Republic of the Philippines an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as

SUPREME COURT attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Manila
In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments,
SECOND DIVISION Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmarias) specifically denied any
liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL), and set up
compulsory counterclaims against it.

G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT
LINES, LTD., respondents.
Sobrevias, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for
petitioner.
Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as
The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27,
1988. On that date APL presented its first witness whose
testimony was completed on November 12, 1988. The case was
reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2)
more witnesses in APL's behalf.
At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its
witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take
the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan
and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters
rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . "
Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that
since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu
thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by
Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center,
Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director
Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange
Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1,
Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of
the aforenamed persons . . . ."
The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a)
the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that
a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b)
issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the
witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a
witness must be taken orally in open court and not by
deposition."
Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through
various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which
APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its
counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this
Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from
the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance
with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts
or judicial bodies to course their requests through the
Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to
the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates
Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the
mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy
or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court
may be obtained.
By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the
incident in favor of APL, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies
of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H.
Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon
written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED.
The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director
Joaquin R. Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to
take down the deposition. Compliance with the
Rules on the taking of testimony by deposition
upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-
29 of Rule 24, Rules of Court is enjoined.
Let this Order be coursed through the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pursuant
to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 4
dated April 6, 1987.
The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being
the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take
the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by
deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by
serving cross-examination."
Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25,
1991 on the following grounds: (1) authority of the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been
established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules
of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's
articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such
authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission
without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is
taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4)
depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations
and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of
witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most
satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the
greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens."
By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was
denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of
arguments already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was
directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order
authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later
than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider
inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional
evidence by deposition."
Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just
described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the
orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain
the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable
damage and injury upon the petitioner."
After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division)
rendered judgment on September 23, 1992 denying Dasmarias
petition for certiorari and upholding the challenged orders of
the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmarias sought reconsideration
of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992.
Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It
has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the
Appellate Court's Decision of September 23, 1992 and
Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.
Dasmarias ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following
errors, to wit:
1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial
of the case, present its evidence by taking the
deposition of its witnesses in a foreign
jurisdiction before a private entity not
authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of
their oral examination in open Court considering
that:
a) the taking of deposition is a
mode of pretrial discovery to be
availed of before the action comes
to trial;
b) no urgent or compelling reason
has been shown to justify the
departure from the accepted and
usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open
court where their demeanor could
be observed by the trial judge;"
2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair
situation in allowing private respondent, a
foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present
its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses
 away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial
Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and
present its witnesses in open court subject to the
prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;"
and
3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . .
(APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign
jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in
view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a
private entity not authorized by law to take
depositions."
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended
as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the
knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in
some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other
modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for
admission by adverse party; production or inspection of
documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material
and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but
also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own
witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible
for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant
facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end
that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy
of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly
and completely laid before the Court, without omission or
suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties
as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts;
they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in
open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the
rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court.
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial
or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out
during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on
the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at
the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for
cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the
testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during
the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These
exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon
the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far
as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with
any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for
the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who
at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation, partnership, or association
which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any purpose
if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or
(2) that the witness if out of the province and at a
greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to
attend to testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice,
that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
with due regard to the importance of presenting
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court,
to allow the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in
evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is
relevant to the part introduced, and any party
may introduce any other parts.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the
deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of
evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against
 the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be
taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the
party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be
taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10,
Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the
deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or
under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be
taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already
been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the
deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines
or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any
intervention by the court in the process, all that is required
being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every
other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for
taking the deposition and the name and address of each person
to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular
class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The
court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to
"enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2)
"upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the
deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that
"certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be
"held with no one present except the parties to the action and
their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that
"it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or
party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where
the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously
it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. Section 12,
Rule 24 provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. A
commission or letters rogatory shall be issued
only when necessary or convenient, on
application and notice, and on such terms and
with such directions as are just and appropriate.
Officers may be designated in notices or
commissions either by name or descriptive title
and letters rogatory may be addressed "To the
Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the
country)."
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a
court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a
person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of
such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p.
415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory,
on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in
the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another,
requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon
interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a
witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to
whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing
Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just
quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . .
designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters
rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority
in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the
indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for
and issued only after a commission has been "returned
unexecuted" as is apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial
Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which
requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the
following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the
______ day of ______, 19__, to take the
testimony of (here name the witness or
witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in
which the testimony is to be taken), before
_________________ (name of officer),
was returned unexecuted by
__________________ on the ground that
____________, all of which more fully
appears from the certificate of said
__________ to said commission and made a
part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other
facts to show commission is inadequate or
cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a
commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director
Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H.
Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written
interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said Center may, "upon
request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate
of Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of
Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of
China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular
Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of
Annex N of the petition for review on certiorari) a prima
facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.
It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through
the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular
No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6,
1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign
Affairs directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all
requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing
abroad through the Department of Foreign Affairs" to enable it
and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the
matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the
interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.
Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the
commission on various grounds.
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a
foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of
its 'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is
that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by
authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in
which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with
the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to
which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will
be fully accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a
mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time
after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only
to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the
taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal
is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to
perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further
proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and
even during the process of execution of a final and executory
judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under
the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court
where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that
it is "inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in
the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its
witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge
while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses
in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions
of the Judge."
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could
be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the
deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying
eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of
any of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the
witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty
(50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured
by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is
unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied)
 is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95
Phil. 754).
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the
depositions of the witnesses in question only by written
interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them
by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and
answers and observations of the parties being recorded
stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the
determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial
Court for the condition that the deposition be taken "only
upon written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant
(Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that
opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the
defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral
examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the
depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the
adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the
deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there
conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct
said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.
because, as the record discloses, the motion for reconsideration
was filed by Dasmarias on June 25, 1991, twenty-five (25) days
after notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991
sought to be reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a
ground is incorrect. In the first place, it appears that there was a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, ending on June 25, 1991 which was however
not acted on or granted by the Court. More importantly, the
order sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order, in
respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the time
within which reconsideration thereof should be sought.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petition for review on certiorari. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

One other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 denying

Dasmarias motion for reconsideration of the earlier order
dated March 15, 1991 (allowing the taking of deposition by
commission) one of the reasons adduced by the Regional
Trial Court for the denial was that the motion had been "filed
out of time." Evidently, the Trial Court reached this conclusion
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE
GO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE
COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive
the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside
the February 19, 2008 Decision1 and November 28, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006 Order3 issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil
Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of the prosecutions
motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in
Laos, Cambodia.
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The
Information4 dated September 24, 2003, later amended5 on
September 14, 2004, reads:
"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd.
Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit:
all said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said Li Luen
Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery,
spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in
the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in
the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles,
Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the
amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and
Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a
FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well
knew that the same had been previously encumbered,
mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as
early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice
to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or
less."
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing
held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were
subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the
MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7 the MeTC
granted8 the motion after the prosecution complied with the
directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.
Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied,9 prompting petitioners to file a Petition for
Certiorari10 before the RTC.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and
declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11 The RTC held that
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in
civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a
specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the
taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases,
which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to
face.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration
through an Order dated March 5, 2006,12 the prosecution
elevated the case to the CA.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of
the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of
procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in
criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have
every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness
and make timely objections during the taking of the oral
deposition either through counsel or through the consular
officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition alleging that
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL IN ALLOWING
THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.
 II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE DEPOSITION TAKING OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA IS
AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO CONFRONT THE
SAID WITNESS FACE TO FACE.
III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
COMMITTED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT IN APPLYING THE RULES ON DEPOSITION-
TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO CRIMINAL CASES.
IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING
THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, OVERLOOKING THE
ESTABLISHED RULE THAT VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE
SIMILARLY COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable
Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court.13 This is true especially in criminal cases
where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face.
The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules
of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the
availability of conditional examination of witnesses both for
the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The
Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v.
Risos15 explicitly states that
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a
party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate
the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring
supplied)16
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows
the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person
authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country,
with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in
writing to the other party.17
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination
should be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of
the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend
the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice
shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness
must take place at no other place than the court where the case
is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders
granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping
before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We
quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of
advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides
that he should be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the
language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require
the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by
the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of
deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick
or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right
to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the
Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further
declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.20 (Underscoring supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made
explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well
as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a
Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed
allowable also under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness
has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of
Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the
rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot
Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in
criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no
less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right
to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses.
Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring
supplied)
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the
deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial and
confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be
accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and
raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same
manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the
face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the
presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a
witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence
of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo, 21 the
Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness
testifying in open court, thus:
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to
appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent",
according to an eminent authority, "demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being
gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination
which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting
of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also
the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it
enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced
upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that
the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will
reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and
his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his
character. These can only be observed by the judge if the
witness testifies orally in court. x x x"22 (Underscoring
supplied)1wphi1
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply
specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow
the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.23 The Court
explained in People v. Seneris24that the constitutional
requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge;
it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable
instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth;
and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness
and assess his credibility."25
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused
in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination,"26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the
use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American
case of Crawford v. Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had
expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation
requirement, thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to
confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the
rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
"reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-
law rule.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be
sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a
point on which there could be little dissent), but about how
reliability can best be determined." (Underscoring supplied)
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution
witness as sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC
Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the ruling in
the case of People v. Webb28 that the taking of an unavailable
witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the
use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which
needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law.29
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein
as the factual settings are not similar.1wphi1 The accused in
the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five
defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of
presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all
residents of the United States who could not be compelled by
subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion
of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition
taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we
sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking
on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the
procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of
deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence
for the defense.30
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the
complaining witness against the accused, the stringent
procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without
violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen
Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before
the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li
Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been
unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act
with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony
taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative
for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li
Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that
the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the
Philippines anytime without any definite date of return.
Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the
court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of
its cause is attributable to no other party.
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional
examination before the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming
sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its
own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on
depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution
must provide the accused every opportunity to take the
deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order
to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to
compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-
taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating
the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face
to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of
depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no
conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and
deposition.31

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable
prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order
allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to
take place in a venue other than the court where the case is
pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated
November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, THIRD DIVISION
Cambodia is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE G.R. No.
MANGUERRA and THE 152643 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25,
HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., 2000[3] granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras
Presiding Judge of Present: (Concepcions) motion to take deposition, and dated November
3, 2000[4] denying the motion for reconsideration of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and
, Branch 19, YNARES- Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
Petitioners, SANTIAGO, J.
, The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA- On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged
MARTINEZ, with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, CHICO-
information dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently
LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. NAZARIO, amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, NACHURA, Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,[5] arose from the falsification of
Respondents. and a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
REYES, JJ. respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the
owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo
Promulgated: property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the
criminal case.[6]
August 28, Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a
2008 resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was
unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------ upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in
------x Manila for further treatment.[7]

