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We stiUpemht in studying a type of war&e that no longer exists
and that we shalZnever iight again, while we pay only passing
attention to the war we fast in Indochina and rhe one we are
about to lose in Algeria. Yet the abandonment ofIndochina or of
Algeria iajust as important for France as would be the loss of a
metipoZitan provioce. The result of&s shortcoming h that the
army is not prepared to confront an adversary employins arms
and methods the army itselfignores. It has, therefore, no chance
ofwiotig.. . Ourmikuy machine reminds one of a pile driver
attempting to crush a fZy,indefatigably persisting in repeating its
efforts. The inability of the army to adapt itself to changed cir
cumstances has heavy consequences. Zt gives credence to the
belief that OUTadversaries, who represent only weak forces, are
invincible and that, sooner orkter, we shall have to accept their
conditions for peace. It encourages the diffusion of dangerously
erroneous ideas which eventually becomepenemZZy accepted.

E LIVE in rapidly changing times and scribed the basis of American strategy as fol-
most observers believe that the rate of lo~rs: US national strategy has consistently
change will continue to accelerate. Thus, it is rested on three basic pillars: deterrence, forward
predictable that challenges to the national defense, and allied solidarity.2 Obviously, US
interests of the United States will multiply and strategy to prevent general war has been suc-
that the nations resolve will be tested re- cessful. Success has been based on the advet-
peatedly. satys perception of US strength and resolve.
Army planners and decision makers have a While US strategy aims to deter general war, it
particularly difficult task ahead. They must is also designed to control crisis and to support
ensure that the nation has a credible ground its allies. This requires a forward presence of
force, able to support the nations global mili- troop units stationed in Europe and Korea and
taty strategy. One must remember that Ger- ships patrolling in international waters.
many in World War II won the Battle of France, The Department of Defense (DOD) exists to
but lost the Battle of Britain--and ultimately fulfill the national governments first obliga-
the wx. Germany, in fact, won the battle for tion: to secure national survival and indepen-
which it prepared and lost the one for which it dence. Frank Carlucci, former secretary of de-
had not. On the other hand, French military fense, summarized DODs mission as 0 to
doctrine, in addition to being defensive and preserve Americas freedom and to secure its
stagnant, was not fully integrated with the vital interests, creating an environment that
national political strategy. Prevailing French allows our nation to ptc~sper.~ Specifically,
military doctrine and its underlying national the current national security objectives of the
thought prior to World War II has been de- United States are:
scribed, Both operationally and politically, l To safeguard the United States, its allies
it looked backward to World War I. Thus, for and interestr by deterring aggression and cow
the statesman who defines the national strategy cion
and the soldier who is charged with implement- l To encourage and assist our allies and
ing it, the consequences of misunderstanding friends in defending themselves against aggres-
changing realities can be disastrous. sion, coercion
Recently, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost de- l To ensure US access to critical resources,

MILITARY REVIEW. March ,990 3


informational), the United States has main-
tained a traditional perspective that military
objectives invariably call for the use of combat
power. JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Pub 2, how-
ever, requires that all the military services have
forces organized, trained and equipped to pros-
ecute operations in war and operations short of
war.*5
For the United States, the difference be-
tween operations in war and operations short
of war lies in the way its military force is applied.
In war, military resources are the dominant
instrument for pursuit of national political
objectives and are employed directly to destroy
the enemys military power and establish the
conditions under which the national strategic
aim can be realized. In operations short of war,
the armed forces support the political, eco-
nomic and inf&mational instruments of na-
tional power, which are the primary means by
which the strategic aim is realized.
French military doctrine and its under The Army, by virtue of its capability to estab-
lying national thoughtprior to World lish and maintain control over land, must have
War II has been described, Both opc~ the capability to operate across the spectrum of
ationally andpoliticxll~ it looked backward conflict from low to high-intensity.6 US Army
to World War I! Thus, for the statesman Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, de-
who defines the nationalstrategy and the scribed the impact of the American soldier as
I
solaYer who is charged with implementing the nations clearest, most valued symbol
it, the consequences ofmisunderstanding of resolve.7 In a dynamic international en-
changing realities can be disastrous. vironment, this capability provides a hedge
against uncertainty and a range of choices in
foreign policy, from negotiating treaties to
establishing alliances for mutual security. In
markets, the oceans and space war, Army forces must be trained, organized
To reduce, where possible, Soviet mili- and available to . defeat the enemys mili-
tary presence throughout the world tary forces and crush his will to continue wag-
s To prevent the transfer of militarily crici- ing WX.~In operations short of war, the Armys
al technology and knowledge to the Soviet range of missions could involve peacekeeping
bloc operations, foreign internal defense, terror-
To pursue equir,&le and verifiable arms ism counteraction, and military operations to
reduction agreements protect high value areas or to defeat hostile
e To defend and advance rhe cause of forces.
democracy, freedom and human rights .4 Americas record of success in her first battles
In order to develop appropriate military oh- has not been impressive. In the LOfirst bat&$
jectives in consonance with the other elements the US Army experienced in nine declared
of national power (political, economic, and wars, it suffered five defeats, four costly victories

