Popular Cases

Case Digest: Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.
April 8, 2014
G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563
JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET

AL., Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences
freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of
the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right
to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no
actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until
July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive
in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not
a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court
as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of
all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right
to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional
rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the
life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,
and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
2)
POLITICAL LAW: right to life
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled
"An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has
long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights
and health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle
of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these
principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
POLITICAL LAW: when life begins
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous

with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez
v. Judicial Bar Council:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution

emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that
would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical

parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus.
The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being
complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only
for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
POLITICAL LAW: the right to health
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for
the health of the people, viz:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.

Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions.
It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question

contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo
-under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician -be maintained.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by
the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for
public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without
the proper scientific examination.
POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is

made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious
people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom
they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind
the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier
to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of
the 1987 Constitution.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:

the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition ofa religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe,
and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of eligious freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality,
their beliefs should be respected.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an

individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who
object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice
it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the
protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure
that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now,
R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.
POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in
the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.
POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom
The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall
be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to
that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health

education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that
it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a
condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
POLITICAL LAW: due process
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service"
and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.
POLITICAL LAW: equal protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH
Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the
law.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification
be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive
health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health
being a privilege and not a right.
The point ofthe OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power
of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers
to render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the
same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say
that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating
a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of
life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to
the poor.
POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After
all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the
Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run.
The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers
is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but
they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should
not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her
religious beliefs;
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
and
8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by
its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
Case Digest: Disini v. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335: February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,

JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361,
and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
HELD:
a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of

cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without
right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should
thus be struck down.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between

them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be
tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client,
such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Hence, valid and constitutional.
b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or

deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message,
without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks
to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally

subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)
(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially
is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the things that
belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic
data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of

proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner
has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same,
if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with

the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire,
parody, or any other literary device.
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,

transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to
another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has
yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process
and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the
"Zones of Privacy."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil.
687, 714-715 (2006).
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone,
and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related

identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process of law.
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse
or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a
person in the news to secure information about him that could be published.
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation,
has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain
which is required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or

indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid
of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They
express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and
wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code,
would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common
usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated
trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms
of married couples or consenting individuals.
The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and
pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived

by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate
white slavery and the exploitation of women.

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through
a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents
the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit
child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means."
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is
committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial

electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise,
sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications,

also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and
interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was
said to be making a "spam."
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and
network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce
and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends
that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in
such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to
delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as
well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200
to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to
form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel
provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed
malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring
"presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354
of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the
author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing

style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction
to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options
offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are
disseminated down the line to other internet users.
Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect
to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others
who simply receive the post and react to it; and
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and
laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He
points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of
"aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues
that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law
enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the
mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad
news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous
reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this
cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The
terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of

communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding
certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected
freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such
latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.

Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a

qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a
substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In
using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able
to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a
basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material
cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a
new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application

of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the
crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under

both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and,
in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated
in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or
both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1)
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least
Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No.
9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
9775, if committed through a computer system.
shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand
pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall
be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed
penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00)
or both.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what
it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and
apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by
the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for
there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public
good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able
to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has
laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The
second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its
application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12
applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of
privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified
privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions,
while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of
the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies
be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the
transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the
date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed
a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the
order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes

an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order
that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from
accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to
their authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is
not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the
same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date
of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Hence, valid and constitutional

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing
a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to
disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in
relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a

subpoena.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to
carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would
not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and
seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise
have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in
this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage

medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer
or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to
protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but
in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the
court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established

search and seizure procedures.
The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search
and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided
in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the
case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of
a preservation and examination.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous

preservation or examination violates the users right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a
demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved
indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should
have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He
could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to

computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue
an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes
that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the
freedom and right mentioned.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision
of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of
the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof
specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in
its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or
both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is
that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard
to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) 1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done

"knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during
which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the
provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby

created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to
be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under
the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination
among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of

real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency
response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the

Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil.
563 (2007).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate
and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided
a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management

approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can
be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users assets.This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating
the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the
law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as
sufficient standard.
Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.
Case Digest: Bayan Muna v. Romulo

G.R. No. 159618 : February 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, as represented by REP. SATUR OCAMPO, ET AL., Petitioners, v.

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al.,
Respondents.
VELASCO, JR.,J.:
FACTS:
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to
cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,only 92 out of
the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process.The Philippines is not among the 92.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note

No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-
surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the
RP.
ViaExchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government.Inesse, theAgreementaims to
protect what it refers to and defines aspersons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.[8]It is
reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership
between the two countries.As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have
been effected by and between theUSand 33 other countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of

the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of
October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding
agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did
not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in

concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and
counter that the Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not
require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their
comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into
the question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in
concluding it; and
2) whether or not the Agreement,which has not been submitted to the Senate for
concurrence, contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.But
because respondents expectedly raised it, we shall first tackle the issue of
petitioners legal standing.
HELD: This petition is bereft of merit.
REMEDIAL LAW:locus standi of petitioner
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.

