Philipine Airlines Inc., Vs.

Civil Aeronotics Board (CAB)

G.R No. 119528 March 26, 1997

FACTS: On November 24, 1994, GrandAir applied for a Certificate of a

Public Convenience and Necessity with the board, which application was docketed
as CAB case NO. EP-12711. Accordingly, the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued
a Notice of Hearing setting the application for initial hearing on December 16, 1994
and directing GrandAir to serve a copy of the application and corresponding notice
to all scheduled Philippine Operators. On December 14, 1994 , Grand air filled its
compliance and requested for the issuance of TOP of temporary Order Permit
Philippine Airlines (PAL), a holder of legislative franchise to operate air transport
services, filed an opposition to the application for a certificate of Public Convenience
and necessity on Dec. 16, 1995, on the ground that the CAB has no jurisdiction to
hear the petitioners application until the latter ha first obtained a franchise to
operate from congress:

At the initial hearing of the application, petitioner raised the

issue of lack of jurisdiction of the board to hear the application, because GrandAir
did not process a legislative franchise.

On December 20, 1994, the chief Haring Officer of CAB issued

an order denying petitioners opposition. Pertinent portion of order states: PAL
alleges that the CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the petitioners application until the
latter has first obtained a franchise to operate from legislative or congress. The
court ruled that the CAB has the jurisdiction to rule over the said application.

In the case of Avia Filipina vs CAB, it has been ruled that under
sec. 10 ( c ) ( 1 ) of R.A. 776 , the board possesses this specific power and duty. In
view thereof the opposition of PAL on this ground is hereby denied.

ISSUE: WON, the congress, in enacting R.A. 776, has delegated the
authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the
respondent board, such that Congressional man. Date for the approval of such
authority is no longer necessary

RULING: The congress has delegated the authority to authorize the

operation of domestic air transport service to CAB by enacting the R.A 776.

The congress has granted certain administrative agencies the

power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. It
is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state
through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises
has frequently been delegated. Even to agencies other than those of legislative
nature In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by
local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as
through the grant had been made by an act of the legislature.
 The trend of modern legislation is to rest the Public services
Commissioner with the power to regulate and control the operation of public
services under reasonable rules and regulation and, as a general rule, courts will not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and
founded upon a legal right.

The court find that the CAB has the authority to issue a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity, or TOP to domestic air transport operator, who
, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all other requirements
prescribed by law.

There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates

that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate
as a domestic air transport operator. Franchise issued by congress is not required
before each and every public utility may operate.

The franchise is a legislative grant, whether made directly by

legislative itself, or by any one of its properly constituted instrumentalities. The
grant, when made, binds the public, directly or indirectly, the art of state.

Congress, giving the respondent Board the power to issue permits

for the operation of domestic services, has delegated to the said body the authority
to determine the capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport
operator to engage in such venture. This is not an instance of transforming the
respondent board into a mini legislative body, with unbridled authority to choose
who should be given authority to operate domestic air transport services.

To be valid, the delegation itself must be circumscribed by

legislative restrictions, not a roving commission that will give the delegate
unlimited legislative authority. It must not be a delegation running riot and not
canalized with banks that keep it from over-flowing. Otherwise, the delegation is in
legal effect an abdication of legislative authority, a total surrender by the legislative
of its prerogatives in favor of the delegate.
 Elision F. Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza P. laguardia

G.R. # 164785 April 29, 2009

Facts: August 10,2004, at around 10:00 pm, petitioner, host of the

program Ang dating Daan, aired on UNTV37 made the following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling :

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae, o

diba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael
ang gumagana ang itaas, o diba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito. xx

Two days after he said airing, separate but almost identical

affidavit complaints were lodge by Jessie L. Glapon and 7 other private respondents,
all Iglesia ni Cristo, against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Michael M. Sandoval, respondent felt directly alluded to in petitioner remarks, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the said TV program.

MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of hearing in relation to

the alleged use of some cuss word in the august 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating
Daan. After the preliminary conference, MTRCB suspended the program for 20
days. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, but after
2 days, he withdraws the said petition followed by the filling with the court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order.

MTRCB, in connection to the administrative case, against

petitioner ruled that the show is suspended for 3 months.

ISSUE: WON, the preventive suspension imposed against petitioner and

the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid in as much as P.D 1986 does not
expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

HELD: the court ruled that the petitioners contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial or a mix of the 5, as may
be conferred by the constitution or by a statute. They have in fine only such powers
or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the
law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be literally
construed.

A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals

the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the
challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from,
and is necessary for the exercise of its power of regulation and supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the

scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more
particularly under sec. 3(d) which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and
grant, deny or cancel, permits for the xxx exhibition and/or television broadcast of
all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no
such pictures, programs and material as are determined by the board to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph ( c ) hereof shall be xxx exhibit and(or
broadcast by television.

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension form part of the

MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its
investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate.
Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise or discipline
illusory.

Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by

itself. Being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and the
power to discipline and impose penalties IF granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.
 Valenton Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

G.R # L-75697 June 18, 1987

FACTS: This case is a petition filled by a petitioner on behalf of video gram

operators adversely affected by R.D No. 1987 with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the

amended the Natl Internal revenue code Provide that ; sec. 134 video tapes there
shall be collected on each processed an annual tax of P15.00; provided, that locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. Sec. 10,
tax on sale, lease or disposition of videograms-not-withstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of 30 % of the purchase price or
rental rate, as the case maybe, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram
containing a reproduction of a motion picture or audiovisual program. 50% of the
proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other 50% shall
accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; Provided, that in Metropolitan
Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the city or municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to restrain the

proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others,
video tapes, disc, cassettes or any technical improvements or variation thereof have
greatly prejudiced the operation of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a short decline in theatrical attendance by at least 40% and
a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial loses estimated of P.450M annually in
government revenues.

Videograms established collectively earned around P.600M per

annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the government of approximately
P180M in taxes each year.
 The unregulated activities of videograms establishment have also
affected the viability of the movie industry. Petitioners attack the constitutionality of
the decree and one of the grounds they raised is that there is undue delegation of
power and authority.

ISSUE: WON, there is undue delegation of power and authority.

RULING: Neither can it be successfully argued that the decree contais a

undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec. 11 of the decree of
authority to the board to solicit the direct assistance of other government agencies
and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heals
or personnel of such agencies and unit to perform enforcement functions of the
board is not a delegation of power to legislative but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion a to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done, to the latte, no valid objection can be made,
besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the board to solicit
such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies
concerned being subject to the discretion and control of the board. That the grant
of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize
the decree as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties
will not be without adequate remedy in law.
 Rizal Empire Insurance Group vs. NLRC

GR No. L-73140 May 29, 1987

FACTS: in August, year 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria

was hired by petitioner as a casual employee with a salary of P100,00 a day. On Jan
1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as a clerk-typist.
Being permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner companys
General information, Office behavior and other rules and regulations. In the same
year, without change in his position designation, he was transferred to the claims
department and his salary was increase. In 1980, he was transferred to the
underwriting department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost
of living allowance, until he was transferred to the fire department as filing clerk. In
July 1983, he was an inspector of the fire division with a monthly salary of P685 plus
allowance and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent was dismissed from

work, allegedly, in the round of tardiness, and unexcused absence. Accordingly, he
fled a complaint with the Ministry of labor and Employment (MOLE) and in decision
of labor arbiter Teodorico Ruiz, reinstated him to his position and back wages.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the NLRC but in Resolutions in dated November 15,
1985, the said appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed
out of time hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON, NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal on technicality
RULING: The court ruled that NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal on a
technicality

Rule 8 of Revised Rules of NLRC on appeal provides: sec. 9( a )

appeal decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executor unless
appealed to the commission by any or both of the parties within 10 calendar days
from receipt of notice thereof. Sec 6 No extension of period. no motion or request
for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer, petitioner herein received a

copy of the decision of the labor arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a motion for
extension of time to file the Memorandum of appeal on April 22, 185. Pursuant to
the No extension policy of the NLRC, aforesaid motion was denied and the appeal
was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of NLRC are dear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation.