4 March 1990 * MILITARY REVIEW


In war, the military resources are the dominant instrument forpursuit
ofnationaipoliticalobjectives andare employed directly to destroy the enemys
mili&rypowerandestabJish the conditions under which the nationalstitegic aim
can be realized. In operations short of war, the armed forces support the politica&
economic andinformationalinstrumen~ ofnatiomdpoweq which are the
primary means by which the strategic aim is realized.

and only one clear victory.0 Moreover, the few the same trap as did the French prior to World
first victories resulted from the courage and sac- War II, training to fight the last war rather than
rifice of individual US soldiers, despite deficien- the next one.
cies in command and control and training that
focused on the wrong enemy. In 1933, General
Douglas MacArthur observed in a report to the
US Army chief of staf, . in no other profes- There is no question that the US Army
sion are the penalties for employing untrained should maintain a credible force to meet its
personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in NATO conlmitments-whatever they may
the military. 11 Vuono summarized the impor- turn out to be--in Central Europe. However,
tance of a properly trained Army when he said, to do that and to ignore operations short of
Clearly, we have learned a key lesson of his- war would be an abdication of responsibility
tory-that poorly trained armies invite attack and national trust. The prevailing assumption
by enemies, incur casualties needlessly and ulti- appears to be that such operations can be
mately suffer defeat.12 With the tremendous handled as a simple planning responsibility and
emphasis that has been placed by the US Army as an additional contingency for those forces
on training to fight the next war in Central prepared for commitment to a major European
Europe, one might ask if we are not falling into war.

MILITARY REVIEW. March ,990 5


Clausewitz defines war as an act of force to that have a significance for US interests and
compel our enemy to do our will.J Taken in includes elements of armed conflict. Such oper
that context, armed conflict is only a means to a ations are of necessity, interdepartmental poli-
political end without which war becomes . tical, economic and informational actions.
pointless and devoid of sense.*+ He repeatedly When these operations are supported by mili-
tary means, they fall into the category of mili-
tary operations short of war and include LIC as
well as security assistance, humanitarian aid,
Thegovernment establishestbepofitical
peacekeeping operations, foreign internal de-
p&pose, themifkuy providesthemeans
fense, peacetime contingency operations and
forachieving thepoliticalendandthe
counterterrorism operations.
peopleprovide the will.AU three are in&
The following descriptions have particular
pensableelemen&of the theoretical triad
utility in establishing the base from which the
Wh& thkk &tively clearwhenapplied to
training challenge posed by the US Army mis-
cooventiooalwaqit k much lessso for
sion can be met:
whatk termedoperations shortof war/
Routine, peaceful cornp&ion-Inter-
ests are contested; the military is employed pri-
marily for its political, economic and infomw
states that war is nothing but the continuation tional effect; military violence is employed in-
of policy with other means.5 The government directly or limited by time and objective.
establish= the political purpose, the military LIC-Interests are contested; organized via-
provides the means for achieving the political lence is used to effect or influence outcomes; all
end and the people provide the will. All three elements of national power are employed; the
are indispensable elements of the theoretical military dimension is employed primarily for its
triad. political, economic and informational effect;
While this is relatively clear when applied to military violence is employed indirectly or lim-
conventional war, it is much less so for what is ited by time and objective.
termed operations short of war. To the US War-Interests are contested; organizedvirr
Army, the term implies involvement in LG. lence is used to effect outcomes; all elements of
US Army Field Manual 100-20, Military national power are employed; the military
ope7anbnr in Low Intensity Conjlict, (June 1988 dimension is used to establish conditions under
Final Draft), defines LIC as follows: which the strategic aim can be realized; other
#
. a politico-military confrontation be- elements are employed to contribute to military
tween contending states or groups below con- effects.7
ventional war and above the routine, peaceful The US Army serves as a credible, strategic
competition among states. It frequently in- deterrent land force against any Soviet/Warsaw
volves protracted struggles of competing prin- Pact incursion. However, it must be understood
ciples and ideologies. Low intensity conflict that while I. successful campaigns . . . may
ranges from subversion to the use of armed be worthy of academic analysis of operational
force. It is waged by a combination of means, art . . . they contribute little to winning wars if
employing political, economic, informational, they are not integrated into a strategy that is
and military instruments. Low intensity con- aimed at solving the real strategic problem.8
flicts are often localized, generally in the Third There is ample evidence to suggest that thestra-
World, but contain regional and global security tegic equation has another important factor
implications.*6 other than Central Europe. Nearly all the
Thus, LIC involves operations or activities armed conflicts of the past forty years have