On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for

DECISION Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-
52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that
NACHURA, J.: Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration
of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. [8] On May 11,
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.[9]
Decision[1] dated August 15, 2001 and its
Resolution[2] dated March 12, 2002. The CA decision set aside
 This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil
action for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of
the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the
appellate court to date.[10]
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a
motion to take the latters deposition. [11] He explained the need
to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical
condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and
directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk
of Court of Makati City.[12] The respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3,
2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities
should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation,
since Concepcion was already of advanced age.[13]After several
motions for change of venue of the deposition-
taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence.[14]
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and
November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.[15]
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered
Decision[16] favorable to the respondents, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
and the August 25, 2000 and November 3,
2000 orders of the court a quo are hereby SET
ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been
taken on the authority of such void orders is
similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.[17]
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in
the respondents petition by not impleading the People of
the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding,
the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring
that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present
case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The
latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil
cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule
119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC
of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and
thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion. [18]
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, the CA added that the rationale of
the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same
court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the
witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded
that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the
situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of
a the rules of criminal procedure.[19]
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
 WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES TO
THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM
A CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A
WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.[20]
It is undisputed that in their petition
for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the
petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners
(respondents herein) to implead the People of
the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the
Solicitor General to comment on the petition.[21]
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to
implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be
added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.[22]
In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing
the petition to proceed, in the interest of substantial
justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-
joinder of the People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it
managed, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to file its
Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was
given the opportunity to refute the respondents arguments.
Instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Commissioner
Domingo v. Scheer[23] in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or
pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice
to the rival claims of contending parties. They
were created, not to hinder and delay, but to
facilitate and promote, the administration of
justice. They do not constitute the thing itself,
which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the means best
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words,
they are a means to an end. When they lose the
character of the one and become the other, the
administration of justice is at fault and courts
are correspondingly remiss in the performance
of their obvious duty.[24]
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on
the merits despite the procedural defect.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court applies to the instant case, we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the
trial of the case in the presence of the judge. [25] This is especially
true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. [26] It
also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound
such questions as they deem material and necessary to support
their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
[27]
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses
demeanor.[28]
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to
28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12,[29] 13[30] and 15,[31] Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a
prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too
sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of
Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that
a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of
the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served
on him, shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal
of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to
exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the
ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the
same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may
be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus,
when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she
not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial
court, she would have been compelled to appear before the
court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the
case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination
be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules
mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in
granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her
deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA
answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the
taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City
erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that
the same be made before the court where the case is
pending.Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its
ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness
which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the
previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of
the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if
not practicable, a member of the Bar in good
standing so designated by the judge in the order,
or, if the order be made by a court of superior
jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be
designated therein, the examination of a witness
for the prosecution under Section 15 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December
1, 2000) may be done only before the court
where the case is pending.[32]
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional
examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the
court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners
contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be
interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases
where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and
not when he is kilometers away, as in the present
case.Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules)
qualifications not contemplated.[33] When the words are clear
and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is
only room for application.[34]
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant
case, because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to
criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the
rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings
are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this
rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is
under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures
that the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment
to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the
prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its
witness testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules
which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the
general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside
of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision and Resolution dated August 25,
2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
62551, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118438. December 4, 1998]
ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CHERRY
VALLEY FARMS LIMITED, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.
assails in this petition the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by Cherry Valley Farms
Limited based on the implied admissions of petitioner.
On 14 October 1986 respondent Cherry Valley Farms
Limited (CHERRY VALLEY), a foreign company based in
England, filed against petitioner Allied Agri-Business
Development Co. Inc. (ALLIED) a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for collection of sum of money
alleging, among others that: (a) CHERRY VALLEY is a foreign
corporation with principal office at Rothwell, Lincoln, England;
(b) on 1 September 1982 up to 16 February 1983, or for a period
of less than six (6) months, petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten
(10) separate orders and received from respondent CHERRY
VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and ducklings which in
value totaled 51,245.12; (c) ALLIED did not pay the total
purchase price of 51,245.12 despite repeated demands
evidenced by a letter of Solicitor Braithwaite of England in
behalf of CHERRY VALLEY; (d) instead of paying its obligation,
ALLIED through its president wrote CHERRY VALLEY on 17
July 1985 inviting the latter to be a stockholder in a new
corporation to be formed by ALLIED, which invitation however
was rejected by CHERRY VALLEY on 26 September 1985; and,
(e) ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly
acknowledged through a letter of 8 October 1985 the obligation
of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY. The complaint also
prayed that ALLIED be made to pay the sum of 51,245.12 or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment, plus legal interest from
date of filing of the complaint until full payment, and twenty
percent (20%) of the total amount being claimed from
petitioner as attorneys fees; and, to pay the costs of suit.
On 27 February 1986 ALLIED filed an answer [1] denying
the material allegations of the complaint and contended
that: (a) private respondent CHERRY VALLEY lacked the legal
capacity to sue; (b) the letter of Quintos to CHERRY VALLEY
was never authorized by the board of petitioner ALLIED, thus
any admission made in that letter could not bind ALLIED; (c)
the alleged amount of 51,245.12 did not represent the true and
real obligation, if any, of petitioner; (d) to the best of the
knowledge of ALLIED, not all ducks and ducklings covered and
represented by CHERRY VALLEYs invoices were actually
ordered by the former; and, (e) private respondent had no
cause of action against petitioner.
On 19 July 1988, CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIEDs
counsel a Request for Admission[2] dated 15 July 1988 worded
as follows:
1. That the chairman of the board of directors and president of
your corporation is Mr. Ricardo V. Quintos;
2. That out of the 3,000,000 subscribed shares of stock,
1,496,000 shares is (sic) owned by Mr. Ricardo Quintos and
1,432,000 shares is(sic) also owned by his wife, Agnes dela
Torre;
3. That for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September
1982, your corporation ordered and received from CHERRY
VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings with a total value of 51,245.12
as reflected on CHERRY VALLEY invoices issued to you;
4. That you received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from Mr.
P.R.C. Braithwaite, solicitor of CHERRY VALLEY, demanding
settlement of your unpaid account of 52,245.12 for the above-
stated purchases;
5. That instead of paying your obligation to CHERRY VALLEY,
Mr. Ricardo Quintos, in his capacity as president of your
corporation, sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY dated 17 July
1985 proposing the setting up of a new corporation with
CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your proposal;
6. That you received a letter dated 26 September 1985 from Mr.
J. Cross, Director and Secretary of CHERRY VALLEY refusing
acceptance of your proposal;
7. That Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a letter dated 8 October 1985
admitted your indebtedness in the sum of English Sterling
Pounds 51,245.12.
It is further requested that said sworn admission be made
within 10 days from receipt of this request.
ALLIED filed its Comments/Objections[3] alleging that: (a)
the admissions requested were matters which the private
respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness
during the trial and thus petitioner need not answer; and, (b)
the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of
petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not
having been pleaded in the complaint.
In its Reply[4] to Comments/Objections to Request for
Admission, CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no
need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters
requested for admission, for these pertained to incidents
personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner
alone. Thereafter, on 2 August 1998, CHERRY VALLEY filed a
motion with the trial court to resolve the objections of ALLIED
to the request for admission.
On 11 August 1988 the trial court issued an
Order[5] disregarding ALLIEDs Comments/Objections to
Request for Admission in view of its non-compliance with Sec.
2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to
answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained in the
request would be deemed admitted. ALLIED moved to
reconsider the order; however, on 8 November 1988 the lower
court denied[6]ALLIEDs motion for reconsideration and
directed the latter to answer the request for admission within a
nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the order.
 ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the request for
admission within the additional period of five (5) days granted
by the trial court. Hence, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion for
summary judgment[7] alleging that there was already an implied
admission on the matters requested for admission pursuant to
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
On 23 October 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment[8] against petitioner: (a) Ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff the sum of -51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the
time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this
complaint until fully paid; and, (b) Ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from
defendant by way of attorneys fees since no protracted trial was
held in this case, plus cost of suit.
ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 6 September
1994 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [9] affirming the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court with the
modification that ALLIED should pay the monetary award to
CHERRY VALLEY in Philippine currency and that the award of
attorneys fees and costs of suit be deleted.
Hence, the instant petition by ALLIED alleging that serious
errors were committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming the
summary judgment of the trial court; that the complaint should
have been instantly dismissed on the ground of lack of
personality to sue on the part of respondent CHERRY VALLEY;
that the summary judgment was tantamount to a denial of
ALLIEDs right to due process for not requiring CHERRY
VALLEY to produce its own witness; and, that the admission
requested were matters which CHERRY VALLEY had the
burden to prove during the trial.
The petition must fail. We cannot sustain the allegation
that respondent CHERRY VALLEY being an unlicensed foreign
corporation lacked the legal capacity to institute the suit in the
trial court for the recovery of money claims from petitioner. In
fact, petitioner is estopped from challenging or questioning the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the
same by entering into a contract with it.[10] The doctrine of lack
of capacity to sue or failure of a foreign corporation to acquire a
local license was never intended to favor domestic corporations
who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms
and then repudiate their obligations simply because the latter
are not licensed to do business in this country.[11]
Petitioner cannot also successfully argue that its failure to
answer the request for admission did not result in its admission
of the matters stated in the request. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Request for admission. - At any time after issues
have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described
in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material
and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies
have already been furnished.
 The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission
of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to
relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be
disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission
is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a period
designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen
(15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as
the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request