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in Administrative law that

administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and one entitled
to great respect.

Under the above quoted provision of the revised NLRC Rules, the
decision appealed from in this case has become final and executed and can no
longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor arbiter appears to be

correct; the consistent promotions in ranks and salary of the private respondent
indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained
despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. The perfection cannot after
all be demanded.
 Smart Communication Inc., vs National Telecom Commission (NTC)

G.R No. 151908 August 12, 2003

FACTS: Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corp. filed
against the NTC, an action for declaration of nullify of NTC Memorandum Circular no
B-6-2000 and the NTC Memorandum dated Oct. 6, 2000 with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction and Temporary Restraining Order ( TRO ). The
complaint was filled at the RTC of the Quezon City.

The Memorandum Circular no. B-6-2000 states the following:

1. That the filling statement shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone
services not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle and in case
the statement is received beyond the period. The subscriber shall have
specified grace period and the Public telecommunication entity ( PTE ) shall
not be allowed to disconnect the services within the grace period.
2. That there shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox,
voice prompt. Recorded messages or similar facility excluding the customer
own equipment.
3. That PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of
prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least
2 years from the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given
45 days from the date the prepaid SIM cards is fully consumed but not
beyond 2 years and 45 days from the date of first use to replenish the SIM
 cards, otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an
invalid SIM card shall be installed upon the request of the costumer of no
additional charge.
4. That subscriber shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards, before
the start of every call using the cards.
5. That unit of billing for the circular mobile telephone services whether
postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per value to 6 seconds
per pulse.

The memorandum issued on October 6, 2000 states that This to

remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on, Oct. 7, 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use pursuant
to memorandum Circular b-6-2000. In addition, all CMTS operators are
reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct.
7, 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first
use. Also, the billing unit shall be on 6 seconds pulse effective Oct. 7, 2000.
IslaCOM and PILTEL alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the consumer Act of the Philippines, that
said billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violate of the Constitution
Prohibition against deprivation of property without due process and that the
said bill will results to impairment of the viability of the prepaid SIM and call
cards. They prayed to declare the bill Nul and void ab initio. Globe Telecom
Inc and smart Communication Inc filed a motion for leave to intervene and it
was granted.
RTC issued a TRO against NTC. NTC file a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of petitioner failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
But it was denied by the RTC but the petitioner application for preliminary
injuction was granted but they are required to file a bond in the sum
P500,000. NTC filed a MOR but it is also denied. So they filed a special civik
action for certirrari and prohibition on CA and it was granted. The decision
rendered by the CA was against the petitioner. MOR were denied for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: WON, the Court of Appeals erred in holing that the private
respondent failed to exhaust administrative agencies.

RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-mking

powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or
rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies

promulgated, which are the product of delegated legislative power to create new
and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provision of the
ending statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provision control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what field are
subjects to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provision of the constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are derogation of, or defeat,
the purpose of a statute in case of conflict between a statute and in administrative
order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power

of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power. This is the
power to hear and determine question of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner on act which is essentially
of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duly entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusion from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the

administrative agency exercises its quasi0judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in
cases involving specialized disputes, the practice have been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by that administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising from in the proceeding before the court. It
appeals where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
of such issues to that administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is to be validity of

unconstitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts. Indeed, the
constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial court. This is within
the scope of judicial power which includes the authority of courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

Philippine Health Insurance Corp. vs. Chinese General Hospital (CGH)