6 March 1990 l MILITARY REVIEW


Americas record ofsuccess in her first battles has not been impressive.
In the 10 fimtbattles for the US Army experiencedin nine de&red wars, it suffered five
defeats, four costly victories and only one clear victory Moreover, the few first victories
resulted from the courage and sacrifice of individual US soldiers, despite deficiencies in
command and control and trabzing that focused on the wrong enemy.

occurred in what is vaguely referred to as the MC inthe Cari


Third World . In & &e period, all the The Soviet Union understands the impor-
ward in which the United States was involved- tance ofnot having to fight on two fronts, while
either directly with its combat forces or indi- the United States does not seem to appreciate
rectly with military assistance--occurred in the the nature of the struggle that is real today in its
Third World. rear area. While the US Army has dutifully
William J. Olson, director of the Low maintained its heavy arsenal in Central Europe,
Intensity Contlict Organization in the Office of the Soviets have steadily taken advantage of
the Secretary of Defense, summarized the US neglect in the Caribbean Basin in general, and
strategic challrnge effectively when he said, in Central America in particular.
While regular forces are very well prepared to The potential impact of a hostile Central
meet challenges at the mid-intensity level of America and Caribbean Basin in a general war
conflict and above, their very preparations and has been all but ignored in favor of the logistic
the associated habits ofmind do not make them and management challenge of moving large
equally prepared to cope with LIC 7 forces and sustainment to Europe in the event
Clearly then, the US Army must develop an of war. The fact is that without a friendly or
understanding of the nature and habits of the at least neutral Central American-Caribbean
mind of LIC operations and train its forces to Basin, the hope of waging a successful conven-
operate effectively in it. tional war in Europe could be doomed. In fact,

MILITARY REWEW . March ,990 7


There is ample evidence to suggest that the strategic equation has another important
factor other than Central Europe. Nearly all the armed conflicts of the past forty
years have occurred in what is vaguely referred to as the Third World. . . In the same
period, all the wars in which the U?ited&ata was involved-either directly with its
combat forces or indirectly with military assistance-occurred in the Third World

the US Army could conceivably find itself hav- capability to treat only serious diseases, with no
ing to deploy forces to protect the Southern preventive medical program21
flank of the United States while fighting a gen- Central America, and indeed all of Latin
eral war in Europe. Thus, it is essentially a ques- America, has increasingly become an area
tion of the United States devoting resources, of strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union.
including the US Army, to secure the nations This situation occurred not only as a result of
southern flank now, or risking paralysis by hav- US strategic and diplomatic neglect, but be-
ing to fight on two fronts at the Soviets option. cause of regional factors including the con-
The recent wave of change in Europe-with tinuing frailty of social and political arrange-
the ongoing and promised drawdowns of Soviet ments, the presence of communist govem-
and Warsaw Pact force levels-offers an oppor- ments in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the con-
tunity to correct this dangerous imbalance by tinuing wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The
shifting mission focus and resources to the LIC situation is compounded further by continuing
environment. As the probability of war and economic and debtservicing problems, the
threat size diminishes in Europe, however, re- illegal drug trade and the growing political
sources available to US forces will also dimin- strength of the drug traders. In fact, the drug
ish, leaving planners and decision makers with traders, often in collusion with the local guer-
persistent shortfalls. As has been said, US rills groups, have begun to pose serious chal-
defense capability is analogous to a medical lenges for the regions emerging democracieszz

