2b2.7 Calalas vs. Court of Appeals

7/18/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 332 7/18/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 332
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This

provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
_______________
*
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000. * SECOND DIVISION.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF 357

APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
VOL. 332, MAY 31, 2000 357
Judgments; Res Judicata; The principle of res judicata does Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
not apply where a party in a pending case was never a party in a
previous one.The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Proximate Cause; The
Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.There is,
to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and
for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not
of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
obligation. between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
Common Carriers; Breach of Contract; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; relation thus created.
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Negligence; Upon
of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove
the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
destination. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or passengers.In the case at bar, upon the happening of the
fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted became the duty of petitioner to prove that he observed
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Now, did the
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his driver of jeepney carry Sunga safely as far as human care and
passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances as
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary against petitioners contention.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000155f9c1dcf948d9a917003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12 http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000155f9c1dcf948d9a917003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/12
court that his driver failed to assist the injured passenger in going
Same; Same; Fortuitous Event; Words and Phrases; The
taking of an extension seat is not an implied assumption of risk to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad
on the part of the passenger; A caso fortuito is an event which faith.In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable; damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court
Requisites.We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contention that Sungas taking an extension seat amounted to contract of carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners
an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an
not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner
also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one
fortuito is an event which could not at fault for the accident.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

358
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Leo B. Diocos for petitioner.
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 359
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This VOL. 332, MAY 31, 2000 359
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it
Enrique S. Empleo for private respondent Sunga.
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
Eduardo T. Sedillo for private respondent Salva.
manner; and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury
to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of MENDOZA, J.:
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
1
highway. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the
Same; Same; Damages; As a general rule, moral damages are contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action
of the Civil Code.As a general rule, moral damages are not for breach of contract of carriage.
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 follows:
of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
Same; Bad Faith; The common carriers admission in open conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at court dismissed the thirdparty complaint against Salva and
the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven dispositive portion of its decision reads:
by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped
the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
injured. She sustained a fracture of the distal third of the and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-
left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
skin. Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
on a cast for a period of (5) to pay the costs.
_______________ SO ORDERED.
1 Per Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Justices Hector L. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in
Hofilena and B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz. Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
360 361
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 332, MAY 31, 2000 361
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
three months and would have to ambulate in crutches proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and
during said period. that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco ground that it is not supported by evidence.
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The petition has no merit.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil
thirdparty defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva judicata does not apply.
and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the quasidelict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney.
lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi- petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the passengers. It provides:
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common circumstances of each case.
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
2
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances.
_______________
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
2 See B. BALDERRAMA, THE PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS AND common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
DAMAGES 20 (1953). acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
362
363
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 332, MAY 31, 2000 363
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the
in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary
liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be diligence in the care of his passengers.
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga safely as far
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck as human care and foresight could provide, using the
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi- for all the circumstances as required by Art. 1755? We do
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The not think so. Several factors militate against petitioners
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where contention.
there is no relation between him and another party. In First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was
such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic.No person shall drive his motor
are those respecting the diligence required of common
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in
loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other law. We find this contention well taken.
vehicles on the highway. In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals
stated:
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in
more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury,
Exceeding registered capacity.No person operating any motor she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that school
vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing
vehicle than its registered capacity. with her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to
pursue her degree, major in Physical Education because of my
The fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat
leg which has a defect already.
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
certified that she has residual bowing of the fracture side. She
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her
negligent in transporting passengers.
major subject, because my left leg x x x has a defect already.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners
contention that Sungas taking an extension seat
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to _______________
arguing that the 3 CIVIL CODE, ART. 1174.
364 4 Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 (1986);
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 (1985); Republic v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp., 128 Phil. 313 (1967).
365
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas VOL. 332, MAY 31, 2000 365
should not be compensated merely because those Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding
an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito
the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the
is an event which could 3not be foreseen, or which, though
sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to it is not one5 of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable:
a normal manner; and (d) the debtor 4
did not take part in (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
protruding two meters into the highway.
carrier
6
is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed
2220. consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent,
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
damages since there was no factual finding by the unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the injury, and without which the result would not have
performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas contention occurred. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of
that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])
the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be
cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact liable in case of collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the had no opportunity to avoid the collision due to his own
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly making is not relieved of liability, such as when his
indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the
is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the collision. (Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668
one at fault for the accident. [2000])
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September o0o
11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman) and Buena, JJ., concur.
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

_______________
5 Fores v. Miranda, 105 Phil. 236 (1959); Mercado v. Lira, 3 SCRA 124
(1961).
6 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Esguerra, 117 SCRA 741 (1982);
Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 620 (1989);
China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 226
(1989).
366

People vs. Doinog
Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.The rules on extraordinary responsibility of

common carriers remain basically unchanged even when
the contract is breached by tort although noncontradictory
principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also
forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World
Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996])

2b2.7 Calalas vs. Court of Appeals

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7/18/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 332 7/18/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 332

diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF 357

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 359

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bellosillo (Chairman) and Buena, JJ., concur.

Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., On leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Notes.The rules on extraordinary responsibility of

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