
requirements. Worse, they did not even mention anything about it in
the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of
the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.12 An appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.13 Deviations from the
Rules cannot be tolerated.14 The rationale for this strict attitude is not
difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the
orderly disposition of appealed cases. 15 In an age where courts are
bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by
appellants with greater fidelity.16 Their observance cannot be left to
the whims and caprices of appellants. 17 In the instant case,
petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the Rules.
Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their non-observance even
when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing
their petition. Such obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea for
liberality in construing the Rules.
On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is
dismissible.
Even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the
Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of
the CA.
The factual and legal situations in the present case are essentially on
all fours with those involved in Basa v. People.18 In the said case, the
accused were charged with swindling and falsification of public
documents. Subsequently, the accused filed a Joint Motion to Quash
on the ground that the facts charged in each Information do not
constitute an offense. Thereafter, the MeTC issued an order in favor
of the accused and, accordingly, quashed the Informations. The
private complainant, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed
a motion for reconsideration but the MeTC denied it. On appeal, the
RTC reversed the order of the MeTC and directed the continuation of
the proceedings. The accused then filed a petition for review with the
CA. In its assailed decision, the CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the remedy of appeal from the RTC decision is improper,
because the said decision is actually interlocutory in nature.
In affirming the ruling of the CA, this Court held that:
Petitioners erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and
appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. Thus, they filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals under Section 3 (b), Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, states:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring
to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, x x x.
The above provisions contemplate of an appeal from a final decision
or order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 resorted to by petitioners
is improper. To repeat, the RTC Decision is not final, but
interlocutory in nature.
A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon
the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its
merits.
Tested against the above criterion, the RTC Decision is beyond cavil
interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners'
motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x
x x, i.e ., the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the
guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the
MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and
finally render the proper judgment.
It is axiomatic that an order denying a motion to quash on the ground
that the allegations in the Informations do not constitute an offense
cannot be challenged by an appeal. This Court generally frowns
upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. The
evident reason for such rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action. To tolerate the practice of allowing appeals from
interlocutory orders would not only delay the administration of justice
but also would unduly burden the courts.19 (Emphases supplied)
In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the
Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by
allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear
that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the
case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.
In their second assigned error, petitioners claim that assuming for the
sake of argument that the remedy they availed of is not proper, the
facts of the case would readily show that there exist just and
compelling reasons to warrant the relaxation of the rules in the
interest of substantial justice.
Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned
Document Report, submitted as evidence by respondent to the
prosecutor's office, showed that the findings therein are not
conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory
Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the document
examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned
Deed of Sale as compared to the standard signatures "reveal
divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which
is] an indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON."20 The Court agrees with the prosecutor's
pronouncement in its Resolution21 dated September 22, 2003, that
although the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by
the statement contained in the Report that "no definite conclusion
can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are
photocopies wherein minute details are not clearly manifested," the
fact that an expert witness already found that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person already
creates probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of
falsification of public document.
In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,22 this Court held:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.23
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the
ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was committed and that
herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.
With respect to respondent's legal personality to appeal the July 9,
2004 Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the appeal filed with
the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public
prosecutor who handles the case.
It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has
authority to file an appeal with the RTC.1wphi1 Section 35 (l),
Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to
represent "the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings." On the other hand, Section 11
of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled "Reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the
Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service,
and Creating the National Prosecution Service," which was the law in
force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or
the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) "shall have charge of
the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city
or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and
shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution
of criminal prosecutions."24 In consonance with the above-quoted
provision, it has been held by this Court that the fiscal represents
the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses
before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial
courts.25 Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the
RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in
this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the
same.
Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is
misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the
assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file an information or
dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority
or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State
Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law which provides that in
cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor
may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated differently, unless
otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State
Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the
dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even
without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief
State Prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29648, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
 BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ
of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari, dated February 13, 2008, of petitioner Burgundy Realty
Corporation, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 14, 2007
and December 20, 2007, respectively.
The facts follow.
Private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes (Reyes), sometime in
1996, offered her services to petitioner as the latter's real estate
agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be
developed into a golf course. She informed petitioner that more or
less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their
properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the
amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those
parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land,
converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her
personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes
to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her
receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for
the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati City.
Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for
petitioner, denied having converted or misappropriated the involved
amount of money. She claimed that the said amount was used solely
for the intended purpose and that it was petitioner who requested her
services in procuring the lots. According to her, it was upon the
petitioner's prodding that she was constrained to contact her friends
who were also into the real estate business, including one named
Mateo Elejorde. She alleged that prior to the venture, Mateo Elejorde
submitted to her copies of certificates of title, vicinity plans, cadastral
maps and other identifying marks covering the properties being
offered for sale and that after validating and confirming the prices as
well as the terms and conditions attendant to the projected sale,
petitioner instructed her to proceed with the release of the funds.
Thus, she paid down payments to the landowners during the months
of February, March, July, August, September and October of 1996.
Reyes also insisted that petitioner knew that the initial or down
payment for each lot represented only 50% of the purchase price
such that the remaining balance had to be paid within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the initial payment. She
added that she reminded petitioner, after several months, about the
matter of unpaid balances still owing to the lot owners, but due to
lack of funds and non-infusion of additional capital from other
investors, petitioner failed to pay the landowners of their remaining
unpaid balances. Meanwhile, Reyes received information that her
sub-broker Mateo Elejorde had been depositing the involved money
entrusted to him under his personal account. On March 28, 2000,
through a board resolution, petitioner allegedly authorized Reyes to
institute, proceed, pursue and continue with whatever criminal or civil
action against Mateo Elejorde, or such person to whom she may
have delivered or entrusted the money she had received in trust from
the firm, for the purpose of recovering such money. Thus, Reyes filed
a complaint for the crime of estafa against Mateo Elejorde before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City docketed as I.S. No. 98-B-
5916-22, and on March 30, 2001, Mateo Elejorde was indicted for
estafa.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the
Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution 2 dated April
27, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view thereof, it is most respectfully recommended that respondent
be indicted of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code. It could not be said that she has violated the
provision of PD 1689 for it was not shown that the money allegedly
given to her were funds solicited from the public. Let the attached
information be approved for filing in court. Bail recommendation at
Php40,000.00.3
Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed against Reyes
and raffled before the RTC, Branch 149, Makati City.
Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the Department
of Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice
through State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo on June 1, 2006.
Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration, and in a
Resolution4 dated July 20, 2006, the said motion was granted. The
decretal text of the resolution reads:
Finding the grounds relied upon in the motion to be meritorious and
in the interest of justice, our Resolution of June 1, 2006 is hereby
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for
review filed by respondent-appellant Josefa Reyes is hereby given
due course and will be reviewed on the merits and the corresponding
resolution will be issued in due time.
SO ORDERED.
On September 22, 2006, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzalez issued
a Resolution5 granting the petition for review of Reyes, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to cause
the withdrawal of the information for estafa filed in court against
respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes and to report the action taken
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the
Secretary of Justice in a Resolution dated December 14, 2006.
Eventually, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the CA. The latter, however, affirmed the
questioned Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated September 14, 2007 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions,
dated 22 September 2006 and 14 December 2006[,] both rendered
by public respondent Secretary of Justice, are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated December 20, 2007, petitioner filed the present
petition and the following are the assigned errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE DOJ SECRETARY, RAUL GONZALEZ, CAPRICIOUSLY,
ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THE [EXISTENCE] OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 1(b) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING BUT INSTEAD CONCURRED IN WITH THE DOJ
SECRETARY, RAUL GONZALEZ, WHO BY GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION HELD THAT NOT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 1 (b), PARTICULARLY THE
ELEMENT OF MISAPPROPRIATION, WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE DOJ SECRETARY, RAUL GONZALEZ, ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING AS TRUTH
WHAT WERE MATTERS OF DEFENSE BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN HER COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN PROVEN AT THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS.8
The petition is meritorious.
It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are
subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code,9 exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and
control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial
steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not
directly by courts.10
In the present case, after review and reconsideration, the Secretary
of Justice reversed the investigating prosecutor's finding of probable
cause that all the elements of the crime of estafa are present. Estafa,
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:(b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property; x x x
The elements are: 1) that money, goods or other personal property
be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same;
2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
4) that there is demand made by the offended party on the offender.11
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not
only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right. 12
In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa
has been committed, the Secretary of Justice reasoned out that, [the]
theory of conversion or misappropriation is difficult to sustain and
that under the crime of estafa with grave abuse of confidence, the
presumption is that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or is
different from that for which it was intended but did not take place in
this case.1wphi1 The CA, in sustaining the questioned resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice, ruled that the element of misappropriation
or conversion is wanting. It further ratiocinated that the demand for
the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused
to account for it, are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation,
however, the said presumption is rebuttable and if the accused is
able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing delivered
in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.1wphi1
It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made
after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary
investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a
case.13 Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof.14
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there
is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. 15 The complainant need
not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. 16 A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence.17 Precisely, there is a trial to
allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their
respective claims.18
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor
was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of
estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount
of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and
vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner
wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was
not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to
return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so,
constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation. The words
convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. 19To misappropriate
for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right.20 In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises
when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.21 Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or
conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for
the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption
can be rebutted by Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be
best presented or offered during a full-blown trial.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so. 23 The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty.24It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.25 Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.26 It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is
hereby GRANTED and, accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 14, 2007 and December 20,
2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City,
where the Information was filed against private respondent Josefa
"Jing" C. Reyes, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with her
arraignment.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 July 30, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2179-MTJ)
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BA YONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case now before this Court sprang from Criminal Case No. 09-
03-164 7 4, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo,
Sr.1 On March 24, 2009, complainant City Prosecutor Armando P.
Abanado filed the Information2 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bacolod City, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 thereof
presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
On April 13, 2009, respondent issued the following order in Criminal
Case No. 09-03-16474 in connection with the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against the accused therein:
Pursuant to Section 6, paragraph (a) in relation to paragraph b, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City is hereby ordered to present
additional evidence, relevant records and documents to enable this
Court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause, to
wit:
1. Copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation;
2. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor on Record, Prosecutor
Dennis S. Jarder Jarder Resolution;
3. Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated
Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor; and
4. Exhibit to the Court, the copies of all documents submitted by the
complainant and the respondents therein for comparison,
authentication and completeness of the photocopies attached to the
information.
Compliance is required within five (5) days from receipt of this
Order.3
On April 29, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted a copy
of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and informed
respondent that the documents submitted by the parties for
preliminary investigation were already appended to the complaint,
thus, taking care of items 1, 2, and 4 required by the April 13, 2009
Order.
With respect to item 3 thereof, complainant, in a letter also dated
April 29, 2009, explained that there was no memorandum of transfer
of the case from the investigating prosecutor, Assistant City
Prosecutor (ACP) Dennis S. Jarder, to him.4 In his aforementioned
letter, complainant discussed that the case was initially handled by
ACP Jarder who found no probable cause against Cresencio Palo,
Sr., accused in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. However,
complainant, upon review pursuant to Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,5found otherwise; that is, there
was probable cause against Palo. Thus, complainant disapproved
ACP Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court. 6
Respondent was nonetheless dissatisfied with the explanation of the
Office of the City Prosecutor. In an Order dated May 5,
2009,7 respondent stated that the Jarder Resolution (dismissing the
complaint) was part and parcel of the official records of the case and,
for this reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary
investigation. He further stated that because there was a conflict
between Jarders and complainants resolutions, those documents
were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Palo.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, complainant is
hereby ordered to complete the records of this case by producing in
Court this official and public document (Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarder), required by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Court. Compliance is required
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Fail not under the pain of
Contempt.8
On May 11, 2009, in view of the foregoing order, the Office of the City
Prosecutor again sent a letter9 explaining the impossibility of
submitting the Jarder Resolution to the court. The letter stated that
the Jarder Resolution was no longer part of the records of the case
as it was disapproved by complainant and it attached a letter of Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo which reads:
This refers to your letter dated April 18, 2008. For your information,
all resolutions prepared by an Investigating Prosecutor after
preliminary investigation shall form part of the record of the case. But
if they have been disapproved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor, the
same shall not be released to the parties and/or their counsels. Thus,
only resolutions approved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor for
promulgation and release to the parties shall be made known to the
parties and/or their counsel.10
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of
the City Prosecutor and insisted instead that the Jarder Resolution
should form part of the records of the case. Thus, in an Order 11 dated
May 14, 2009, he required complainant to explain within five days
from the receipt thereof why he should not be cited for contempt
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.12
Complainant received the aforementioned order on May 15, 2009
and requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it. 13
In an Order14 dated May 19, 2009, respondent denied the request of
a ten-day extension and set the hearing for the contempt charges on
May 26, 2009. He likewise ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to ACP Jarder directing him
to testify on the existence of his resolution dismissing the case
against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutors Records Officer
Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire record of the preliminary
investigation of the Palo case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for
inhibition15 against respondent on May 20, 2009 claiming:
4. That Complainant is now in a quandary because despite the fact
that the production of the disapproved resolution is not required
under Circular Resolution No. 12 for purposes of issuance of warrant
of arrest, the Court is very much interested in its production and
adding insult to injury in foisting to cite in contempt the City
Prosecutor for its non-production.
5. That the issuance of said order is capricious and whimsical and
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Because as it appears now,
the presiding judge is very much interested in the outcome of this
case, thereby showing bias and prejudice against the prosecution. 16
Complainant likewise filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain
respondent from proceeding17 with the May 26, 2009 hearing of the
contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO was granted
in an Order dated May 25, 2009 by Presiding Judge Pepito B.
Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.
In an Order18 dated June 15, 2009, Judge Gellada granted the
petition for certiorari (Gellada Order) holding that:
When a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating
assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable
cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be that
the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the
records of the case. It is no longer required that the complaint or
entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and be examined by the judge.
The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to
unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete
records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining
probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest
against the accused. "What is required, rather, is that the judge must
have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. x x
x.19(Emphases supplied.)
The records thereafter make no mention of what happened in
Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474.
On July 10, 2009, complainant executed the present administrative
complaint and the same was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on August 20, 2009. 20 Complainant alleged
therein that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure,21 gross misconduct,22 and violation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987. 23 He essentially asserted that
respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over the
production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially
the Jarder Resolution.
Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment
of Prosecutor Abanado,24 essentially reiterated the importance of the
Jarder Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. He stated that the document was
"material and relevant in the proper conduct of preliminary
investigation and the neutral, objective and circumspect appreciation
of the Judge of the evidence x x x for a proper and just determination
whether probable cause exist[s] or not for the possible issuance of a
warrant of arrest."25 As for respondents countercharge, he claimed
complainant should be disbarred for (a) filing a malicious and
unfounded administrative complaint; (b) disrespect and disobedience
to judicial authority; (c) violation of the sanctity of public records; (d)
infidelity in the custody of documents; and (e) misconduct and
insubordination.26
In a Reply27 dated October 8, 2009, complainant vehemently denied
respondents charges against him and claimed that they were merely
meant to discourage him from pursuing his just and valid
administrative complaint.
On February 2, 2011, the OCA submitted its report and
recommendation.28 It noted the June 15, 2009 Gellada Order which
held that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal
is superseded, and no longer forms an integral part of the records of
the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
Thus, the OCA held that complainant cannot be held guilty of
contempt. Nevertheless, because there was no showing that
respondent was motivated by bad faith and settled is the rule that the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to the
disciplinary action, it recommended that:
(a) The administrative complaint against [respondent] be RE-
DOCKETED as a regular administrative case; and,
(b) [Respondent] be REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more
severely.29
We adopt the factual findings of the OCA but find reason not to
impose the recommended penalty of reprimand on respondent.