March 1990 * MILITARY REVIEW


Central America. . . has increasinglybecome an area ofstrategic opportunity
for the Soviet Union. This situation occurred not only as a result of US strategic and
diplomatic neglect, but because ofregiional factors including the contiuing fAty
ofsocialandpoliticalarrangements, the presence ofcommun&tgovemments in
Cuba and Nicaragua, and the continuing wars in El Salvador and iVicaragua.
The situation is compounded further by continuing economic and debt-servkingprob
lems, the illegal drug trade and the growingpoliticalstrength of the drug traders.

The terrain itself appears to have been a recently as 1976, military governments and die,-
major factor in the social-political-economic tatorships were the rule in Central America.
vulnerability of the region, With the exception of Marxist-Leninist Nic-
A large portion of the region is dominated aragua (non; that democracy has been restored
by steep slopes. This mountain and hill country in Panama), military governments have disap
tends to restrict settlement, economic develop peared. Historically, t%e United States has
ment, circulation and acculturation. Indeed, it played a major role in the rise of democracy
has been referred to as a Dalkanized region both as an example and through direct encour-
because the dominance of sloping terrain has agement of the national structures themselves.
tended to fragment the area socioeconomically The evolution to civilian democratic govern-
as well as politically.* ments. unfortunately, leas not been accom-
For a number of teasons, all of which appear panied by corresponding growth and develop-
to stem from a general awakening of the people ment in the social and economic sectors.
to the fact that a better life exists and that they Leaders of Central American countries have
may be able to influence their own plight, there been unanimous in <heir emphasis that politi-
has been a steady drift toward political and eco- cal democracy cannot endure without the sup-
nomic democracy throughout the area. As porting social and economic development.

MILITARY REVIEW 0 March ,990 9


States Strategic Rear for very obvious reas0ns.~4
While there hasbeena steadydecolon- The challenge to the United States is to be a
izationof theareaby European powers, positive catalyst to the growth and spread of
CentralAmerican hopes of imitating the democracies and to accelerate the social and
USdemocracywereunmilled inevery economic benefits to the people of Central
caseexceptin CostaRica.Unfortunately, America. To accomplish this task, the United
the UnitedStateswasoften identi&dwith States has outlined six basic propositions to
theestablkhed, oiienoppressive structure. guide military action in theThird World:
Theresultwasafearof USinffuence, e US forces will not, in general, be comba-
tants. A combat role for US forces, as executed
in Panama, is viewed as an exceptional event.
The principal military role will to be to aug
The second major reason for unrest in rhe ment security assistance teams.
region is foreign interference. While there has @ The United States should actively sup
been a steady decolonization of t,he area by port anticommunist insurgencies.
European powers, Central American hopes of 0 Security assistance requires new legisla-
imitating the USdemocracy were unfulfilled in tion and more resources.
every case except in Costa Rica. Unfortunately, 0 The United States needs to work with its
the United States was often identified with the Third World allies at developing cooperative
established, often oppressive strucnxe. The re- forces.
sult was a fear of US influence. In the period @ In the Third World, no less than in devel-
after the Korean War, the Soviet Union hastened oped countries, US strategy should seek to max-
to exploit this fear at every opportunity. imize its technological advantage.
The most important US interest in Central e The United States must develop altema-
America is ensuring access to the Panama tives to overseas bases.25
Canal and to the shipping lanes of the Carib- Now that the basis for the East-West struggle
bean Sea. The Panama Canal is important for as focused in Central American-Caribbean
its strategic location. It is also important for Basin has been outlined, it will be useful to
symbolic reasons as well as providing quick review the methods Soviets and their surrogates
access between the two oceans which border are using to exploit the opportunities available
the US East and West coasts. Until the United to them.
States commits itself to the expense of two inde-
pendent navies (which appears very unlikely The Insurgent Model in
with co&ys budget-cutting realities), the Pan- Central America
ama Canal will be significant to US power pro. In order for the US Army to develop an effec-
jection efforts. Significantly, in the unlikely tive training strategy for its forces operating in
event of a war in Western Europe, more than LIC, it is necessary to understand the nature of
half ~of the US reinforcements and resupply the conflict generated by the insurgent. The
must pass through the Caribbean area. Eco- Cuban revolution is particularly important, as
nomically, it is important to the United States its guerrilla example became the most impor-
because two-thirds of the US imported oil, tant model for Latin American insurgencies.
many strategic minerals and nearly half of other With US assistance, other Latin American
US trade passes through the Panama Canal or countries were able to make necessary changes
the area of the Caribbean Basin. Thus, it is on- in their structure to prevent Cubas revolution
derstandable that Moscow refers to the Cen- from being imported. However, conditions exist
tral American-Caribbean area as the United that cause it to remain relevant. Each time

