Caasi vs. Comelec (EN BANC, G.R. No.
88831 November 8, 1990) disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and
Facts: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of 18
January 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground
that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of
the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order
that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and
to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2
February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
elections on 18 May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner
Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the
United States
Held: Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to
the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card
or authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguels application).
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective
office. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or
that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he
ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he was
void.
MATEO CAASI VS. CA AND MERITO C. MIGUEL, RESPONDENTS. / ANECITO
CASCANTE VS. COMELEC AND MERITO C. MIGUEL (NOVEMBER 13, 1990).
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on
the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January
13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of
Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and
Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel
filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of
the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival
candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to
disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued
to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent
resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic
medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections,
including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception
of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary,
inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of
citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided
for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his
candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign
country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove
that he has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant to be
qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R.
No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito
Miguel, respondents, the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June
21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 Merito C. Miguel,
petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents, reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguels motion to dismiss the petition for
quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court
to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court
of Appeals held:
it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC
has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are
appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof
that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether
respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant
to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public
officials in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders
of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders right to hold elective
public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the
outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration (Optional Form No. 230, Department of
State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US
Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguels
answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state), Miguels answer was,Permanently.
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the
back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
United States. (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For
he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he
entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the
entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a
broader meaning to the term immigrant. (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the
protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in
general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain
are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of
person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident
alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive any person of
life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal
protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to
earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled
to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not during his tenure as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), which provides:
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting
himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections,
waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective
office (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he
is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this
case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran
for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore,
hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least
one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in
Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent
residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid
down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those
Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has
reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country
without mental reservations or purpose of evasion. The assumption is that those
who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion
to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties
here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents
thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently,
for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S.
with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for
immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one
foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were
true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to
benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he
is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for
it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that
he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for
mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that
he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null
and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in
SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively,
are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said
respondent.
NOLASCO V COMELEC
Facts:
Alarilla and Blanco are candidates for the mayoralty elections of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. After elections but before proclamations, Alarilla filed a
disqualification case against Blanco on the grounds of vote-buying, committing
acts of terrorism and spending in his campaign more than that allowed by the
Election Code. A motion to suspend proclamation was also filed by Alarilla. This
was granted by COMELEC because evidence in support of his disqualification is
strong.
COMELEC held that Blanco is disqualified for vote-buying and ordered the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates.
Blanco filed an MR, Nolasco intervened. Nolasco, elected vice-mayor,
claims he should be proclaimed Mayor, not the person who got the 2 nd highest
number of votes.
Held:
Blanco is disqualified; Nolasco should be Mayor.
Ratio:
 1. LGC provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of mayor Thus, the petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto.
(e.g. failure of the winner to qualify) the vice-mayor should fill in the vacany.
ISSUE:
2. It is settled that if the candidate who got the most number of votes fails W/N proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review
to qualify, the person who gets the second most number of votes cannot be its validity. NO!
proclaimed winner. He cannot be considered first among the qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would RATIO:
have substantially changed. Division Proclamation not yet Final
The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the MR filed by
CODILLA SR. VS DE VENECIA (as Speaker)
the petitioner. And since the MR was seasonably filed, the COMELEC (E) was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the COMELEC (D) Resolution.
FACTS:
The legal basis for this is Section 3, Article IX-C 2, which empowers the COMELEC
Codilla (Mayor of Ormoc) and Locsin (incumbent Representative) are both
en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided
candidates for the Representative of the 4 th District of Leyte in the 2001 elections.
by a division.
A registered voter then filed a petition for Disqualification against Codilla indirect
solicitation of votes1, prohibited by section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HRET no jurisdiction to review resolutions of COMELEC decisions
COMELEC (Division) delegated the hearing and reception of the evidence of such
Locsin argued for HRET jurisdiction, raising section 17 of Article VI 3 as her basis.
case to the Regional Director.
