1. Roe v.

Wade (1973)

Facts:

A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion
except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed
physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was
permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being
pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities
of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of
the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that
Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented
justiciable controversies. The court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and
overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court
on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of
declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.

Held:

State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a
life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her
pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a
woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override
that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and
the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling"
point at various stages of the woman's approach to term.

(a) The abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.

(b) The State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother.

The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed
by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so
defined.
 It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue, since the Texas authorities will
doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling that the Texas criminal abortion statutes are
unconstitutional.

2. Republic v. Cagandahan

Facts:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. Her tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized; she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.

According to Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, respondents

condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare,
that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up
her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
 The RTC granted respondents petition. The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of
his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and
first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be
male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender,
from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.

Ruling: No. The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar. The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known
as CAH does not make her a male.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.

Together with Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]

CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot
be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose
sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. If we
determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth
certificate entry is in order.

Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due
to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.

3. U.S v. Windsor

Facts:

Two women then resident in New York were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario,
Canada, in 2007. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer returned to their home in New York City.
When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim
the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. She was barred from doing so, however,
by a federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act, which excludes a same-sex partner from
the definition of spouse as that term is used in federal statutes. Windsor paid the taxes
but filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this provision. The United States District
Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this portion of the statute is unconstitutional
and ordered the United States to pay Windsor a refund. This Court granted certiorari and
now affirms the judgment in Windsors favor.

Issue: Whether or not DOMA is constitutional

Ruling: No. DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons.

(a) By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage has been treated as
being within the authority and realm of the separate States. Congress has enacted
discrete statutes to regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy,
but DOMA, with a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal statues and the whole realm
of federal regulations, has a far greater reach. Its operation is also directed to a class of
persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect.
Assessing the validity of that intervention requires discussing the historical and
traditional extent of state power and authority over marriage.

The States decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them
a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the state-
defined class for the opposite purposeto impose restrictions and disabilities. The
question is whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part
of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment, since what New York treats as alike the
federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to
protect. New Yorks actions were a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. They reflect
both the communitys considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of
marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.

(b) By seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic
due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The
Constitutions guarantee of equality must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate
treatment of that group. DOMA cannot survive under these principles. Its unusual
deviation from the tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with
federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of a class recognized and protected by state law.
DOMAs avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the
unquestioned authority of the States.

DOMAs principal effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned

marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State,
but not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two contradictory marriage
regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to live as married for the
purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the
stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to
acknowledge and protect.
4. Quiao vs. Quiao

The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family
where children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate
and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving
legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.

Facts

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). [3] Subsequently, the
RTC rendered a Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
provides:

WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is

hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and
defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.

As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from

each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.

Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain
under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.

Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed
by the RCBC, all the remaining properties shall be divided equally between
herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of
the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00.

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal

partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of

[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution [7] which the
trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
 Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby
granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of
the Judgment.

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution [9] which
reads as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner]

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-
quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the service of this
Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.

But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy

this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands
and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner
required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule
[sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings

immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in
consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.[10]

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the
respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to
define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC issued an Order which held that the phrase NET
PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. [14] The Order further held
that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of
the net profits earned.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order holding that
although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it
may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted
to clarify the meaning of net profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered
set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the]
parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with]
par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20]
 On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[21]
praying for the correction and reversal of the Order which the trial court granted the
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007
this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:

(Actually madaming issues. Sobrang haba kasi, so pinili ko yung related sa

consti. Mostly Fam codekasi)
Issue: WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY
ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?

Ruling:
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family
Code?

We respond in the negative.

Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing:
As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal
properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the
Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between
the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil
Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All
property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife. He insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested
right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of
the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or equitable to the present or
future enjoyment of property.

In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party
List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:

The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional

guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
[64]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested
right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in
law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he
was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. [65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10,
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
[67]
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested
right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of
the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his
or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to
the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.
 In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to
all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal
partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation
case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his
evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil
Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.

Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision
dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal.
Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it
has become final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final
judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final
and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court. [71]

5. Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. Philippine Ports Authority

Facts:
TEFASCO is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines with principal place of business at Barrio Ilang, Davao City. It is engaged
in the business of providing port and terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring
and other port-related services at its own private port at Barrio Ilang.
TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the construction of a specialized terminal
complex with port facilities and a provision for port services in Davao City. To ease the
acute congestion in the government ports at Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City, PPA
welcomed the proposal and organized an inter-agency committee to study the plan. The
committee recommended approval thereof and its report stated that - TEFASCO Terminal
is a specialized terminal complex. The specialized matters intended to be captured are:
(a) bananas in consideration of the rate of spoilage; (b) sugar; (c) fertilizers; (d)
specialized movement of beer in pallets containerized handling lumber and plywood.

The government port facilities are good for general cargoes only. Both ports are not
equipped to handle specialized cargoes like bananas and container cargoes. Besides the
present capacity, as well as the planned improvements, cannot cope with the increasing
volume of traffic in the area. Participation of the private sector, therefore, involving
private financing should be encouraged in the area.

It will service domestic and foreign vessels. Main products to be handled initially will be
bananas in the export trade and beer in the domestic traffic. Easing the problems at
these two ports would result in savings on cost of the operation as cargo storage and on
damages and losses. It would also give relief to passengers from time-delay,
inconvenience and exposure to hazards in commuting between the pier and ship at
anchor.

Furthermore, it would redound to better utilization of the government piers, therefore

greater revenue from port operations. At the bigger scale, more economic benefits in
terms of more employment, greater productivity, increased per capita income in
the Davao region, and in light of the limited financial resources of the government for
port development the TFSC proposal would be beneficial to the country.

On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 7 accepting and
approving TEFASCO's project proposal. Under the foregoing terms and conditions,
TEFASCO contracted dollar loans from private commercial institutions abroad to
construct its specialized terminal complex with port facilities in the process of building
the port.
The PPA Board curiously passed on October 1, 1976 Resolution No. 50 under which
TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to submit an application for
construction permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application imposed additional
significant conditions.

Pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 857, a Special Permit is hereby
granted to TERMINAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES CORPORATION (TEFASCO to provide its
arrastre/stevedoring services at its own private wharf located at Barrio Ilang, Davao City.

On February 10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
providing among others for (a) acknowledgment of TEFASCO's arrears in government
share at Three Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos
and Seventy-Five Centavos (P3,807,563.75) payable monthly, with default penalized by
automatic withdrawal of its commercial private port permit and permit to operate cargo
handling services; (b) reduction of government share from ten percent (10%) to six
percent (6%) on all cargo handling and related revenue (or arrastre and stevedoring
gross income); (c) opening of its pier facilities to all commercial and third-party cargoes
and vessels for a period coterminous with its foreshore lease contract with the National
Government; and, (d) tenure of five (5) years extendible by five (5) more years for
TEFASCO's permit to operate cargo handling in its private port facilities. In return PPA
promised to issue the necessary permits for TEFASCOs port activities. TEFASCO complied
with the MOA and paid the accrued and current government share.[9]
On August 30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port Manager, and Port Officer
in Davao City for refund of government share it had paid and for damages as a result of
alleged illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing and
wharfage fees. The complaint also sought to nullify the February 10, 1984 MOA and all
other PPA issuances modifying the terms and conditions of the April 21, 1976 Resolution
No. 7 above-mentioned.[10]
In G.R. No. 135639 TEFASCO prays to reinstate in toto the decision of the trial court. Its
grounds are: (a) PPA Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereunder constitute
a contract that PPA could not change at will; (b) the MOA between PPA and TEFASCO
indicating the schedule of TEFASCO arrears and reducing the rate of government share is
void for absence of consideration; and, (c) government share is neither authorized by
PPA Resolution No. 7 nor by any law, and in fact, impairs the obligation of contracts.
In G.R. No. 135826 PPA seeks to set aside the award of actual damages for wharfage
and berthing fees and for attorneys fees. PPA anchors its arguments on the following: (a)
that its collection of one hundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing fees is
authorized by Secs. 6 (b, ix) and 39 (a), P.D. No. 857, under which the imposable rates
for such fees are within the sole power and authority of PPA; (b) that absence of
evidentiary relevance of PPA issuances effective 1995 to 1997 reducing wharfage,
berthing and port usage fees in private ports; (c) that TEFASCO's lack of standing to
claim alleged overpayments of wharfage and berthing fees; and, (d) that lack of legal
basis for the award of fifty percent (50%) wharfage and thirty percent (30%) berthing
fees as actual damages in favor of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to 1991, and for
attorneys fees.
Issue: The character of the obligations between TEFASCO and PPA
Ruling: it was not a mere privilege that PPA bestowed upon TEFASCO to construct a
specialized terminal complex with port facilities and provide port services in Davao City
under PPA Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereof. Rather, the
arrangement was envisioned to be mutually beneficial, on one hand, to obtain business
opportunities for TEFASCO, and on the other, enhance PPA's services -The
international port of Sasa and the domestic port of Sta. Ana are general cargo type
ports. They are facing serious ship and cargo congestion problems brought about mainly
by the faster growth of shipping industry than the development of the ports. They do not
possess the special cargo handling facilities which TFSC plans to put up at the proposed
terminal.[13]
It is true that under P.D. No. 857 (1975) as amended,[14] the construction and operation of
ports are subject to licensing regulations of the PPA as public utility. [15] However, the
instant case did not arise out of pure beneficence on the part of the government where
TEFASCO would be compelled to pay ordinary license and permit fees. TEFASCO accepted
and performed definite obligations requiring big investments that made up the valuable
consideration of the project.
With such considerable amount of money spent in reliance upon the promises of PPA
under Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereof, the authorization for
TEFASCO to build and operate the specialized terminal complex with port facilities
assumed the character of a truly binding contract between the grantor and the
grantee.[20] It was a two-way advantage for both TEFASCO and PPA, that is, the business
opportunities for the former and the decongestion of port traffic in Davao City for the
latter, which is also the cause of consideration for the existence of the contract.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.[23]