Specifically, it is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and
calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest refers to material
interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.The rationale for
requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized
that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.Consequently, in
a catena of cases, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi.
Going by the petition, petitioners representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as
concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the
Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action,
a petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed
with standing.Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.expounded on this requirement, thus:
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as acitizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way.It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying
conditions or specific requirements exacted under thelocus standirule.As citizens,
their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal.At the very
least, their assertions questioning theAgreementare made of a public right,i.e., to
ascertain that theAgreementdid not go against established national policies,
practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of
nations.
POLITICAL LAW: Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the
Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized

international doctrines, practices, and jargon is untenable. One of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements,which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities

with the private law contract.The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent.The signatories of the letters may
be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements

have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of
executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other
hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines
Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement
Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes
or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It is fairly
clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as
consent to be bound is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.
POLITICAL LAW: Senate Concurrence Not Required; treaties
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an

international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law,whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instrumentsand whatever its particular designation.International agreements may be
in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they
do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive

agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.Neither,on
the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution.Authorities
are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart
from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US
constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the
authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;a ratified treaty, unlike an
executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
POLITICAL LAW: The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute
Contrary to petitioners pretense, theAgreementdoes not contravene or undermine,

nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute.Far from going against each other, one
complements the other.As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity
underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted
by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions of the signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides:
Article 1
The Court
AnInternational Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby established.It x x xshall have

the power to exercise its jurisdictionover persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, andshall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be
governed by the provisions of this Statute.
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that it is
the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes.This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-
called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime
was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated
under Art. 17, par. 1of theRomeStatute.
Of particular note is the application of the principle ofne bis in idemunder par. 3 of
Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a
state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the provision states that no person
who has been tried by another court for conduct [constituting crimes within its
jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the
same conduct.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the
idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender
agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of theAgreementsubstantially impairing the
value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute.Ignoring for a while the fact
that the RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear
to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states,
like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory
states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestionthat the RP, by entering into
theAgreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and
breached its commitment under the Vienna Conventionto refrain from performing
any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statutehas to be
rejected outright.For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement,in relation to the
Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the
purpose of the ICC.Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that
enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process
require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international
agreement it has entered into.We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which
reads:
Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a

State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty;whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally
obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.
In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the
Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the
treaty would be premature.
As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements

are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically
Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-
Parties, not signatories.
Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not
incompatible with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the
requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not
under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall
give priority to the request for surrender from the Court In applying the provision,
certain undisputed facts should be pointed out:first, the US is neither a State-Party
nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international
agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of
persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-
Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements
entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the
Rome Statute.
POLITICAL LAW: Sovereignty Limited by International Agreements
Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its
sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US
nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who commit serious
crimes of international concerns in the Philippines.Formulating petitioners argument
a bit differently, the RP,by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its
sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek
recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing
international crimes in the country.
We are not persuaded.As it were, theAgreementis but a form of affirmance and

confirmance of thePhilippines national criminal jurisdiction.National criminal
jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and
within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC.Thus,
thePhilippinesmay decide to try persons of theUS, as the term is understood in
theAgreement, under our national criminal justice system.Or it may opt not to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or overUSpersons committing
high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC
over them.As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the
country would, in effect, accorddiscretion to the US to exercise either its national
criminal jurisdiction over the person concerned or to give its consent to the referral of
the matter to the ICC for trial.In the same breath, theUSmust extend the same
privilege to thePhilippineswith respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes
withinUSterritorial jurisdiction.
To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated

on the postulate that some of its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its
sovereignty.Almost every time a state enters into an international agreement, it
voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty.The Constitution, as drafted, did not
envision a reclusivePhilippinesisolated from the rest of the world.It even adheres, as
earlier stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect
on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty.By their
voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute
jurisdiction.The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the
greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting
party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.On the rationale that the
Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law aspart
of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or
deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of

International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law.The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility
for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner's earlier position, which, as

already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country's judiciary
to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment.This is manifestly incorrect.Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and
punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,
before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind
both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which
may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of
the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
REMEDIAL LAW: No Grave Abuse of Discretion
Petitioners final point revolves around the necessity of the Senates concurrence in
the Agreement.And without specifically saying so, petitioner would argue that the
non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in
grave abuse of discretion.
The Court need not delve on and belabor the first portion of the above posture of
petitioner, the same having been discussed at length earlier on.As to the second
portion, We wish to state thatpetitioner virtually faults the President for performing,
through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitutionthe power to
enter into international agreements.
By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of
state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international
agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the
Senate.But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into
without such concurrence.As the President wields vast powers and influence, her
conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, asBayanwould put it, executive
altogether.The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive
agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude theAgreementthru E/N BFO-028-03, then President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted
within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.At
the end of the day, the Presidentby ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender
agreementdid nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a
prerogative that pertains to her office.
POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Need Not Be in the Form of a Treaty

