Harland W. Braun, Fsq. [CASBN 41842) BRAUN & BRAUN LLP » || 10250 Constellation Boulevard, Suite 1020 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 277-4777 Facsimile: (310) 507-02 Email: harland@braunlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant « |, ROMAN RAYMOND POLANSKI SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. A 334139 1s || CALIFORNIA, u Plaintiff, MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 15 v | 16 || ROMAN RAYMOND POLANSKI, Date: Apri 25, 2017 Time: 103 5 e Defendant. Place: Department 100 29 a Defendant Roman Polanski, through his attorney of record, requests the Court 22 ||reconsider its Order of April 3, 2017, based on factual and legal analysis in this motion 29 |] and the contents of 2010 Testimony of Deputy District Attormey Roger Gunson whether 24 |Jonly read by the Court or unsealed as requested. 25 PRIOR LITIGATION This matter has been litigated in three judicial systems: California, Switzerland 27 || and Poland. All three judicial proceedings concluded by questioning the ethical conduct of the Los Angeles criminal justi jem in its treatment of Mr. Polanski. The MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 1California Court of Appeal was stunned by the misconduct of DDA David Wells in secretly directing the conduct of Judge Rittenband; the appellate court also described the flight. ase by sentencing Mr. many acts of judicial misconduct by Judge Rittenband leading to Mr. Polanski ‘The appellate Court suggested that this Court resolve thi Polanski in absentia. The Swiss Court, after detaining Roman Polanski in custody for over nine (9) months, rejected the American extradition request because this Court refused to provide the Swiss Court with the 2010 sworn testimony of Deputy District Attorney Roger Gunson. The Swiss logically reasoned that, without the Gunson transcript, it could not determine whether Mr. Polanski had already served his promised sentence -- the same reason Mr. Polanski is requesting the veil of secrecy be lifted on the Gunson testimony, The Polish Regional Court in Krakow, the Polish prosecutor and the Polish Supreme Court, all questioned the ethical conduct of this Court chronicling the evidence of secret agreements between its judges, the secret judicial orders to the trial judge documented by emails, and the secret agreement to allow Mr. Polanski to "cool his heels" in jail even though the judges recognized that he the court owed no additional custody time. These disturbing facts were established by the sworn declaration of retired court press representative Allan Parachini. These facts remain uncontradicted by this Court in its December 2014 order, by the DA in the Polish proceedings, and even in this Court’s April 2017 Order. Neither this Court nor the DA have contradicted these facts because they are true. The most recent order by this Court which again ignores these allegations amounts to a judicial adoptive admission. This Court also ignored its own April 22, 2009 letter to Mr. Polanski falsely stating that the presiding judge does not “insert himsel!” in a case pending before another} ued |judge, When the court sent this letter, it knew that the presiding judge had already is secret e-mail orders to the trial judge directing how the Polanski case was to be decided MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 2‘This Court did not anticipate that in 2014 Mr. Polanski would obtain copies of these long, hidden c-mails. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND and factual issues in this 40-year old criminal ease may An analysis of the kl conclude that this Court's Order of April 3. 2017. is morally incoherent, legally illogical, iss the secret e-mail and factually deceptive, Factually, the Court does not even di orders to the trial judge, the judicial agreement to let Mr. Polanski "cool his heels” in the jail, nor its own false representation in its 2009 letter. Because these uncontradicted allegations are neither discussed nor explained, the “Background” statement in the April 3, 2017 Order is rendered suspiciously deceptive. MORAL INCOHERENCE Roman Polanski has admitted his criminal conduct in 1977 and accepted both moral and legal responsibility. In distressing contrast, the most recent Order of this Court fails to even mention or discuss any judicial errors, misconduct, misrepresentations, secret e-mails or secret sentencing plans which all are thoroughly documented in the record. When sentencing defendants, this court considers whether cach defendant recognizes his misconduct and accepts moral and legal responsibility. Yet this Court in its order has not even discu: sutorial misconduct the recognition of ed the judicial or pros which is the first step to accepting moral responsibility. Even the universally recognized misconduct of Judge Laurence Rittenband which caused Mr. Polanski to flee is not mentioned in the most recent Order. LEGAL INCONSISTENCY The Court applies the equitable doctrine of fugitive disentitlement to even deny Mr. Polanski's request that the Court recognize ils own sentencing promise and to follow the law of sentencing credits, The Court fails to discuss several important rationales for the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement. The Court failed to discuss that Mr, Polanski fled because of its own judicial misconduct in