The Marketing of Technology

European Journal of Marketing
The Marketing of Technology

David FordChris Ryan
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David FordChris Ryan, (1977),"The Marketing of Technology", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 11
Iss 6 pp. 369 - 382
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| 369
Editor's note;
The authors believe that a company's technology is unlikely to be fully exploited simply by its jn-
corporation in products and services alone. They present an exploratory study of the problems which
can arise during the marketing of "know-how", illustrating their themes by numerous case-histories,
and suggesting various marketing strategies.
The Marketing of Technology

by David Ford and Chris Ryan
This paper is based on an exploratory study of the issues and problems

which arise in the marketing of a company's technology or know-
how[l]. This involves a differentiation between three marketing activi-

ties:
(1) the use of a technology in the manufacture or design of a
physical product;
(2) the marketing of a service based on that technology, e.g., the
sale of a design or testing service;
(3) the sale of that company's technology "whole", e.g., the sale of
a particular electronic know-how to another party for its own
use.
The aim of the paper is to set out the dimensions of the topic and to
provide a framework for its analysis. It is based on the belief that know-
how or technology is currently relatively under-exploited from both the
company and societal point of view. This means that a full exploitation
of a company's know-how is unlikely to be made by its incorporation
in products and services alone. Further, a fuller exploitation will depend
on the development of a coherent strategy not only for analysis of the
markets for a company's know-how, but also of the technological
resources the company actually possesses.
BACKGROUND AND SCALE
Japanese companies obtained over 2,500 licences to exploit foreign technologies during
their great efforts to "catch-up" with Western countries. Similarly, imported Western
technology is playing an increasing part in the so-called "scientific-technical revolu-
tion" of the current five-year plans of eastern bloc countries. On the other hand,
Middle Eastern countries are importing technologies at a considerably lower level
of sophistication, whilst there is an enormous potential market for very simple, and
often almost forgotten, technologies for less developed nations.
An uneven rate of technological advance is also characteristic within countries,
both between industries and betweenfirms.Certain industries in the United Kingdom,
for example, electronics and communications, have been heavily sponsored by govern-
ment contracts for defence and space programmes. These contracts have given firms
370 | European Journal of Marketing 11, 6
technological leads, whilst subsidies given to low technology industries, such as

motor cars and textiles, have merely been to maintain employment during trade
recessions. This uneven rate of technological advance has led the high research
industries increasingly to invade the territory of the technologically backward. The
invasion of the textile industry by chemically derived synthetics and that of the
aerospace industry into machine tools are examples. In some cases the diffusion of
advanced technology occurs through a natural process of industrial diversification,
and in some cases by government intervention andfinancing.A current example which
has enormous potential is the application of micro-electronic technology to areas
currently using older technologies. These areas include automotive electrical equipment
and, in fact, any control equipment currently based on mechanical principles, in-
cluding such mundane devices as petrol pumps.
A company possessing a high technology capable of widespread application and
exploitation is however faced with several questions:
Should the knowledge be used by the firm to enhance its own narrow market
position? Should it be sold "whole" for either short term profits or on a longer
term licensing basis?
To whom should the knowledge be sold? What are its potential applications
outside the company's own areas? How should it be sold and what, if any, inter-
mediaries are required?
It appears that the sale of technology is often overlooked by manyfirms.This may
be due to the supposed difficulties of handling the marketing of an intangible product
compared with the tangibility of the normal manufactured product. It may also be
caused by the difficulties of recognising a potentially marketable technology among
those possessed (and taken for granted?) by the firm.
EXCLUSIVITY
In discussing the area it is important to distinguish between "exclusive" and "non-
exclusive" technology marketeers: the Pilkington company provides a good example
of a non-exclusive technology marketing company.
The manufacture of high quality flat glass was a relatively costly and wasteful
process of grinding and polishing until the innovation conceived by Sir Alastair
Pilkington in 1952. The Pilkington Float Glass Process which was announced in 1959
involves the forming of a continuous ribbon of molten glass on an enclosed bath of
molten metal. Its development was justified solely on the basis of the very substantial
savings it brought about in the company's own operating costs. At no stage did
Pilkington intend to monopolise the flat glass process. Friction between the major
plate glass producers would have eventually led to increasingly costly R & D through-
out the industry and there were fears of a price war. Pilkingtons also used the
patented know-how of its competitors in some other fields and this would have had
to cease in the event of a "technologywar".
Marketing of Technology | 371
Pilkingtons were not in a position to meet work demand outside the UK. Therefore
they took the decision to exploit overseas markets by licensing their know-how.
Pilkingtons' seven year, 7 million development programme led to 100 relevant UK
patents by 1972 and corresponding patents in 50 other countries[2]. All the world's
major glass manufacturers had taken licences to the process by 1969. The process
is licensed to 23 manufacturers in 13 countries. Altogether the world's glass industry
has invested 500 million in the process. There are 64 float glass plants operating,
under construction or in the planning stage. The licences were granted for manu-
facturing in the licencee's home territory and provided for the free exchange of know-
how and patent improvements. They also provided for the licencee to license others
to use the patent improvements. Royalty receipts had reached 9 million per annum
in 1972. The float glass project had proved a success by royalties alone.
Non-exclusive know-how marketeers like Pilkingtons include companies whose

