Criminal Law Review- Midterm Consolidated Cases
Criminal liability of each accused-appellant; As a
PEOPLE v PETRUS YAU AND SUSANA YAU y
SUMOGBA; G.R. No. 208170; August 20, 2014
I. The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under
Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
are as follows:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty;
(b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and
(c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom
for the release of the victim.
All of the foregoing elements were duly established
by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private
individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using
sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious
while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.
Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house
owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said
victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of
his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And
fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransom in
the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
II.
Principal; As an Accomplice
there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other
hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly
found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there
was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person
may be considered an accomplice, namely;
(1) that there be a community of design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by
previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and
(3) that there be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of
her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported
the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed
with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or
accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus illegal act, but
also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been
held that being present and giving moral support when a
crime is being committed make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by
the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was
not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of
sympathy or feeling of support to her husband. Moreover,
this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera, where
it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the
offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather
than that of a principal.
III. Penalty
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole against Petrus as
principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of
R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court
finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, meted out against Susana, an
accomplice, to be proper.
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the
total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged
only as an accomplice. (People v. Montesclaros)
FACTS:
1. Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping For Ransom of private complainant
Alastair Onglingswam, who was put into sleep while
riding a taxi (White Toyota taxi cab with plate
number PVD-115) bound to San Juan, Manila.
Subsequently, Chau (Alastair girlfriend) received an
email from the purported kidnapper demanding
US$2,000.00;
2. During twenty-two (22) days of captivity, he was
allowed to communicate with his family almost daily
to prove that he was still alive and was served with
meals almost five times a day either by Petrus or the
other accused Susan Yau;
3. The police were able to chance upon the said vehicle.
they followed it, then flagged it down and
approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll
down his window and was told that the vehicle was
being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant
did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this
prompted the officers to ask for his name and since
he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British
national, they asked him for his drivers license and
car registration but appellant was not able to
produce any. Since he could not produce any drivers
license and car registration, they were supposed to
bring him to the police station for investigation,
however, when shown a picture of private
complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered
that the man is being kept in his house. He was
immediately informed that he was being placed
under arrest for kidnapping private complainant
 Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his
constitutional rights. rescue operations of the victim
proceeded thereafter;
4. When the police proceeded inside the house they
found a man sitting on the floor chained and
handcuffed. The man later identified himself as
Alastair Onglingswam;
5. RTC finds them guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up
submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same
were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence
6. The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and
Susana, Hence this assignment of errors.
ISSUES
The focus of this case is the degree of responsibility
of each accused-appellant for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
Case no. 2
People of the Philippines v. Gonzales
183 SSCRA 309, March 19, 1990
Doctrine: The commission of a felony under Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code requires that an act a punishable act or
omission must be committed, and that it must be committed
with deceit and/or fault.
FACTS:
The appellant is appealing to the court regarding his
participation in the killing of a certain Loly Penacerrada. He
claims that he did not participate in the killing based on the
claim that he was not present in the said act.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 p.m. of February 21, 1981, Bartolome
Paja, barangay captain of Brgy. Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo,
was awakened by two of the accused. Paja learns that
Fausta killed their landlord, Lloyd Penacerrada, and
would like to surrender to authorities. Knife used in
killing was seen, and blood was found smeared on
Faustas dress.
-Paja immediately ordered a nephew to take spouses
to the police at the Municipal Hall in Poblacon, Ajay,
where the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident.
-Several patrolmen, along with Paja and Augusto
proceeded to the residence at Sitio Nabitasan where
the killing incident allegedly occurred, and found the
body of the deceased, clad in underwear, sprawled
face down inside the bedroom.
-Group stayed for an hour in which the scene was
inspected, and a rough sketch of the area was made.
-The next day, a patrolman, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene for further
investigations. Fausta was brought back to the police
station.
-The autopsy of the deceased was performed at 11:20
a.m. Report shows the following:
-Sixteen wounds: five fatal as they
penetrated the internal organs
 -Multiple puncture, stab, incision,
and lacerated wounds
-The day after the autopsy, Augusto appeared before
the sub-station and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Sazon for detention and protective custody
for having been involved in the killing of the
deceased. Augusto requests to be taken to where
Fausta was already detained.
Based on the investigations conducted, an
information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses. However,
they pleaded not guilty. Before the trial, however, a certain
Jose Huntoria presented himself to the wife of the deceased.
Huntoria claims to be a witness of the killing, and on October
6, 1981, volunteers as a witness for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was called, in which several more
were filed as accused, including the appellant. All the
accused except for Lenida pleaded not guilty
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus
Rojas, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the body,
Paja, the patrolmen and constabulary members who joined
in the investigation, the widow, and Huntoria.
Dr. Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy at
around 11:20 a.m. on Feb. 1981 after the deceased was taken
to the municipal hall. He found 4 puncture wounds, 7 stab
wounds, 4 incisions, and1 laceration; five of these were fatal
wounds. Rojas admitted one of two possibilities:-
-Only one weapon might have caused all the
wounds-
-Multiple instruments were used due to the
number and different characteristics
The substance of the prosecutions case rested on
Huntorias alleged eyewitness account of
theincident, which was as follows:
-Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb.
21, 1981, he left his work at Brgy. Central,
and walked home, taking a short-cut.
-While passing at the vicinity of the
Gonzales spouses home at around 8:00 pm,
he heard cries for help. Curiosity prompted
him to approach the place where the shouts
were from.
-15-20 m away from the scene, he hid
himself behind a clump of banana trees, and
saw all the accused ganging upon the
deceased near a threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the
place was awash in moonlight.
-After stabbing and hacking the victim, the
accused lifted his body and carried it to the
house. Huntoria then left home. Upon
reaching his house, he related what he saw
to his wife and mother before going to sleep.
-Eight months after the incident, bothered
by his conscience and the fact that his father
was a tenant of the deceased, he thought of
helping the widow. Out of his own volition,
he travelled to the widows house, and
related to her what he saw
Except Fausta who admitted killing the deceased as
he was trying to rape her, the rest denied participation in the
crime. The appellant claimed that he was asleep in his house
which was one kilometer away from the scene of the crime,
and he knew of the crime only when his grandchildren went
to his house that night
The trial court disregarded the version of the
defense; it believed the prosecutions version.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
basis of the testimony of the lone witness, and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi. The Court found no merit in
the errors, and rejected defense of alibi. Worsening this is
that the appellate court found the sentence erroneous, and
upgraded the penalty to that of murder reclusion
temporal/death. The case is now brought upon certification
by the Court of Appeals, hence the appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the client, under the evidence presented, has
committed the felony of murder.
HELD:
NO. Courts analysis of the evidence:
-Investigation conducted left much to be desired.
Centeno gave the date of commission as March 21, 1981. The
sketch made was troubling, as it did not effectively indicate
the extent of the blood stains in the scenes of crime. This
would have added a lot of weight to any one of the versions
of the incident
-Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to
him, failed to state clearly the reason for the surrender. It
may even be possible that Augusto surrendered just so he
could be safe from the victims kin. Sazon also admitted that
Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing.
-Rojas statement showed two possibilities for the
killing. Faustas admission that she was the only killer is
plausible. Furthermore, there were only five fatal wounds,
which will be discussed later.
-Huntorias testimony, of which the prosecutions
argument solely rests, needs to be examined further.
Huntorias claims in his testimony did not exactly match
with those from his cross-examination. He first claimed that
he recognized the people involved. However, in the cross-
examination, he only saw flashes. This implies that he may
not have recognized anyone at all.
On the criminal liability of the appellant:
-There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that
establishes the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal for direct participation under Art. 17, para. 1 of the
Revised PenalCode.
-Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or
evidence that inculpates him by inducement, under
paragraph 2 of the same article. Based on the definition of
felonies in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecutions
evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall that the
elements of felonies include:
-An act or omission
-Act or omission must be punishable
-Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or
fault
-The lone witness could not properly establish any
acts or omissions done by the appellant. He stated that he
does not know who hacked or stabbed the victim, thus
implying that he does not know what the appellant did. With
this, the essential elements of felonies may not even be
present.
-Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab
wounds and six accused would imply tha one of them may
not have caused a grave wound (especially given the
statement of the physician). This may have been the
appellant, and given that there is no evidence that the
appellant caused any of the wounds, coupled with the
prosecutions failure to prove the presence of conspiracy
(that is, how many people actually took part in the killing), it
weakens the arguments against the appellant. On the lone
witness:-
Huntorias credibility as a witness is tarnished by
two points:
1. He came out eight months after the killing. He
claims that he feared for his life, but there was
no proof that he was being threatened, nor was
 the length of time reasonable given the
circumstances.
2. He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness.
He admitted to being a tenant of the deceased,
and stated that one of the reasons why he
testified was because the victim was his
landlord.-
-Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
source of his livelihood from his landlord. As such, they
would do everything to get the landlords to their favor.
Posing as a witness would have been a convenient way to do
this, especially as he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981.
Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions,
it is unlikely for the appellant to be in the scene of the crime,
as under our family culture, aging parents are usually
sheltered and insulated from possible harm. It is improbable
for the accused to bring their aging father when they were
clearly in better shape than he was, and it was unlikely for
the appellant to offer his services as they were more or less
enough to handle what could have been a perceived enemy.
Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this
where the participation of the appellant is not clear, it may
be considered. In light of the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient for an acquittal.
Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.
Appellant acquitted
(case No. 3 is in pdf format)
CASE No. 4
U.S. vs. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902
DOCTRINE:
There can be no conviction under the Penal Code where by
reason of a mistake of fact the intention to commit the crime
does not exist. However, the diligence with which the law
requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct
varies with the nature of the situation in which he is to
perform. In a matter so important to the good order of
society as that in question, where the consequences of a
mistake are necessarily so serious, nothing less than the
highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard
prescribed by the law.
FACTS:
Julian Gonzales and Accused Tomasa Delos Reyes were
married in 1897. After some time, the two separated, with
Gonzales living elsewhere while Delos Reyes stayed at their
home where Gonzales mother also lived. On July 12,1900,
Delos Reyes remarried to Ramon Martinez. Thus, Gonzales
filed for a case of bigamy against his wife.
As her defense, she testified that she honestly believed that
her husband was dead when she married Martinez. That
sometime after they separated, the mother of Gonzales
informed her that her son was dead and she believed this to
be true.
As witness, Gonzales testified that after he left their house,
he would still visit his relatives who were left living in their
house almost every day until a few days before the trial of
this case.
ISSUE:
Was acquittal of the accused for the crime of bigamy proper?
YES
RULING:
Acquittal for bigamy was proper, however, accused should be
convicted under Art. 568 (Old Penal Code: reckless
imprudence)
U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
Doctrine/Topic: Art. 3; Mental element (Mens rea) -
Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he
would have been justified in killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art XI
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that in order for
the act to be justified, the requisites must be present.
Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact):
1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself
If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the
room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful
aggression, there would have been a necessity on the part of
Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home and the knife
would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such
aggression.
The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to
Honest Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah Chong.
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at
Officers quarters. On the night, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, Who is there? He heard no answer
and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out: If you enter the
room, I will kill you. He was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair and he thought that the blow had been
inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom
he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate. The roommate eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally
responsible for murder in the case at bar.
People v Estrada
Doctrines and Decision:
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is
criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the
classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the
basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is
essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to
choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have
been done voluntarily,i.e., with freedom, intelligence and
intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes
that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are
voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is
that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal
condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity
which exempts the actor from criminal liability.
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability.The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter
has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of
the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he
has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds
the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed,
he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his
confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he
may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict
which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental
institution.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be
incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern
or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the
time thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to
fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court
must suspend the proceedings and order the mental
examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary
for examination, order such confinement and examination. If
the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at
the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a
felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of
the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the
questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence
that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his
defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental
condition that effectively renders [the accused] unable to
fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-
appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the
charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea
was made intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made
by accused-appellant but by the trial court because of his
refusal to plead.
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
speaks of a mental examination. The human mind is an
entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual
process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and
psychological appreciation.Thus, an intelligent
determination of an accuseds capacity for rational
understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more
comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than
laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior.
Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can
the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial
court. By this time, the accuseds abilities may be measured
against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.
Facts:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City
of Dagupan, Philippines, the accused, Roberto Estrada, being
then armed with a butchers knife, with intent to kill one
Rogelio Mararac with treachery and committed in a holy
place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his
body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly
thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive
Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per Autopsy
Report and Certificate of Death. At the arraignment,
accused-appellants counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric
Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that
accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter
a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that
before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio
City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and
the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial
court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on
accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were
understood and answered by him intelligently, the court
denied the motion that same day.
Issue:
Whether or not insanity of a person can exempt him from
criminal liability and postpone the trial for a case against
him.
Whether the judge through intelligent questions can validly
determine the mental capacity of a person in determining
whether to continue with the trial and with his liability in a
criminal case.
JESUSA CRUZ VS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
FOR WOMEN IN MANDALUYONG
G.R. NO 125672 Septmeber 27, 1996
RA 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993,
partly modified the penalties prescribed by R.A. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), that is, inter alia, where the
quantity of prohibited drugs involved is less than 750 grams,
the penalty is reduced to a range of prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua and that where the
marijuana is less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
shall be prision correccional. Moreover, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable is
further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as
minimum term, to the medium period of prision
correccional as the maximum term, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
The petitioner should now be deemed to have served
the maximum period imposable for the crime for which she
was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. Although her penalty of life imprisonment had
already become final, the beneficial effects of the amendment
provided under R.A. 7659 should be extended to petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitoner Jesusa Cruz, presently confined at the
Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City
serving the penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon her
as a consequence of her conviction which became final and
executory last March 1, 1993 for violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A 6425, filed, through her counsel, the present
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges that, as of the
date of filing of her herein petition, she has already served
five and a half years of her life sentence. She argues that the
penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is
excessive considering that the marijuana allegedly taken
from her was only 5.5 grams or less than 750 grams.
ISSUE: After having served five and a half years of her life
sentence, may petitioner -- who was convicted of selling 5.5
grams of prohibited drugs, namely, dried marijuana leaves --
be now entitled to the beneficent penalty provisions of R.A.
7659 and be now released from imprisonment?
Case #7
People of the Philippines v. Daniel Quijada
G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996
Article 14 Aggravating Circumstances
Ruling:
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1
of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or
murder as a distinct offense penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession
of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person.
Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to
repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder,
either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve
to aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the
words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude
any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and
murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code,
is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating
circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the
unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. The only
purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed
in the first paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua -- to death,
seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant
defiance and contempt of the law in using an unlicensed
weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to
absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death
of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish
homicide or murder with death if either crime is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such
use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an
offense. That could not have been the intention of the
lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject provision
is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We
explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use
of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in homicide
or murder. Under an information
charging homicide or murder, the fact
that the death weapon was an
unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to
death. The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of
the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other
crime, is not included in the inventory
of aggravating circumstances set out
in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests,
even vaguely, a legislative intent to decriminalize homicide
or murder if either crime is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal
possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the
firearm so illegally possessed is used in the commission of
homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that
intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear
intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and
impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if
such firearm is used in the commission of homicide or
murder.
Facts:
On or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the
municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, the
accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable
motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the
victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without
giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with
evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a
grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of
murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea
with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his head
and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased. That
the accused carried and had in his possession, custody and
control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first
obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said
firearm from competent authorities which firearm was
carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was
used by him in committing the crime of Murder with
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim.
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada now appeals from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol
convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two
informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four
months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one
day, as maximum, for the second crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting the accused
of two separate crimes.
People v. Pinto Jr.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE - In the performance
of a Public Duty
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE - Evident
Premeditation, Unlawful Aggression, Night time,
Taking Advantage of Public Position
MOTIVE - Needed to prove Circumstantial Evidence
ABERATTIO ICTUS - Mistake in the Identity
CONSPIRACY - Acting in concert
=================================
Pt. I
=================================
Search warrant was issued for inspecting the house and
premises of Francisco Bello on the ground that the police had
probable cause that Bello illegally possessed a garand rifle, a
thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols
1 of 3 teams were walking on the Mariawa road toward the
premises, when one PC Romero heard rumbling of a jeep,
heard gunshots and saw flashes of light from the direction of
Buenaflor, his team member running towards the same.
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were
Fr. Felix Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson,
her six children and the driver returning from mass, fearing
that there might be "people with bad intentions" or hold-
uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster. Shots were
fired at the jeep.
After the shooting incident, the police pursued the mission
searching the premises.
=================================
Pt. II
=================================
Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were
not around, the police searched the area and found a
Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle,
ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber
pistol and 380 bullets for an automatic pistol.
Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared the search
terminated and the entire searching party left for
headquarters
Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to remain and
maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity including
Mariawa". While he and Buenaflor were patrolling the area,
at around midnight, they "chanced upon a house" wherein
Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of
Bello's bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn
shirt of one of the captives he saw a man with a bolo in his
hand running towards him. As the man was menacingly near
him, Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes
when he was at a distance of around three meters
Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee
when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was
the balcony facing the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back
towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his hands
above his head. Then there was another burst of gunfire.
From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where
she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later
identified as Pinto, near the pili tree which was around eight
meters from where Bello was, and another man, also holding
a gun, crouching near the stairs
Inocencia was about to rush to Bello. Just then a man, whom
Inocencia identified as Buenaflor, came up the house,
pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband and told them to
lay flat on the floor.
When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia
that Rosalio was dead. Inocencia went near the pili tree
where Rosalio's body was, knelt down and asked the man
with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered
that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not notice
any weapon near Rosalio's body
=================================
Pt. III
=================================
Buenaflor and Pinto were charged: without any justifiable
cause or motive, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, by means of a Cal.
45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun and a US Carbin Inland,
Cal. 30 owned respectively by said accused,
(1) shoot one Rosalio Andes,23y/o. inflicting upon him
gunshot wounds causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious
and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous death.
(2) one for the murder of Richard Tiongson, 9y/o. sustained
a gunshot wound at the back, Richard was operated at the
hospital but he died suffering a hemorrage.
(3) another for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa
Tiongson.
(4) Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds.
=================================
ISSUES
=================================
(1) Is the defense of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11(5)
of the RPC tenable?
(2) Is there evident premeditation, treachery, night time,
public position present as Aggravating Circumstances?
(3) Is the defense of unlawful aggression tenable?
(4) Is the defense of mistake in the identity of those who
were shot in the jeep tenable?
=================================
RULING
=================================
(1) Originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a
search warrant on Bello. In the process, however, appellants
abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and
unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a search
warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went
beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and
two other persons of their lives.
The defense has to prove that these two requisites are
present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty
and (b) the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of
such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the
justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting
it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of
the same Code
The police had obtained a search warrant for illegal
possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day
which was supposed to be a holiday, no such effort was made
in securing warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged frustrated
killing of Botin
(2) On Killing Bello and Andres:
Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt in this case but we find that the appellants
indeed took advantage of their public position in
perpetrating the crime.
(3) As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes
against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have
to stamp full credibility on his statement alone. Even
Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack
Pinto.
(4) On the jeep coming towards them was owned by the
Anduizas, the appellants acted obviously in the belief that
Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even
without any inquiry as to the identity of its passengers
Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has
been established. Such motive provided a circumstantial
evidence leading to the inference that indeed he fired his gun
All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other
inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in
defiance of their superior officer's order only "to find the
whereabouts" of Bello
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the
appellants intended to injure cannot save them from
conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the
victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in
on his intended victim. The main reason behind this
conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a
disregard for the life of the victim(s) without checking
carefully the latter's identity as to place himself on the same
legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously. Neither may the fact that the accused made a
mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered
a mitigating circumstance
It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and
Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the
wounding of Maria Theresa in the presence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each
other.
The lower court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellants shall solidarily be liable for each of the three
murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of
Maria Theresa Tiongson
People vs. Oanis
Art. 11, no. 5 of RPC
Art. 69 of RPC
Murder
Rule 109, Sec. 2, par. 2
Facts:
In the afternoon of Dec. 24, 1938, The Constabulary
Provincial inspector received a telegram stating " escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive". The Inspector then called
his men, Included is Alberto Galanta, and instructed to
arrest Balagtas, and if overpowered, to follow the instruction
contained in the telegram. The same instructions were given
to Chief of Polic Oanis, by the Inspector.
The inspector divided the party into 2 groups to locate
Balagtas. Galanta and Oanis were group together and
proceeded to Irene's house. Upon reaching the house, Oanis
approached brigida Mallare and asked Irenes location.
Defendants then went to the room of Irene and upon seeing
a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with
their revolvers. It turned out that the person shot and killed
was not the notorious Balagtas, but an innocent Serapio
Tecson, who was Irene's paramour.
On trial, the testimonies of the defendants were contrary to
each other but such was corroborated by Irene's testimony
that the defendants fired at Tecson while he was lying in bed.
The RTC charged the defendants of Homicide through
reckless impudence and senteced each an indeterminate
penatly and a fine to pay the heirs of Tecson.
Defendants contended that they incur no criminal liability
because they believed that the man was Balagtas and they
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties.
Issue: WON they should be held responsible for the death
caused to Tecson?
Held: Yes, they are responsible for tge death of Tecson.
The SC are of the opinion that the crime committed is
murder though specially mitigated. The contention of the
defendants that they are not liable because of their defense of
"mistake of fact" is not applicable.
In the case of Ah Chong, it was shown that there was an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to
take the facts as they then appeared to him.
In the instant case, appellants found no circumstances
whatsorever which would press them to immediate action.
The person in the room being asleep, appellants had ample
time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard
to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made.
The SC also held that the crime committed by appellants is
not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. Stating that "a deloberate intent to di an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence.
There is, however, an incomplete justifying circumstance,
falling under Art. 11 no. 5 of the RPC. Only one requisite was
present as the "offenders acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right". Such being the case, and
applying Art 69 od the RPC, the penalty lower by one or two
degress than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between
them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at
Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom
but there was no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the
testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an
impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law,
and to pay the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her
room on the night he and his companions riddled it with
bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,
recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish
criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does
not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed
is factually impossible or accomplishment - attempt to
commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment -
cannot be held liable for any crime