promising a sentence, twice breaking its MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 3promise, and holding held a news conference. Rather than the 90 days promised Mr. Polanski, this Court threatened Mr. Polanski with up to 50 y in state prison and deportation. The reason for Mr. Polanski’s flight is not mentioned is because it eviscerates the Court’s theory for applying the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement. If a defendant flees because of an illegal judicial threat, that threat should be removed before the defendant is expected to return to court. The Court cites the case of Polanski v. Superior Court (2009), 180 Cal.App.4th 507, ("Polanski") to deny Mr, Polanski’s request to correct a past injustice. This Court knows that the Polanski ease was premised on the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial judge yet this Court’s own e-mails filed in court in December 2014 and again in March 2017 prove that the trial judge was not exercising judicial discretion; he was obeying the undisclosed secret e-mail orders from the presiding judge. Any use the Polanski decision without mentioning the secret emails is disinge MoUs. Even taking the Polanski decision at face value, it suggests that this Court could ;, ||Sentence Mr. Polanski in absentia. The appellate court assumed that such a sentencing , || could lawfully occur without Mr. Polanski returning to court, Currently Mr. Polanski is willing to return to Los Angeles, but is simply requesting assurance that this court will 15 |] not engage in any additional misconduct. To apply the equitable doctrine of fugitive 20 || disentitlement to even prohibit Mr. Polanski from asking this court whether it will honor 21 |]its own promise and obey California law is inexplicable. 2 PROPOSED DEFENSE SOLUTION aa As a dual citizen of France and Poland, it is not Mr. Polanski’s mission to correct 24 such misconduct judicial misconduct or unscal the secret Gunson testimony unles directly affects him. Mr. Polanski is not an American taxpayer; the public funds wasted in} the unnecessary litigation in C , Poland and Switzerland should be a concem of the Court. However, the continuing existence of a twice rejected international warrant 28 makes it hazardous for Mr. Polanski to travel with his wife and children. Therefore, Mr. MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 4» || Polanski has proposed a simple resolution to this ancient litigation which would even 2 || sidestep any consideration of judicial or prosecutorial misconduct in Los Angeles 2 || County. The operative facts of this case reveal a remarkably simple solution, r-old defendant, in a 40-year-old This criminal proceeding involves an 83- prosecution. Mr, Polanski was promised a sentence of at the most 90 days by this Court, and has served more than 350 days. Had Mr, Polanski been sentenced to state prison in 1978 he would have served 365 days. The victim has asked the case to} be concluded without any additional custody time for Mr. Polanski. When condensed to these basic elements, the just resolution is clear. The only issue is what custody sentence this Court promised Roman Polanski. Vhe declarations of defense counsel, prosecutor Gunson, and the victim's lawyer are all consistent that this nostic study would be his Court’s promised Mr. Polanski that his custody time in the dia total custody time. The Court obviously knows what it promised Mr. Polanski. The reason the sworn testimony of Mr. Gunson remains sealed is because it would remove all «, || doubt of what this Court promised Mr. Polanski, Fa Once the promise is established, this case solves itself. The Penal Code requires ts |] that Mr. Polanski be given credit for 43 days in California custody and over 9 months in 25 |] Swiss custody. The Court has no legal alternative but to give Mr. Polanski credit for his 20 || total custody time in California and Switzerland, Simple math then dictates: that Mr. 21 || Polanski served more time than the custody time is required under California law. What 22 |lis erroneously claimed to be a complex case can be solved with a simple solution, ‘The only question is what was Mr. Polanski promised? Once that is decided, ** || this case solves itself. = THE FEBRUARY 2017 MOTION TO UNSEAL, . Mr. Polanski filed a February 2017 Motion to Unseal the 2010 Sworn Testimony ?” || Se DDA Roger Gunson. The testimony was sealed purportedly pursuant to Penal Code Sections 1335 through 1345, The sealing of testimony contradicts the basic tenet of MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 51 || American constitutional Jaw that all criminal proceedings, with few exceptions, must be 2 |] open to public scrutiny to prevent the hiding of dishonesty and corruption or judicial 3 || misconduct, Mr. Polanski filed the motion to unseal to test several matters, First, to determine whether the DA could reasonably argue that fugitive disentitlement can deny the public’s right to have access to a criminal proceeding? And, second, to determine whether the Court would recognize its own obligation to make all criminal proceedings available to the public. Mr. Polanski felt that the application of lugitive disentitlement to deny access to public proceedings would demonstrate the absurdity of the application of this equitable| doctrine ‘Mr. Polanski’s brief to the Krakow