Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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We stiUpemht in studying a type of war&e that no longer exists
and that we shalZnever iight again, while we pay only passing
attention to the war we fast in Indochina and rhe one we are
about to lose in Algeria. Yet the abandonment ofIndochina or of
Algeria iajust as important for France as would be the loss of a
metipoZitan provioce. The result of&s shortcoming h that the
army is not prepared to confront an adversary employins arms
and methods the army itselfignores. It has, therefore, no chance
ofwiotig.. . Ourmikuy machine reminds one of a pile driver
attempting to crush a fZy,indefatigably persisting in repeating its
efforts. The inability of the army to adapt itself to changed cir
cumstances has heavy consequences. Zt gives credence to the
belief that OUTadversaries, who represent only weak forces, are
invincible and that, sooner orkter, we shall have to accept their
conditions for peace. It encourages the diffusion of dangerously
erroneous ideas which eventually becomepenemZZy accepted.
E LIVE in rapidly changing times and scribed the basis of American strategy as fol-
most observers believe that the rate of lo~rs: US national strategy has consistently
change will continue to accelerate. Thus, it is rested on three basic pillars: deterrence, forward
predictable that challenges to the national defense, and allied solidarity.2 Obviously, US
interests of the United States will multiply and strategy to prevent general war has been suc-
that the nations resolve will be tested re- cessful. Success has been based on the advet-
peatedly. satys perception of US strength and resolve.
Army planners and decision makers have a While US strategy aims to deter general war, it
particularly difficult task ahead. They must is also designed to control crisis and to support
ensure that the nation has a credible ground its allies. This requires a forward presence of
force, able to support the nations global mili- troop units stationed in Europe and Korea and
taty strategy. One must remember that Ger- ships patrolling in international waters.
many in World War II won the Battle of France, The Department of Defense (DOD) exists to
but lost the Battle of Britain--and ultimately fulfill the national governments first obliga-
the wx. Germany, in fact, won the battle for tion: to secure national survival and indepen-
which it prepared and lost the one for which it dence. Frank Carlucci, former secretary of de-
had not. On the other hand, French military fense, summarized DODs mission as 0 to
doctrine, in addition to being defensive and preserve Americas freedom and to secure its
stagnant, was not fully integrated with the vital interests, creating an environment that
national political strategy. Prevailing French allows our nation to ptc~sper.~ Specifically,
military doctrine and its underlying national the current national security objectives of the
thought prior to World War II has been de- United States are:
scribed, Both operationally and politically, l To safeguard the United States, its allies
it looked backward to World War I. Thus, for and interestr by deterring aggression and cow
the statesman who defines the national strategy cion
and the soldier who is charged with implement- l To encourage and assist our allies and
ing it, the consequences of misunderstanding friends in defending themselves against aggres-
changing realities can be disastrous. sion, coercion
Recently, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost de- l To ensure US access to critical resources,
and only one clear victory.0 Moreover, the few the same trap as did the French prior to World
first victories resulted from the courage and sac- War II, training to fight the last war rather than
rifice of individual US soldiers, despite deficien- the next one.
cies in command and control and training that
focused on the wrong enemy. In 1933, General
Douglas MacArthur observed in a report to the
US Army chief of staf, . in no other profes- There is no question that the US Army
sion are the penalties for employing untrained should maintain a credible force to meet its
personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in NATO conlmitments-whatever they may
the military. 11 Vuono summarized the impor- turn out to be--in Central Europe. However,
tance of a properly trained Army when he said, to do that and to ignore operations short of
Clearly, we have learned a key lesson of his- war would be an abdication of responsibility
tory-that poorly trained armies invite attack and national trust. The prevailing assumption
by enemies, incur casualties needlessly and ulti- appears to be that such operations can be
mately suffer defeat.12 With the tremendous handled as a simple planning responsibility and
emphasis that has been placed by the US Army as an additional contingency for those forces
on training to fight the next war in Central prepared for commitment to a major European
Europe, one might ask if we are not falling into war.
the US Army could conceivably find itself hav- capability to treat only serious diseases, with no
ing to deploy forces to protect the Southern preventive medical program21
flank of the United States while fighting a gen- Central America, and indeed all of Latin
eral war in Europe. Thus, it is essentially a ques- America, has increasingly become an area
tion of the United States devoting resources, of strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union.