is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters.[12] Upon service of request for admission, the
party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit
each of the matters of which an admission is requested, in
which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the
truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving
upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters
within the period stated in the request, which must not be less
than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as
the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a
sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an
admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is
requested.[13]
The records show that although petitioner filed with the
trial court its comments and objections to the request for
admission served on it by private respondent, the trial court
disregarded the objections and directed petitioner after denying
its motion for reconsideration, to answer the request within five
(5) days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the matters of
which the admission was requested would be deemed
admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the required answer
within the period. The matter set forth in the request were
therefore deemed admitted by petitioner, i.e., (a) that for a
period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982,
petitioner ordered and received from respondent CHERRY
VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings amounting to 51,245.12; (b)
that petitioner received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from
private respondents lawyer demanding payment of the amount
of the purchases; (c) that instead of paying the obligation to
respondent CHERRY VALLEY, petitioners president Ricardo
Quintos sent a letter to the former proposing the establishment
of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY as one of the
stockholders; (d) that the proposal was refused by the Director
of CHERRY VALLEY; and, (e) that petitioners president
Ricardo Quintos admitted the indebtedness of his corporation
to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling Pounds
51,245.12.
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon
whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon
the party seeking the admission.[14] Hence, when petitioner
failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the
adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be
admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated
in the request.[15]
 This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment
filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that there
were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations
of the complaint were not disputed was correctlygranted by the
trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be
granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a partys
failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission
show that no material issue of fact exists. [16] By its failure to
answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has
admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against
itself.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1994
which AFFIRMED the trial court in "ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the sum of 51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the time
of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this
complaint until fully paid;" and "ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from
defendant by way of attorney's fees since no protacted trial was
held in this case plus cost of suit," with the modification that
"Allied shall pay the monetary award of attorney's fees and
costs of suit be deleted," is AFFIRMED. Costs against herein
petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development Co., Inc.
SO ORDERED.
SYNOPSIS
Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide,
filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to take
the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S.,
before the proper Philippine consular authorities. The trial
court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals allowed the
same.
The only reason why respondent was seeking the
deposition of the foreign witnesses was to foreclose any
objection to the admissibility of two defense exhibits which had
already been admitted. Further, the evidence sought to be
obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous
as there are exhibits of the same species previously introduced
and admitted in evidence by the trial court. Hence, the same
would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and will
not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence
already in hand. The use of discovery procedures is directed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. Here, the Court found no
indication of grave abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEPOSITIONS;
ELUCIDATED.- As defined, a deposition is - The
testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written
interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a
commission to take testimony issued by a court, or under a
general law or court rule on the subject, and reduced to
writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in
preparation and upon the trial of a civil or criminal
prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one
party (through his or her attorney) asks oral questions of
the other party or of a witness for the other party. The
person who is deposed is called the deponent. The
deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court
room, usually in one of the lawyers offices. A transcript -
word for word account - is made of the deposition.
Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing, under oath or
affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to
questions or interrogatories x x x. and the purposes of
taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the
parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and
preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of
detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and
defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and
inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved
except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in
advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite
litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent
delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite
and facilitate both preparation and trial. As can be gleaned
from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature
as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not
during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly
on the defense of alibi, which is respondents main defense
in the criminal proceedings against him in the court below
- states that when a person intends to rely on such a
defense, that person must move for the taking of the
deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for
filing a pre-trial motion.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO STOP
FURTHER EVIDENCE.- Considering the factual
circumstances of the case, the depositions proposed to be
taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely
corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying
respondents motion to take them, the trial court was but
exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a
superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction
thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the
evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears
stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court: SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further
evidence. x x x The court may stop the introduction of
further testimony upon any particular point when the
evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to
the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be
additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. Needless to state, the trial court can
not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondents
motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the
case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not
feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to
present his side. It must be borne in mind in this regard
that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed,
the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused.
 Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; NOT COMMITTED IN THE DENIAL
OF MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY ORAL
DEPOSITION IN CASE AT BAR.- The use of discovery
procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. The deposition taking can not be based nor can it be
denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in
a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of
the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying
the motion of respondent accused, the trial judge acted in a
biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave
abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious, and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in
contemplation of law. Whether or not the respondent-
accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his
innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of
proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in the first
instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. If there
has been no grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction
may this Court examine such matters further. It is pointed
out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-
seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464)
documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as
those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign
deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the
proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of
discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter
sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly
add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
NOT COMMITTED IN THE DENIAL OF MOTION
TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY ORAL DEPOSITION IN
CASE AT BAR.- I fully concur with the majority that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the application of the defense for the taking by
depositions of the testimony of its witnesses who are
residents of the United States of America. Since the trial
court had already admitted the exhibits on which the said
witnesses would have testified, the taking of the
depositions would have been unnecessary.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS OF
WITNESSES RESIDING ABROAD IN CRIMINAL
CASES BEFORE THE PHILIPPINE COURTS MUST
BE ALLOWED.- Whether the taking of the depositions of
witnesses may be allowed in criminal cases before the
Philippine courts must be squarely resolved. I take an
affirmative stand on the issue. For one, we have Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the Application for examination of witness for accused
before trial and Examination of defense witness; how
made, respectively. These Sections refer to the conditional
examination of defense witnesses, which is one mode of
perpetuating testimony available to the accused
(REGALADO F.D., REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM,
vol.2, 1995 ed., 428). This deposition, being to perpetuate
testimony, may be done before the commencement of the
trial state, or anytime thereafter, as the need there for
arises, but before the promulgation of judgment. Then, too,
there is Section 7 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court, which
provides for Depositions pending appeal applies to
criminal cases. (REGALADO F.D., REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, vol. 1, 1997 ed., 322). According to Justice
Regalado the procedure in Section 7 is available in all
actions, including criminal cases. Thus, the ruling in the
case of Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (225 SCRA 622, 634 [1993]), is applicable in the
case at bar, to wit: x x x. Depositions may be taken at any
time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary
or convenient. There is no rule that limits depositions-
taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-
trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of
witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the
judgment of a Regional Trial Court to perpetuate their
testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the
said court (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the
process of execution of a final and executory
judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521,
5440). And more importantly, deposition in criminal cases
of a witness for the defense who is residing abroad must be
allowed. Involved in a criminal case is not just the status or
the property of the defendant, but the life or limb or the
liberty of the accused. If, then, a deposition is allowed for a
witness in a civil case, then it is with more reason that it be
allowed in a criminal case; its denial would amount to a
deprivation of due process and to the accuseds right to
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
in his favor, which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
(Sections 1 and 14(2), Article III, Constitution).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST
BE APPLIED ON HOW TO DO THE SAME.- As to
how to take the testimony of a defense witness who is
unable to come to testify in open court because he is a
resident of a foreign country, I respectfully submit,
however, that the rule on the matter under Rules on Civil
Procedure may be applied suppletorily. Section 11 of Rule
23 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure which provides
for Persons before whom depositions may be taken in
foreign countries. There are provisions of the Rule on Civil
Procedure which have been made applicable in criminal
cases. For one, as earlier mentioned, Section 7 of Rule 24 is
applicable in criminal cases. See also the instances allowed
in Caos v. Peralta, (115 SCRA 843
[1982]); Naguiat V. IntermediateAppellate Court, (164
SCRA 505 [1988]); and Cojuangco v. Court of
Appeals, (203 SCRA 619 [1991]). Also, an authority on
criminal procedure asserts that in all matters not
 specifically touched on by Section 6 and the preceding
Sections of Rule 119, Rule 24, Rules of Court, ante, applies
in a suppletory character, since the taking of depositions
under Rule 24 and conditional examination of defense
witnesses under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 119, supra, are
taken under the same circumstances and for the same
purpose; that is, the preservation of a material witness
testimony. (PAMARAN, THE 1985 RULES IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 1998 ed., 402). Finally,
Section 6 of Rule 1 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure
(formerly Sec. 2, Rule I of the 1964 Rules of Court),
expressly provides that the rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
PUNO, J., concurring opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; NOT COMMITTED IN
THE DENIAL OF MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY
BY ORAL DEPOSITION IN CASE AT BAR.- I agree
that respondent Webbs Motion to Take Testimony by Oral
Deposition was correctly denied by the trial court on the
ground of lack of necessity. The only reason for the filing of
the motion is to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of,
as the case may be, the admissibility of defense Exhibits
218 and 219. It appears that said Exhibits 218 and 219 have
already been admitted by the trial court.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; DISCOVERY PROCEDURES IN
CRIMINAL CASES; TO STRENGTHEN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO DUE
PROCESS.- I write this opinion to complement the
learned opinion of our Chief Justice. Thus, this Court has
given an expensive interpretation of the right of an accused
to discovery procedure. In the first Webb case, we held: x x
x. This failure to provide discovery procedure during
preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its
use by a person under investigation when indispensable
to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and
property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a
stage to guard against any significant erosion of the
constitutional right to due process of a potential
accused. x x x We uphold the legal basis of the right of
petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the
original copy of the April28, 1995 sworn statement of
Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary
investigation considering their exculpatory character,
and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their
probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional
protection of due process which we rule to be operational
even during the preliminary investigation to a potential
accused. x x x Upon assumption of office, our present Chief
Justice vowed to have a court that is pro-active, a stance
that will surely promote rights more than authority. I am
sure such a stance will quicken moves to liberalize further
our rules on criminal procedure on the matter of discovery
and deposition taking as to strengthen the constitutional
right to due process of an accused.
 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Office for private
respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132577. August 17, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399
entitled Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, People of the Philippines and Lauro
Vizconde which set aside the order of respondent judge therein
denying herein respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webbs request to
take the depositions of five (5) citizens and residents of the
United States before the proper consular officer of the
Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may
be.
The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of
record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused
in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide
entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et
al. presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque, presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court,
respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony
By Oral Deposition[1] praying that he be allowed to take the
testimonies of the following:
1.] Steven Bucher
Acting Chief, Records Services Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20536
U.S.A. 210 South Glasell, City of Orange