We are tasked to determine whether respondent was administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and violation
of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987 for requiring
the Office of the City Prosecutor to submit the Jarder Resolution to
the court despite the reversal thereof.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive
function.30 Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of
the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An
examination of the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service 31 (DOJ-NPS
Manual), therefore, is necessary.
The pertinent provisions of the DOJ-NPS Manual are as follows:
J. PREPARATION OF THE RESOLUTION
1. When There is Lack of Probable Cause
If the investigating prosecutor does not find sufficient basis for the
prosecution of the respondent, he shall prepare the resolution
recommending the dismissal of the complaint.
3. Form of the Resolution and Number of Copies
The resolution shall be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared and signed by the investigating prosecutor. It shall
be prepared in as many copies as there are parties, plus five (5)
additional copies.
e. Contents of the Body of the Resolution
In general, the body of [the] resolution should contain:
 1. a brief summary of the facts of the case;
2. a concise statement of the issues involved;
3. applicable laws and jurisprudence; and
4. the findings, including an enumeration of all the
documentary evidence submitted by the parties and
recommendations of the investigating prosecutor.
All material details that should be found in the information prepared
by the Investigating Prosecutor shall be stated in the resolution.
K. TRANSMITTAL OF THE RECOMMENDATORY RESOLUTION
AND INFORMATION TOGETHER WITH THE COMPLETE RECORD
OF THE CASE
The investigating prosecutor shall forward his recommendation and
Information, together with the complete records of the case, to the
Chief State/ Regional State/ Provincial/City Prosecutor concerned
within five (5) days from the date of his resolution.
3. Documents to be Attached to the Information
An information that is filed in court shall, as far as practicable, be
accompanied by a copy of the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, the complainants affidavit, the sworn statements of the
prosecutions witnesses, the respondents counter-affidavit and the
sworn statements of his witnesses and such other evidence as may
have been taken into account in arriving at a determination of the
existence of probable cause.
4. Confidentiality of Resolutions
All resolutions prepared by an investigating prosecutor after
preliminary investigation, whether his recommendation be for the
filing or dismissal of the case, shall be held in strict confidence and
shall not be made known to the parties, their counsels and/or to any
unauthorized person until the same shall have been finally acted
upon by the Chief State/Regional State/Provincial/City Prosecutor or
his duly authorized assistant and approved for promulgation and
release to the parties
L. ACTION OF THE CHIEF STATE/REGIONAL STATE/PROVINCIAL
OR CITY PROSECUTOR ON THE RECOMMENDATORY
RESOLUTION
The Chief State/Regional State/Provincial or City Prosecutor
concerned shall act on all resolutions within a period of thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, extendible for another thirty (30) days in
cases involving complex issues and/or heavy workload of the head
of office, by either.
3. reversing the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, in
which case, the Chief State/Regional State/Provincial or City
Prosecutor a. may file the corresponding Information in court (except
the Regional State Prosecutor); or
b. direct any other state prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, as the
case may be, to do so.
In both instances, there is no more need for the head of office
concerned to conduct another preliminary investigation. (Emphases
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing, the guidelines for the documentation of a
resolution by an investigating prosecutor, who after conducting
preliminary investigation, finds no probable cause and recommends
a dismissal of the criminal complaint, can be summed as follows:
 (1) the investigating prosecutor prepares a resolution
recommending the dismissal and containing the following:
a. summary of the facts of the case;
b. concise statement of the issues therein; and
c. his findings and recommendations.
(2) within five days from the date of his resolution, the investigating
fiscal shall forward his resolution to the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor, as the case may be, for review;
(3) if the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is reversed by the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, the latter may file the
information himself or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so;
(4) the resolution of the investigating prosecutor shall be strictly
confidential and may not be released to the parties, their counsels
and/or any other unauthorized person until the same shall have been
finally acted upon by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor or
his duly authorized assistant and approved for promulgation and
release to the parties; and
(5) that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
complainant's affidavit, the sworn statements of the prosecution's
witnesses, the respondent's counter-affidavit and the sworn
statements of his witnesses and such other evidence, as far as
practicable, shall be attached to the information.
We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the
removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending
the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.
Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an
information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned
manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only
"as far as practicable." Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or
required under the rules.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in
insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all other
pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have
been submitted to his court, and in going so far as to motu proprio
initiating a proceeding for contempt against complainant.
However, not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the
law and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be
subjected to administrative sanction. 32 While complainant admitted
that he erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution
despite the provisions of the DOJ-NPS Manual, such error cannot be
categorized as gross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be
motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the
prosecution office were not clear as to whether or not an
investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that had been
reversed by the city prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Neither did respondents action amount to gross
misconduct.1wphi1 Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of
grave irregularity in the performance of duty.33 In the case at bar,
respondents act of requiring complainant to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt for his failure to submit the Jarder
Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of
procedure. Furthermore, complainant did not abuse his contempt
power as he did not pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29,
2009 and June 15, 2009 Gellada orders. 34 Lastly, as previously
discussed, respondent issued those orders in good faith as he
honestly believed that they were necessary in the fair and just
issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474.
As far as the disbarment charges against complainant are
concerned, under the Rules of Court, complaints for disbarment
against a lawyer are ordinarily referred to an investigator who shall
look into the allegations contained therein. 35 However, in the interest
of expediency and convenience, as the matters necessary for the
complete disposition of the counter-complaint are found in the
records of the instant case, we dispose of the same here. We find no
merit in the countercharges. It appears from the records that
complainants non-submission of the Jarder Resolution was
motivated by his honest belief that his action was in accord with the
procedures in the prosecution office. It likewise cannot be said that
the filing of the present administrative case against Judge Bayona
was tainted with improper motive or bad faith.
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against Judge Abraham A. Bayona of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, Branch 7 is
DISMISSED.
The counter-complaint against City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado
is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA, G.R. No. 175887
Petitioners,
- versus -
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x stakeout at the DPWH 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur in
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] dated August 14, 2006 and Resolution [2] dated
December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
86210. The CA denied the petition for mandamus/certiorari filed by the
petitioners which assailed the Order[3] dated March 24, 2004 of the Office of
the President (OP) dismissing the murder charge against the respondent.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning at
the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and
concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines
Sur, was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He
was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot
wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman
of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines
Sur the indictment of Roberto Obet Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito Totoy Ona y
Masalonga and Atty. Epifania Fanny Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of
Engr. Tria.
On the basis of statements given by twenty-six (26) individuals,
autopsy and ballistic examination reports, and relevant documents gathered,
[4]
the NBI submitted its findings, as follows:
Promulgated: November 24, 2010
Our investigation disclosed that about two weeks before the
incident ACLAN and ONA had been conducting an almost daily
Sta. Elena, Iriga City where Regional Director TRIA was holding
office from time to time as District Engineer in concurrent
capacity. Alternately ACLAN and ONA would ask the security
guard on duty if Director TRIA had already arrived and the usual
days and time of his coming to the office. At noontime or early
afternoon, after waiting vainly for TRIAs arrival, the duo would
leave, riding tandem on a red motorcycle. During their surveillance
it was ONA who frequently sat on the couch at the lobby of
the Engineering Building while ACLAN was waiting near their
motorcycle at the parking space. At times ONA would approach
ACLAN to whisper a message and the latter would relay the
message to someone else through a hand-held radio.There were
also some instances when ACLAN would wait at the lobby while
ONA was staying near the parked motorcycle. At one instance an
employee had noticed a gun tucked on the waistline of ACLAN.
Around 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 22, 1998, ACLAN and
ONA were spotted in their usual places at the 2 nd Engineering
District in Iriga City. ONA was wearing a loose, yellow long
sleeved shirt, maong pants and a pair of sneakers; ACLAN was in
a white and gray striped shirt and a pair of maong pants. Shortly
before 9:00 a.m. on that day, THEO RUBEN CANEBA, a DPWH
employee and newly elected Municipal Councilor of Buhi,
Camarines Sur, arrived. He was warmly greeted and congratulated
by his former co-employees outside the engineering building. It
was at this point when CANEBA noticed a man about 54 in height,
sturdy, with semi-curly hair, wearing a white and gray-striped shirt
with maong pants and about 40 years old. The man (later identified
through his photograph as ROBERTO ACLAN) was looking
intensely at him and was shifting position from left to right to get a
better view of him. Obviously, ACLAN was trying to figure out
whether CANEBA was Director TRIA. After about 20 minutes,
Administrative Officer JOSE PECUNDO announced to those who
had some documents for signature of Director TRIA to proceed
to Pili Airport where TRIA would sign them before leaving
for Manila. Upon hearing this, ACLAN and ONA left hurriedly on
board a red motorcycle. No sooner had ACLAN and ONA left that
CANEBA cautioned the guards to be extra alert because he had
some sense of foreboding about that man (referring to ACLAN).
Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on that day, Director TRIA arrived at the
Airport. After signing some documents at the parking lot he
proceeded towards the pre-departure area on the second floor of
the airport building. ONA, who was waiting on the stairway,
immediately followed TRIA as the latter was going up the
stairs. As TRIA was approaching the pre-departure area he was
met by Atty. [E]PIFANIA OBIAS who shook his hands and started
conversing with him. It was at this juncture that a gunshot rang out
and TRIA dropped like a log on the floor, bleeding profusely from
a gunshot wound at the back of his head. As a commotion ensued,
ONA was seen running down the stairway while tucking a gun on
his waistline. Even before ONA could come out of the doorway,
ACLAN was already outside the building, pointing a handgun at
everybody obviously to discourage any attempt of pursuit while
swiftly stepping backward to where their motorcycle was
parked. He then fired shots at an army man who tried to chase
ONA. The army man, who was then unarmed, sought cover behind
a parked van. ACLAN and ONA then boarded a red motorcycle
and sped away. Director TRIA died from a lone gunshot wound on
his nape at the Mother Seton Hospital in Naga City the following
day.
Atty. EPIFANIA OBIAS, on the other hand, admitted that she was
with ROBERTO OBET ACLAN in the early morning of May 22,
1998; that at about 7:00 a.m. on that day she went to the residence
of Director TRIA at Liboton, Naga City, had a brief talk with the
latter and left immediately. She also volunteered the information
that ROBERTO ACLAN was not the gunman who had fired the
fatal shot at Director TRIA. She was also the last person seen
talking with Director TRIA when the latter was gunned down. A
practicing lawyer, Atty. OBIAS also engages herself in real estate
business on the side. In 1997 she had brokered a sale of real estate
between and among spouses PRUDENCIO and LORETA
JEREMIAS, as Vendors, and Spouses NESTOR and PURA TRIA,
as Vendees, over a .9165 hectare of land in Balatas, Naga City. It
was Atty. OBIAS who received, for and in behalf of the vendors,
the full payment of P2.8 Million of the sale from the TRIAs with
the agreement that Atty. OBIAS would take care of all legal
processes and documentations until the Deed of Absolute Sale is
delivered to the TRIA family. After the death of TRIA, the
surviving spouse and heirs made several attempts to contact Atty.
OBIAS to demand immediate delivery of the deed of sale, but the
latter deliberately avoided the TRIA family and, despite verbal and
written demands, she failed and refused, as she still fails and
refuses, to fulfill her legal obligation to the TRIA family. At one
instance, a representative of the TRIA family had chanced upon
Atty. OBIAS at her residence and demanded of her to deliver the
deed of sale to the TRIA family immediately. But Atty. OBIAS
replied that Director TRIA had already disposed of the property
before his death, a claim that can no longer be disputed by Director
TRIA as his lips had already been sealed forever, except for the
fact that neither the surviving spouse nor anyone of the heirs had
given any consent to the purported subsequent sale.
During the lifetime of Director TRIA, Atty. OBIAS was one of the
frequent visitors of the TRIA family and had been known to the
family members as a friend and a close associate of Director
TRIA. Yet, she never attended the wake of Director TRIA nor
made any gesture of sympathy or condolence to the TRIA family
up to the present time.[5]
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she
was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria. Respondent admitted
that Engr. Tria was a longtime friend and that she went to his residence at
about 7:30 oclock in the morning of May 22, 1998. Since Engr. Tria had
many visitors at that time, they just agreed to see each other at the airport
later. Respondent denied having admitted to NBI Supervising Agent (SA)
Atty. Manuel Eduarte that she was with Aclan then, and neither did she
volunteer the information that Aclan was not the triggerman. Respondent
submitted the sworn statement of Edgar Awa, one of those witnesses
interviewed by the NBI, who declared that Aclan and Ona were at the Iriga
City DPWH Office in the morning of May 22, 1998 at 8:00 oclock in the
morning. Such is also corroborated by the sworn statement of another NBI
witness, Theo Ruben Caneba, who declared that when he arrived at the
DPWH Iriga office at about 8:30 oclock in the morning of May 22, 1998, he
noticed the presence of Aclan who was supposedly eyeing him intensely, and
that after it was announced that those who have some transactions with Engr.
Tria should just proceed to the airport, Caneba saw Aclan with a companion
later identified as Ona, immediately left the compound in a motorcycle.[6]
Respondent likewise denied that she met Engr. Tria as the latter was
approaching the pre-departure area of the airport and that she supposedly
shook his hands. The truth is that when she and Engr. Tria met at the airport,
the latter took her by the arm and led her to a place where they
talked. Respondent asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by
the NBI, it has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to
implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria.[7]
On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur issued a resolution [8] directing the filing of an information
for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency
of evidence as against herein respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the
Provincial Prosecutors order to dismiss the charge against respondent.
[9]
On January 25, 2000, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas issued a
Resolution[10] modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the information
for murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
The DOJ agreed with the contention of petitioners that there is
interlocking circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that respondent
conspired with Aclan and Ona in the killing of Engr. Tria. It cited the
following circumstances: (1) Despite respondents admission regarding her
friendship and close association with Engr. Tria, her visit at his house early
morning of the same day, and her presence at the airport where she met
Engr. Tria and was the person last seen with him, respondent never lifted a
finger to help Engr. Tria when he was gunned down and neither did she
volunteer to help in the investigation of Engr. Trias murder nor visit the
grieving family to give her account of the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria,
which behavior negates her claim of innocence; (2) In the sworn statement
of NBI SA Manuel Eduarte, he declared that respondent admitted to him
that she and Aclan were together when she went to the residence of Engr.
Tria at 7:30 in the morning of May 22, 1998 and that while she later denied
such admission and explained that Aclan could not have been with her as
the latter was at the DPWH Regional office at about 8:00 a.m., such does not
render impossible the fact of Aclans presence at the residence of Engr. Tria
considering that the time given was mere approximation by respondent not to
mention the possibility that Aclan could have easily gotten to the DPWH
office after coming from the house of Engr. Tria using the same
motorcycle which Aclan used as get-away vehicle at the airport; (3) SA
Eduartes statement cannot be simply disregarded as he had no ill motive to
impute upon respondent the said admission; and (4) The double sale of the
property wherein the Tria spouses already paid P2.8 million to respondent
who brokered the sale, only to sell it to another buyer for P3.3 million,
without turning over to the Tria family the deed of sale and her failure to
attend to the registration of the land in the name of the Tria spouses this
strongly establishes the fact that respondent had the strongest motive to have
Engr. Tria murdered by Aclan and Ona who were obviously guns for
hire. Also mentioned was the respondents representation of Aclan as the
latters defense lawyer in a frustrated murder case which was dismissed. Such
client-lawyer relationship could have spawned respondents ascendancy over
Aclan.[11]
The DOJ was thus convinced that the sequence of events and
respondents conduct before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria
undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona. Moreover, it
pointed out that respondents defense consisted merely of denial which
cannot prevail over the positive allegations of witnesses showing her
complicity with the gunmen in the perpetration of the crime.[12]
Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJs January 25, 2000 resolution.[13] On February
18, 2000, Justice Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero issued a directive to State
Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia who was the Acting Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur, to defer, until further orders, the filing of the information for
the inclusion of respondent, in order not to render moot the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration of the January 25, 2000 resolution.[14]
On September 17, 2001, then Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez
issued a resolution denying respondents motion for reconsideration.[15]
In the meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has
already been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,
Camarines Sur. Upon request however, the venue was transferred to the
RTC Quezon City by resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-3145-RTC.[16]
Sometime in October 2001, the prosecution filed with the
RTC Quezon City a Motion to Admit Amended Information to include
respondent as one of the accused for the murder of Tria.[17]
On October 8, 2001, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the
DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.