Case # 12
ESCAMILLA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013
HOMICIDE
DOCTRINE: The intent to kill, as an essential element of
homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous
with the infliction of injuries. The evidence to prove intent to
kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and
the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim.l1
Petitioners intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction
of injuries. Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest,
petitioner continued to shoot at him three more times, albeit
unsuccessfully. While running, the victim saw his nephew in
front of the house and asked for help. The victim was
immediately brought to the hospital. The doctor said that the
victim would have died if the latter were not brought
immediately to the hospital. All these facts belie the absence
of petitioners intent to kill the victim.
FACTS:
1. Around 2am of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the
comer of Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila. Mendol was
about to ride his tricycle at this intersection while facing
Arellano Street.
2. Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30
meters away from Mendol, shot the later four times, hitting
him once in the upper right portion of his chest.
3. The victim was brought to the Ospital ng Makati for
treatment and survived because of timely medical attention.
4. Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Fled an Information
charging petitioner with frustrated homicide.
5. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado
Garcelazo(Garcelazo), who all positively identified the
petitioner as the shooter of Mendol.
RTC: found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.
CA: affirmed the conviction
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the
conviction of frustrated homicide?
13. People vs Campuhan [G.R. No. 129433. March
30, 2000]
Ruling: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. Costs de oficio.
People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with
his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
erection to be able to penetrate his victim
the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's
vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted
Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that
she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy"
about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact
between the accused and the victim.
FACTS:
April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother
of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of
their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2
children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of
Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy
filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor.
Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she
went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his
short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding
his penis with his right hand
Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!"
and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried
to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help
thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle
who were living within their compound, to chase the
Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay
officials who detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel
s hymen was intact
Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to
ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing
both of them to fall down on the floor.
RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the
extreme penalty of death
Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VIOLETO VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al.,
defendants. CRISANTO INOFERIO Y ALINDAO
alias SANTE, and MARCIANO YUSAY alias
MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of 7/10/67),
defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-21860 February 28,
1974
RULING: Although inherently weak and easily fabricated,
the evidence presented by an accused in support of that
defense must be scrutinized with the same care that evidence
supporting other defenses deserves. When an accused puts
up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a
mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all
the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him, as
in the case of appellant Inoferio. He should be acquitted
upon the ground that although his defense, in the nature of
an alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be considered
sufficient as in this case, to tilt the scale of justice in favor of
the accused because the evidence for the prosecution is itself
weak and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large,
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
FACTS: After closing his shop for the day, Chinese
merchant Benito Ching left his store in the public market of
Caloocan. He brought with him a paper bag where all the
proceeds of his sale for the day are placed. While walking
with his 2 companions, Libantino and Galvez, 4 men
accosted them. Two of the men held Ching and Galvez while
Labantino continued to walk in front of them, initially
unaware of the commotion. A .45 caliber pistol as pointed at
Ching while he was held, while another man snatched the
paper bag from him. When Ching tried to call Labantinos
name for help, the gun was shot resulting to a gun wound on
Ching. Labantino fled, while Galvez finally freed himself
from the men holding him. The men eventually fled too.
After falling from the gun shot, Ching was able to walk to
home. His common-law wife brought him to the hospital. He
died a day after.
Galvez and Labantino both identified Villacorte as one of the
men who accosted them. Upon interrogation, Villacorte
admitted to the crime and identified his companions as
"Roque", "Sante" and "Fred".
Consequently, an information for robbery with homicide was
filed against Villacorte, Roque Guerrero (Roque), Alfredo
Handig (Fred) and an alias Sante whose identity was not
yet ascertained. The information was eventually amended to
implicate Crisanto Inoferio. The trial court acquitted Handig
and found Villacorte and Inoferio guilty. Guerrero was
discharged and used as a state witness.
Only Inoferio pursued this appeal. Inoferio testified that he
first met Villacorte and Handig while in Police custody for
the investigation. He claims that he knew Guerrero as they
played cara y cruz together.
ISSUE: Whether or not Inoferios weak alibi could warrant a
conviction.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADEO
PERALTA, ET AL.
Doctrine: A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefore
as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
Proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes the
existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to
establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be proof as
to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient
that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective." Hence, conspiracy is proved
if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a
common objective pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in
the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of
the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the
consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarity liable.
Imposition of multiple penalties where
conspirators commit more than one offense. Since in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each
of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the
conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of
murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each
of them is guilty of three murders and shall suffer the
corresponding penalty for each offense.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple
death penalties upon conspirators. An accused who
was charged with three distinct crimes of murder in a single
information was sentenced to two death penalties for two
murders, and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death
penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated. Therefore there
appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be
sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the
nature and number of crimes they commit in furtherance of
a conspiracy
Ruling. The evidence on record proves beyond
peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the
moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time
they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that
Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual
killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are
equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act
of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should
know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy
is the common design to commit a felony; it is not
participation in all the details of the execution of the crime.
All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in
the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-
principals. Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the
slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz each is
guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.
Facts: On February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the
penitentiary were preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a
fight between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and
"OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were
assembled, causing a big commotion. The fight was,
however, quelled, and those involved were led away for
investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to
return to their respective quarters. Moments later, another
riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A, mostly
"OXO" members and sympathizers, destroyed the lock of
their door and then rampaged from one brigade to another.
The invading OXO clubbed and stabbed to death Jose
Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened
the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates, namely,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz. The three victims
sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death
before they could be brought to the hospital.
Issue: Whether or not the commission of the
murders was attended with conspiracy?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. EDWIN DE VERA yGARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA
y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER
CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE VERA yGARCIA,
appellant.
Doctrines:
Conspiracy - It is axiomatic that the prosecution must
establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Mere
presence does not amount to conspiracy criminal
conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises
or conjectures.
Requisites of Conspiracy:
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the
following three requisites:
1 that two or more persons came to an agreement;
2 that the agreement concerned the commission of a
crime; and
3 that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon.
Accomplice, Defined; Elements.
The Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the
criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or
intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered,
the crime would be committed just the same.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must
be present:
1 the community of criminal design; that is, knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; and
2 the performance of previous or simultaneous acts
that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.