2.] Debora Farmer California, 92666

Records Operations, Office of Records U.S.A.

U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington D.C.
before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent
of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in
court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the
United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena
to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.

U.S.A. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral

depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
3.] Jaci Alston testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to
establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by
Department of Motor Vehicles Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that:
Sacramento, California
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a
U.S.A. motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
4.] Ami Smalley may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
Department of Motor Vehicles notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
Sacramento, California
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose
U.S.A. of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent
as a witness;
5.] John Pavlisin
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of
taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province
and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering
the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it
which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may
introduce any other parts. (italics supplied).
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said
motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused,
has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of
discovery, only provides for conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule
119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does
not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.[2]
In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the
motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not
allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Court.[3]
A motion for reconsideration[4] thereto on the grounds
that: 1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of
depositions, and 2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of
Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign
countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, was likewise
denied by the trial court in an order dated July 25, 1997. [5]
Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari[6] naming as
respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino,
the People and private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In the
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399, respondent Webb
argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is
applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral
testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular
officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.]
He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to
support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his
constitutional right to due process.
Commenting[7] on the petition, the People contended that
the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well within the
sphere of her judicial discretion and do not constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and that if at all, they may be considered merely as errors of
judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due time
because: a.] The motion failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.] The conditional
examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and c.]
The examination of the witnesses must be done in open court.
In his Comment,[8] private respondent Lauro Vizconde
sought the dismissal of the petition contending that:
1.] The public respondent did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein
respondent] Webbs motion to take testimony by
oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration dated 23
June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of
Court.
a.] The public respondent correctly held that
Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure finds no application in criminal actions
such as the case at bar.
b.] The public respondent correctly ruled
that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure only provides for conditional
examination of witnesses before trial but not during
trial.
c.] The public respondent correctly ruled
that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
does not sanction the conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused/defense outside of
Philippine jurisdiction.
2.] The public respondent did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webbs
motion to take testimony by oral deposition
considering that the proposed deposition tends
only to further establish the admissibility of
documentary exhibits already admitted in
evidence by the public respondent.
On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division [9] of the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment,[10] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of
respondent judge dated 11 June 1997 (Annex A of the Petition)
and 25 July 1997 (Annex B of the Petition) are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby ordered that the
deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the
proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in
Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be:
(a) Mr. Steven Bucher;
(b) Ms. Deborah Farmer;
(c) Mr. Jaci Alston;
(d) Ms. Ami Smalley; and
(e) Mr. John Pavlisin.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause
to this Court by way of the instant petition dispensing with the
filing of a motion for reconsideration for the following
reasons: 1.] The rule that the petitioner should first file a
motion for reconsideration applies to the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and there is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a
final judgment or order[11] such as the present appeal
by certiorari; 2.] Section 4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for
review on certiorari which indicates that when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed implies that
petitioner need not file a motion for reconsideration; 3.] The
questions being raised before the Court are the same as those
which were squarely raised before the Court of Appeals; [12] 4.]
The issues being raised here are purely legal; [13] 5.] There is an
urgent need to resolve the issues considering that the trial of
the accused in the criminal case is about to end; and, 6.] The
nature of this case requires a speedy and prompt disposition of
the issues involved.[14]
What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory
orders and not a final judgment. The respondent has filed his
Comment[15] which We treat as an Answer. The petitioner, in
turn, filed a Reply.[16] The petition is ripe for decision.
In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over
the assailed decision of the Appellate Court, petitioner asserts
that the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible
error
I
IN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS.
II
IN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN
BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES RESIDE OR ARE
OFFICIALLY STATIONED.
III
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.
which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not
the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the
motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United
States which would be used in the criminal case before her
Court.
In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate
Courts Fourth Division reasoned, inter alia, thus:
Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of
procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Thus, as the Supreme Court
has ruled in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General and
reiterated in subsequent cases:
x x x The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that
which give the opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the
most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to
transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the
parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to
restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but
to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in
passing that the most salient objection which can be urged
against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the
courts powers by technicalities that part of its authority
effective for justice between the parties is many times an
inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of the contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which the courts are always striving to
secure the litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to
obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is
the means by which the powers of the court are made effective
in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and
takes on the other [,] the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism.[17]
In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds
that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in
denying the motion to take the deposition of the witnesses for
petitioner. While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which is found under the general
classification of Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its
application to the other proceedings, provided the same is not
contrary to the specific rules provided therein. Indeed, the
Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as a whole, and if
the Supreme Court had compartmentalized the same into four
divisions, it was, as petitioner had claimed, for the purpose of
organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.
To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure,
specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis--vis Section 1, Rule 23
would reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application
of the latter rule in criminal proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119
refers to the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the
taking of deposition witnesses during trial. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly
provided [for] under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we find
no reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the
same in the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23
under the circumstances of the case. To disallow petitioner to
avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would
deny him the opportunity to adequately defend himself
against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now
pending before the public respondent and, further, [it] loses
sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
xxxxxxxxx
Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively
applied to civil actions, the taking of the deposition of
petitioners US-based witnesses should be still allowed
considering that the civil action has been impliedly instituted
in the criminal action for rape with homicide. Since public
respondent has jurisdiction over the civil case to recover
damages, she exercised full authority to employ all auxillary
writs, processes and other means to carry out the jurisdiction
conferred and [to] adopt any suitable process or mode of
proceeding which includes the application of the rule on
depositions pending action under Rule 23 in the case pending
before her.
Second. Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or
country may be taken before a consular officer of the Republic
of the Philippines where the deponent resides or is officially
stationed.[18] Section 5, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is thus
clearly inapplicable in the instant case since the same relates
to the examination of witnesses under Section 4 thereof and
not Section 1 of Rule 23. Consistent with the procedure
provided [for] under Rule 23, the deposition of the petitioners
witnesses, which include four (4) officials of the United States
government, will be taken before a consular officer of the
Philippines where these witnesses reside or are officially
stationed, as the case may be.
The denial of petitioners right to present his witnesses, who
are residing abroad, based on a very shaky technical ground,
is tantamount to depriving him of his constitutional right to
due process. This Court recognizes the impossibility of
enforcing the right of petitioner to secure the attendance of the
proposed witnesses through compulsory process considering
that they are beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine
Courts. Petitioner, however, is not without any remedy and he
correctly sought to secure the testimonies of his witnesses
through the process of taking their depositions pending the
trial of Criminal Case No. 95-404 in the court below under
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the prosecution
would have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for
accused Hubert Webb (petitioner herein) since they will be
given the opportunity to cross-examine the deponents as in
accordance with Sections 3 to 18 of Rule 132.[19]
Furthermore, no prejudice would be suffered in the taking of
the depositions of petitioners US-based witness[es]. On the
other hand, a denial of the same would be prejudicial to
petitioner-accused since he would be denied an opportunity to
completely present his evidence, which strikes at the very core
of the due process guarantee of the Constitution. To reiterate,
it is not the function of this Court to second-guess the trial
court on its ruling on the admissibility of the pieces of
documentary evidence as well as the latters witnesses, [20] but it
is definitely within this courts inherent power to scrutinize, as
it does in the case at bench, the acts of respondent judge and
declare that she indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned Orders.
In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial of the
deposition-taking amounts to the denial of the constitutional
right to present his evidence and for the production of
evidence in his behalf. The denial is not justified by the flimsy
reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to criminal proceedings. To rule that petitioner
cannot take the testimony of these witnesses by deposition is to
put [a] premium on technicality at the expense of the
constitutional rights of the accused, which this court is not
inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner is bound to hinge heavily upon the
testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public
respondent not only to guarantee that accused is given a
reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to
allow him a certain latitude in the presentation of his
evidence, lest he may be so hampered that the ends of justice
may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. Finally,
even if respondents contention is correct, it cannot be denied
that the case at bar includes the recovery of the civil liability of
the accused, which normally is done through a civil case.
We disagree.
As defined, a deposition is -
"The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written
interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a
commission to take testimony issued by a court, or under a
general law or court rule on the subject, and reduced to writing
and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in
preparation and upon the trial of a civil or criminal
prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party
(through his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other
party or of a witness for the other party. The person who is
deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted
under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the
lawyers offices. A transcript - word for word account - is made
of the deposition.Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in
answer to questions or interrogatories x x x.[21]
and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater
assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means
of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses;
3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great
difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging
settlements; 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against
surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues;
and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial. [22] As
can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with
its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and
not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly
on the defense of alibi, which is respondents main defense in
the criminal proceedings against him in the court below - states
that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that
person must move for the taking of the deposition of his
witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial
motion.[23]
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent
for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is to
foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be,
the admissibility of Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This issue
has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by the
admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the
trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.[24]
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that
the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking
would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful
examination of Exhibits 218 and 219 readily shows that these
are of the same species of documents which have been
previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial
court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb,
et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al. [25] wherein We pointed
out, among others, [t]hat respondent judge reversed this
erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of
evidence after finding that the defects in (their) admissibility
have been cured though the introduction of additional evidence
during the trial on the merits.[26]
Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit 218-A which is a U.S.
Department of State Certification issued by Joan C. Hampton,
Assistant Authenticating Officer of the said agency, for and in
the name of Madeleine K. Albright, stating that the documents
annexed thereto were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice
as shown by seal embossed thereon, [27] with other exhibits
previously offered as evidence reveals that they are of the same
nature as Exhibits 42-H[28] and 42-M.[29] The only difference in
the documents lies in the fact that Exhibit 218-A was signed by
Joan C. Hampton for and in behalf of the incumbent Secretary
of State, Madeleine K. Albright whereas, Exhibits 42-H and 42-
M were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for
and in behalf of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
[30]
A comparison of Exhibit 218-B[31] with the other
documentary exhibits offered by respondent, likewise discloses
that its contents are the same as Exhibits 42-I [32] and 42-N.
[33]
The only difference in the three exhibits, which are actually
standard issue certification forms issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice with blanks to be filled up, is that Exhibit
218-B is dated February 5, 1997 and signed by one of the U.S.
Attorney Generals several Deputy Assistant Attorneys for
Administration for and in her behalf, while Exhibits 42-I and
42-N are both dated September 21, 1995 with another of the
said deputies signing both documents.[34]
Still comparing respondents Exhibit 218-F, [35] which is
likewise a standard issue U.S. Department of Justice
Certification Form, with other documents previously
introduced as evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits
39-D[36] and 42-C.[37] The only differences in these documents
are that Exhibit 218-F is dated October 13, 1995 and is signed
by Debora A. Farmer while Exhibits "-39-D and 42-C are both
dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G. Christian, Jr.,
Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS. [38]
Still further scrutinizing and comparing respondents
Exhibit 218-G[39] which was also introduced and admitted into
evidence as Defense Exhibit 207-B[40] shows that the document
has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by the
trial court an astounding seven (7) times, particularly as
Exhibits 34-A, 35-F, 39-E, 42-D, 42-P, 50 and 50-F.[41] The only
difference in these documents is that they were printed on
different dates. Specifically, Exhibits 218-G as with Exhibits 34-
A, 35-F, 50, and 52-F were printed out on October 26,
1995[42] whereas Exhibit 207-B as with Exhibits 39-E, 42-D and
42-F were printed out on August 31, 1995.[43]
In fact, the records show that respondents: a.] application
for Non-Commercial Drivers License; b.] Documentary records
based on Clets Database Response; c.] Computer-generated
