The Im Alone

Vessel. Canadian registration.De facto ownership.American citizens.Violation of American

laws.Hot pursuit.Place of pursuit. Intentional sinking.Not justified.No compensation for loss
of ship or cargo.Apology for wrongful sinking.Indemnity as material amend. Indemnities to
captain and crew.

The I'm Alone appears to have been a well known offender, having been engaged in smuggling liquor
into the United States for years. It was sighted by the United States coast guard vessel Walcott, within
ten and one-half miles of the coast of the United States. Upon the approach of the Walcott the I'm
Alone fled. The Walcott ordered the schooner to halt for boarding, but this command was not
complied with. The Walcott pursued the I'm Alone seaward, calling on her to halt. This command was
not obeyed, and the Walcott fired warning shots, first across the bow of the schooner and then into
the sails and riggings. At this juncture the Walcott's gun jammed and she summoned to her
assistance the coast guard vessel Dexter, which joined in the pursuit. The Dexter warned the I'm
Alone to stop, but the master of the schooner refused to heed. After firing warning shots the Dexter
put several shots into the hull of the I'm Alone, whereupon she sank. The crew were rescued -by the
coast guard vessels, with the exception of one seaman who was drowned.

Referring to the legal question involved, the Canadian Government pointed out that the Treaty of
19245 between the United States and Great Britain, and to which Canada agreed, was concluded
"because the parties were desirous of avoiding any difficulties which. might arise" in connection with
the subject. It was stated in the treaty that while the parties reaffirmed their intention to uphold the
three mile limit principle, the British Government would make no objection to visit and search beyond
the three mile limit "when appearances warranted." The rights so conferred were not to be exercised
at a greater distance from the United States coast than could be traversed in one hour by the vessel
suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense, or by any other vessel in which the liquor was
intended to be conveyed to shore. It appeared to be established that the vessel was at all times
beyond the limit of an hour's sailing distance from the shore.

The Canadian Government questioned the appropriate application of the doctrine of "hot pursuit." It
was admitted that the validity of the doctrine is recognized in international law and by Canadian
courts, if the pursuit is begun within the three mile limit. The fact that the sinking of the I'm Alone
was not done by the cutter that commenced the pursuit but by one which "came up from a different
direction two days later," is suggested as an additional. ground for objection to the application of this
doctrine. Finally objection is made to the destruction of the I'm Alone by the coast guard vessel, as
unwarranted by the circumstances and unauthorized -by the treaty.

In 1922 the Congress of the United States enacted into law a Tariff Act establishing the authority of
the United States for certain revenue purposes for a distance of twelve miles measured from the
coast seaward.2 6 The courts of the United States have generally upheld the validity of the Act of
1922, as they had the Act of 1799, although distinguishing between the territorial jurisdiction within
the three mile limit and the right to make extra-territorial seizures within twelve miles of the shore.2

The treaty of 1924, agreed to by the United States and Great Britain, adopted a one-hour cruising
distance from the coast as the limit of extra-territorial control to be exercised by the United States.

The three mile limit is to be maintained as the territorial limit, although under Article III
extraterritorial seizures may be made within the one hour limit. There is no specific provision in the
treaty that permits the seizure of the ships upon the high seas, when pursuit is begun beyond the
three mile limit and within the one hour limit. Nor can such procedure .be justified by the practice of
other nations. Authoritative writers agree that pursuit must begin within "territorial waters," which in
the present instance is definitely established as three miles from the shore.

The question is whether, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States was legally
justified in sinking the I'm Alone. On the assumptions stated in the question, the United States might,
consistently with the Convention, use necessary and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the
objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port the suspected vessel ; and if sinking
should occur incidentally, as a result of ihe exercise of necessary and reasonable force for such
purpose, the pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless. But the Commissioners think that, in the
circumstances stated in paragraph eight of the Answer, the admittedly intentional sinking of the
suspected vessel was not justified by anything in the Convention.

