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XII.

RULE 39

BANES VS. BANES


374 SCRA 340

FACTS: The RTC of Cebu decreed legal separation between Aida and Respondent Gabriel on the ground of sexual
infidelity. Dissolution of conjugal property and division of the net conjugal assets forfeiture of Gabriels half share in the net
assets in favor of common children; payment of 100,000 as attorneys fees and surrender of a Mazda car and small
residential house to petitioner and common children 15 days from receipt of decision was also decreed by the same court.
Respondent appealed.

Aida filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The RTC gave due course to the execution pending appeal and issued a
writ of execution commanding the sheriff to order the respondent to vacate the house and surrender the Mazda car. It also
ordered the petitioner to post bond to answer for all damages that respondents may suffer.

The CA set aside the judgment.

Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children be allowed to occupy the house for she did not have the chance to
occupy it and besides, she posted a bond for damages that respondent may suffer. Respondent on the other hand argued
that Aida chose not to live in the house for she owned two houses in the US where she resides.

ISSUE: WON the execution pending appeal is justified?

HELD: Execution pending is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may
result from issuance of writ. Otherwise, the writ may become a tool of oppression and inequity.

In this case, considering the reason cited by Aida, there is no superior or urgent circumstances that outweigh the
damages which the respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. She did not refute the respondents
allegations that she did not intend to use the house for she owned two houses in the US where she resides. Merely,
putting up a bond is not sufficient to justify her plea for execution pending appeal.

FAJARDO VS. QUITALIG


400 SCRA 25

DOCTRINE: As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the final stage in the litigation process is completed without
unnecessary delay.

The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from the
court and its branches, including such as may be properly delegated to him by other courts.

FACTS: Sheriff Rodolfo Quitalig was charged by Reverend Fernando Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and/or dereliction of duty.

Complainant filed a case of ejectment against Datuin. Fernando (Complainant) won. The decision was appealed to the
RTC but was dismissed. The decision became final and executory. Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution
was served, defendant (Datuin) asked for a period of 2 weeks for her to remove her property. After 2 weeks he went to
Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ shall be implemented. In executing the Writ, respondent did not do anything except to ask
Defendant Datuin to bring out her personal properties. In addition a TRO was issued according to respondent.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Respondent to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff.
The writ was issued on March 7, 2000 and served on March 9, 2000. The TRO did not ripen into an injunction. The writ
was only implemented only on August 24, 2000 which was more than 4 months.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SHERIFF WAS REMISS IN HIS DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION.

RULING: YES. The SC agreed with the findings of the OCA. Respondent only enforced the Writ dated March 7, 2000
only on August 24, 2000. Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly
serving it upon the Defendant on March 9, 2000.

He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff. He should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to
enforce the Writ because another court has issued a TRO. His failure to make a return of a writ within the required period
is nonfeasance.
SANTOS VS. COMELEC
399 SCRA 611

TOPIC:

FACTS: Edgar Santos and Pedro Panulaya were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental
in the 2001 elections. Panulaya was proclaimed the winner. Santos, filed an election protest before RTC where it ruled in
favor of Santos trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received only 2,105

Santos, filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Panulaya then appealed to the COMELEC before RTC could have
acted on Santos motion. COMELEC, issued a writ of PI against the RTCs decision, then dismissed Panulayas appeal
and lifted the earlier WPI.

Santos, posted bond then RTC, issued a writ of execution thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan,
Misamis Oriental . Santos then took his oath and assumed duties. Panulaya then filed an MR before the COMELEC, and
pending resolution of his MR, he filed another petition before the COMELEC, which contained the same prayers.
COMELEC then issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining Santos from assuming
the functions of Mayor, Santos filed an MR before COMELEC 1st Division

COMELEC 1st Division did not refer the MR to the COMELEC En Banc

Santos filed a Rule 65 before the SC and filed an Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC

1. To Dissolve The Status Quo Order As It Was Based On An Unverified And Dismissed Petition With Pending
Motion For Reconsideration
2. To Refer This Motion To The Commission En Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

COMELEC then granted the omnibus motion

ISSUES:

1. Did Panulaya commit forum shopping? YES.


2. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC? NO.
3. Was the COMELEC correct in setting aside the RTC order which granted the motion for execution pending
appeal? NO.

HELD: It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he
instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
or order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For it to exist, there
should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was dismissed by the
COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the
trial courts order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and
while the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari, docketed
as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. This is plainly evident
from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the petition for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing
so, respondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were at
his own instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a favorable decision in another petition. He filed the second
petition on the supposition that the COMELEC might look with favor upon his reliefs.

Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the
court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial
processes. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts
and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs.

Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should
have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal
of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.
The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial courts orders for the execution of its decision pending
appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain
the annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order granting execution pending appeal,
it held:

It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short
period is left. Relative to this Courts jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing
of the notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve
pending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal (Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745)
need not be overemphasized.

However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for
execution of a judgment pending appeal.

We disagree.

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we
clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest
involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested
office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending (italics supplied).

The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of
trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to
run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given
meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest
was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of
Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the
case of Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise:

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the
immediate execution should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale why
such execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as much recognition to the
worth of a trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers. Thus:

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume office,
subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed,
when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically
prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt to yield to
extraneous considerations, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while,
on the other hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better
technical preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study
and mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the
immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding the
perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court,
good reasons therefor.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v.
COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by
devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence,
lay to waste the will of the electorate.
Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing outright, the petition
in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial
courts order granting execution pending appeal.

RCBC VS. MAGWIN MARKETING CORP


402 SCRA 592

TOPIC: Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed, and
set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it ready for pre-trial are matters which should have been clarified and
resolved in the first instance by the court a quo.

FACTS: Petitioner RCBC filed on March 4, 1999 a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy. On
April 26, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment. On June 4, 1999 the writ was returned partially satisfied since
only a parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached. In the meantime, summons was served on
each of the defendants who filed their respective answers, except for Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without prejudice
as party-defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On September 21, 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ of
attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a quo denied. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial, and
for 6 months petitioner and respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, undertook restructuring of the indebtedness of
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation. Petitioner finally approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation, with
only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the
restructuring. RTC Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice the case for failure of
petitioner as plaintiff to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging that only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
already approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but
subject to the terms and conditions specified in the letter sent by RCBC. This motion was followed by petitioners
Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that petitioner
could not submit a compromise agreement because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature. Respondent
Anderson Uy opposed the submissions of petitioner while respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and
Benito Sy neither contested nor supported them. The trial court denied petitioners motion to calendar case for pre-trial for
failure of the plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement.

Petitioner then went to the CA in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA dismissed the petition, for failure to prosecute
its action for an unreasonable length of time is dependent on the following conditions, to wit: a) The submission of the
compromise agreement by petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice; and b) Failure of petitioner to submit the said
compromise agreement shall cause the imposition of the payment of the required docket fees for the re-filing of the case;
so much so that the non-compliance by petitioner of condition no. 1 would make condition no. 2 effective, especially that
petitioners manifestation and motion to set case for pre-trial conference and supplemental motion were denied which in
means that the order was ultimately not set aside considering that a party need not pay docket fees for the re-filing of a
case if the original case has been revived and reinstated.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it did not allow the parties to set the case for pre-trial and dismiss the case after
no compromise agreement was submitted.