Conspirator and Accomplice, Distinguished. of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal
1 Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective
and not individual. The act of one of them is deemed
the act of all. In the case of an accomplice, the
liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.
2 Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in
common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to
know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution.
3 Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment.
4 Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices
are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Accomplices; Penalties;
The penalty of an accomplice is one degree lower than that
of a principal.
Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery;
Abuse of Superior Strength; Treachery absorbs
abuse of superior strength
Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. The trial court
found that the killing was attended by treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. Hence, there
is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two.
Facts:
The accused with evident premeditation, treachery and use
violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y
DIZON, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with
the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds. The trial court ruled
that there was conspiracy and sentenced all of the accused to
suffer reclusion perpetua mainly on the testimony of an
eyewitness. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the
following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused
inside the victims car; the victim was clearly struck with a
blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for
Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was
impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of
Florendos dark design on Roderick.
Such witness, Cacao, testified that he saw Appellant De Vera
in the car, where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he
saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled
Capulong and shoot the victim in the head moments later.
But, Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate
appellant De Vera aside from the fact that he was inside the
car, no other act was imputed to him.
Issues:
1 WON the trial court erred in deciding that there is
conspiracy?
2 WON the trial court erred in aside from treachery,
there are other two aggravating circumstances
(evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength).
Ruling:
1 YES. The prosecution must establish conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the bare testimony
of Cacao fails to do so. Cacaos testimony contains
nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from
 the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was
imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy. Criminal conspiracy must be founded on
facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures
2 YES. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.
Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE
LABAIGA, Appellant.
G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013
ARTICLE PRINCIPLE OF LAW
Article 6 Consummated, frustrated, and attempted FACTS
felonies.
In Serrano v. People, we distinguished a frustrated
felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1 In a frustrated felony, the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in
an attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2 In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing
that the wound would have been fatal were it not for
timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to
convince the court that the wound sustained would have
caused the victims death without timely medical
attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.
A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not
afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the
attack. The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that
the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the
execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated
against the accused.
According to the Prosecution, Regie Labiaga shot Gregorio
Conde outside the latters house. Conde cried for help which
prompted his daughters Judy and Glenelyn to rush towards
him. Regie Labiaga shot Judy and told the other accused
Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag that she is
already dead., and they left the vicinity. Judy and Gregorio
were rushed to the hospital wherein Gregorio was treated
and fully recovered Judy was declared dead on arrival due to
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade
due to gunshot wound.
According to the defense, Regie Labiaga admitted that he
was present during the shooting incident and claimed that he
acted in self-defense when Gregorio challenged him to a fight
while armed with a shotgun. He alleged that when he tried to
wrest the gun from Gregorio, the shotgun fired without him
knowing whether somebody was hit. Demapanag alleged that
she was 14 km away from the crime scene which was
corroborated by her brother.
The accused were charged with Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm. The information stated that the
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate 121 SCRA 389
intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there G.R. Nos. L-33466-67
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, x x x
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would April 20, 1983
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused; that is by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio
Conde which prevented his death. Intro:
The RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of
evidence while Regie Labiaga was convicted of murder and Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying
frustrated murder. CA-Cebu affirmed the conviction.
circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites
ISSUES:
Whether Regie Labiaga is guilty of frustrated or attempted must occur:
murder.
First. Unlawful aggression;
HELD:
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was admitted prevent or repel it;
by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the
shooting incident.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, the SC held
that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder and person defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal
not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended).
Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall
be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated
murder under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In this case, there was an aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights when the victims angrily
ordered the continuance of the fencing. There was also no
Case No. 18
provocation at all since the appellant was asleep before the
commission of the crime. However, the second element is
People vs. Narvaez not present as the killing was disproportionate to the attack.

Facts:
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia as the
two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez
from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was
taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He tried to stop the group from
destroying his house and asked if they could talk things over
but Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher
and Rubia with his shotgun. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property but the CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of killing of the accused is in defense
of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be
exempt from criminal liability.
Flores vs People G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013
Article #/Doctrine: To successfully claim self-defense, the
accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the
elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his
person or rights does not incur any criminal liability
provided that the following circumstances concur:
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful
aggression. "There can be no self-defense, whether complete
or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive
and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating
action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to ones life." 31"Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-
defense."32
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. Indeed,
the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon
Jesus further negate the claim of self-defense by the accused.
Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in
the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial
portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first
rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right
quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to
the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank
towards the umbilicus.
According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy
on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver. 36 If there was any
truth to Flores claim that he merely acted in self-defense, his
first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the latter
to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the
attack allegedly initiated by the latter.
But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the
number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the
Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend
himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this
regard that the location and presence of several wounds on
the body of the victim provide physical evidence that
eloquently refutes allegations of self-defense."37
Facts: On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta
in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie de
Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were
drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus. They started
drinking at 8:30 oclock in the evening. Jesus, however,
joined his visitors only at around 11:00 oclock after he and
his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to
settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one
of their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing
when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle. 4
was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his
father talking to each other from a distance of about six (6)
meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the
right shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was
already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt
hurt to have lost his father.8
Issue: WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE
CREDIT TO PETITIONERS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met
Flores who was heading towards the terrace. After glancing
[G.R. No. 109614-15. March 29, 1996]
at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace,
Duran focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he
heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
table. Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the vs. ADRONICO GREGORIO and RICARDO
bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores GREGORIO,defendants-appellants.
was no longer in sight.5

Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type

jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie
ARTICLE
de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to
the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any
ARTICLE 11. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES The
time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun
following do not incur any criminal liability:
with him.6
1. Anyone who acts in defense of is person or rights, provided
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house
the following circumstances concur:
before the shooting incident took place, anxiously waiting for
First. Unlawful aggression;
the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
were then attending to his problem regarding a vehicular
employed to prevent or repel it;
accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace. 7
the person defending himself.
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the
street in the company of some members of the CAFGU. He
 According to the court the guiding jurisprudential
principle has always been that when an accused invokes the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is
shifted to him to prove the elements of that claim; otherwise,
having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable. And
that he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution. Having admitted the
killing, appellant has to justify his taking of a life by the
exacting standards of the law. For self-defense to prosper,
the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
If the appellants stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo
Lo to defend themselves it certainly defies the reason why
they had to inflict 16 stab wounds and 6 respectively. The
location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
victims belie the appellants contention that they acted in
self-defense. The nature and extent of the wounds inflicted
on a victim negate an accused claim of self-defense.
FACTS
Around 8:00 PM of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse
together with his fifteen year old son Romeo Catorse arrived
at the house of appellant Adronico Gregorio at Sitio Bug-as,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the
wake of the latters grandson.
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant
Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their possession
for safekeeping so as to avoid trouble. Complying therewith,
Carlos Catorse handed over his samurai, John Villarosa and
Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to Adronico .
Around 1:00 oclock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the
game of pusoy was still in progress, appellant Ricardo, in a
very loud voice, reprimanded Tunggak (son of Adronico)
from peeping at the cards of other players. In response,
Tunggak stood up and also in a very loud voice ordered the
game stopped).
Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered his son
downstairs and right there and then scolded and boxed him
several times. While Adronico was severely beating Tunggak,
Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from
further hurting his son so as not to put him to shame before
the crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying the matter
between the father and son when suddenly appellant Ricardo
stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind with a samurai (the
same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and
thereafter hacked and stabbed him several times more in
different parts of his body: Right after Carlos fell to the
ground, Adronico, for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim
with a bolo.
Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house.
Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out of the house but
Adronico hacked him instead with a bolo hitting his left
shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to help his uncle Jovito but
Ricardo, with the same samurai used against Carlos hacked
him on his forearm. Adronico immediately followed and
using a bolo hacked Marcelo on the nape. Although
wounded, Marcelo was able to run out of the house but
Adronico ran after and overtook him. Adronico then hacked
him again.
Ricardo died during the trial. Adronico on the other hand
interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal
liability. In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the
attack upon defendant be simultaneous with the
ISSUE killing, or preceded the latter without an appreciable
Whether or not the appellant can validly invoke self- interval of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),
defense.

xxx xxx xxx

P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The harm caused by one person to another who
G.R. No. L-60159, 06 November 1989 offended or caused him injury, sometime after he
suffered such offense or such injury, does not
constitute an act of self-defense, but an act of
revenge. (Banzuela 31 Phil. 564)

Introduction (Provisions involved, principles,

jurisprudence): In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (1) year
of prision correccional, the respondent Court held (which
the Supreme Court affirmed):

The petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised. The

primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression.
And for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a xxx xxx xxx
real danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case,
there was no imminent and real danger to the life or limb of
the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had
already been disarmed. As former Chief Justice Aquino
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion
states in his book on Criminal Law:
to the court in lowering the penalty either by one or
 two degrees whenever incomplete justifying
circumstance exists in a given case like the case at
bar. The laudable patience of accused in not
retaliating despite repeated insults by a subordinate,
his length of service in the government (since 1957),
and most important, his obsession to inculcate
discipline in his men, to OUR mind, entitle accused
to a two-degree reduction of the penalty prescribed
by law. Our attitude is a signal to the men in uniform
that while WE condemn felonious violence WE
support efforts to maintain discipline in the service.
Brief facts:
At about 0700pm on 25 September 1980, Petitioner Fausto
Andal, then a corporal in the Batangas Integrated National
Police, while on patrol aboard a tricycle driven by Police Pfc.
Casiano Quinio, went to the police station at the pier located
at Sta. Clara, Batangas City to check on one of his men, Pfc.
Maximo Macaraig, who was stationed there, because the said
Macaraig had failed to report to police headquarters for
briefing but Macaraig replied that he did not have to report
to police headquarters since he already had his orders and
told the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka.
When petitioner Fausto Andal and Quinio went back to the
poblacion of Batangas City and parked their vehicle in front
of the Philbanking Building at P. Burgos Street, Batangas
City, Macaraig arrived and went straight to the petitioner as
he was furious and demanded why the petitioner had
embarrassed him in front of so many people. The petitioner
denied the charge and Quinio told Macaraig that the
petitioner did not utter defamatory words against him and
asked him to forget the incident. But still Macaraig
challenged the petitioner and fired his gun at the petitioner,
hitting the latter in the middle aspect, lower right knee. The
petitioner was able to wrest the gun from Macaraig when
they grappled for the possession of the gun and two (2)
successive shots were fired at Macaraig by the petitioner
which caused Macaraigs death.
Brief issue:
Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first
aggression, i.e. when deceased shot accused on his knee and
the time accused resorted to force by way of firing the two
shots at the deceased? The facts unfolded indicate that there
was. This is what happened after accused had grabbed the
gun: (1) He asked deceased, "Why did you fire at me?" (2) He
even turned his head towards his son and instructed him just
to stay in the jeep. (3) His son, Domingo Andal, challenged
deceased to a fight "Sportsman like." (4) Deceased moved
backward 2 meters away from accused. (5) Pfc. Quinio
even thought the trouble was over as he started to get his
tricycle.
Case no. 25
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO
SAZON, alias "INSIK,"
G.R. No. 89684 | September 18, 1990
REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE / RULING:
Self-Defense; Well-entrenched is the rule that where the
accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted
in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the
killing.
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of
unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can
be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself. In the present case, the burden of
evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed
to establish the primary element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense
must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the
accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for the defense,
are unconvincing primarily on account of their inherent
inconsistency and conflict with each other.
Qualifying Circumstances; Under such considerations
and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of
the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or
reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder. The circumstances qualifying
or aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and
incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively
as the acts constituting the offense. Thus, for the same
reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior
strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly
shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of
it. Absence of any evidence to show that the accused
purposely sought to use their superior strength to their
advantage in this case, a finding to that effect by the trial
court cannot be sustained.
Conspiracy; The fact that appellant did not inflict the
mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment, since the
existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the
evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant and Altejos of
immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him
thereafter reveal a concordance and unity of thought which
resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the
accused shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the
victim were grappling for appellants gun, Altejos stabbed the
victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of their
action geared towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the
victim. Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is
not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is
sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective, as such circumstance is
invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to
who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
conviction. The act of one in killing the victim becomes the
act of all the accused.
FACTS:
Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by appellant near the
barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that
appellant and his companions were engaged in stealing.
Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which
caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longno, who was then
present at the scene, approached and helped the fallen
Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently
angered appellant who, in his native dialect said, Andam ka
lang Inday kay patyon ta guid, (Watch out Inday for I will
kill you) to which Longno retorted, Just do it.
Two days later, appellant and his cousin, Cornelio Altejos,
were drinking softdrinks at the store of Gloria Aposaga when
Longno passed by. Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left
their softdrinks half-consumed and followed Longno who
eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where a
group of guys were sitting and joined the group in their
conversation. Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos
arrived and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno,
saying, Maano ka? (What are you going to do?). Longno
then faced appellant and said, Brod, tiruha lang. (Brod,
just shoot.)
Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun,
hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso and
Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the
wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while the two
were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the
chest, after which both appellant and Altejos ran away.
Appellants version of the incident, however, differs. He
admits having shot Longno but pleads self-defense. He
claims that Altejos for help to have a .22 caliber revolver
repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a
policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant saw Longno
from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said,
Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe you want
to be taught a lesson.
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in
his waist and was about to draw the same. He, therefore,
parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellants left
fingers which was later amputated. It was then that appellant
pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant
and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos
allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he was
brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle,
Altejos then shouted to appellant, I stabbed Inday, run,
and so he and Altejos ran away.
ISSUE/S:
1 Did the accused act in self-defense?
2 Whether or not qualifying circumstances are
present?
3 Is there a conspiracy between the accused and
Altejos?
Note:
Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over him and he can
neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in
this judgment to him are, therefore, obiter and with no
binding effect on him.
PEOPLE v. ALCONGA
Facts:
As the deceased Barion and the defendant Alconga were
playing black jack, the former became outraged and
expressed his rage at the latter for his cheating tactics. Two
(2) days later, making good the threat uttered after the game,
Barion approached the defendant and swung his pingahan, a
bamboo stick. A fight ensued afterwards, upon which
Alconga gained the upper hand by firing his revolver at
Barion and eventually inflicting a mortal bolo blow, slashing
the latters cranium. The argument of self defense was raised
by Alconga.
Issues:
1 Whether or not the Alcongas plea of self defense can
be sustained
2 Whether or not Barions provocation is considered a
mitigating circumstance
Ruling:
1 NO.
There were two (2) stages in the fight- the first wherein
the deceased was the aggressor and the second wherein
there is no more aggression, since Barion was already
injured and fleeing. Under such circumstances,
Alcongas plea of self-defense (as a justifying
circumstance) during the second stage of the fight
cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where
there is no aggression, given that the aggression must be
deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased
during the first stage. A fleeing man is not dangerous to
the one from whom he flees.
2 NO.
Section 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code
requires that there be sufficient provocation or threat
on the part of the offended party immediately preceding
the act. Sufficiency, as defined by Justice Albert, means
that it should be proportionate to the act committed
and adequate to stir one to its commission. It would
seem self-evident that Alconga could never have
succeeded in showing that Barions aggression was
proportionate to his killing his already defeated
adversary. Also, it is noteworthy to mention that at
Alconga, as a guard by profession, was the holder of
more deadly weapons and has superior fighting ability
than Barion.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN
GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", ET AL.
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances- 1. Anyone who
acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
Article 13. Mitigating Circumstance- 1. Those
mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites
necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Article 14. Aggravating Circumstance- 16. That the act
be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
No unlawful aggression when there is an agreement to fight.
The challenge to a fight must be accepted. The reason for the
rule is that each of the protagonists is at once assailant and
assaulted and neither can invoke the right to self-defense
because aggression which is incident in the fight is bound to
arise from one or the other of the combatants.
Unlawful aggression must come, directly or indirectly, from
the person who was subsequently attacked by the accused.
RULING: Benjamins story is manifestly artificious and
unworthy of credence. It should be noted that, according to
Benjamin, he held the dagger, even before they fell from the
"papag"; that the dagger was still in his hand when Piol
allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he
(Benjamin), in turn, took another piece of stone, and hit Piol
with it. This would have been impossible, however, unless
Benjamin first released the dagger, which he then held; but,
We cannot believe that he, or anybody for that matter, would
have done so under the circumstances.
Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin,
the latter threw the stone away and picked up the dagger
once more. He would thus have Us believe that, in order to
get the stone with which he claimed to have hit Piol on the
head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from which, at
the opportune moment, he got it back to inflict the second
stab wound. The context of Benjamin's story does not convey
the idea that he had such a control of the situation as to be
able to choose the place where he would put the dagger and
the time he would retrieve it.
But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach,
for, by this time, he was again lying down on his back
according to the defense with Benjamin on top of him, he
(Benjamin) thrust the dagger, with his left hand, into the
back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound almost at
right angle with his body, like the first. Just why, being in the
precarious condition he depicted himself, Benjamin chose to
stab Piol in such an awkward, inconvenient and unbelievable
manner, the defense has not even tried to explain.
Regardless of the foregoing, an injury inflicted in this fashion
on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed against the
ground, would have necessarily been much more slanting
than the first, instead of being almost perpendicular to the
body. The fact of the matter and this has been established
by the testimony of the Chief of Police, whose impartiality
and veracity are not contested is that Piol was then lying
down, not on his back, but on his stomach with Benjamin on
top of him. This explains why and how he (Benjamin)
managed to stab Piol on the back. It, likewise, shows that
Piol could not have struck Benjamin on the face with a stone,
much less squeezed his neck.
Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming
him. Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked
the incident, by hurling uncomplimentary remarks at his
political opponents, one of whom was Piol; that such
remarks led to an altercation with Piol, in consequence of
which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him on the head;
that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which could
have rendered him groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus
sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to fight by drawing
out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting
from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling
with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given
the benefit of either complete or incomplete self-
defense. Although Piol was stabbed from behind, Benjamin
did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of
their struggle, which had begun with both contenders facing
each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued.
The crime committed by Benjamin Gondayao is, therefore,
that of homicide, and no modifying circumstance having
attended its perpetration, the penalty therefor (reclusion
temporal) should be imposed in its medium period.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should,
accordingly, be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory
penalties.
FACTS: Appeal, taken by defendants Benjamin Gondayao
and Anoy Gondayao from a decision convicting them of the
crime of murder of Orlando Piol, qualified by treachery.
After consuming a bottle of gin, Benjamin, repeatedly cursed
the "Nacionalistas" for not offering a drink despite their
victory in the polls; that, as Piol who was nearby, replied by
cursing the losers in the elections, an exchange of unfriendly
utterances followed; that, eventually, the group headed by
Benjamin picked up stones and threw them at Piol, who was
hit several times on the head; that, as the same began to
bleed, Piol drew out a dagger and approached Benjamin,
who, forthwith, embraced him; that, grappling with each
other, they both fell down.
After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, Orlando Piol
appeared to have in addition to several lacerations on the
head two (2) stab wounds on the back, 4 to 4-1/2 inches
deep, in consequence of which he died due to a massive
internal hemorrhage. Immediately after the occurrence,
Benjamin assumed full responsibility for said injuries, which
he claimed to have inflicted in self-defense.
Benjamin testified that his remark, about the failure to give a
blow-out on the part of the winner in the elections, was
addressed to his nephew, Rudy Natividad; that, when Piol
resented said remark, Benjamin replied that the same was
not aimed at him, and that, perhaps, he (Piol) is a
"nacionalista".
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense.
G.R. No. L-28129 October 31, 1969
ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RULING
The petitioner is acquitted.
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not
incur any criminal liability
Paragraph 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The facts and circumstances constrain us to hold that the act
thus performed by petitioner, which unfortunately resulted
in the death of the escaping detainee, was committed in the
performance of his official duty and was more or less
necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully
eluding the officers of the law. To hold him guilty of
homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police officers
discharging official functions identical or similar to those in
the performance of which petitioner was engaged at the time
he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that
thereafter We would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts
on their part to comply with such official duty. This of
course, would be to the great detriment of public interest.
FACTS:
The deceased, Roberto Pimentel was a detention prisoner
who escaped. While in search for the escaped prisoner, Sgt.
Daiton saw a person approaching slowly under the bridge
and he ordered him to halt. The latter instead of doing so,
jumped down into the creek spanned by the bridge. Roberto
Pimentel emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at
the appellant Valcorza, hitting him with a stone and causing
him to fall to the ground. Appellant Valcorza regained his
composure and immediately chased the deceased, as the
deceased did not heed his order to stop, appellant fired four
times into the air, and a fifth shot at Pimentel as the latter
was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the
creek. The members of the patrol team went down into the
water to locate Pimentel and they saw him floating, with a
wound on his back. Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and
his firearm to the Chief of Police
ISSUE:
Whether or not peace officer Valcorza was justified in
shooting the deceased
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVELINO
MANANSALA, JR. and JOSE MANANSALA
G.R. No. L-23514, February 17, 1970
Article 17 of the RPC; Article 18 of the RPC states that
Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
Art.17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts. In this case, Jose Manansala was found
guilty as co-principal on the ground that there was concert of
action between him and his nephew. The evidence does not
justify this finding beyond reasonable doubt. There is no
showing that the killing was agreed upon between them
beforehand. No motive for it has been shown other than the
provocation given by the deceased; and such motive was true
only insofar as Avelino was concerned. The circumstances
indicate that if Jose embraced Rodrigo and rendered him
helpless, it was to stop him from further hitting Avelino with
his fists. However, Jose is not entirely free from liability, for
it has been established that even after the first knife thrust
had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino, either by
word or overt act. Instead Jose continued to hold Rodrigo,
even forced him down on the bamboo bed with Avelino still
pressing the attack. Withal it cannot be said that Jose's
cooperation was such that without it the offense would not
have been accomplished. But although not indispensable, it
was a contributing factor. If Jose's initial intent was free
from guilt, it became tainted after he saw the first knife
thrust delivered. The thirteen wounds must have taken an
appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose's cooperation
facilitated their infliction. He must therefore be held liable as
an accomplice.
Facts: Avelino was eating his lunch inside one of the
eateries dotting the market site, when Rodrigo Aringo alias
Diego, a baggage boy in the same market, approached him
and demanded his fee for having carried Avelino's baggage.
When Avelino said he was willing to pay for the services
rendered at noon, but not for those rendered earlier in the
morning, Rodrigo brusquely brushed Avelino's hand aside
and instantly gave him a fist blow in the face. A quarrel
between them ensued and Jose Manansala, Avelino's uncle,
noticed the commotion and so he went there and had
Rodrigo in a tight embrace. While in that position, Avelino
stabbed him with a balisong, or Batangas knife thirteen
times which resulted to Rodrigo's death. Avelino and his
uncle, Jose were charged with murder and Jose was
considered as a co-principal by the CFI.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Manansala was correctly
considered as a co-principal by the CFI?
Case #32.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Encomienda
GR No L-26750; August 18, 1972
Article 11, Revised Penal Code/ Legitimate Self-
Defense, elements: (1) unlawful aggression on part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means, employed to
prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself
Illegal Aggression, what constitutes: Illegal
aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means
Employed, what constitutes: Reasonable
necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. When the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter
as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed and
the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness
thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of murder
aggravated by recidivism. He interposed the lawful self-
defense as per Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the accused satisfied the elements of
lawful self-defense?
Held: Yes, the accused sufficiently proved the elements for
lawful self-defense. Elements are: (1) unlawful aggression on
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means,
employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
It was the deceased who drew his gun towards the
accused. Not having enough time to think rationally how to
deal with the situation, the accuseds act of hacking the left
arm of deceased is justified due to immediate danger to his
life as the former was about to grab gun from his free left
hand. Provocation came from the deceased (not the accused)
as he ordered the accused to vacate land and drew his gun
when he did not like the response of the former.
PEOPLE VS. JAURIGUE
C.A. No. 384, February 21, 1946
Doctrine:
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful
aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very
existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus
imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot
be considered a crime from the moment it became the only
means left for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs.
Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504).
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is
justified in killing her aggressor in the defense of her honor.
When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the
same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed
his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh without her
consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and
there were already several people inside the chapel,
including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and
other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado
Capina a thrust at his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal
wound and causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor
was evidently excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the
crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by two
degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that
of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature,
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant
and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to
prision correccional in its medium degree.
Facts: Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist
Church, Amado Capina sat beside the appellant and with the
greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upperpart of
her right thigh. On observing this highly improper
and offensive conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of
her personal dignity and honor, pulled out a fan knife and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck
Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes
later. Appellant Avelina Jaurigue was subsequently tried
and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the
legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be
completely absolved of all criminal responsibility.
People vs Sotelo
55 PHIL 403
December 13, 1930
Article 13 of the RPC: Incomplete Self Defense
Facts:
The Sotelo brothers, namely, Constante, Dominador, and
Vicente, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur for the crime of homicide. The said accused
conspired to attack Ignacio Cambaliza and inflicted a mortal
wound upon him which he died in a few minutes afterwards.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Constante can invoke self
defense?
Ruling:
The selfdefense invoked by the accused was incomplete, for,
although the appellant was unlawfully attacked by the
deceased and compelled to employ reasonable means to
defend himself, he is responsible for provoking the attack.
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
GR NO. L-6025, MAY 30 1964
Labrador, J.:
Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or
insurrection
FACTS:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other
appellants were accused of conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one
(31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. They were accused of being
members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which
was actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
government of the Philippines. With the party of
HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon),
they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder,
pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on
government forces or civilians by HUKS.
ISSUE: Does his or anyones membership in the communist
party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of
Article 136 of the RPC?
HELD:
No. The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory
and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy
of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a
theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement
forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working
class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins
of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a
Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet
actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject
to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action
and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears
to be the propagation of improvement of conditions of labor
through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which
he is the founder and active president, has communistic
tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the
unity and cooperation between labor elements and preparing
them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need
of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant
was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable
to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection
with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and
fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his
political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster
the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an
actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not
merely to advance his political aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist
are concerned, We have not found, nor has any particular act
on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he
had advocated action or the use of force in securing the ends
of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders
of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the
rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to
show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated
and conspired with said leaders in planning and encouraging
the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar
as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is
concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an
intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to
others. It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or
material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or
to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go
underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the chief of
the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the
conspiracy to engage in or to foster the rebellion or the
uprising.
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO,
 POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants
FACTS:
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the
outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the
Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved
to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown
persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla
was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H.
Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry,
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province
of Abra.
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the
liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio
Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape
the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his
instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the
residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time,
charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of
authority were filed against Borjal.
The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found
Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him
instruction from his superiors. And on the night of the same
day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal.
Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as
grave digger.
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor,
Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and
Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin
Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos,
Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano
Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as
members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner,
Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as
an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First
Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal.
ISSUE:
whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's
quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter
to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of
April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of
Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by
Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold
(Exhibit 8-8-a).
RULING:
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important
issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did
actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof.
The accused roundly denied it.
. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken,
another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged
conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the
accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening
of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was
made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the
accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear
mass.
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that
can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the
Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the
charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be
rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire
against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced
to death.
decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and
collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation
does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the
Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be
held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal
motives" Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not
dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice.
The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal
had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and
civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be
captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court
is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason
that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal"
Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain
crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference
to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds
of the person performing the act complained of be
innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y
FERNANDO, appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
there is no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
The accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS,
a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and there, shooting
him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant
of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of
public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of
the appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal
liability.
RULING:
The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence, his affirmative defense that the victim's
death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet
hitting the victim without his fault or intention of causing it;
hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to
be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with
criminal intent or with fault or negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a
person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it. 34 An accident is
an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will,
and although it comes about through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it
will be a case of negligence.
The appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no
modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
People VS. Ong
Intro:
All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating
circumstances:
(a) Evident premeditations;
(b) Grave abuse of confidence;
(c) Nighttime;
(d) Use of an motor vehicle ;
(e) Use of uperior strenght;
(f) Cruelty.
Kidanapping with Murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
is absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery
because in this crimes," treachery arose from the defenseless
position of Chua when he was killed, while nighttime was
purposely sought by the accused to facilitate immunity in the
commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place (despoblado) is also present, due to the
deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio Makatipo
Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim
The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the
commission of the crimes," can be considered present
because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the victim's
car and to facilitate the commission of the crimes," and the
escape of the accused.
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the
crimes, because the accused meditated, planned, and
tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea
of guilty and one analogous to passion and obfuscation"
because Chua previously threatened Ong for non-payment of
debt arising from gambling, causing Ong humiliation and
shame.
"Conspiracy, connivance and unity of purpose and intention
among the accused were present throughout in the execution
of this crime. The four participated in the planning and The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the
execution of the crimes," and were at the scene in all its accused Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the
stages. They cannot escape the consequences of any of their commission of the crime.
acts even if they deviated in some detail from what they
originally thought of. Conspiracy implies concert of design
and not participation in every detail of the execution. Thus, Case #41
treachery should be considered against all persons
participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the
crime."