A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the
States obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations,i.e., genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes.Relying on the above-quoted statutory
proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper
international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA
9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a
foreign national for violations of RA 9851, the Philippines has only two options, to
wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender
the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant to the applicable
extradition laws and treaties.But the Philippines may exercise these options only in
cases where another court or international tribunal is already conducting the
investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime; otherwise, the
Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.
Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal

for any crime under RA 9851, the Philippines has the option to surrender such US
national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US national
here.The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is
not subject to the consent of theUS, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such
as requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option,
requires an amendatory law.In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that
theAgreementprevents thePhilippineswithout the consent of theUSfrom surrendering
to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851,
and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.Consequently, the view is strongly
impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement
in the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition
law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities.
Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution,
where thePhilippinesadopts, as a national policy, the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, the Court is further impressed to
perceivethe Rome Statute as declaratory of customary international law.In other
words, the Statute embodies principles of law which constitute customary
international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an
enforceable domestic law in the context of the aforecited constitutional provision.As
a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the Rome Statute principles cannot
be undertaken via a mere executive agreement, which, as an exclusive act of the
executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing
law.TheAgreement, so the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the
principles of law or alters customary rules embodied in the Rome Statute.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the
Agreement inefficacious, unless it is embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the
concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a Senate- ratified treaty partakes of
the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in this
instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of
enforceable domestic law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the
Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851.For another, the view does
not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters.And for a
third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to frustrate
the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, theUSnotably follows

the doctrine of incorporation.As early as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray inThe
Paquete Habana case already held international law as part of the law of theUS, to
wit:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for the
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of
domestic legislation.The cited ruling in U.S. v. Coolidge,which in turn is based on the
holding inU.S. v. Hudson, only applies to common law and not to the law of nations
or international law.Indeed, the Court inU.S. v. Hudson only considered the question,
whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases.Stated otherwise, there is no common law crime in the
US but this is considerably different from international law.
TheUSdoubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land,

necessarily including international crimes, even without any local statute.In fact,
years later, US courts would apply international law as a source of criminal liability
despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in Ex Parte
Quir in the US Supreme Court noted that from the very beginning of its history this
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of
nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of
enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. It went on further to explain that
Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific offenses covered in
the law of war, thus:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not
itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise
boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law
condemns. An Act of Congress punishing the crime of piracy as defined by the law
of nations is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10,
to define and punish the offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently
precise definition of international law. Similarly by the reference in the 15th Article of
War to offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be triable by such military
commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of
military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and
which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has
been held that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have attained the
status of customary international law.Some even go so far as to state that these
crimes have attained the status of jus cogens.
Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law

as stated in the Statute of the ICJ. It is defined as the general and consistent
practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two
elements must concur: State practice, the objective element; andopinio juris sive
necessitates, the subjective element.
State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts
or norms by States.It is demonstrated upon the existence of the following elements:
(1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. While,opinio juris, the
psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The term jus cogens means the compelling law.Corollary, ajus cogensnorm holds
the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles.As
a result,jus cogensnorms are deemed peremptory and non-derogable.When applied
to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the
existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them,
even by agreement.
These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., any
state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and
widely condemned offenses, even when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction
exists.The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so egregious
that it is considered to be committed against all members of the international
community and thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime.
Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it
still has both the doctrine of incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try these
crimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Case Digest: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The
Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of
2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come
from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of
Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a
sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political
partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral
party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is

clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement
in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by
the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may
have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party
has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to
what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-
write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
Petitions Granted
Case Digest: Reyes v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House
of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate
of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was
without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En
Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings
in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of

the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that
she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Case Digest: Boracay Foundation v. Province

of Aklan
G.R. No. 196870 : June 26, 2012
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,

REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHIL. RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY & THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI),Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas region
of the Philippines and one of the countrys most popular tourist destinations, was
declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in 1973 under Presidential Proclamation
No. 1801. The island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and
Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan.
More than a decade ago, respondent Province built the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay.It also
built the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the
receiving end for tourists in Boracay. Respondent Province operates both ports to
provide structural facilities suited for locals, tourists and guests and to provide safety
and security measures.
Governor Marquez sent a letter to respondent PRA on March 12, 2009 expressing
the interest of respondent Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the
foreshores of Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, pursuant
to Resolution No. 13, s. 2008 issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan.
Sometime in April 2009, respondent Province entered into an agreement with the
Financial Advisor/Consultant that won in the bidding process held a month before, to
conduct the necessary feasibility study of the proposed project for the
Renovation/Rehabilitation of the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Building and Jetty
Port, Enhancement and Recovery of Old Caticlan Coastline, and Reclamation of a
Portion of Foreshore for Commercial Purposes (the Marina Project), in Malay, Aklan.
Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent

Province issued Resolution No. 2009110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file
an application to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay,
Aklan with respondent PRA.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its

strong opposition to the intended foreshore lease application, through Resolution
No. 044, approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that respondent Provinces
foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit, at
the expense of the local government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the
rightful entity to develop, utilize and reap benefits from the natural resources found
within its jurisdiction.
In August 2009, a Preliminary Geohazard Assessmentfor the

enhancement/expansion of the existing Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal
through beach zone restoration and Protective Marina Developments in Caticlan,
Malay, Aklan was completed.
Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance Report and

Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his
letter dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). The letter reads in part:
With the project expected to start its construction implementation next month, the
province hereby assures your good office that it will give preferential attention to and
shall comply with whatever comments that you may have on this EPRMP.
Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on the
possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to
forty (40) hectares.
Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its
Resolution No. 4094and authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) to enter into a MOA with respondent Province for the implementation of the
reclamation project.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province ECC-R6-1003-

096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent
of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA with respondent PRA.
In Resolution No. 046, Series of 2010, adopted on June 23, 2010, the Malay
Municipality reiterated its strong opposition to respondent Provinces project and
denied its request for afavorableendorsement of the Marina Project.
The Malay Municipality subsequently issued Resolution No. 016, Series of 2010,
adopted on August 3, 2010, to request respondent PRA not to grant reclamation
permit and notice to proceed to the Marina Project of the respondent Provincial
Government of Aklan located at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.
In a letter dated October 12, 2010, petitioner informed respondent PRA of its
opposition to the reclamation project.
Petitioner likewise transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010, registering its
opposition to the reclamation project to respondent Province, respondent PRA,
respondent DENR-EMB, the National Economic Development Authority Region VI,
the Malay Municipality, and other concerned entities.
Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipalitys denial of respondent

Provinces request for afavorableendorsement, as well as the strong opposition
manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as an NGO, respondent
Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection
Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court
issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.
After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province

immediately issued an order to the Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned
contractor to cease and desist from conducting any construction activities until
further orders from this Court.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot
and academic;
[2] Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing this case;
[3] Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by
laws and regulations based on the scope and classification of the project;
[4] Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under
the pertinent laws and regulations; and
[5] Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project
HELD:
A close reading of the two LGUs respective resolutions would reveal that they
are not sufficient to render the petition moot and academic, as there are
explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by respondent
Province. In Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Caticlan it is stated that any vertical structures to be constructed shall be subject for
barangay endorsement. Clearly, what the barangay endorsed was the reclamation
only, and not the entire project that includes the construction of a commercial
building and wellness center, and other tourism-related facilities.Petitioners
objections, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the reclamation per se, but also to
the building to be constructed and the entire projects perceived ill effects to the
surrounding environment.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for

respondent Province to comply with on pain of revocation of its endorsement of the
project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on the environmental
impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us.
Therefore, the contents of the two resolutions submitted by respondent Province do
not support its conclusion that the subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs
had already addressed all the issues raised and rendered the instant petition moot
and academic.
We do not agree with respondents appreciation of the applicability of the rule

on exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case. We are reminded of our
ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals, which summarized our earlier decisions on the
procedural requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:
REMEDIAL LAW: exhaustion of administrative remedies
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule.
It is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2)
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, when there is no due process observed, or where the protestant
has no other recourse.
Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue
an ECC was rendered, it stands to be aggrieved by the decision, because it claims
that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would unavoidably adversely affect
the Boracay side, where petitioners members own establishments engaged in the
tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner contends that the declared objective of the
reclamation project is to exploit Boracays tourism trade because the project is
intended to enhance support services thereto; however, this objective would not be
achieved since the white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be
negatively affected by the project. Petitioners conclusion is that respondent
Province, aided and abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the
spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to perform
their duties under said laws.
REMEDIAL LAW: new rules of procedure for environmental cases; writ of

continuing mandamus
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC,
provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a
special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO as an
auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The Rationale of the said
Rules explains the writ in this wise:
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of
regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the
appropriate government agencies.
Thus, a government agencys inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future
of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to
change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely on such agencies to
take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly,
questions regarding the propriety of an agencys action or inaction will need to be
analyzed.
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus,
which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ
pertains: the performance of a legal duty.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated
under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well
as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.
Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.
Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised here
that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus it was justified in
coming to this Court.
3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs

submissions bear great weight in this case.However, the following are the issues
that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB RVI in issuing the ECC:
[1] Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere
expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new
project;
[2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located
project;
[3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies;
and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation
project to the environment.
As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by
respondent Province above, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would be
devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be utilized for
the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be
true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at the
very least predict the impact that the construction of the new buildings on the
reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These new
constructions and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies
that respondent Province previously submitted for the construction of the original
jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this alleged
expansion, instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.
Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay
are separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the
significant contributions of Boracays white-sand beach to the countrys tourism trade,
which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in implementing
projects within its vicinity.
POLITICAL LAW: public consultation
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government

agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure
prior public consultation and approval of local government units for the projects
described therein.
In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the
project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which
authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to
undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province
to go through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs
authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB
RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which is
tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found
in the Local Government Code provisions.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultationwith the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is
illegal.
Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required
by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent Province.
Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had
already been issued was insufficient to comply with this requirement under the Local
Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior public consultation
should have considered the ecological or environmental concerns of the
stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize
adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to
obtain the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was
denied by the latter.
Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:

5.3. ublic Hearing / Consultation Requirements
For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS
review is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other
undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required by EMB.
Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that

environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in
the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All public consultations
and public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. The
public hearing/consultation Process reportshall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD
and shall constitute part of the records of the EIA process.
In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public

consultations, the same should be initiated early so that concerns of stakeholders
could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case, respondent Province
had already filed its ECC application before it met with the local government units of
Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan
on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
onFebruary 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and
insistence of respondent Province. As we have established above, the respective
resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not render this petition moot and
academic.
It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the
promotion of tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill
the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this decision, we
mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very
apparent from both the petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and
memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth
resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces
cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the
proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of
utmost importance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing
mandamus specifically as follows:
1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental

Management Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and review the following
matters:
a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located
project;
b. its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere
expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new
project; and
c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated,
and comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be ordered by respondent
DENR-EMB RVI.
2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:
a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation
project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with
non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as
required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of the Local Government Code.
Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the

submission by respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by
respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns
raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in
modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of respondent DENR-
EMB RVI.
The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of
Aklan, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine
Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with
the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3) months from
the date of promulgation of this Decision.
In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their

agents, representatives or persons acting in their place or stead, shall
immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the
project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this Court.
For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5) days to this Court
the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy furnished the
petitioner.
Case Digest: Samson v. Restrivera
G.R. No. 178454: March 28, 2011.
FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner, v. JULIA A.

RESTRIVERA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a government officer from the Population Commission, agreed

to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latters land
located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens
System.Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000 and
accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the
titling of respondents land.However, petitioner failed to accomplish her
task because it was found out that the land is government property.When
petitioner failed to return theP50,000, respondent sued her
forestafa.Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against petitioner
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A.

No. 6713 and suspended her from office for six months without pay.It was
reduced to three months suspension without pay.According to the
Ombudsman, petitioners acceptance of respondents payment created a
perception that petitioner is a fixer.Her act fell short of the standard of
personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public
officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The CA affirmed, and added
that contrary to petitioners contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
even if the act complained of is a private matter.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act

was private
2. Whether or not the proper offense has been identified
HELD:
The Court sets aside the CA decision and enters a new judgment.
POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; conduct

unbecoming of a public officer.
First issue: Section 13(1), Article XI of the1987 Constitution states that the
Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any
personanyact or omission of any public official. Under Section 16of R.A.
No. 6770, otherwise known as theOmbudsman Act of 1989, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or
employee during his/her tenure.Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states
that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited,
to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular.Thus, even if the
complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not
service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.The law does not qualify.
Second issue: Both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of

R.A. No. 6713 asbroad enough to apply even to private transactions that
have no connection to the duties of ones office. However, that petitioner
may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In
Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court had ruled that failure to
abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in
relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, for reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount,
petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. In Assistant
Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory
S. Ong, et al., unbecoming conduct means improper performance and
applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.
Respondent is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer, and

is FINED P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman.
Case Digest: Session Delights v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 172149 : February 8, 2010
SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS, Petitioner, v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION), HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) AND ADONIS ARMENIO M. FLORA,
Respondents.
BRION,J.:
FACTS:
The private respondent filed against the petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal,
entitled Adonis Armenio M. Flora, Complainant versus Session Delights Ice Cream &
Fast Foods, et. al, Private respondents.
The labor arbiter decided the complaint on February 8, 2001, finding that the
petitioner illegally dismissed the private respondent. The decision awarded the
private respondent backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, indemnity,
and attorneys fees, under a computation that the decision itself outlined in its
dispositive portion.
On the petitioners appeal, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters decision.
On July 4, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed with modification the
NLRC decision by deleting the awards for a proportionate 13th month pay and for
indemnity.
In January 2004, and in the course of the execution of the above final judgment
pursuant to Section 3,Rule VIII of the then NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Finance
Analyst of the Labor Arbiters Office held a pre-execution conference with the
contending parties in attendance. The Finance Analyst submitted an updated
computation of the monetary awards due the private respondent in the total amount
of P235,986.00. This updated computation included additional backwages and
separation pay due the private respondent computed from March 1, 2001 to
September 17, 2003. The computation also included the proportionate amount of the
private respondents 13th month pay. On March 25, 2004, the labor arbiter approved
the updated computation.
The petitioner objected to the re-computation and appealed the labor arbiters order
to the NLRC. The NLRC disagreed with the petitioner and affirmed the labor arbiters
decision in a resolution dated October 25, 2004. The NLRC also denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated January 31, 2005.
The petitioner sought recourse with the CA through a petition for certiorari on the
ground that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The CA partially granted the petition in its decision of
December 19, 2005 (now challenged before us) by deleting the awarded
proportionate 13th month pay.
The petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its
resolution of March 30, 2006, now similarly assailed before us.
ISSUE: Propriety of the computation of the awards made, and, whether this violated
the principle of immutability of final judgments.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
We state at the outset that, as a rule, we frown upon any delay in the execution of
final and executory decisions, as the immediate enforcement of the parties rights,
confirmed by a final decision, is a major component of the ideal administration of
justice. We admit, however, that circumstances may transpire rendering delay
unavoidable. One such occasion is when the execution of the final judgment is not in
accord with what the final judgment decrees in its dispositive portion. Just as the
execution of a final judgment is a matter of right for the winning litigant who should
not be denied the fruits of his or her victory, the right of the losing party to give,
perform, pay, and deliver only what has been decreed in the final judgment should
also be respected.
That a judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive

portion is a long and well-established rule. Otherwise stated, it is the dispositive
portion that categorically states the rights and obligations of the parties to the
dispute as against each other. Thus, it is the dispositive portion which the entities
charged with the execution of a final judgment that must be enforced to ensure the
validity of the execution.
A companion to the above rule on the execution of a final judgment is the principle of
its immutability. Save for recognized exceptions, a final judgment may no longer be
altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, renders it. Any attempt
on the part of the responsible entities charged with the execution of a final judgment
to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion
violates the rule on immutability of judgments.
In the present case, with the CAs deletion of the proportionate 13th month pay and
indemnity awards in the labor arbiter's February 8, 2001 decision, only the awards of
backwages, separation pay, and attorney's fees remain. These are the awards
subject to execution.
LABOR LAW
A distinct feature of the judgment under execution is that the February 8, 2001 labor
arbiter decision already provided for the computation of the payable separation pay
and backwages due, and did not literally order the computation of the monetary
awards up to the time of the finality of the judgment. The private respondent, too, did
not contest the decision through an appeal. The petitioners argument to confine the
awards to what the labor arbiter stated in the dispositive part of his decision is
largely based on these established features of the judgment.
We reject the petitioners view as a narrow and misplaced interpretation of an illegal
dismissal decision, particularly of the terms of the labor arbiters decision.
While the private respondent failed to appeal the February 8, 2001 decision of the
labor arbiter, the failure, at the most, had the effect of making the awards granted to
him final so that he could no longer seek any other affirmative relief, or pray for any
award additional to what the labor arbiter had given. Other than these, the illegal
dismissal case remained open for adjudication based on the appeal made for the
higher tribunals consideration. In other words, the higher tribunals, on appropriate
recourses made, may reverse the judgment and declare that no illegal dismissal
took place, or affirm the illegal dismissal already decreed with or without modifying
the monetary consequences flowing from the dismissal.
We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as

it essentially considered the labor arbiters original decision in accordance with its
basic component parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains
the finding of illegality and its monetary consequences; the second part is the
computation of the awards or monetary consequences of the illegal dismissal,
computed as of the time of the labor arbiters original decision.
To illustrate these points, had the case involved a pure money claim for a specific
sum (e.g. salary for a specific period) or a specific benefit (e.g. 13th month pay for a
specific year) made by a former employee, the labor arbiters computation would
admittedly have continuing currency because the sum is specific and any variation
may only be on the interests that may run from the finality of the decision ordering
the payment of the specific sum.
In contrast with a ruling on a specific pure money claim, is a claim that relates to
status (as in this case, where the claim is the legality of the termination of the
employment relationship). In this type of cases, the decision or ruling is essentially
declaratory of the status and of the rights, obligations and monetary consequences
that flow from the declared status (in this case, the payment of separation pay and
backwages and attorneys fees when illegal dismissal is found). When this type of
decision is executed, what is primarily implemented is the declaratory finding on the
status and the rights and obligations of the parties therein; the arising monetary
consequences from the declaration only follow as component of the parties rights
and obligations.
In the present case, the CA confirmed that indeed an illegal dismissal had taken
place, so that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and backwages should be paid.
How much that separation pay would be, would ideally be stated in the final CA
decision; if not, the matter is for handling and computation by the labor arbiter of
origin as the labor official charged with the implementation of decisions before the
NLRC.
LABOR LAW
As the CA correctly pointed out, the basis for the computation of separation pay and
backwages is Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.
By jurisprudence derived from this provision, separation pay may be awarded to an

illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement. Recourse to the payment of
separation pay is made when continued employment is no longer possible, in cases
where the dismissed employees position is no longer available, or the continued
relationship between the employer and the employee is no longer viable due to the
strained relations between them, or when the dismissed employee opted not to be
reinstated, or payment of separation benefits will be for the best interest of the
parties involved.
This reading of Article 279, of course, does not appear to be disputed in the present
case as the petitioner admits that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement shall be
paid, computed up to the finality of the judgment finding that illegal dismissal had
taken place. What the petitioner simply disputes is the re-computation of the award
when the final CA decision did not order any re-computation while the NLRC
decision that the CA affirmed and the labor arbiter's decision the NLRC in turn
affirmed, already made a computation that on the basis of immutability of judgment
and the rule on execution of the dispositive portion of the decision should not now be
disturbed.
Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that under the terms of the
decision under execution, no essential change is made by a re-computation as this
step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of
dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if
no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279
of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read
into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to
add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The
re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle
of immutability of final judgments.
We fully appreciate the petitioners efforts in trying to clarify how the standing
jurisprudence on the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and the
accompanying payment of backwages ought to be read and reconciled. Its attempt,
however, is out of place and, rather than clarify, may only confuse the
implementation of Article 279; the core issue in this case is not the payment of
separation pay and backwages but their re-computation in light of an original labor
arbiter ruling that already contained a dated computation of the monetary
consequences of illegal dismissal.
That the amount the petitioner shall now pay has greatly increased is a
consequence that it cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek
recourses against the labor arbiters decision. Article 279 provides for the
consequences of illegal dismissal in no uncertain terms, qualified only by
jurisprudence in its interpretation of when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
allowed. When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes
the reckoning point instead of the reinstatement that the law decrees. In allowing
separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment
relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to
that point. The decision also becomes a judgment for money from which another
consequence flows the payment of interest in case of delay. This was what the CA
correctly decreed when it provided for the payment of the legal interest of 12% from
the finality of the judgment, in accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
DENIED
Case Digest: Nollen, Jr. v. COMELEC

G.R. No.187635 : January 11, 2010
MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

SUSANA M. CABALLES, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR.,J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were

candidates forpunongbarangayof Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the October 29, 2007
barangay elections.Having garnered four hundred and fifty-six (456) votes as
against the four hundred and forty-eight (448) votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was
declared as the punong barangay-elect. Dissatisfied with the result, Caballes
instituted an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).The MTC rendered
a decision declaring protestant Caballes as punong barangay-elect. Nollen filed on
June 5, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid the MTC the appeal fee of PhP 1,000.
The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed Nollens appeal for his failure to pay
the appeal fee of PhP 3,000 prescribed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the reglementary period of five (5) days.The
COMELECEn Banc denied Nollens motion for reconsideration on the rationalization
that, while he timely filed his notice of appeal and simultaneously paid the PhP 1,000
appeal fee with the MTC on June 5, 2008, the appeal would be deemed duly
registered and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction.
HELD:
POLITICAL LAW
Pending resolution of this petition, several relevant incidents transpired bearing on

the payment of the appeal fees imposed by different rules in election cases.Payment
of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases is now separately required by the
Rules of Court and Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by Resolution No. 02-0130, Series of 2002, a situation not obtaining
previously.
The Court takes judicial notice that the COMELEC promulgated on August 4, 2009
Resolution No. 8654 with regard to the determination of the sufficiency and timely
payment of the appeal fees as requisite for the perfection of appeals. The Resolution
provides that: 1) the appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election
contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and the payment of the PhP 1,000-appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period.The non-paymentor
the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200to the COMELEC
Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended,does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not
result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal; and 2) If the appellant filed his
appeal before the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall
be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice from the Commission, in accordance with Resolution No.
8486.If the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then shall the appeal be
dismissed.
AsCOMELEC Resolution No. 8654 reiterated, the payment of the PhP 1,000 appeal
fee within five days from the promulgation of the Regional Trial Court or MTC
decision technically perfects the appeal from the trial courts decision.Such appeal is
not dismissible as a matter of course on account alone of the inadequate payment or
nonpayment of the filing fee of PhP 3,200.The legal situation, however, changes if
the appellant, in the words of Resolution No. 8654, fails, as directed, to pay the
amount within 15 days from receipt of notice from the COMELEC.In the instant case,
albeit Nollen paid the PhP 3,200 only in October 2008, or long after his receipt of the
June 2008 MTC decision, his appeal may validly be viewed as not fatally belated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 is applicable to his appeal, as the appeal was on
June 5, 2008, or prior to July 24, 2008 when the more stringent Resolution No. 8486
took effect.
For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding the payment of the appeal
fee, a discussion of the application of the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials is necessary.
Divinagracia explained the purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated,
the COMELEC issued to clarify existing rules and address the resulting confusion
caused by the two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC.Divinagracia stressed that if the
appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within the
five-day reglementary period,they are further required to pay the COMELEC,
through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from
the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court.If the appellants
failed to pay the PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be
dismissed.
Divinagracia,however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice of appeal
filed after the promulgation ofthis decision,errors in the matter of non-payment or
incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases areno longer
excusable.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the warning given inDivinagraciais