HELD: the SC ruled in favor of RCBC.

Petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court may dismiss a case on the
ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances
plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
Unless a partys conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for
dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which
would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case
or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

Clearly, another creative remedy was available to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil Case without
sacrificing the course of justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a compromise agreement was the refusal of just
one of herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and the
common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference was the best-
suited solution to the problem as this stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and the dispute quickly and
genuinely reconciled. By means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to sway the litigants to agree upon some fair
compromise.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and circuitous route that
may end up aggravating, not resolving, the disagreement. This case management strategy is frighteningly deceptive
because it does so at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action, perhaps, may have already been admitted by its
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4) defendants not willing to contest petitioners allegations, and more
critically, since this approach promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard work already undertaken by the trial
court. As we have aptly observed, inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges,
they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to
delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.

CITY OF ILIGAN VS. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GR


407 SCRA 554

TOPIC: Execution pending appeal

FACTS: A MOA on a turn-key arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano with Land Bank Realty Development
Corporation (LBRDC) as General Contractor and PMGI as Developer - Financing Manager. The project to be undertaken
was the construction of a Sports Complex which upon completion shall be turned over to Iligan City for acceptance and
the issuance of Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to enable LBRDC-PMGI to call on the SLC.

The work on the project stopped due to the refusal of some of the occupants to vacate the premises claiming that
they have not been paid their disturbance compensation. By then, PMGI had already accomplished 78.27% of the
contracted project equivalent to P10,957,800.00 of the total project cost of P14,000,000. PMGI requested from petitioner
for a deductive change order to enable it to collect the above-stated amount based on the 78.27% accomplishment of the
project. Petitioner claimed that PMGIs accomplishment was only 52.89% or equivalent only to P6,958,861.59 based on
the Accomplishment Report. Petitioner refused to pay since the mutually agreed price of P14,000,000 shall only be paid
after the completion of the project and acceptance by it and since the project is not yet complete, no payment can be paid.
The problem on the payment of the affected occupant, which was the cause of the work stoppage, was accordingly
brought to the attention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which authorized the payment of the affected occupants in the
project site.

PMGI filed a complaint against petitioner for rescission of the MOA and damages. After the filing of petitioners
Answer, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by PMGI which claimed that there was no genuine issue as to
the fact of the obligation of the petitioner since it admitted the accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59
of PMGI and that the petitioner had not specifically denied under oath the genuineness of the Letter of Credit and MOA.
An Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by petitioner. The trial court granted the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and ruled in favor of PMGI. Petitioners MR was denied. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.
PMGI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal which alleged that when the appeal is clearly dilatory, order for
execution upon good reasons may be issued with the discretion of the court. The same was granted over the opposition of
the petitioner. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the execution pending appeal was proper or not?

HELD: The Order granting execution pending appeal was proper. Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. There are 3 requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal:

a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and

c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.

Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained
until and unless

(a) the judgment has become final and executory;

(b) the right of appeal has been renounced or waived;

(c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or

(d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin
-- in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.

On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be
allowed except if, in the courts discretion, there are good reasons therefor. These reasons must be stated in a special
order, because unless these are divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial discretion has been
properly exercised by the lower court. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate
execution of a judgment, lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time,
considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay.

The good reason relied upon by both the trial and the CA was that the partial adjudication of the case was based
on petitioners own admission; hence, any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed,
both courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue
execution.

The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and the appellate court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is shown that
there has been an abuse of discretion. Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial courts grant of execution
pending appeal. Indeed, a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize immediate execution is when an appeal is
clearly dilatory.

VILLARUEL VS. FERNANDO


412 SCRA 54

[G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003]

PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO,


MODESTO ABARCA, JR. and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
[1] [2]

CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 denying due course to the petition
[3]

for certiorari filed by Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 denying the
[4]

motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M.
Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the
Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air
traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation
industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing
them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary
Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order
their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also
sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from
Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a
memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents
to their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0139. Respondents prayed for the following:

P R AY E R

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners herein respectfully pray of this Honorable Court
that:

1. Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction be issued ex-parte directing respondent Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., to recall the petitioners
herein within twenty four (24) hours from receipt hereof to their mother unit, the Civil Aviation
Training Center, Air Transportation Office, DOTC, and to forthwith allow them to assume, perform
and discharge the functions, duties and responsibilities inherent, appurtenant and incident to their
respective offices.

2. After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered confirming the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction earlier issued by this Honorable Court and declaring the same permanent, and ordering
the respondent Panfilo Villaruel, Jr., to pay petitioners herein the following damages, to wit:

a) to pay petitioner Reynaldo D. Fernando the amount of P50,000 as actual and compensatory
damages;

b) to pay petitioners herein moral, exemplary and temperate damages, in such amounts as may
hereafter be proven in the course of trial, which petitioners herein are leaving to the sound
discretion of this Honorable Court to determine and adjudge;

c) to pay petitioners herein attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000;

d) to pay petitioners herein the costs of suit.

Petitioners herein pray for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
[5]

On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents prayer for a preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial court was appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 231 of
the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. [6]

On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit until further orders by the trial court.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents
moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not
filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding petitioner guilty of indirect
[7]

contempt. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41263.


Meanwhile, the trial court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the
petition for mandamus and damages. Accordingly, respondents adduced their evidence ex-
parte before the Clerk of Court.
On 11 July 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondent declaring mandamus permanent and thereby ordering
respondent Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., to pay the following:

(1) One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) each as moral damages;

(2) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as exemplary damages;

(3) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as temperate damages, and;

(4) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED. [8]

Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42447. With the filing of the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
[9]

respondents motion for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being
moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within
which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the
memorandum. Subsequently, Solicitor Restituto Tuando, Jr. who was handling the case was
appointed Regional Trial Court judge of Dumaguete City. The case was re-assigned to Assistant
Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing
petitioners appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor
Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The
Resolution became final and executory on 14 June 1997.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a
copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition.
Acting on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution on 22 September
1997. On 3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting on 23 February 1998
the sale of petitioners real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83030.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
[10]

Execution and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial courts decision
never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner
claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the
dismissal of his appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the
dismissal of his appeal and of the trial courts order granting respondents motion for execution.
Petitioner further asserted that the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-96-
0090 superseded the decision of the trial court. The Ombudsmans Resolution approved the
[11]

following recommendation of the reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent MODESTO ABARCA, JR., is hereby found GUILTY of


violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713, for which the penalty of Suspension Without Pay
for Six (6) Months is hereby recommended pursuant to Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07, in relation to Section 25(2) of Republic Act No. 6770.
It is also respectfully recommended that the charge against respondents REYNALDO FERNANDO
and MARY LOU CLEOFAS be DISMISSED. [12]

On 23 February 1998, the trial court issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution because the
Sheriff failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, however, issued an
Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the
same on 28 April 1998.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts orders, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 assailing the execution of the trial courts
decision of 11 July 1996. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and
dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner raised before the Court of Appeals the following issues:

1. THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DATED JULY 11, 1996 IS VOID FOR LACK OF DUE
PROCESS AND COULD NOT HAVE BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

2. SUPERVENING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE TRANSPIRED WHICH


RENDERED EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE. [13]

On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming
final and executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds petitioner.
The Court of Appeals admonished petitioner for his failure to ascertain periodically from the OSG
or from the Court of Appeals the status of his appeal. The appellate court cited Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, which held that it is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to his counsel on matters
[14]

concerning his case. A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to
apprise himself of the progress of the case. A lawyers negligence binds a party litigant who must
suffer the consequences of such negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no
proof that the OSG failed to inform petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts ruling that the nature of
the case before the Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial court. The former deals
with a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713) punished with suspension from office while the
[15]

latter deals with an ultra vires act punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that the findings
of the Ombudsman had nothing to do with the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are
separate and distinct from each other.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals opined that petitioner failed to prove that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion to warrant the writ of certiorari. The appellate court ruled that the trial court
acted in accord with law and prevailing jurisprudence in issuing the questioned orders.

The Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for resolution of this Court: [16]

1. Whether the award of moral, exemplary and temperate damages to respondents has legal
basis.

2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from
becoming final and executory.
3. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due process when the appellate court dismissed
his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum.

4. Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating
Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.

The main issue to resolve is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari assailing the trial courts orders dated 23 February 1998 and 28 April 1998. Resolving this
issue necessarily determines the validity of the questioned orders. This in turn resolves the questions
of whether the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due process and whether the Ombudsmans
resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
We can no longer resolve the issue regarding the validity and reasonableness of the award of
damages for three reasons. First, the decision of the trial court dated 11 July 1996 is already final and
executory. Second, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner was simply a direct consequence of the
trial courts issuance of the writ of execution and notice of sheriffs sale. In other words, petitioner
merely questioned the execution of the trial courts decision in his petition for certiorari. Third,
petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity and reasonableness of the award of damages before
the Court of Appeals. [17]

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.


We begin by pointing out that petitioner failed to allege the essential requisites under Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Specifically, petitioner never
alleged that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
orders. Neither did petitioner allege that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In other words, there is no issue that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On this
score alone, the dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is in
order. However, in disposing of the instant case, we shall still resolve the principal issues raised by
petitioner.

No Denial of Petitioners Right to Due Process

Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 96-0139 is
void for lack of due process. Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him the chance to be
heard and to submit his evidence. Petitioner, formerly represented by the OSG, failed to file an
answer to respondents petition for mandamus and damages. Consequently, the trial court declared
petitioner in default. While the OSG filed a notice of appeal of the judgment by default, it failed to file
with the Court of Appeals the required memorandum resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. In
petitioners words, the OSG virtually abandoned his case. Petitioner argues that the inexcusable
[18]

negligence of the OSG did not bind him and prevented the decision of the trial court from becoming
final and executory.
We do not agree.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not
[19]

denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals,
petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioners former
counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate
courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such
negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
[20]

In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz, which petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled:
[21]
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake
binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should
an exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without
an explanation to that effect. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him
from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even
attempt to refute the respondents allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSGs
failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring
petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another
lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of interest
in petitioners case, until the trial courts decision became final. In Salva v. Court of Appeals, the
[22]

Court declared:

Respondents reliance on Legarda is inapropos. Notably, the decision in said case was not yet final
in 1991. The private respondent therein then filed a timely motion for reconsideration. In granting
the motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc held:

xxx

Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas
counsel. If she may be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her
counsel, with more reason are respondents truly innocent. xxx In this case, it was not respondents,
but Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her
case and who continued to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.

At any rate, we find that respondent Governor Sato, as well as the Province of Occidental Mindoro
which she represents, were not denied their day in court. Responsive pleadings were filed before
the lower courts, and respondent was given all the opportunities to prove her case. Her chosen
counsel did not diligently exhaust all legal remedies to advance respondents cause, yet
respondent did not terminate his services. She was aware of the repeated negligence of her
counsel and cannot now complain of counsels errors. Hence, there is no justifiable reason to
exempt her from the general rule that clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence,
mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had the full
authority to fire at any time and replace with another even without justifiable reason. (Emphasis
supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors. Petitioner should have taken
the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his
case. Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
[23]

and await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioners stance would enable every party to
[24]

render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on
the part of his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts
[25]

long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.


[26]

The Ombudsmans Resolution Does Not Render the Execution


of the Trial Courts Decision Unjust and Inequitable

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner
insists that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.
True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances
[27]

transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This, [28]

however, is not the case here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to
the finality of the trial courts decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997
while the trial courts decision became final and executory on 14 June 1997.Therefore, the resolution
of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of
the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of
RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for
damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the
action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and
distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action. Petitioners cause of action arose
from respondents alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of
action resulted from petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the
administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of
violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether
respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial courts decision unjust
and inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of
RA 6713 did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail respondents to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando and
Mary Lou Cleofas. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded damages to respondents. Contrary to
petitioners contention, awarding damages to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents
for their alleged wrongdoing. The award merely compensates respondents for petitioners own
unlawful acts. Clearly illegal were petitioners acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to the office of
DOTC Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive of Secretary
Garcia to recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1513 November 12, 2003

Spouses JAIME and PURIFICACION MORTA, Complainants.


vs.
Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and Sheriff
DANILO O. MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao, Albay, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unreasonable delay in resolving motions opens a judge to administrative sanctions. Likewise, a


sheriff is administratively liable for delayed implementation of a writ of execution and failure to
render the required reports thereon. These are necessary lessons from the time-honored
principle that "justice delayed is justice denied."

The Case and the Facts


In their Administrative Complaint1 dated July 26, 2001, Spouses Jaime and Purificacion Morta Sr.
charged Judge Antonio C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay with
gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and delay. They also indicted Sheriff Danilo O.
Matias of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay (Branch 14) with gross ignorance of the
law, negligence and connivance with the defendants in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 (MTC,
Guinobatan, Albay). The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the factual
antecedents as follows:

"x x x [In] a Complaint-Affidavit dated July 26, 2001 (with enclosures), x x x [Spouses] Jaime
and Purificacion Morta[,] through their counsel[,] Atty. Rodolfo R. Paulino[,] charg[ed]
[Respondent] Judge Antonio C. Bagagan and Sheriff Danilo O. Matias with gross ignorance of
the law and procedure, incompetence, bias and delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 481,
entitled Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purficacion Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental and Atty. Mariano Baranda,
Jr., for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Civil Case No. 482 entitled
Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purficacion Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and
Daniel Corral, for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

"Complainants, who are the plaintiffs in the aforementioned civil cases, allege[d] that on March
29, 1994[,] the Municipal Trial Court [of] Guinobatan, Albay rendered a decision in their favor.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of the


plaintiffs and against the defendants in both cases as follows:

1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and disturb the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs in the lands in question situated at San Rafael, Guinobatan;

2) Condemning the defendants in Civil Case No. 481 to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs the total amount of P8,130.00 representing the value of the coconuts, pili nuts
and anahaw leaves and for the destroyed plants;

3) Ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 481 jointly and severally to reimburse the
plaintiffs the amount of P202.00 as legal expenses incurred in filing their suit;

4) Condemning the defendants in Civil Case No. 482 jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiffs the total amount of P9,950.00 representing the value of the coconuts and
anahaw leaves;

5) Ordering the said defendants in Civil Case No. 482 to jointly and severally reimburse
the plaintiffs the sum of P202.00 as legal expenses in filing this suit.

