Case Review Victoria L.

Coefield October 9th, 2016

Tilton v. Richardson
Supreme Court of the United States, 1971
403 U.S. 672, 91 S. Ct. 2091
FACTS

Tilton implicated a challenge by taxpayers to Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of

1963, which made available grants to colleges and universities, including those that are

religiously affiliated, in order to construct buildings and facilities that are used exclusively for

secular educational purposes. The taxpayers objected to grants to four institutions in Connecticut

which were religiously affiliated, claiming that the law granting the funds to the institutions

violated the taxpayers rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First

Amendment.

A federal trial court in Connecticut upheld the act in the face of the Establishment Clause claim

on the bases that it authorized grants to church-related institutions of higher learning and that it

had neither the purpose nor effect of promoting religion. The court also held that because the

grants did not coerce the taxpayers in the practice of their religious beliefs, it did not violate their

rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The taxpayers were not pleased with the outcome and

appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?

Is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?
Does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion?
Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion?

ANSWERS

The Act expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental

action.
Case Review Victoria L. Coefield October 9th, 2016

The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a

consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect

advances religion.
Lemon v. Kurtsman and Robinson v. DiCenso have discussed and applied this

independent measure of constitutionality under the Religion Clauses. Those cases

concluded that excessive entanglements between government and religion were fostered

by Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutory programs under which state aid was provided

to parochial elementary and secondary schools.

Appellants claim that the Free Exercise Clause is violated because they are compelled to

pay taxes, the proceeds of which in part finance grants under the Act. Appellants,

however, are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their

religious beliefs.

REASONING OF THE COURT

The Court found that the act violated neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clause.

Four judges, led by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun,

announced the judgment of the Court. They pointed out that Congress intended the act to apply

to all colleges and universities, regardless of whether they were religiously affiliated. The judges

then applied the three-part test that it articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which has

become the judicial standard in controversies involving religion in both K12 and higher

educational settings.

They explained that the act was constitutional because Congress carefully designed it to ensure

both that funds would be available to assist institutions to serve the rapidly growing number of

young people who wished to achieve a higher education and that the federal resources would be

used for defined secular purposes, while expressly forbidding the use of these monies for
Case Review Victoria L. Coefield October 9th, 2016

religious instruction, training, or worship. After conducting the Lemon test, they ruled that none

of the four institutions violated the acts restrictions. They then determined that the act did not

advance religion, because the money was not being used for facilities for religious purposes and

that the funds were being used to construct facilities such as libraries and performing arts centers.

Emphasizing the differences between elementary, secondary and higher education, they noted

that the act did not create excessive entanglement with religion. They also distinguished Tilton

from Lemon, wherein the Court invalidated aid in the form of salary supplements to teachers in

religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. The Court observed that the cases were significantly

different, because in Tilton, religious indoctrination was not a substantial purpose or activity in

the four institutions insofar as their student bodies were not composed of impressionable young

people, the assistance was not ideological, and the one-time grants were for the single purpose of

construction. Having resolved that the act did not violate the Establishment Clause, they

dismissed the Free Exercise challenge. The judges rejected the taxpayers argument that by being

compelled to pay taxes, a portion of which were used to finance the disputed grants, the

taxpayers were experiencing coercion that was directed at their own religious beliefs.

Finally, it was declared that because states and the federal government had the authority to

finance the separable secular function of higher education. The Act does not violate the Religious

Clauses of the First Amendment except the part indicating the twenty year limitation on the

religious use restrictions.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Courts Tilton v. Richardson decision upheld a grant program that made federal

funds available to religious affiliated colleges for constructing buildings. Tilton is significant to
Case Review Victoria L. Coefield October 9th, 2016

higher education for three key reasons. First, Tilton stands for the intention that the government

may provide funds to religiously affiliated colleges and universities without violating the

Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses. Second, the case drew the line between instructional and

educational uses; not promoting what is taught yet providing buildings for education. Third, the

case noted the differences between K-12 and higher education needs provided by the

government.