thumb-print; d.] Documentary records based on still another
Clets Database Response, and e.] The Certification issued by
one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of Californias
Department of Motor Vehicles, were already introduced and
admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits 66-J, 66-K, 66-H,
66-I and 66-L, respectively.[44]
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual
circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable fact
that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S.
based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in
nature and in denying respondents motion to take them, the
trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived
to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction
thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the
evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing
that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court
may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so
full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.
(emphasis and italics supplied.)
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with
lack of caution in denying respondents motion considering that
under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more
than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense.
Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he
had the opportunity to present his side. [45] It must be borne in
mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the
defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as
the accused.[46] Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.[47]
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.[48] The deposition taking can not be
based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. [49] Discretion has
to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with
the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in
denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted
in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave
abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious, and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or,
in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act all in contemplation of law.[50]
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there
is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and
(b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper.[51]
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition,
but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion
may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may
not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy
for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action for certiorari.[52]
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given
ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a
further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is
addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the
trial judge. If there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only
after conviction may this Court examine such matters further. It
is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least
fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464)
documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as
those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign
deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the
proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of
discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought
to be proved in the United States could not possibly add
anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is
no showing or allegation that the American public officers and
the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb
as the very person mentioned in the public and private
documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that they know,
of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can
identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in
the United States and not in the Philippines on the specified
dates.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the
main case and to render judgment therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA
AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and
EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of
Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that
"a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court,
or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to
prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the April
15, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 99535 which dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari
for lack of merit and its October 2, 2008 Resolution4 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 5
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a
Complaint6 for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction
sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages,
against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 and assigned to Branch
7.
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under
Philippine laws, while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
After the filing of the parties pleadings and with the conclusion
of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require Metrobanks
officers8 to appear and testify as the petitioners initial
witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the
documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as
those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411 (M). The
Motion contained a notice of hearing written as follows:
NOTICE
The Branch Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court
Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion for the consideration and
approval of the Hon. Court immediately upon receipt hereof.
(signed)
Vicente C. Angeles9
Metrobank filed an Opposition10 arguing that for lack of a
proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being
a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and
time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro
forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the
Rules, Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse
parties may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with
written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the
materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be
produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.
Petitioners submitted a Reply12 to Metrobanks Opposition,
stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by
the filing of Metrobanks Opposition; that applying the
principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of
court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobanks officers
depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is
not unreasonable and oppressive, but instead favorable to
Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers
just the same during the presentation of its own evidence; that
the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will
prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations to
Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the
validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and that
the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse
party as its own witness.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order 13 denying
petitioners Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum, thus:
The motion lacks merit.
As pointed out by the defendant bank in its opposition, the
motion under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason
of its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice
of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, the defendant bank and its
officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify
unless written interrogatories are first served upon them, as
provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In view of the foregoing, and for lack of merit, the motion under
consideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 pleading for
leniency in the application of the Rules and claiming that the
defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobanks
Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They
further argued that Metrobanks officers who are the subject
of the subpoena are not party-defendants, and thus do not
comprise the adverse party; they are individuals separate and
distinct from Metrobank, the defendant corporation being sued
in the case.
In an Opposition16 to the Motion for Reconsideration,
Metrobank insisted on the procedural defect of improper notice
of hearing, arguing that the rule relative to motions and the
requirement of a valid notice of hearing are mandatory and
must be strictly observed. It added that the same rigid
treatment must be accorded to Rule 25, in that none of its
officers may be summoned to testify for petitioners unless
written interrogatories are first served upon them. Finally, it
said that since a corporation may act only through its officers
and employees, they are to be considered as adverse parties in a
case against the corporation itself.
In another Order17 dated April 17, 2007, the trial court denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court held,
thus:
Even if the motion is given consideration by relaxing Sections 4
and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no such laxity could be
accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of
Court which require prior service of written interrogatories to
adverse parties before any material and relevant facts may be
elicited from them more so if the party is a private corporation
who could be represented by its officers as in this case. In other
words, as the persons sought to be subpoenaed by the plaintiffs-
movants are officers of the defendant bank, they are in effect
the very persons who represent the interest of the latter and
necessarily fall within the coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25
of the Revised Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari19 with the CA asserting
this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it does not
seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. For
these reasons, the Motion need not be heard. They likewise
insisted on liberality, and the disposition of the case on its
merits and not on mere technicalities.20 They added that Rule
2121 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing only with
respect to the taking of depositions; since their Motion sought
to require Metrobanks officers to appear and testify in court
and not to obtain their depositions, the requirement of notice
and hearing may be dispensed with. Finally, petitioners claimed
that the Rules particularly Section 10,22Rule 132 do not
prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own
witness.
On April 15, 2008, the CA issued the questioned Decision,
which contained the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed orders dated October 19, 2006 and April 17, 2007
in Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 issued by the RTC, Branch 7,
Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Orders; petitioners Motion is
a litigated motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse
party, Metrobanks officers, to appear and testify in court as
petitioners witnesses. It held that a proper notice of hearing,
addressed to the parties and specifying the date and time of the
hearing, was required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule
15 of the Rules.
The CA held further that the trial court did not err in denying
petitioners Motion to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in
providing that the consequence of a partys failure to serve
written interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the
latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court or
to render a deposition pending appeal. By failing to serve
written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed
their right to present the banks officers as their witnesses.
The CA declared that the justification for the rule laid down in
Section 6 is that by failing to seize the opportunity to inquire
upon the facts through means available under the Rules,
petitioners should not be allowed to later on burden Metrobank
with court hearings or other processes. Thus, it held:
x x x Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material
and relevant to his case by addressing written interrogatories to
the adverse party to elicit those facts, the latter may not
thereafter be compelled to testify thereon in court or give a
deposition pending appeal. The justification for this is that the
party in need of said facts having foregone the opportunity to
inquire into the same from the other party through means
available to him, he should not thereafter be permitted to
unduly burden the latter with courtroom appearances or other
cumbersome processes. The sanction adopted by the Rules is
not one of compulsion in the sense that the party is being
directly compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one
of negation by depriving him of evidentiary sources which
would otherwise have been accessible to him.25
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,26 which the
CA denied in its assailed October 2, 2008 Resolution. Hence,
the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4
AND 5, RULE 15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION
FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANKS OFFICERS
WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO
DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE)
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MUST
FIRST SERVE WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO
RESPONDENT BANKS OFFICERS BEFORE THEY CAN BE
SUBPOENAED.27
Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that
the Court allow the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum, petitioners assert that the questioned Motion is
not a litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the
issuance of process. They insist that a motion which is subject
to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an
application for relief other than a pleading; since no relief is
sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice
requirements may be done away with. They cite the case of
Adorio v. Hon. Bersamin,28 which held that
Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not
require notice to other parties to the action.1wphi1 No
violation of due process results by such lack of notice since the
other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the
witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented
in court.29
Petitioners add that the Rules should have been liberally
construed in their favor, and that Metrobanks filing of its
Opposition be considered to have cured whatever defect the
Motion suffered from.
Petitioners likewise persist in the view that Metrobanks officers
the subject of the Motion do not comprise the adverse party
covered by the rule; they insist that these bank officers are mere
employees of the bank who may be called to testify for them.
Respondents Arguments
Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment30 that the subject
Motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum is a litigated motion, especially as it is directed
toward its officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence
would affect it as the adverse party in the civil case. Thus, the
lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere
scrap of paper. It adds that being its officers, the persons sought
to be called to the stand are themselves adverse parties who
may not be compelled to testify in the absence of prior written
interrogatories; they are not ordinary witnesses whose presence
in court may be required by petitioners at any time and for any
reason.
Finally, Metrobank insists on the correctness of the CA
Decision, adding that since petitioners failed up to this time to
pay the witnesses fees and kilometrage as required by the
Rules,31 the issuance of a subpoena should be denied.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was
notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto.
The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured
by the filing of the Opposition.32
Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners submission, the case of
Adorio cannot apply squarely to this case. In Adorio, the
request for subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank
officials who were not parties to the criminal case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The situation is different here, as
officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to
testify as the calling partys main witnesses; likewise, they are
tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the
petitioners principal evidence. This is not without significant
consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as
will be shown below.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse
party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown
and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with
written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition
pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing
expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order
and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a
party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse
party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful
to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness
stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a
fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it
produces no significant result that a prior written
interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse
partys testimony,33 compelling the adverse party to take the
witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own
case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or
information useful to its case through the facility of written
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of
the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to
weaken its own case as a result of the calling partys being
bound by the adverse partys testimony, which may only be
worthless and instead detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written
interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is
relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or
harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from
unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the
calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling
its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court
can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear
witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such
as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their
own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only
constitute a waste of the courts precious time, if not pointless
entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers
to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to
present documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their
principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of
their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobanks officers
who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the
principle that corporations act only through their officers and
duly authorized agents34 as their main witnesses; nor may
they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks documentary
evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of
their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on
petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their
claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party
Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own
defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause
shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give
testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served
written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against
the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that
Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute
and build their case from the start. This they may not be
allowed to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible
consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their
causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they
were not furnished with specific documents relative to their
loan agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the
loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to
willingly provide petitioners with these documents even before
petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were
never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this
would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that
by providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank
would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners
with these documents prior to the signing of the loan
agreement, and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of
the law.