The terms and conditions binding TEFASCO are only those enumerated or mentioned in
the inter-agency committee report, PPA Resolution No. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7,
1976 and its enclosure. With due consideration for the policy that laws of the land are
written into every contract,[26] the said documents stand to be the only source of
obligations between the parties. That being the case, it was arbitrary, unreasonable and
unfair for PPA to add new burdens and uncertainties into their agreement of which
TEFASCO had no prior knowledge even in the context of regulation.
The record shows that PPA made express representations to TEFASCO that it would
authorize and support its port project under clear and categorical terms and conditions of
an envisioned contract. TEFASCO complied with its obligation which ultimately resulted
to the benefit of PPA. And the PPA accepted the project as completed and authorized
TEFASCO to operate the same. Under these circumstances, PPA is estopped from
reneging on its commitments and covenants as exclusively contained in the inter-agency
committee report, PPA Resolution No. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and its
enclosure. As this Court explained in Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines - [29]
Even if PPA granted TEFASCO only a license to construct and operate a specialized
complex terminal with port facilities, the fact remains that PPA cannot unilaterally impose
conditions that find no basis in the inter-agency committee report, PPA Resolution No. 7
and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and its enclosure.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30,
1998 in case CA-G.R. CV No. 47318 is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is held liable and hereby ordered to pay and
reimburse to Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation (TEFASCO) the amounts
of Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos
(P15,810,032.07) and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06) representing fifty percent (50%)
wharfage fees and thirty percent (30%) berthing charges respectively, from 1977 to
1991, and the sum of Five Million Ninety-Five Thousand Thirty Pesos and Seventeen
Centavos (P5,095,030.17) representing PPAs unlawfully collected government share in
the gross income of TEFASCO's arrastre and stevedoring operations during the said
period;

2. The said principal amounts herein ordered to be paid by PPA to TEFASCO shall earn
interest at six percent (6%) per annum from July 15, 1992, date of promulgation of
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17 of Davao City in Civil Case No. 19216-
88; and

3. The PPA is also ordered to pay TEFASCO the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for and as attorneys fees.

Costs against the Philippine Ports Authority.

SO ORDERED.
6. Board of Medicine vs. Ota
Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals. The facts are as follows: Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national,
married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10
years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a
degree of Doctor of Medicine. After successfully completing a one-year post graduate
internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial MedicalCenter, he filed an application to
take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was
required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of
undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would
not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and
the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine.

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners

Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy
to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in
August 1992, which he subsequently passed. In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine
(Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a
license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board believes that
no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner
who can possibly practice there.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before
the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14,
1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman.

In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing
to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had
acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to
practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.

On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had
adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be
granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of
reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of
Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially
complied with the requirements under the law. The RTC then ordered the Board to issue
in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to
practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while
respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice
medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there
are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not
established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the
practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ
of mandamus.

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.

Ruling:

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise

granted by the government. It is a right that is earned through years of education and
training, and which requires that one must first secure a license from the state through
professional board examinations.

It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary,
despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary
power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally
strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise
of their power.

R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof
that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board examinations shall
have the following qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has
submitted competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his countrys existing laws permit citizens of
the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof;

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to
practice medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice
of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since
the requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no
reciprocity between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to
practice medicine in the Philippines.

The Court does not agree.

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board
examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing
that his countrys existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine
under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. .

Nowhere is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it
stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to
practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to
practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No.
223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing
laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession [of medicine] under the
[same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and
practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been
granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements
provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.

While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws,
the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the
academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better
than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take
the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination respondent, however,
presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not
precluded from getting a license to practice there.

In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He

finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a
one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose ReyesMemorial Medical Center, a
government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given
on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the
12 subjects.

In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of
respondent to prove that there is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and
the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any
reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution
dated October 19, 2003.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
D. Heirarchy of Rights and the Standards of Review on Levels of Scrutiny

7. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming

Mills Co. Inc.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and
that they informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed
demonstration. The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning
about the planned mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed
by the union, explaining further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed
out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. Company informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed.
Another meeting was convoked Company. It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, those
from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise,
they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and
the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No
Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issues::
1. Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

2. Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employees.
Ruling:

1. No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to
his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in
the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers.
The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition
of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights
also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.

Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be
lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic
or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech
and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

2. Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on its part to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) workers from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid
or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."

8. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001
when he was forced to vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office. [1] He was charged, in eight cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them
plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion,
more or less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No.
7080, otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information
charges more than one offense.
In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion, along
with those filed by his co-accused, Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to set
aside the Sandiganbayans resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law
is void for being vague and overbroad. We gave due course to the petition and required
respondents to file comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on
September 18, 2001 and on their memoranda filed on September 28, 2001 to consider
the constitutional claims of petitioner.

In this case, Estrada petitions the court to declare the Anti-Plundering Law
unconstitutional.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2
wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible
of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY
with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF
OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.

RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY

SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK
IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE'

Issues:
R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. It violates due process clause for its vagueness.
2. It violates the Constitutional right of the accused to know the nature of the accusation
against him.
3. It violates the Constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of
evidence necessary for proving plunder.

Ruling:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Reasons:
1 and 2.
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the
lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"

Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To

combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d)
of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve
said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In
the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy
to attain a common goal.

With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must
be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute.

3.
On the third issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of
acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill- gotten wealth.

In view of mens rea as regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that
the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are
the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

9. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging
of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and
motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made
to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.

Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers
on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that
under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it
is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as
such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,
Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions
and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could
be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels
but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its
core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the
Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of
the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that
the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury
to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the
petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who
would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities
with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion
of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded..

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The
State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its
citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and
whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.

E. Relativity of Due Process

10. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion

Facts:
On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of
Persons who have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The
Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was
ratified by the Senate.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs of U. S. a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are
charged in the U.S. with the violation of the following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax,
false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of another.

Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on

July 1, 1999, requested copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the
requested papers.

Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:

1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;

2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose
the request, and to present evidence is support of the opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to
furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of
Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from
considering the extradition request).

On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered: The Secretary of Justice et al ordered to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of.
Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:

1. by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained
of (i.e to desist from refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and
documents.)

2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under
the extradition treaty and the Philippine Extradition Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court must uphold a citizens basic due process rights, or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

Ruling:
Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part
of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the
above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.

11. Cudia vs. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy

Facts:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias class had a lesson examination in their
Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher.
Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was
late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.

In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a
bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied
when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she
never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction.

Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with
the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the
senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class
was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied:
that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher
did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm,
not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination
paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom,
hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state
that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each
student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a
class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such
transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his
query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time
querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a class; Cudia could just
have stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he
lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.

Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating
the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was
dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.

The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their
cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.

Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine
(9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved
were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members
cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.
Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia.
However, they also have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the
dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the minority.
After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial not guilty vote was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMAs holding center.

Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of
Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.

PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court
should avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

HELD:

I.

Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that PMA should be compelled to
reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The
Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a
discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency,
in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further,
such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMAs academic freedom
as an educational institution and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed

The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and
its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia.
Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and
to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs
is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined
and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it
in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling
at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning
of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose
private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good
name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such without
due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such
strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was
dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below
discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)

II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is
still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case,
the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO.
He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation.
Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new
team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he
was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the
chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have
violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was
also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the
AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted
by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President.
Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to
disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.

Academic freedom of the PMA

Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that
Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.

Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by
the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;

c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;

d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this
case, based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.

But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?

The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of
the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to
abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of
due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

12. MULLANE VS. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK AND TRUST CO.

Facts: A trust company in New York which had exclusive management and control of a
common trust fund established by it under $100-c of the New York Banking Law
petitioned under that section for a judicial settlement of accounts which would be
binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth therein upon everyone having any
interest in the common fund or in any particular trust. In this common fund, the trust
company had invested assets of numerous small trusts of which it was trustee and of
which some of the beneficiaries were residents, and some nonresidents, of the State. The
only notice of this petition given beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper
pursuant to $100-c.

Issue: Is the publication a sufficient notice under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held: Such notice of publication is not sufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment as a
basis for adjudication depriving of substantial property rights known persons whose
whereabouts are also known, since it is not impracticable to make serious efforts to
notify them at least by ordinary mail to their addresses on record with the trust company.

The means used in the service of notice must be reasonably certain to actually inform
the affected parties. The means used in the service of notice must be reasonably certain
to inform those who are affected. If such means are not possible, then the alternate
means adopted must not be substantially less likely to inform the concerned parties. A
large number of cases brought before the court on the issue of notice involves those
served by publication. In any, case, the bank has a record of the names and addresses of
the income beneficiaries. It has not been shown that the bank has made any serious
effort to inform the said beneficiaries personally of the settlement proceedings through
the said addresses.

13. LACHANCE VS. ERICKSON

Facts: Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts and McManus are government
employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which
they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect
to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally
charged false statement as ground for adverse action, and the action take in each was
based in part on the added charge. The employees separately appealed the actions
taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board upheld that portion
of the penalty based on the underlying charge in case, but overturned the false
statement charge. The Board further held that an employees false statements could not
be used for purposes of impeaching the employees credibility, nor could they be
considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employees underlying
misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with
failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tent to implicate the
employee in employment-related misconduct. The Director of the Office of Personnel
Management appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett and Roberts,
that could agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the
underlying claim.
Issue: Whether or not the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act precludes
a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the
agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee.

Held: NO. Neither the Fifth Amendments Due Process nor the Civil Service Reform
precludes federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to
the agency regarding his alleged employment-related misconduct. It is impossible to
square the result reached below with the holding that a citizen may decline to answer a
Government question, or answer it with a falsehood. There is no hint of a right to falsely
deny charged conduct in $7513(a), which authorizes an agency to impose the sort of
penalties involved here for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,
and then accords the employee four carefully delineated procedural rights-advance
written notice of the charges, a reasonable time to answer, legal representation, and a
specific written decision. Nor can such a right be found in due process, the core of which
is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Even assuming that
respondents had a protected property interest in their employment, this Court rejects,
both on the basis of precedent and principle, the Federal Circuits view that a
meaningful opportunity to be heard includes a right to make false statements with
respect to the charged conduct. It is well established that a criminal defendants right to
testify does not include the right to commit perjury, and that punishment may
constitutionally be imposed because of perjury or the filing of a false affidavit required by
statute. The fact that respondents were not under oath is irrelevant, since that were not
charged with perjury, but with making false statements during an agency investigation, a
charge that does not require sworn statements. Moreover, any claim that employees not
allowed to make false statements might be coerced into admitting misconduct, whether
they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of
removal for falsification is entirely frivolous. If answering an agencys investigatory
question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. An agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the
charge, might take that failure to respond into consideration, but there is nothing
inherently irrational about such an investigative posture.

14. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. LUCAS

Facts: On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the
Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture, filed with the office of the
Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same
agency, for misconduct. Mr. Lucas touched her thighs down her ankle and when she
kicked him for repeating the same actions, the two had a verbal exchange. Mr. Lucas
shoved her to the door twice, causing her to stumble. When Lucas was summoned by the
Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI) to answer complaint, but denies the charges. BOPI
finds the respondent guilty of simple misconduct.

In due time, the respondent brought the case to the Civil Service Commission.
Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution finding the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and imposing on him a penalty of dismissal from the service.
The respondent, then, appealed to the Court of Appeals where it set aside the resolution
of the CSC and reinstated the resolution of BOPI. The Court of Appeals further ruled that
a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges
against him. However, in this case, Lucas came to know of the modification of the
charges against him only when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from
service.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the respondent was denied due process when the CSC found him
guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct.
2. Whether or not the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.

Held:

1. The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic
requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges
against him and that (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he
was not charged.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.

2. The Supreme Court does not in any way condone respondents act. Even in jest, he
had no right to touch complainants leg. However, under the circumstances, such
act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent
was maliciously motivated. It has been noted that the respondent has been in
service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.

15. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. LEDESMA

Facts: Respondent Ledesma is a Clerk III at the Records Section of the Bureau of
Immigration, the complainants, the Tsai siblings are Taiwanese nationals who were
studying in the country at the time. Steve Tsai attested that on March 15, 1999 he went
to the Bureau to seek Ledesmas assistance in securing Emigrant Certificate Clearances
(ECCs) for him and Ching Tsai. He gave their passports and P3,000 to Ledesma, Steve
Tsai claimed that Ledesma has helped him obtain ECCs for the previous three years. He
usually paid P1,500 for each. He knew that out of the amount Ledesma kept P200 to
P300 as a service charge.
According to Steve Tsai, Ledesma instructed him to return for the ECCs on a certain date
but Ledesma did not give him the ECCs on that date. Steve Tsai informed Ledesma that
he and his sister were leaving for a vacation that Friday. Ledesma replied that he should
return the next day, but still unable to produce the requested documents. On Friday,
Ledesma gave Steve Tsai the ECCs but did not return their passports and were not able
to leave the country for their planned vacation. An administrative case was filed against
Ledesma based in complainants affidavits. She requested that the Department of Justice
)DOJ) investigate her case.

Bureaus Decision finding Ledesma guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. The Bureaus Decision meted Ledesma with the
penalties of dismissal, disqualification from reentry into the service, and forfeiture of all
benefits and emoluments. Ledesma assailed the Bureaus Decision before the DOJ. On
Augsut 16, 1999, the DOJ dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Bureaus Decision.

Bureaus Decision: finding Ledesma guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service with the penalties of dismissal,
disqualification from reentry into the service, and forfeiture of all benefits and
emoluments. Ledesma assailed the Bureaus Decision before the DOJ. The DOJ dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the Bureaus Decision. She appealed to CSC and it dismissed her
appeal. She appealed to CA, found her guilty of simple misconduct.

Issue: Whether the Decision of the Court of Appeals violated Ledesmas Constitutional
Right to Due Process

Held: NO. The court does not see a verdict of simple misconduct can violate Ledesmas
right to due process. The Court has, on several instances, overturned charges of grave
misconduct where the circumstances showed that the respondent only committed simple
misconduct.

CA did not simply ignore the charge of dishonesty, rather, the appellate court found that
the evidence did not support the charges enumerated, including dishonesty. The
appellate court appreciated the evidence presented and the facts of the case differently
from CSC. The Court of Appeals discussed the factual and legal basis for its verdict of
simple misconduct. The appellate court Decision thus sufficiently complied with Section
14, Article VII of the Constitution, which requires only that a courts decision be clear on
why either party prevailed under the law applicable to the facts as proved. The
constitutional provision does not require a point by point refutation of the CSCs
Resolutions so long as the basis for the Court of Appeals decision modifying the former
is clear.

16. ANONYMOUS VS. RADAM

Facts: In an anonymous letter-complaint, Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of RTC, was charged of immorality. The unnamed complaint alleged
that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in October
2005 and that her behavior tainted the image of judiciary. Judge Abella conducted a
discreet investigation to verify the allegations. In his report 6 months after, Judge Abelle
made the following findings:

1. She was unmarried and gave birth

2. She refused to marry the father because they planned to migrate in Canada
3. She expressed remorse and promised not to commit the same mistake
4. The father of the child is unknown as seen in the birth certificate
5. She gave birth to 2 other babies while she worked abroad and before she was
employed by the RTC.
6. Recommendation: Such conduct fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel
and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in
the judiciary demands upright men and women. She is guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct which cannot be countenanced by the Court. (Guilty of immoral
conduct or act unbecoming a court employee, 1 month suspension or 5 thousand
pesos fine)

After reviewing the findings of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that:

1. She be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that
is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her
position as a utility worker.
2. She be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine
ofP5,000 for stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father
was unknown to her.