main business is in the sales of tangible products and for whom the sale of know-how
is a sideline. Other examples include ICI who have sold the design of chemical plants
and Plessey who have sold manufacturing techniques for the manufacture of electronic
equipment and components.
Non-exclusive marketeers also include those firms whose sales consist of both
hardware and a large element of know-how. Examples are the sale of the design and
construction of a specialist steel or chemical plant by companies like Davy Inter-
national or Construction John Brown. These projects include site construction,
major engineering and design and procurement activity.
Those firms in business solely to sell know-how are examples of "exclusive" know-
how marketeers. It is in this area that it is often difficult to distinguish between those
companies offering a service and those who are selling know-how. This differentiation
is dealt with later. For the moment the two activities can be separated as follows. A
service marketeer provides an intangible productadvice, work being carried out,
advertising copy etc., on the basis of his own skill and techniqueswhich are not
imparted to the customer. The know-how marketeer, on the other hand, sells his
knowledge or technique to the customer for the customer's own use. Examples of this
latter category include semi-government departments such as PERA (Production
Engineering Research Association) and NRDC (National Research and Development
Corporation). It also includes some industrial companies, for example, the research
and development division of PA management consultants, and Warren Point Ltd.,
who act as electronic engineering consultants. In addition to management consultancy,
executive recruitment, etc. PA also develop specific technological products for client
companies.
SPIN-OFFS
This paper is mainly concerned with technology marketing by non-exclusive
marketeers. This area needs to be divided into further segments.
A company may sell its "mainstream technology"its own current or past produc-
tion or product technologies. This can be to another manufacturer operating in the
same or similar product/market areas (although perhaps in another country). Examples

of this are the sales of production facilities, know-how and product design by Fiat
to Russian and other East European car manufacturers. Similarly the labelling
division of the Norcross group now sells both labelling equipment and know-how as
well as finished labels to label users.
The company may also sell a "by-product" technology developed in its own
production or research for use in a different product/market segment. This is usually
known as spin-off. The importance of spin-off was emphasised by the Plowden report
on the aircraft industry[3]. This commented that the independent benefits of tech-
nological spin-offs may have been important grounds for the state maintenance of an
aircraft industry in Britain. The report lists almost 100 products and processes where
aviation has contributed to general technology. This opens the argument as to whether
that technological manpower and finance could have been better employed directly
on these commercial by-products. However, the possibility of wastefulness in this
area is countered by two factors: firstly, there is the difficulty in setting objectives
when tackling technological development problems directly; secondly, the maintenance
of high-technology firms in, for example, the aircraft industry, means that the tech-
nology which is spun-off to receiving companies is likely to be at a higher level than
would have been developed internally in those companies.
Spin-off can take place either by direct sale or by the company setting up its own
company to exploit the technology. The Fairey company is an example of a company
which has developed in part by buying spin-off technologies from other firms. Most
large corporations seem to leave a wake of spin-off companies either part owned by
themselves or often managed by former employees. The management of this "spinning-
off" process is further discussed in Thackray[4].
It is in the area of technology spin-off that the ability of a company to spot its own
potentially marketable technologies becomes critical. This can be illustrated by an
example from the electronics industry. It may be said that the capacity for growth in
this industry is closely related to innovative capability. This includes manufacturing
process innovation as well as product innovation. Indeed the product technology in
micro-electronics is relatively widely known. However, it is the ability to manufacture
products with acceptable "yields" which reduces the number of companies (and
countries) able to operate in the area.
Integrated circuits are microscopic electronic circuits produced on tiny pieces of
silicon. These are assembled into easily handled, packaged devices which plug into
printed circuit boards. These in turn are assembled to build up the complete electronic
systems which comprise TV sets, radar and computers, etc. Figure 1 shows some
detail of the integrated circuit manufacturing process. Although it is an industry in
itself, the IC manufacturing requires specialised knowledge from a number of other
areas. Engineers and managers in these individual departments have to detect industry
trends and guard against technological obsolescence. The processes are capital
intensive and effectively lack patent protection. This means that a competitive edge
is maintained by intensive research and development. Thus technical expertise in
such an industry is likely to be greater than other industries and it might be expected
to produce significant technology for "spinning-off".
The example can be taken a stage further if one department in the company is
considered: the Test Department has a number of engineering and production staff
who have a highly developed expertise in the testing of integrated circuits. This
"test know-how" is an important although intangible asset. We may now use this
department and this know-how to discuss the potential opportunities for the exploita-
tion of know-how in general.
APPLICATIONS OF KNOW-HOW
The firm has a resource in the form of know-how which it can use strategically in a
number of ways. Figure 2 shows the potential applications of a given know-how (in
this case test-technology) possessed by the firm:
(a) In Providing a Product