Court, which is part of the record, explains in ations have no paragraph 14 & 15 that the provisions for criminal conditional exami 3 1 || application to the testimony of Mr. Gunson, Mr. Polanski had already entered a plea and 15 | [there was going to be no trial, Furthermore, the 19th Century doctrine of "sealing" a te || transcript is inconsistent with eurrent American constitutional law and fails to recognize 17 || that the 19% century concept of sealing refers to preservation of the integrity of the ss to a public proceeding, 1» | transcript--- not cutting off the public's right to have a is the promise made by 9 ‘As Mr. Polanski has explained, the only issue in this 20 || Judge Rittenband to Mr, Polanski. To eliminate any doubt, it nntial to unseal now es: 2 || the trans pt so that the public will know what this court promised Mr. Polanski. POSITION ON CUSTODY 22 REQUEST REGARDING PEOPLE'S 3 Mr. Polanski filed a request for that the Court inform the DA that it would 24 || "appreciate" it if she informed the Court whether she contends that Mr. Polanski owes any additional time in eustody as part of his sentence and, if she believes he does, the 26 ” . court would appreciate if she would tell the Court and counsel the rationale for such al. belief. 28 MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 61 ‘The Court criticized Mr, Polanski because he submitted no points and authorities 2 || for this request. There is no precedent because there has never been a past case handled 5 ||as bizarrely as this case. Every day in almost every eriminal courtroom, judges ask, “What is the People's position?" There is nothing strange or unprecedented about the Court asking the prosecution its position, What if the People represented to the Court that Mr. Polanski owes no more custody time? Does not that simplify this proceeding? DA Jackie Lacey owes it to the taxpayers of this county to state whether Mr, * Il Polanski owes the Court any additional time in custody. Does it not make sense to "cut to * ll the chase” rather than waste any more taxpayer's money on this four-decade-old © | hitgation? Aiso, does the DA claim that this Court should break its promise to Mr. . Polanski? . ‘The Court claims that Mr, Polanski is not entitled to request the court ask the DA 1 || et position because he openly stands in contempt of a legal order" from this very Court _. || The Court should consider why Mr. Polanski was not charged with unlawful flight by cither the State or federal authorities. It was this Court that that stood in contempt of its 17 || basic judicial obligations by making one promise to Mr. Polanski and then breaking its a || promise. Mr. Polanski was as justified in fleeing this Court's illegal conduct as he was to 19 || flee the Germans who invaded Poland. 20 MR. POLANSKI'S REQUEST FOR THE COURT 2 TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS PROMISE cg ‘Mr. Polanski requests that this Court acknowledge its own promise to Mr. 23 || Polanski. The Court surely knows its own promise. That simple acknowledgement would solve this entire proceeding, The evidence is consistent that Mr. Polanski was promised either 43 or 90 days and that he has more than served that sentence. For some unfathomable reason [perhaps marching order?], this Court refuses to accept a solution consistent with the law which spares the Court from litigating its own misconduct. MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 71 This Court made the promise to Mr. Polanski. The promise is contained in the swom statements of the participants, including the DDA representing the prosecution. |)-The honesty of Roger Gunson is beyond dispute; his statement is an authorized admission] by the prosecution of the fact which would solve this entire proceeding ‘The Court claims that Mr. Polanski cannot ask the Court to acknowledge its own promise because of the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement as articulated in Polanski. Why| does the Court fail to mention that the Polanski appellate decision was based on the false record that the judge exercising judicial diseretion when the e-mails prove he was obeying secret orders from the presiding Judge. On this basis, Polanski is wholly discredited. Even a consideration of Polanski disproves this court’s conclusions. Polanski applied the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement to a motion to dismiss not to a sentencing, in absentia. Any reading of Polanski would conclude that it would not apply the doctrine to an inquiry of whether the court would assure Mr. Polanski that there will be no more 1 || judicial misconduct The Court claims that its acknowledgment of its own promise would require 1» || "factual findings.” which would be a benefit to a fleeing defendant. Not true. Mr. is || Polanski fled because of the misconduct of this Court. There is no disputed evidence of 20 |) the terms of the court’s promise. a After Polanski the issue became whether Roman Polanski must come to court to 22 Ibe sentenced. Mr. Polanski has conceded that issue to solve this litigation by promising 3 ||he will come to court as long as the Court recognizes its own promise, Does not this 24 |! Court know the promise it made? There are no necessary factual findings because there is| °5 |! no dispute about the terms of the promise 7 ‘The recent Order was incorrect