Issue: Whether or not giving birth out of wedlock constitutes immoral and disgraceful
conduct

Held: For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of

wedlock is not per se immoral under civil service laws. For such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. For a particular conduct to constitute disgraceful and immoral behavior under
civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular
morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by
particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on cultural values not convincingly
demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public expressed in the
Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionality guaranteed rights
should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon
by the majority. Respondent was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving birth out
of wedlock. It was only charge of which she was informed. Respondent was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally
different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.
The essence of due process is an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain
ones side, whether written or verbal. This presupposes that one has been previously
apprised of the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both
with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the
birth certificate of her child.

F. Procedural Due Process

17. HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO vs. . MORAL

Facts: Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent
Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library.

Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative

offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national
library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general."
She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement
and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations. Respondent did not
appeal the judgment. Respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was, however, denied. She filed
a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution which similarly denied.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted.

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The appellate
court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit
holding that -

FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant
petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if the
aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless,
must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to the respondent
judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised
by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.

Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review. Secretary Gloria was replaced by
Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary
Gloria.
Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for
failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion
to dismiss

W/N CA erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss.

Held:

1. YES.

Clearly, the rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to
dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and
likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.

The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts
jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the
basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied. The order only confused
petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject
of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting their orders,
stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance,

Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for
reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or
order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions.
Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply
with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower
court directly on certiorari.

2. YES. On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the
subject of discussions in several cases.

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a
clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial
duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is
not entitled to the writ prayed for.

Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution
dismissing her from the service.[7] By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS
resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose
now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created
to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to
meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.

In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is not
a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent
nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on
a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and,
respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the
DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a
ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation
report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, while the
trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper
remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
18. FE A. YLAY vs ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT

Facts: The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners
of two (2) parcels of land at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the
acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of
expropriation proceedings. The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the
City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property.

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign
a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for
the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent then
fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding
converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4,
2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for P200,000.00.5

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8

Respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006 praying
for the early resolution of the complaint. The complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case.

The complainant executed an Affidavit 21 affirming and confirming the existence,

genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000; 23 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as
an attachment to his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25

IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively

liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Canon 16 .

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the IBP Commissioners finding, but increased the penalty imposed to
two (2) years suspension and a warning.

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. IBP Board of Governors denied the
respondents Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or
any cogent reason

The respondent filed a Petition for Review.

The Issues: From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:

(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and

(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
Ruling: Not liable for Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC. But liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for being
remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties; Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the represented parties,
thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to him.

a. Due process violation - NO

The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not
given the "amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness
complainant, to object to the admissibility of documents or present controverting
evidence. In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a
sufficient ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The
respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting
evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference.
These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received and considered by the IBP
Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation, and were the
bases for the IBP Boards Resolution.

b. Merits of the Complaint

This Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in notarizing the
Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and
Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as
follows:

The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule
because his uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale
but the seller Laurentino Ylaya is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the
instant case are considered principals in the contract entered into. In this case, we find
that the complainants evidence and the records of the case do not show the
respondents deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the
complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.

c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all
concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his
obligation to hold in trust his clients properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

d. The Complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss
the Case and her Affidavit. In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the
complainants desistance or withdrawal does not terminate the proceedings. From this
perspective, we consider the complainants desistance to be suspect; it is not grounded
on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual misconduct; rather, because
of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the position of the respondent
and/or Reynold.

e. Procedural aspect

We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. The
Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.
19. MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS vs MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS

Facts: Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit

liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and
in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the filing of the complaint.

(a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel as constant escort of his paramour in
going to their appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where she is
staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his mistress are
together;

(b) Respondent has been using another court employee as contact person to his young
lover and in summoning and bringing complainants witnesses to respondent to be
harassed and threatened;

(c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has been brought many times by
respondent to his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing court
personnel and lawyers,;

(d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court sessions nor court
hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date with his
paramour, to the great prejudice of public service;

(e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano
Carangan, aunt of respondents paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur

(f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he shamelessly cavorts even in
the presence of court personnel.2

From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4) witnesses
shall be presented. The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the
allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado.

The Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice, however,
recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and
circumspection in his actions.30

Issues: First, considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really
necessary that administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed
of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on

respondent judge?

I. In several cases,31 this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge
connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the
quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to establish
grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial.
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been
well defined. The Supreme Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is
authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges made
against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter,
to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of
the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further
annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are
referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the
conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-Generals
investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to
determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the
respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-
General.

In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative
quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges. In
order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to be made.

When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the
commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the
complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we
require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish
liability.39 There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when
we deal with cases filed against judges.

Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the integrity
demanded of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments of a
magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The nature of the position
requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any
judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting on the
bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality committed
by judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable
conduct from the members of its bench.

II. However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by
substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. We have
already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. This quantum of evidence,
complainant failed to satisfy.

The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly
prove that respondent committed disreputable conduct.

Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the
charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not
satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively liable for
UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

20. Office of the Court Administrator vs Indar

Facts: Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City reports to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions,
resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.

the OCA Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not
exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that
the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the
series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-
Cotabato.

At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indars compliance with Deputy
Court Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin A. Villasors 1st Indorsement,. As regards this case,
the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases
filed, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasors Indorsement and in response to the

Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that
this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases involving
Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the
marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.3

In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be
docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of
Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be
preventively suspended, pending investigation.

In compliance with the Courts Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of
the questioned decisions and to testify thereon. All the Decisions were signed by
Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of
Judge Indars signature appearing above the name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The
Certificates of Finality were issued by Atty. Silonganand in one case, by Abie Amilil, the
OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.7

Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
locate the whereabouts of Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan.

This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta)
since Justice Gacutan was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011.
Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to
Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.

In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of
the records of the listed decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the
officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to
produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents related therein. He
personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence
to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing
that a docket fee has been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing
that the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no
record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings
were also made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for
decision as it was not calendared for that purpose.8

Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic)
an opportunity for the Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x9

To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda
mentioned in the report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on
various dates from the period starting April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket
Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of January to
December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15.

Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have
been complied with. Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending
administrative case against him. The notice of this Courts Resolution of 4 May 2010,
preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-
Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.

According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of

marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive
requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the
records show no judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indars act of affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the
validity of a decision he allegedly rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in
the courts records, constitutes dishonesty.

Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the
investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not included as respondent in this case, on her
participation in the certification of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions.

Issue:

whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Ruling:

Yes. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued
decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that
such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites
for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided
marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only
makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly
violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indars
gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays
public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no
place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service."

It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to
administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. 12 It is enough that the party is given the
chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.13 Otherwise stated, in the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack
of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.14

The Court emphasized in Cornejo15 the Constitutional precept that public office is a public
trust,16 which is the underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due
process of law in administrative proceedings, thus:

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against
him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing
issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one
Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was
received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive
notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against
him because aside from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed
to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers.18
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases
which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1)
proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the
parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the
list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are
not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the
law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any
showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross
misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided
marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only
makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly
violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that,
Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and
betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness
has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the
service.
21. Ingraham v. Wright

Facts: James Ingraham was a junior high student in a Florida public school. After failing
to respond quickly to a teachers instructions, Ingraham was brought to Principal Willie
Wrights office where he refused to admit the infraction. Ingraham was then subjected to
corporal punishment by Principal Wright, with the help of the Assistant Principal and his
personal assistant. According to the record, Ingrahams spanking was particularly harsh
as he was subjected to twenty separate strokes from the wooden paddle. Ingrahams
doctors ordered him to remain out of school to recover from injuries sustained during his
paddling. Ingraham and another student brought suit alleging that Florida law allowing
corporal punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, violated their due process rights,
and sought damages in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief. The district Court
granted Wrights motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:

W/N the Eighth Amendment bar corporal punishment in public schools?

W/N due process require notice to parents before corporal punishment is imposed?