including the US Army, to secure the nations This situation occurred not only as a result of
southern flank now, or risking paralysis by hav- US strategic and diplomatic neglect, but be-
ing to fight on two fronts at the Soviets option. cause of regional factors including the con-
The recent wave of change in Europe-with tinuing frailty of social and political arrange-
the ongoing and promised drawdowns of Soviet ments, the presence of communist govem-
and Warsaw Pact force levels-offers an oppor- ments in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the con-
tunity to correct this dangerous imbalance by tinuing wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The
shifting mission focus and resources to the LIC situation is compounded further by continuing
environment. As the probability of war and economic and debtservicing problems, the
threat size diminishes in Europe, however, re- illegal drug trade and the growing political
sources available to US forces will also dimin- strength of the drug traders. In fact, the drug
ish, leaving planners and decision makers with traders, often in collusion with the local guer-
persistent shortfalls. As has been said, US rills groups, have begun to pose serious chal-
defense capability is analogous to a medical lenges for the regions emerging democracieszz
The terrain itself appears to have been a recently as 1976, military governments and die,-
major factor in the social-political-economic tatorships were the rule in Central America.
vulnerability of the region, With the exception of Marxist-Leninist Nic-
A large portion of the region is dominated aragua (non; that democracy has been restored
by steep slopes. This mountain and hill country in Panama), military governments have disap
tends to restrict settlement, economic develop peared. Historically, t%e United States has
ment, circulation and acculturation. Indeed, it played a major role in the rise of democracy
has been referred to as a Dalkanized region both as an example and through direct encour-
because the dominance of sloping terrain has agement of the national structures themselves.
tended to fragment the area socioeconomically The evolution to civilian democratic govern-
as well as politically.* ments. unfortunately, leas not been accom-
For a number of teasons, all of which appear panied by corresponding growth and develop-
to stem from a general awakening of the people ment in the social and economic sectors.
to the fact that a better life exists and that they Leaders of Central American countries have
may be able to influence their own plight, there been unanimous in <heir emphasis that politi-
has been a steady drift toward political and eco- cal democracy cannot endure without the sup-
nomic democracy throughout the area. As porting social and economic development.
10
TRAL AMERICA
as a guerrilla force. Castros iorces easily de- lery and f&d-wing aircraft that have tremen-
feated a guerrilla uprising shortly after captur- dous utility in a Central European battlefield.
ing the government because his forces were However, in LIC, such emphasis on capital
trained in guerrilla warfare. Small-unit satura- items reinforces an armys predilection for
tion patrolling and ambushing by small lmits spending too much time in comfortable bar-
of lightly amwd, highly foot-mobile teams is racks. Helicopters and gunships transform elite
essential to deny the gwrrilla rest and freedom soldiers into reaction forces rather than using
of movement. These units must be able to oper- their offensive capability to place the enemy on
ate without a fixed base and be capable of simul- the defensive. Gunships and heavy artillery
taneously harassing the insurgents and politiciz- encourage commanders to stay close to their
ing the civilian population. Leaders ofcounter- bases and rely on firepower for defense rather
insurgency units must be schooled in human than on aggressive patrolling and ambushes in-
rights doctrine and capable of enforcing it in depth. USsupplied airborne intelligence can
their forces. Such a strategy would in effect undermine a host country politically by provid-
attack the guerrillas from the rear and transfer ing targets for firepower that cannot distinguish
the advantages of better intelligence, surprise between guerrillas and civilians. When fire-
and local initiative to the government army. power fixes civilians out of a rural area, the
Unfortunately, much of the US Army mili- government is faced with inc.reased financial
tary training and assistance is measured in ;ind logistic. burdens which, if not met, generate
terms of capital items such as helicopters. artil- palitical dissatisfaction and strengthen the in-
in Cenrml Europe has been the dominate pri- You know you never defeated us on the
ority. The firepower, attrition oriented mind-set battlefield, said the American Colonel. The
some feel is necessary in Europe to delay the North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this re-
decision to use nuclear weapons does not work mark a moment. That may he so, he replied,
in combating insurgency. This mind-set in- but it is also irrelevant. 38
stilled in the leadership of the Army through The starting point is in leader education.
its school system leads to an attempt to solve The Army institutional school system must re-
the LIC problem by large-scale capital items focus to provide emphasis commensurate with
which in turn, tends to handicap US allies. It the threat. When it is clear to Army leaders
can lead to their slow strangulation and ulti- that operations short of war share at least an
mate failure as in South Vietnam. eqtral billing with the improbable war in Cen-
The price of preparing for the wrong war has tral Europe, the institutional mindeet will be
historically been high for a nation. For an army easily changed to think mobility and destruc-
it has been defeat. It is not satisfactory for the tion of the enemys means to resist and his will
United States to lament, as illustrated by the to fight rather than simply firepower and attri-
now famous conversation in Hanoi, April 1975, tion. Nk
NOTES