"The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court [of] Ligao, Albay. In its decision dated
August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court [RTC] dismissed the aforesaid cases on the ground
that the claims for damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). On
September 9, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing
the decision of the RTC. However, in its decision dated May 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower courts ruling that the cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of DARAB. Thereafter, the First Division of this Court, acting on the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the plaintiffs, rendered its decision dated June 10, 1999 in G.R. No. 123417
affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay in Civil Case Nos. 481 and
482 and thereby setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 35300 and
that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.

"They now complain that despite the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid
case had already become final and executory, the respondent Judge still refused to issue a writ
of possession in their favor.

"Complainants further allege that on June 6, 2000 they filed a motion to cite Jaime Occidental
for contempt of court. Although more than one (1) year had already elapsed since the motion
was filed in the respondent Judges sala, the same had remained unresolved up to the filing of
the instant complaint.
"As against the respondent Sheriff, the complainants aver[red] that through his ignorance,
negligence and connivance with the defendants, he failed to execute in full the writ of execution
that had been previously issued by the court in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482. Moreover, it took
respondent Sheriff a long time before he finally submitted his Sheriff's Return of Service on the
Writ of Execution."2

In his Answer/Comment3 dated April 2, 2002, respondent judge explained that he had denied
complainants Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time Civil Case
Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by this Court on June 10, 1999, they had already been
ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil
Case No. 1920. In Civil Case No. 1920, respondent judge ordered complainants to vacate the
disputed lots. A Writ of Execution/Demolition was thereafter issued on January 29, 1998. On the
other hand, the DARAB Decision, which became final and executory on October 27, 1998,
directed them to cease and desist from disturbing the peaceful possession of therein Petitioner
Jaime Occidental.

Regarding the alleged delay in the resolution of the Motion for Contempt filed by complainants,
respondent judge contended that an ocular inspection and a hearing had been conducted by his
court as early as June 16, 2000, to determine if their Motion had any basis. With the consent of
their counsel, the hearing had to be deferred, however, pending receipt of the Sheriffs Report in
Civil Case No. 1920.

For his part, Respondent Sheriff Matias admitted in his Comment 4 dated April 18, 2002, that
there was delay in the full implementation of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case Nos. 481 and
482. Explaining that the delay was due to his heavy workload and thus unintentional, he begged
for compassion from this Court.

Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA found that the explanation of respondent judge for not granting the Motion for
Execution, filed by complainants, was sufficient. According to the court administrator, the records
showed that they had indeed been evicted from the lots they were claiming when Civil Case Nos.
481 and 482 were finally decided by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1999. 5 Moreover, it
emphasized that this Court had merely affirmed the Decision of the MTC insofar as the award of
damages was concerned.

As to complainants Motion to cite Occidental in contempt, the OCA held that the delay was due
primarily to the need of the court to clarify some important matters, not to the negligence or
partiality of respondent. Accordingly, it recommended that the charges against him be dismissed
for lack of merit.

On the other hand, the OCA found that Sheriff Matias had failed to implement the Writ of
Execution promptly and efficiently. It recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future would be dealt with
more severely.

The Courts Ruling

We modify the OCAs findings and recommended penalties, consistent with Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court and the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.

Administrative Liability

We agree with the OCA that respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of
execution/possession. His action was consistent with the Decision of this Court in GR No. 123417
affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latters Order directing defendants not to
molest complainants in their peaceful possession was rendered moot when they were ousted
from the disputed lots by virtue of the final and executory judgments in Civil Case No. 1920 and
DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may be refused, as in this
case, when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that would make its execution
inequitable.6
The delay in the resolution of complainants Motion, however, is an altogether different matter.
The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins trial court judges, as paragons of justice in the first
instance, to dispose of the courts business promptly 7 and to decide cases and motions within the
required periods.8 Section 15(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution mandates them to do so within
three months from the date of submission for decision or final resolution. This Court, through
Administrative Circular No. 1,9 also specifically requires all of them to act promptly on all
motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. 10

Hence, it is well-settled that the unexplained failure of judges to decide cases and resolve
motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days, which is fixed by the
Constitution and the law, renders them administratively liable.11 We have stressed often enough
that delay in the administration of justice undermines the faith of the people in the judiciary,
which is expected to hear their supplications promptly. Delay reinforces in the mind of litigants
the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.12 As the time-honored principle
goes, "justice delayed is justice denied."

In this case, respondent judge never resolved the Motion, filed on June 6, 2000, to cite
Defendant Occidental for contempt. While it is true that the former immediately conducted an
ocular inspection of the area to determine if the Motion had any basis, this act served only to
mitigate his infraction, but not absolve him from it. The Sheriffs Return of Service of the Writ of
Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1920 would have clarified whether or not Occidental had
already been fully restored in possession. But while its absence was a valid reason to defer
action on the contempt Motion at the outset, it was certainly not an excuse for the prolonged
inaction.

Had respondent judge been so minded, he would have requested a copy of the Sheriffs Report,
so that he could rule on the Motion with dispatch. He has not satisfactorily explained his failure
to do so, considering that the Writ of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1920 had been fully
executed as early as February 25, 1998, and the return thereon made on March 17, 1998. 13

With respect to the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that he was
remiss in his duty to implement the Writ fully in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482.1a\^/phi1 Time
and time again, we have impressed upon those tasked to implement court orders and processes
to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process -- the execution of judgment -- be carried
out promptly. They should exert every effort and indeed consider it their bounden duty to do so,
in order to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 14 A decision that is left
unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because of the sheriffs inefficiency or negligence remains an
empty victory on the part of the prevailing party.15 For this reason, any inordinate delay in the
execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be countenanced by the Court.1a\^/phi1

There is no mistaking the mandatory character of the period prescribed under Section 14 of Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Return of a Writ of Execution, which reads:

"SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied
in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties."

A similar rule is stated in Administrative Circular No. 12 dated October 1, 1985, and incorporated
in the Manual for Clerks of Court.16 According to this Circular, all sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall
submit to the judge concerned a report on actions taken on all writs and processes assigned to
them within 10 days from receipt.

Per the records of this case, a Writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1999 in Civil Case
Nos. 481 and 482.17 Respondent Sheriffs Return of Service18 of that Writ was filed only on May
25, 2000, however, or six months thereafter. There is nothing in the records showing that he
submitted before then a periodic report on the actions he had taken on the Writ "every 30 days
from the date of receipt" as required. On the contrary, the Report indicates that the Writ was
partially executed on December 15-28, 1999 and January 11, 2000; and that the damages
adjudged were partly paid in the amount of P3,500 plus one unit of Karaoke machine. But it was
only on May 25, 2000, that this matter was reported to the trial court.

The excuse proffered by respondent sheriff -- heavy workload -- cannot absolve him from
administrative sanctions.19 As an officer of the court, he should at all times show a high degree
of professionalism in the performance of his duties.20 He has failed to observe that degree of
dedication required of him as a sheriff. The charge of connivance is, however, dismissed for lack
of basis.

Although the OCA recommended that Respondent Judge Bagagan be absolved of all charges,
we find him guilty of undue delay21 in resolving a pending motion, an infraction that also
constitutes a violation of a Court circular.22Under Section 11(B) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, this less serious charge23 may be sanctioned by a fine of more than P10,000, but not
exceeding P20,000.