Holding:

1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply
to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools.

(a) The history of the Eighth Amendment and the decisions of this Court make it clear
that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was designed to protect those
convicted of crime.

(b) There is no need to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its historical context and
extend it to public school disciplinary practices. The openness of the public school and its
supervision by the community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses
from which that Amendment protects convicted criminals. These safeguards are
reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law, whereby any punishment going
beyond that which is reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the
child may result in both civil and criminal liability.

Justice Powell explained that there was no basis for extending the Eighth Amendment
beyond that historical context, particularly as applied to schools that are already
carefully monitored by local communities. Furthermore, aggrieved students and parents
can seek criminal and civil remedies in the event punishments exceed what is necessary
to enforce rules and impose discipline within the school environment.

2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require notice and
hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment as that practice is authorized and
limited by the common law.

a) Liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated where public
school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately punish a child for
misconduct by restraint and infliction of appreciable physical pain. Freedom from bodily
restraint and punishment is within the liberty interest in personal security that has
historically been protected from state deprivation without due process of law. Pp. 430 U.
S. 672-674.

(b) Under the longstanding accommodation between the child's interest in personal
security and the traditional common law privilege, there can be no deprivation of
substantive rights as long as the corporal punishment remains within the limits of that
privilege. The child nonetheless has a strong interest in procedural safeguards that
minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the resolution of disputed
questions of justification. Pp. 675-676.

(c) The Florida scheme, considered in light of the openness of the school environment,
affords significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment of school children.
The teacher and principal must exercise prudence and restraint when they decide that
corporal punishment is necessary for disciplinary purposes. If the punishment is later
found to be excessive, they may be held liable in damages or be subject to criminal
penalties. Where the State has thus preserved what "has always been the law of the
land," United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 376 U. S. 692, the case for administrative
safeguards is significantly less compelling than it would otherwise be. Pp. 430 U. S. 676-
680.

(d) Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement would

significantly intrude into the area of educational responsibility that lies primarily with the
public school authorities. Prior procedural safeguards require a diversion of educational
resources, and school authorities may abandon corporal punishment as a disciplinary
measure rather than incur the burdens of complying with procedural requirements. The
incremental benefit of invoking the Constitution to impose prior notice and a hearing
cannot justify the costs

Children obviously have a strong and legitimate interest in avoiding unwarranted

punishments or being unnecessarily deprived of their liberty. However, the Court here
concluded Florida law already contained adequate protections, with teachers and
principals alike required to exercise prudence in applying punishments, subject to the
watchful eye of the community and the possibility of subsequent civil or criminal liability
for wrongful behavior. The Court saw no need to add pre-punishment notifications, as
school discipline has always been handled without the need for prior notification or
hearings. Finally, the Court explained that imposing additional requirements on schools
seeking to impose punishments would intrude state authority to regulate schools. Justice
Powell pointed out that additional safeguards may well require schools to abandon
certain modes of punishment, and any small benefit from adding constitutional remedies
to already existing tort and criminal remedies were small compared to the important
interests of schools protecting their educational environments.

The Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment did not bar corporal punishment in
public schools, reasoning that adequate safeguards were in place to prevent erroneous
application, and in the event of mistakes, students were afforded civil and criminal
remedies sufficient to cure the violation of their rights.

Petitioners cannot prevail on either of the theories before us in this case. The Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to school
paddlings, and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of procedural due process is
satisfied by Florida's preservation of common law constraints and remedies. We
therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' evidence affords no basis for
injunctive relief, and that petitioners cannot recover damages on the basis of any Eighth
Amendment or procedural due process violation.

22. Guzman v National University(1986)

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of

respondent National University have come to court to seek relief because the respondent
(national University) refused to allow them to enroll. That the reason for their refusal to
re-enroll is that they participated in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
university. Petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause
and without being afforded the opportunity to defend themselves.

On the other hand, the respondent contended that the petitioners failure to enroll
for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not
because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That petitioner
Urbiztondo to re-enroll when the enrollment period was already closed. As regards to
petitioner Guzman, he continued to lead or actively participate in activities within the
university premises conducted without permit from school authorities that disturbed and
disrupted classes and he is facing criminal charges. However , petitioners denied the
allegations of the University.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the right of the petitioners to
procedural due process as they were refused to re-enroll in the University.

Ruling: Yes. The respondents never conducted proceedings to determine whether or not
petitioner-students had indeed led or participated in activities within the university
without permit from the authorities. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process. And due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in court of justice. There are withal minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural process and these are (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusations against them; (2) they
have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of the counsel, is
desired (3) they shall be informes of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee.
23. De La Salle University v Court of Appeals (2007)

Facts: On March 29, James Yap mentioned to his two brods that while he was eating
dinner alone in a restaurant near la salle, he heard two men bad mouthing and
apparently angry at Domino Lux. And so the three together with four other persons went
to the restaurant and confronted the two who were still there. By the admission of the
respondent Bungubung in his testiomony, one of the two was a member of the Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After the incident,
the two heads of the fraternity conducted a meeting through the intercession of the
student council. Tau gamma was asking for an apology however, no apology was made..

Minutes before his next class, James yap was beaten up by members of Tau
gamma fraternity including the respondent Bungubung, Valdez and reverente.
Afterwards, the guards of La Salle arrived and the group of attackers left.

Petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the disciplinary board of DLSU charging
private respondents with direct assault. During the proceedings before the board
private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No full blown hearing was
conducted nor the students allowed to cross examine the witnesses against them. The
DLSU discipline board found the respondents guilty and meted the supreme penalty of
automatic expulsion.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents were accorded due process of law given that
there was no full blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross examine the witnesses
against them.

Ruling:

No. Private respondents right to due process of law was not violated. In
administrative cases , such as investigation of students found violating school discipline,
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural process and these are (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of the accusations against them; (2) they have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of the counsel, is desired (3) they shall be
informes of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee.

A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. One may also be heard through pleadings , there is
no denial of due process.

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them.
They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they in fact
submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidences against
them.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not
allowed to cross examine the witnesses against them. This arugment was already
rejected in Guzman v National University.

24. Tumey v Ohio US (1927)

Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the
village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He
moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the
14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey
of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him
$100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey
obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas
of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground
that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and
affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused
Tumeys application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case.
Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of
the mayors court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On
11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason
that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was
then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of
the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.

Issue: Whether or not the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and
the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders
the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus
matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminalcase of due process of law to subject
his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.
Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person
sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The
mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who
came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not
have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was
the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an
inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become
so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country,
that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so
small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minim is non curat lex.
The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each
case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each
defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt
or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh
against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the
defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the
country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts
to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The
inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines
provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury,
without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented
by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by there viewing court to set aside the
judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly
against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right
to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt
the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome ,and because of his official motive to convict
and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the
supreme court of Ohio is reversed.

25. Macalintal v Teh (1997)

Facts: In a letter, dated 01 April 1996, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the Court
the actuations of Judge Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to Election Case No. R-95-
001.

Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty. Macalintal in the
aforenumbered election case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the resolution, via a petition
for certiorari, before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"). While the case was
pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh actively participated in the proceedings by filing his
comment on the petition and, still later, an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer
forthwith filed a motion to prevent respondent Judge from further acting on Election Case
 In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent Judge admitted that he had
filed his own pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the order of
16 November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc requiring respondents to comment on the
petition. The urgent manifestation he filed was meant to rectify the assertion of
complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election
Code.
In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge expressed his willingness
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of his comment which he repleaded and
reproduced. He also made his observation that the complaint of Atty. Macalintal had not
been under oath.
In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant informed the Court that his letter
of 01 April 1996 was not intended as an administrative complaint but that he was leaving
the matter of treating it as such to the discretion of this Court in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over the members of the judiciary. He likewise
manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
already filed. He, in passing, informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996
issued by respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be "irrational."