(i) Aid production
This is the test department's main reason for existence. Its contribution lies in
enabling production deliveries to be made. Errors in electronic measurement
can be the difference between profit and loss for the whole business.
It is this function, or its equivalent in other cases, which is usually the limit
of the exploitation of know-how, i.e., the potential application is restricted to its
basic function without further exploitation.
(ii) Market as a service

Perhaps the most obvious extension of the use of testing know-how would be
in marketing a test service for other firms products. Firms buying such a service
would be motivated by such factors as production overload, the economics of
subcontracting or the requirements of special skills or equipment which are not
justified for "one-off" jobs.
There are likely to be few engineering problems in undertaking such service
work. The main issues involved are in organising the marketing of the service,
particularly in terms of market identification.
(b) In Facilitating a Product

(i) Enhance product value
Product value is enhanced by marketing "know-how" in the form of increased
product quality. Using advanced technology in a standard product is worthwhile
in a quality conscious market. Customers in the electronics industry pay a premium
for extra and more complex testing as well as statistical data to show life
expectancies, etc.
(ii) Aid to product design

In the example used here, testing know-how can be used to aid product design
and development by communicating long term test results and fault analysis.
More fundamentally, the test engineering skill in diagnosis could well influence a
complete design philosophy change. This could take the form of a move away
from emphasis on low cost criteria to an emphasis on repairability in the face of
increasing repair labour costs.
(c) Non-ProfitUse
The non-profit use of know-how by the firm includes the furtherance of broad
social goals held by thefirmconcerning the diffusion of knowledge. It also includes
the furtherance of political aims especially in the case of international transfer of
know-how. This area can perhaps best be analysed by considering the company
as relating to all its publics not just the consuming one. It could be argued that
know-how has been acquired for society by people who are part of that society
and have gained their knowledge through the social process of education. Further,
it may be said that the transmission and enhancement of knowledge is an integral
part of this same social process. Although this may sound rather idealistic there
is considerable evidence of such transfer of know-how by firms on a non-profit
basis.
(d) Market as Know-How

The differentiation of the sale of services from the complete sale of knowledge
has already been mentioned. The service industries use their know-how, their
expertise and themselves to supply an intangible product. This expertise is
retained by the service company and is re-employed for each customer. The
customer sees the results of this expertise and benefits, but does not retain it.
The sale of know-how can be made via a patent or royalties, thus the recipient
exchanges money for knowledge and retains it. Know-how can also be exchanged
by a reciprocal agreement between firms involving a form of bartering. This
mode is common in the electronic industry.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "KNOW-HOW" AND PRODUCT MARKETING