But stemming from the previous ratio, HRET doesnt have jurisdiction as the issue
Election time came, and yet still no hearing from the Regional Director.
on the validity of the COMELEC (D) Resolution has not yet been resolved by the
When it was apparent that Codilla garnered the most votes, Locsin intervened in
COMELEC en banc. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
the DQ case, and filed an urgent motion to suspend proclamation. Codilla was not
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Adding to the fact that jurisprudence has held that
served with the Motion. COMELEC (D) issued an order suspending the
HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions of COMELEC decisions, whether
proclamation due to the seriousness of the allegations. Again, Codilla was not
issued by a (D) or (E).
served with a summons to air his side and provide contrary evidences. Although
Codilla filed a petition to lift the suspension, COMELEC (D) nevertheless issued a
Resolution finding Codilla guilty of indirect solicitation. As a result, COMELEC (D) DOMINGO V. COMELEC
disqualified Codilla and considered votes cast for him as stray even though such
resolution is still not yet final. Locsin was proclaimed the winner and assumed her Facts:
seat in Congress as the Representative.
Codilla then seasonably filed an MR to COMELEC (En banc), which
reversed the Division Resolution. Locsin then questioned jurisdiction of 2 Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
COMELEC (E), stating that it was the HRET who has jurisdiction over the shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
case now that she has assumed the post. De Venecia concurs with COMELEC shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
(E), but since Locsin said in one of her privilege speeches that she will not obey of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc
the COMELEC (E) reversal, he said that it was up to the SC to decide on the
matter.

1 by using the vehicles and equipment of Ormoc to extract and haul sand and 3 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
gravel and distribute it to some voters in 2 cities. which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
 Ernesto Domingo Jr. and Benjamin Abalos, Jr. were both mayoralty
candidates of Mandaluyong City. After Benjamin Abalos, Jr. was
proclaimed as mayor, petitioner Domingo sought to disqualify him, on the
ground that during the campaign period, Abalos, Jr. prodded his father who
was then incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong to give substantial allowances
to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the
BEIs for Mandaluyong City.
This allegations stem from an incident during a Pasyal-Aral outing for
Mandaluying City public school teachers in Quezon where then mayor
Abalos, Sr., announced that the teachers will get an additional
pay/allowance through the initiative of his son, Abalos, Jr.
Petitioner Domingo alleges that private respondents act of prodding his REPUBLIC vs. DELA ROSA
father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(giving money or other consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions).
COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
W/N petitioner was violated of his right to due process as his petition was
dismissed without hearing on the merits? NO
W/N the allegation of influencing his father was sufficiently proven? NO
W/N Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification? NO
W/N there was forum shopping (an issue raised by private respondent
Abalos, Jr.)? NO
Held:
1. No violation of due process because the fact that petitioner was able to file
an MR shows that he was accorded ample opportunity to dispute the
findings of the COMELEC First Division.
2. The affidavits were not able to prove any knowledge or degree of
participation of Abalos, Jr. in the grant of these allowances. Court fails to
see the connection between the photographs and videos presented to
show the alleged influence wielded by Abalos, Jr. on the public school
teachers of Mandaluyong City. The burden of proving that Abalos, Jr.
indirectly influenced the public school teachers through his father was a
burden that petitioner failed to meet.
3. Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or
error of law in the questioned resolutions, the Court may not review the
factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the
sufficiency of evidence.
4. The issues in the two cases are different. The complaint for election
offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or
innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case,
requires conviction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition for
disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether
the respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification from office,
and is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in
character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.
232 SCRA 785
June 6, 1994
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily aims to declare the
naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as invalid and consequently, nullify his
proclamation as governor of Sorsogon.
It appears that Frivaldo had served as governor of Sorsogon for six terms
already and was only compelled to renounce his citizenship when he sought
political asylum in US due to the precarious political atmosphere here in the
country during the Marcos regime. As he wasnt able to reacquire his citizenship
through repatriation or through act of Congress, he was forced to file a petition for
naturalization on September 1991.