inapplicable to the case at bar, since the notice of appeal in the instant case was
filed onJune 5, 2008.In the strict legal viewpoint,Divinagraciacontextually finds
applicability only in cases where notices of appeal were filed at least after the
promulgation of theDivinagraciadecision onJuly 27, 2009.Since petitioner paid the
appeal fee of PhP 1,000 simultaneously with his filing of his notice of appeal on June
5, 2008, the appeal is considered perfected pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
8654, taking it beyond the ambit ofDivinagracia.Again, petitioners failure to pay the
remaining PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period cannot be taken against him,
since the COMELEC failed to notifyhim regarding the additional appeal fee, as
provided by Resolution No. 8654.Although Nollen, following superseded
jurisprudence, failed to pay the filing fee on time, he nonetheless voluntarily paid the
remaining PhP 3,200 appeal fee on October 6, 2008.We, thus, credit him for
remitting the amount of PhP 3,200, which, applying extant rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, cannot be considered as having been belatedly paid.
GRANTED
Case Digest: Bombo Radyo Phils. v. Secretary
of Labor, et al.
G.R. No. 179652 : March 6, 2012
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.),

Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The DOLE Regional Director found
that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his
money claims. When the matter was brought before the CA, it was held that the
DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter. In the Decision of this Court, the
CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the complaint against petitioner was
dismissed. The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondent. It was held that while the DOLE may
make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this
function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power
provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification
of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial
and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the
power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In its
Comment, the DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and
enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended.
ISSUE: May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-

employee relationship exists, and if so, to what extent?
HELD: The Decision of this Court is affirmed with modification.
LABOR LAW
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where
the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held
by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should
the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would
refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether
or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether
or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code,
as amended by RA 7730.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the

DOLE must be respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer
could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship,
force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that at
least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship be
made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced
with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does
successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee relationship. If the DOLE
makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes
cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no
jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated,
or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the
first place.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a
finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the
DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that
there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the
NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for
reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of
the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If
a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE,
however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
DENIED
Case Digest: Hilton Heavy Equipment v. Dy

G.R. No. 164860: February 2, 2010
HILTON HEAVY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION and PETER LIM, Petitioners, v.

ANANIAS P. DY, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
DY was employed at Hilton Heavy Equipment Corporation (hereafter, the
"CORPORATION"). In the course of his employment, he was assigned as the
personal bodyguard of Peter Lim (hereafter, "LIM"), the President of the said
Corporation. On April 19, 2000, Dy mauled Duke Echiverri, a co-employee, within
the premises of the principal office of the Corporation, in front of Lim and the
employees. Dy defied orders of Lim to stop mauling Duke Echiverri. Dy also
threatened to kill the latter, and uttered that if he will be given monetary
consideration, he will cease working in the company.
Geraldine Chan, Secretary of the Corporation, executed an affidavit attesting to the

fact of Dy's utterance of his intention to resign from his job. Thereafter, Dy stopped
reporting to work.
Duke Echiveri filed criminal complaints against Dy but the same were dismissed on
the formers motion. A month after the mauling incident, on 19 May 2000, Lim
requested Dy to come to the office where he was confronted by Lim and Wellington
Lim, Lims brother. Thereat, Dy was paid by Wellington Lim the amount of
P120,000.00 as separation pay.
Dy filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

Regional Arbitration Branch VII in Cebu City against petitioners for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of labor standard benefits with claim for damages and attorneys
fees.
The LA dismissed Dy's complaint for illegal dismissal because Dy stopped working
when he was given separation pay ofP120,000. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision
on appeal. On further appeal to the CA, the appellate court ruled that that Dy did not
voluntarily resign from his employment, but there was a valid cause for Dys
termination from employment. Petitioners, however, failed to observe due process in
terminating Dys services. The appellate court decided that Dy was dismissed for just
cause but was not entitled to reinstatement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners failed to observe due
process in terminating Dy
HELD:
Labor Law
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
Dy's behavior constituted just cause. However, petitioners cannot deny that they
failed to observe due process. The law requires that the employer must furnish the
worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him.
Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality.
Petitioners should thus indemnify Dy for their failure to observe the requirements of
due process. Dy is not entitled to reinstatement, backwages and attorney's fees
because Dy's dismissal is for just cause but without due process.
In light of this Court's ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
violation of Dy's right to statutory due process by petitioners, even if the dismissal
was for a just cause, warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages.
GRANTED

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Case Digest: Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.

JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge

The Court is not persuaded.

REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a

REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance

REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

POLITICAL LAW: right to life

POLITICAL LAW: when life begins

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical

POLITICAL LAW: the right to health

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.

It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:

POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an

POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases

POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom

The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health

POLITICAL LAW: due process

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude

The point ofthe OSG is well-taken.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the

Case Digest: Disini v. Secretary of Justice

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,

Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;