[18]
In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondents counsel, the
DOJ denied respondents notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November 4, 1983, as amended by
Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP where
the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is reclusion perpetua to death,
shall be taken by petition for review.[19] Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal.[20]
It appears that on January 28, 2002, the RTC Quezon City issued an
order admitting the amended information which includes respondent. The
latter then filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for
the Suspension of the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest dated February 28,
2002, a copy of which was furnished to the Legal Office of the OP on March
6, 2002.[21]
On February 6, 2002, the DOJ denied respondents motion for
reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or
petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was
considered closed and terminated.[22] However, the DOJ directed the
Provincial Prosecutor to forward the records of the case to the OP in
compliance with the Order dated October 18, 2001 of Deputy Executive
Secretary Jose Tale.[23] It turned out that respondent filed on October 1, 2001 a
notice of appeal before the OP (O.P. Case No. 01-J-118).[24]
On June 27, 2003, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q.
Flores adopted the findings of facts and conclusions of law in the appealed
Resolutions dated January 25, 2000 and September 17, 2001 of the DOJ,
and affirmed the same.[25] Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
on September 17, 2003.[26] On December 3, 2003, respondent filed a
Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly Discovered Evidence. [27]
In his Order dated March 24, 2004, Presidential Assistant Manuel C. conclusion. They maintain that the CA decision is contrary to law and
Domingo granted respondents motion for reconsideration and reversed the established jurisprudence.
DOJ resolutions. It was held that mere close relationship without any
corroborative evidence showing intent to perpetrate the crime is not enough
Petitioners argue that since the preliminary investigation and review of the
probable cause. The conclusion that respondent was the only one interested
resolution finding probable cause have already been terminated years before
in the death of Engr. Tria because of the double sale from which respondent
respondents appeal to the OP -- more so with the earlier denial of the said
supposedly wanted to get away from her obligation to the Tria spouses, was
appeal for failing to raise any new issue not raised before the DOJ -- the
based merely on the opinion of SA Eduarte. Also, since Mrs. Pura Tria
alleged new affidavits should have been referred to the DOJ for
admitted she knew of the said transaction, she could very well file a civil
reinvestigation. As to the affidavits of Calayag and Jennis Nidea, said
case for collection such that even with the death of Engr. Tria, respondent
witnesses have not been confronted by the petitioners in violation of the
will not be able to evade her obligation. As to the presence of both Aclan
latters right to due process. Thus, the CA decision affirmed the OPs
and respondent at the house of Engr. Tria early morning before the incident
dismissal of the case against respondent at the level of the DOJ without
took place, the same was not sufficiently established, as shown by the
referral to the said office and without consideration of the pendency of the
affidavit of Felix Calayag. The OP thus concluded there was no interlocking
case at RTC of Quezon City, Branch 76. Lacking such authority on appeal
circumstantial evidence of respondents acts before, during and after the
to appreciate newly submitted affidavits of Calayag and Nidea, Presidential
killing of Engr. Tria that would establish conspiracy among Aclan, Ona and
Assistant Manuel C. Domingo arrogated unto himself the judicial task of
respondent to commit the crime.Accordingly, the case against respondent
analyzing the said documents without confrontation of the witnesses by the
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[28]
other party. Further, the CA overlooked the fact that such affidavits
submitted by respondent as newly discovered evidence was merely a ploy in
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[29] which was denied by the OP order for her appeal to qualify as raising new and material issues which
in its Order[30] dated June 10, 2004. Before the CA, petitioners filed a were supposedly not raised before the DOJ.[32]
petition for mandamus/certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Petitioners further argue that the CA should not have affirmed the OPs
dismissal of the murder charge against the respondent pursuant to Crespo v.
On August 14, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the Mogul[33] that once an information has been filed in court, any disposition of
petition. On the issue of the alleged grave abuse committed by the OP in the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
modifying the findings of the DOJ instead of ordering the Secretary of in the sound discretion of the court.
Justice to reopen/review the case in accordance with Memorandum Circular
No. 58, the CA held that it was not mandatory for the OP to do so. As for
On the procedural issue raised by the petitioners, we hold that the OP did
the evaluation of factual matters and credence to be accorded to the
not err in taking cognizance of the appeal of respondent, and that the CA
testimonies of respondent and her witnesses, the CA declared that these are
likewise had jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of probable cause in a
not proper grounds in a petition for certiorari which is confined only to the
petition challenging the OPs ruling.
correction of errors of jurisdiction. Neither will mandamus lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty in view of the failure of petitioners to
show a clear and certain right to justify the grant of relief.[31] Memorandum Circular No. 58[34] provides:

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners No appeal from or petition for review of
are now before us contending that the CA manifestly overlooked relevant decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by
the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new and
material issues are raised which were not previously presented
before the Department of Justice and were not ruled upon in
the subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President
may order the Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the
case, provided, that, the prescription of the offense is not due to
lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned
resolution/order/decision, and provided further, that, the appeal or
petition for review is filed within thirty (30) days from such notice.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall
within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in
the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright
and no order shall be issued requiring the payment of the appeal
fee, the submission of appeal brief/memorandum or the elevation
of the records to the Office of the President from the Department
of Justice.
If it is not readily apparent from the appeal or petition for review
that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, the appellant/petitioner shall be ordered to prove the
necessary jurisdictional facts, under penalty of outright dismissal
of the appeal or petition, and no order to pay the appeal fee or to
submit appeal brief/memorandum or to elevate the records of the
case to the Office of the President shall be issued unless and until
the jurisdictional requirements shall have been satisfactorily
established by the appellant/petitione
The offense for which respondent was charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, which is clearly within the
jurisdiction of the OP in accordance with Memorandum Circular
No. 58. Respondents appeal was initially dismissed when Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores issued the Resolution
dated June 27, 2003 affirming in toto the appealed resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice and adopting the latters findings and
conclusions. However, subsequent to her filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the said June 27, 2003 Resolution, respondent
filed a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly
Discovered Evidence. The arguments of respondent in support of
her motion for reconsideration were duly considered by the OP in
reexamining the appealed resolutions. As the word may in the
second paragraph of Memorandum Circular No. 58 signifies, it is
not mandatory for the President to order the DOJ to reopen or
review respondents case even if it raised new and material issues
allegedly not yet passed upon by the DOJ.Hence, the OP acted well
within its authority in reexamining the merits of respondents
appeal in resolving the motion for reconsideration.
In arguing that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the
OPs dismissal of the murder charge against respondent, petitioner invoked
our ruling in Crespo v. Mogulthat any disposition of the case rests on the
sound discretion of the court once an information has been filed with it.
A refinement of petitioners understanding of the Crespo ruling is in
order. In Crespo, we ruled that after the information has already been filed
in court, the courts permission must be secured should the fiscal find it
proper that reinvestigation be made. Thereafter, the court shall consider and
act upon the findings and recommendations of the fiscal.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[35] we clarified that the justice secretary is
not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating
prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in
court. However, the justice secretarys subsequent resolution withdrawing
the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose
jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise
judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in assessing the merits
of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to wit:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the
ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the
secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make
an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is
not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible
error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to
evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding
with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action. (Underscoring supplied.)
Further, it is well within the courts sound discretion to suspend arraignment
to await the result of the justice secretarys review of the correctness of the
filing of the criminal information.[36] There are exceptional cases, such as
in Dimatulac v. Villon[37] wherein we have suggested that it would have been
wiser for the court to await the justice secretarys resolution before
proceeding with the case to avert a miscarriage of justice. Evidently
however, this is not a hard and fast rule, for the court has complete control
over the case before it.
Petitioners argument that the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the
appeal or motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent had deprived
them of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses on
those affidavits belatedly submitted by the respondent is likewise
untenable. Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended,[38] in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where
there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, [t]he parties
can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions
which may be asked to the party or witness concerned. [39] Hence, the non-
referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of
respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate petitioners right
to due process.
In resolving the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the OPs reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, it is
necessary to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the
respondent for conspiracy in the murder of Engr. Tria.
A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand points to a
different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound
discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice.[40]
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence
of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the
Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor,
after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. [41] Ordinarily, the determination of
probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case
is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination,
as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-
existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, [42] or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions.[43]
In reversing the DOJs finding of probable cause, the OP found
merit in the argument of the respondent that the DOJs finding that she was
with Aclan when she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in the
morning of May 22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave
more weight to the affidavit[44] of Calayag (attached to respondents
supplemental pleading on motion for reconsideration) -- stating that Aclan
was not around when they and respondent, among other visitors, were at
Engr. Trias house at that time -- than that account given by SA Eduarte
which was uncorroborated. As to the double sale allegedly committed by
the respondent from which the latters strong motive to liquidate Engr. Tria
was inferred, the OP found this as a mere expression of opinion by the
investigators considering that Engr. Trias widow, Mrs. Pura Tria,
categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was
the OP persuaded by the NBIs kiss of death theory since it is but a
customary way of greeting a friend to shake hands and hence it cannot
imply that respondent utilized this as a signal or identification for the
gunman to shoot Engr. Tria. Respondents alleged indifference immediately
after Engr. Tria was gunned down while conversing with her, was also
negated by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine Air Lines based at
the Pili Airport, stating that right after the incident took place he saw
respondent in the radio room in shock and was being given water by another
person.
Considering the totality of evidence, the OP was convinced there was
nothing suspicious or abnormal in respondents behavior before, during and
after the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria as to engender a well-founded belief of
her complicity with the killing of Engr. Tria, thus:
The act of Obias in failing to help the deceased when the latter was shot
should not be taken against her. In a tragic moment such as the incident, it is
safe to assume that one could be overtaken by shock, grief or fear especially
if the one involved is an acquaintance or a friend, leaving the former unable
to act or think properly. Obias could have been overtaken by shock or grief
making her body unable to function or think properly.
Moreover, the act of Obias in failing to contact or to visit the
family of the deceased during the wake of the latter should not be
taken against her. With rumors circulating that she is a possible
primary suspect over the death of Engr. Tria, and to avoid any
unnecessary confrontation with the family of the latter, whose
emotions could be uncontrollable or animated by anger or revenge,
Obias act in keeping her silence and distance is permissive.
The behavior of Obias before, during and after the incident should
not be taken against her. It is worthy to note that Obias was
confronted with extraordinary situations or circumstances wherein
a definite or common behavior could not be easily formulated or
determined. Ones behavior or act during said extraordinary
situations should not prejudice the actor if the latter failed to act or
behave in such a manner acceptable to all or which, upon reflection
afterwards, could be deemed the more appropriate, common or
acceptable reaction.
Obias actions could be presumed common or acceptable
considering the attendant circumstances surrounding the same, and
they do not evince or show any malice or intent whatsoever.[45]
The relevant portion of SA Eduartes affidavit reads:
3. That our first meeting was on or about 10:00 AM of May 25,
1998 at our office. She was accompanied by a certain RODEL who
was introduced as her Office Assistant. On said meeting she
verbally admitted the fact that she was the last person conversing
with Dir. Tria when shot at the airport on or about 10:20 AM of
May 22, 1998; that the shooting took place even before her first
step after their short talk, but she could not identify the assailant/s
because she had blacked out or became senseless because of fear;
4. That our second meeting was on or about 11:20 AM of May 28,
1998 at our office and she was alone then. That she stood pat on
her claim that she was overwhelmed with fear and became
oblivious of her surroundings after the gunshot that hit Dir
TRIA. When asked about the veracity of the information that she
was seen at TRIAs residence at Molave St., Liboton, NagaCity,
Atty. Obias admitted that she was indeed at the residence of
Director TRIA at around 7:30 AM of May 22, 1998, claiming her
visit as official matter, she being the lawyer of the victim in some
cases;
5. That finally we met on or about 5:00 PM of June 1, 1998 at the
restaurant of Villa Caceres Hotel, Magsaysay Avenue, Naga City,
upon arrangement made by our former Assistant Regional Director
FRANCISCO FRANK OBIAS of NBI (now retired) and father-in-
law of Atty. FANNY OBIAS; That said meeting materialized when
on the morning of the said date, Atty. FRANK OBIAS visited me
at the office asking why her daughter-in-law FANNY was being
implicated in the case of TRIA. Verbally, he said, FANNY had
admitted to him that our suspect ROBERTO OBET ACLAN
was with her at the residence of TRIA at about 7:30 AM on 22
May 1998, but he (Aclan) was not the triggerman. During this
meeting, ATTY. FRANK OBIAS was also around. Atty. FANNY
OBIAS said she was worried because two (2) men who introduced
themselves as NBI Agents visited her mother at Godofredo Reyes,
Sr., (GRS) Ragay, Camarines Sur, telling the latter that she,
(FANNY) was being tagged as the finger (identifier of the victim
to the assailant) in the case of TRIA. This matter causes anxiety to
her mother, she said. On said meeting, she admitted OBET
ACLAN was with her at the residence of TRIA on or about 7:30
AM on May 22, 1998, and further, that OBET ACLAN was
actually at the Pili Airport on that morning but insisted that
ROBERTO OBET ACLAN was not the triggerman; x x x.
[46]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In its Comment filed before the CA, the Solicitor General argued
that the alleged interlocking circumstantial evidence is pure speculation. To
render even a preliminary finding of culpability based thereon does not sit
well with the cherished right to be presumed innocent under Section 14 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, the case for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of evidence for the defense.[47]
Petitioners, however, maintain that the records are replete with abundant
proof of respondents complicity in the murder of Engr. Tria. They cite the
following circumstances showing the existence of probable cause against
the respondent: (1) In a radio interview in Naga City sometime in August
1998, respondent admitted that Aclan is her relative and that she is close to
the family of Ona; (2) Respondent was present at the residence of Engr. Tria
in the morning of May 22, 1998 between 7:00 to 7:30 a.m. with passengers
in her vehicle waiting outside, and when later she was invited by the NBI as
possible witness considering that she was the last person seen talking to
Engr. Tria before the latter was gunned down at the airport, respondent
admitted to SA Eduarte that Aclan was with her that morning at the
residence of Engr. Tria; (3) The pre-arranged signal provided by respondent
was in the form of a handshake while Ona was at the stairway observing the
two, and thereupon Ona waited for the right moment to shoot Engr. Tria
from behind; (4) Respondent despite having claimed to be a friend of the
Tria family, just left the scene of the crime without asking for help to render
assistance to her fallen friend; instead, she just boarded the plane as if no
astounding event took place before her very eyes which snuffed the life of
her longtime client-friend; and (5) In a conduct unbecoming of Filipinos,
respondent never bothered to see the grieving family of Engr. Tria at
anytime during the wake, burial or thereafter, and neither did she give them
any account of what she saw during the shooting incident, which does not
constitute normal behavior.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. [48] It is a reasonable ground
of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts
in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is
so. The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[49] A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not
a pronouncement of guilt.[50]
On the other hand, conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[51] Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. [52]
We reverse the OPs ruling that the totality of evidence failed to
establish a prima facie case against the respondent as a conspirator in the
killing of Engr. Tria.