The judge set the hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the publication
of the order in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation---for
three consecutive weeks, at least once every week, the last publication to be made
six months before the scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked the court if the
hearing could be moved to an earlier date as he intends to participate in the May
1992 elections, the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy being March 15
1992, a day ahead of the scheduled hearing.
The court granted his request and set the hearing on Feb 21 1991. Of this
advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting of notice was made. Six
days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa rendered a decision granting Frivaldos
application and allowed him to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To
this, petitioner Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldos rival for governorship in Sorsogon, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration alleging jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.
Subsequently, two petitions were filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is an
American citizen and is therefore ineligible to run, and that the courts decision is
null and void for being fraught with legal infirmities. In one of the petitions,
petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted in favor Frivaldo be declared as
stray votes and that he be declared winner instead. These petitions were all
dismissed by Comelec on the ground that such petitions were filed out of time, as it
should have been filed within three days.

ISSUES
1. W/N Comelec was correct in dismissing the petitions for being filed out of
time?
2. W/N the proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo not a Filipino citizen
and thus ineligible for public office?
3. W/N Hermo may be proclaimed winner upon nullification of Frivaldos
proclamation?
RULING
1. Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that they
were filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are quo warranto. As
such, they are not covered by the 10-day appeal period provided in Sec.
253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. The proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have cancelled
Frivaldos certificate of candidacy. The Court never acquired jurisdiction
over the case due to the following irregularities: (1) there was no order
published advancing the date of the hearing, (2) the petition was heard
within 6 months from last publication of the petition, (3) Frivaldo took his
oath of allegiance when there was still a pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo
did not observe the 2-year waiting period. Thus, as qualifications for public
office is a continuing requirement, once lost (citizenship), title may be
seasonably challenged.
3. Hermo cannot be proclaimed as winner. Well settled is the rule that
upon disqualification of the winner in an election, the second placer cannot
be proclaimed as winner having failed to obtain the mandate of the
majority of the electorate.
Quinto vs COMELEC MR
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court voting 8-6 declared as unconstitutional
the second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being
overbroad. The ponente of the decision was Justice Antonio B. Nachura.
On February 22, 2010, voting 10-5, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling,
granted the motions for reconsideration of its December 1, 2009 decision and
upheld the constitutionality of the three provisions in election laws that deemed
appointive officials automatically resigned once they filed their certificates of
candidacy (CoCs). The ruling was penned by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno with a
dissent from Justice Nachura.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Puno rationalized that the issue as to equal
protection has been addressed in the earlier case of case of Farinas v. Executive
Secretary, (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003) where the Court stated that
the equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. x x Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. x x Another substantial distinction between the two sets
of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.
The Court goes on to state that By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office
of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification. x x x Since the classification justifying
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials,
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
In view of these pronouncements, Justice Puno states that the case at bar is a
crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. And that the miracle is that the (our)
assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really adherence to
precedents, mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.
The Farinas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum. This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are
presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and
lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the
decision is predicated.
The concern, voiced by Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis--
vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a
matter worth exploring but not by the Court. The remedy lies with the
Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our constitutional
system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices
responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures
power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected officials,
should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency
and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. The Court
cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on
the people the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
Penera vs. Comelec (September 11, 2009 Decision)
Facts:
Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte
in the 14 May 2007 elections. Andanar filed a petition for disqualififcation against
Penera and other candidates in her party for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the campaign period. Andanar
alleged that Penera, together with her partymates, held a motorcade announcing
their candidacies and requesting people to vote for them during the time they filed
their certificate of candidacies.
The Comelec 2nd Division disqualified Penera for engaging in premature
campaigning. Penera filed an MR to the Comelec en banc which it denied. So
Penera filed this petition for certiorari.
Penera maintains that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned; and that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the ruling of the Comelec.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera was guilty of premature campaigning and should therefore
be disqualified? And whether or not Comelec was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction?
Held:
Penera was indeed guilty of premature campaigning. SC denied certiorari.
Ratio:
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits premature campaigning. It
states that
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period.