to apply the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement * |! even to Mr. Polanski's request that the Court acknowledge its own promise and assure 28 him it will follow California law. It is one thing to say that a defendant must return to MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 8court to be sentenced under the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement: it is quite another thing to say that the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement even applies to the Court's ob} is duty to enforce its own promise and to follow California law As is plain, Mr. Polanski is looking for an economical and practical solution to a four-decade-old case. But for whatever reason, this Court seems to want to overly complicate this case. ‘There is no issue about what the Court promised. There is no testimony or evidence to contradict the sworn statements of District Attorney Gunson,, defense attorney Dalton and civil lawyer Lawrence Silver. There is no factual issue and, a] matter of law, this Court must enforce THE 2014 MOTION FOR AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT own promise. On December 15, 2014, Mr. Polanski filed a motion for a public evidentiary hearing on judicial misconduct. Fight days later, a judge of this Court previously uninvolved in the Polanski matter filed an opinion denying the order just before Christmas eve. The order did not mention the sworn statement of Allan Parachini, the newly revealed e-mails, the false letter sent to Mr. Polanski by this court, nor the secret arrangement by the judges to incarcerate Mr, Polanski despite believing he owed no additional custody time The order relied on the Polanski appellate case without mentioning that it was alleged that the secret e-mails undercut the judicial discretion rationale of the appellate opinion. ‘There are three very unusual features of this Christmas eve order:(1) this Court did| not wait for or request a response from the DA. What if the DA agreed? Would not the position of the DA assist the court? (2) there was a public hearing scheduled for mid- January 2015 unilaterally canceled by the order and (3) counsel doubts that the judge of this court wrote the order; he suspects that Court Counsel Fred Bennet wrote the order [just as he suspects Mr, Bennet wrote the current order. Mr. Bennet signed the false letter MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 9on behalf of the court assuring Mr. Polanski that the presiding judge docs not influence the trial judge. This letter was contained in the motion but not mentioned in the order. PRINCIPLE OF COMITY Judge Mazur in the Krakow Regional Court issued an opinion more than 200 pages chronicling the Roman Polanski case as it made its way through the California courts, then the Swiss courts and finally the Polish courts. Although Judge Mazur stated that he had respect for the American judicial system, he commented that he would be afraid to appear in a Los Angeles Court given the evidence that was presented to him about the emails between the judges, the declaration of court officer Allan Parachini, and What he viewed as serious violations of civil rights. Judge Mazur even concluded that to extradite Roman Polanski in a case in which Mr. Polanski had already done more time in custody than he was promised would constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Judge Mazur's decision, which in the English translation is now a part of the record in this case, constitutes the historic record which will probably be used by those who are analyzing the history of this case. However, Mr. Polanski cited the Polish and Swiss cases for very limited purposes which were ignored by the Court, The Swiss case establishes the fact that Mr. Polanski was in custody in Switzerland for over nine months after which this Court torpedoed the extradition by refusing to give the Swiss Court the sworn testimony of the prosecutor Gunson, The Swiss Court, perplexed by this secrecy surrounding the testimony of a prosecutor, stated that, without Gunson’s testimony, it could not determine whether Mr. Polanski had already served his promised sentence. The District Attomey of Los Angeles participated in the Polish proceedings and answered numerous questions propounded by the Polish Judge. The Los Angeles DA told! the Polish Court that Mr. Polanski is entitled to credit for all his eustody time in Switzerland and the di ostie study against any future California sentence. This MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER 10concession by the DA made Mr. Polanski ineligible for a return to LA under the Extradition Treaty. The DA who answered dozens of questions for the Polish Court seems unable to answer a few simple questions for this court. The most important aspect of the Polish decision is not its 200-page indictment of the Los Angeles Superior Court’s handling of Mr. Polanski’s case, but it establishes probable cause for Mr. Polanski’s fear of returning to Los Angeles without this Court assuring him i ill not engage in any future illegal conduct, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL In footnote 2 of the recent Order this Court has for the first time in four decades deprived Mr. Polanski of legal representation in the Los Angeles Superior Court. The Court claims that Penal Code Section 977 requires