As to Sheriff Matias, we find him guilty of simple neglect of duty,24 a less grave offense under the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This infraction is punishable
by a suspension of one month and one day to six months. 25 But under the circumstances, we
find it inadvisable to suspend respondent sheriff, considering that his work would be left
unattended in his absence. Instead, we adopt our previous ruling in Aquino v.
Lavadia 26 imposing a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, so that he can finally implement
the subject Writ and perform his other duties.

WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay, is
found guilty of unreasonable delay and is FINED P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand,
Sheriff Danilo O. Matias of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay (Branch 14), is ordered to pay
a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, with a similar warning of stiffer sanctions for the same
or a similar act.

SERRANO VS. CA
417 SCRA 415

WRITS OF EXECUTION; SUPERVENING FACTS

The execution of a judgment may be stayed, nothwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by the Supreme
Court if there are supervening facts and circumstances which either have a direct effect upon a matter already litigated
and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of
a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.

FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon located at
Road 4, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80384, and a parcel of land located in
Caloocan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The couple mortgaged the said properties in favor of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the couple was able to
pay only the amount of P18,000.

On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as vendors, and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as vendees, executed a deed
of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house
thereon for the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property, the
balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses Geli thereafter
took possession of the property. In the meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was survived by her husband Emilio Geli
and their children.

Emilio Geli and his children failed to settle the amount of P32,000 to the GSIS. The latter forthwith filed a complaint
against Emilio Geli and his children with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the rescission of the deed of absolute
sale with partial assumption of mortgage. The defendants therein alleged, by way of special defense, that the plaintiffs
Spouses Serrano failed to furnish them with a detailed statement of the account due from the GSIS, thus amounting for
their failure to remit the balance of the loan to the GSIS. On September 6, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering the rescission of the said deed.

Emilio Geli and his children appealed the decision to the CA on October 19, 1984. During the pendency of the appeal, the
GSIS foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the property for non-payment of the P50,000 loan secured by the said
property. At the sale on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A certificate of sale over the property was thereby
issued by the sheriff in its favor on August 30, 1986. On October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio Geli paid the
redemption price of P67,701.844 to the GSIS. Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the said amount with the
notation for the account of Arturo Serrano were issued. Accordingly, on February 22, 1988, the GSIS executed a
certificate of redemption5 and turned over to Emilio Geli the owners copy of TCT No. 80384 in the names of the Spouses
Serrano. Emilio Geli did not inform the Spouses Serrano and the CA that he had paid the redemption price to the GSIS.

After the remand of the records, the Spouses Serrano filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994 a motion for the execution
of the trial courts September 6, 1984 Decision. On February 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order granting the motion
and forthwith issued a writ of execution. The writ, however, was not implemented as the Spouses Serrano were then in the
United States. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution on motion of the plaintiffs. This, too, was
not implemented, because of the defendants change of address. On May 9, 1996, the trial court issued an order granting
the motion of the plaintiffs for a second alias writ of execution. On September 6, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to
quash the same claiming, for the first time, that defendant Emilio Geli had already redeemed the subject property in 1988
from the GSIS. According to the defendants, this constituted a supervening event that would make the execution of the
trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.

On May 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. It noted that the payment
by defendant Emilio Geli of the redemption price to the GSIS took place before the CA dismissed the appeal and before
the decision of the RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not constitute a supervening event warranting a quashal
of the writ of execution.

The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987 while his
appeal was pending in the CA, the said redemption was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement of the writ
of execution issued by the trial court against them unjust and inequitable.

Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE REDEMPTION CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH CHANGE
THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THUS RENDERING EXECUTION INEQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the
part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it
becomes final and executory. It may happen, however, that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a
judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal
has been dismissed and the appealed judgment had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of and
could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that
time. In the first situation, any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory decision must fail. Once a
judgment has become final and executory, the only remedy left for material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38
of the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no other prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the judgment on
equitable grounds predicated on facts occurring before the finality of judgment. In the second situation, the execution may
be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It is required, however, that the
supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or
create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final
judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice. The interested party
may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts. Evidence may be adduced by the parties on such
supervening facts or circumstances.

In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to the GSIS
for the account of the petitioners was made while the appeal of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the
RTC was pending. The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory. It behooved the said
respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where they should have invoked the payment of the redemption
price as a ground for the reversal of the trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The respondents failed to do so, and
even concealed the payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners. Worse, the respondents did not pay the
requisite docket fees for their appeal, which resulted in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any motion for
the reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of
the trial court to become final and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial court
can no longer be frustrated by the respondents payment, through Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in
1987.

G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005

D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner,


vs.
ARNULFO ORPIA, LODUVICO ABUCEJO, ROWEL AGURO, EFREN ALMOETE, ROMEO AMISTA, WARLITO BALAGOSA,
ROMEO BALINGBING, RAMON BARROA, MONTECLARO BATAWIL, ARNEL BON, RICARDO CAPENTES, DANILO
DADA, JOEL DELA CRUZ, HERNANO DELOS REYES, FLORENTINO DELOS TRINO, ROGELIO DUERME, NONITO
ESTRELLADO, JOSEPH FALCESO, ISIDRO FLORES, VICTOR GUNGON, SONNY JULBA, PATRICIO LACANA, JR., FELIX
LASCONA, JUANITO LUNA, RAUL LUZADAS, ROMMEL MAGBANUA, ROGELIO MARIBUNG, NICOLAS MENDOZA,
EZVENER OGANA, RICKY ORANO, REYNALDO OZARAGA, SAMUEL PADILLA, EDWIN PARRENO, IRENEO PARTOLAN,
JUAN PIGTUAN, GUILLERMO PUSING, RODEL SIBAL, SILVESTRE SOLEDAD, JOVENAR TEVER, VIRGILIO TIMAJO,
ERMILIO TOMARONG, JR., VIRGILIO VERDEFLOR and JOEREX VICTORINO, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For resolution is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision1 dated December 18, 2001 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61799, entitled "DArmoured Security
and Investigation Agency, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Arbiter Ariel C. Santos, NLRC Sheriff Ricardo Perona,
Arnulfo Orpia, Ludovico Abucejo, Rowel Aguro, Efren Almoete, Romeo Amista, Warlito Balgosa, Romeo Balingbing, Ramon
Barroa, Monteclaro Batawil, Arnel Bon, Ricardo Capentes, Danilo Dada, Joel dela Cruz, Hernando delos Reyes, Florentino
delos Trino, Rogelio Duerme, Nonito Estrellado, Joseph Falceso, Isidro Flores, Victor Gungon, Sonny Julba, Patricio Lacana,
Jr., Felix Lascona, Juanito Luna, Raul Lozadas, Rommel Magbanua, Rogelio Maribung, Nicolas Mendoza, Ezvener Ogana,
Ricky Orano, Reynaldo Ozaraga, Samuel Padilla, Edwin Parreno, Ireneo Partolan, Juan Pigtuan, Guillermo Pusing, Rodel Sibal,
Silvestre Soledad, Jovener Tever, Virgilio Timajo, Emilio Tomarong, Jr., Virgilio Verdeflor and Joerex Victorino."

On February 9, 1995, the above-named respondents, who were employed as security guards by DArmoured Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc., petitioner, and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc. (Fortune Tobacco), filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco, docketed as NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-02-01148-95.