Issue: Whether or not Judge The showed gross incompetence and misconduct.
Ruling: Yes. While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that complaints against Judges
should be sworn to, the Court deems it proper to dispense with the requirement since the
letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an administrative complaint and
considering, further, that respondent Judge, in his comment, practically admitted all
pertinent allegations of complainant. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court
may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show
gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.
Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed related to
the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties
defendant with such court or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining
the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such person or persons to
appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the court or
judge affected by the proceedings, and costs awarded in such proceedings in
favor of the petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only, and
not against the court or judge."
Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or
formal party[6] in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs. Hernando,
[7]
the Court has explained:
"x x x (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is
challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active
part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the
duty of the private respondent to appear and defend, both in his/her behalf and in
behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at issue. The judge should
maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time by
taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case
 but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the
cases in his court. He is merely a nominal party to the case and has no personal
interest nor personality therein."
When complainant filed a motion for respondent's inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-
001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the
Rules of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith denied
the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to payP100,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses "for compelling the respondent Judge to engage
the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the Motion for
Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a judge
before his own court.
In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was directed to act on the
motion for inhibition in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either misunderstood or chose to
misunderstand the directive for, in his order, dated 17 April 1997, he granted the motion
for inhibition "in compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the Court, in its
resolution of 12 March 1997, merely required respondent Judge to act on the motion for
inhibition in accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification." Certainly, he was not directed by the Court either to grant or deny the
motion.
Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not only be just
but must be perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its
fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible representation of the law and, most
importantly, of justices should be the embodiment of independence, competence, and
integrity.] Once again, the Court would also wish to say that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show
acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authorities doctrines. Not for a
moment, indeed, does the learning process in law cease.

26. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. FLORENTINO FLORO, JR.

FACTS:

Judge Florentino V. Floro of Branch 73, Malabon City faced a total of 13 charges calling
for his disbarment and removal from his office as a judge. Some of the charges against
him were the act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
regarding qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct; for
rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules
of Procedures; his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct; for
appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of
hearing; for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system; for the use of highly
improper and intemperate language during court proceedings; for violation of Circular
No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

Judge Floro also claimed that he has certain psychic powers such as the power to see the
future, the power of bilocation, the power to type letters while he is in a trance and the
power to see and consult with his little friends or the duwendes.

ISSUES:

WON Judge Floro should be relieved for being unfit to serve as a judge.

WON Judge Floro is entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension.

HELD:

WON Judge Floro should be relieved for being unfit to serve as a judge. YES.

Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides
that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan
the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law.
Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little
friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on
his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to
subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his
fitness to remain in the judiciary.

The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13
charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which
allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office. This
being the case, the SC considered the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be
endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the
transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
Judge Floro was found guilty for seven of the 13 charges against him. Namely, one
simple misconduct, two counts of gross ignorance of law and three counts of
unbecoming conduct. The penalty is a fine of P40,000, the maximum for gross ignorance
of law because simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct were considered as
aggravating circumstances. In imposing the penalty of fine, the SC considered the fact
that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges
and that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives.

The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is substantially supported by

evidence. Based on the three psychological tests and evaluation of the two psychiatrists,
there is no other recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared
unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.

Courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly
honorable men, competent and independent. There is no indication that Judge Floro is
anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against
him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However,
the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate
gross deficiency in competence and independence.

One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know
and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanctions. However, there is an exception as "good faith
in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." Thus, even if a judge
acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively
liable.

An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes
entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are
substantive and procedural rules of law.

Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to
continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a
critical and impartial judiciary. Hence, he must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC
Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit
to discharge the functions of his office.

WON Judge Floro is entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension. YES.
The Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts. The Constitution limits this power through the
admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative
cases against judges, but it does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge
is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its
amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.

The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This power --
consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an
adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.

The resolution regarding Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration
of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days
from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as
amended, now states that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire
period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme
Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to
come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until
such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her,
because the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring
judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice where
litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.

This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an
exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. In the case
of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the
serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation
into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the
delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. Be that as it
may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that
the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the
Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.

In the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde: Ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the
investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive
suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back
salaries, allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his
preventive suspension, the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
should likewise be applied.

Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety
(90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified. In such a situation, it would be unfair
to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the
preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was not due to
his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive
suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and
would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent
acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place.
Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds.

Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case,
"for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even
pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this
entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus
putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate
for his loss of income as Judge.

Even though Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against
him, it does not mean that he is beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice
Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. Equity as the
complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to
the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of
and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.

In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the
resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. It is
imposed upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the
mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions
of his office.

The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As
discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it
would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these
cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February
2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than
three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years
suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with
his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.

27. Zambales Chromite Mining co. v Court of Appeals (1979)

Facts:

ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloa.
Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of
Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but
he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then
appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that
the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137,
Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the
Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from
deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to
disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon
acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed
the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the
rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that
the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed while
Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision without disturbing
due process.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon
had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human,
he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed
the 2nd decision of the CA.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

32. Buck vs. Bell

FACTS: The Virginia statute providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of
institutions supported by the State who shall be found to be afflicted with an hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility, is within the power of the State under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Failure to extend the provision to persons outside the institutions named does not render
it obnoxious to the Equal Protection Clause.

Petitioner was ordered by the board of the institution to be sterilized after a careful
scrutiny and trial, Buck, and her guardian appealed the case to the Circuit Court of
Amherst County, which sustained the decision of the Board. The case then moved to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

The appellate court sustained the sterilization law as compliant with both the state and
federal constitutions, and it then went to the United States Supreme Court. Buck and her
guardian contended that the due process clause guarantees all adults the right to
procreate which was being violated. They also made the argument that the Equal
Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment was being violated since not all similarly
situated people were being treated the same. The sterilization law was only for the
"feeble-minded" at certain state institutions and made no mention of other state
institutions or those who were not in an institution.

ISSUE: Whether or not it violates due process clause

RULING: No, it does not violate due process clause

In determining whether it violates the constitutional mandate, we must look the

substantive rather than the form of law, for the form cannot convert the process if the
result leads to deprivation of a constitutional right

The test of due process is that the proceedings should be legal, preserving the liberty of
the citizen

An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924, recites that the health of the patient and
the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental
defectives, under careful safeguard, &c.; that the sterilization may be effected in males
by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial
danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many
defective persons who, if now discharged, would become a menace, but, if incapable of
procreating, might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to
themselves and to society, and that experience has shown that heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility.

The superintendent first presents a petition to the special board of directors of his
hospital or colony, stating the facts and the grounds for his opinion, verified by affidavit.
Notice of the petition and of the time and place of the hearing in the institution is to be
served upon the inmate, and also upon his guardian, and if there is no guardian, the
superintendent is to apply to the Circuit Court of the County to appoint one. If the inmate
is a minor, notice also is to be given to his parents, if any, with a copy of the petition. The
board is to see to it that the inmate may attend the hearings if desired by him or his
guardian. The evidence is all to be reduced to writing, and, after the board has made its
order for or against the operation, the superintendent, or the inmate, or his guardian,
may appeal.

The judgment finds the facts that have been recited, and that Carrie Buck is the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be
sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health, and that her welfare and that
of society will be promoted by her sterilization, and thereupon makes the order. In view
of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific findings of the Court,
obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and, if they
exist, they justify the result.

It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this
sort. But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can,
indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all
similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course, so far as the
operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the
world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly
reached.

33. Michael H. vs. Gerald D.

FACTS: In May, 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to,
and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father
on the birth certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests
showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an
adulterous affair, was Victoria's father.

During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who
held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom
they have lived since June, 1984. In November, 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in
California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria,
through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she
was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald.

The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were
no triable issues of fact as to paternity under which provides that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed
to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the
husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances.

In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that
Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald
was neither sterile nor impotent.

Lower and appellate courts denied the visitation rights of Michael to Victoria, prompting
the former to appeal in this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption established by law infringes the due process of
a man to establish paternity to the child born to the wife of another man

RULING: No, A possible biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain
parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over
the child.

Michael has failed to meet his burden of proving that his claimed "liberty" interest is one
so deeply imbedded within society's traditions as to be a fundamental right. Not only has
he failed to demonstrate that the interest he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been
accorded protection by society, but the common law presumption of legitimacy, and
even modern statutory and decisional law, demonstrate that society has historically
protected, and continues to protect, the marital family against the sort of claim Michael
asserts.

Historically, the marital family has been protected rather than the potential father
outside of the marriage. The presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at common
law, and could be rebutted only by a husband who was incapable of procreation or had
no access to his wife during the relative period. The policy rationales were the aversion
to declaring children illegitimate and the peace and tranquility of the States and families.
No modern or historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the natural father to
assert parental rights. It is important that the scope of the right be properly constrained.
Any right can be fundamental at a general level. The scope of the right examined should
be the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified.

To provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital

father.