10
TRAL AMERICA

communist revolutionaries failed, they learned


important lessons which made them increas-
ingly effective in subsequent attempts.
Gn the surface, the situation in Cuba was
hhl
*g y unf avorable for revolutionaries. Cuba
was one of the more highly developed countries
of Latin America and enjqed a developed I&
tionship with US business interests. The army
was well armed and its government was fully
supported by the US govemment.2s
Fidel Castro managed to rum the Cuban gov,
emments strengths to his advantage. He was
able to establish a secure base of operations in
the mountains soon after he and his guerrilla
cadre were driven there by government forces.
From his base, Castro launched raid and am-
bush attacks on government forces throughout
the country. Government military aircraft never Revolutioaaries throughout Latin
had fixed targets and often bombed empty jun- America trained in the Cuban example.
gle or civilians. Frustrated government troops One does not necessarily have to wait
overreacted, used their firepower indiscrim for a revolutiomuy situation to arise,
inately and arrested anyone in the cities SW it can be CreatedlHowever, the rural
petted of supporting the rebel force. Thus, Cuban4nspiredinsurgenciks weresteadily
many otherwise apathetic Cuban people were defeatedin the 196Osanda newsetofrevo-
pushed into supporting the revolution to gain ludonaries began to shiftemphasisto the
revenge against the government. As Castros cities, to pokical unde~un$ to
strength grew from the rural populace joining politicalagitation.. . and terrorism.
the revolution, the government forces became
increasingly demoralized and isolated.2
As government repression increased, the
Catholic Church turned against it in protest Revolutionaries throughout Latin America
over the killing of innocent civilians. Later, the trained in the Cuban example. One does not
middle class, fed up with government conup necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary sit-
tion and inefficiency, joined the rebels. They uation to arise, it can be created.* However,
believed that Castro, who was not at that time the rural Cuban-inspired insurgencies were
a proclaimed Communist, might actually be steadily defeated in the 1960s and a new set of
able to improve Cuban society. It became in- revolutionaries began to shift emphasis to the
creasingly clear that the government had lost cities, to political undergrounds, to political
its legitimacy in terms of the support of its peo- agitation, civil disturbances and terrorism.
ple. The final straw was the withdrawal of US The shift to the cities where large groups of
support after a successful propaganda campaign discontented people could be found reflected
convinced the US government that it would be demographic developments throughout Latin
in its best interest to end its military and diplo- America.30
matic backing of a corrupt dictatorship. In Traditional military thinking was based on
January 1959, Castro and his revolutionaries controlling terrain, while revolutionary warfare
marched into Havana as victors.** is based on controlling polarized popular will.