With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary
to further address the other issues raised by the parties, which
are irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions
arrived at.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 15,

2008 Decision and October 2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 BERSAMIN, J.:

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the

criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a
private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is
intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close
associates.
Republic of the Philippines
The Case
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari
there solutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
FIRST DIVISION
Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled
People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005
(denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First
vs.
Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Antecedents
x-----------------------x
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case
vs.
No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
DECISION
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
confederating with the then President of the Philippines
Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to
said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINIs
ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of
stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four
billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation,
with both shares of stock having then a book value of P100.00
per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical
construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at
Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini
seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct,
respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos,
taking undue advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the
aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded
to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of
corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
confederating with the then President of the Philippines,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and
golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further
the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first
cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family
physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close
personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan,
request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant,
the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of
Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less,
both of which entities were then having business, transaction,
and application with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI
securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain,
the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do
the engineering and architectural design, and construct,
respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and
receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by
accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company
of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand
E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted
kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary
advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did
secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction
contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, 5 alleging that
the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and
that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form.
The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself
for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayans favorable action
on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered
a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the
motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated
January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4,
PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED
PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION
WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE
UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH
GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND
DENIED PETITIONERSCONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ERRED INDETERMINING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF
INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF
GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES
CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001
AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE
SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH
THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED
FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING
THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of
the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v.
Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
(Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et
al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted
in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of
public funds, plunder of the nations wealth, extortion,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first
cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this
relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering
commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing
the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine
government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and
willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their
association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in
order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and
Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants
received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as
unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations
like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special
concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract
awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an
inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendants staggering
commissions defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the
contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted
the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for
appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319
92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to
your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached
criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco
case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are
also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed
with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the
respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the
respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the
Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper
action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the
PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases
similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGGs letter of transmittal was adverting to the
ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie
basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors
alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of
the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed
with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze
orders against petitioners properties, it was on the basis of a
prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were
acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy
funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly
conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it
has prejudged the matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the
PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot
possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an
even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice
can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints
subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has
primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman,
following its conduct of the preliminary investigation on the
criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were
reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file
the informations that became the subject of Disinis motion to
quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege
that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the
offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the
informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG;
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be
prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the
Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged
because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249;
and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints
initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate
civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of
the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that
established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The
law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
 c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed
the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office
of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only
after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the
PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being
established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case
No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013
and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the
contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and
President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering
and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the
construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
(PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still
expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case
No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal
prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses
charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2
of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the
President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of
the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President
Marcos immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, without distinction as to their private or public
status.
Contrary to Disinis argument, too, the qualifying clause found
in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection
4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
 (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified
as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and
Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting
the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within
the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the
PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the
Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disinis being a
private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his
being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be
considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini
had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to
Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of
Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do
the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the
PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be
awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of
public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal
Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal
Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by
the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does
not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum
periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the
gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of
public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a
violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall
prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive
period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of
15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on
March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given
retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With
the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986
as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the
applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with
People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A.
No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 30 is also
enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the
day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled
to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts
out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of
the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs
only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would
decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff
does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the
Court confronted the question on the running of the
prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the
cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too.
Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the
special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e.,
discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for
the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date
of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five
years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the
1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries
of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the
legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the
contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the
offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and
conspiracy among the public officials involved and the
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it
similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved
party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged
prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the
highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the
unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered
only through the PCGGs exhaustive investigation, resulting in
the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG
to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the
discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having
been regularly done in the course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it
would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their
records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary
investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the
running of the period of prescription. According to
Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v.
Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused.
In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the
nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is
instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in
Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-
up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to
the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be
sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the
offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a
special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the
office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five
years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every
single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that
the complaint or information charges no offense may be
properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in
the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence
of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer
be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of
public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of
Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in
the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines,
conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave
gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue
advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in
relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and
presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President
Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering
and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP
to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of
the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212
of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives
gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or
presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer liable for
direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public
officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1)
Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President
Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers,
promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of
the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking
advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation
to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make
him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply
required the public officer to be placed under circumstances,
not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or
indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President
Marcos received or accepted Disinis offers, promises and gifts
an essential element in direct bribery the allegation that
President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging
the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly
upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation
with a public official;
 2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
such family or close personal relation by directly or certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First
material or pecuniary advantage from any person Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
having some business, transaction, application, request 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
or contract with the government;
SO ORDERED.
3. That the public official with whom the offender has
family or close personal relation has to intervene in the
business transaction, application, request, or contract
with the government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of

Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1)
Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first
cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the
same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to
President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage
of such family and close personal relations, requested and
received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and
$17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having
business, transaction, and application with the Government in
connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public
officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations,
intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the
engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction of the PNPPP.
 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as
successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK
CORPORATION,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO
H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,