We now turn to some of the differences between the marketing of technology and
conventional product marketing. The intention here is to highlight some of the
difficulties inherent in marketing in the technology area.
(a) Intangibility
The problem of the intangibility of the product is shared both by service and
know-how marketing. The difficulties of describing or illustrating a service or of
influencing customer perception have been frequently discussed in the case of
service marketing, with particular reference to advertising and sales promotion[5].
However, intangibility has a second aspect in the case of know-how marketing.
This is the difficulty faced by the possessing company in recognising the potentially
saleable know-how which it has. This is also related to the problem of market
identification which is discussed later. However, experience shows that few
companies have developed any scanning mechanism for examining their tech-
nology. It is even less likely that they have developed any strategy for marketing
that technology.
Such a strategy would be concerned with sales of technology within the overall
corporate objectives. It is perhaps because of the lack of awareness of their
potentially marketable commodity that there has recently been a considerable
growth in so-called "technological middlemen" acting on behalf of potential
buyers in seeking know-how.
(b) Buying
The buyer in an industrial company frequently has an important role in the
purchase of conventional products. However, the purchase of technical know-
how may be negotiated largely by engineering staff. This is possibly the same
staff who have failed to meet the company's expectations in technical expertise
resulting in the need to buy-in know-how. These individuals may be reluctant to
make such a purchase as this which may infer their own incompetence. It is notice-
able that decisions to buy-in expertise are usually made at Director level. Thus
any approach to sell technology must allow for the possible unwillingness of those
who will use the technology to recommend its purchase and must make a sales
approach at the appropriate level within the company.
(c) Distribution
Technical know-how for the non-exclusive marketeer differs from physical
products in that it is not deliberately stockpiled. Know-how can be built up within
an enterprise although it is unlikely to be prepared in advance for a promotion
or sales effort. It can also be considered perishable in the sense both of its
relatively short life and the ability of key personnel to leave the firm in the short term.
Know-how sales are likely to be direct sales or involve very short channels of
distribution. An analogy to the passage of physical products down a distribution
channel is the communication channels, either written or spoken employed in
know-how transfer. Whereas physical products are delivered in measurable
units on given dates, know-how is delivered in varying volume by semi-continuous
communication. This means that the delivery of know-how is often difficult to
define with associated legal problems. These problems are often tackled by
relating know-how transfer to the events concerning tangible products. For

example, the first successful product from a newly built production process may
be related to the successful transfer of the intangible know-how for that process.
The growth of middlemen in technology marketing has already been mentioned.
These are agents or brokers who bring buyer and seller together but do not take
legal title to the know-how. Normal fees are 1-3 % of selling price or a percentage
of the royalties involved. Examples of the operation of middlemen have been in
sales to Middle Eastern countries. This is an interesting example of low tech-
nology sales in that recent cases have included know-how for making school
desks and sheet metal ducting for ventilation systems. It is also an example of
a case where the possessors of the know-how in the UK have not valued that
know-how or considered marketing it. The task of finding a suitable supply

company has rested with the middlemen. Another example is formed by a
company called Strategy Ltd. This operates at the high technology end of the
market and was itself an example of know-how spin-off. Its founder was
previously employed by British Rail in selling the technology developed during
the Advanced Passenger Train project.
It is also possible for a product manufacturer to act as technological middle-
man. Glass reinforced concrete was developed by the Building Research Council.
The project was supported by the NRDC. A licence to exploit the technology
was granted to the Pilkington company. This company now sells the rights to
use of this know-how to building companies. However, it is noteworthy that
potential clients are vetted by Pilkingtons and that quality control at the clients
is exercised by the company. This extends the role of the middleman from
simply bringing a possessor of technology and a potential user together. The
middleman himself is proving an addition to the "basic" product in the form of
a testing service based on his own know-how.
Finally, under the distribution of know-how it is important to mention
franchising. Without discussing the issues in depth, it is apparent that franchising
has certain advantages for the know-how marketeer. Franchising ensures a
measure of control over the operations of the franchisee and the development
of the technology. In addition to the market or geographical restrictions dictated
by the franchiser it is possible that he may also benefit by continuing sales of
components or raw materials used in the exploitation of the know-how. For
further discussion see Izraeli[6].
(d) Market Identification

Market identification for the potential know-how marketeer poses considerable
problems. The fact that sales tend to be of a "one-off" nature and are often
conducted on a highly confidential basis reduces the relevance of test-marketing
and means that it is often difficult to determine potential customers and
competitors in the market.
Initial study indicates that the market for technical expertise includes firms in
at least the following categories:
(1) Those who are well managed and seek to advance their technical position,
possibly in another market. These are likely to survey the market
thoroughly and be able properly to assess the technology "on offer".
They may also search for technology which is possessed by another
company but which has not been offered for sale.
(2) Those who are forced into buying technology either for survival or to
make up for a very significant technological inadequacy. These companies
do not necessarily understand their own problems and requirements.
They may require the objectivity and advice of the supplying firm as to
those requirements.
(3) Those who have experienced a rapid upsurge in demand for products in
their area and are limited by their own technical and production resources.
These are likely to seek outside knowledge to speed up their expansion
or adaptation process.
On the other hand, firms are likely to part with their expertise because:
(1) Government authorities order them under anti-trust regulations.
(2) Thefirmmay require a technology from a rival and may wish to exchange
its own technology in return.
(3) For financial reasons. The firm may gain more and reach wider markets
by allowing others to exploit its technology than through its own produc-
tion (e.g., the float glass project).
(4) The company may not have the technical or commercial resources to
exploit a technological breakthrough.
(5) A technological breakthrough may not be relevant to the firms overall
strategy. This means that it would rather sell the technology than pursue
further development.
Consideration of the "appropriate" level of technology for the company to
sell is one of the aims of the current research. There is evidence of sales by com-
panies of their highest or most current technology down to the lowest or oldest
technology they possess. This means that there is no "technological gap" between
buyer and seller companies which is appropriate in all circumstances. However,
it is reasonable to generalise that the greater the technological gap between seller
and potential buyer then the greater likelihood of middleman involvement. This
is because companies are more likely to identify the marketability of current or
recent technology than of older know-how.
This relationship impinges on a frequently quoted criticism of technology
sales. This is that in marketing its technology a company is effectively selling
its "seed-corn" or adversely affecting its future products. However such criticism
seldom rests on an accurate interpretation of the life of a given technology. This
life is frequently very short. This means that technology is often sold too late.
Thus the maximum royalty return is likely to be closely related to the period
when the sales of products incorporating the technology are at a peak. Here
again the desirability of a strategy for the maximum exploitation of know-how
is emphasised.
It is in the area of international sales of know-how that the seed-corn argument
has been heard most. Much publicity has been given to the sales of cheap Fiat-
based cars throughout Europe. These have been produced in East Europe,
following sales of complete production and product technology to East European
governments by Fiat. Another common automotive example is in the case of
foreign assembly of "knock-down" parts. In this, a foreign enterprise assembles

kits of parts using an agreed and documented method supervised by the original
manufacturer. This can provide the original manufacturer with a source of cheap
assembly labour as well as overcoming import restrictions. An early example of
this operation was the local assembly of British cars by the Japanese company of
Nissan-Datsun. British parts were progressively substituted by Japanese as local
skills developed. The results of this initial technology sale are now very apparent.
Wells' concept of a product life cycle for international trade[7] provides an
insight into this issue. According to Wells, and with certain exceptions, there
appears to be an inevitability in the following progression in the international
marketing of a product:
Country A exports the product to Country B
Home production of the product is established in Country B
Country A experiences competition in other markets from product produced
in Country B
Country A finds competition from products from Country B in its home
market.
This sequence leads to three points:
(1) The exploitation of a particular technology is likely to be the prerogative
of the developer company or country for a relatively short time before the
technology is applied by competing, and possibly lower cost, producers.
(2) The original developer can exploit this cycle by the controlled sale of his
technology in line with the demands and abilities of potential buyers of
that technology.
(3) The process of use and sale of technology is only likely to be successful
for the developer company if his own technology is developing during
the process of exploitation and sale. If company A sells a particular
technology to company B and does not advance his own technology then
that company will later be vulnerable to the products of the low cost
producer who has bought or acquired that technology.
This is a further argument for the company to consciously plan the exploitation
and development of its technology. This planning involves the relationship
between a technology's expected life and its employment in hardware or direct
sales. It also requires a judgment of the relationship between the timing of sales
of current technology, the development of more advanced technologies and
their incorporation in new products.
Information concerning the volume of technology business conducted in
Britain and overseas is difficult to obtain. The international volume of this trade
continues to grow and a positive balance is currently obtained for the UK.
Royalty figures have been published by the Central Statistical Office, but these
contain returns from mineral rights which are difficult to separate. Even if the
technological trade monetary volume could be obtained, true trade is obscured by
money channelled between divisions of multi-national companies as "royalties
on processes" to take advantage of differences in international tax situations.
(e) Pricing
The pricing of know-how or technology presents certain complexities. These
concern the difficulties in establishing the perceived worth of the technology by
the market, the determination of the true costs of developing a technology and
the relationship of revenue from technology sales to sales of hardware.
The price which the market will bear for a given technology clearly depends
on the value which an individual buyer puts on the expertise. There is likely to
be considerable variation in realisable price between different potential customers
depending on end-product values and volumes, e.g., sales of know-how to the
eastern bloc countries are often at relatively high prices as product runs tend to be
long and steady. The impracticability of "test-marketing" a technology in what
may be a monopsonistic market is probably balanced by the relative price in-
sensitivity of technology. Small changes in price are unlikely to affect, say,
the sale of an integrated circuits technology. The possibility of being able to
produce integrated circuitry in the time it takes to equip and stock a factory
and without the years and costs of development is a strong selling factor. This
leads to the second factor in price determination, the calculation of the costs of
developing a technology.
The allocation of costs to specific projects is complicated, particularly if
technology is being developed on a broad front. Technical expertise is essentially
people and the primary costs of technological advance are the costs of employ-
mentpayroll, benefits and expenses. Other remaining costs are directly related
to the level of manpowertravel, office supplies, rents, etc. This means that
methods of estimating the costs of technology must be able to account realistically
for personnel costs.
Perhaps the least sophisticated method of attempting this is by calculating