To begin with, whether or not respondent actually conspired with
Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during the preliminary
investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the
trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.[53]
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not
contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding,
and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged
with a crime.[54] Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to
review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate
cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless
made with grave abuse.[55] After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence
on record, we find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found
probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with
Aclan and Ona. The following facts and circumstances established during
preliminary investigation were sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in
respondents guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had credible reason to have Engr.
Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for estafa from
her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest
of Engr. Trias family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the
second sale to a third party; (b) Access - respondent was close to Engr. Trias
family and familiar with his work schedule, daily routine and other
transactions which could facilitate in the commission of the crime
eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her
father categorically admitted being in her company while she visited Engr.
Tria hours before the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious
Behavior -- respondent while declaring such close personal relationship
with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any satisfactory
explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend
while they conversed and shook hands at the airport. Indeed, a relative or a
friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing
happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would
help the authorities investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital
eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the people to bring her friend quickly
to the hospital. She would not even dare go near Engr. Trias body to check
if the latter was still alive.
All the foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and from the point of view of
an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable inference of respondents probable
participation in the well-planned assassination of Engr. Tria. We therefore
hold that the OP in reversing the DOJ Secretarys ruling, and the CA in
affirming the same, both committed grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the
OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded facts on record which established
probable cause against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 14, 2006 and Resolution
dated December 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86210
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 25, 2000 Resolution of
then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur and directing the latter to
include respondent in the information for murder filed against Aclan and
Ona is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143032. October 14, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEGUNDINO VALENCIA y
BLANCA, JOHNNY TADENA y TORDA, and DOMINGO DEROY,
JR. y SAROCAM, accused-appellants.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny
Tadena y Torda and Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged
and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for violation
of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.0
grams of Psuedophedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated
drug. The trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme
penalty of death and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Hence, the case
is now before us on automatic review.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that on September 22,
1998, a confidential informant of the PNP Narcotics Group confided
to the group that he was able to negotiate the purchase of one kilo of
drugs from a certain Junior and Johnny. The information was passed
to the operatives team leader, Insp. Ramon Arsenal and then to their
commanding officer, Supt. Arturo Castillo. Supt. Castillo immediately
formed a buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp. Arsenal,
P/Insp. Beasa, SPO2 Estrada and SPO1 Facto. SPO1 Larry Facto
was designated as the poseur buyer. He was to buy the one kilo of
drugs for the agreed price of P800,000.00. SPO1 Facto was given
ten P100.00 bills which he used in preparing the boodle money.[1]
 The team proceeded to the corner of Baler and Miller Streets in
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. SPO1 Facto and the
informant waited at the corner of Baler and Miller Streets, while the
other members of the team stayed about ten meters away. At about
10:50 in the evening, a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. UET
384 arrived. The driver, Johnny Tadena, called the informant. The
informant, together with SPO1 Facto, approached him. SPO1 Facto
was introduced by the informant to Johnny Tadena as the buyer.
SPO1 Facto asked Tadena where the stuff was. The latter replied, Its
here. He told him not to worry because their boss, a certain Dodong
(Segundino Valencia), was present. SPO1 Facto saw three persons
inside the car. Valencia was seated beside the driver while their other
companion, Domingo Deroy, was at the backseat. Tadena then
asked SPO1 Facto about the money and the latter showed him a
plastic bag containing the money. When SPO1 Facto asked Tadena
to show him the stuff, Valencia ordered Deroy to hand him the bag
containing the drugs. Deroy did as instructed.Valencia then handed
the stuff to SPO1 Facto in exchange for the money. SPO1 Facto
examined the content of the bag and when he saw the white
substance inside, he scratched his head to signal his companions
that the transaction had been consummated. SPO1 Facto then
introduced himself as a police officer and grabbed the car key from
the ignition switch. SPO1 Facto arrested Johnny Tadena while his
companions seized the other accused. The three accused were
brought to Camp Crame for investigation. [2] The substance was
submitted for examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory. It tested
positive for psuedo-ephedrine, a regulated drug. [3]
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that in the evening of
September 22, 1998, Johnny Tadena went to see Segundino
Valencia in Caloocan City to ask him if he knew anyone who would
be interested in buying a 1995 Mitsubishi Lancer. Valencia was
allegedly engaged in the business of buying and selling used
cars. On the way home, Valencia rode with Tadena to go to Bago
Bantay, Quezon City. As they were crossing an intersection along
Iligan Street, an Isuzu van suddenly blocked their way. The
passengers of the van who appeared to be police officers
approached them. They took Valencias gun which he bought from a
police asset. The police brought Valencia and Tadena to Camp
Crame. Tadena was placed in a jail cell while Valencia was brought
before Col. Castillo. Col. Castillo showed Valencia a plastic bag and
said that he would use it as evidence against him. Valencia claimed
that the police mauled him and extorted from him the amount of
P20,000.00. They also took his necklace worth P5,000.00 and his
wallet containing P1,200.00.[4] Meanwhile, Domingo Deroy claimed
that in the evening of September 22, 1998, he was picked up by the
police without any reason at the house of Valencias parents. [5]
On September 24, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo B.
Vargas filed the following information against the accused:
That on or about the 22nd day of September 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 634.0 grams of white
crystalline substance containing Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a
regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Giving more weight to the testimony of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation, the trial court convicted the
accused of the crime charged. It held that the denial and alibi of the
accused were not sufficient to overturn the prosecution evidence
which established the guilt of the accused. [7] The dispositive portion
of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby sentences each of
them (1) to suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to pay a fine of P500,000.00;
and (3) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In this appeal, accused-appellants raise the following errors:
1. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the
accused-appellants for the crime charged has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence
to the improbable testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
3. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was
conspiracy in the case at bar.[9]
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-
bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive
or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the
operation deserves full faith and credit. When the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify
against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that
they have performed their duties regularly.[10] The trial court in this
case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in
applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by
law enforcement agents. We laid down in the case of People vs.
Doria[11] the test in determining the credibility of the testimony of
police officers regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations.The
Court said:
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the
Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. The presumption should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. It is the duty of courts to
preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal
law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be
used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands
that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately
shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the
illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug,
the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not
at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to
commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition
of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.[12]
In the case at bar, SPO1 Facto, the poseur-buyer, gave the
complete details of how the transaction was conducted from
beginning to end -- the negotiation between the confidential agent
and the drug dealers, the preparation made by the buy-bust team
before conducting the operation, when the informant introduced him
as the supposed buyer to the drug dealers, the exchange of the stuff
and the payment between the pushers and the poseur buyer, and the
arrest of said drug dealers. SPO1 Facto positively identified
accused-appellants as the drug dealers. His testimony went as
follows:
Q: Can you recall, Mr. Witness, if you reported for duty on
September 22, 1998?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What time did you report?
A: Nine oclock in the morning, maam.
Q: Now, while you were on duty was there any specific
assignment given to you by your chief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that assignment?
A: To conduct surveillance against drug traffic in Quezon City.
Q: Was there any specific person whom you were supposed to
conduct surveillance on December 22 ... September 22,
1998?
A: Yes, maam. The group of a certain Johnny alias Paniki group.
Q: And who ordered you or instructed you to conduct the
surveillance?
A: Our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal.
Q: Now, how did you know the group of Paniqui would be the
subject of surveillance?
A: Through our confidential agent, maam.
Q: Were you able to talk to this confidential agent?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And what is the gender of this confidential agent?
A: A male, maam.
Q: What did he tell you, if any?
A: He told me that he was able to negotiate the one kilo drug deal
to a certain Junior and Johnny, maam.
Q: And upon receiving this information, what did you do?
A: We informed our team leader, Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal
the information of our confidential agent, maam.
Q: And what happened after giving that information to your team
leader?
A: Our team leader Ramon Arsenal told our CO Col. Castillo
about that drug transaction.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: Inspector Arsenal formed a team to conduct buy bust
operation.
Q: Was there any briefing?
A: There was a briefing in our office, maam.
Q: What was taken up in that briefing?
A: In the briefing, I would pose as poseur buyer.
Q: And how much were you supposed to buy?
A: Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos per kilo, maam.
Q: So, what else were taken up during the briefing?
A: Inspector Arsenal furnished me ten (10) pieces of One
Hundred Peso-bill. Then I prepared the three bundles with
numbers inside and make it appear, parang tingnan mo
P800,000.00, parang may boodle sa loob.
Q: After that ... By the way who are the members of the team?
A: P/Insp. Arsenal, P/Insp. Beasa, SPO2 Estrada, myself and
others.
Q: You mentioned of a confidential informant, was he present
during that briefing?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And after preparing the boodle money and 10 pieces of P100-
bill, what else happened?
A: After I prepared the boodle on the night, we proceeded to the
area.
Q: Where is this area?
A: Corner Baler and Miller Streets, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
Q: Were you able to reach the area?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next if any?
A: Around 10:30 p.m., 22 September 1998, minutes later, around
10:50, pm., there was an automobile, Mitsubishi Lancer color
white UET 384 arrived at the corner of Baler-Miller Streets.
Q: Where were you at that time when that Mitsubishi Lancer
arrived?
A: I was at the corner of Baler and Miller Street.
Q: Who were with you at that time?
A: Our confidential agent.
Q: How about the other members of the team where were they?
A: They were away from us at least 3 meters ... 10 meters, away
from us.
Q: Ten meters away from you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When this Mitsubishi Lancer arrived, what happened next?
A: The driver called for me and our CI, together with the CI.
Q: And then what happened?
A: The CI introduced me as buyer.
Q: And then what happened after the CI introduced you to the
occupants or to the driver, what happened next?
A: After I was introduced as the buyer, I asked the driver where
the stuff was. The driver said, Its here and he also
admonished me not to worry because their boss is there, a
certain Dodong, seated in front, in the front seat beside the
driver.
Q: How many occupants were there in that Mitsubishi Lancer?
A: Three persons, maam.
Q: And where was the other one?
A: One at the back seat, maam.
Q: And when the driver told you that his boss was there, a certain
Dodong, what happened next?
A: He asked me where was the money, and I said, Its here, and
while I was holding the money which was placed inside a
plastic wrap.
Q: What happened next?
A: I told him to show me the stuff first because the money was
with me.
Q: And what happened?
A: The man seated in the front seat called the man at the back
and said Dalhin mo dito, bigay mo dito. The person at the
back seat handed the green bag to the person seated in the
front seat.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then he handed it to me sabay kaliwaan.
Q: Who handed to you the stuff?
A: The man beside the driver.
Q: And when it was handed to you, what did you do?
A: I gave the money, kaliwaan na. And then I quickly looked at the
stuff and I saw that there was white substance inside so right
away I made the pre-arranged signal.
Q: What was that pre-arranged signal?
A: I scratched my head which means the deal was, the drug deal
was positive.
Q: And when you scratched your head what did you do?
A: I introduced myself to the suspect as a police officer. And I
grabbed the key of the vehicle.
Q: Where was the key at that time?
A: It was a(t) the ignition switch.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: I said, Arestado kayo and arrested the driver.
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, where were you at the time, while
you were talking with the driver?
A: Beside the driver.
Q: There (sic) were still inside that car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you told the driver, you are arrested, what else
happened?
A: I got the key.
Q: And then, after that?
A: I said, Arestado kayo.
Q: After that what happened?
A: My companions alighted from the Tamaraw FX and arrested
his other companions.
Q: And then what happened?
A: After that we brought them to Camp Crame, maam, for
investigation.
Q: If you will be able to see this driver again of that vehicle with
whom you had that transaction, will you be able to identify
him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If he is inside the courtroom will you please point him to us?
A: That one is Johnny Tadena (the person pointed to by the
witness by tapping his shoulder when asked to identify
himself gave his name as Johnny Tadena).
Q: How about that man who handed to you that green bag
containing the white substance?
A: (Witness pointing to a man seated inside the courtroom who
when asked to identify himself gave his name as Segundino
Valencia).
Q: How about the man seated at the back of the car who handed
the green bag to Mr. Segundino Valencia?
A: (Witness pointing to a man who when asked to identify himself
gave his name as Domingo Deroy)
SPO1 Factos testimony withstood the rigorous cross-
examination by the defense counsel and was corroborated by SPO2
Estrada, also a member of the buy-bust team.[13]
Accused-appellants contend that it is incredible that the alleged
vendors of the drugs would readily do business with the alleged
poseur-buyer whom they met only on September 22, 1998,
considering that the transaction involved the huge amount of
P800,000.00. We are not impressed. It has been shown that the
appellants have previously negotiated with the confidential
agent. Prior to September 22, they have already closed the deal for
the purchase of drugs for the price of P800,000.00. Hence, it is not
as if the appellants were dealing with strangers. They knew the
informant. When they met with the poseur-buyer, the latter was
accompanied by the informant who introduced them to each
other. Nonetheless, the Court has observed that drug pushers sell
their prohibited articles to any customer, be he a stranger or not, in
private as well as in public places, whether daytime or
nighttime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring,
dangerous and openly defiant of the law. Hence, it is immaterial
whether the vendor and the vendee are familiar with each other. It is
only necessary to prove the fact of agreement and the acts
constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs. [14] These facts
have been sufficiently proved in this case.
Accused-appellants also argue that the prosecution has not
shown by clear and convincing evidence whether the sale was
voluntary or whether this was a case of instigation. The argument
deserves scant consideration. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is
commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the
offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police
or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to
prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause.[15] In this case, accused-appellants,
apparently, have, for some time, been engaged in drug dealing. They
were in fact the subject of a surveillance conducted by the operatives
of the PNP Narcotics Group. The police engaged the services of a
confidential informant to lead them to transact with them. The
confidential agent facilitated the meeting of accused-appellants and
the poseur buyer. Hence, it was not the police nor the confidential
agent who induced accused-appellants to commit a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. They were already violating the law and the
police only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend them in the act
of unlawfully selling drugs. This is certainly a legitimate entrapment
operation and not instigation.
Finally, accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to
prove the existence of a conspiracy among the three accused, as it
did not show a common plan or design among them. Again, we find
otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[16] The existence of a conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence because it may be inferred from the parties conduct
indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect
to the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or object to
be carried out. It may be deduced from the mode or manner in which
the crime was perpetrated or from the acts of the accused showing a
joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.[17] The existence of a conspiracy among the
three accused is very much apparent from the narration of SPO1
Facto about how the transaction went. Upon the arrival of the
Mitsubishi Lancer bearing plate no. UET 384 at the corner of Baler
and Miller Streets, the driver, Tadena, called the informant and SPO1
Facto, the supposed buyer. Tadena asked SPO1 Facto about the
money. When SPO1 Facto asked for the stuff, Valencia, who was
occupying the front passenger seat, ordered Deroy, who was seated
at the back of the car, to hand him the bag containing the
drugs. Valencia gave the bag to SPO1 Facto as the latter handed
him the money. This demonstrates the concerted effort of the three
accused in drug dealing. Conspiracy among them is obviously
present in this case.
As regards the penalty, the Court agrees with the conclusions of
the trial court, thus:
Section 20, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended, provides that The
penalties for offense under x x x Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Art. III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities: 8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity
which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the DDB, after consultations/hearings conducted for the
purpose. In Section 15, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. The crime is
aggravated when committed by any person or persons belonging to an
organized or syndicated crime group (Section 30, R.A. 7659; and People vs.
Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July 10, 1998). In such a case, the death penalty
shall be imposed. An organized or syndicated crime group has been defined
as a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
(Section 30, R.A. No. 7659; and People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July This administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for "gross
10, 1998) ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of
duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie 2 M. Uy (Uy)
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q98-78878 is AFFIRMED.[18] and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorneys
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin 3 B.