Under Section 68 of the same Code, premature campaigning warrants
disqualification from continuing as a candidate or from holding office, as the case
may be.
SC ruled that it was sufficiently established that Penera and her parytmates did in
fact, after filing their COCs, participated in a motorcade wherein they waved their
hands to the public and gave away candies. Such act falls within the definition of
election campaign or partisan political activity under Section 79 (b)(2) of the OEC
holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes.
The dissenting opinion raises the legal issue that RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, provides a new definition of the term candidate as a result of which,
premature campaigning may no longer be committed.
Section 13 of RA 9369 states that any person who files his COC shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period. Provided, that,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period.
In other words, there can be no premature campaigning because there is yet a
candidate to speak of until the start of the campaign period.
The question now is how to reconcile this with Section 79 (a) of the OEC which
defines a candidate as any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, who has filed a COC.
SC ruled that RA9369 did not repeal the definition of a candidate in the OEC. It
found that there was neither an express nor an implied repeal hence the statutes
could be harmonized.
SC held that although it is true that a person is not yet a candidate upon filing
his/her COC and before the campaign period, such person had already explicitly
declared his/her intention to run upon filing of the COC. Such intention turns into
actuality when the campaign period begins; which means to say that it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when a person becomes an official candidate.
Nevertheless, the advantages of the acts of such candidate during the period
between filing his/her COC and prior to the start of the campaign period, which
constitutes election campaign or partisan political activity, accrues when the
campaign period begins. Hence, said acts can be given the effect of premature
campaigning only upon the start of the campaign period.
In other words, RA 9369 did not, in effect, extinguish premature campaigning, it
only deterred the effects of such partisan political activities until after the start of
the campaign period.
So a person can only be held liable for premature campaigning for partisan political
activities which were done after filing COC and before the campaign period, after
the campaign period starts.
Penera vs. Comelec (November 25, 2009 MR Decision)
SC granted MR. A person is not considered a candidate for purposes other than
the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period.
The SC ruled that the Sept. 11 decision reversed the decision in Lanot vs.
Comelec which held that a person who files a COC is not a candidate until the start
of the campaign period.
Section 11, RA 8436 moved the deadline for filing COCs to 120 days before
election day. The same section states that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the campaign period. Under this
provision, the purpose of the early filing of COCs is to give ample time for printing
of the ballots, as shown in the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee.
Hence, Congress never intended the early deadline for filing COCs to make the
person filing such COC to become immediately a candidate for purposes other
than the printing of ballots.
So when Congress enacted RA 9369, it sought to incorporate the Lanot Doctrine
into law. Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369 states that a person
who files his COC within the early deadline shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign periodunlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC
FACTS:
ABS-CBN prepared to conduct radio-TV coverage of the national elections and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials and the
results to be broadcasted immediately.
COMELEC believed that such survey will conflict with COMELEC official count and
NAMFRELs unofficial quick count. Also that ABS-CBN is not authorized to
undertake such survey.
Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution for the issuance of a restraining order to
prohibit ABS-CBN from conducting an exit survey.
ABS-CBN then filed this petition contending that the prohibition restrains its
freedom of speech and of the press.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition is valid
HELD/ RATIO: NO! the prohibition is invalid. The conduct of exit polls is a valid
exercise of the freedom of speech.
The constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. Free speech and free press consists of the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
However, such freedom is not absolute. It is subject to limitations and it is not
immune to regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.
There are 2 tests to determine the validity of restrictions to the freedom of speech:
1) clear and present danger test the evil consequence of the comment of
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before the utterance can be punished.
2) dangerous tendency rule if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent then such words are punishable. In this test,
it is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated.
IN this jurisdiction, the courts use the clear and present danger test.
In this case, the restriction to conduct exit polls would curtail the freedom of 3 PARTS:
expression.
1. PAPER BASED AES
Exit polls is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or
2. PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS
groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an
3. OVERALL PROJECT MGT + CONTINUITY & BACK UP PLAN
election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted
for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey
FOR THE BIDDING: 2 ENVELOPE SYSTEM
are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance
overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the
1ST ELIGIBILITY ENVELOPE
electorate voted. Aside from that definition, exit polls generate important research
data which may be used to study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. 2ND- BID ENVELOPE W/ 2 ENVELOPES
1ST- TECHNICAL PROPOSAL
Thus, an absolute prohibition would be unreasonably restrictive because it
2ND FINANCIAL PROPOSAL
effectively prevents the use of exit poll date not only for election day projections
but also for long-term research. SPECIAL BIDS & AWARDS COMMITTEE (SBAC) PUBLICIZED INVITATIONS W/
10 RESPONDENTS ONLY 7 COMPLIED &ONLY 3 WERE FOUND ELIGIBLE
As to the contention of the COMELEC that exit poll has a clear and present danger - JOINT VENTURES HOLDING THEMSELVES SOLIDARILY LIABLE ARE
of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process, such contention
ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE
is purely speculative and untenable.
Therefore, an absolute ban on exit polls cannot be justified. There are other valid TIM & SMARTMATIC IS A Joint Venture, TIM IS DOMESTIC CORP while
and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC end of avoiding and
SMARTMATIC IS A FOREIGN CORP FROM BARBADOS- PROPOSED TO
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought by exit surveys. On the
contrary, exit polls can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and DELIVER 82,200 PCOS MACHINES- THEY WON BUT HAD TO UNDERGO
fraud. POST QUALIFICATION SCREENING WHERE THERE PCOS MACHINE
COMPLIED W/ THE SBACS 26-ITEM CRITERIA SET BY THE COMELEC & HAD
PETITIONER- ATTY ROQUE & BUTUYAN AND OTHER SKEPTICS ABOUT AES
100% ACCURACY RATING
RESPONDENTS- COMELEC , (NCC )NATL COMPUTER CENTER, TIM- LATER, TIM & SMARTMATIC INCORPORATED THEIR Joint Venture Corporation
SMARTMATIC
ISSUES:
What? Wants TO NULLIFY THE AWARD OF AUTOMATION PROJECT TO TIM- 1. TIM-SMARTMATIC DIDNT SUBMIT DOCUMENTS TO ESTABLISH JVA
SMARTMATIC & NO VALID JVA
TIM & SMART IN FACT SUBMITTED THEIR JVA ON APRIL 09
HISTORY: IT INCLUDED THE COMPOSITION, 60-40 CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
DEC 97- CONGRESS MADE RA 8436 AUTOMATION LAW AND ALTHOUGH INCORPORATED LATE IT DIDNT VITIATE
JAN 2007- PASSED RA 9369 AMENDMENT OF AUTO LAW AND FAIR THE BID BEC IT IS ALLOWED BY CIRCULAR
2. TIM-SMARTMATIC DIDNTY SATISFY DEFINITION OF JOINT
ELECTION ACT CREATED THE CAC & TEC (COMELEC ADVISORY COUNCIL
VENTURE
& TECHNICAL EVALUATION COMMITTEE)
ACTUALLY THEY undertook to incorporate, if called for by the
2008- MANAGED TO CONDUCT AUTOMATED ELECTION IN ARMM USING bidding results, a JVC that shall be solidarily liable with them for