G.R No. 163123 April 15, 2005

FACTS: On Feb.14, 1995, R.A No. 7875, otherwise known as An Act

instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and establishing the
Philippine Health Insurance Corp. for the purpose, was approve and signed by the
law. Prior to the enactment of R.A 7875, CGH has been an accredited health care
provider under the Philippine Medial Care Mission known as medicare. Its application
for the payment of its claim with the SSS was overtaken by the passage of R.A
7875, which in Sec. 51 and 52 provides: Sec. 51 Merger- within 60 days from the
promulgation if the implementing rules and regulations, all functions and assets of
the Philippine Medicare shall be merged with those of the corporation (PHILHEALTH)
without the need of conveyance, transfer and assignment. The Philippine Medical
Care Commission (PMCC) shall thereafter cease to exist. The liabilities of the PMCC
shall be treated in accordance with existing laws and pertinent rules and
regulations. Section 52. Transfer of Health insurance funds of the SSS and GSIS- the
health insurance funds being administered by the SSS and GSIS shall be transferred
form the corporation within 60 days from the promulgation of the perform Medicare
functions under the contract with the corporation until such time that such functions
are assumed by the corporation.

For being allegedly filed beyond 60 days period allowed by the

implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 52 thereof, petitioner claims were denied
by the claims review unit of the Philippine Health. CGH filed a petition for review.
The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to pay the claims in the amount of
P14,291,568.71. principally on the ground of liberal application of the 60 days rule
under Sec.52 of R.A 7875 implementing rules and regulations. Hence, PhilHealth
petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: WON, CGH failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before

resorting to judicial intervention.

RULING: The court disagree to the contention of the petitioner.

Under the doctrine of Exhaustion of administrative remedies, an

administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superior at the
highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. This doctrine,
however, is a relative one and its flexibility is conditioned on the peculiar
circumstances of a case. There are a number of instances when the doctrine has
been held to be inapplicable. Among the established exception are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3)
when the act complained of is patently illegal 4) when there is urgent need for
judicial intervention; 5) when the claims involve is small; 6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; 8) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest in involved; 9) when the subject of the
controversy is private land; 10) In quo warranto proceeding.

Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) vs. Interport Resources Corp. (IRC)

GR No. 135808 October 6, 2008

FACTS: Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the MOA, IRC acquired 100% or
the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would own and
operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power-generating barge. Also stipulated is that
GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corp.
At that time, GEHIs power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-
line by mid-Sept 1994.c.In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded
capital stock of IRC (amounting to 40.88 billion shares total par value of P488.44
million). On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in
Makati. Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of
Companies in Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the
proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI.2)8 Aug 1994 IRC alleged that a press release
announcing the approval of the agreement was sent through fax to Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE) and the SEC, but that the fax machine of SEC could not receive it.
Upon the advice of SEC, IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 Aug 1994.

SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors heavily
traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On Aug. 16, 1994, the
SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to SEC a copy of its
aforesaid MOA with GHB and further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at
a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED) of SEC to explain
IRCs failure to immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts y the corporation whose securities are listed in an stock
Exchange or registered or licensed under the Securities act. IRC sent a letter to SEC,
attaching a copies of MOA and its directors appeared to explain IRCs alleged failure to
immediately disclose material information as required under the rules on disclosure of
material facts.

SEC Chairman issued an order finding that IRC violated the rules n
disclosure of material facts, in connection with the old securities Act of1936, when it
failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC
pronounced that some of the officers and directors of the IRC entered into some of the
officer and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of
Sec. 30 in relation to Sec. 36 of the Revised Securities Act. IRC filed an Monibus Motion
alleging that SEC had no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Sec. 8
of PD 902-A, as amended by PD 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the prosecution
and enforcement Department (PED) of SEC.

IRC also claimed that SEC violated their right to due process when it
ordered that the respondents appear before SEC and show cause why no administrative,
civil, or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them, and thus, shifted the burden of
proof to the respondents. Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of
Proceedings but no formal hearings were conducted in connection with the
aforementioned motions. But on Jan. 25, 1995, SEC issued an Omnibus order creating a
special investigating panel to hear and decide the case in accordance with rules and
practice and procedure before the PED, SEC, to recall the show cause orders and to
deny the Motion for continuance for lack of merit.