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La
this decision, let the records of these cases be forwarded to the Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their
complaint:
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on
Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on official leave. Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several
occasions as examples: (a) In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled
People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a
Republic of the Philippines warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the
SUPREME COURT Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075,
Manila entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge
Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with
FIRST DIVISION the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 September 5, 2012 prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ) Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the
same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d) In
BASCUG, Complainants, Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious
vs. Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary
CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent. examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for
DECISION arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant
and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.Second, Judge Javellana gave the impression
that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a certain Leilani
"Lani" Manunag (Manunag). Judge Javellana had conveyed to the
public on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position
to influence him in granting provisional liberty to the accused. 4 In
different cases, Judge Javellana (a) instructed the wife of an accused
to file the Motion to Reduce Bond prepared by the PAO with
Manunag, leading the wife to believe that Manunag was a court
personnel, hence, said Motion was never filed with the MTC and,
instead of the cash bond the accused intended to post, the accused
was released on a surety bond issued by Manunags company for
which the accused still had to pay premium;5 (b) reduced the bail
from P 40,000.00 to P 30,000.00, consistent with the reduced bail
amount Manunag instructed the representative of the accused to
seek, not to P 10,000.00 as prayed for by the PAO in the Motion for
Reduction of Bail or to P 20,000.00 as recommended by the Chief of
Police;6 (c) did not warn Manunag against getting involved in court
processes as she was engaged in surety insurance and did not even
question a counter-affidavit of an accused prepared by "Lani;" 7 (d)
instructed the relatives of the accused to go to Manunag who knew
how to "process" an affidavit of desistance, and when said relatives
did approach Manunag, the latter charged them fees; 8 (e) did not set
the Motion to Reduce Bail for hearing but granted the same because
it was filed by "the intimate friend of judge who is an agent of surety"
and took cognizance of the amount of premium for the surety bond in
determining the amount of bail;9 (f) denied the Motion to Extend Time
to File Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day notice rule, but
granted the Motion to Reduce Bail facilitated by Manunag even when
it was filed in violation of the same rule; 10 and (g) issued warrants of
arrest under questionable circumstances, more particularly described
in the immediately succeeding paragraph, in which cases, the bail
bonds of the accused were facilitated by Manunag.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without
propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under
immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of
arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or
when a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of
the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.
Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even when the accused had
no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing
the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in Civil
Case No. 05-001, entitled Villanueva v. Regalado, 12 only stated that
the hearing would be "in the morning," without indicating the time.
Judge Javellana failed to arrive for the pre-trial of the case set in the
morning of April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana was still a no-show when
the pre-trial was reset in the morning of April 15, 2005 and May 3,
2005. Finally, anticipating Judge Javellanas tardiness, the pre-trial
was rescheduled at 1:30 in the afternoon of another date.
Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented
laws and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons
accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his personal
relations with the parties/lawyers. Judge Javellana, in several
cases,13 denied or refused to receive Motions for Extension of Time
to File Counter-Affidavits signed only by the accused, yet in other
cases,14 granted such motions. In another case, 15 Judge Javellana
denied the Motion to Extend Time to File Counter-Affidavit for
violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to
Reduce Bail, which was in violation of the same rule. Judge
Javellanas inconsistent and irregular ruling could be due to the fact
that the former motion was filed by Public Attorney Bascug, with
whom Judge Javellana had an axe to grind, while the latter motion
was facilitated by Manunag.
Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the "litigants
are made for the courts" instead of "courts for the litigants." In Crim.
Case No. 03-104, entitled People v. Fermin, the accused, assisted by
Public Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted
homicide. The accused filed a Petition/Application for Probation,
prepared by the PAO but signed only by the accused. Judge
Javellana refused to accept said Petition/Application and required
the father of the accused to return the Petition/Application all the way
from the MTC in La Castellana to the PAO in La Carlota, despite the
great distance between these two cities. The PAO already adopted
the practice of preparing the motions for extension of time to file
counter-affidavit, motions for release of minor, or applications for
probation, but letting the accused themselves or their parents (in
case the accused were minors) sign the motions/applications, thus,
enabling the PAO to serve as many clients as possible despite the
lack of lawyers. Such practice is not prohibited considering that
under Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a party may
conduct his litigation in a municipal court "in person, with an aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose or with aid of an
attorney."16
Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in
airing his complaints against public attorneys. Judge Javellana
rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders he issued. In one such
Order,17 Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that Public Attorney Uy
"has already expressed her desire not to attend todays hearing,"
when Public Attorney Uy actually waived her personal appearance at
said hearing as she had to attend the hearing of a criminal case at
the MTC of Pontevedra. In another Order,18 Judge Javellana
reported, prior to confirmation, that the PAO lawyer refused to
prepare the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavit, thus,
prompting the accused to hire a special counsel. Additionally, Judge
Javellana improperly filed his complaints against the public attorneys
appearing before his court with the Department of Justice or the
District Public Attorney (DPA) of Bacolod City, instead of the
appropriate authorities, namely, the DPA of La Carlota City or the
PAO Regional Director. Moreover, Judge Javellana had required
Public Attorney Bascug to explain why she allowed the accused in
Crim. Case No. 03-090, entitled People v. Earnshaw, to sign the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits, even when
she was the one who prepared said Motion. Judge Javellana did not
verify first whether it was indeed Public Attorney Bascug who
prepared the Motion in question, thus, violating her right to due
process. Also, Judge Javellana was already encroaching upon the
domain of the PAO. It is the concern of the PAO and not the court "as
to how the Public Attorneys Office will be managed, specifically,
what policies to use in the acceptance of cases brought to its Office,
how one could avail of its legal services, at what point in time one is
considered a client of said Office x x x ."19
Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug
attached a hand-written note20 relating the observations of an
anonymous member of Judge Javellanas staff, viz:
Page One
1. Honorable Judge reports to duty at past 11:00 A.M. and hurriedly
conducts preliminary investigations or preliminary examinations after
making party litigants wait from 8:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. There had
been occasions when litigants became impatient for waiting for
several hours for the Judges arrival and would leave the court.
Judge then would forego the examination.
2. Judge spends more time conversing in cafeterias than stay in the
court. Litigants who are in a hurry to go home would bring the
affidavits to the cafeteria for Judges signature.
3. Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and
even while solemnizing civil marriage Judge would keep repeating
these remarks:
I am a criminal lawyer.
I did not come from the DAR or the COMELEC.
I am an intelligent Judge.
I am the counsel of the famous Gargar-Lumangyao and Spider
Hunter cases and I have caused the execution of Col. Torres.
I am not under the Mayor or the Chief of Police. and other remarks
as if he is the only intelligent, credible and qualified judge in the
whole world.
4. Judge tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker.
Said utility worker never reports to open or close the court; he never
cleans the courtroom; most of the time he stays in his Karaoke bar
which is some few meters away from the MTC of La Castellana. As a
matter of fact the MTC of La Castellana is the dirtiest of all the
courtrooms in the whole province.
Page Two
5. Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit in CC 03-
090-Pp. vs. Efraim Earnshaw made by Atty. Bascug was denied by
Judge on the ground that it was the accused who signed the Motion
and Atty. Bascug was ordered to explain. Other motions had been
denied for not meeting the 3-day rule but others were granted.
6. Motion to Reduce Bail received by court on January 7, 2004 was
not set for hearing but was ordered granted because it was filed by
the intimate friend of the judge who is an agent of Surety. This did
not meet the 3-day rule CC 03-108 Pp. vs. Lowell Panaguiton for
"Homicide."
Page Three
1. Criminal Case No. 03-102- Julius Villanueva "Frustrated
Homicide" Urgent Motion to Stay Transfer to Provincial Jail - Filed
1/21/2004 was not heard but order was issued January 21, 2004
also.
2. Criminal Case No. 03-090- Efraim Earnshaw "Less Serious
Physical Injuries" January 26, 2004 - Scheduled for arraignment but
upon order of Judge on affidavit of Desistance of Melanie Pabon and
Motion to Dismiss was filed and case dismissed.
3. Deonaldo Lopez Case - Motion for Extension of Time to File
Counter Affidavit dated 10-3-02 was signed by accused namely
Deonaldo Lopez, Jojo Balansag, Junnel Jorge, and Bernie Bello -
granted by judge.21
Based on the foregoing, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed that
Judge Javellana be removed from the MTC of La Castellana.
In his Comment22 on the complaint against him, Judge Javellana
discounted the allegations of Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug as
"baseless, untruthful, intrigues, malicious and a harassment tending
to intimidate him," and countered as follows:
First, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of
the rules of procedure and explained his actions in particular cases:
(a) In People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest
for the two accused charged with Malicious Mischief in the exercise
of his judicial discretion, and the necessity of holding the accused in
detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that the
same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in Crim. Case
No. 04-096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana insisted
that referral of the dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to
Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional
requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
(c) Still in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to
dismiss outright the complaint as prayed for by Public Attorney Uy as
the Judge had to accord due process to the complainant in said
case; and (d) In People v. Lopez, et al. another case for Malicious
Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
and added that he could not dismiss the case outright since the
prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.
Second, Judge Javellana denied acting as the co-agent of Manunag.
Manunag was an Authorized Surety Bond Agent of Commonwealth
Insurance and Surety Bond Company, a bonding company duly
accredited by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The
relationship between Judge Javellana and Manunag was "purely on
official business." That Manunag influenced Judge Javellana in fixing
the amount of bail in several cases was a malicious and deliberate
lie, based on mere speculation and suspicion. Judge Javellana had
consistently granted the reduction of the amount of bail to only 75%,
and not as low as 25%, of the amount stated in Department Circular
No. 89 dated August 29, 2000 of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Judge Javellana even chided Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug that
as officers of the court, said public attorneys were duty bound not to
demand outrageous reduction of bail. In addition, Judge Javellana
could not warn Manunag to stay away from "the processes (sic)
premises in the Court" because "everybody are allowed to attend
Court proceedings unless otherwise the attendance of the public is
prohibited."23 Judge Javellana likewise stated that he could not
interfere with the processing of surety insurance and bond for such
was a private matter between the insurance and bonding company
and its authorized agents. Referring to case records, Judge
Javellana pointed out that he only granted the motions to reduce bail
that complied with the three-day notice rule.
Third, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary
examination, asking the complainants and their witnesses searching
questions, before issuing warrants of arrest. According to Judge
Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of arrest right
after the preliminary examination. In some cases, Judge Javellana
was not aware that the accused had already voluntarily surrendered
or was already taken into custody by virtue of a warrantless arrest
because police officers did not timely inform the court of such fact.
Fourth, Judge Javellana did not violate the constitutional rights of the
accused in People v. Bautista. Judge Javellana argued that while a
judge can ask clarificatory questions during the preliminary
investigation, a preliminary investigation is mandatory only when the
law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of at least four years, two
months, and one day. Judge Javellana further averred that he always
advised litigants to secure the services of a counsel or that of a
public attorney from the PAO. However, even when the public
attorney failed or refused to appear before the court, Judge
Javellana still proceeded with his clarificatory questions since there
was yet no full blown trial for which the accused already needed the
services of a competent lawyer.
Fifth, Judge Javellana explained his failure to arrive for the pre-trial in
Villanueva v. Regalado scheduled on April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana
averred that he had been suffering from diabetes, as evinced by his
medical records from the Supreme Court Health and Welfare Plan,
and on said date, his blood sugar rose to 300, which caused him to
be lethargic, weak, and drowsy.
Sixth, Judge Javellana repudiated the allegation that he applied the
law and ruled whimsically and inconsistently. Judge Javellana
asserted that he "applied the law and the rules according to what he
believes is fair, just and equitable in the exercise of his judicial
discretion."24 Judge Javellana never favored Manunag and in all
criminal cases involving homicide, he had granted the reduction of
bail to P 30,000.00 (75% of the recommended bail of P 40,000.00).
Seventh, Judge Javellana admitted not accepting petitions,
applications, and motions prepared by the PAO but signed only by
the accused, asseverating that public attorneys should affix their
signatures and state their Roll of Attorneys number in every pleading
they file in court. Judge Javellana asked that "if all courts admits (sic)
any pleading filed by any litigant then what will happen to the
practice of law?"25
Eighth, Judge Javellana emphasized that government lawyers, such
as Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, are paid with peoples money, so
they should be sincere and dedicated to their work and, whenever
possible, go the extra mile to serve poor litigants. Thus, Judge
Javellana reported Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug to higher PAO
officials to guide said public attorneys and not to interfere with the
performance of their functions.
And ninth, Judge Javellana identified the member of his staff who
wrote the note containing more allegations against him as Mr. Ray D.
Pineda (Pineda), Process Server. Judge Javellana described Pineda
as "very abnormal, eccentric and queer in his relationship with his
fellow staff as shown by his quarrelsome attitude and fond of inciting
litigants to criticize the Clerk of Court and other personnel and most
of all his loyalty to the Official of the Municipality rather than to this
Court x x x."26 Judge Javellana clarified that he often mentioned the
Gargar-Lumangyao Kidnapping with Double Murder Case and the
Spider Hunters Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder Case
not to boast but to relay the impression that he meant business as
Presiding Judge. These cases were dubbed as the "Case of the
Century" by then Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (who later became Deputy Court
Administrator) because the same involved big time personalities.
Judge Javellana mentioned the said cases even when solemnizing
marriages because he would then be reading the Holy Scriptures
and he had to highlight that he survived the trials and threats to his
life because of the Holy Bible. Judge Javellana also did not have a
Court Aide who owned a Karaoke Bar whose negligence the judge
was tolerating. Pineda was just "jealous" because he was not
designated by Judge Javellana as Acting Docket Clerk in lieu of Mr.
Vee Caballero who was already on terminal leave prior to retirement.
Judge Javellana further narrated that he had reprimanded Pineda
several times, even in open court. In one of these instances, it was
because Pineda submitted a falsified information sheet to the
Supreme Court Personnel Division, stating therein that he had never
been charged with a criminal offense, when in truth, he was
previously charged with "Physical Injury." Judge Javellana advised
Pineda to rectify the latters records by executing an affidavit to be
submitted to the Supreme Court Personnel Division, but Pineda did
not heed the same.
In the end, Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him
were baseless and malicious; and the acts being complained of
involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the
proper subject of an administrative complaint. Judge Javellana
hinted about a conspiracy between the Municipal Mayor, on one
hand, and Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, on the other. The
Municipal Mayor was purportedly angry at Judge Javellana because
the latter caused the arrest of and heard the cases against the
formers supporters and employees; while Public Attorney Bascug
was suffering from a "Losing Litigants Syndrome" and "Prosecution
Complex," and was influencing Public Attorney Uy, a neophyte
lawyer.
Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant
complaint against him.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report 27 dated
January 2, 2006, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule;
and (2) gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations
with Manunag, implemented the law inconsistently, and mentioned
his accomplishments for publicity. The OCA thus recommended that:
1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter; and
2. Judge Edwin B. Javellana, MTC, La Castellana, Negros
Occidental be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other
benefits for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.28
In a Resolution29 dated February 5, 2007, the Court re-docketed the
complaint as a regular administrative matter and required parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed.
On separate dates,30 the parties manifested their willingness to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings already filed.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for
the penalty imposed.
I
Gross Ignorance of the Law
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following
criminal cases:
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a
fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or
of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence,
this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten
thousand pesos (P 10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases People v. Cornelio31 and People v. Lopez, et al.32 pending
before Judge Javellana were both for malicious mischief.
The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who
deliberately causes damage to the property of another through
means not constituting arson.33 There are special cases of malicious
mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any person who
shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of public functions,
or using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or spreading any
infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the
property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing
used in common by the public, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the above-
mentioned amount but is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.
(Emphasis ours.)
All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article 329
of the same Code, which reads:
ART. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next
preceding article shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value
of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does
not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be estimated. (Emphasis ours.)