34. Kansas vs. Hendricks

FACTS: Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act establishes procedures for the civil
commitment of persons who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder,"
are likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence." Kansas filed a petition under
the Act in state court to commit respondent (and cross-petitioner) Hendricks, who had a
long history of sexually molesting children and was scheduled for release from prison.
The court reserved ruling on Hendricks' challenge to the Act's constitutionality, but
granted his request for a jury trial. After Hendricks testified that he agreed with the state
physician's diagnosis that he suffers from pedophilia and is not cured and that he
continues to harbor sexual desires for children that he cannot control when he gets
"stressed out," the jury determined that he was a sexually violent predator.

Finding that pedophilia qualifies as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court
ordered him committed. On appeal, the State Supreme Court invalidated the Act on the
ground that the pre commitment condition of a "mental abnormality" did not satisfy what
it perceived to be the "substantive" due process requirement that involuntary civil
commitment must be predicated on a "mental illness" finding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the definition of mental illness set forth in the Act violates
substantive due process

RULING: No, it does not violate substantive due process

The Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies "substantive" due process

requirements. An individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding
physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context.

This Court has consistently upheld involuntary commitment statutes that detain people
who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health
and safety, provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and
evidentiary standards.

Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if it couples proof of

dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or "mental
abnormality," for these additional requirements serve to limit confinement to those who
suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.

This court agrees with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental abnormality"
as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that
such person is a menace to the health and safety of others." Hence, affirming Kansas
that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not able to control
their dangerousness.

35. Washington vs. Glucksberg

FACTS: It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington. The
State's present law makes "[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony, and provides: "A
person is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or aids another person to
attempt suicide." Respondents, four Washington physicians who occasionally treat
terminally ill, suffering patients, declare that they would assist these patients in ending
their lives if not for the State's assisted suicide ban.

They, along with three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and a nonprofit
organization that counsels people considering physician assisted suicide, filed this suit
against petitioners, the State and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the
ban is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause which extends to a personal choice by a
mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted suicide.

Federal District Court agreed, concluding that Washington's assisted suicide ban is
unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on the exercise of that
constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not prohibition in causing or aiding suicide does not violate the due
process clause

RULING: No, it does not violate the due process clause

An examination of our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices demonstrates that
Anglo American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide
for over 700 years; that rendering such assistance is still a crime in almost every State;
that such prohibitions have never contained exceptions for those who were near death;
that the prohibitions have in recent years been reexamined and, for the most part,
reaffirmed in a number of States

In light of that history, this Court's decisions lead to the conclusion that respondents
asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court's established method of substantive due
process analysis has two primary features:

First, the Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.

Second, the Court has required a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest.

The Ninth Circuit's and respondents' various descriptions of the interest here at stake--
e.g., a right to "determin[e] the time and manner of one's death," the "right to die," a
"liberty to choose how to die," a right to "control of one's final days," "the right to choose
a humane, dignified death," and "the liberty to shape death"--run counter to that second
requirement.

This asserted right has no place in our Nation's traditions, given the country's consistent,
almost universal, and continuing rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally
competent adults. To hold for respondents, the Court would have to reverse centuries of
legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every
State.

The constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was
discussed in Cruzan, supra, at 279, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of
personal autonomy, but was instead grounded in the Nation's history and traditions,
given the common law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal
tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. And although
Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy, 505 U. S., at 852, it does not follow that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected

Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest
in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice
which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of
human life.
36. Lawrence vs. Texas

FACTS: In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were
dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They
entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The
right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned. The officers
observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two
petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a
Justice of the Peace.

Texas Penal Code: A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual

intercourse with another individual of the same sex.

They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. The Court of
Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners federal
constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion,
rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
RULING: Yes, texas penal code on prohibition to consensual same sex intimacy violates
due process clause

The Court held that homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private,
sexual activity; that homosexuals' moral and sexual choices were entitled to
constitutional protection; and that moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate
justification for Texas's law criminalizing sodomy. The laws involved in Bowers and here
are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act.
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether
or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element
in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.

Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults
acting in private. A substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which
there are surviving records were for predatory acts against those who could not or did
not consent, as in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault. As to these, one
purpose for the prohibitions was to ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a
predator committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the
criminal law. The Court, with a five-justice majority, overturned its previous ruling on the
same issue in the 1986 case Bowers v. Hardwick, where it upheld a challenged Georgia
statute and did not find a constitutional protection of sexual privacy. The Court held that
intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due
process under the 14th Amendment.

37. VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, ET. AL vs. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, ET.
AL

FACTS:

Two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan as the petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 84 should be declared
null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation
or calling. They also claim that such an ordinance is violative of their right to due process
and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

The said cases were assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a restraining order to rift the two case,
upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance as a valid exercise of police power. He
reasoned that the municipality was stigmatized by innuendos of sexual titillation and
fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, which left the municipality with no
alternative except to order through its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of
partial economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets.

ISSUE:

WON a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation.

HELD:

WON a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation. NO.

The Supreme Court holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.

Ordinances must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power
by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly, the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.

Based on the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if
the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night
clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close
their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more
than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would
undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be
avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays
less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation
of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable
consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness
enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due
process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be characterized as falling within that
aspect of the police power. This case cannot be referenced to Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association z, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, as that was a regulatory
measure so there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It
did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in
order precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
This is an entirely different case. What was involved is a measure not embraced within
the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it
was pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it was likewise made
clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were void on its
face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and
under the present Local Government Code non-existent.

38. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON

TRANSPORTATION CO., INC & MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC.

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the Executive Order 179 on February 10, 2003,
"Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System." In the said
order, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) had "recommended a
plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities." It designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Both Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., domestic
corporations engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus
operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief. Viron alleged that the MMDAs authority
does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing
bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, while Mencorp
questioned the constitutionality of EO 179 and illegal for transgressing the possessory
rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective
terminals.

The trial court initially held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the
State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence,
Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of
police power.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

WON E.O. 179 is unconstitutional for being violative of both the Constitution and the
Public Service Act.

WON the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of bus terminals.

HELD:

WON E.O. 179 is unconstitutional for being violative of both the Constitution and the
Public Service Act. YES.

Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory
relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of
bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. They argue that Viron and
Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department
apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. Their contention
failed, however, since both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites
for their respective petitions for declaratory relief so there can be no denying, therefore,
that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
The issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or
anticipatory. Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by
the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents bus terminals would be foolhardy
for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which,
under Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a
breach or violation of rights.

Also, Petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government
property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation
created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons. Their contention must fail, because to ensure the success
of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to coordinate
their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by
third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be
forced to operate from the common bus terminals.

The closure of bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from
the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation
of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Thus, Respondents
have amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that
[they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s]
enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or
administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a
result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.

Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and
taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up
points might even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict
enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.

Even though respondents certificates of public convenience confer no property right and
must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people, an order for the closure
of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The
PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may
reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege.

Hence, E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.

WON the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of bus terminals. YES.

It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although
authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific
grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924, which declared the Metropolitan Manila
area39 as a "special development and administrative region" and placed the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.

39. Dycaico v. Social Security System

FACTS: Elena Dycaico seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the decision of Social Security Commission denying her claim for survivors
pension which accrues from the death of her husband, Bonifacio Dycaico.
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight children
as beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.
Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the
SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few months
prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner.

Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not
living under the benefit of marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis
was Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 which reads:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of
his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.

An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but it was, likewise, denied. The same
Court ruled that that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio
at the time of his retirement, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries is void. The
petitioner claims that there is no merit to the decision of Court of Appeals as the SSS law
does is silent denying the beneficiarys claim for survivor pension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d)
of RA 8282 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.
RULING: YES. The classification violates the equal protection clause because: (1) it is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
Classifying dependent spouses with respect to their entitlement based on whether the
marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of
the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the police
objective of the law, which is to provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and
other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. (2) it is not based on
real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It unfairly lumps
marriages contracted after the members retirement as sham relationships or were
contracted solely for acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse.
The proviso also violates the due process clause as it out rightly deprives the surviving
spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after
the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of
benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. The
proviso creates the presumption that marriages contracted after the members
retirement date were entered for securing benefits under RA 8282. This presumption is
conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to
disprove the presence of the illicit purpose, thereby also depriving them the opportunity
to be heard.
40. REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She
later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Not in conformity, the OSG filed an
appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to
enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING: No, respondents marriage is not void. The court said: Based on the above,
consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

The court also explained that There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid. No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.

41. IMBONG VS OCHOA

FACTS

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
ISSUES

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:

Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is
a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the
principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view:
Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence
of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as
law.