MILITARY REVIEW-March 1990 11


Thus, guerrilla warfare creates a strange para- after the Spanish American War, the Army sac-
dox in history, That ofa strong, well-equipped, ceeded only after it developed a strategy that
well-trained army being unable to cope with an allwed unity of command and a central focus
irregular force which may sometimes be for economic, political and military action
comp3sed almost entirely of poorly equipped designed to achieve well-defined goals. The
civilians with little, if any, regular military counterguerrilla operations practiced then were
trair1ing.3 subsequently employed by General John J. Per-
However, revolutionary violence alienated shing in his campaign against the Moms on
the people from the guerrillas and led to popu- Mindanao in 1908. In the final analysis, iron-
lar demand for the gwernmcnt to take drastic ically perhaps. the greatest significance of the
measures to stop it. . guerrilla fish can sw American Armys Philippine experience might
vive only if in a friendly sea .? The resulting still be as an example of a successful pacification
military governments implemented economic campaign. 34 Thus in its domestic and colo-
and industrial policies which improved social nial experience, tie US Army perfected the
conditions. Thus the military, rather than the strategies and tactics of LIC. After the success
revolutionaries, came to be identified with of Castros revolution in Cuba, the US Atmy
change, progress and freedom from corruption. systematically imparted that experience to
The 1970s saw several developments that friendly Latin American governments. The re-
gave nw life to revoltrionary doctrine in Cen- s&s were positive and the communist threat
tral America. The US defeat in Vietnam was was essentially contained on the island of Cuba.
followed by a period of retreat in which the With the US Army in Vietnam, the situa-
United States demonstrated a relucr:tnce to tion was different. At the height of the war, it
become involved in foreign wars or even sup was able to move nearly a million men in and
port its interests abroad. The Soviet Union, on out of the theater and sustain them to an
the other hand, became more willing to support unprecedented standard. In engagement after
revolutionary operations abroad and fill the engagement the forces of the Vietcong and
vacuum left by the United Stares.3 North Vietnamese Army were beaten with
The most dramatic result of this new situ+ enmtnous losses. Yet, in the end it was not the
tion was the overthrow of the Somoza govern- US, hut North Vietnam that emerged as the
ment and assumption of power in Nicaragua by victor. A case can he made that the US Atmy
the Sandinista revolutionaries in 1979. confused the major activities of war. If the
Army is, as some would have it, merely a lo-
Training to Corn a~~~~~~~~N~y gistics and management system designed to
The US Army has had considerable experi- organize, train, and equip active duty and re-
ence in counterinsurgency operations in its serve forces, it was an unqualified success.35
200-year history. This experience has prodwed If the US Army is to succeed in combating
both positive and negative lessons in the strug communist insurgencies, it has to learn from its
gle to find the right combination ofstrategy and m&rakes in Vietnam as well as from its previous
tactics that is both successful and palatable to success. The lesson seems cleat. For an army to
the American people. be successful, it must operate as one element in
In the Second Seminole War, the US Army the range of necessary economic, social, politi.
achieved SUCCESS in 1842 only after it abane cal and military activities designed to place the
doned the strategic objective of seeking a de- guerrilla on the defensive, destroy his base of
cisive battle to destroy the Seminole means support and ultimately, his will to fight.
to resist in favor of destruction of their base of To win the initiative from the guerrilla, the
support and will to fight. In the Philippines Army must be capable of thinking and fighting

12 March 1990 *MILITARY REVIEW


Emphasis on capitalitems reinforces an armys predilection for spending too much
time in comfortable barracks. Helicopters andgunskips transform elite soldiers into
reaction foxes mther than using their offensive capability. . . Gunships and hzwy artillery
encourage commanders to stay close to their bases and rely on firepower for defense
rather than on aggressive patrolEng and ambushes in-depth.

as a guerrilla force. Castros iorces easily de- lery and f&d-wing aircraft that have tremen-
feated a guerrilla uprising shortly after captur- dous utility in a Central European battlefield.
ing the government because his forces were However, in LIC, such emphasis on capital
trained in guerrilla warfare. Small-unit satura- items reinforces an armys predilection for
tion patrolling and ambushing by small lmits spending too much time in comfortable bar-
of lightly amwd, highly foot-mobile teams is racks. Helicopters and gunships transform elite
essential to deny the gwrrilla rest and freedom soldiers into reaction forces rather than using
of movement. These units must be able to oper- their offensive capability to place the enemy on
ate without a fixed base and be capable of simul- the defensive. Gunships and heavy artillery
taneously harassing the insurgents and politiciz- encourage commanders to stay close to their
ing the civilian population. Leaders ofcounter- bases and rely on firepower for defense rather
insurgency units must be schooled in human than on aggressive patrolling and ambushes in-
rights doctrine and capable of enforcing it in depth. USsupplied airborne intelligence can
their forces. Such a strategy would in effect undermine a host country politically by provid-
attack the guerrillas from the rear and transfer ing targets for firepower that cannot distinguish
the advantages of better intelligence, surprise between guerrillas and civilians. When fire-
and local initiative to the government army. power fixes civilians out of a rural area, the
Unfortunately, much of the US Army mili- government is faced with inc.reased financial
tary training and assistance is measured in ;ind logistic. burdens which, if not met, generate
terms of capital items such as helicopters. artil- palitical dissatisfaction and strengthen the in-