Brief Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the vs. GEORGE CORTES y ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, [G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001]
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
above named accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with
*in this case the court took little discussions on the application
treachery and known premeditation and for the purpose of
killing one Henry Chua and thereafter extorting money from of the following aggravating circumstances as alleged in the
his family through the use of a ransom note, kidnapped and complaint.
carried away said Henry Chua, initially by means of friendly
gestures and later through the use of force, in an automobile,
and later after having taken him to an uninhabited place in
Caloocan City, with the use of force detained him (Henry Evident Premeditation.
Chua) and killed him in the following manner, to wit: The
accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua and
In the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if
the prosecution must prove the following elements:
he would write and sign a ransom note for the payment by
his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would not be
killed and would be released upon receipt of the ransom (a) the time when the accused determined to commit
note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and the crime,
thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region, several times
with an ice-pick, inflicting upon him (Henry Chua) mortal (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death. to that determination, and
Brief Issue:
 (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the
execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of the act
In the case at bar, the prosecution fails to prove this
aggravating Circumstance
II. Cruelty
For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be
shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction,
caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he
inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain.
Rationale: The crime is aggravated because by deliberately
increasing the suffering of the victim the offender
denotes sadism and consequently a marked
degree of malice and perversity.
In the case at bar, The mere fact of inflicting various
successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death,
no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one
(1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to
prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking
this aggravating circumstance into consideration.
III
Nighttime
Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when:
(1) it is specially sought by the offender;
(2) the offender takes advantage of it; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the
offender's immunity from identification or capture.
In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused
purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the
crime, or to conceal his identity.
Abuse of Superior Strength
Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that
it cannot be appreciated separately as another aggravating
circumstance. Here, treachery qualified the offense to
murder.
Disregard of Sex
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the
same could not be considered as it was not shown that
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of
the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her
womanhood.
In the case at bar, the accused mistook the victim for a
man
Intoxication
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either
aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
 contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual
or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance.
A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must
present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to
produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time,
that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker
and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to
reinforce his resolve to commit the crime
FACTS:
1 an Information for murder (violation of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code) against accused On George Cortes y
Ortega, for the murder of Edlyn S. Gamboa, a 16 year old girl
2 Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn.
3 He entered a plea of guilty In virtue of his plea of guilty, the
trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of
the plea by propounding questions to the accused to find out
if he understood his plea and the legal consequence thereof.
4 The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of
superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were
present in the commission of the crime.
5 The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of
guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.
6 the trial court after considering the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attendant found the existence of
the aggravating circumstances and appreciated only the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty that was offset by
one of the aggravating circumstances. Hence, this review
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty,
nighttime, abuse of superior strength, sex and intoxication
attended the commission of the crime charged.
HELD:
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that the
only aggravating circumstance present was treachery which
qualified the killing to murder and that there were two
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication,
not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not
death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6759
 CASE No. 42
People vs Regala
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000
FACTS:
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in
Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and
her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when
appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions
entered the formers house.
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the
kitchen and went to the room of the victims and poked at 8-
inch gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of
them. Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother
was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmothers
aparador being opened where two rings, two wrist watches,
and money were taken from the aparador. After raping her in
bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money
taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the
kitchen, still hogtied and was raped again by the accused.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant
appealed his criminal case at the Regional Trial Court in
Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita
Ulanday, a health officer of Aroroy, testified herself that the
complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a
sexual act or was forced into one.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery
be considered as an aggravating circumstance?
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo
Arevalo, separately testified that they saw the face of Regala,
despite of no electricity at the commission of the crime,
because he used a flashlight and took off the mask he was
wearing, and thus, they remembered him wearing an earring
of his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the
police line-up inside the police station.
The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor
detail, cannot detract from the fact, that both Nerissa and
Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-
year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and
was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate
accused-appellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulandays
testimony does not support the contention of accused-
appellant that the victim voluntarily submitted to sexual
advances of Regala.
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when
RA 7659 was already in force. Under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides, under
paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
In this case, the additional rape committed by herein
accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court
is proper. The judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape, where the victim is entitled to an additional award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