On June 11, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the respondents except Antonio Cabangon Chua are jointly and severally liable to pay
complainants the total sum of ONE MILLION SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR AND TWENTY
NINE CENTAVOS (P1,077,124.29) for underpayment, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay, illegal deduction and refund of firearms bond, as indicated in Annex A.

Finally, ten (10%) percent of all sums owing to complainants is hereby awarded as attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED."

From the said Decision, Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner
did not appeal. On March 26, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision affirming with modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in
the sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was dismissed. This Decision became final and executory. Thus, the
award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter became the sole liability of petitioner.

The records were then remanded to the Arbiter for execution.

Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of garnishment upon the
Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an existing services agreement. Thus,
petitioners receivables with Foremost were garnished.

Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment" which was opposed by
respondents.

On March 10, 2000, the Arbiter issued an Order denying the motion and directing the sheriff to release the garnished sum of
money to respondents pro rata.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the NLRC.

In a Resolution dated July 27, 2000, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to post a bond within the
reglementary period. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 25, 2000.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

In a Decision dated December 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In this petition, the issue posed is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners monthly receivables from the
Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from execution.

The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is
not appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. 2 On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.

Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on
Execution of Judgment provides:

"Rule IV
EXECUTION

SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of execution,
except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as may be provided
for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection
therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law;

(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;

(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing party such as
he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount fixed by law;

(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months;

(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen,
teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;

(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the month preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family;

(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;

(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a value not exceeding three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos;

(i) Other properties especially exempted by law."

The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent that the exemption pertains only
to natural persons and not to juridical entities. On this point, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate
entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus:

"We cannot accede to petitioners position that the garnished amount is exempt from execution.

Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the
Rules pertinently reads:

SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no
other, shall be exempt from execution:

xxxxxxxxx

(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services within the four months
preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family.

The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive law which
proscribes the execution of employees wages, thus:

ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter,
clothing and medical attendance.

Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to favor only
laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a days labor for
immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court of Appeals,
140 SCRA 304 (1985)].

In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to juridical entities such as
petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the personal services rendered by the judgment obligor.
The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtors family.

Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the exemption. If at all, the exemption refers to petitioners
individual employees and not to petitioner as a corporation.

x x x. Parenthetically, in a parallel case where a security agency claimed that the guns it gives to its guards are tools and
implements exempt from execution, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the exemption pertains only to natural and
not to juridical persons, thus:

However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is personal, available only to a natural
person, such as a dentists dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-15612, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a
judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity [Pentagon Security and Investigation Agency vs. Jimenez, 192
SCRA 492 (1990)].

It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his own and that of his
familys support are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as
petitioner security agency is not covered by the exemption.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."

PEREZ VS. CA
464 SCRA 87

Topic: Effect of Judgments

FACTS: The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the International Exchange Bank to finance their project for the
construction of townhouses. To secure the payment of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over the said property. The construction was delayed resulting to the failure of Sps. Digos to pay their loan which
subsequently caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM. Consequently, the property was sold at public auction,
with the bank as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00, which appeared to be the account of the spouses Digos at the time.
The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register of Deeds. When the
period to redeem the property was about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from the bank to redeem property, to
which the bank after previous refusal agreed to one month extension. However, instead of repurchasing said property, the
spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and sale at public
auction and/or redemption of the property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the
trial court.

Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was filed by Sps.
Digos against the bank, Perez and Ragua, for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as well as the certificate of sale
executed by the sheriff, and the Torrens title issued to them. The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first complaint
that they were not notified of the sale at public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid for the property was
unconscionably low compared to the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They also admitted their failure to pay
their amortization on their loans.
However, they alleged this time that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction
were illegal because the bank charged much more than the amount due on their loan account, to wit: interest of 26% per
annum on the loan account covering January 2, 1998, whereas under the promissory note executed in favor of the bank,
the new interest rate should commence only on March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account, and 5% penalty
charges on top of the 26% interest per annum, as shown by the banks statement of account.

The spouses Digos also averred that although they pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account and a moratorium on
the payment of their account, they were unaware of the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan account. They
maintained that the banks consolidation of its title over the property on September 19, 1999 was premature because they
were given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property. Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on similar grounds
of res judicata, splitting of a single cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial court denied. The MR was also
denied. Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed orders. The appellate court declared that there was no identity of causes of action in the two cases because the
first action was one for injunction and redemption of the property, whereas the second action was for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous computation of the
balance on the respondents account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were not estopped from filing their second
action. The petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment in the first case is res judicata to the second case.

HELD: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or
claims and instituting two or more actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or
divided so as to be made the subject of two or more different actions. A single act or omission may be violative of various
rights at the same time, such as when the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The
violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated by several acts or
omissions, there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinct primary rights are
violated by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should be violated by two distinct and separate legal
wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of
action would result.

Causes of action which are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact
may be sued separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others. The mere fact that the same
relief is sought in the subsequent action will not render the judgment in the prior action as res judicata. Causes of action
are not distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by difference in the claims for relief. Comparing the material averments
of the two complaints, it would appear that separate primary rights of the respondents were violated by the banks
institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction; hence, the
respondents had separate and independent causes of action against the bank, to wit: (a) the first complaint relates to the
violation by the bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial, foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an extension
of the period for the respondents to redeem the property with damages; (b) the second complaint relates to the breach by
the bank of its loan contract with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of their unpaid account with the bank.

However, we are convinced that the institution by the respondents of their second complaint anchored on their claim that
the bank breached its loan contracts with them by erroneously computing the actual and correct balance of their account
when the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was filed by it designed to avert the dismissal of
their complaint due to splitting causes of action and res judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint and the
dismissal of their appeal through their negligence. The Court is constrained to conclude that this was a last-ditch attempt
to resuscitate their lost cause, a brazen violation of the principle of res judicata.

Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides in part:

SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. (c) In any other
litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which
refers to a theory or matter that has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
without fraud or collusion. There are four (4) essential requisites which must concur for the application of this doctrine: (a)
finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.

A judgment or order is on the merits of the case when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not necessary that a trial, actual hearing or
argument on the facts of the case ensued. For as long as the parties had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on the ground that the
complaint does not state a cause of action is a determination of the case on its merits. Such order whether right or wrong
bars another action based upon the same cause of action. The operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by a
mere right of appeal where the appeal has not been taken or by an appeal which never has been perfected. Indeed,
absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for the application of res judicata. It is sufficient that there is a
shared identity of interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found in the second action, res judicata still applies if
the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a case can always be
renewed by the mere expedience of joining new parties in the new suit. The ultimate test to ascertain identity of causes of
action is whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the first and second cases. The application
of the doctrine of res judicata cannot be excused by merely varying the form of the action or engaging a different method
of presenting the issue.

Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second branch, otherwise
known as collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between the first case wherein judgment is
rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity of causes of action. As explained by
this Court: It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of
an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and
positively appear, either from the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or
question in issue in the second suit was involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a given question
was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to
sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first action. In the
present case, before the private respondents filed their first complaint, they already knew that the balance of their account
with the bank was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce
their account to P3,500,000.00. If indeed the bank made an erroneous computation of the balance of their account as
claimed by the private respondents in their second complaint, this should have been alleged in the first complaint as one
of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The private respondents unequivocably admitted in their first complaint that
the balance of their account with the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise amount for which the bank sought
the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property at public auction; they even sought judicial
recourse to enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse of the one-year period therefor. Relying on these
admissions on the part of the private respondents, and the fact that the bank has already consolidated its title over the
property, the Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment
of the case on the merits. The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint to avoid the application of the principle
of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot prosper. Case
law has it that where a right, question or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a first case, between the same parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or question is
binding on the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective of whether the causes of action are the same. The ruling
of the CA that the action of the private respondents and their legal theory in their second complaint were different from
their causes of action and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A different cause of action is one that proceeds
not only on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a different factual footing as not to require the trial of facts
material to the former suit; that is, an action that can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues raised in the
plaintiffs original complaint are concluded in defendants favor. In this case, the private respondents second complaint
cannot be maintained without trying the facts material to the first case, and the second case cannot be maintained if all
the disputed factual issues raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of the bank. The principle of res
judicata applies when the opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if
the pleading of a different legal theory would have convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in the first action
which, with the use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so, they are barred by res
judicata. Nor do legal theories operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of
action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res judicata. The statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two
actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been
open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first,
merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. It bears stressing
that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues
existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion
of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.

FEBTC VS. TOH SR.


404 SCRA 590

Doctrine: The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of good reasons to justify execution. The
determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

FACTS: Tomas Toh, Sr. and sons executed a Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of FEBTC wherein the Tohs
jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and
Bills Purchased Line, earlier granted by FEBTC to CASICO.

Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for another year, subject to some
amendments.

Toh, Sr. filed before RTC an action seeking recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the amount of P2,560,644.68
plus damages. He claimed that FEBTC had debited, without their knowledge and consent, said amount from his savings
and current accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of by
CASICO from FEBTC. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored by
FEBTC allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient funds, although Toh alleged as of February 4, 1999, he had an
outstanding withdrawable balance of P2,560,644.68.

FEBTC filed an Answerand averred that the debiting of Tohs bank accounts was justified due to his surety undertaking in
the event of the default of CASICO in its payments. It further claimed that the reduction of credit line does not relieve
Toh, Sr. from his continuing surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety undertaking or any provisions in the
renewal agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from his personal obligation. It pointed out that CASICOs default in its obligations
became inevitable after CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Toh, Sr. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was granted by the RTC and rendered judgment against
FEBTC.
Toh, Sr. filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution invoking Section 2,[5] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed
that execution pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy
his money deposited in petitioners bank.

RTC gave due course to FEBTCs appeal but also granted the Motion for Discretionary Execution. It hheld that
discretionary execution may be issued upon good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),[7] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Citing De Leon v. Soriano,[8] where we held that the approach of the end of ones life span is a compelling cause
for discretionary execution pending appeal,[9] the trial court used the circumstance of Tohs advanced age as a good
reason to allow execution pending appeal.

FEBTC did not file an MR, and directly filed Certiorari (Rule 65) to the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition and denied ensuing an MR.

ISSUE: WON discretionary execution may be allowed in this case.

HELD: YES.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the lower court. Discretionary execution is
permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending
appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons are compelling circumstances
justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of
time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case
except to delay.

he Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of good reasons to justify execution. The
determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge
in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of anothers
judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule.

In the present case, private respondent Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be denied
that he is already of advanced age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no one could claim with
certainty that his tribe would be always blessed with long life.

PANOTES VS. TOWNHOUSE DEV. CORP


512 SCRA 269

DOCTRINE: Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who did not
have his day in court.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment
which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party.

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Rogelio Panotes, president of Provident Village Homeowners Association Inc. with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR) for its failure to provide an open
space in the subdivision.

During the proceedings before the NHA, an ocular inspection showed that the subdivision has no open space. The NHA
found, however, that Block 40, with an area of 22,916 square meters, could be utilized as open space. Thus, in its
Resolution dated August 14, 1980, the NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident Village an open space which is
Block 40. Considering that PROSECOR did not appeal from the NHA Resolution, it became final and executory.

When Panotes filed a motion for execution of the NHA Resolution, it was found that the records of the case were
mysteriously missing. Hence, his motion was provisionally dismissed without prejudice. Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold
to City Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC), respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the lots sold
were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to have Block 40
utilized as open space of Provident Village.

Eventually, Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as president of the Provident Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. She filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for revival of the NHA Resolution ,
impleading CTDC whom she alleged as successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

In its answer, CTDC averred, among others, that (1) Araceli Bumatay has no legal personality to file the action for revival
of judgment; (2) there is a pending litigation between CTDC and PROSECOR involving Block 40; and (3) other entities
like the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and Provident Savings Bank have existing liens over Block 40. The HLURB rendered
its Decision in favor of Bumatay, reviving the NHA Resolution and declaring Block 40 of the Provident Village as open
space for the said subdivision.

On appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the decision was affirmed with modification in the sense that CTDC
has the right to recover from PROSECOR what it has lost.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, CTDC then interposed an appeal to the Office of the President (OP). The
OP rendered its Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. CTDC filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

CTDC then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43.

The appellate court rendered its decision reversing the decision of the OP and dismissing the complaint for revival of
judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA resolution may be enforced against CTDC;

HELD: NO. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety
or correctness of the first judgment.

Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR,
not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay and respondent CTDC.

In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of
PROSECOR and, therefore, assumed the obligations of the latter to provide an open space for Provident Village.

CTDC purchased from PROSECOR Block 40 in the said village, not as an owner-developer like PROSECOR, but as an
ordinary buyer of lots. Even after the sale, CTDC did not become an owner-developer. The Deed of Sale executed by
CTDC, as buyer, and PROSECOR, as seller, shows that the subject matter of the sale is the unsold lots comprising Block
40 within the subdivision to CTDC. The contract does not include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer
of the said subdivision. Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

It bears stressing that when CTDC bought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECORs title showing that the
property is encumbered. In fact, the NHA Resolution was not annotated thereon. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and
for value, and as such, may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40. Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced
against CTDC.

Clearly, providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of PROSECOR, the owner-developer
and the real party-in-interest in the case for revival of judgment.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE VS. FELIX


508 SCRA 357

DOCTRINE: RULE 39 Execution Pending Appeal; Requisites; Existence of Grounds to Justify Execution Pending Appeal

FACTS: Emerita Garon (private respondent) filed an action for sum of money against Project Movers Realty and
Development Corporation (Project Movers) and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold Insurance). The RTC of
Makati granted Garons motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2000 and ruled in her favor.

On October 6, 2000, Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On October 10, 2000, Stronghold Insurance
moved for the reconsideration of the September 19 Order. The court denied Stronghold Insurances motion for lack of
merit. On February 8, 2001, the trial court granted Garons motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court ordered
Garon to post a bond of P20 million to answer for any damage that Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain
by reason of the execution pending appeal. The clerk of court issued a writ of execution pending appeal on February 14,
2001.

Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal on February 16, 2001. It also filed for certiorari before the CA on the Order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution pending appeal. The CA issued a TRO
(temporary restraining order) to enjoin the trial court, Garon, and the clerk of court from enforcing the February 8 Order.