MILITARY REVIEW * March IQ90 13


surge& political position. relationship to the strategy designed to achieve
An effective stmtegy places government US national objectives. The emphasis must be
forces permanently in the countryside, thereby on the development of what General John A.
denying the guerrilla freedom of movement and Wickham Jr. tetmed soldier power. This
support. US Army assistance programs should emphasis on the bottom-up . is developed
encourage this offensive, mobile strategy hy through thorough, rigorous training, physical
providing small arms, lightweight, portable and mental toughness, excellence in basic in&an-
communications and those soldier items that try skills, and competent, rewurceiul leadership.7
enhance individual mobility away from fixed The second element in tmining for LIC oper-
bases. US Army forces involved in LIC open- ations is to ensue Army leaders at every level
are familiar with the guerrilla mindset and are
instructed in the basics of what constitutes the
will to fight. US Atmy leaders at every level
The fist element in a LZC train-
must be able to apply guerrilla principles across
ingstrategy 15to ensure Army leaders are
the spectrum of conflict. Leader training is the
instructedat every level io tbe nature of
key, as prejudices and institutional bias against
such confZict as well as its relationship to
such soldier power training as airborne,
tbe strategy designed to achieve US nation-
Ranger, Special Forces and light infantry ate
al objectives. . . T&g an army to open
passed on at that level.
ate in a LIC environment does not require
Training an army to operate in a LIC
a separate training doctrine to aflow for
environment does not require a separate train-
the forwani deployed forces. The mind-set
ing doctrine to allow for the forward deployed
necm to operate effktiveiy in combat is
forces. The mind*t necessary to operate effec-
one that focuses on mobility and surprise.
tively in combat is one that focuses on mobility
and surprise. Leaders with this mindset do
what the enemy does not expect, and con-
tions must be expert at small-unit opemtions, stantly change both the means and methods to
light weapons, communications and intel- do the most improbable thing whenever thesit-
ligence gathering. They must he well-informed uation permits.
about the nature of the enemy they are encoune The Army has made tremendous gains in
wing. When in an advisory role, they must improving its capability in operations short of
understand and demonstrate the important war with the addition of light infantry divisions
intcriace of social, political, economic and mili- to the force structure, the increase in Ranger
tary elements at the lowest possible level. and airborne units for a greater forced entry/
Leaders at every level must understand the strike capability, the increase in Special Forces
oatwe, context and objectives of the operation. groups which specialize in foreign internal
The philosophy of Sun Tzu applies: defense, and US Southern Commands training
If you know the enemy and know you&f, efforts in Latin America. However, support of
you need not fear theresult ofa hundred battles. wery type for these efforts still falls considerably
If you know youtself hut not the enemy, for short of the need.
every victory gained you also suffer a defeat. If While the area of national interests, objec-
you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you tives and strategy is the principal province of
will succumb in every battle. the State Department, the US Army must be
The first element in a LIC training strategy is involved. While the Armys twofold mission is
to ensure Atmy leaders are instructed at every clear- to prepare for war and operations short
level in the nature of such conflict as well as its of war-it is also clear that preparation for war

14 March 1990. MILITARY REVIEW


LIC IN CENtRAL A

in Cenrml Europe has been the dominate pri- You know you never defeated us on the
ority. The firepower, attrition oriented mind-set battlefield, said the American Colonel. The
some feel is necessary in Europe to delay the North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this re-
decision to use nuclear weapons does not work mark a moment. That may he so, he replied,
in combating insurgency. This mind-set in- but it is also irrelevant. 38
stilled in the leadership of the Army through The starting point is in leader education.
its school system leads to an attempt to solve The Army institutional school system must re-
the LIC problem by large-scale capital items focus to provide emphasis commensurate with
which in turn, tends to handicap US allies. It the threat. When it is clear to Army leaders
can lead to their slow strangulation and ulti- that operations short of war share at least an
mate failure as in South Vietnam. eqtral billing with the improbable war in Cen-
The price of preparing for the wrong war has tral Europe, the institutional mindeet will be
historically been high for a nation. For an army easily changed to think mobility and destruc-
it has been defeat. It is not satisfactory for the tion of the enemys means to resist and his will
United States to lament, as illustrated by the to fight rather than simply firepower and attri-
now famous conversation in Hanoi, April 1975, tion. Nk

NOTES

MILITARY REVIEW. March 1990 15

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