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of
malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be applied. If
the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio
and People v. Lopez, et
al., P 6,000.0034 and P 3,000.00,35 respectively, are proven, the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in
People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to
appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted
for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case,
Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative
of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge
Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious
mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096,
which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the
same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the
other.
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary
investigation even when it was not required or justified. 36
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under
said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits
of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as
there are accused plus two (2) copies for the courts files. If this
requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the case may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court. (a) If commenced by complaint. On the
basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other evidence
accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for
being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the
accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by
information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding
paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies
of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution,
shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf,
serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later
than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may
file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits of the defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a
consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits
submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be
immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall
forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only
requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established
herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in
People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to
conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We
stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.37
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings
beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution
of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a
blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a
prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously
referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
read:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement,
shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after
such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall
not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without
a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section.
(Emphases ours.)
We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which
has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall
be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the
pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that
referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following
facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was not referred to the
Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this
ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since
November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of
civil and criminal cases pending before Judge Javellanas court.
Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same.
Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.38
In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,39 we called the attention of Judge
Tresvalles to Section 2 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
which states that a "patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground
for disciplinary action." We went on further to interpret said provision
as follows:
Although the said provision states that "patently erroneous
determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action," the provision
cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to apply the rule
is deliberate or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of the law to provide
for the expeditious and summary disposition of cases covered by it
could easily be frustrated. Hence, requiring judges to make the
determination of the applicability of the rule on summary procedure
upon the filing of the case is the only guaranty that the policy of the
law will be fully realized. x x x.40 (Emphasis ours.)
Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of
deliberate or malicious intent as a defense. His repeated failure to
apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so
obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and
efficient administration of justice, for which we hold him
administratively liable.
As for Judge Javellanas refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al.
and People v. Celeste, et al., however, we exonerate him of the
administrative charges for the same. Judge Javellana is correct that
the appreciation of evidence is already within his judicial
discretion.41 Any alleged error he might have committed in this regard
is the proper subject of an appeal but not an administrative
complaint. We remind Judge Javellana though to adhere closely to
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in hearing and resolving
said cases.
II
Gross Misconduct
Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary42 to act and behave, in and out of court, in a
manner befitting their office, to wit:
Canon
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely
be done but must also be seen to be done.
Canon 3 IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and
out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public,
the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary.
Canon 4 PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
2 SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their
family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly
to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept,
any gift, bequest, loan favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or
functions.
Canon 5 EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to
the due performance of the judicial office.
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,
by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person
or group on irrelevant grounds.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on
any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such
duties.
Canon 6 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance
of judicial office.
SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous
in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in
several instances.
Judge Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with
Manunag, contrary to the finding of the OCA. What Judge Javellana
stated in his Comment was that his relationship with Manunag was
"purely on official business," since Manunag was a duly authorized
agent of a credited bonding company. Nonetheless, Judge Javellana,
by referring the accused who appeared before his court directly to
Manunag for processing of the bail bond of said accused, gave the
impression that he favored Manunag and Manunags bonding
company, as well as the reasonable suspicion that he benefitted
financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should remember
that he must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of
impropriety" as well.
Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in
Granting43 or denying44 motions for extension of time to file pleadings
which were signed only by the accused. Judge Javellana reasoned
in his Comment that the PAO lawyers who prepared the motions
should have signed the same as counsels for the accused, but this
only explained Judge Javellanas denial of said motions. It did not
address why, in other cases, Judge Javellana had granted similar
motions signed only by the accused. Without any satisfactory basis
for the difference in his ruling on these motions, Judge Javellana had
acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the PAO lawyers.
Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his
previous accomplishments as counsel in big and controversial cases,
claiming that he only did so to impress upon the parties that he
meant business and that he relied greatly upon God to survive the
trials and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.
The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the
judges against seeking publicity for personal vainglory.45 Vainglory, in
its ordinary meaning, refers to an individuals excessive or
ostentatious pride especially in ones own achievements. 46 Even no
longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges
are still proscribed from engaging in self-promotion and indulging
their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on Propriety)
of the New Code.
We have previously strongly reminded judges in that:
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no
uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is
found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a
lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means
that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting
standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if
ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a
leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are
prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or
self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal
services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more
reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity
or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians,
who thrive by publicity.47
Judge Javellanas actuations as described above run counter to the
mandate that judges behave at all times in such a manner as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.48 We cannot stress enough that "judges are the visible
representations of law and justice. They ought to be embodiments of
competence, integrity and independence. In particular, municipal
judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. It is
therefore essential that they live up to the high standards demanded
by the Code of Judicial Conduct."49
For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge
Javellana committed gross misconduct. We have defined gross
misconduct as a "transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer."50
There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana
administratively liable for the other charges against him contained in
the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellanas attention to several
matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may again
result in another administrative complaint against the judge: (1)
notices of hearing issued by Judge Javellanas court must state the
specific time, date, and place51; (2) in case Judge Javellana is unable
to attend a hearing for any reason, he must inform his Clerk of Court
as soon as possible so that the latter can already cancel the hearing
and spare the parties, counsels, and witnesses from waiting 52; and
(3) he must take care in ascertaining the facts and according due
process to the parties concerned before levying charges of
incompetence or indifference against the PAO lawyers appearing
before his court.53
III
Penalty
Gross ignorance of the law54 and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct55 are classified as serious
charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the same Rules by:
1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3) A fine of more than P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00
The OCA recommended that Judge Javellana be suspended without Statement of the Facts and of the Case
salary and benefits for three months.1vvph!1 Given the gravity and
number of violations committed by Judge Javellana, we deem it The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
appropriate to impose suspension without salary and benefits for a version of the prosecution, are as follows: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who
was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a
period of three months and one day.
traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around
3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the
WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City,
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down
office without salary and other benefits for a period of three (3) the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that the repetition motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle;
that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-
severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation
this Court. ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was
uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted
SO ORDERED. and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
Republic of the Philippines
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
Supreme Court
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
Manila
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it;
SECOND DIVISION that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
G. R. No. 197788 plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
RODEL LUZ y ONG, contained suspected shabu.[3]
Promulgated: February 29, 2012
Petitioner,
- versus - Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1] plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous
Respondent. drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued. During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a
DECISION forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner
testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
SERENO, J.:
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It
to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516
found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully
dated 18 February 2011[2]and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which
led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to
contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to
be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE
OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE
OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE
DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful
arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or
charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a
valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the
RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in
this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by
motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing
penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was
not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said
police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is
legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest
the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their
presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words,
the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance,
he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down
for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. [10] It is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The
period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become
invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days
from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual[12] provides the following procedure for flagging down
vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not
apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic
Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never
indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with
the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was
that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it
was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There
was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of
the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as
follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails
the freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the
detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore
a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in
the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the
doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly,
but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that
powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide
whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional
rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a
person questioned will be induced to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at
467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists
expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him,
are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but
that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his
way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop
is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently
is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop
are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some
discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least
to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous
to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the
absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive
aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons
temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not in custody for
the purposes of Miranda.
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent
will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.
California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If
a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was
only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop,
he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have
been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort
be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time
that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive
the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them. [14] It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings
must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The
purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself,
which work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of
persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket,
then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second
timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already
in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was
not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. [17] It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the
RTC found that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his
pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant
to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)
the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. [19] In this case,
all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot,
the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation
instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no
justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the
search incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to
preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these
underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both
legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from
issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the
case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial
arrest involves danger to an officer because of the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the
fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . .
than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973)
(Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less
hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate
steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in
the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms,
supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern
for officer safety in this context may justify the minimal
additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of
the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without
the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent
bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger.
For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414;
perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an
occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981). Nor has Iowa shown the second
justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of
excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the
offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. [24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. [25] The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz
judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, jumped bail, the court tried her in absentia. 3
5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-
0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong
is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of
unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan,
ground. P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on
board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility
SO ORDERED. patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified
Republic of the Philippines men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a
SUPREME COURT jeep.
Manila
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers
THIRD DIVISION approached the house from where the men came and peeked
through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013 saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink
lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner, aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other
vs. at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. 4

DECISION While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a

wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner,
ABAD, J.: wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of
white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused
strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent
brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
search prompted by the police officers' chance sighting through an
Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and
ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.
testing.5
The Facts and the Case
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug
paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6
City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon
Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date
and time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when
he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it,
three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of
them shoved him and said, "Dyan ka lang, pusher ka." He was
handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his
room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the
police station and there informed them of the charges against them.
They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered
from his house.7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision 8 that found accused
Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them
to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years
and four months, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 each and the costs
of the suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of
using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession.
Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1
Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony
and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal
arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihans credible testimony
that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot
session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia.
The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a
warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision 10 on
September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial court.
The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. 11 The
accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding
accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the
police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing
drug paraphernalia.
Ruling of the Court
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that
it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw
accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the
act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the
officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating
to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested
positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into
the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the
accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no
bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused
was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest
made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two
unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City.
Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural
thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a
tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task
but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they
heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going
on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as
they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity
that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion
towards the open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open,
or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the
house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have
to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push
its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may
Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search
warrant before you can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search
warrant before searching the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before
you tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that
you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session,
Your Honor.
Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door
wide open to peep through its opening because you did not
know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting
officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without
warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest
was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity
of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November
16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime
of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1 The Court
further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he
posted for his provisional liberty.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON,"Accused-
Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the
Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with
modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the
appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under
Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of
violation of Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused not having been authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport
or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams,
51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total
weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-
EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as
"Shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which
is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose
from an alleged violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, 5 which was said to be
committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by
law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and
there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control 1.61 grams,
0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17
grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams,
0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four
point zero three grams of white crystalline substance
contained in twelve (12) transparent plastic sachets known
as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the
RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant,
however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch
41.8 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to
both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was
held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without
the parties entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector
(P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and
(3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo. 13 Thereafter,
the defense presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the
appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina
Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn
from the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1,
1998, a confidential informant went to their office and
reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in
illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that
he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a
good commission if he (the informant) would present a
potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the
information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito
Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp.
Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a
possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on
the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo,
PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la
Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of
the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias
Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on
that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda.
She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night but she
decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her
team went to the meeting place with the informant. The
members of her team positioned themselves strategically
inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp.
Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias
Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied
in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein
she would buy 250 grams of shabu for P250,000.00. They
also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys Restaurant
around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her
team went back to Cindys Restaurant. Alias Don was
already waiting for her outside the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she
had the money with her. She brought five genuine P500.00
bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play
money to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with
her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested
that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the
sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3,
1998 in front of alias Dons apartment at 765 Valdez St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western
Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for
coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing
before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that
the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch
her hair, which would signify that the deal had been
consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the
scene. The team then travelled to the address given by alias
Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m.
on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked
along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and
stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m.,
alias Don came out of the apartment with a male
companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but
P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs
first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was
carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she
found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which
contained white crystalline substance. After checking the
contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was
indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias
Don and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to
rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a
narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2
Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp.
Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias
Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he
replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF"
on the genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno
Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust
team brought them to the police station. The suspects
rights were read to them and they were subsequently
booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was
in fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his
name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being
booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the
appellants companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also
arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo
explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the
appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was
present the entire time the sale was being consummated.
Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green
plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and
uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug
specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory.
She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1
Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1
Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the
forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously
weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at
the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp.
Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the
laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of
shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually
contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a
brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated
from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and
signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the
envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga"
but she did not bother to check out what they were for or
who made them. When she interrogated the appellant about
the brown envelope, she found out that the same was
submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide
at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six
plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which
sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also
stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo
conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search
yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant.
The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a
white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and
signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same
were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2
Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp.
Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of
April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them
about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt.
Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust
team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with
alias Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda,
Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp.
Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the
members of the team that she convinced alias Don that she
was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a
second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting,
P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what
happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998,
P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with five genuine P500.00
bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo
placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name
"Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office.
When they arrived at Cindys Restaurant past 10:00 p.m.,
alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the
boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted
ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don
decided that the drug deal would take place in front of alias
Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila.
After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize
themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD
station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp.
Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo
was designated as the immediate back-up arresting officer.
The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal.
PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members
of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30
to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons
apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a
parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the apartment
gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the
street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out
of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias
Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something
but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see
something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big
brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo
then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the
buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When
PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest
of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to
recover the buy-bust money from alias Dons male
companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved
12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same
were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside
alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12
sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police
officers then informed the suspects of their rights and they
proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to
P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The
envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white
crystalline substance. When they got back to their office,
the team reported the progress of their operation to P/Supt.
Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the
required documentations were prepared. Among such
documents was the Request for Laboratory Examination of
the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was
the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on
the results of her examination of the drug specimens seized
in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr.
initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was
already assigned to another office. The results of the
examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical
Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied
the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-
98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered
that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the
drug specimens and examined the white crystalline
substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined
first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4,"
"A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos examination revealed
that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26She also examined the
contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that
also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets
were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder
inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequitos findings
were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object
and documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five
original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-
E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report 30 dated April
3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for
examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order 31 dated
September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences
Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6)
Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown
envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q);
(9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10)
Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-98 33 (Exhibit DD); (11)
Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money
(Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical
Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of
Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip 38 of
Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of
events. The appellants brief39 before the Court of Appeals
provides a concise summary of the defenses counter-
statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working
as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry
Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena
clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from
different police agencies to have their specimens examined
by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and
during regular office hours and in the absence of the
laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As
subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial
courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special
Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in
Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o?clock p.m.
Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop
at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house,
arriving at 9:45 o?clock that evening, where he saw
Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a
confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o?clock in the morning, Donalds
household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from
Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She
heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door
and thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at
Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door
to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his
room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp.
Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six
(6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they
could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug
specimens in [Donalds] possession in relation to his work
as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases
and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and
DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug
specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303
was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from
the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a
VHS player, and his wallet containing P2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the
policemen entering the apartment and apprehending Donald
and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace. 40 (Citations
omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI
Disposition Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2)
Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2);
(3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List
of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5)
Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director
Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and
(6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-
1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the
crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the
prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held
that the appellant did not present any evidence that would
show that the police officers in this case were impelled by
an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and
falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that
the volume of the shabu involved in this case was
considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal
sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the
trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the
drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police
officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive
testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug
peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latters
bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was
merely framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out
that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the
proper authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief
[Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in
Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she
issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998
(xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A.
Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the
NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said
Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and
strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to
keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or
turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have
filed the proper charges against those police officers who
were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even
bother to do the same. Further, the pieces of evidence
(Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter
dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director)
presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight
and credence considering that the said persons were not
presented in Court to identify the said documents and that
the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the
same, thus, it has no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in
Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-
164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused,
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art.
III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as
Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR
THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams,
respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor of the
government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said
shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution
sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp.
Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found
to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce
any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part
of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the
Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties on the part of the police
officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in
Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald
Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its
medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again
impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported
illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the
police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the
illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police
officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest
at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact
that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a
warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was
illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a
result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus
delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant
posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his
custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring
drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both
parties to this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no
longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in
People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them
before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was
cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is
that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section
5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in
People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver
or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking
belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent
search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should
be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.56 As
held in People v. Chua Tan Lee, 57 in a prosecution of illegal
sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused
peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of
illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and
PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was
legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to
entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer,
positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her
six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown
envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise
identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized
from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory
examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the
plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp.