the historical costs of development. Thus the costs of direct materials, capital
equipment and the costs of employment could be capitalised without seeking
to value them at current prices. However, the firm wishing to buy know-how must
compare the purchase cost with the cost of developing the know-how itself.
Estimates of the costs of recruitment and employment of a suitable team of
technologists over the appropriate development time would provide an estimate
of the present value of the technology.
The historical cost and present value methods of aiding pricing decisions are
mechanistic in approach and are unlikely to reflect the intangible human know-
ledge and experience which are an asset to the firm. Personnel output is flexible
in terms of quality and quantity over short periods. On the other hand, continuity
of employment can allow conventional accounting methods as a costing exercise
to regard people as fixed assets of a going concern. These fixed assets can create
an earnings flow and be amortised over a number of years.
The asset value of personnel provides an indication of the worth of know-how
within the firm. This know-how can be apportioned to particular departments
within the firm. The aim of this approach is to allow an evaluation of the return
on the "capital" represented by know-how. This can be for pricing decisions and
also to determine whether the investment in know-how has yielded an acceptable
rate of return by marketing of products and know how. The techniques of
determining asset values of personnel is referred to as "Human Asset Accounting"
see Kekiman and Jones[8] and Dobbins and Trussel[9]. Although the detailed
quantification of asset value is of dubious benefit, it is necessary to comprehend
the magnitude of the asset represented by staff knowledge. It is this knowledge
which is the core of the "know-how" product. An assessment of its exploitation,
both by direct sale or in terms of physical products or services, is the basis of a
realistic strategy for the company which sees a relationship between the elements
and a rational balance of the three.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK

So far this work has sought to identify the peculiarities involved in the sale of know-
how. No attempt is made to say that know-how (or service) marketing is conceptually
different from the marketing of physical products. Rather, that there are complexities
in each which may or may not be generalisable. The aim of the research is to increase
understanding, firstly, of the relationships between the three areas; secondly, of the
procedures and strategies which are relevant to an optimum mix of the three; and
thirdly, of the process of scanning the company and the market in order to identify
both potential products and potential clients. It is also hoped to provide information
of value to the growing business of middlemen in the area, particularly as regards
the matching of the technological levels of potential buyers and sellers.
References
1. The initial work for this paper was carried out with the support of the Plessey Group. Consequently'
many of the examples used are taken from the electronics industry. The opinions expressed in the
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2. Taylor, C. T., The Economic Impact of Patents, University of Cambridge Press, 1974.
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The Marketing of Technology

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The Marketing of Technology

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European Journal of Marketing

The Marketing of Technology

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The Marketing of Technology

This paper is based on an exploratory study of the issues and problems

how[l]. This involves a differentiation between three marketing activi-

technological leads, whilst subsidies given to low technology industries, such as

Non-exclusive know-how marketeers like Pilkingtons include companies whose

same or similar product/market areas (although perhaps in another country). Examples

(a) In Providing a Product

(ii) Market as a service

(b) In Facilitating a Product

(ii) Aid to product design

(d) Market as Know-How

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "KNOW-HOW" AND PRODUCT MARKETING

relating know-how transfer to the events concerning tangible products. For

know-how or considered marketing it. The task of finding a suitable supply

(d) Market Identification

foreign assembly of "knock-down" parts. In this, a foreign enterprise assembles

Perhaps the least sophisticated method of attempting this is by calculating

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK

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