However, notices of garnishment were already served on Stronghold Insure before the CA issued the TRO. Stronghold
Insurance filed for a motion to recall the notices of garnishment, which the trial court denied.
The CA sustained the trial court in issuing the writ of execution pending appeal on the ground of illness of Garons
husband. The CA held that while it was not Garon who was ill, she needed the money to support her husbands medical
expenses and to support her family.

Stronghold Insurance alleged that its liability is limited only to P12,755,139.85 in accordance with its surety bond with
Project Movers, plus attorneys fees of P200,000 as awarded by the trial court. However, the amount in the writ of
execution pending appeal and notices of garnishment is P56 million. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Stronghold Insurance failed to show that more than P12,755,139.85 had been garnished.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether there are good reasons to justify execution pending appeal.

RULING: No, the Court held that Garon failed to prove that she had provided proof of good reasons to justify execution
pending appeal. The Court held that an execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule.

Execution pending appeal is provided under Sec. 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

As to its nature, an execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, which is strictly construed against the
movant because the courts do not favor any attempt to execute a judgement which has not acquired finality. It affects the
rights of parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.

The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal;

(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.

As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

The Court defined good reasons as special, important, pressing reasons which exist to justify the execution
pending appeal. They must consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency that outweighs the injury or
damage that the losing party may suffer should the appealed decision be reversed later.

In the instant case, the posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is
not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration
which impels the grant of immediate execution.

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY


700 SCRA 69

TOPIC: Foreign judgment

FACTS: In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines.
But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi
Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan.

In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese
judgment declaring Marinays marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same
year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or
Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:

1. the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;


2. that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and

3. for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, a petition for such may
only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 021110SC) is applicable.
2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.

RCBC VS. SERRA


701 SCRA 124

DOCTRINE: where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well as
beyond the judgment creditors control, the fiveyear period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed
to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

FACTS: Petitioner Federico Serra, who is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located at Masbate, Masbate,
and private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a "Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy" in May 25, 1975 which provided that Serra will lease the subject land to RCBC for a period of 25 years from June 1,
1975 to June 1, 2000, that the RCBC has the option to purchase the same at P210.00 per square meter within a period of
10 years from May 25, 1975, the date of the signing of the Contract, and that Serra will have to register said land under
the Torrens System to the Register of Deeds of Province of Masbate within the same 10-year option period. Pursuant to
said contract, RCBC constructed improvements on the subject land to house its branch office, while the petitioner had the
property, within 3 years from 1975, duly registered with OCT No. 0-232 under the Torrens System. Later, petitioner alleged
that as soon as he had the property registered, he kept on pursuing the branch manager for the sale of the lot as per their
agreement, but it was not until September 4, 1984, that RCBC decided to exercise the option.

RCBC informed petitioner, through a letter, of its intention to buy the property at the agreed price of not greater than
P210.00 per square meter or a total of P78,430.00, but petitioner replied that he is no longer selling the property. RCBC
then filed an action for specific performance and damages against Serra in March 1985 alleging that during the
negotiations it made clear to petitioner that it intends to stay permanently on property once its branch office is opened
unless the exigencies of the business requires otherwise.

Although finding that the contract was valid, the lower court ruled that the option to buy is unenforceable because it lacked
a consideration distinct from the price and RCBC did not exercise its option within the reasonable time. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, the lower court reversed itself on the 2nd issue, declared the contract as valid, and ordered
Serra to deliver the proper deed of sale to RCBC. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its 05 January 1989
decision executed through motion, considering that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully
prevented by the respondent from enforcing the said decision.

HELD: YES.
Exception to five-year period to move for execution of judgment. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory
judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five
years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion
even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned
by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtors own initiatives
and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditors control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of
the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15
April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute an deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade
his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras action
prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his
own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the fiveyear period to enforce through a
motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3
March 2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within the
fiveyear period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from
sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality.
While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS. RICAFORTE


700 SCRA 778

TOPIC: Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising pure question of law.

FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon". In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind
real properties

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth;
(b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have
been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.

Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name.

RTC Ruling
RTC finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs.
Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory
heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno
and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the
counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
was proper.

RULING: Yes, it was proper.

General Rule: The rule is that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who
are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

Exception: By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may
be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated,
and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist.

1. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled
to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

2. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

17. G.R. No. 172852 January 30, 2013

CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR..

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2) parcels of
land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner before the RTC of
Cebu City on September 17, 1993. The petitioner immediately took possession of the lots after
depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.

During the pendency of the case, or on December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered into a
Compromise Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the
former in consideration of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,786,400.00) as provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of
commissioners.

Forthwith, the panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC recommending the sum
of P20,826,339.50 as just compensation. The report was adopted and approved by the RTC in its Order dated
December 27, 1996.

The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then by the Court, in a Decision dated May 7, 2002, when the matter
was elevated for review in a petition docketed as G.R. No. 142971.

When the said decision became final and executory on September 20, 2002, the case was remanded for execution
to the RTC, before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4,
2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ.

In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted in the case by herein respondent.

On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the difference
between the just compensation due and the provisional payment already made.
On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the petitioner to pay
interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.

On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and executory judgment
that did not specifically direct the payment of legal interest. Adamant, the respondent sought recourse before the CA
asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation
computed from the time of actual taking of the property up to the date of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12%
legal interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation became final and executory on September 20,
2002 until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.

The Ruling of the CA

In its Decision dated November 30, 2005, the CA rejected the respondents first claim since the issue was belatedly
raised during the execution stage and after the judgment of just compensation attained finality.

Nonetheless, the CA found the respondents second contention meritorious. The CA awarded legal interest accruing
from the time the RTC Order dated December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was affirmed with finality by the
Supreme Court up to the time of full payment thereof in line with the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals that when a court judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, it shall earn legal
interest of 12% per annum reckoned from such finality until satisfaction.

The CA effectively reiterated the above decision when it denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof.
Both parties elevated the CA judgment to the Court. The respondents petition was docketed as G.R. No. 172942
where he sought, in the main, that the 12% interest rate be reckoned from the date of taking of the property and not
from the date of finality of the Decision dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The Court denied his petition on
August 22, 2006 for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. The respondents motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied with finality on November
27, 2006.

At bar is the recourse interposed by the petitioner wherein he seeks the setting aside of the same CA Decision
dated November 30, 2005.

On October 20, 2006, the respondent moved for the consolidation of the present petition with G.R. No. 172942. The
motion was denied in view of the prior denial of G.R. No. 172942 on August 22, 2006.

In the case at bar, the petitioner prays for the annulment of the award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view
of the termination of the eminent domain case upon payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of the writ of
execution. The petitioner further asserts that the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 which did not explicitly
pronounce the payment of interest can no longer be modified lest the basic principles of remedial law be defiled.

For his part, the respondent avers that Section 10, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court mandating the payment of legal
interest on just compensation forms part of every judgment rendered in eminent domain cases even if the same was
not directly ordered therein.

The respondent also claims that the award of just compensation must be reckoned from the date of taking of subject
lots and not from the date of finality of G.R. No. 142971 because just compensation, before it is paid, constitutes
loan or forbearance of money that entails the imposition of a 12% interest per annum.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment.

A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly
raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as
long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated
differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in
a previous case. 1wphi1

The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer
question the respondents entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts determination in
G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-
litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse.

Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related
to the ruling in the former.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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