HELD:
 PEOPLE vs BERDIDA
GR No. L-20183; June 30, 1966
DOCTRINE:
Rule of aggravating circumstances with regards to penalty
the presence of one generic aggravating circumstance,
apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, suffices
to fix the penalty for murder at the extreme punishment of
death.
Nighttime from the facts and evidence of record in this
case, appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing
the felonies charged for they had evidently chosen to execute
their victims under cover of darkness, at the dead of night,
when the neighborhood was asleep.
Exception to the rule of absorbing Nighttime in Treachery
in as much as the treachery consisted in the fact that the
victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the
circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but
can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery
rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case
therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is
absorbed in treachery does not apply.
Evident Premeditation from the time the accused
abducted the victims up to the time one of the latter lost
consciousness and the other died, sufficient time had lapsed
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences
of their act.
FACTS:
At around 10:00pm, Antonio, Federico, Virgilio and Pedrito
had just left a store and were on their way to each of their
homes, when a group of men armed with bolos stopped them
and introduced themselves as policemen, saying that the four
are accused of killing someone and that they should go with
them. Antonio and Federico held their hands up while
Virgilio and Pedrito could ran away. Antonio and Federico
were taken to a rail track where their hands were tied. They
were then further taken to a pier in North Harbor where they
were met by more armed men. The group of men beat
Antonio and Federico until Antonio lost consciousness at
around 1:00am of the following day. The police, together
with Antonio's sister, found Antonio and Federico the
following day. Antonio was still alive thus was rushed to the
hospital while Federico was already dead.
ISSUE:
1. Was the RTC correct in imposing the death penalty?
2. Was the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances
proper?
People vs Castillo
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE
PADAYHAG, appellants.
[G.R. No. 132895. March 10, 2004]
Doctrine/s and/or Rulings: We affirm the trial courts
judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-
accused Padayhag.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[8]
the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender
is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or
in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the
act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances
is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
[9]
Appellant Castillos Liability
Castillo asserts that the victims parents did not pay her
wages when she worked as a maid of the victims family.[10]
She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level and
her ignorance of the law, which impelled her to take Rocky.
She faults the trial court for refusing to consider this. Castillo
is mistaken. Whether or not her employer failed to pay her
salary is irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can
serve as justification for any person to retaliate through the
commission of another crime. The trial court was therefore
correct in disregarding Castillos claim that Rockys parents
committed injustice on her.
Castillos claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her
demand for ransom. Ransom is money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from
captivity.[11] Thus, even if she had a right to demand
payment of her unpaid wages, the money she actually
demanded and eventually received, is still ransom.
Castillos reliance on her low educational level is similarly
unavailing. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom is the
singular and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the
application of any alternative, mitigating or aggravating
circumstance
Appellant Padayhags Liability
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the
evidence on record shows that the prosecution failed to
prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case
opens the entire case for review on any question including
those not raised by the parties.[25] This becomes even more
imperative in cases where the penalty imposed is death.
There must be positive and conclusive evidence that
Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same
criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of
events that directly and definitely links the accused to the
commission of the crime without any space for baseless
suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through.[26]
Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the crime itself.[27]
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1)
singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an
unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an
act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The
act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of
conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a
common design.[28]
Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of
her complicity with Castillos plan, a plan Padayhag did not
even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met
Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhags
boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they
were to visit Padayhags boyfriend that the two met. When
they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of
conspiracy. We also find that the prosecution failed to prove
Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v.
Gonzales[36] we held:
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.
Penalty and Damages
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[44] the penalty
of death is imposed upon proof that the kidnapping was
committed to extort ransom from the victim or any other
person. We find that the prosecution has established
Castillos guilt for this crime beyond reasonable doubt.
However, Castillos pecuniary liability must be modified to
conform with jurisprudence. The award of exemplary
damages must be deleted in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their family suffered
serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky again.
[45] The pain and anguish they experienced justifies the
award of moral damages. However, we reduce the trial courts
award of moral damages to P100,000 in line with current
jurisprudence.
Brief Facts: Before us on automatic review is the
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Branch
260, National Capital Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No.
95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo (Castillo) and
Evangeline Padayhag (Padayhag) guilty of Qualified
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention[2] and sentencing
them to death.
The Information[3] charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda
Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping, reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, said accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO and
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring together,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry
away, and seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @
Rocky, a five years old child (sic), which kidnapping or
serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days thereby
depriving him of his liberty, and which was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of the
victim, to the damage and prejudice of the victim himself and
his parents.
Issues:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
MISAPPRECIATING (SIC) THE FACTS OF THE
CASE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT
RANSOM IN THIS CASE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION OF
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
[7]
People vs Tan, G.R. No. 132324. September 28, 1999
Doctrines:
Self defense
When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is
shifted to them to prove that the killing was justified and that
they incurred no criminal liability therefor. They must rely
on the strength of their own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter is
weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission
of responsibility for the killing.
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly
Tan to prove self-defense. Thus, he must prove that there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the
means employed to prevent it were reasonable, and that
there was lack of sufficient provocation o his part. However,
he failed to discharge this burden.
Crime and its Punishment
The killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was
murder. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person attacked. Treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the
attack on Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was
caught off guard and was therefore unable to defend himself,
as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated
by the wounds inflicted on him.
Culpability of Jose Tan
The prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the
killing of the victim; thus, Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only
as an accomplice. According to the widow Ofelio Olos, she
even heard Jose Tan telling and pleading with his brother to
stop his attack and stabbing of the victim. The most
therefore that said accused could be liable for is merely that
of an accomplice, who, not being a principal cooperated in
the execution of the offense by previous and simultaneous
acts, that in this case, by his stoning the victim Modesto Olos
and hitting him on the neck. However, the accused Jose Tans
act of stoning was neither a direct participation nor
indispensable to the killing of the victim. Also, as held by the
Supreme Court, when doubt exists whether an accused acted
as principal or accomplice, the court should favor the lesser
or milder identity (People vs. Irenea, G.R. No. 44410, August
5, 1988).
The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one
degree lower than that of the principal, which in murder
cases is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to
death. Considering that he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, because he was only
sixteen years old when the crime was committed, the trial
court should have lowered his penalty by two degrees,
i.e. prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven,
the imposable penalty on Norlito Tan is reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
On the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo,
Municipality of Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, Norlito Tan and Jose Tan as an accomplice, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stone and stab with a deadly
weapon one Magdaleno Rudy Olos alias Modesto Olos,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in
such amount as may be proven in court.
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo,
Camarines Sur. Subsequently, Norlito Tan was arrested on
April 1, 1996. They both pleaded not guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not self defense can be used as a justifying
circumstance in this case.
Whether Jose Tan can be considered as an accomplice in this
case.
Case # 47 People v. Abarri
G.R. No. 90185 March 1, 1995
Art. 8 Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony
Art. 17 Principals
Doctrine/ Ruling:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence, as the agreement itself may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
The common intent of robbing the victim and committing
the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred from their
behaviors.
Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and
forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The other appellants
followed them and watched while Abarri divested the victim
of her valuables. After robbing the victim, Abarri with the use
of a "balisong" tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse
and all the other appellants participated in removing her
clothes, pawing her and biting her nipples.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the
nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. We find that the acts of appellants in striping
naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts
constitute lewd designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness
committed by him culminated in the raping of the victim
when he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show
that the other accused had knowledge or were aware of the
rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty
of robbery with rape.
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by
Cawaling to Andales as sufficient to make him a
principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before
a remark can produce such an effect, the same must
be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to
become the determining cause of the crime, as to
make the utterance a command from a superior to a
subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the
decision of Andales to rape the victim had been
made before Cawaling uttered the remarks.
Cawaling was then leaving the place with Abarri,
Estrada and Pajalago while Andales purposely
stayed behind with the victim. There is not even a
showing that Cawaling had any moral influence over
Andales.
Facts:
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria
Gan was walking along 4th Avenue, Kalookan City on her
way home, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her
and each poked a knife at her neck. Abarri then grabbed
Gan's bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag
kang sisigaw." Gan was dragged by the two and brought
inside a fenced, vacant lot strewn with garbage and covered
with tall grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada and
Joselito Pajalago were former employees of Gan.
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a
"balisong, " tore the upper portion of Gan's blouse. The other
accused then started tearing the rest of the blouse and
pulling down her pants. The torn blouse was used to tie her
mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the
accused started touching her private parts.
Abarri opened Gan's handbag and took a bunch of keys,
which included the key for her store at Carmen Planas Street
in Binondo, Manila. He also got her watch valued P2,000.00,
necklace valued at P5,000.00 and wallet containing
P250.00.
After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales.
Before leaving, Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog,
(referring to Andales) bahala ka na, sampung taon
na rin na hindi nakakatikim 'yan, makatas pa 'yan."
Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening
the tie on her legs, raped her twice. After satisfying his lust,
Andales left.
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll
over to the middle of the lot. In the process, the tie on her
mouth loosened and she was able to shout for help.
Responding to her cries, neighbors came and untied her
hands.
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay
Captain Anita Alejo was informed by a resident that
somebody was opening the store of Gan. Repairing at the
place, Alejo saw Abarri and Estrada. She noticed that the
door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked
the two what they were doing there, Abarri answered that
Gan instructed them to get the latter's pants. Alejo brought
them to the barangay hall for investigation. Upon further
questioning, Abarri admitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a
vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over
the two to the custody of the police detachment in Binondo.
The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene.
However, Gan was no longer there when they arrived. The
police proceeded to Gan's house where the latter positively
identified the two as among those persons who robbed her.
Issue:
Are the accused guilty of robbery with rape?
Case No. 48
Enrile vs. Salazar
186 SCRA 217
G.R. No. 92163 64
June 5, 1990
Intro:
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the
two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a
fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48
said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Facts:
A warrant was issued charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. The
petitioner's counsel contended that the petitioner is charged
with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
therefore, the same must be dismissed as it is just a mere
flight of rhetoric.
Issue:
Whether or not under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
rebellion may properly be complexed with a common
offense, murder.
#49 Santiago v Garchitorena
ART 10 RPC - Supplementing Special Laws
CONTINUING CRIME - For delito continuado to exist there
should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim
a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of 32
aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege
under EO 324, causing undue injury to one offended party,
the Government, done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.
According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the
names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly
plead and prepare for trial.
The information was then amended reproducing verbatim
the allegation of the original information, except that instead
of the word "aliens" in the original information each
amended information states the name of the individual
whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the
public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one
amended information embodying the legalization of stay of
the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12,
1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has
conceded categorically that the accusation against Miriam
Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law
represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign
nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the
concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only
one . . . (
ISSUE:
Is the consolidation of cases proper for violation of EO
324? / Was there only one offense committed?
RULING:
YES. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code
shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter
provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from
the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity
to crimes punished under special laws.
Applying the concept of delito continuado
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were
committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the
approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of
the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing
the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government
suffered a single harm or injury.
Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations into one information charging only one offense
under the original case number,
#50 People vs. Dela Torre
Rule 122 Sec. 1 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, any party on appeal from a judgment or final order,
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
People v. Leones (GR Nos. 128514 & 143856-61), it
unmistakably declared that "while it is true that this Court is
the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error
committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into
to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an
appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty
imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of
the accused against double jeopardy."
Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme (157 SCRA 518) clarified the
Kepner Doctrine stating that "an appeal of the prosecution
from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of
increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would
place him in double jeopardy"
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in
jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the
accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It
also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State,
following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
The Court also states: "Whatever error may have been
committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that
can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no
matter how obvious the error may be."
Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre was charged and convicted of 2
counts of acts of lasciviousness and 4 counts of rape against
his daughter Mary Rose dela torre.
The RTC rendered its judgment imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, maintaining there were circumstances
mitigating the gravity of the offense. An appeal was made
seeking to increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
the supreme penalty of death.
Issue: WON an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower
court will violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy?
Case # 52
Cristobal v. Labrador
G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940
ABSOLUTE PARDON
DOCTRINE: Absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from
the conviction.
FACTS: The CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of
estafa, however, he continued to be a registered elector in the
city of Malabon, Rizal and was seated as the municipal
president from 1934 to 1937. On 1938, Commonwealth Act
No 357 or the Election Code was approved which disqualifies
the respondent from voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against property. The
respondent applied to the President for an absolute pardon
and granted the petition restoring the respondent to his full
civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right
to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the
name of Santos from the list of voters in precinct no. 11 of
Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the latter is disqualified.
After hearing, the court denied the petition for exclusion and
declared that the pardon extended in favor of respondent has
had the effect of excluding him from the disqualification
created by the Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon not only blots out the of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.
the conviction? ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against Parulan?
FACTS: Petitioner Parulan was confined in the state
54. RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life
OF PRISONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-28519 imprisonment which, however, was commuted to 20 years by
February 17, 1968 the President. He was then transferred to Fort Bonifacio in
Ruling: There are crimes which are called transitory or Makati. In October 1964, while still serving his sentence, he
continuing offenses because some acts material and essential escaped. He was eventually recaptured in Manila.
to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in Consequently, he was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of
which case, the rule is settled that the court of either service of sentence and was found guilty. As a recourse, he
province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus
took place has jurisdiction to try the case. There are, also, directed against respondent Director of Prisons.
crimes which although all the elements thereof for its
consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by
reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. The crime of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO
evasion of service of sentence is an example of the latter kind
of crime - when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and
thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009
another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a
continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse CARPIO MORALES, J.:
and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it
may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall
have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is
Doctrine(s): Special complex crime. Where the law
fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the
provides a single penalty for two or more component
service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place
crime. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the
Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
same precision that would be necessary if they were made
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a
the subject of separate complaints.
person may be arrested without warrant is where he has
Mitigating Circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty
escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
in single and indivisible penalty. The presence of
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty has no
effect or disregarded incase the penalty imposable is single
and indivisible.
Automatic Review in case the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
When the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the case is automatically
forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
However, such automatic review to the Supreme Court does
not bar the referring of the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate disposition.
Searching inquiry incase of plea of guilty in a crime
having a penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. There is thus no hard and fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as
the voluntary intent of the accused and his full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea are
ascertained.
Facts: In January 14, 2004, while AAA was on her way to
school, appellant kidnapped AAA by deceiving the latter that
they would would go to Jollibee, but in fact appellant
brought AAA to a house in Imus, Cavite. AAA was thereafter
under appellants control and custody for eight days during
which he abused her by inserting his finger inside her vagina
on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home, her stepfather BBB went
to search for the former. A neighbor then informed him that
he saw appellant with AAA while the latter was on her way to
school. At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004,
appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
An information for kidnapping with rape was filed against
appellant by on the basis of the report submitted by the
medico legal.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The lower court
thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated
questions and just as repeated answers showing that
appellant understood his plea and its consequences, the trial
court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not a searching inquiry is
required in case of plea of guilty where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment?
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.),
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Doctrines:
1 A court-martial case is a criminal case and the
General Court Martial is a court akin to any other
courts. The General Court Martial is a court within
the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal
court. On that premise, certain provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for
Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article
 10 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 10. Offenses not
subject to the provisions of this Code.Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
2 A special law is defined as a penal law which
punishes acts not defined and penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. In the present case, petitioner
was charged with and convicted of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article
of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War, or
Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline, both of which are not defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The
corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court
Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at
hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore, absent any
provision as to the application of a criminal concept
in the implementation and execution of the General
Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be
applied.
3 Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles
of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long
line of decisions, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the states duly-constituted
authorities
Facts:
Major General Carlos Garcia of the AFP was charged in a
Court Martial for failure to disclose all his existing assets in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth
for the years 2002 and 2003. After six (6) years and two (2)
months of preventive confinement, Garcia was found guilty
of the charged offenses and was dishonorably discharged
from the service, forfeited all pay and allowances due and
confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority
may direct for a period of two (2) years.
Issue: WON the period of preventive confinement of Garcia
shall be credited to the sentence imposed by the court
martial.
Ruling: Yes. Applying the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the
sentence confirmed by the Office of the President. The period
of confinement of six years shall be credited in his favor and
deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was
sentenced.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondnet.
G.R. No. 176504, Spetember 03, 2008
ARTICLE
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is
qualified when it is, among others, committed with
grave abuse of confidence, to wit:
 ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of
theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed x x x with grave abuse
of confidence x x x.
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to
the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right
to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it.
Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees
higher than that specified in Article 309.
FACTS:
Ferdinand Cruz was a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone
Rentals, Inc., a corporation engaged in the lease of cellular
phones. He went to his office, obtained a pad of official
receipts from the collection officers table. He delivered the
communication equipment and received the PhP15,000.00
payment and issued a receipt even though he not authorized
to receive cash payments and issued receipts. He then failed
to deliver the cash to his office. When he was confronted,
Ferdinand admitted that he deposited the amount to his
personal bank account. He was instructed to remit the
amount which he failed to do claiming that the company has
paid his reimbursements.. The company sent a demand
letter which he answered stating that he already remitted the
amount to the accounting supervisor which the latter denied.
He refused to turn over the amount despite demands made
by the officers of the company which prompted the company
to file the a case of Estafa/Falsification of Documents.
According to the Information filed before the RTC of Makati,
Ferdinand Cruz as a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone
Rentals, Inc. had access to the funds of the corporation and
with grave abuse of confidence, steal and carry away the
amount of PhP15,000.00. He entered a plea of not guilty
during arraignment, and the witnesses for the prosecution
testified that he received the said amount from Hemisphere-
Leo Burnett and issued a receipt but failed to turn over the
amount to Porta-Phone Rentals. The prosecution changed
the case to Qualified Theft.
Ferdinand Cruz in his defense alleged that he issued an
acknowledgment receipt to Hemisphere and remitted the
amount to the accounting supervisor. He was asked by the
supervisor to sign the official receipt because he was the one
who closed the deal.
The RTC found Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT. He filed a Motion for
New Trial on the grounds of (1) absence of a preliminary
investigation for the crime of qualified theft and (2) newly
discovered evidence the testimony of a former employee of
Hemisphere testifying on Ferdinands signing of an
acknowledgment receipt. The RTC revived and reinstated the
conviction of Ferdinand. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
1 Whether Ferdinand was denied of due process when
he was indicted for qualified theft even as he was
initially investigated for estafa/falsification of
private documents.
2 Whether Ferdinands guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
3 Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
applied.
HELD:
1 Ferdinand was not denied of due process. The
settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the
charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to
 preliminary investigation and the right to question
any irregularity that surrounds it. In the instant case,
Ferdinand did not present evidence that
arraignment was forced upon him. On the contrary,
he voluntarily pleaded to the charge and actively
participated in the trial of the case
It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that
preliminary investigation on the charge of qualified
theft was not accorded him. The truth is, Ferdinand
was able to answer the initial charge of
estafa/falsification of private documents through his
counter-affidavits. Based on the same complaint
affidavit and the same sets of evidence presented by
the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it proper to
charge Ferdinand with qualified theft. Since the
same allegations and evidence were proffered by the
complainant in the qualified theft, there is no need
for Ferdinand to be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits anew, as he had already answered
said allegations when he submitted counter-
affidavits for the original indictment of
estafa/falsification of private documents.
2 The elements of the crime of theft are the following:
(1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking was
without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was
done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was
accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person or force upon things.12 Under
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is
qualified when it is, among others, committed with
grave abuse of confidence, to wit:
ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall
be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, if committed x x x with grave
abuse of confidence x x x.
The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of
doubt that Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen
thousand peso-collection from the companys client.
3 The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate
penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor as
minimum to 14 Years, 8 Months and 1 Day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher
than that specified in Article 309. Paragraph 1 of
Article 309 provides that if the value of the thing
stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. In this case, the
amount stolen was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher
than prision mayor minimum and medium is
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum shall be prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period or within the range of 10 years and
1 day to 14 years and 8 months. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the maximum period of
the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range
of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2
months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed
by the RTC is correct. However, the maximum
period imposed by RTC should be increased to 16
years, 5 months and 11 days.