Church v. Hubbart
In the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, John Barker Church, Jr., instituted an action against the
defendant on two policies of insurance, whereby he had caused to be insured $20,000 the cargo
of the brigantine Aurora, Shaler, master, at and from New York to one or two Portuguese ports on
the coast of Brazil, and at and from thence back to New York. At the foot of one of the policies
was the following memorandum: "the insurers are not to be liable for seizure by the Portuguese
for illicit trade." In the body of the other policy was inserted the following: "N.B. The insurers do
not take the risk of illicit trade with the Portuguese."

The Aurora cleared out for the cape of Good Hope. She proceeded to Rio Janeiro, where she
remained some days, and under a permit some of the cargo was sold, and afterwards sailed for
Para on the coast of Brazil, and in company with another vessel came to anchor about four or
five leagues from the land. The destination of the vessel after she left Rio Janeiro was by order of
the plaintiff kept secret, and it was said by the master at the time that the anchoring off the
River Para was for wood and water, which were actually wanted.

The plaintiff went on shore in a boat, asserting that he left the Aurora for the purpose of
procuring a pilot, to take the vessel up for wood and water and to sell the cargo if permitted. Mr.
Church was arrested when on shore, and imprisoned, and the Aurora and the vessel in her
company were taken possession of by a body of armed men and carried into Para.

It was in evidence, that the trade to Para was prohibited. The vessel and cargo were condemned
by the governor of the capital of Para, as having been seized for illicit trade.

The defense against the claims of the plaintiff on both policies was that the loss occurred from a
prohibited or illicit trade, for which the defendant, as an insurer, was not liable according to the
exception in both policies. To prove that the trade to Para was illicit, the defendant offered a copy
of a law of Portugal certified by the US consul as true copy. To establish this defense, the
defendant offered in evidence the statement of the /governor of Para finding that the purpose of
the plaintiff there was not really because of want of repairs, water or something of that kind, but
for the purpose of introducing there commercial and contraband articles of which the cargo is
composed due to surrounding circumstances: 1) I came from Rio Janeiro where said vessel was
provided with every necessary until she passed the Salinas, without alleging and proving an
unforeseen accident; 2) it does not appear that any of those that were brought to the village as
prisoners, alleged the want of water as a motive for coming in; nor that they had made the least
endeavors, or demanded to be supplied with such want; and 3) should their want of water be
true, they might have supplied themselves with it, in any of the numerous ports

Court found in favor of defendant. The right of a nation to seize vessels attempting an illicit trade
is not confined to its harbors, or to the range of its batteries. Its power to secure itself from
injury, may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. This right does not appear to
be limited within any marked boundaries. If the means used by a nation for this purpose are such
as unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their
exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from violation,
they will be submitted to.

"a nation's power to secure itself from injury might certainly be exercised in the
marginal sea -beyond the limits of territorial waters. The exercise of extra-territorial
authority is necessary to insure territorial security.

Hence, the defendant is justified that it is not liable for the insurance since the vessel and the
cargoes were validly seized by the Portuguese for illicit trade.

Anglo-Norweigan Fisheries Case (UK vs. Norway) 1951

Facts:
 This is a case between United Kingdom and Norway on the issue whether the method of
drawing the baseline from which Norway measured its territorial sea is legally acceptable in
accordance with international law.

The coastal zone of Norway can be described as mountainous, broken by fjords and bays,
and has some islets along its coasts. The land configuration stretches out into the sea and what
really constitutes the Norwegian coastline is the outer line of the land formations viewed as a
whole. In other words, the land configuration is known as Skjaergaard or rock rampart. Along
the coastal zone are situated shallow banks which are very rich in fish. These have been
exploited from time immemorial by the inhabitants of Norway.

At around 1906 British vessels with trawlers and powerful gears exploited the fish along
the Norwegian Coasts. Because of this, measures were taken by Norway in prohibiting the
foreigners from fishing in the Norwegian Coast by specifying the limits which fishing was
prohibited to foreigners. Thus, on 1935, the Norwegian Fisheries Zone was enacted by the
Government of Norway

However, in 1948 to 1949, a considerable number of British trawlers were arrested and
condemned for fishing along the coast. It was then that the United Kingdom Government
instituted proceedings before the Court.