Fajardos testimony on the events that transpired during the
conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and
straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in
her narration even in the face of the opposing counsels
cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the
exchange of the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust
money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery
from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of
shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated
that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the
appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12
more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested
positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was
amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account
dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both police
officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of
shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence
shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution
witnesses especially so when they are police officers who
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the
instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less
satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely
incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that,
not only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did
not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of such ill
motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures
undertaken by the appellant to criminally or administratively
charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up
for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would
not have been a daunting task for the appellant under the
circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the
appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate
supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him
from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in
evidence were mere photocopies of documents that
supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug
specimens in his custody. That the original documents and
the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all
presented in court did nothing to help the appellants case.
To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the
appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and
categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the
appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a
considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the
buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no
showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted
some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion,
the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the
facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was
in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual
findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial
court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that
the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and
Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall
be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess
or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license
or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties
for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride;
or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of
which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs
Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the
purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of
illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was found to
have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98
grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum
of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition of
either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating
circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates
that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime,
the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this case,
considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the trial courts imposition of reclusion
perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on
the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly
invoked our ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the
proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a
regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is
prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the
quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the
imposable penalty shall be as follows:
IMPOSABLE
QUANTITY
PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25
prision correccional
grams
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found
in the possession of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams,
the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the
imposable penalty on the appellant should be the
indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper
imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine
is imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty
only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case
admitted that the appellant was a regular employee of the
NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however,
cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties
in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. 66 Such a special
aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under
special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to
its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged in the
informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by
the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction
of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31,
2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004]PROV. PROSECUTOR
DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant, vs. Judge ELIODORO
G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch
72 respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By a Sworn Complaint[1] dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial
Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of
the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross
ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by Order [2] of July 9, 1997,
Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw,
et al., for illegal entry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97
[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599 which established the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension
of the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone,
respondent virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal
jurisdiction to the Chinese government.[3]
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as
he has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse
of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure,
complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires
lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three
months or ninety days from date of submission.
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable
cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act
No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act).[4]
Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him
(complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 634-99, People v.
Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to handle the
prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman.
By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000,
[5]
respondent contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate
the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject
thereof.
On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-
97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal has not yet
been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting
claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an
inter-country agreement determining the common boundaries of the
Exclusive Economic Zone.[6]
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his
July 9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No.
212-97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the
accused were already released from detention. He further points out
that during the pendency of said motion, representatives of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office
was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it
was suggesting an amendment of the order.[7] Respondent explains
though that since the accused had already been released from
detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA
was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the motion
had already become academic.
As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition
for bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation,
which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set
by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which
there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and that as
the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable
offense, respondent granted him bail.
As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No.
634-99, respondent explains that he had already reconsidered the
same through his February 10, 2000 Order,[8] he having earlier failed
to see petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report,[9] the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found, as to the first charge, that it was not
shown that respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith
sufficient to find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having
appeared that respondent based his dismissal order on his
interpretation of a provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as
respondents conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or
reason, and unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith,
[10]
he could not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA
hastened to add, however, that respondent is nonetheless required
to act on the motion for reconsideration.
As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of
Court requires a movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties
concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof,
hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without
hearing the prosecutions side.
Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents
explanations were fraught with inconsistencies since his allegation
that he failed to see complainants designation as Ombudsman-
Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17,
2000 Order[11] wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by
the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in
fact noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order
reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after
the latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.
The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED
in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
By Resolution of February 26, 2003, [12] this Court noted the OCA
Report and required the parties to MANIFEST within twenty (20)
days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003, [13] complainant proffered
additional charges against respondent and submitted in support
thereof, among other things an administrative complaint filed by one
Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders
issued by respondent. Dr. Rosetes complaint, which was addressed
to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant
submitted the case for decision.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this
Court received an undated manifestation[14] of respondent stating that
he was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed in the case.
This Courts Findings
I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon
judges that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe
it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are
supposed to apply to a given controversy.[15] They are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain
the desired professional competence.[16]
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of
Crim. Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a
matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party
aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court,
not file an administrative complaint.[17]
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous.[18] Only in cases where the error is gross or
patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith
may administrative sanctions be imposed.[19] There is no showing
that this was the case here.
With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for
Reconsideration of the order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-
97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his Reply
to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in
this wise:
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese
fishermen were not yet released from detention. It was during the pendency
of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were allowed to leave by the Chief
of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our representation that they should not
be released from jail as another case for illegal fishing was still pending
investigation. . . . The representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely
wanted to convey to Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of
dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and
national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon
publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas as
evidenced of an article which appeared in the July 13, 1997 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is hereto attached as Annex A
and made integral part hereof.
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer
interested in the setting aside of his Order of dismissal. In fact, the Motion
for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal was already filed in his
Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July 1997 submitting the said
Motion for resolution. Copy of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto
attached as Annex B and made integral part hereof. Since the said Motion
for Reconsideration of his Order of dismissal was already considered by
him as submitted for resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should
have resolved one way or the other, the said motion. [20] (Underscoring
supplied)
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already
released at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration did
not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued an
order stating that it was submitted for resolution.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose of
their cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing which
they are liable for gross inefficiency.[21]
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of
judicial business are complied with, this Court laid down guidelines in
SC Administrative Circular No. 13[22] which provides, inter alia, that:
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all
cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be
decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so. (Underscoring supplied)
This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-
99[23] which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe
which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
speedy disposition of their cases.[24]
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent is liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order
which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no
charge has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-
detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought.
[25]
So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca[26] instructs:
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is
on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other
words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice
and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)[27]
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim.
Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. [28] Given the filing
of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be
said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable
notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of
the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that
the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to
comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt
is strong.[29]
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no
period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a
reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement
of a three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule
15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice,
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call
for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances
of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense
committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in
the hands of the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation
of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, [30] which is punishable by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for
statutory rape[31] qualified by relationship which is punishable by
death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail,
the prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure [32] which is a serious charge
under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries
the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part
of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of
more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[33]
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a
judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is
entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, [34] against the
right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements.[35]
III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from
the Ombudsman in Crim. Case No. 634-99
The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on
the matter is well taken.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, [36] the
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the
government service for assistance. [37] Section 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator
or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall
be under his supervision and control.
It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero endorsed Case No.
OMB-1-98-2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the
instruction to file the Information and to prosecute the case. [38] The
indorsement included an order to submit a monthly report to the
Office of the Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case.
Respondents December 17, 1999 Order [39] which states, inter
alia, as follows:
The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby directed to
designate any of the Assistant Prosecutors of the City Prosecutors Office to
take the place of Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z. Floresta. While
Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been deputized by the Office of the
Ombudsman to prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such
authority. Instead, it appears that such designation was merely based on the
premise that the offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as
erroneously indicated in the original Information filed with this Court.
Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor
Floresta himself, shows that the place of the commission of the offense
charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor does
not have the authority to continue prosecuting this case for the People of the
Philippines (Section 2, Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For
this reason, the Office of the City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch
as the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged.[40] (Underscoring supplied),
shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation,
hence, belying his explanation that he must have overlooked the
same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the
Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special
reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any
prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.
It would appear though from respondents above-quoted
December 17, 1999 Order that he was of the belief that it was the
City Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had
territorial jurisdiction over the offense. It is in this light that he is given
the benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was motivated
by malice or bad faith.
With respect to the charges raised against respondent in
complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by which complainant
submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino
Rosete and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While
Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows the
institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous
complaint, the veracity of Rosetes complaint is doubtful as it does
not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous
complaint.
Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court
is unable to pass upon them as complainant merely submitted
photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly
and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations
of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of
Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY
of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the
law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording
the prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
 SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004]
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant,
vs. Judge ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn
complaint[1] dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge
Alejandrino C. Cabebe,[2] then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that
Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or
regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet
Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn
Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment,
all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with
this Court a petition for change of venue but was denied in a
Resolution dated August 13, 2001. [3] On October 8, 2001, the
accused filed a motion for reconsideration. [4] In the meantime, the
proceedings before respondents court were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking
as ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5,
2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order[5] granting bail
to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or
property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge
issued the Order without the accuseds application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration.
[6]
Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order
inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that
what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that
respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,[7] respondent denied the charges. While
admitting that he issued the Order dated November 5, 2002 granting
bail to the accused without any hearing, the same was premised on
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There was
delay in the proceedings due to complainants frequent absences and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court,
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not
object to the grant of bail to the accused. [8] He added that the
administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is
not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order.
Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government
service, he prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed
upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution[9] dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and
required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties
submitted the required manifestations that they are submitting the
case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,[10] we held that
jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.
[11]
It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases
where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter
to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. [12] In fact, even in
cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be
held.[13]
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the
accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as
follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall
any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under
section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing
to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a)
In Cortes vs. Catral,[14] we laid down the following rules outlining
the duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise
the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the
courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. [15]
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and
procedure enumerated in Cortes.[16] He did not conduct a hearing
before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution
of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of
evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. [17]
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of
bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable
for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,[18] we held that the failure to raise or the
absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an
application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail
hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the
granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without hearing.
This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail.
Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a
hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of
the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the
grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting
the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court
to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6,
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the
amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that
these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether
or not to grant bail.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the
alleged absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the
grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to
their right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing.
He blames the prosecution for the delay.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication
in the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was
delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is
utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has
been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and
the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very
nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his
duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts
clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with
knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality. We ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have
acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the right of a
litigant.[19] A perusal of the records, specifically the assailed Order,
hardly shows that any of these incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that
to constitute such infraction, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his
official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption. [20] In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.[21] we
categorically held that good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge. In Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee,[22] we ruled that a judge may
not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order
he renders. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the
assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more
important, it must be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
some other similar motive. Complainant, having failed to present
positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting bail without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the
same. It is merely based on complainants speculation. Mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove this charge. The only exception to
the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice, [23] which are not present
here.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme
Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative offense is
considered a less serious charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and
Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same Rules, thus:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges includ
4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
Sec. 11. Sanctions.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now
retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is
hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
 Corona, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify
the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in
Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December
20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post
bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ),
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic
of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts
of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an
Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI
agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the
petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest
against private respondent. The Decision became final and
executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further
erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the
following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer
the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate
the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order
dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that
the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail
shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion
to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice,
held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings,"
thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected
to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even
in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century,
has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the
past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World
War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under
the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person
is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of
the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail
 to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a
Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After
noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the
Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who
has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used
"is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail
was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies
to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee
is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal,
for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly
to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized
by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee
may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September
23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when
the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had
been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of
due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the
accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major
premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his
bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
x--------------------------------------------
------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks
to reverse and set aside the Resolution [1] of herein respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal
Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy
Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for brevity), as effectively reiterated
inits Resolution[2] of May 30, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The factual antecedents which gave rise to this

proceeding are set forth in the Courts Decision[3] of February
EN BANC 26, 2002, in G.R. No. 148965, to wit:

In November 2000, as an offshoot of the

impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158754
Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his
Petitioner,
associates, friends and conspirators were filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman.
- versus -
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE Resolution finding probable cause warranting the
JINGGOY ESTRADA, filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the
Respondents. other respondents therein. One of the Informations
was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act
Promulgated: [RA] No. 7080 and among the respondents was
herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then
August 10, 2007 mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18,
2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case
was assigned to [the] respondent Third Division of
the Sandiganbayan. xxx. (Emphasis added.)
The amended information referred to, like the
original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with
the former President and several others, with
plunder, defined and penalized under RA No. 7080,
as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659, allegedly
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January,
2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, ,
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR
A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS,FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, ,
[and] JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration
OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public
funds [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing
a portion of the [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under
by
R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie
Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
OR
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
or COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKB
ACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
the amount of MORE OR
LESS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.[4]
What transpired next are narrated in the same February 26,
2002 Decision in G.R. No. 148965, thus:
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a
warrant of arrest for [Jinggoy] and his co-accused. On
its basis, [Jinggoy] and his co-accused were placed in
custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for
plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or
combination of overt or criminal acts as required in
R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. [He] prayed that he be excluded from
the Amended Information . In the alternative, [he]
also prayed that he be allowed to post bail ..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a Motion to Resolve
Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-
Bailable Offense As To Him.
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying [Jinggoys] Motion to Quash and
Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion. [His]
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing
after arraignment of all accused. xxx
The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for
reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent
court denied the motion and proceeded to
arraign [him]. [He] refused to make his plea
prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not
guilty for him.[5] (Emphasis and words in brackets
added)
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately
adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari
before this Court claiming that the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators with whom
he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for
him. Pending resolution of this petition, docketed as G.R. No.
148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons. The
Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in
September 2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on
the motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of
the Makati Medical Center appearing as sole witness for
Jinggoy.[6]
On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court
an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition
for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He
reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the
Sandiganbayan. On the same day, the Court referred the
motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed
said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the
morning of December 21, 2001.[7]
The report was submitted as directed. Attached to
the Report was a copy of the Sandiganbayans Resolution
dated December 20, 2001 denying Jinggoys motion for bail
for lack of factual basis. According to the graft court, basing
its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy
failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court
that the medical condition of the accused requires that he
be confined at home and for that purpose that he be
allowed to post bail. [8]
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No.
148965, on the following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or
denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies
with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to
[Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The
hearings on which respondent court based
its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved
the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months
ago. The records do not show that evidence on
petitioners guilt was presented before the lower
court.
Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent
Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of [Jinggoys] guilt is strong
as to warrant the granting of bail to [him].[9]
(Underscoring and words in brackets added).
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus
Application for Bail [10] against which the prosecution filed its comment and
opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission
by the parties of their respective memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution[11] of March 6, 2003, respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus application for bail,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the facts and applicable
law and jurisprudence, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADAs
OMNIBUS APPLICATION FOR BAIL dated April 16,
2002 is GRANTED. Bail for accused-movant is fixed at
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) to be
paid in cash and his release is ordered upon the
posting thereof and its approval, unless movant is
being held for some other legal cause.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent
court denied via the herein equally assailed May 30, 2003 Resolution,[12] the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the prosecutions
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [RE: GRANT OF JOSE
JINGGOY ESTRADAS PETITION FOR BAIL] dated 13
March 2003 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition on the submission[13] that
respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction -
IN GRANTING BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA,[CONSIDERING] THE WELL-ESTABLISHED
THEORY OF OVERLAPPING CONSPIRACIES AND, THUS,
GRIEVOUSLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF
ACCEPTED CRIMINAL LAW PRECEPTS AND THEREBY
SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE
CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA
POINTED TO A CONCURRENCE OF SENTIMENT OR
CRIMINAL DESIGN INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA
AND JINGGOY ESTRADA.
WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA CONSIDERING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACT
CLEARLY EVIDENCES THAT RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA, EVEN WITHOUT A FINDING OF
CONSPIRACY, IS EQUALLY GUILTY AND LIABLE AS
ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA HIMSELF BY HIS
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION AND/OR DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
OF PLUNDER.
WHEN IT LIMITED THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
EVIDENCE, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL [LIABILITY]
OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, TO
SUBPARAGRAPH A OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.
The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public
respondent is untenable.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution mandates: Section 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may
justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.
[14]
Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed
Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy
does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a
flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court
wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy]
has, in general, been consistently respectful of the Court
and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or
by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would
necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal
circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case
seems remote if not nil.[15]
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is
now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes
stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail are
shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes
of the people for as long as they can flee from the
retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a
reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve
are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot
accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular
mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give
up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from
justice.