Mr. Polanski to sign a 977 waiver in open court for him to be represented without personally appearing. This new ruling is contradicted by the four-decade history of this Mr. Polanski has been represented over the years by several law firms and lawyers without any judge refusing to entertain arguments or motions based on a failure to comply with Penal Code Section 977. Mr. Polanski believes that a necessary exception to Penal Code 977 is when the defendant's failure to appear is caused by the unlawful conduct of this court. Until now, this has been the implicit assumption of all the proceedings attempting to correct the past failures of both parties. THE USE OF MODERN MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS In footnote I, the Court criticized counsel for communications and filing pleadings| using email. When counsel filed pleadings, to speed up the process, he anticipated the physical filings by e-mailing pdf copies to the court clerk and the district attorney. Counsel received numerous communications from the court using e-mails all of which were sent to the DA simultaneously. Counsel also e-mailed hundreds of pages of exhibits to the Court press representative at the Court’s request, Counsel also believed that the pdt MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER "» || transmission of pleading made it easier for the court to forward the documents to Fred Bennet who counsel believed was writing the order for the court. PDF form. The Court 3 Cal. Rule of Court 2.118(a)(3) refers to filing pleadings ‘ |! could have notified counsel if it believed email was illegal. Given the serious issues in this ancient case, itis ironic that the Court is focusing on the open and public use of emails by all counsel, rather than the secret e-mails ordering the trial judge how to decide the Polanski matter. . REQUEST FOR SENTENCING IN ABSENTIA. “ Having dealt with the serious issue of modern email usage, the court complains *° ll that counsel suggested in a reply brief that one way of resolving the case would be . sentencing in absentia, ‘This was the suggestion made by the appellate court in 2010, As counsel stated at the hearing, the suggestion of a sentencing in absentia was only a possible alternative to having Mr. Polanski fly from Paris, subject the court to a circus like atmosphere, and ultimately receive a sentence which did require any additional custody time, ‘The Court unfortunately construed a reasonable suggestion of an ition as a violation of a sacred principle of pleading, > || alternative disp a COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL as The Court claims that because Judge Espinoza denied sentencing in absentia in 20 || January 2010 that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata prevent the parties from relitigating issues which were already decided, The defect of this argument is that 22 || the emails totally undermine the theory that Judge Espinoza was exercising judicial 2 || discretion. au Moreover, the Polanski appellate court applied the doctrine of fugitive 2° || disentitlement to the issue of whether Mr. Polanski had to return to court to make a 2° || dismissal motion and later Judge Espinoza denied a motion to be sentenced in absentia. 2 Mr, Polanski has already conceded that he would return for sentencing to resolve this old case. This Court is incorrectly applying the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement to even MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER« |] Mr. Polanskis simple request that the Court acknowledge that it will enforce its own 2 |] promise and follow California law 3 CONCLUSION ‘The facts in this case are simple and straightforward. This ease is forty-years-old swith an 83-year-old Defendant. Mr. Polanski was promised at most 90 days in custody ® |] and has done over 350 days. Had he been sentenced to state prison in 1978, his maximum| ” || sentence would have been 365 days. The vietim has publicly stated she wants the ease to * Ilbe concluded and desires that Mr. Polanski do no more time in custody. . ‘The only issue is how much time was Mr. Polanski promised? There is no : dispute that he was promised at most 90 days in custody. Once the Court states that __||itwilt keep its promise, which under any rational judicial system is obvious, the case _, ||sotves its 7 This solution has never been previously presented to this Court and therefore the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to Defendant Polanski's current request. Pugitive disentitlement should not apply to someone who owes the Court no « || custody time, fled in the face of judicial dishonesty and simply wants the Court to « || acknowledge its own promise and honesty before the he returns Dated: April 14, 2017 Respectfully submitted, BRAUN & BRAUN DP py/_[-f [4 lV 24 Ya “ Harland W. Braun 2 Attorneys for Defendant 2 20 MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDERspa eg ear Poteet. fi I SMa oO RONAN Phe From: Allan Parachini Tot Gharke, John; Czuleger, Judge J. Stephen; McCoy, Judge Chatkes W cc: Expingan, audge Peter’ Van Sidon, Judge Steven; wesley, Judge David Date: 16/4/2008 6:23 AM Subjects Potentially troublesome HBO decementay on Roman PolarsH ye were cortactd yearby arelince wer dg pees onan wrasing HBO documenta 3 wee ta em the oan Pal cae 1k we Wore wh the produce evra mots 3 We