may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party complaints or issues.1 But a separate trial may be denied if
a party is thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an
issue dealt with and determined in the main trial.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Through this special civil action for certiorari, Metropolitan
Manila Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) hereby seeks to set aside
and nullify the resolutions dated June 25, 20042 and July 13,
FIRST DIVISION 20053 issued in Civil Case No. 0004, whereby the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for separate trial filed by
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013 the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and upheld its
jurisdiction over the Republics claim against the petitioner as
the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation (Asian
Bank).
Antecedents
On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages
in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action
was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the
properties subject of the action were two parcels of commercial
land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2664234 and
TCT No. 2665885 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and
Ludivina L. Genito.
On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment
of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an
additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion.6 It appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the
two parcels of land as the registered owner by virtue of TCT No.
N-201383 and TCT No. N-201384 issued in its name by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian Bank was also in
possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City.7
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of
evidence against the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004,
it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank.8
Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment
of any action on the motion until it was first given the
opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary
evidence the Republic had already presented against the
original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of
its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it
without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence
the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an
additional defendant.9
In its reply to Asian Banks comment, the Republic maintained
that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause
of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and
independent from its cause of action against the original
defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian Bank was
whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at
the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the properties in its
name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the original
defendants was whether they had "committed the acts
complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation
of wealth which would, as a consequence, justify forfeiture of
the said properties or the satisfaction from said properties of
the judgement that may be rendered in favor of the Republic."10
Asian Banks rejoinder to the Republics reply asserted that the
issue concerning its supposed actual or constructive knowledge
of the properties being the subject of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 0004 was intimately related to the issue delving on the
character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the
original defendants; that it thus had a right to confront the
evidence presented by the Republic as to the character of the
properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to
decide Asian Banks ownership of the properties because the
Sandiganbayan, being a special court with limited jurisdiction,
could only determine the issue of whether or not the properties
were illegally acquired by the original defendants.11
On June 25, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution granting the Republics motion for separate trial,
giving its reasons as follows:
xxxx
A cursory reading of the comment filed by defendant Asian
Bank to plaintiffs request for a separate trial would readily
reveal that defendant is not actually opposing the conduct of a
separate trial insofar as the said bank is concerned. What it
seeks is the opportunity to confront the witnesses and whatever
documentary exhibits that may have been earlier presented by
plaintiff in the case before the Court grants a separate trial. This
being the situation, we find no reason to deny the motion in
light of plaintiffs position that its claim as against Asian Bank is
entirely separate and distinct from its claims as against the
original defendants, albeit dealing with the same subject
matter. In fact, as shown by the allegations of the Second
Amended Complaint where Asian Bank was impleaded as a
party defendant, the action against the latter is anchored on the
claim that its acquisition of the subject properties was tainted
with bad faith because of its actual or constructive knowledge
that the said properties are subject of the present recovery suit
at the time it acquired the certificates of title covering the said
properties in its name. Consequently, whether or not it is
ultimately established that the properties are ill-gotten wealth
is of no actual significance to the incident pending
consideration since the action against defendant bank is
predicated not on the claim that it had knowledge of the ill-
gotten wealth character of the properties in question but rather
on whether or not it had knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the fact that the properties it registered in its name are the
subject of the instant recovery suit. Besides, plaintiff already
admits that the evidence it had presented as against the original
defendants would not apply to defendant bank for the reason
that there is no allegation in the second amended complaint
imputing responsibility or participation on the part of the said
bank insofar as the issue of accumulation of wealth by the
original defendants are concerned. Thus, there appears no basis
for defendant banks apprehension that it would be deprived of
its right to due process if its not given the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses presented prior to its inclusion as party
defendant in the case. To reiterate, the only issue insofar as
defendant bank is concerned is whether there is evidence to
show that it acquired the titles to the sequestered properties in
bad faith.
Neither are we inclined to sustain defendants bank argument
that the Court cannot grant a separate trial in this case because
it has no jurisdiction over the claim that defendant bank
acquired the properties in bad faith. Indeed, the issue of
defendant banks acquisition of the properties in bad faith is
merely incidental to the main action which is for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages. It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein (Russell v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; Saura v.
Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465).12
Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but
the Sandiganbayan denied its motion through the second
assailed resolution issued on July 13, 2005.13
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action
for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank and
transferee of the properties.14
Issues
Metrobank contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that: (1) the Republic was entitled
to a separate trial against Asian Bank; (2) the only issue as
regards Asian Bank was whether there was evidence that Asian
Bank acquired the properties in bad faith; and
(3) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian
Banks alleged bad faith in acquiring the properties.15
Anent the first issue, Metrobank states that the holding of a
separate trial would deny it due process, because Asian Bank
was entitled to contest the evidence of the Republic against the
original defendants prior to Asian Banks inclusion as an
additional defendant; that Asian Bank (Metrobank) would be
deprived of its day in court if a separate trial was held against it,
considering that the Republic had already presented such
evidence prior to its being impleaded as an additional
defendant; that such evidence would be hearsay unless Asian
Bank (Metrobank) was afforded the opportunity to test and to
object to the admissibility of the evidence; that because Asian
Bank disputed the allegedly ill-gotten character of the
properties and denied any involvement in their allegedly
unlawful acquisition or any connivance with the original
defendants in their acquisition, Asian Bank should be given the
opportunity to refute the Republics adverse evidence on the
allegedly illgotten nature of the properties.16
With respect to the second issue, Metrobank submits thuswise:
8.02 x x x the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to consider that
Respondent Republic of the Philippines claim for the recovery
of the subject properties from Asian Bank Corporation is
anchored mainly on its allegations that: a) the subject
properties constitute ill-gotten wealth of the other defendants
in the instant civil case; and, b) Asian Bank Corporation
acquired the subject properties in bad faith and with due notice
of the pendency of the ill-gotten wealth case. In other words,
the determination of the character of the subject properties as
"ill-gotten wealth" is equally important and relevant for Asian
Bank Corporation as it is for the other defendants considering
that the issue of its alleged acquisition in bad faith of the subject
properties is premised on Respondent Republic of the
Philippines claim that the subject properties form part of the
ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos and his cronies.
Such being the case, Asian Bank Corporation is entitled as a
matter of right to contest whatever evidence was presented by
Respondent Republic of the Philippines on these two (2) issues,
specifically the character and nature of the subject properties.
8.03 It must be stressed that the discretion of the court to order
a separate trial of such issues should only be exercised where
the issue ordered to be separately tried is so independent of the
other issues that its trial will in no way involve the trial of the
issues to be thereafter tried and where the determination of that
issues will satisfactorily and with practical certainty dispose of
the case, if decided for defendant. Considering that the issue on
Asian Bank Corporations alleged acquisition in bad faith of the
subject properties is intimately related to the issue on the
character and nature of the subject properties as ill-gotten
wealth of the other defendants in the instant civil case, there is
absolutely no legal or factual basis for the holding of a separate
trial against Asian Bank Corporation.17
As to the third issue, Metrobank posits that Asian Bank
acquired the properties long after they had been acquired by the
original defendants supposedly through unlawful means; that
the Republic admitted that the evidence adduced against the
original defendants would not apply to Asian Bank because the
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 did not impute any
responsibility to Asian Bank for the accumulation of wealth by
the original defendants, or did not allege that Asian Bank had
participated in such accumulation of wealth; that there was also
no allegation or proof that Asian Bank had been a business
associate, dummy, nominee or agent of the Marcoses; that the
inclusion of Asian Bank was not warranted under the law; that
Asian Bank was a transferee in good faith and for valuable
consideration; that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
civil cases against innocent purchasers for value like Asian Bank
that had no notice of the allegedly ill-gotten nature of the
properties; and that considering the admission of the Republic
that the issue on the accumulation of wealth by the original
defendants did not at all concern Asian Bank, it follows that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to pass judgment on the
validity of Asian Banks ownership of the properties.18
In contrast, the Republic insists that the Rules of Court allowed
separate trials if the issues or claims against several defendants
were entirely distinct and separate, notwithstanding that the
main claim against the original defendants and the issue
against Asian Bank involved the same properties; that the
allegations in the case against Spouses Genito and the other
original defendants pertained to the Republics claim that the
properties listed in Annex A of the original complaint
constituted ill-gotten wealth, resulting in the probable
forfeiture of the listed properties should the Republic establish
in the end that such original defendants had illegally or
unlawfully acquired such properties; that although the Republic
conceded that neither Asian Bank nor Metrobank had any
participation whatsoever in the commission of the illegal or
unlawful acts, the only issue relevant to Metrobank being
whether it had knowledge that the properties had been in
custodia legis at the time of its acquisition of them to determine
its allegation of being an innocent purchaser for valuable
consideration; that because the properties were situated in the
heart of Quezon City, whose land records had been destroyed by
fire in 1998, resulting in the rampant proliferation of fake land
titles, Asian Bank should have acted with extra caution in
ascertaining the validity of the mortgagors certificates of title;
and that the series of transactions involving the properties was
made under dubious circumstances.19
The Republic posits that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
original jurisdiction over all cases involving the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth pursuant to Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14
and No. 14-A issued in 1986, laws encompassing the recovery of
sequestered properties disposed of by the original defendants
while such properties remained in custodia legis and pending
the final resolution of the suit; and that the properties
pertaining to Spouses Genito were among the properties placed
under the writs of sequestration issued by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), thereby effectively
putting such properties in custodia legis and rendering them
beyond disposition except upon the prior approval of the
Sandiganbayan.20
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious.
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting
the Republics motion for separate trial, but was correct in
upholding its jurisdiction over the Republics claim against
Asian Bank (Metrobank).
First and Second Issues:
Separate Trials are Improper
The first and second issues, being interrelated, are jointly
discussed and resolved.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2,
Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to
determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the
exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.
The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a
provision that governs separate trials in the United States
Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), viz:
Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials.
xxxx
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any
claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving
the inviolate right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several
principles and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction
may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been
patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b).21 There is no
obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides
in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is
because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted
the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application
of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated
from or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the
Federal Courts and the various US State Courts.
In Bowers v. Navistar International Transport
Corporation,22 we find the following explanation made by the
US District Court for the Southern District of New York on the
objectives of having separate trials, to wit:
The aim and purpose of the Rule is aptly summarized in C.
Wright and A Millers Federal Practice and Procedure:
The provision for separate trials in Rule 42 (b) is intended to
further convenience, avoid delay and prejudice, and serve the
ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial
administration that is to be controlling rather than the wishes
of the parties. The piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single
suit is not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in
the exercise of informed discretion when the court believes that
separation will achieve the purposes of the rule.
xxxx
As explained recently by the Second Circuit in United v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158, 6160 1993 WL 100100, 1 (2d
Cir., April 6, 1993), the purpose of separate trials under Rule 42
(b) is to "isolate issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and
perhaps needless litigation . . . and to encourage settlement
discussions and speed up remedial action." (citing, Amoco Oil
v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); Katsaros v.
Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 469
U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1984) (separate
trials are proper to further convenience or to avoid
prejudice); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (quoting, United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (separate
trials under Rule 42 (b) are appropriate, although not
mandatory, to "(1) avoid prejudice; (2) provide for convenience,
or (3) expedite the proceedings and be economical.") Separate
trials, however, remain the exception rather than the rule. See,
e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1976) xxx (separation of issues is not the
usual course under Rule 42 (b)). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that separate trials are necessary to
prevent prejudice or confusion and serve the ends of
justice. Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Divine Restoration Apostolic Church v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.,23 the US District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, Houston Division specified that separate trials
remained the exception, and emphasized that the moving party
had the burden to establish the necessity for the separation of
issues, viz:
Rule 42 (b) provides that a court has discretion to order
separate trials of claims "in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy." FED. R. CIV. P.42 (b). Thus, the two
primary factors to be considered in determining whether to
order separate trials are efficient judicial administration and
potential prejudice. Separation of issues for separate trials is
"not the usual course that should be followed," McDaniel v.
Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 987 F. 2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1993), and
the burden is on the party seeking separate trials to prove that
separation is necessary. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2388 (3d ed. 2001).
xxxx
Still, in Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital,24 the US District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has cautioned against
the unfettered granting of separate trials, thusly:
Courts order separate trials only when "clearly
necessary." Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp.
1553, 1566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing 5 James William
Moore, Moores Federal Practice at pp. 42-37 to 42-38 & n.4
(1982)). This is because a "single trial will generally lessen the
delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the
courts." 5 James William Moore, Moores Federal Practice P.
42-03[1], at p. 42-43 (1994); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D. La. 1992); Willemijn
Houdstermaatschaapij BV. V. Apollo Computer, 707 F. Supp.
1429, 1433 (D. Del. 1989). The movant has the burden to show
prejudice. Moore at p. 42-48.
x x x A Colorado District Court found three factors to weigh in
determining whether to order separate trials for separate
defendants. These are 1) whether separate trials would further
the convenience of the parties; 2) whether separate trials would
promote judicial economy; and 3) whether separate trials would
avoid substantial prejudice to the parties.
Tri-R Sys. V. Friedman & Son, 94 F.R.D. 726, 727 (D. Colo.
1982).
In Miller v. American Bonding Company,25 the US Supreme
Court has delimited the holding of separate trials to only the
exceptional instances where there were special and persuasive
reasons for departing from the general practice of trying all
issues in a case at only one time, stating:
In actions at law, the general practice is to try all the issues in a
case at one time; and it is only in exceptional instances where
there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this
practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case
may be made the subjects of separate trials. Whether this
reasonably may be done in any particular instance rests largely
in the courts discretion.
Further, Corpus Juris Secundum26 makes clear that neither
party had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue;
hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid
prejudice, further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair
trial to all parties, to wit:
Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or
at least such a trial should be undertaken only with great
caution and sparingly. There should be one full and
comprehensive trial covering all disputed matters, and parties
cannot, as of right, have a trial divided. It is the policy of the law
to limit the number of trials as far as possible, and
separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even
under a statute permitting trials of separate issues, neither
party has an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue
involved. The trial of all issues together is especially
appropriate in an action at law wherein the issues are not
complicated, x x x, or where the issues are basically the same x x
x context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of
x x x Separate trials of issues should be ordered where such
separation will avoid prejudice, further convenience, promote
justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters
defined by the relevant US case law, we conclude that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in
ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the
ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and
separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the
Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all
the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably
shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single
trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience
to the parties and the courts."27
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there
are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on
different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials
of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the
issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the
issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues
will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule
must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for
allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or
compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the
issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that
convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian
Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against
the original defendants.1wphi1 Should the Sandiganbayan
resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on
the basis of the evidence adduced against the original
defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-
gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without
Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its
side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards
Metrobank.
The representation by the Republic in its comment to the
petition of Metrobank, that the latter "merely seeks to be
afforded the opportunity to confront the witnesses and
documentary exhibits," and that it will "still be granted said
right during the conduct of the separate trial, if proper grounds
are presented therefor,"28 unfairly dismisses the objective
possibility of leaving the opportunity to confront the witnesses
and documentary exhibits to be given to Metrobank in the
separate trial as already too late. The properties, though already
registered in the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile
declared liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic, causing
Metrobank to suffer the deprivation of its properties without
due process of law. Only a joint trial with the original
defendants could afford to Metrobank the equal and efficient
opportunity to confront and to contest all the evidence bearing
on its ownership of the properties. Hence, the disadvantages
that a separate trial would cause to Metrobank would far
outweigh any good or benefit that the Republic would
seemingly stand to gain from the separation of trials.
We must safeguard Metrobanks right to be heard in the
defense of its registered ownership of the properties, for that is
what our Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the grant by the
Sandiganbayan of the Republics motion for separate trial, not
being in furtherance of convenience or would not avoid
prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and,
therefore, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. 29
Third Issue:
Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the matter involving Metrobank
Presidential Decree No. 1606,30 as amended by Republic Act
No. 797531 and Republic Act No. 8249,32 vests the
Sandiganbayan with original exclusive jurisdiction over civil
and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued
in 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and
sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses
their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that
the ill-gotten wealth includes assets and properties in the form
of estates and real properties in the Philippines and abroad.
Executive Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A pertain to the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
relative to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
cronies.
The amended complaint filed by the Republic to implead Asian
Bank prays for reversion, reconveyance, reconstitution,
accounting and damages. In other words, the Republic would
recover ill-gotten wealth, by virtue of which the properties in
question came under sequestration and are now, for that
reason, in custodia legis.33
Although the Republic has not imputed any responsibility to
Asian Bank for the illegal accumulation of wealth by the original
defendants, or has not averred that Asian Bank was a business
associate, dummy, nominee, or agent of the Marcoses, the
allegation in its amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 that
Asian Bank acted with bad faith for ignoring the sequestration
of the properties as ill-gotten wealth has made the cause of
action against Asian Bank incidental or necessarily connected
to the cause of action against the original defendants.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has
ruled in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan,34 that "the Sandiganbayan has original and
exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action
involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases."
The Court made a similar pronouncement sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Republic of the Philippines
(PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),35 to wit:
We cannot possibly sustain such a puerile stand. Pea itself
already dealt with the matter when it stated that under Section
2 of Executive Order No. 14, all cases of the Commission
regarding alleged illgotten properties of former President
Marcos and his relatives, subordinates, cronies, nominees and
so forth, whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, "and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or
related to such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to
review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court."
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition for certiorari.
Let the writ of certiorari issue: (a) ANNULLING AND
SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated June 25, 2004 and the
Resolution dated July 13, 2005 issued by the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case No. 0004 granting the motion for separate trial of the
Republic of the Philippines as to Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company; and (b), DIRECTING the Sandiganbayan to hear
Civil Case No. 0004 against Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company in the same trial conducted against the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 0004.
The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over the amended complaint in Civil Case
No. 0004 as against Asian Bank Corporation/Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company.
No pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199501 March 6, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
REGION III, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF OLONGAPO
CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 29 April 2011 Decision2 and
16 November 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 90559. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner
Republic of the Philippines' (peitioner) appeal of the Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch 72,4 which
dismissed petitioner's action for reversion and cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-5004 in the name of
Enrique Oribello, Jr. (Oribello ).
The Facts
The present controversy involves a parcel of land situated in
Nagbaculao, Kalaklan, Olongapo City, which was once classified
as forest land by the Bureau of Forest Development. The
property was originally occupied by a certain Valentin
Fernandez (Valentin) in 1968 by virtue of a Residential Permit
issued by the same government office.
Upon Valentins death, his son, Odillon Fernandez (Odillon),
continued to occupy the property, together with spouses
Ruperto and Matilde Apog. Sometime in 1969, Odillon sold the
property to a certain Mrs. Florentina Balcita who, later on, sold
the same property to Oribello. Oribello filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which denied the application since
the land remained forest land.
On 20 February 1987, the subject property was declared open to
disposition under the Public Land Act. Thus, Oribello filed
another Miscellaneous Sales Application on 6 April 1987.
On 27 March 1990, the Director of Lands issued an Order for
the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello. On even date,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 12756 and OCT No. P-5004
were issued to Oribello.
Matilde Apog (Apog) and Aliseo San Juan (San Juan),5 claiming
to be actual occupants of the property, protested with the
DENR the issuance of the sales patent and OCT in favor of
Oribello. They sought the annulment of the sales patent,
arguing that Oribello and Land Inspector Dominador Laxa
(Laxa) committed fraud and misrepresentation in the approval
of the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Oribello. They alleged
that Laxa submitted a false report to the Director of Lands, by
stating that there were no other claimants to the property and
that Oribello was the actual occupant thereof, when the
contrary was true.
After investigation, the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR found substantial evidence that fraud and
misrepresentation were committed in the issuance of the sales
patent in favor of Oribello, warranting a reversion suit.
On 25 March 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General,
representing petitioner, instituted a complaint for reversion
and cancellation of title before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 225-0-92. The case
was thereafter consolidated with Civil Case No. 233-0-91, a
complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello against
Apog and San Juan.
During the trial, petitioner marked numerous documentary
evidence and presented several witnesses on various hearing
dates.6
In an Order dated 20 December 1996, the trial court warned
petitioner on the possible effect of its non-appearance on the
next scheduled hearing, thus:
WHEREFORE, let the continuation of the reception of evidence
for the Republic of the Philippines be reset to February 14, 21
and 28, 1997, all at 10:00 oclock in the morning, as previously
scheduled.
The Solicitor General is warned that should his designated
lawyer or any of his assistants fail to appear on the dates above-
stated, the Court will be constrained to consider the
presentation of evidence for the Republic of the Philippines as
terminated.
Atty. Dumpit, therefore, is advised that he bring his witnesses
on said dates to testify for the defendants Matilde Apog and
Eliseo San Juan should the Solicitor General fail to appear and
present evidence.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied)
On the hearing of 4 April 1997, Atty. Oscar Pascua, representing
petitioner, presented a witness on the stand.For petitioners
failure to appear on the hearing of 12 September 1997, the trial
court issued an Order8 on even date holding as follows:
On July 25, 1997, this Court issued an Order, quoted as follows:
xxxx
On several occasions when these cases were set for trial, neither
Atty. Barcelo nor Atty. Pascua appeared, constraining the Court
to postpone the hearing. The actuations of both lawyers result
to delay in the early termination of these cases which have been
pending since 1992.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Republic of the Philippines is hereby
deemed to have abandoned the case for the government.
Attorney Dumpit for the defendant Matilde Apog, et al., is
hereby required to manifest in writing on whether or not he is
adopting the evidence already presented by the Republic of the
Philippines, and if so, to make his offer of evidence within 30
days from today. Atty. Leyco is given 10 days from receipt of a
copy of his offer to file his comment or opposition. Let the
reception of evidence, if there be any on any part of Enrique
Oribello, be set on October 24, 1997 at 10:00 a.m. as previously
scheduled. And in addition thereto on November 21, and
December 5, 1997 also both at 10:00 a.m. To give way to the
filing of these pleadings, cancel the hearing scheduled for
October 3, 1997.
Upon receipt of proof from the Post Office by this Court which
will show that Atty. Pascua has received a copy of the Order
dated July 25, 1997, the Motion to hold him in contempt will be
deemed submitted for resolution. Furnish Atty. Barcelo, the
Solicitor General, the Executive Regional Director, DENR, R-
III, Angeles City, and Atty. Oscar Pascua, a copy of this Order.
Attys. Dumpit and Leyco are both notified in open court of this
Order.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial of the consolidated cases continued and the reception
of evidence of the private parties proceeded.
However, in its Order of 21 February 2005, the trial court
dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non-
substitution of the deceased plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel,
to wit:
Considering that the plaintiffs counsel is already dead, and the
plaintiff is likewise dead already, there being no substitution of
party-plaintiffs or any record showing the heirs or party in
interest, these cases are dismissed without prejudice.10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the
Order applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for
recovery of possession) and did not affect Civil Case No. 225-0-
92 (for reversion of property). Petitioner prayed that it be
allowed to present its evidence.
Acting favorably on the motion, the trial court allowed the
continuation of the presentation of petitioners evidence in its
Order dated 29 June 2005.11
Aggrieved, Oribellos heirs filed a Manifestation and Motion,
bringing to the attention of the trial court the previous 12
September 1997 Order declaring petitioner to have abandoned
the reversion case. Oribellos heirs pointed out that from the
time petitioner received the Order in 1997, it did nothing to
question the same, making the Order final.
In its Resolution of 12 July 2006, the trial court recalled its 29
June 2005 Order, and declared instead:
Finding merit in defendants Motion and Manifestation, the
Order dated 29 June 2005 granting the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is recalled and
the above-entitled case is DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.12
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal. The Court of
Appeals held "that the remedy of appeal is no longer available"
to petitioner. The appellate court agreed with respondents that
petitioner has lost its right to participate in the proceedings of
Civil Case No. 225-0-92 when it failed to question the trial
courts 12 September 1997 Order, declaring it to have
abandoned the case. As a consequence of petitioners inaction,
such order inevitably became final.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is barred
by laches and estoppel for failing to challenge the 12 September
1997 Order after almost a decade from receipt thereof. The
appellate court stated that "while the general rule is that an
action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said
right can be barred by laches or estoppel."
The Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
13
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Issues
Petitioner anchors the present petition on the following
grounds:
1. Interlocutory orders are not subject of appeal.
2. The consolidated cases, without any order of
severance, cannot be subject of multiple appeals.
3. There can be no private ownership over an
unclassified public forest.
The Ruling of the Court
Is the 12 September 1997 Order interlocutory?
Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997 Order of the
trial court, deeming it to have abandoned the case, is
interlocutory in nature; thus, is not appealable.14 Respondents
argue otherwise, maintaining that such Order is a dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute which is,
under the Rules,15 considered an adjudication on the merits,
and hence appealable.
We agree with petitioner.
A final order is defined as "one which disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court."16
Conversely, an interlocutory order "does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon"17 by the
court. Its effects are merely provisional in character and
substantial proceedings have to be further conducted by the
court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy.18
Based on the records, petitioner has presented testimonial
evidence on various hearing dates and marked numerous
documents during the trial of Civil Case No. 225-0-92. Such
acts do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute. Admittedly
there was delay in this case. However, such delay is not the
delay warranting dismissal of the complaint. To be a sufficient
ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also
unnecessary resulting in the trifling of court processes. 19 There
is no proof that petitioner intended to delay the proceedings in
this case, much less abuse judicial processes.
While petitioner failed to appear on the hearing of 12
September 1997, such failure does not constitute a ground for
the dismissal of the reversion complaint for failure to prosecute.
Petitioners non-appearance on that date should simply be
construed as a waiver of the right to present additional
evidence.20
We note that prior to the issuance of the 12 September 1997
Order, the trial court already warned petitioner on the likely
adverse effect of its non-appearance on the next hearing date. If
petitioner fails to attend the next scheduled hearing, the trial
court would consider petitioners presentation of evidence as
terminated. Termination of presentation of a partys evidence
does not equate to dismissal of the complaint for failure to
prosecute. In fact, the trial court merely "deemed" petitioner to
have abandoned the case without stating expressly and
unequivocally that the complaint for reversion was dismissed.
Had the trial court declared, in no uncertain terms, that the
reversion suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no
doubt that petitioner would have questioned such ruling, as it
now did with respect to the trial courts 29 June 2005 Order.
While it is within the trial courts discretion to dismiss motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of plaintiffs failure to
prosecute, it must be exercised with caution. Resort to such
action must be determined according to the procedural history
of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the
diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to proceed
therein.21 As the Court held in Gomez v. Alcantara,22 if a lesser
sanction would achieve the same result, then dismissal should
not be resorted to.
Unless a partys conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for
dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the
case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would
still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts
should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority
to dismiss.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the trial court, even after its supposed "dismissal" of
the case for petitioners abandonment, continued to recognize
petitioners personality in its proceedings. In fact, in its Order
of 16 January 1998, well beyond the "dismissal" on 12
September 1997, the trial court directed the service of such
order to the Solicitor General, to wit:
xxxx
Should Atty. Dumpit fail to submit the said offer of evidence, it
will be deemed a waiver on his part to do so. Atty. Leyco
announced that he is presenting evidence for and in behalf of
the defendants Oribello in Civil Case No. 225-0-92 and as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 233-0-91.
To give way to the filing of said pleadings, cancel the hearing on
February 20, 1998. Let the reception of evidence for the
plaintiff Oribellos be set on March 20, 1998 at 9:00 a.m.. Attys.
Leyco and Dumpit are notified in open court. Furnish a copy of
this order the Solicitor General, DENR Office in Angeles City, as
well as Atty. Pascua.24(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the above Order states that Oribellos counsel was
presenting evidence on the two consolidated cases. This means
that Oribello himself continued to recognize the pendency of
the reversion suit (Civil Case No. 225-0-92), contrary to his
subsequent allegation that such case has already been
dismissed.
Are the consolidated cases subject to multiple appeals?
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated,
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding
how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the
court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties.25To promote this end, the rule
allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the
courts docket, or the consolidation of issues within those
cases.26 The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is
used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed
until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one
trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-
consolidation)
 (2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose
their separate identity, and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated
by a situation where several actions are pending
between the same parties stating claims which might
have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)1wphi1
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried
together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single
action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to
the other. (consolidation for trial)27
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by
petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was consolidated with the
complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil
Case No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve common
questions of law and fact,28 each action retains its separate and
distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject
land will be reverted to the State, while the recovery of
possession case determines which private party has the better
right of possession over the subject property. These cases,
involving different issues and seeking different remedies,
require the rendition and entry of separate judgments. The
consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the
complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently
of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by the
trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance
of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a
judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or
law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment
in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further,
severance is within the sound discretion of the court for
convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under
the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other
cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.
Is the property unclassified public forest?
In its petition, petitioner contended that the subject property
remains unclassified public forest, incapable of private
appropriation. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that Oribello
committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the
subject property.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Fraud is a question
offact. 29 Whether there was fraud and misrepresentation in the
issuance of the sales patent in favor of Oribello calls for a
thorough evaluation of the parties' evidence. Thus, this Court
will have to remand the reversion case to the trial court for
further proceedings in order to resolve this issue and
accordingly dispose of the case based on the parties' evidence
on record.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition IN PART and
SETS ASIDE the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals. The reversion case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. The trial court is ordered to resolve the SO ORDERED.
reversion case with utmost dispatch.