Respondent filed a petition to the CA questioning the order and filed a

supplemental Motion wherein they prayed for the issuance if writ of preliminary
injunction. CA granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which
effectively enjoined SEC from filing any criminal, civil, or administrative case against the
respondents.

The CA promulgated a decision on Aug. 20, 1998. It determined that

there was no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading,
or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which respondents allegedly
violated. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be
allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders.

Further decided that the ruled of practice and procedure before the
PED did not comply with the statutory requirements contained in the administrative
code of 1997. Sec. 9 of the Rules of practice and procedure before the PED affords a
party the right to be present but without the right to cross-examines witnesses
presented against him, in violation of Sec. 12(3), Chap. 3, bok 7 of the Administrative
Code.

ISSUE: WON, the SEC retains the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the
Revised Securities Act, re-enacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the
abolition of the PED.

RULING: The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the

Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the
abolition of the PED.

Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints
for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be
referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC
nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers. 70 Additionally, the SEC may still
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the
aforementioned law.71

In Morato v. Court of Appeals,72 the cases therein were still pending before the PED for
investigation and the SEC for resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was
enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject
matter of the other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and
violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of directors. The
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not result in the dismissal of the
cases; rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper regional trial
court and the SEC to continue with the investigation of the other case.

The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already
commenced the investigative proceedings against respondents as early as 1994.
Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose
pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already
made initial findings that respondents failed to make timely disclosures of their
negotiations with GHB, ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The
investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent by virtue of the Decision,
dated 20 August 1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case, the
Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of
Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the
case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the
respondents.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. Vs. Amante

G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010

FACTS: The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory

Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government. On June 16, 1993, a Notice of Coverage was sent to the landowners. On
March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their
identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to become
beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They alleged that they are the tenants
thereof and have not relinquished their rights over the same, as they returned the
monetary awards given by the landowners.

Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered into a joint project
with 1st A.M. Realty Development Corporation, represented by Atty. Alejandro Macasaet
for its development. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved the
landowners application for conversion, subject to the following conditions: 1. The
farmer-beneficiary, if any, shall be paid disturbance compensation pursuant to R.A. 3844
as amended by R.A. 6389; 2. The remaining 18.5006 hectares shall be covered by CARP
under compulsory acquisition and the same be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries. In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the coverage of the
remaining 18.5006 has. The petitioners herein were identified as qualified farmer-
beneficiaries where three (3) Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued
in their favor. Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance
compensation. They now, however, question the validity and legality of the institution of
the petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject landholding. Sometime on January
1996, respondents together with the landowners filed another case for annulment of
CLOAs and prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision dismissing the case, The PARAD
ruled that respondents had waived their rights as tenants and as farmer-beneficiaries of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) program, as evidenced by their Salaysay and
that it had no authority to rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was
a purely administrative matter under the jurisdiction of the DAR

Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) rendered a Decision setting aside the PARAD Decision.
Petitioners then appealed to the CA. On September 9, 2003, the CA issued a
Decision ruling in favor of petitioners. Respondents then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision. On February 27, 2004, the CA grant respondents
motion for reconsideration

ISSUE: WON, the DARABs jurisdiction to entertain the question of whether the
subject property is subject to CARP coverage.

RULING: According to SRRDC, such authority is vested with the DAR

Secretary who has the exclusive prerogative to resolve matters involving the
administrative implementation of the CARP and agrarian laws and regulations. Theres
no question that the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP
coverage lies with the DAR Secretary. Sec. 50 of R.A No. 6657 provides that; Sec. 50.
Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
the department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).. The DARs jurisdiction
under Section 50 of RA No 6657 is two-fold. The first is essentially executive and
pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second is judicial and involves
the determination of rights and obligation of the parties.