Case No. 58
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LICERIO P.
SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON & ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
DOCTRINE & DECISION:
The crimes committed in these three cases are not
complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation
were committed. These are not cases where the execution of
a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or
where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used
to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate
offenses
In the instant case, the provincial , as the custodian
than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could
have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any
voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent
detection of the malversation.
Falsification and malversation did not constitute a
complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary
means for the committing malversations. Each falsification
and each malversation constituted independent offenses
which must be punished separately. The falsifications cannot
be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled
by a single criminal impulse. Each falsification of a voucher
constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers
constitutes six separate or distinct offenses. And each
misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher
constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were
committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the
said twelve offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was in possession of the forged
vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies
from the provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because
he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing
those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private
person conspiring with an accountable public officer in
committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.
FACTS:
In these three cases of malversation through
falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio
P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in
conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with
Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice,
used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
Paragraph 4 is a certification of Voucher No. 10724
dated February 28, 1969 certifying that the voucher has been
pre-audited and signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a
certification signed by the provincial treasurer that
the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's
certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown
below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. " It
may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of
the voucher.
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on
the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words:
"Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor,
Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of
malversation through falsification of public or official
documents
 Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his the present case, the prosecution merely proved that
criminal liability was dismissed. appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he
knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the
appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of
falsicification of public documents and six crimes of
malversation?

No Motive to "Kidnap"

Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNULFO
ASTORGA
G.R. No. 110097, 22 December 1997
becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial
or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime
has been committed or whether the accused has committed
it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct
evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, the identity of appellant is not
in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to
Maco Central Elementary School.

Introduction (Provisions involved, principles,

jurisprudence): Kidnapping or Coercion?

Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of The prosecution failed to prove one essential element of
kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this kidnapping the fact of detention or the deprivation of
liberty. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of kidnapping are as follows:
1 That the offender is a private individual.
2 That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3 That the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal.
4 That in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present:
1 That the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than five (5) days; or
2 That it committed simulating public
authority; or
3 That any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made;
or
4 That the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
uses the terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap"
(secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader
term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a
person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any
other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily
involve locking up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently,
the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the
English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution
witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of "locking up." It is
clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the
move. There is no actual confinement or restraint of the
victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take
Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. The
evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain
Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's
forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot
be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the
person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion
under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion
or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited
by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will,
be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is
effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of
another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged
and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to
Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
preventing Yvonne from going home.
While the accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation
as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge, they
met some group of youngsters-men and the said group was
suspicious about the man who was bringing a child, thus the
said group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked
fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he
carried the victim and ran but they were chased and were
overtaken.

Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions

with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were
bound and he answered towards Binuangan but the group
noticed something suspicious because their destination was
Brief facts: already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to
Binuangan.