UK asserted that the 1935 Norwegian fisheries zone is not in accordance with international
law. While Norway asserted that the Norwegian fisheries zone is in accordance with international
law.

Issue:

Whether or not the Norweigan fisheries zones is in accordance with International law?

Held:

The 1935 Norwegan Fisheries Zone is not contrary to international law.

The reasons of the court are as follows:

1) United Kingdom is contending that the baseline must be based on the low-water mark
which is the criterion generally adopted by most states.

However in this case, the Court had considered the land configuration of the Norwegian Coast
which is Skjaergaard or Rock Rampart. Which is considered as Rugged Coast. This is an
exception to the rule that baselines should always follow the low water mark. The Rugged Coast
must be viewed as a whole in order for the method of straight base-lines to apply.

2) United Kingdom is contending that the maximum length for straight lines should be ten
miles since this has been adopted generally by most states.

However in this case, the Court ruled that: a) Other states could adopt a different length b) The
10 mile rule is not a general rule of international law c) The ten-mile rule is inapplicable as
against Norway in as much as it always opposed its application to the Norwegian coast since
time immemorial.

3) The 1935 Norwegian Fisheries Zone was based on prior Decrees, and diplomatic
correspondence and has been established that it has been a traditional system and long
practice of delimiting the coastlines The application of this system encountered no
opposition from other States. Even the United Kingdom did not contest it for many years: it
was only in 1933 that the UK made a formal and definite protest.
Corfu Channel Case United Kingdom vs. Albania 1949

Facts:

In 1946, during the Greek civil war, a series of three encounters took place in the Corfu Channel, between
Albania and the United Kingdom.

The first encounter happened where the cruisers Orion and Superb passed through the northern part of the
Corfu Channel. Albanian shore batteries opened fire on the two ships but striking neither vessel. The
United Kingdom lodged a formal protest, demanding an apology from Albania. Albania stated that the
ships had violated Albanian territorial waters, and asserted that passage through the Corfu Channel
required Albanian permission.

The second encounter happened where a Royal Navy flotilla composed of cruisers Mauritius and Leander,
and destroyers Saumarez and Volage, entered the Corfu Channel. The ships were ordered to return fire if
they were attacked. Saumarez struck a mine and was heavily damaged; thirty-six people aboard were
killed. The Volage took her in tow, only to strike another mine. eight people were killed. A total of forty-four
people died and forty-two others were injured.

The third encounter happened where the Royal Navy undertook a mine clearance operation known as the
Operation Retail in the Corfu Channel, which took place in Albanian territorial waters without advance
permission from that country. Subsequently, the Albanian government formally complained to the United
Nations, describing the operation as an incursion into Albanian territorial waters.

The United Kingdom demanded reparations from Albania. Albania denied involvement in the laying of
mines, blaming Greece. On 22 May, the United Kingdom brought suit against Albania.The ICJ, being
permanently in session, was available to begin hearing the case immediately.

Issue:

1) Whether or not United Kingdom violated the Albanian Territorial Waters

2) Whether or not United Kingdom has the right to innocent passage
3) Whether or not Albania had laid the minefields in the Corfu channel which caused the death of 36
people.
4) Whether or not United Kingdom contention that the Operation Retail is a valid intervention

Held:
1) United Kingdom did not violate Albanian Territorial Waters

The courts ruled that the Corfu Channel is an international strait connecting two parts of the high seas and
that the Corfu Channel is used for international navigation. Thus, Albanias contention that it entered its
territorial waters without its permission is untenable.

2) United Kingdom has the right to innocent passage

Innocent Passage - is a concept in the law of the sea that allows for a vessel to pass through the territorial
waters of another state, subject to certain restrictions. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.

The Court held that a right to innocent passage existed during times of peace through straits like the Corfu
Channel, which connected two parts of the high seas. The Court accepted that some Albanian regulation of
passage through the Channel would have been acceptable, but not to the extent of demanding prior
authorization, or of barring the passage of warships outright.

3) With respect to the minefield itself, the Court rejected the British contention that Albania had laid it,
stating that such a claim was not credible: at the time, Albania lacked the capacity for such
operations. , the Court demanded "a degree of certainty", while to establish the omission, the Court
demanded that there be "no room for reasonable doubt" that Albania had knowledge of the
minefield. In this case, there was failure to establish that Albania indeed laid down the mines

4) Operation Retail Is not a valid intervention. The Court also rejected the British arguments
that Operation Retail was justified as self-protection or self-help, holding that "respect for territorial
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations". No state can simply conduct an
operation in the territorial waters of another sea. This would entail a violation of territorial
sovereignty.

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom vs. Iceland)

International Court of Justice (1974)

International Court of Justice Reports 3

Facts:

This case is a proceeding before the International Court of Justice concerning fisheries jurisdiction
between two states. Icelands claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was recognized by the United
Kingdom in 1961 in return for Icelands agreement that any dispute concerning Icelandic
fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be referred to the International Court of Justice. An
application was filed before the I.C.J. when Iceland proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores in 1972. By postulating that changes in
circumstances since the 12-mile limit was now generally recognized was the ground upon which
Iceland stood to argue that the agreement was no longer valid. Iceland also asserted that there
would be a failure of consideration for the 1961 agreement.

Issue:

Does there have to be a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations that need to be
performed for there to be a "change of circumstances" that give rise to a ground for invoking a
termination of a treaty?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that in order for a change of circumstances to give rise to a ground for
invoking the termination of a treaty it is necessary that the change has resulted in a radical
transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed. The change must have
increased the burden of the obligations yet to be executed to the extent of rendering the
performance something essentially different from that initially undertaken. The change of
circumstances alleged by Iceland in this case cannot be said to have transformed radically the
extent of the jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

Please read this longer version for more information:

In its Judgment the Court recalls that on 14 April 1972 the Government of the United Kingdom instituted
proceedings against Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning the proposed extension by the Icelandic
Government of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a distance of 50 nautical miles from the baselines
around its coasts. It is, the Court observes, to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed to
appear to plead the objections to the Court's jurisdiction which it is understood to entertain. Nevertheless
the Court, in accordance with its Statute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine the question on its
own initiative, a duty reinforced by Article 53 of the Statute, whereby, whenever one of the parties does
not appear, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before finding on the merits. Although the
Government of Iceland has not set out the facts and law on which its objection is based, or adduced any
evidence, the Court proceeds to consider those objections which might, in its view, be raised against its
jurisdiction. In so doing, it avoids not only all expressions of opinion on matters of substance, but also any
pronouncement which might prejudge or appear to prejudge any eventual decision on the merits.

Compromissory clause of the 1961 Exchange of Notes (paras. 13-23 of the Judgment)

To found the Court's jurisdiction, the Government of the United Kingdom relies on an Exchange of Notes
which took place between it and the Government of Iceland on 11 March 1961, following an earlier dispute
over fisheries. By that Exchange of Notes the United Kingdom undertook to recognise an exclusive
Icelandic fishery zone up to a limit of 12 miles and to withdraw its fishing vessels from that zone over a
period of 3 years. The Exchange of Notes featured a compromissory clause in the following terms:

"The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution of May 5,
1959, regarding the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give to the United Kingdom
Government six months' notice of such extension, and, in case of a dispute in relation to such extension,
the matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred to the International Court of Justice."

The Court observes that there is no doubt as to the fulfilment by the Government of the United Kingdom of
its part of this agreement or as to the fact that the Government of Iceland, in 1971, gave the notice
provided for in the event of a further extension of its fisheries jurisdiction. Nor is there any doubt that a
dispute has arisen, that it has been submitted to the Court by the United Kingdom and that, on the face of
it, the dispute thus falls exactly within the terms of the compromissory clause.

Although, strictly speaking, the text of this clause is sufficiently clear for there to be no need to investigate
the preparatory work, the Court reviews the history of the negotiations which led to the Exchange of Notes,
finding confirmation therein of the parties' intention to provide the United Kingdom, in exchange for its
recognition of the 12-mile limit and the withdrawal of its vessels, with a genuine assurance which
constituted a sine qua non for the whole agreement, namely the right to challenge before the Court the
validity of any further extension of Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit.

It is thus apparent that the Court has jurisdiction.

Validity and duration of the 1961 Exchange of Notes (paras. 24-45 of the Judgment)

The Court next considers whether, as has been contended the agreement embodied in the 1961 Exchange
of Notes either was initially void or has since ceased to operate.

In the above-mentioned letter of 29 May 1972 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland said that the 1961
Exchange of Notes had taken place at a time when the British Royal Navy had been using force to oppose
the 12-mile fishery limit. The Court, however, notes that the agreement appears to have been freely
negotiated on the basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision on both sides.

In the same letter the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland expressed the view that "an undertaking for
judicial settlement cannot be considered to be of a permanent nature" and the Government of Iceland had
indeed, in an aide-mmoire of 31 August 1971, asserted that the object and purpose of the provision for
recourse to judicial settlement had been fully achieved. The Court notes that the compromissory clause
contains no express provision regarding duration. In fact, the right of the United Kingdom to challenge
before the Court any claim by Iceland to extend its fisheries zone was subject to the assertion of such a
claim and would last so long as Iceland might seek to implement the 1959 Althing resolution.

In a statement to the Althing (the Parliament of Iceland) on 9 November 1971, the Prime Minister of Iceland
alluded to changes regarding "legal opinion on fisheries jurisdiction". His argument appeared to be that as
the compromissory clause was the price that Iceland had paid at the time for the recognition by the United
Kingdom of the 12-mile limit, the present general recognition of such a limit constituted a change of legal
circumstances that relieved Iceland of its commitment. The Court observes that, on the contrary, since
Iceland has received benefits from those parts of the agreement already executed, it behoves it to comply
with its side of the bargain.

The letter and statement just mentioned also drew attention to "the changed circumstances resulting from
the ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland". It is, notes the
Court, admitted in international law that if a fundamental change of the circumstances which induced
parties to accept a treaty radically transforms the extent of the obligations undertaken, this may, under
certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the
treaty. It would appear that in the present case there is a serious difference of views between the Parties
as to whether there have been any fundamental changes in fishing techniques in the waters around
Iceland. Such changes would, however, be relevant only for any eventual decision on the merits. It cannot
be said that the change of circumstances alleged by Iceland has modified the scope of the jurisdictional
obligation agreed to in the 1961 Exchange of Notes. Moreover, any question as to the jurisdiction of the
Court, deriving from an alleged lapse of the obligation through changed circumstances, is for the Court to
decide, by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 6, of its Statute.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases

Overview: The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the North Sea
between Germany and Denmark and Germany and Netherlands beyond the partial boundaries
previously agreed upon by these States. The parties requested the ICJ to decide the principles and
rules of international law that are applicable to the above delimitation. The parties disagreed on the
applicable principles or rules of delimitation Netherlands and Denmark relied on the principle of
equidistance (the method of determining the boundaries in such a way that every point in the
boundary is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breath of the
territorial sea of each State is measured). Germany sought to get a decision in favour of the notion
that the delimitation of the relevant continental shelf is governed by the principle that each coastal
state is entitled to a just and equitable share (hereinafter called just and equitable principle/method).
Contrary to Denmark and Netherlands, Germany argued that the principle of equidistance was neither
a mandatory rule in delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that
was not binding on Germany. The court was not asked to delimit the parties agreed to delimit the
continental shelf as between their countries, by agreement, after the determination of the ICJ on the
applicable principles.

Facts: Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance
principle (A-B and C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary proved difficult
because Denmark and Netherlands wished this prolongation to take place based on the
equidistance principle (B-E and D-E) where as Germany was of the view that, together, these two
boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her. Germany stated that due to its concave
coastline, such a line would result in her losing out on her share of the continental shelf based on
proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles
and rules of international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the court had to decide
if the principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either through treaty law or
customary international law.

Issue: Must delimitation be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved?

Held: Yes. Delimitation must be the object of an equitable agreement between the states
involved. As stipulated in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, equidistance principle is not part of
customary international law. Article 6 makes the obligation to use the equidistance method a
secondary one which comes into play only when agreements between the parties are absent.
Although the principle of equidistance is not given a fundamental norm-creating character by
Article 6, which is necessary to the formation of a general rule of law. In this case, after taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances, the delimitation here is to be excused by equitable
agreement. Furthermore, the court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on
Germany by way of treaty or customary international law because, in the case of the latter, the
principle had not attained a customary international law status at the time of the entry into force
of the Geneva Convention or thereafter. As such, the court held that the use of the equidistance
method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas concerned in the present proceedings.
The Court rejected Germanys claim of proportional apportionment because doing so would
intrude upon the natural claims due to States based on natural prolongations of land. Also, the
Courts role was to outline a mechanism of delimitation only. The Court found, therefore, that the
two parties must draw up an agreement taking both the maximization of area and proportionality
into account. These were to be based upon equitable principles. The holding here is somewhat
inconclusive, but the opinion is significant to international law, regardless. It considered that the
principle of equidistance, as it figured in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, had not been
proposed by the International Law Commission as an emerging rule of customary international
law. This Article could not be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule. Upon inspection of
the language of both the Geneva Convention and the Truman Proclamation, equidistance was
found to be a last resort rather than an a priori rule. Also looking to these sources, the Court
rejected claims which included equidistance in customary international law. Theses texts which
originally included the rule of equidistance only did so for secondary purposes, and the utilization
of it was insufficient to prove it to be either customary international law, or a general law of
practicality. The Court also pointed out mathematical problems of contradiction under the rule.

Gulf of Maine

Facts: In 1976-1977 certain events occurred which added to the continental shelf
dimension that of the waters and their living resources, for both States proceeded to
institute an exclusive 200 mile fishery zone off their coasts and adopted regulations
specifying the limits of the zone and continental shelf they claimed. In its account of the
negotiations which eventually led to the reference of the dispute to the Court, the
Chamber notes that in 1976 the United States adopted a line limiting both the
continental shelf and the fishing zones and the adoption by Canada of a first line in 1976.
The Chamber takes note of the respective delimitation lines now proposed by each Party.
The Canadian line, described like that of 1976 as an equidistance line, is one constructed
almost entirely from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. Those points happen to be exclusively islands, rocks or low-
tide elevations, yet the basepoints on the Massachusetts coast which had initially been
chosen for the 1976 line have been shifted westward so that the new line no longer takes
account of the protrusion formed by Cape Cod and Nantucket Island and is accordingly
displaced west. The line proposed by the United States is a perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast from the starting-point agreed upon by the Parties, adjusted to
avoid the splitting of fishing banks. It differs from the "Northeast Channel line" adopted
in 1976 which, according to its authors, had been based upon the "equidistance/special
circumstances" rub of Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. The Chamber notes that
the two successive lines put forward by Canada were both drawn primarily with the
continental shelf in mind, whereas the United States lines were both drawn up initially on
the basis of different considerations though both treated the fishery regime as essential.

Issue 1: What are the rules of international law governing maritime delimitation?

Held: The Chamber sets out a more precise reformulation of the fundamental norm
acknowledged by the Parties: "No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation
must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations
conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result.
Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by
recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.

"In either case delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and
by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic
configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result."

The Chamber is of the view that they must be looked for not in customary international
law but in positive international law, and in that connection it examines those provided
for by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, in Article 6 (median line in the case
of opposite coasts, lateral equidistance line in the case of adjacent coasts). The Chamber
points out that a treaty obligation concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf
cannot be extended so as to apply to the superjacent waters and, after rejecting the
Canadian argument that the combined equidistance/special-circumstances rule has
become a rule of general international law, finds that Article 6, while in force between
the Parties, does not entail either for them or for the Chamber any legal obligation to
apply its provisions to the present delimitation.

Issue 2: Whether and to what extent the Chamber is obliged to adhere to the terms of
the Special Agreement as regards the starting-point of the line to be drawn - called point
A - and the triangular area within which that line is to terminate.

Held: THE CHAMBER decides that the course of the single maritime boundary that
divides the continental shelf and the exclusive fisheries zones of Canada and the United
States of America in the Area referred to in the Special Agreement concluded by those
two States on 29 March 1979 shall be defined by geodetic lines connecting the points.

The Chamber finds it indispensable to define with greater precision the geographical
area-"the Gulf of Maine area" - within which the delimitation has to be carried out. The
Chamber emphasizes the quasi-parallel direction of the opposite coasts of Massachusetts
and Nova Scotia. The delimitation, the Chamber observes, is not limited to the Gulf of
Maine but comprises, beyond the Gulf closing line, another maritime expanse including
the whole of the Georges Bank, the main focus of the dispute. The Chamber rejects
however the arguments of the Parties tending to involve coasts other than those directly
surrounding the Gulf so as to extend the delimitation area to expanses which have in fact
nothing to do with it. After noting that it has up to this point based itself on aspects
inherent in physical geography, the Chamber goes on to consider the geological and
geomorphological characteristics of the area given the unity and uniformity of the sea-
bed, there are no geomorphological reasons for distinguishing between the respective
natural prolongations of the United States and Canadian coasts in the continental shelf of
the delimitation area: even the Northeast Channel, which is the most prominent feature,
does not have the characteristics of a real trough dividing two geomorphologically
distinct units.

As regards another component element of the delimitation area, the "water column", the
Chamber notes that while Canada emphasized its character of overall unity, the United
States invoked the existence of three distinct ecological regimes separated by natural
boundaries the most important of which consisted of the Northeast Channel.

United States v. F/V Taijo Maru

FACTS:

These two proceedings arise from the seizure of a Japanese fishing vessel, the F/V TAIYO MARU 28, by
the United States Coast Guard for violation of United States fisheries law. On September 5, 1974, the
Coast Guard sighted the TAIYO MARU 28 fishing at Latitude 43-35.9 North, Longitude 69-20 West,
which is approximately 16.25 miles off the coast of the State of Maine and approximately 10.5 miles
seaward from Monhegan Island. It is conceded to be within the contiguous fisheries zone of the United
States. The Coast Guard signaled the TAIYO MARU 28 to stop, but the vessel attempted to escape by
accelerating toward the high seas. The Coast Guard immediately pursued and seized the vessel on
the high seas. The vessel was thereafter delivered to the port of Portland, and on September 6, 1974,
the United States filed in this Court a civil complaint for condemnation and forfeiture of the vessel and
a criminal information against the master, Masatoshi Kawaguchi. On October 4, 1974, Miho Maguro
Gyogyo Kabushiki Kaisha of Shimizi, Japan, a corporation, as the sole owner and party entitled to
possesion of the TAIYO MARU 28, appeared through local counsel and filed its demand for restitution
and right to defend, and an answer to the complaint, in the forfeiture action. [2] On October 18, 1974,
the master was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the criminal information. [3]

The Statutes Involved

By the Bartlett Act, enacted in 1964, Congress made it unlawful for any foreign vessel, or for the
master of such a vessel, to engage in fishing within the territorial waters of the United States, or
"within any waters in which the United States has the same rights in respect to fisheries as it has in
its territorial waters . . . except . . . as expressly provided by an international agreement to which the
United States is a party." In enacting the Bartlett Act, the intent of Congress was to fill a gap in
existing law by making it clear that foreign vessels are denied the privilege of fishing within the
territorial waters of the United States and by providing effective sanctions for unlawful fishing by
foreign vessels within territorial waters.