CENTRAL COUNT OPTICAL SCAN (CCOS) any actionable breach of the automation contract

MARCH 09- COMELEC SENT REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

 NON- INCLUSION OF THREE (3) IT PROVIDERS- ACTUALLY
UNDER INSTRUCTION TO BIDDERS THEY ARE ALLOWED TO
SUBCONTRACT
3. COMELEC ABDICATED ITS MANDATE & RESPONSIBILITY
NO! THE LOSS OF CONTROL SUPPOSEDLY BEC. THE
PUBLIC & PRIVATE KEY WERE ALL GIVEN TO SMARTMATIC
BEC. THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDIED THAT THE COMPANY
WITH MORE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE SHOULD PROVIDE
SERVICES BUT THE COMELEC STILL MAINTAINED
SUPERVISION & CONTROL ON CONDUCTING THE ELECTION
THRU ITS PERSONNEL & WHOEVER IT DEPUTIZES
4. NO PILOT TESTING WAS CONDUCTED
SEC. 6 OF RA 8236- SUPPOSEDLY REQUIRES THAT IT BE
PILOT TESTED IN AT LEAST 12 AREAS
NO! PILOT TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED- SEC 5 IMMEDIATELY
AFTER EFFECTIVITY SHALL BE USED IN 2 HIGLY URBANIZED
CITIES & 2 PROVINCES- THE MAY 2007 DIDNT USE AES
NO AUTHORITY SAYS THAT THE PCOS MACHINE IN 2007 BE
USED FOR PILOT TESTING THOSE THAT WILL BE USED FOR
2010- NOT A MANDATORY REQT/ PREREQUISITE FOR THE
2010 ELECTIONS
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO HAVE 2010 FULLY AUTOMATED
REGARDLESS OF W/N PILOT TESTING WAS DONE IN 2007
PLUS GOVT KNEW THAT THE PCOS MACHINE WASNT USED
IN PILOT TESTING YET ALLOCATED 11.3 BILLION FOR ITS
USE SO THEY INTENDED THAT THERE BE AUTOMATION
REGARDLESS
ALSO THE CCOS MACHINE USED IS SIMILAR TO THE PCOS
MACHINE (difference?) the ccos doesnt transmit results
PARTIAL AUTOMATION? NOPE THE LAW MANDATED FULL
AUTOMATION
5. PCOS DOESNT SATISY MINIMUM SYSTEM REQT
DOESNT MEET STANDARD OF COMELEC THAT IS 99.99%
ACCURATE SINCE THE SMARTMATIC WEBSITE SAID THE
MACHINE HAD 2-10% MARGIN OF ERROR
COMELEC HAS ADOPTED A RIGID TECHNICAL EVALUATION
MECHANISM OF APPLYING 26-ITEM CRITERIA- THE PCOS
MACHINE HAD A 99.99% ACCURACY
SBAC-TWG (one of the committees of the COMELEC)
CONDUCTED A TEST THAT SHOWED THE PCOS MACHINE
PASSED THE DEMO TESTS AND HAD A 99.955% ACCURACY
ALSO THE WEBPAGE IS ALREADY OUTDATED THE PCOS
NOW HAS 99.99% ACCURACY
ALSO IN TERMS OF CHECKING THE RESULTS SINCE THE
ELECTION IS PAPER BASED THE ACTUAL BALLOTS CAN BE
MANUALLY COUNTED
6. Violate the SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT?
NO! SINCE THE VOTERS CAN STILL FEED THEIR OWN
BALLOTS INTO THE MACHINE REGARDLESS OF HOW LONG
THE BALLOTS ARE
7. POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-DUMMY LAW
SINCE THE 60% FILIPINO OWN REQT ON THE JOINT
VENTURE BIDDER * SMARTMATIC OWNS 40% EQUITY ON
THE JV & THEN IN SMARTMATIC TIM CORP.
COURT SAYS NO LAW REQUIRING THAT THE PROVIDING OF
MACHINES FOR AUTMOMATED ELECTIONS TO BE OWNED
60% BY FILIPINOS & NOT CLASSIFIED AS A NATIONAL
ACTIVITY
8. POSSIBILITY OF HACKING
POSSIBILITY OF HACKING IS SLIM SINCE ITS ONLY IN THE 2
MINUTE INTERVAL OF THE TRANSMISSION AND WOULD
REQUIRE A SUPER COMPUTER
ALSO THE MEMORY CARD IS READ ONLY AND CANNOT BE
WRITTEN OVER
IT HAS ALSO PROVIDED FOR A CONTINUITY PLAN PF
PROVIDING 2000 SPARE PCOS MACHINES & IN THE CASE
THAT ALL 82000 UNITS FAIL TO RESORT TO MANUAL
COUNTING