Anges on Morey oy sok loses ines ne end tot sy, nee, ak en eines poe ot A ovr the documenta ro Jeph prison wih Jon Fer, who agreed to no pion ne on Potonal would agtee for his sentencing hearing to be telesc, eesess sy, age Per wos vry upset a the prospec tat sch an assertion ay appear Ip this roan ME Nees, on en fes We ae scan 10 gt BO to se 2 county revi py of he (ronson, but can guarantee wel! be successful, srs nef the oxo, or even tot Taupec ts all my ret, yt aga, Pecialon about PUR D2 a es ont Seach us Wa, orig ras A ty Resuilon fs can ony be oceued ME, ple sopers penal Iannis by oeeTeY OME 1 RceeNotves Mae negotiating on his behalf for wo is beng present. a ae rey aria Fd eta eo casio, whch wuul sul is beng oN Oe «Bere ger ears horng at vhs he di tapes 1977 woe eld and sence es be pen 3). akan erred etsmyresn, Ue ony ng pare an ouside uve wrrat Mr Plans es charged with ual gh Is there anvthing we should may? ‘sto the sue of whether there tan algaton tht Judge Fidler atempted to kngase sath a condion at re Aso the oe of wnt yea aor tot san lemon ofthe documenta, we wil mast cera oe Mee ‘Sp ra fr ge ier a bon Tn pateridy un, He was very unsct ot the prospec that ‘oud appear ona ‘ven that contortion doesnot altract attention, any new Plans documentary sere to reigte sorme mea ers ‘Welt have to see wot, ‘ta Porat Public Tformaton Pector Uae angeles Superior Court S11 Nut st, room $07 os Angeles, A 90012 ‘fee: (213) 974-5227, frat tne? 22) 974,553 ite: (eae) are sa20 Far: (213) 621-7042 parachini@asuperioeourt org[SER veers essen . vee sg CouRt Course Superior Court of California 3: TOEMEEL EN SDOIZ SOI County of Los Angeles A) teajornizsa ei) 20984 ‘April 22, 2009 Chad S. Hume! Manatt, Phelps & Phillips 1135 West Olympic Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 9064-1 614 Re: People v. Roman Polanski, LASC Case No, A334139. Dear Mr, Hummel; In conjunction with motions you fled in the above litigation you sent a letter dated December 16, 2008, to the Courts Public Information Officer requesting copies of emails and other communications between the Public Information Officer and judges or court personnel, ‘other agencies or members of the media concerning the case. By the enclosed letter dated December 23, 2009, I responded to you identifying and providing copies of non-privileged documents and setting forth the legal basis for not providing, certain privileged documents ‘There are no new or different documents relating to your requests other than those considered in response to your December 16, 2008, letter. T concluded that letter by advising: “Finally, given the context in which you have made the request in a pending case, you should direct any further requests to the judge presiding, in that case." Your motions procesied before Judge Peter Espinoza, the judge presiding in that ea eee ere tm ts cnclowea eter fo mo iwage Charles W. McCoy, Jr the Presiding Judge of the Count, dated April 17, 2009. ‘The Presiding Judge has directed me to respond to that letter of his belalf. In your letter dated April 17, 2009, you state to Presiding Judge McCoy that you are writing to him at the specific written direction of the Court's Counsel. That is incorrect. As indicated above, I advised that "given the context in which you have made the request in a pending case, you should clirect any further requests to the judge presiding in that case." The judge presiding in your case is Judge Peter Espinoza, not the Prosiding Judge of the Court. SA ‘A Presiding Jude doce not have authority to interfere or insert himself into a case ponding before another judge of the court. As! indicated in the letter of December 16, 2008, ‘you should make any further motions to Judge Espinoza,Chad 8, Hummel, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips Re: People v. Roman Polanski ‘April 22, 2009 Page: 2 ‘Aga final matter, I still have not received the requested payment for the copies of the documents sent to you With my letter of December 23, 2009. Please forward that payment. Very truly yours, rederick R. Bennett Court Counsel Hon, Charles W. McCoy, Jr. Presiding Judge22 23 aa 25 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Jam employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 10250 Constellation Boulevard, #1020, Los Angeles, CA 90067. On April 14, 2017, I served the foregoing document described as MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER on interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows: Michele Hanisee, Deputy District Attorney Major Crime Division 211 West Temple Street, Suite 1100 Los Angeles, CA 90012 mhanisee@da.lacounty.gov X_ (BY MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California. (BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) I caused such document to be sent by facsimile transmission to the number listed above. X_ (EMAIL/ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused such document to be sent by} email/electronically to the email address listed above. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the office of the addressee. Executed on April 14, 2017, at Los Angeles, California. X_ (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. (FEDERAL) I declare that 1 am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. 2 MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S APRIL 3, 2017 ORDER “