While there was a brown out, accused or "Boy" Astorga told

Yvonne Traya, who was only eight (8) years old at that time Jonathan, one of those who chased, knew Yvonnes family
and who stays with her grandparents and so with her parents and he got from the accused Yvonne who showed some
at Sitio Binuangan, Maco, to go with him to buy candy and resistance, and the group brought the accused and Yvonne to
immediately grabbed and held Yvonnes hand as the latter Yvonnes home at Binuangan.
did not answer, placed his hand on her shoulder, covered her
mouth, and went and walked inside the compound of Maco
Elementary School, and later, there being no person around
the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked
towards the direction of Tagum which is the opposite
direction towards her grandparent's house at Binuangan,
Brief issues:
hence Yvonne cried and protested that she must go home but
the accused did not heed her plea.
Whether the accuseds motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya is
relevant to convict him for the crime of kidnapping. No,
motive is not relevant.
Whether Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or
deprived of her liberty so as not to convict the accused for the
crime of kidnapping but only for grave coercion. Yes!
ORTEGA V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)
ARTICLE 12 - EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Section 6 of RA 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility - A child
15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant
to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above 15 years but below 18 years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected
to an intervention program, unless he/she acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act
ORTEGA vs PEOPLEGR No. 151085August 20, 2008
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was
charged with the crime of rape
for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape
happened in 3 occasions. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape and is
sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law. At
the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years of
age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved from criminal
liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance
provided by the newly enacted law on minors in conflict with
law.
HELD
: Yes
RATIO
: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve
him from criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to
the accused, and is therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15 years of age in
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability,
but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal
liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability.
Section 64 of the newly enacted law also provides that cases of
children under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to
the appropriate local social welfare and development officer.
The Court therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega
is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local
social welfare and development officer of the locality for the
appropriate intervention program
Case No. 65
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRVIN
TADULAN y EPAN
G.R. No. 117407 | April 15, 1997
PADILLA, J.
DOCTRINE / RULING:
Alibi; It has been held time and again that for alibi to
prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so
far away that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this
case, however, it is not so situated, for according to him he
was at the plant of the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in
Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, which is but a few
kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same
municipality where the crime was committed.
Rape; Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victims
testimony by questioning her behavior after she was
allegedly raped. The court ruled that it is not proper to judge
the actions of children who have undergone traumatic
experience by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion
shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by the
calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect uniform reactions
from rape victims.It should be borne in mind, in this
connection, that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old
child when the crime was committed on her. She considered
the accused as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she
called him Tito Loloy.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: (A)s regards
the acts imputed to Estela, the delay of seven (7) days from
the date of her knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April
1992 in reporting to the authorities the rape of her daughter
is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps
she would take considering the delicate nature of the
problem they were facing (citing People v. Danguilan, 218
SCRA 98; People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179). Besides, we
have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the rape is not
indicative of fabricated charges.
Pardon; It is clear to the mind of this Court that the
complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be
granted not only by the parents of an offended minor but
also by the minor herself in order to be effective as an
express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G.
9460, we find the following words: Neither must we be
understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the
belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is
inefficacious. It was also held in another case, that The
express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of
a minor, granted by the latters parents, is not sufficient to
remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by
the express pardon of the girl herself. (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil.
360).
FACTS:
Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia
St., in Barangay Sumilang, Pasig, she resides with her
common-law husband and their minor daughter, Maristel
Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-
door apartment building, one unit of which was rented and
occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan
and their three children name Dianne, Angie and Bochoy
who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992
complainants daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine (9)
year old and was in grade school. She often played with the
accuseds children in the vicinity of their house and the
apartment building.
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed with a knife,
with lewd design and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Maristel Cruz, a
minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and against
her will.
Estela Santos immediately informed the wife of Irvin
Tadulan that her husband has raped her daughter. She
further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take
action against the latters husband if they would vacate the
apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with
Estela Santos and told her that she had driven away Irvin
Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed
to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos thereafter
noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to
the apartment unit every night despite the promise of his
wife that she herself would call the police should he ever
come back to the place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in disregarding the defense of
pardon and alibi of the accused?
PANAGUITON, JR. v. DOJ
Facts:
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money
from petitioner Panaguiton, Jr. On January 8, 1993, Cawili
and Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson) jointly issued in favor of
Panaguiton, Jr. three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Upon presentment for payment on March 18, 1993, the
checks were dishonored.
On August 24, 1995, Panaguiton, Jr. filed a complaint against
Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Bilang 22 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
However, on March 15, 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor
Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant
to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years
starting on the date the checks were dishonored (March 18,
1993) Panaguiton, Jr. appealed to the DOJ but it dismissed
the case on the same grounds of prescription.
The DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for
the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act,
does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines
and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of
the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder. The DOJ also cited the case
of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., wherein the SC ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's
office (administrative proceedings). Therefore, the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issues:
Whether or not the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326
Ruling:
NO.
As correctly stated by the DOJ, Act No. 3326 is the law
applicable to offenses under special laws which do not
provide for their own prescriptive periods. However, as ruled
in the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim, and Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al, the Court ruled that the prescriptive
period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. Although
Panaguiton, Jr. went through the proper channels, within the
prescribed periods, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed from the time he filed his complaint-affidavit up to
the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control. Notwithstanding whether or not the
proceeding is a judicial proceeding or an administrative
proceeding, Panaguiton, Jr.s filing of the complaint
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, ET AL.
Prescriptive period for Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019, as amended)
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended (Act
Establishing Prescriptive Periods for Violations of Special
Laws and Municipal Ordinances), which provides that
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. overwhelm
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed
prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the
government as the aggrieved party could not have known of
the violations at the time the questioned transactions were
made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19,
2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra,
Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.-Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (2001)
RULING: Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the
ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and
Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No.
3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, increased the prescriptive period from
ten to fifteen years.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, where the Court
held that it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived
or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the
same not be known' in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not
mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the crime 'is not
reasonably knowable' is unacceptable, as it provides an
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law,
which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and
thus provides no room for interpretation but only
application.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended,
provides that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person.
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in
1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 5, 1995, or within three (3) years from
the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was
well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
FACTS: On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans,
determine the parties involved and recommend whatever
appropriate actions to be pursued thereby and Memorandum
Order No. 61 expanded the functions of the Committee to
include the inventory and review of all non-performing
loans, whether behest or non-behest.
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical
Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between
Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) and
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Committee
classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and
inadequate collaterals after it had examined and studied all
the documents relative to the said loan transactions.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando
Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
the criminal complaint against respondents on April 5, 1995.
Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following
provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading
before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator
Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case
based on the available evidence. In a Resolution, GIO Diaz-
Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause
against the respondents and for prescription of the offense.
Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo, which was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the offense leveled against
respondents has prescribed.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G.R.
No. 158131
vs
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
August 8, 2007
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that SENCORs criminal liability
was not extinguished. The SC argued that for novation to
apply there must be an original contract to speak of. In this
case, the novation does not apply because there was no
original contract that can be replaced by a new contract
changing the object or principal condition of the original
contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or
subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
The Court observed that although novation is not one of the
means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of criminal liability
or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction, provided the novation takes place before the
filing of the Information with the trial court. In the case
People v. Nery, We held:
The novation theory may perhaps
apply prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court by the state prosecutors
because up to that time the original trust
relation may be converted by the parties into
an ordinary creditor-debtor situation,
thereby placing the complainant in estoppel
to insist on the original trust. But after the
justice authorities have taken cognizance of
the crime and instituted action in court, the
offended party may no longer divest the
prosecution of its power to exact the
criminal liability, as distinguished from the
civil. The crime being an offense against the
state, only the latter can renounce it.
It may be observed in this regard
that novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Penal Code whereby
criminal liability can be extinguished;
hence, the role of novation may only be to
either prevent the rise of criminal liability or
to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it
was such that its breach would not give rise
to penal responsibility, as when money
loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to.
FACTS
respondent Martels are directors of SENCOR, an
information technology firm. Petitioner is a government-
owned and controlled corporation mandated by its charter,
RA 1161, to provide financial benefits to private sector
employees. Petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors
Office a complaint against Martels and their five co-accused
for SENCORs non-payment of contributions. To pay this
amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a
parcel of land in Tagaytay City. Petitioner accepted the offer
 subject to the condition that respondent Martels will settle
their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through
cash settlement within a reasonable time. Thus, petitioner
withdrew its complaint but reserved its right to revive the
same in the event that no settlement is arrived at. In
December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner
offering, in lieu of the Tagaytay City property, computer-
related services. Petitioner filed with the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office another complaint against respondent
Martels for SENCORs non-remittance of contributions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the concept of novation serves to abate the
criminal liability of the respondents
Part I, Case No. 70
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official
capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006
Intro/Doctrine/Ruling:
Sec. 7 and 11 of RA 3019; Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326;
Article 91 of the RPC cannot be applied suppletorily to Act
No. 3326 because such Act is not a special law within the
ambit of Article 10 of the RPC.
1 Yes. Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses
punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. But prior to
the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg.
195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under the said statute was
only ten (10) years. Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by
the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same
shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses
allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from
March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made
to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of
prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under
special laws. Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive
period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery
thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint
filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
against the petitioner with the PCGG.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated
the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to
submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject
therein have already prescribed.
2 No. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period
shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person. However, there is no such proceeding
instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the
prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him. In
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner averred that PCGG
acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion
in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling
within its competence. This Court, in its resolve to deal with
the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes
petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to take declared
invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG
over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez.
 In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner assailed the
validity of the informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same
were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting
petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
cured by conducting another preliminary
investigation. An invalid information is no
information at all and cannot be the basis for
criminal proceedings.
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then
Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the
PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled.
In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could
have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
3 No. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription
shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive
period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Also, while it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code
makes the Code suppletory to special laws, Act No. 3326
cannot fall within the ambit of special law as contemplated
and used in Article 10 of the RPC because it does not define
any acts which are punishable and provides penalties for
them. Special law is defined as penal laws that punish acts
not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the
Philippines.
Thus, Art. 91 cannot apply suppletorily to Act No. 3326.
Facts: Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section
7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets
and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the
period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in
the DFA. He claims that the court should dismiss the
criminal cases pending against him on the ground of
prescription.
The Ombudsman and the PCGG argue that that the filing of
the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from
the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No.
3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to
run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the
Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative,
should be applied.
Issues: 1. Whether the offenses for which petitioner are
 being charged have already prescribed?
2 WON the filing of the complaint with the PCGG and
Sandiganbayan interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period?
3 WON Article 91 of the RPC applies suppletorily to Act No.
3326, such that it suspended the running of the prescriptive
period of 10 or 15 years in RA 3019?
Case #72.
People of the Philippines vs Vergara
GR No 177763; July 3, 2013
Doctrines:
Self-Defense, elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.
A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof.
He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the
most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim.
Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or
incomplete. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and
strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating
action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to ones life."
Treachery, how manifested: the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
Credibility of Witnesses:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness,
settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the
Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the
lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of
the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of
the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand,
and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth
or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Facts: Accused Vergara and Inocencio were charged of
murder qualified by treachery. Victim was allegedly stabbed
by the accused while the latter were causing some
disturbance in the street. Exchange of words lead to the
incident initiated by the accused and the retort of the victim
was not likened by the former.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused had basis to
interpose self-defense? No, the accused had no basis to
interpose self-defense. Elements are not all present. In fact,
the unlawful aggression came from the accused and not the
victim. The victim was passing in peace when they
approached him and initiated the act of killing causing the
life of the victim in peril.
2. Whether or not treachery is present? Yes, treachery
is present. Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging
words with the victim, threw his arm around the victims
shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally
unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and
severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that
he was rendered immobile and without any real opportunity
to defend himself other than feebly raising his arm to ward
off the attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TALARO ET. AL
G.R. No. 175781; March 20, 2012
Doctrine:
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation. The presence of any one of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is
sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.
In People v. Sanchez, the Court held that the essence of
treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.
There can be no cavil that the evidence on record shows
treachery in the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the
crime as murder. The assailant, identified as accused-
appellant Renato Ramos, just suddenly fired upon Atty.
Alipio at a very close distance, without any provocation from
said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with
some other people.
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence
shows that a couple of days before the actual shooting of
Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw and heard
accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos,
and Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and coming to
an agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants'
only defense is that the evidence is insufficient to prove they
are part of the conspiracy to commit the murder. Said
defense is sorely wanting when pitted against the
prosecution evidence.
In People v. Bautista, the Court reiterated the hornbook
principle of conspiracy, to wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by
such acts that they had the same purpose or common design
and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. It must be shown that all participants performed
specific acts which such closeness and coordination as to
indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the
original design. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been
established by the testimony of Raymundo Zamora,
positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones
he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro on April
24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of
P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who
demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio
had been killed.
Facts:
Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the
husband of Francisca Talaro. In the morning of April 24,
1994, when Zamora went home for breakfast after driving his
tricycle, he found Francisca Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato
Atong Ramos, and Norberto Jun Adviento conversing among
themselves. He heard that Francisca Talaro, was transacting
with the other three accused-appellants for the killing of
Atty. Melvin Alipio in consideration for a certain amount.
The three accused-appellants then nodded their heads in
agreement. After learning of the group's plan, Zamora got
scared and stayed away from the group, but three days after
that meeting in front of his house, he was asked by Francisca
Talaro to drive her and her husband Gregorio to Brgy.
Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place in Brgy.
Bactad, while Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely
waited for them. He assumed that the couple delivered the
payment to someone in Brgy. Bactad.
Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was
confined at the clinic, was sitting at a bench in the garage of
the clinic on the morning of April 26, 1994. Two other
women who were looking for Atty. Alipio also sat at the
bench with him after he told them that Atty. Alipio was still
having his breakfast. After a few minutes, a man arrived
looking for Dr. Alipio, and also sat at the bench. Thereafter,
Atty. Alipio came out to the garage and talked to the two
women. When Atty. Alipio finished talking to them, the man
sitting with them on the bench suddenly stood up and shot
Atty. Alipio three times. Atty. Alipio was merely one meter
away from the assailant when the latter shot him. After the
shooting, the assailant walked away. Hidalgo then saw the
helper at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but
the latter had whistled to his companion who was waiting on
his motorcycle and the two were able to speed away aboard
said vehicle. Hidalgo identified the assailant from a picture
shown to him.The picture was that of Renato Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not there was treachery, evident
premeditation and conspiracy in the given case.
DAYAP VS SENDIONG
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any
person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period. When such
reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in
the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon
the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods;
Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view
of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions
punishable by law committed either by means of deceit
(dolo) or fault (culpa). Thus, the penalty imposable upon
petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional
in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years).
FACTS:
Dayap allegedly drove in a reckless manner a 10-wheeler
cargo truck hitting an automobile driven by Sendiong who
was with two female passengers. Such incident caused the
death of Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the
bodies of the two female passengers and extensive damage to
the automobile. Hence, Dayap was charged with the crime of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to hear a criminal case
involving complex crimes such as reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property?
RULING:
NO. When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section
32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been
amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the
jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to
include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states
"that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for
reckless imprudence punishable with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods
should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and
not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try
the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have
original jurisdiction over the criminal case. Consequently,
the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken
cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were
valid and legal.
People vs Mamantak
GR no. 174659
July 28, 2008
Article 267 of the RPC
Facts:
Christopher, a two-year old minor, had disappeared from
mcdonalds in Binondo when his mom and his sister were
ordering from the counter. On February 25, 2001, Teresa
received a call from a woman and claimed to have custody of
Christopher and asked forP30,000 in exchange for the boy.
They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of
April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 ofthe RPC, as
amended by RA No. 7659?
Ruling: Yes
Kidnapping; Elements.The crime has the following
elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; not either
of the parents of the victim or a public officer who has a duty
under the law to detain a person; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4)
in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public official.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of
the accused to effect it; If the victim is a minor, or the victim
is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes
inconsequential.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY vs. TANGCO
GR No. 165732, December 14, 2006
Austria Martinez, J.:
DOCTRINE: An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where
the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
Provisions mentioned: Art. 2176, 2177 of the Civil
code, Article 103 of the RPC
FACTS:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline
Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of
the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was
stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from
her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her
in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six
minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide
against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806
and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right
to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The
RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of
Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal
to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification
as to the penalty in a Decision.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations
in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due
to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-
defense.
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It
rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense.
It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline
was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting
incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head
office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that
being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he
should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care
by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead
of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806;
and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in
the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be
jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while
it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised
care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings
and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated
under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the
protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their
servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that
such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied
with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16,
2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only
subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA
held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts,
but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been
found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment
and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in
the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction,
because said liability arises from the offense charged and no
other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed
extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a
pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability
arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good
father of a family in the employment and supervision of
employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities
based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the
civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint
or solidary.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the liability of
Safeguard Security is subsidiary
HELD:
YES. Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by
respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611
of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and
severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established
that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil
liability.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action
and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case
must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already
been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must
be governed by the Revised Penal Code
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where
the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
A reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are
invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for
their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under
Article 2176, Civil Code. The scope of Article 2176 is not
limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional.
In Elcano vs Hill, the court ruled that: Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law.
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from
the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one
based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by
law.
Since the civil liability was founded on a quasi-delict and not
from the crime of homicide. The liability of Safeguard
Security must be Solidary and not Subsidiary.
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias
CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC,
WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO
LIMAMA, Accused,
 JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias
CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT
SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc,
Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged with
double murder and double frustrated murder in an Amended
Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of
Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill with
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe
the house of Eugenio Santander resulting to death of
[Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and seriously
wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which
would have caused their death had there been no timely and
able medical assistance rendered to them, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended parties.
ISSUE:
WON: the crime committed is a complex crime
Rulings:
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of
double murder and double frustrated murder and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of death. It further ordered them
to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and
Rolly the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the
surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums
of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC. However, it found merit in appellants
argument that the crime committed could not have been a
complex crime since the death and injuries complained of
did not result from a single act but from several and distinct
acts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the
Amended Information and sufficiently proven during trial,
appellants should be convicted instead of two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Thus, in
rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA disposed
ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo
Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed
butmodified as follows
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and
Pasot Saloli, are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:
 a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x
x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa
Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and
[ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum; d.
Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel
Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and
ten (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All
accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Crisjoy Santander and Rolly
Santander the sum of P100,000.00 and the
surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel
Santander P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive
on the part of Jojo for committing the crime as well as
Pasots incredulous claim of ignorance on almost about
everything. It is well to note, however, that the said court
neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of
such motive nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone,
but upon the prosecution witnesses identification of
appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and
defense, we see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of
his defense, the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his
family was massacred by Jerry Santander, brother of
Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting
the crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored
ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos Santander but
also against their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the
Santander family has been established giving credence to
prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo
Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his
intention to wipe out the said family became even more
apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that
killed his family, he did not file any case against them. It was
only after he was arrested that he filed a complaint against
Jerry and Carlos Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the
Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out
the possibility that he could walk without crutches five
months after his discharge, the same was based on general
medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the
doctor himself that the healing period may vary depending
on the age and physical condition of the patient. Notably
Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by
Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander of all of the
accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding
Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of almost anything only
served to arouse incredulity. Both accused claimed they
could not read, write, tell time, day, month or year. Neither
could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which
is of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every
part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know what day
[it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after
that. Both claimed they did not know the complainants or of
the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are
belied by the evasiveness by which all three accused
answered in obvious effort to avoid criminal responsibility.
Behind the faade of ignorance and lack of education lurks a
calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence
to the accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness
characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the
face of the positive and spontaneous identification of the
assailants/accused by credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang
and Remigio Santander.15
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification
of the appellants considering that (1) Jerry was just six
meters away from them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry
was familiar with all the accused as most of them are his
relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was
small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the
positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve]
more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary
weight."19
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it
to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of a credible witness."20
There was conspiracy among the accused.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it."21 It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime.22"Conspiracy may be
shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest."23
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the
accused but there is a series of events that clearly established
conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with
firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime
scene. Third, when they were within close range of the
intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their
firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled
together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and
immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their
unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery
attended the commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods
orforms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself
arising from [any] defense which the offended party might
make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims of an
opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons.
This is considering that the victims were unaware that they
would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from
their firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness
of the attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof,
placed the [victims] x x x in such a position that they could
not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26
The crime committed is two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-
Appellant.
G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015 LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as
follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty
of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship
of the offender to the victim. 23 All the elements are present in
this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant,
his own son.
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating
circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was
proper.
FACTS:
The said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having
conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting
y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their residential
house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and
unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing
means, manner and form in the execution thereof which
tender directly and specially to insure its commission
without danger to the person of said accused, the result of
which attack was that said victim received multiple stab
wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous
death.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding
accused-appellant guilty of Parricide based on his verbal
admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that
accused-appellant's admission was inadmissible in evidence,
the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able to
establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator
of the brutal killing of his father.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure
to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in
his favor.