Petitioners first argument denigrates as grave abuse of
discretion the public respondents rejection of the theory of
overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a
picture of a conspirator in the first level of conspiracy
performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of,
another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not
an active party. As the petitioners logic goes following this
theory, respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring
with former President Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth from jueteng under par. (a) of the amended
information. He has also a culpable connection with the
conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco
excise tax and in receiving commissions and kickbacks from
the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation
shares and other illegal sources under par. (c) and (d),
albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And
since the central figure in the overlapping
conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a
capital offense, all those within the conspiracy loop would be
considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable
offense.
Explaining its point, petitioner cites People
v. Castelo[16] which, as here, also involves multiple levels of
conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead
accused is a former President no less, the prime suspect
in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government
official a former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent
capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary
of National Defense, to be precise. In Castelo, charges and
countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo
and Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present
Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo in a scandal
case. Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While away,
someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a
conspiracy led by a certain Ben Ulo (who appears to be the
mastermind) and a group of confidential agents of the
Department of National Defense, one of whom was the
triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard
of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General tagged Ben Ulo
(not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This
notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive
for desiring Monroys demise. The conspiracy between
Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping
with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential
agents, one of whom was the triggerman.
Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies,
petitioner cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui Wong,
[17]
featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and
Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila
for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of
Mariano was found with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley
in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among Sampaloc
hoodlums who had no direct link with Victor. However, one
of the neighbors of the Sampaloc hoodlums was a classmate
of Victor. In the end, on the basis of interlocking confessions,
the Court found Victor and his classmate together with all
the Sampaloc hoodlums guilty of murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under
the premises, petitioner presently argues:
It should be noted that this is the same scenario of
accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with former Gov.
Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes
(jueteng protection money); and of former Gov.
Singson involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet
another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e.,
the regular collection of jueteng protection money for
accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy
between accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson,
agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of
bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate
beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada
reached an agreement with former Gov. Singson,
executed the plan and participated in furtherance of
the conspiracy for the receipt and collection
of jueteng protection money, i.e., collecting P3 Million
in jueteng protection money every month; remitting
P2 Million thereof to former Gov. Singson for delivery
to accused Joseph Estrada and retaining P1 Million
thereof for himself.
Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada
should have been denied bail since he is as guilty
and liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-
bailable offense of Plunder.[18]
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not
on all-fours applicable to and of governing sway to the issue
of the propriety of revoking Jinggoys release on bail.
As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the
provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his virtual
acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is
wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the
guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the
evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the
propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against
the bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui
Wong. And in the present case, respondent Sandiganbayan
is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of
the main case. In the words of the public respondent:
As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically
stated herein that in making the above
pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not
making any judgment as to the final outcome of this
case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with
respect to accused Estrada. This Court
[Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine
whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt
is strong as to warrant his temporary release on
bail. xxx.[19]
Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the
petitioner urges, which necessarily implies that the evidence
of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting
the Sandiganbayans ongoing determination of the facts and
merits of the main case.
Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the
possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the crime of
Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their
respective logical conclusions, tend to cancel each other
out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite
of the other. For while the second argument attempts to
establish an implied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his
father - hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the
third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but
respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally guilty as
President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation
and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.
By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.[20] Venturing into the
gray areas of the concept of conspiracy, petitioner cites the
following obiter defining implied conspiracy, thus:
When by their acts, two or more persons proceed
toward the accomplishment of the same felonious
object, with each doing his act, so that their acts
though seemingly independent were in fact
connected, showing a closeness of formal association
and concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be
inferred.[21]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy
may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently
indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed
by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert is
proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.
[22]
From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds
to present voluminous documents and transcripts of
stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had
been deep inside the web of implied conspiracy under the
second argument of this petition. From the implied
conspiracy theory, it then shifts gears to embrace the
equally guilty hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.
Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner
may have in mind, the fundamental principle that the Court
is not a trier of facts remains. Petitioners second and third
arguments are to be sure relevant to the proceedings for the
grant or denial of bail that were pending before in the
Sandiganbayan. They are of little moment here where the
only issue now is whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting bail
to the private respondent.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated
only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced
in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation
of the right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant
of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the
same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of
the evidence after full trial on the merits. As jurisprudence
teaches:
Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and
should not prevent the trial judge from making a final
assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is
not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person
granted bail is convicted in due course. [23]
Petitioners last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have
the Court reverse in this case its earlier holding in another
case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs,
charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his other co-accused
with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names
all the accused, while the second paragraph
describes in general how plunder was committed and
lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in
detail the predicate acts that constitute the
crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in
each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in
the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money from
illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration
or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly
names petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of
the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of
diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two
predicate acts that of ordering the (GSIS) and the
(SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions
from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde
account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the
enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly
committed by the former President in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph
(d) alleged the predicate act that the former
President unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same
under his account name Jose Velarde at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the
offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section
1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended
Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual
acts, conspired with former President Estradato
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth . As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired
with each other to enable the former President
to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of
this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for
the conspiracy entered into by the other accused
with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to
its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information which were allegedly
done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.[24] (Emphasis
added.)
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so
as to implicate individual respondent for predicate acts
described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended
Information, petitioner now argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the
proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and
opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate
and later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses
whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the
other constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the
Amended Information under sub-paragraphs b, c and
d.[25]
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded
benefits to respondent Jinggoy that were inexistent at the
start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as
the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as
couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent
Jinggoys participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings
involving sub-paragraphs b, c and d, did not change the
legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the
Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R.
No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged
and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy,
the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be
penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. [26] In fine, all
that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no
more than to implement his right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the
Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding
in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the ill
effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the
Amended Information.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings
and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions evidence, it
determined that the evidence against individual respondent
was not strong and, on the basis of that determination,
resolved to grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made
by the respondent court which adds an appropriate
dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this
recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed resolution of March
6, 2003:
Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time,
there looms the possibility that, in case of conviction,
[respondent Jinggoys] criminal liability would
probably not warrant the death penalty or reclusion
perpetua. (Underscoring in the original; Words in
bracket added).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS
ALAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition
for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007 Decision 1 and
the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97761 that affirmed the trial courts Orders of January 24, 31,
February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
Petitioner was, by Information 3 of January 16, 2007, charged with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to
which the case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda,
forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was
placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical
Center.5
After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court
approved,6 he was released from detention, and his arraignment was
set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to
allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24,
20078 deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the prosecution
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and
submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia;
and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the
first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutors
recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court
resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant
him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation and
thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable
cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge
Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information.11
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz:
(1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted the Amended
Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of
arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 200714 which set the arraignment
on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via
supplemental petition before the appellate court.
The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition, hence, his
present petition, arguing that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE
THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN
THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH
THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO
BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR VELASCOS
AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST,
AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT,
CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS
ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE
QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED
INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCOS FINDINGS IN
HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY
BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES,
WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE
BEING ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION,
RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the
original omitted)
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007
pushed through during which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the
trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela 16 which the
trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21,
2007,17 it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is
not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount
of P300,000 for his provisional liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the
appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended
Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found
petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the
appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the
pendency of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioners application
which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March
17, 2010.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the
present petition had been rendered moot since the presentation of
evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been
concluded.18
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished
from mootness of the petition, for in the present case, petitioner did
not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation. An application for or admission
to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early
as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the
regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity
of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his
arrest under the Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them
prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007,
petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were
still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial
court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from
questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish
his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only
proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily
and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other
explanation of his conduct is possible.20
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a
valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a
definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than
its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and
convincing proof that petitioners participation in the trial was
unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
abandon his petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still
moved for the early resolution of the present petition. 21
Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies
against the trial courts Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to
operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary
relinquishment of petitioners principal prayer. The non-issuance of
such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not
preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution. 23 Consequently,
the trial of the case took its course.
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial courts
rendition of judgment.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.24
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended
Information for murder operates as a supervening event that mooted
the present petition. Assuming that there is ground 25 to annul the
finding of probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or
value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying the case
under the original Information for homicide just to arrive, more likely
or even definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. Mootness
would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder, for
proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable
cause, would have been established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of
mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the legal issues in order to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
public.26 In the present case, there is compelling reason to clarify the
remedies available before and after the filing of an information in
cases subject of inquest.
After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed
issuances, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the four trial court Orders.
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution
has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an
accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the
remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an
offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such
investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance
with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may
ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from
the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this
Rule. (underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint
or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is
at least four years, two months and one day without regard to
fine.28 As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a
preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a
warrant29 involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest,
where available, has been conducted.30
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation
conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons
arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest
issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said
persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court.31
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both
the arrested person and the private complainant during the brief
period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them
before and after the filing of a complaint or information in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN
COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating with
the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latters conduct
of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of
a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial
authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious
reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since
he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the
provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or
information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable
period,32 belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and
the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with either the
prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of
the arrested person.33 Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for
a motion for reconsideration.34
Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should have
appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately
available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by
"petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides
that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject
of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating
the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private
complainant may pursue the case through the regular course of a
preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the
rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to ask for a
preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of
its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent,
however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as
respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right
to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for
reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a
witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for
the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in
court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has
the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in cases where the
private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal
action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private
complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused,
trial prosecutors must "examine the Information vis--vis the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the
necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information
is sufficient in form and substance."41
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error
would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the
preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by
the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the
prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why
such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that
such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken
into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor
can and should institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this
power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise
of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors.43
The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite,
however.44 The standing principle is that once an information is filed
in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Interestingly,
petitioner supports this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case
that:
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal
or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case
is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal.
For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed
in court, once the case had already been brought therein any
disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and
approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.
xxxx
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be
conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the
court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution
finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause
the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be
taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.46 (underscoring supplied)
While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial
is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized
that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a
motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought
the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped
with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition
thereof,48 subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting
proposed course of action.
Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal
information as what happened in the present case, the Courts
holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature
of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies
of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (emphasis supplied)
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without
leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment
may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the
accused.50
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for
quashal.51 An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon
the trial court is likewise impermissible.52
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended
even in substance and even without leave of court at any time before
entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at
that stage is a mere superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation be it a
complete disposition or an intermediate modification 53 of the charge
is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the
determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the
prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to
adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the
appropriate motion to be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a
substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law
demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be
admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation,
unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is
included in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the
Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the
prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The
following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4)
an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right
of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment
is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise
or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related
does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of his right
to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that
both the original Information and the amended Information
in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the
Information from homicide to murder is "one of substance with very
serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present
case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the
offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and
material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the
chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely
clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the prosecutions
original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but
the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v.
CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the caption
of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered
substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the
Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were
already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed
out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use
of superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the
amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of
these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is
required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a
reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the
Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether
there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. 60 What is essential is that
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made known to him
as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite
notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings
and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do
not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a
preliminary investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as
efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the
complainants evidence was accorded him.62
In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the
hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC Orders despite the
pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari
challenging the first two trial court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary retraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued. 63 The appellate court,
by Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied petitioners application
for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved futile. 65 The
appellate court thus did not err in finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with the
case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there
being no injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover,
petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-
inquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and which
could have suspended the arraignment.661avvphi1
Regarding petitioners protestations of haste, suffice to state that the
pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an indication of
bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial
officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains
as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard
of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official
actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it
was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or
shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of
not just one but five state prosecutors.68
There is no ground for petitioners protestations against the DOJ
Secretarys sudden designation of Senior State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the
present case69 and the latters conformity to the motion for
reinvestigation.
In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the
public prosecutor who will conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary
investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm
of the executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice 71 who is
vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or
designate an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which
broad power of control has been recognized by jurisprudence. 72
As for the trial courts ignoring the DOJ Secretarys uncontested
statements to the media which aired his opinion that if the assailant
merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would
have sufficed the DOJ Secretary reportedly uttered that "the filing
of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I
told you to watch over that case there should be a report about the
ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then thats not a complete
investigation, thats why you should use that as a ground" no
abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination
to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause." 73 On
the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of
securing basic investigative reports to support a finding of probable
cause. The original Resolution even recognized that probable cause
for the crime of murder cannot be determined based on the evidence
obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough investigation is
conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.]" 74
The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at
the back of his head, the absence of paraffin test and ballistic
examination, and the handling of physical evidence," 75 as
rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient
circumstances that require further inquiry.
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed
in the bail hearings does not affect the prior determination of
probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the
standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to
an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.76
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not
conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of
probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new
evidence adduced during the reinvestigation.
Petitioners argument is specious.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive
and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one
made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.77
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable
cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge
is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the
presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court
is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.80
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the
basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that
probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused
before any warrant may be issued. 82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a
matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of
probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records
should be [since t]he extent of the judges examination depends on
the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case
require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence
or absence of probable cause within such periods. The
Sandiganbayans determination of probable cause is made ex
parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should
not be stymied and distracted from his determination of
probable cause by needless motions for determination of
probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing
that no circumstances exist that would qualify the crime from
homicide to murder.
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence
deserves no credence, because new pieces of evidence are not
prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material
that no new matter or evidence was presented during the
reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation,
as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the
case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a
reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review
and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. 85
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review on certiorari
since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review
the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue of the absence or
presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional
circumstances to warrant a factual review.86
In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the
appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to
stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment. 87 The courts duty in the
pertinent case is confined to determining whether the executive and
judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is
possible that error may be committed in the discharge of lawful
functions, this does not render the act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.88
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
 JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and
during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14,
20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause
be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying
Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
8
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail , 12 both dated July 7, 2014,
which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In
support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to
post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal ,
not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed
resolution denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In
fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily,
no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly
premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that
may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said
that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances
will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his
bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must
also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a
flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior
showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles
Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed
resolution to deny Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis
the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for
certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to
fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if ever) is
strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight
risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is
entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the
Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes
under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right
to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and
that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that
he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail
is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be
granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of
it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted
in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused
from committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough
to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the
accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of
the Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that,
under the law existing at the time of its commission and the
application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of
right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or
not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the
Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma , 30 "such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that
bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has
been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court
already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged
with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder
case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without
bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on
the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended
only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits
the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must
be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation
of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute
it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or
not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate
these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is
neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a
summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated
in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that
might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant
clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could
entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua , 37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court
is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized
the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but
also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction
is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his
utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the
Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as
a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on
multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex
1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate
on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia,
because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications JUSTICE MARTIRES:
associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate
a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) Why?
exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen PSUPT. JOCSON:
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma
or COPD.43 Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him
the best.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced
age and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement JUSTICE MARTIRES:
at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, 44 was not
even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the
medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows: present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
DR. SERVILLANO:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
Hospital?
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
DR. SERVILLANO:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
No, Your Honor.
DR. SERVILLANO:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities
confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ? to do those things, Your Honor.45

PSUPT. JOCSON: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
No, Your Honor. charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The
Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular
case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should,
regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence
the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ; 47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute
to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal,
early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that
the petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples
Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent
and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples
Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was
evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for
bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has
adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against
Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in
which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that
they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison
would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident
and we consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail. 48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of
his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his
defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in
court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be
had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused
to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail
without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time
realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles
Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where cause.
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS No pronouncement on costs of suit.
the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING
and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan SO ORDERED.
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon