Restitution of Conjugal Rights

s . p . Sharm a*

M A R R IA G E E N JO IN S som e rights an d obligations on b o th the

spouses. T hese rights and o b ligations are equal in som e respects to b o th the
spouses b u t uneq u al in som e o th e r respects. O ne o f these obligations is th at
b o th spouses will coh ab it w ith each o th er. It implies th a t th e parties to
m arriag e will live to g eth er as h u sb an d and wife. It is one o f the express
conditions in th e n u p tial vow o f th e H indus th a t each p a rty is to becom e
th e asso ciate o f th e other.^ A cco rd in g to M an u , L et m utual fidelity continue
till death. L et a m an an d w om an u n ited by m arriage, constantly bew are, lest
a t any tim e disunited they violate th e ir m u tu al fidelity. ^ A n d the sages de
n o unced th e desertiton or neglect o f either p a rty by the o th e r w ithout ju st
cause as an act p u nishable in this w orld and in th e next.

H ow ever, an agreem ent o n th e p a rt o f the husband entered into at the

tim e of th e m arriage th a t he will n o t be at liberty to rem ove his wife from
h er p a re n ts ab o d e to his ow n a b o d e has been held to be void as being
c o n tra ry to H indu law as w ell as to p u b lic policy.* So fa r th e duties o f the
husb an d an d th e wife w ith resp ect to each o th e rs person are reciprocal. As
regards rights, p erfect equality in betw een the m arried couple has so fa r n o t
b een allow ed by any system o f law . I f th e re be inequality, it h a s always
been in favour o f m an. T o use th e language o f B entham : In his hands
th e pow er m aintains itself. G iv e th e au th o rity to the w om an, a n d every
m o m en t a revolt w ould b reak o u t on th e p a rt o f h er h u sb a n d . T his in equal
ity was originally very great, but th e tendency o f society has been to reduce
it as far as possible. A ccording to B anerjee th e H in d u law In resp ect o f
this inequality p a rta k e s to som e extent, no d o u b t, o f the ch a ra c ter o f o th er
archaic system s, b u t on th e w hole, it is fa r m o re equitable tow ards the fem ale
sex th a n m o st o f th o se system s.

' Lecturer, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

1. V lll, Asiatic Researches, 303.
2. XA/anu, 102-3.
3. Colebronk's Ditest, Book IV, 57-61.
4. Takait Mon Mohini v. Basanta, T.L.R. 28 Cal. 751. See also Thiruma! Naiduy,
Rajammal, A.I.R. 1968 Mad. 201; Pothuraju v. Radha A IM . 1965 A.P. 407.
5. Bentham, Theory o f Legislation 230.
Banerjse, The Hindu Law o f Marriage and Stridhana, 115 (3rd ed,),
 JiESTITUTION O F CONJUGAL R IG H TS 159

T he rem edy o f th e re stitu tio n o f conjugal rights is based u p o n th e co n

cep t o f good ancient days a b o u t m arriag e w hen th e w ife w as considered as
pro p erty . A ctually in H in d u law corrective m easures w ere p ro v id ed fo r wifes
f a u lts / b u t it was n o t p e c u lia r to H in d u law only. O n th e contrarj^ M a n u s
au th o rity is, in this instance, alm o st balanced by a tex t o f high authority,
w hich says : strike n o t even w ith a blossom a wife guilty o f a hundred
fa u lts. A v irtuous wife was placed a t high p o sitio n by all sages and it was
ord a in ed th a t such a wife should be revered by th e h u sband.

T he relief o f re stitu tio n o f conjugal rights was ad o p ted in In d ia fro m

Jew ish law th ro u g h E nglish com m on law. T h ere w as som e d o u b t as to the
n a tu re o f such rem edy p ro v id ed fo r H indus by B ritish In d ia n courts, and
th e ground fo r such d o u b t was th e difficulty o f enforcing the perform ance
o f conjugal duties in th e ir detail, b u t th e p o in t was settled by the decision o f
th e Privy C ouncil in th e case o f M oonshee Buzloor Rtiheein v. Shum soonnissa
B eg u m } In th a t case th e Judicial C om m ittee observed :

U p o n au th o rity th en , as well as principle, th e ir L o rd sh ip s h av e no

dou b t th a t a M u ssalm an h u sb a n d m ay in stitu te a suit in th e civil
courts o f In d ia fo r a d ecla ra tio n o f his rig h t to th e possession o f his
wife & for a sentence th a t she re tu rn to co h ab itatio n , and th a t th a t suit
m ust be determ ined acco rd in g to th e principles o f th e M oham m edan
Law . T he la tte r p ro p o sitio n follow s n o t m erely from the im perative
words o f R egu latio n IV o f 1793, Section 15, b u t fro m , th e n a tu re o f
th e thing. F o r, since th e rig h ts and duties resulting fro m the con
tracts of m arriage vary in different com m unities, so especially in
India, w here th ere is no general m arriage law, they can be only as
certained by reference to p a rtic u la r law o f co n tractin g parties.

T hough th e case was one b etw een M oham m ed an s the rule laid dow n evidently
applies m utatis m utandis to th e H indus, and it has b een so applied.*

I t is subm itted th a t u n d er H in d u law m arriag e was a sa cram en t an d m u tu al

u n d erstan d in g was ingrained in th e H in d u society by m ainly religious
and m oral sanctions.

7. W. at 119.
8. Colebrooke's Digest, Book III, ch. I, II note.
9. I I M I . A . 551.
10. Kateeram Dokanee Mussumai Gandhenee, V/.K. 178; Brindaban v. Chandra,
I.L.R. 12Cal. 140, Bmda KamsiUa, I.L.R. 13 All. 126; Dadaji BhUcaji v. Rukmabai,
I,lv.R. 10 Bom, 301,
160 THE HINDU M A R R IA G E & SPECIAL M A R R IA G E ACTS

som e o f th e cases it was held th a t the decree should direct the

delivery o f th e wife b odily into h e r h u sb a n d s h a n d s . T h i s view, perhaps
was sup p o rted by th e lan g u ag e o f article 34 o f th e L im itatio n A ct o f 1877,
which provided fo r th e lim it fo r th e recovery o f a wife. B ut late r on, the
p ro p e r form o f th e decree Wcvs settled, it provides T h a t the plaintiff is
entitled to th e conjugal rights, an d th a t his lawful wife, the d efendant, be
ordered to retu rn to his p ro te c tio n . ^* This view was based u p o n old trad i
tio n s w here m ostly h u sb an d clairried this relief against the wife. N ow if the
husban d is th e p etitio n er (p lain tiff p rio r to th e H indu M arria g e A ct, 1955'^)
th e form o f th e decree is th a t th e R espondent (defen d an t wife p rio r to the
H in d u M arriag e A ct) do go to th e petitio n er and ren d er conjugal duties, th at
in case resp o n d en t does n o t go and ren d er such rights, th e p e titio n er do
tak e th e necessary process th ro u g h co u rts to get the re sp o n d en t to his house
fo r securing conjugal rig h ts an d to live w ith h im .^* I f th e wife is the p eti
tio n er th e form is t h a t t h e . re sp o n d a n t do tak e th e p e titio n e r hom e and
receive h er as his wife a n d re n d e r h e r conjugal rights. T his is so because
th e law considers th e h o m e o f th e h u sb an d as the p ro p e r hom e o f the wife
also and thus th ere is a slight change in th e form o f th e decree according to
th e petitio n er being wife o r h u sb a n d as th e case m ay be.

II

As regards th e m ode o f execution o f a decree in a suit fo r restitu tio n o f

conjugal rights, th ere was som e difference o f o p inion in th e In d ian courts.
I t was held by the H igh C o u rt o f Bengal in Gatha R am M istree v.
M oohita Cochin A ttea h Domoonee,^^ th a t th e decree in such cases could
only have th e effect o f a d e clarato ry decree, an d was in cap ab le o f enforce
m ent by any coercive process against th e wife. C onversely, the B om bay
H igh C o u rt ruled th a t in case o f disobedience, th e decree could be enforced
by im prisonm ent o f th e wife u n d er section 200 o f the A ct V III o f 1859.^^ T he
questio n had thus been settled by th e A ct X o f 1877 since replaced by A ct X IV
o f 1882 (section 260), w hich again had been replaced by A ct V o f 1908,
th e presen t C ode o f Civil Procedure.^* R u les 32 an d 33 o f th e Civil
P ro ced u re C ode provide th a t a decree fo r re stitu tio n o f conjugal rights may^

11. See Hurka Shunkur v, Raeejee Monohiir, I.L.R. I Bom. 353.

12. Koobitr Khansama v. Jan Khansama, 8 W.R. 467; Chotun Beebee v. Ameer Chund,
6 W.R. 105.
12a. Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
12b. Pedapudi Nookeratnam v. Pedapudi Venkata Suryanarayana, A. I. R. 1949
Mad. 374.
13. 23 W.R. 179.
14. Yamuna Bai v. Narayan Moreshvar Pendse, (1876-77) I-L.R. 1 Bom. 164.
H a. See order xxi, rr. 32, 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, 19Q-
 RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIG H TS 161

in the discretion o f th e c o u rt be enforced by th e im p risonm ent o f the person

a n d the a ttach m en t o f th e p ro p e rty o f th e p a rty against w hom such decree is
m ade. A gain, ru le 32 o f th e aforesaid o rd er was am ended by section 2 o f
A ct 29 o f 1923, a n d th u s th e enforcem ent o f decree fo r restitu tio n o f
conjugal rights by im p riso n m en t was d one away w ith. O rd e r 21, rule 32 o f
th e Civil P ro ced u re C ode lays dow n :

W here th e p a rty ag ain st w hom a d e c re e ...fo r restitu tio n o f conjugal

rig h ts...h a s b een p assed h as h ad an o p p o rtu n ity o f obeying the
decree an d h as w ilfully failed to obey it, the decree m ay be en
forced in th e case o f a decree for restitu tio n o f conjugal rights by
th e a tta c h m e n t o f his p ro p e rty ....

Section 28 o f th e H in d u M ariag e A ct provides fo r the enforcem ent of,

an d appeal from , decrees an d orders :

All decrees an d o rd ers m ade by th e c o u rt in any proceed in g u n der

this A ct shall be enforced in like m an n er as th e decrees and
orders o f th e C o u rt m ad e in th e exercise o f th e original civil ju ris
diction a re enforced, and m ay be appealed from u n d er any law for
the tim e being in force ;
Provided th at th e re shall be no app eal o n the subject o f costs
only.

Section 28 o f th e A ct read w ith section 21 im pliedly apply th e provisions

o f the Civil P ro ced u re C ode, 1908 to th e proceedings institu ted u n d er th e
A ct, subject to th e p rovisions o f th e A ct and th e rules m ade by the H igh
C ourts. Sim ilarly, th e Special M arriag e A ct, 1954 also provides u n d er sections
39 and 40 for the ap p licatio n o f th e provisions o f the- C ode o f Civil P rocedure
in the proceedings in stitu ted u n d e r th a t Act.

It is, th erefore, necessary to discuss th e p rovisions o f o rd er 21,^ rule 32

in the light o f decided cases. As has been discussed above, th e enforcem ent
o f the decrees for restitu tio n o f conjugal rights by im p riso n m e n t has been
d one aw ay w ith by am en d in g th e above rule itself in 1923. T here is scanty
case law on this p a rtic u la r p o in t. In Pedapudi N oo ka ra tn a m v. Pedapudi
Venkata Suryanarayan^^ it was held by th e M ad ras H igh C o u rt th a t the
provision u n d er o rd er 21, ru le 32 is d iscretionary and to be judicially exercised
by the c o u rts. In th e p re se n t case the ap ellant wife was th e judgm ent-
d eb to r against w hom a suit w as filed in th e civil co u rt fo r th e restitu tio n o f
conjugal rights by her h u sb an d an d a decree was passed by th e co urt on 12th
M arch 1943. T he h u sb an d filed an application fo r th e execution o f the said

}5. Supra note \26 at 37^.

162 THE HINDU M A R R IA G E 4 SPECIAL M ARRIAGE ACTS

decree in 1945 w hen his wife becam e sui ju ris (since owing to h e r m inority
tw o such applications were alread y dism issed by th e executing c o u rt). T he
ap p licatio n was filed w ith p ray er in th e alternative, (1) fo r restitu tio n o f
conjugal rights ; and (2) on th e failu re o f th e ju d g m en t-d eb to r to com ply
w ith th e terras o f th e decree, to a tta c h h e r m ovables. T he trial co u rt using
its discretio n ary pow er dism issed th e ap p licatio n on being satisfied by the
g round s sub m itted by the wife on affid av it fo r disobedience o f th e decree. O n
app eal th e learned su b o rd in ate ju d g e d irected execution to be proceeded by
a tta c h m e n t o f the w ifes (ju d g m e n t-d e b to rs) m ovables. T he H igh C o u rt in a
second app eal held :
W here an o rd er u n d er O rd e r 21 ru le 32 based upon the exercise o f
discretion o f the trial co u rt was reversed on appeal by th e appellate
co u rt, w hich did n o t p u rp o rt to exercise any discretion at all,...this,
was a fit case w here th e o rd e r o f Ihe trial court should be restored.^"
T h e second case on this p o in t is M . P. Shreevastava \ . Veena}^ w herein
also th e wife was th e ju d g m e n t-d e b to r against whom the husband obtained
an e x p a rte decree fo r restitu tio n o f conjugal rights un d er section 21 o f
th e Special M arriag e Act.
O n having th e know ledge o f th e decree, th e wife cam e to her h u sb a n d s
house in D elhi after som e tim e alongw ith h er sister and child. A t th a t tim e
h er h u sb a n d h ad gone o u t. O n his re tu rn she greeted him , b u t he ignored th e
greetings an d asked h er to go away. H e also left im m ediately th e re a fter and
did n o t re tu rn fo r a couple o f h o u rs. A fter w aiting fo r som e tim e, she went
back to C alcu tta to h er f a th e rs hom e. F ro m th ere she sent tw o registered
letters to h er h u sb a n d o f w hich o n e was refused and the a n o th e r was re
tu rn ed b ack duly m arked address n o t k n o w n . She presented an application
u n d e r section 47 read w ith section 151, th e C o d e o f Civil P ro c ed u re, in the
co u rt o f D istrict Judge, D elhi, claim ing th a t th e decree fo r re stitu tio n o f
conjugal rig h ts o b tain ed by h er h u sb a n d has been satisfied a n d a finding be
record ed to th a t effect. It was accepted an d th e o rd e r was passed accordingly
w hich was appealed against by th e h u sb an d .
D ism issing th e appeal I.D . D u a , J., observed th a t in the case o f decree
fo r restitu tio n o f conjugal rights if th e
ju d g m e n t-d e b to r is willing to obey th e decree, and the decree-hol-
d er, how ever, o bstructing p erfo rm an ce w ithout ju st cause, then the
c o u rt can record satisfaction o f th e decree on application o f th e
ju d g m en t-d eb to r so th a t th e decree-holder m ay n o t fraudulently
a n d m ala fid e utilise th e d ecree fo r th e p u rp o se o f securing th e
decree o f divorce'**.
15a. M. at 374.
16. A.I.R. 1965 Punj. 54-
16a. Id. at 56,
 R E ST IT U T IO N OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS 163

T h e provision o f rule 32 o f o rd er 21, prescribing the m ode o f execution

does n o t seem to im ply any b a r to th e reco rd in g o f satisfaction, an d , th e re
fore, th e argum ent, th a t once a decree fo r restitu tio n o f conjugal rights is
secured by the h u sb an d then even if th e wife com es to live w ith him and does
so live fo r a length o f tim e, every fresh and new desertion by th e wife would
also be covered by the said decree, an d o p eratio n against all fu tu re re
fusal o f th e wife to live w ith h e r hu sb an d , even if such refusal be fully
justified, is untenable. U p h o ld in g o f this argum ent m ay a t tim es lead
to un ju st an d oppressive consequences w hich cannot be im puted to the legis
lature. A nd this finding was affirm ed in th e la tte rs p ate n t app eal by D . K.
M a h aja n an d S. K . K a p u r, JJ., in M .P . Shreevastava v.

I t is clear from th e above cases th a t th e decrees fo r re stitu tio n o f conjugal

rights can even be m ade ineffective by th e spouses on one o r th e o th er
ground s. Such course o f litigation fails to provide any relief to the parties and
creates fru stratio n s w hich at tim es lead to sad ?nds- This ca n n o t b e th e p u r
pose of any law, w hatsoever.

Ill

A t this stage it is b e tte r to refer th e p roposals o f th e Law M inistry

and the recom m en d atio n s o f th e Law C om m ission concerning th e subject
u n d er discussion. O ne ra th e r w onders to n o te th a t the Law C om m ission has
also recom m ended th e reten tio n o f this relief in its F ifty-ninth R eport b u t in
an am en d ed form.* It is good th a t th e com m ission by recom m ending
deletion o f section 9(2) o f th e A ct has a t least sought to rem ove th e diffi
culty, and th e p ro b lem th a t h as arisen d u e to th e conflicting views o f various
H igh C o u rts. T he conflicting views are m ainly based u p o n th e co nstruction
o f term s and expressions w ith o u t re aso n ab le excuse in section 9(1) and
g ro u n d in section 9(2) so also as to th e b u rd en o f p ro o f in b o th th e cases.

M ajo rity o f th e H igh C o u rts a re o f th e view th a t th e relief o f restitu tio n

o f conjugal rights can even be denied if th e resp o n d en t has pleaded and
pro v ed som e reasonable excuse fo r th e w ithdraw al from th e society o f the
p etitio n e r. In som e o th er cases th e H igh C o u rts have also expressed the
view th a t th e p etitio n er should p ro v e th e absence o f reaso n ab le excuse o r
legal g ro u n d for such an actio n o f the respondent.' B ut th e A n d h ra P ra
desh H igh C ourt strictly applied th e test o f th e specific req u irem ents laid

16b- A.T.R. 1966 Punj. 506.

17. The Law Commission, Fifty-ninth Report, para 4.12 (1974).
18. Hardeep Singh V. Dalip Kaur, A .J.R . 1970 P. & H. 284; Anna Saheb v. Tarabai,
A.T.R. 1970 M.P. 36.
19. Shanti Devi v. Balbir Singh, A.T.R. 1971 Delhi 294 at 295 and ths cases refer
red therein.
J,64 T HE HINDU M A n R I A C E & SPECIAL M A R R IA G E ACTS

dow n by section 9(2) an d u p h eld th e view th a t the respondent could plead

only the specific grounds req u ired u nder this sub-section and nothing sh o rt o f
these g rounds can provide a good defence to the respondent.- As to the
question o f b u rd en o f p ro o f o f reaso n ab le excuse m entioned in section 9(1)
o f th e A ct th e Law C om m ission has recom m ended th at it should be shifted
u p o n to th e resp o n d en t in w hose know ledge th e presence o f such an excuse'
is supposed to be.^^

T hese recom m endations w ould certainly p u t an end to the contro v ersy '
discussed above. B u t th e th eo ry reg ard in g burden o f p ro o f will definitely
create som e disadvantages fo r respondents (who are m ostly wives in such
cases). Paras D iw an has correctly deplored this conclusion o f the Law C o m
m ission in his p a p e r on R estitu tio n o f C onjugal R ig h ts read a t the
Sem inar.

T h e Law C om m ission has also recom m ended either com plete deletion or
red u ctio n in th e p eriodic lim itatio n s laid dow n fo r the institution o f enter
tain m en t o f m atrim onial cases.^^ T he p ro p o sed reduction in th e w aiting
p e rio d fo r non-observance o f th e conjugal relations after the decree o f resti
tu tio n from tw o years to o n e y e a r u n d er section i3(IA )(!/) is still a cause o f
co n cern fo r th e young affected people.-^ T he argum ent advanced in favour
o f t h i s w aiting p erio d is th a t it offers an o p p o rtu n ity to the parties for
m u tu al u n d erstan d in g b efo re proceeding for an end to the m arriage. This
w riter is unable to u n d erstan d th e logic behind it. So m uch so th a t the
L aw C om m ission has itself realised a t a n o th e r stage while discussing section
14th a t such o p p o rtu n ity is alread y provided u n der section 23(2) o f th e'
A ct W hy th e sam e conclusion could n o t be arrived a t by the Law C om
m ission w hile considering section 13(1 A)? It is difficult to und erstan d th e
different conclusions for th e sam e ju ristic purpose. O n the co n trary , such an
o pp o rtu n ity o f m u tu al u n d erstan d in g would ra th e r have been m o re ap p ro
p riate fo r th e newly m arried couple u n d er section 14 th a n fo r the parties
w ho have already co n fro n ted each o th e r a t the b ar and the bench. So also
they have crossed one stage fo r reconciliation w hile ob tain in g th e decree
u n der section 9 o r 10 o f th e A ct, b efo re proceeding u n d e r section I3(1A).
I t is, th erefore, sub m itted th a t th e w aiting p erio d should be done aw ay with

20. Peddigari Amapiirnomma v. Peddigari Appa Rao,A.l.R. 1963 A.P. 312.

2J. Op. cjV. note 17, para 4.11.
22. S. 14 and proviso to s. 15 of the Act; see also theLaw Commission, Fi/tj'-nmtft
Report paras 2.31 and 2.32,
23. W. para 2.18.
24. W. Para 2,31,
 R ESTITU TIO N OF CONJUGAL R lG H t S 165

fro m section 13(1 A ) also. T his w ould certainly save the p a rtie s from w aste
ful w aiting p e rio d assum ed to be necessary to see- th a t th e parties have
ceased to value each o th e rs society, and their need fo r each o th e rs com pany'
is prim a fa c ie at an e n d . ^

Even otherw ise; th e m o d ern tren d is in fav o ur o f enlarging the scope o f

divorce in the m atrim o n ial law s. T h e p ro p o sed policy fo r adding cruelty
an d d esertio n as g ro u n d s fo r divorce u n d er section 13 o f the A ct is the
result o f m o d ern social t r e n d . A g a i n , th e p ro p o sed relief th ro jjg h counter
claim in any proceeding fo r divorce or ju dicial sep aratio n o r restitu
tio n o f conjugal rig h ts' an d if th e resp o n d en t alleges p e titio n er's adultery,
cruelty or desertion in d efence is also a salutory step in this direction.^
These m easures w ould certainly m inim ise the m atrim o n ial cases fo r petty
re lie f An effective ch eck will be en sured against petty actions, m ultiplicity
o f proceedings a n d u n d esirab le h arassm en t to th e resp o n d en ts (who
are m ostly wives p a rtic u la rly in proceedings fo r re stitu tio n o f conjugal
rights).

It is gratifying, th at the L aw C om m ission has tak en a serious note o f

delay suffered by th e p a rtie s in m atrim o n ial proceedings Under the schem e
o f existing laws. It is co rrectly said : In no field, how ever, such a delay
constitutes a g reater stigm a o n th e ad m in istratio n o f ju stice th a n in th a t o f
m atrim onial cases.^

Som etim es m o re th a n ten years are ta k e n by the co u rts in finalising the

m atrim onial d isputes a n d th a t to o w ith o u t any relief in its tru e sense. W h at
relief could be re n d e re d to th e spouses if th e p etitio n fo r restitu tio n o f
conjugal rights was finally dism issed a fte r w asting n early ten years o f th e ir
youthful lives ?- T h e p arties w ere left in th e sam e strained situ atio n as they
w ere before. In o th e r m atters ju stic e delayed m ay a m o u n t to denial o f ju s
tice but in m atrim onial cases delay in ju stice w ould, natu rally , am o u n t to a
denial o f h ap p y m arried life to the young p arties w hose youthful days are
wasted in slow and ta rd y legal proceedings.

In o rd er to p u t a n end to this d elay an d expedite the proceedings, the

L aw C om m ission has reco m m en d ed various p ro ce d u ra l m easures such as
establishm ent o f fam ily c o u rts, co n so lid atio n o f case^ p resented in diffe-

25. Id. para 2.18.

26. W. paras 2.17, 7.16.
27. Id. para 2.45.
28. Inaugural Address by Justice H.R. Khanna at the Seiiiinaf ott the Hindu Marriage
Act and the Special M arriage Act organised by the Indian Lnw Institute ia 1975.
29. Shanti Devi v. Balbir Singh, A-I.R. 1971 Delhi, 294.
30. See the Law Commission, nfty-fju rth Report on Civil Procedure Code, ch. 32A,
Us f H E HINDU m a r r ia g e & SPECIAL M A RR IA G E ACTS

re n t courts,^* disposal o f p etitio n s a n d appeals w ithin six and th ree m onths

respectively o f service o f notice,^ bars to appeals ag ain st certain in terim
orders^ an d relief th ro u g h c o u n te r claim.* All these m easu res, if tra n s
form ed in to laws, w ould certainly b rin g a healthy and long desired change
in th e respective areas. It will also elim inate to som e extent, th e defects
and th e d raw backs o f th e existing law s. T he p roposed changes m ight also
help in setting a t re st th e co ntroversies found in th e H igh C o u rts' decisions.
H ow ever, th e Law C om m ission has n o t given d u e w eight to certain o th e r
issues concerning th e p ro b lem s such as m atrim onial h o m e and enforce
ability o f decrees in their tru e sense. B oth th e issues are p ertain in g to the
fo rm an d execution o f decrees o f restitu tio n o f conjugal rig h ts. Since no
su b stan tial change has been reco m m en d ed by the Law C om m ission in either
o f th e reports,'*' these issues will be governed by th e existing provisions of
law, as discussed above.

A s to th e question o f m atrim o n ial hom e it is su b m itted th a t a m ost

unsatisfactory developm ent o f th e case law regarding this p a rtic u lar relief
has taken place in recent years, which does n o t suit to th e p re sen t socio
econom ic p roblem s a t all. T his relates to th e em ploym ent o f wives w ith or
w itho u t the consent o f the husb an d s. It is p eculiar to n o te th a t in all such
cases o f m arried em ployed wives eith er they g o t into sevvicc b efo re the
m arriag e o r they w ere com pelled to en ter into service due to econom ic h a rd
ships o f th e family. In all such c a s e s " husbands m oved the courts to
enforce restitu tio n o f conjugal rights. O u t o f these fo u r re p o rte d cases
two were decreed by the trial courts in favour o f petitioners (h usbands) and
the rem aining two were dism issed. In appeals preferred by the wives low er
c o u rts decrees w ere confirm ed. O ut o f the appeals p referred by the defeated
h u sb an d s, one^ was dism issed o n the reaso n ab le excuse o f cruelty b u t the
o th e r o n e " was accepted by th e M ad h y a P ra d e sh H igh C o u rt o n th e ground

3L Supra note 17 at 8.12.

32. Id. para 8.16.
33. Id. para 8.41-
34. Id. para 2.45 and see above, f.n. 27 supra.
35. See, the Law Commission, Fifiy-fourth and Fifty-ninth Report':.
36. See supra noXs ^2 anA Pedapudi v. Pedapud, . 1949 Mad. 374 as to form
and for enforcement see the Law Commission, Fifty-ninth Report, para 8.41.
37. Tirath Koiir v. Kirpal Singh, A .I.R. 1964 Punj. 28; Gaya Prasad v. Mst. Bbagwati,
A .I.R. 1966 M.P. 212; Sadhii Singh y. Jagdish Kaur, A .I.R. 1969 P. & H. 139 and
Siirinder Kaur v. Gurdeep Singh, A .I.R . 1973 P. & H. 134.
38- Tirath Kaur v. Kirpal Singh, supra note 37.
39. Gaya Parsad & Sadhu Singh, supra note 37.
40. Sadhu Singh, supra note 37.
41. Gaya Prasad, supra note 37.
 fiESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS \61

o f H indu social n o tio n s . T h u s only in one o u t o f fo u r cases w ifes pleas

were accepted alth o u g h in all th e se cases wives raised th e sim ilar pleas but
th e sam e w ere rejected on th e basis o f u n sa tisfac to ry eyidence. H ere lies
the crucial p o in t to be stressed u p o n , th a t how fa r th e H in d u wife, will be
m ade victim o f this b a rb a ro u s rem edy u n d er the guise o f o u td ated notions
o f H indu society. Is this p ro p e r fo r th e co u rts to ask th e em ployed wife
to resign from h er service in o rd e r to ren d er th e h u sb a n d conjugal rig h ts
at his residence, p resu m ed to be th e m atrim o n ial h o m e u n d er the old and
outd ated social n otions? I t is evident by th ese cases th a t the low incom e of
the husband, ill tre a tm e n t by parents-in-law , su b o rd in atio n o f the husband to
paren ts, higher edu catio n an d aspirations o f th e wife to augm ent th e
faniily incom e in o rd e r to raise th e sta n d a rd o f living a re th e various cir
cum stances which com pelled th e wife to seek a jo b . N o one can expect
th a t a m odern ed ucated wife w o u ld su b m it to all th ese situations w ithout
any revolt. I t is futile to im pose such m atrim o n ial obligations u n der these
circum stances against th e wishes o f th e wife.

T he L aw C ornm ission in its F ifty-n in th R eport suggests revision of

sections 28 an d 39 o f th e H in d u M arriag e A ct and Special M arriage A ct res
pectively. T hese sections re la te to appeals and en fo rc e m en t com binedly.
F o r th e enforcem ent o f decrees an d orders th e envisaged in sertion o f new
sections 28A an d 39A alm o st in th e sim ilar language o f existing provisions
will still leave th e m a tte r to be governed u n d e r th e respective provisions o f
th e Civil P ro ced u re C ode as discussed above.^"

F ro m th e above discussion th e follow ing questions clearly em erge in

connection w ith th e relief o f re stitu tio n o f cpnjugal rights :

(/) Is it necessary to re ta in th e relief in question even in its p ro p o sed

m odified form in o u r laws?

(ii) W h eth er th e law as to fo rm and en fo rcem ent o f decrees is opposed

to th e m o d ern social norm s.

I f the first q u estio n is an sw ered in th e afiirm ative th e second question

does n o t arise at all. N e ith e r th e M inistry o f Law n o r th e L aw C om m is
sion has considered th e basic p ro b lem s a tta ch e d to th ese questions. T he
fundam en tal principle fo r th e existence o f any legal provision is th at it
renders som e efTective re lie f to th e in n o cen t or aggrieved p arty and it is m ore
so in the m atrim onial cases. I t is also expected th a t th e law should always
accord w ith th e changing social n otions o f a society at a given time,

42. See supra notes 15-16.

ifig the HINDU m a r r ia g e & SPECIAL M ARRIAGE ACTS

in th e light o f these observ atio n s one can safely argue ag ainst th e present
fo rm o f decrees fo r restitu tio n o f conjugal righls w hich is based upon the
o u td a te d social circum stances. T he q uestion o f m atrim o n ial hom e deserves
due consideration so th a t th e wives can be s a \e d from the undesirable situa
tions u n d er th e heavy h and o f th e law.^^ This view can also be supported
by th e P ream ble o f th e C o n stitu tio n w hich envisages E qu ah ty o f statu s and-
assures th e dignity o f the in d iv id u al.

As to the q uestion o f en fo rcem en t o f decrees it is subm itted th a t out o f

all th e m atrim onial reliefs th e restitu tio n o f conjugal rights is th e only relief
w hich em pow ers th e courts to direct the unw illing, o r so to say, the p a rty at
fau lt to d o som e positive action. R est o f the reliefs in m atrim o n ial law are o f
declarato ry n atu re. So th e questio n of.enforcem ent o f decrees involves the
questio n ol o ne's liberty. It has already been seen above th at even a t the
stage o f execution proceedings p arties are at liberty to place som e reasonable
excuses before the courts an d the courts can refuse the enforcem ent o f such
decrees under the d iscretionary provision o f o rd er 21, rule 32 o f the C ode o f
Civil Procedure."** So also th e decrees can be recorded as satisfied at the
instance o f the resp o n d en t u n d er section 47 o f th e Civil P ro ced u re C ode, if
th e cou rts are satisfied in the given circumstances.^^ This all leads to the
conclusion th a t the decrees a re rarely effected in th e ir tru e sense. Even o th er
wise, w hat relief can be rendered by m erely attaching th e p ro p e rty o f the
ju d g m en t-d eb to r as p ro v id ed for u n d er o rd er 21, rule 32 o f th e C ivil P ro ced
ure C ode.

W e have seen above th a t th e dharam shastras d id n o t provide fo r such

relief,'" an d th e sim ilar was th e p o sitio n in M uslim L a w T h i s was applied
in respect o f H indus and M uslim s by the courts in India during th e British rule
On th e basis o f general principles o f law and the n atu re o f t hi ngs. H o w
ever, no o th er specific provision was m ade fo r any com m unity in In d ia th an
th a t in th e In d ian D ivorce A ct, 1868* which was based upon the views o f
Ecclesiastical courts in E ngland. T h e conflict as to reaso n ab le excuse and
g ro u n d was already ab an d o n ed in th e English Law in 1950.* It seem s th at
section 22 o f the Special M arriag e A ct, was accorded sim ilarity w ith th a t o f

43. See w pra notes 37-41.

44. Supra note 15.
45. Supra note 16.
46. Supra notes 7-8.
47. Supra note 9.
48. notes 9-10,
49. See ss. 32 and 33.
50. Ihe Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950;
 k k ^ r iT U T tO N OF C o n j u g a l r ig h t s l6^
E nglish law b u t th e p rovisions u n d e r section 9(1) a n d 9(2) o f the H indu
M arriage A ct w ere en acted on th e basis o f sections 32 and 33 o f the Indian
D ivorce A ct, 1869. In view o f this, one can safely conclude th a t this relief
w as intro d u ced in th e In d ian m atrim o n ial laws th ro u g h the English law.

T he relief was n o t considered by th e H in d u an d M uslim law givers

in the old days. It is also being abo lish ed from th e m atrim o n ial laws in all
the civilised societies. O ne ra th e r w onders to n o te th a t w hen the Law C om
m ission has based its various reco m m en d atio n s o n th e basis o f E nglish law,
th en why th e suit was n o t follow ed w hile considering th e provisions pertaining
to this p a rtic u la r re lie f ? T h e so-called reco m m en d atio n s as to alternative
relief in case o f n o n-com pliance o r relief th ro u g h c o u n te r claim were already
m ade available in th e E nglish law long before.^

A nd at last th e English law having realised the practical difficulties o f

enforcing th e decrees fo r re stitu tio n o f conjugal rights abolished this relief
from th e m atrim o n ial law s fo r cver.^" B u t th e In d ian m atrim o n ial laws have
still to retain this a d o p te d re lie f^ w hich is o u td ated , unsuitable and p ra c ti
cally un enforceable in th e p resen t d ay p a tte rn o f society. T he argum ents in
favour o f this relief said to be based upon the th eo ry o f indissolubility o f
m arriag e do n o t find any su p p o rt in th e m o d ern age. M oreover, by en larg
ing th e scope o f divorce th e Law C om m ission has itself favoured the m odern
tren d of dissolubility even o n sim ple grounds.* H ence, th e practical im por
tance o f this relief as th a t o f enabling the innocent p a rty to get som e conse
quential reliefs, viz., divorce if th e decree is n o t com plied w ith fo r a period of
two years (now p ro p o sed one year), m ain ten an ce Uspendence^^ or perm anent
alim ony a fte r p ro ceed in g s has also b e e n red uced up to som e extent by
m aking reco m m en d atio n s fo r any relief th ro u g h c o u n ter claim and so on.

It w ould n o t be o u t o f place to m en tio n th a t th e Law C om m ission has

unduly throw n the b u rd e n o f p ro o f over th e re sp o n d e n t (it is very often the
wife) und er section 9(1). T h e scope o f reaso n ab le excuse fo r w ithdraw al from
the society was being enlarged in fav o u r o f the resp o n d en ts (wives) in m any
o f the decisions by th e courts.* O ver and above this relief som etim es proves

51. 12 Halsburys- Laws o f England 284 (3rd ed.); Barber v. Barber, (1954) 2 All E.R. 307.
52. S. 20 of the M atrimonial Proceedings and Properly Act, 1970, para 4.12, supra
note 17.
53. Supra note 17.
54. Paras 2.17 and 7.16, supra note 17.
55. S. 13 (1 A) of the Act.
s6. Id. s. i24.
57. Id. s. 25.
58. Capt.Chand Narain Gnutam v. S>nt. Safoj (1974) Raj. W-L.N. 808; A/tl',
Gufdev Kaur v. Sarivan ^ingh. A.T.R. 1959 Punj. 162.; Lochman v. Meena, A.I.R. 1564 S.C. 40.
H6 T H E H iN D u C a r r ia g e & s o c i a l m a r A j a Oe A c fs

to be intolerab le, inh u m an e a n d c o n tra ry to th e status o f a n individual. T he

m arital relatio n s can only be g u ard ed and secured by th e inclinations' o f
th e spouse concerned and th ey c a n n o t be enforced o r im posed upon by any
au th o rity o f law. F o r such a serious aspect o f legal rem edy under the
m atrim o n ial law th e re is an old saying th a t you can push som eone into th e
w a ter b u t y ou ca n n o t m ake him to swim.

In view o f th e above subm issions it can be said in answ er to the first

q u estio n th a t th e relief o f re stitu tio n o f conjugal rights should be abolis
h ed from th e In d ia n m atrim o n ial laws so th a t th e p artie s m ight be saved
fro m th is b arb aro u s, tim e consum ing an d useless rem edy, fo r ever. It will
not h arm th e cause o f m a rita l relatio n s in any way.

59. JX. M am 12.