By the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, enacted in 1966, Congress established a fisheries zone
contiguous to the territorial waters of the United States and provided with respect to such zone:

The United States will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in the zone as it has in
its territorial sea, subject to the continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as
may be recognized by the United States.

The contiguous fisheries zone was defined by Congress in the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act as
having "as its inner boundary the outer limits of the territorial sea and as its seaward boundary a line
drawn so that each point on the line is nine nautical miles from the nearest point in the inner
boundary." In so defining the contiguous zone, Congress recognized that the territorial sea of the
United States extends three miles from the United States. It was the expressed intent of Congress in
the 1966 legislation to "unilaterally establish a fishery zone contiguous to the present 3-mile
territorial sea of the United States by extending our exclusive fisheries rights to a distance of 12 miles
from our shores."

The Right of Hot Pursuit From the Contiguous Fisheries Zone

Defendant's sole contention is that the United States had no right to conduct hot pursuit from the
contiguous zone and to effect seizure of the TAIYO MARU 28, because the vessel was seized on the
high seas in violation of Article 23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.

The Convention on the High Seas provides, in Article 2, that:

The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to
its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas . . . comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal
States:

(2) Freedom of fishing; . . .

Article 5 of the Convention vests "exclusive jurisdiction" in each signatory over its vessels "on the
high seas." Article 23 of the Convention, however, recognizes certain instances in which a State may
seize a foreign vessel on the high seas, based on hot pursuit:

The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal
State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State.
Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal
waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. . . . If the
foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the
rights for the protection of which the zone was established.

Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for
signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1607 (entered into force September 10, 1964), contains the
following pertinent provisions:

1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the
control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory
or territorial sea;

(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.

2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

The history of the 1958 Conventions confirms the conclusion that the United States did not
specifically undertake to limit its authority to exercise exclusive fisheries jurisdiction within 12 miles
of its coast, to establish a contiguous zone for such a purpose, or to conduct hot pursuit from such a
zone. The Convention on the High Seas and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone were the product of the Conference on the Law of the Sea. Most commentators agree that the
two principal issues presented for the Conference's consideration were the question of the breadth of
the territorial sea, and the closely-related question of whether there should be an additional
contiguous zone in which the coastal States could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over fishing. The
1958 Geneva Conference was unable to achieve agreement on either issue, primarily because of the
volatile political ramifications involved in setting a limit to the territorial sea. [12] In recommending that
the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Conventions, the Senate Report from the
Committee on Foreign Relations made clear that the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone did not define the width of the territorial sea, or circumscribe the right of a coastal
State to assert exclusive fisheries jurisdiction.

It is clear from the foregoing history that, in becoming a signatory to the 1958 Conventions, the
United States could not have intended to accept any limitation on its right to conduct hot pursuit for
violations of exclusive fishery rights occurring within 12 miles of its coast, since the Geneva
Conference could not agree as to whether a contiguous zone could be established for the purpose of
enforcing domestic fisheries law.

It is apparent that Congress was well aware of its obligations under the 1958 Conventions when the
1966 Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act was enacted, and that Congress perceived no conflict between
the Act and the treaty provisions.

The Report also notes that, as of July 1, 1966, of the 99 United Nations coastal nations, slightly more
than 60 countries asserted a 12-mile exclusive fishery zone, either as territorial sea or as territorial
sea plus a contiguous zone.

Order

Since the seizure of the TAIYO MARU 28 on the high seas following hot pursuit from the contiguous
zone was not in violation of Article 23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and, moreover, was
sanctioned by domestic law and in conformity with the prevailing consensus of international law and
practice, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the present proceedings on their merits. Defendant's
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are therefore denied.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines
was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with
the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by
the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this
also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic waters
which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to
acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition
or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old
law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under
9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA
9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our
internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters
and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow
the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of
islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since
they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be
enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This
is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from
the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercise treaty-based rights:

a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of
the UNCLOS.