Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would
depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law.
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for
ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a
case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Singson vs BPI
Singson vs BPI
23 SCRA 1117
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had
been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became
final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ
of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had a
current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the
name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
without further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was
merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a
letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B.
M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by
the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored
by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are
now constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.

Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim
for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was
held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the
latters part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as
soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the
amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.
CIRIACO ROBLES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YAP WING, defendant-appellee.G.R. No. L-
20442 October 4, 1971
FACTS:The plaintiff was employee by defendant in its contracting business; that on
July 6, 1961 at about 1:30 p.m. while plaintiff was dismantling lumber brace in the
construction of a bodega which defendant undertook to construct, defendant
negligently failed to provide safety measures within the constructionpremises, as a
result of which a piece of lumber fell and hit plaintiff on the head, causing him
physical injuries; that immediately thereafter plaintiff was taken to a medical clinic,
where he remained unconscious for several hours; that defendant defrayed
Plaintiff's medical expenses; that since then plaintiff was unable to work, thereby
losing his expected earning at an average of P39.00 a week or a total of P2,340.00,
more or less, up to the filing of the complaint; that because of the physical injuries
sustained by plaintiff due to defendant's negligence, he suffered mental anguish,
anxiety, fright and pain.
ISSUE:WON the plaintiff can claim moral damages based on breach of contract?
No. In breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad
faith is alleged in the complaint here. In any event, whether or not such
anallegation, in relation to the breach of a contract of employment by the employer,
resulting in injury to an employee or laborer, would justify a claim for moral
damages and place it within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is a question which
we do not decide in this case, not being the issue involved.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Ramos V. CA (1999)
FACTS:
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after
being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed
by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was
to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the
operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was
held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College
of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went
down with her to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed
of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3
p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a
month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then
comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in
her brain for four to five minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta
Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses
totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000
moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25
plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages
HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date
of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner
Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages
and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a
question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain
set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence - applicable in this case
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly
intubate the patient according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with
her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either
 by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus
experience.
Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way,
which led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable
drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as
the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied the
expert opinion brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor,
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus
anesthesia protocols except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with
late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This
them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be
indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending
and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of the tires of the bus were old.
an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which
compensatory damages. ignited the gasoline.
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change
would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to
also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the
which her body would normally undergo through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which
been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting.
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.
The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the
Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the to the villagers.
instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000
are likewise proper
WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
102 Phil 181 Civil Law Torts and Damages Proximate Cause
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was
on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he
stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier
and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he
was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and
again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27,
1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital
where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and
was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by
the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial
based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the
proximate cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the
wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote
cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."
Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's
branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private
respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of
Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store.
Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-
wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was
brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6
years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they
had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private
respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages,
P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income
and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneths act of
clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It
also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort.
Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable
to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA
and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside
the store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance,
event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the
failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in
determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be
attributed to negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering
and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations
and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the
res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a
startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a
falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of
such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she
trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony
on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic
death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to
secure or make stable the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure
the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the
situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence
required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to
ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that
she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was
the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to
collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and
Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the
counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded
towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH
was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her
mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was
near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress
upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
David Taylor vs Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company
16 Phil. 18 Civil Law Torts and Damages Element Quasi
Delicts
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy
at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical
engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad
was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a
mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of
Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps
which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor
experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one
eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left
the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to
the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as
follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally,
or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence
and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent
in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and
that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal
connection between the companys negligence and the injuries
sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor
which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various
experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It
is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his
age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a
day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a
stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought
about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap,
show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be
any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which
comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand
reparation therefor from another.