RULING

SUBSTANTIAL

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins
at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment
of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition,
they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take
action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term primarily, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory

only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient
and effective.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or
wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a
state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the
RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of
e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-
surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education

has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private
health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private
health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods
(as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23
(a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section
7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter now.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and
responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible

parenthood which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human
development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .
24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
42. Obergefell, et al vs. Hodges

FACTS: The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners
are deceased. The respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in
question. The petitioners claim that respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in
another State, given full recognition.

ISSUES

(1) whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex;

(2) whether the fourteenth amendment requires a state to recognize the same-sex
marriage licensed and performed in a state which does not grant that right.

RULING

1. Yes. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendments Due

Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See,
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,
484486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and
tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When
new insight reveals discord between the Constitutions central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. THE RIGHT TO
MARRY IS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

1. The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of

individual autonomy.
2. The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any
other in its importance to the committed individuals.
3. The right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
4. Marriage is a keystone of the nations social order.

The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co- extensive, yet each may
be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. Indeed, recognizing that new
insights and societal under- standings can reveal unjustified inequality within
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has
invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex- based inequality on
marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 460461, and confirmed the
relation between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in
the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575.
This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty
of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at
issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-
sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing
harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. Pp. 1822.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of
the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same- sex marriages

validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the
fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 2728.
43. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growery & Export Association Inc

FACTS

The ordinance was challenged by Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association
Incorporated (PBGEA) after it took effect on March 23, 2007 more than a month after it
was approved by then Mayor Rodrigo Duterte.

A regional trial court granted the prayer for a preliminary injunction, but later on
declared the ordinance as valid and constitutional. Petitioners Davao City, and Wilfredo
Mosqueda et al, who intervened and argued in favor of the ordinance, appealed to the
CA and sought injunctive relief. The CA issued a temporary restraining order.

But the CA thereafter reversed the earlier RTC decision and declared Section 5 of the
ordinance as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive. Section 5
bans aerial spraying in the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City 3 months after the
effectivity of the ordinance. Petitioners then brought the issue to the SC, but the High
Court unanimously denied the consolidated petitions on certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prohibition against aerial spraying is a lawfully permissible

method that the city government can adopt to prevent the effects of the so-called aerial
drift.

RULING: The Supreme Court has ruled as unconstitutional a Davao City ordinance
banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice.

1. The ordinance violates the due process clause - The High Court said Davao City
"must not act arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically regardless of the ordinance's
salutary purpose."

On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be inadequate time for the city to shift from
aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively depriving the city an efficient means
to combat disease.

But the High Court disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer zone required by the ordinance
is in violation of due process since the purpose is to minimize the effects of aerial
spraying.

2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause - The SC said equal
protection was violated since the ordinance made no substantial distinctions when it
prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of the substance or the level of
concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-meter buffer
zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of landholdings.
3. The ordinance is an ultra vires act - According to the SC, the city disregarded
regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA), including its
identification and classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.

Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, the SC said, is a
function lodged with the FPA and not with local government units. Thus, when Davao City
enacted the ordinance "without inherent and explicit authority to do so" the SC said the
local government performed an ultra vires act.

Michael H. v Gerald D.

FACTS: In 1976 Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and established a home in
California. In 1978, Carole became involved in an adulterous affair with Michael H. She
conceived a child, Victoria, in 1980, with Gerald listed as father on the birth certificate.
Gerald has always held the child out to be his daughter, but soon after delivery Carole
informed Michael she believed he might be the father. In 1981 Gerald moved to New York
and Carole, Michael, and Victoria had blood tests revealing a 98.07% probability that
Michael was the father. Carole visited with Michael for several months, were he held
Victoria out as his daughter. Carole left Michael and took up residence in California with
another man. In the summer of 1982 Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York, and
the three vacationed in Europe. In the fall she returned to California. In November of
1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California to establish his paternity and right to
visitation. In 1983 the court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem to represent
Victorias interests. Victoria filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than
one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship,
with all of the attendant rights, duties, and obligations, with both. Carole filed for
summary judgment while she was again living with Gerald in New York. In August of 1983
she returned to California and again became involved with Michael, instructing her
attorneys to remove the summary judgment motion. For the next eight months Michael
held Victoria out as his daughter. In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation
that Michael was Victorias father. The next month Carole left Michael, instructing her
attorneys to not file the stipulation. Carole reconciled with Gerald and they lived together
with two more children being born.

In May 1984 Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for
Michael pendente lite. A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain
sole custody, but Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a
restricted visitation schedule. The court concurred. In October of 1984 Gerald moved for
summary judgment on the ground that under California law there were no triable issues
of fact as to Victorias paternity. The law provides that the issue of a wife cohabiting
with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child
of the marriage. The presumption may only be rebutted by blood tests, and a motion for
such tests must be made within two years of the birth by the husband, or by the wife if
the NATURAL father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that
Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald
was neither sterile nor impotent.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption established by the law infringe upon
the due process rights of a man who wishes to establish his paternity of a child
born to the wife of another man or infringe upon the constitutional right of the
child to maintain a relationship with her natural father

Held: Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has
established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Caroles
marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship.
However, Michaels interest must be a fundamental liberty to be constitutionally
protected.

Historically, the marital family has been protected rather than the potential father
outside of the marriage. The presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at common
law, and could be rebutted only by a husband who was incapable of procreation or had
no access to his wife during the relative period. The policy rationales were the aversion
to declaring children illegitimate and the peace and tranquility of the States and families.
No modern or historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the NATURAL father
to assert parental rights. Michael must establish not that society has traditionally allowed
a natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally
accorded such a father parental rights. To provide protection to an adulterous natural
father is to deny protection to a marital father.

Victorias due process challenge is weaker than Michaels. Her claim that a State must
recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in history or tradition. The Court declines
to accept Victorias argument that she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of
her legitimacy, because Victoria is not illegitimate.
44. ROMUALDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts: Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn

applications for Voters Registration. They indicated that they are residents of Leyte,
when in truth and in fact, they were residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them with
violations of Omnibus Election Code and Voters Registraion Act. The Comelec
recommended the filing of information against the Spouses Romualdez for violation of
Voters Registration Act.

Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due process of law when
the elections offenses for which they are charged by Garay are different from the
resolution of the Comelec. The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voters
Registration Act is vague on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of
the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof.
Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.

Issue: Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration is vague.

Ruling: NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. However, the Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal
statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. The Court has declared that
facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.

Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The Court
has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude. As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of
election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its
specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an
election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision
renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves
no guesswork. The Court does not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
The petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of
which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular
words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.

45. RUBEN SERRANO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION

FACTS: Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann
Department Store. He was charged with the task of supervising security checkers in their
jobs (apprehending shoplifters and preventing pilferage of merchandise). On October 11,
1991, the management sent him a letter immediately terminating his services as
security section head, effective on the same day. The reason given by the management
was retrenchment; they had opted to hire an independent security agency as a cost-
cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, under
payment of wages and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the Labor Arbiter. The
labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner was not accorded
due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serranos dismissal, Isetann
employed a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the former. The
NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay
equivalent to one month per year of service, unpaid salary. It held that the phase-out of
the security section was a valid exercise of management prerogative on the part of
Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment in the absence of bad faith or
abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety supervisors
position was long in place prior to Serranos separation from the company, or the phase-
out of the Security Section.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was in compliance with the due process
clause

RULING: No. The Court also responded to the arguments of Justices Puno and
Panganiban by stating that the violation in the procedural requirement of termination is
not a denial of the fundamental right to due process. This is because of the following
reasons:

1) The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the

exercise of private power, such as in this case. The provision No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law pertains only to the
State, as only it has the authority to do the same.

2) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide
an opportunity for the employee to be heard before the power of the organized society is
brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283, however, the purpose is to give him time to
prepare for the eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to determine whether economic
causes exist to justify termination. It is not to give opportunity to be heardthere is no
charge against the employee under Art. 283

3) The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause.

4) Not all notice requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a
procedure to be followed before a right granted to party can be exercised; others are an
application of the Justinian precept. Such is the case here. The failure of the employer to
observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual.

46. AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. [Riviera Home] is engaged
in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It
employed Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on
January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work. Virgilio and Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the
dismissals illegal and ordered Riviera Home to pay the monetary claims.

Issue: Whether the dismissal was proper and in compliance with due process.

Ruling: YES. In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine
and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing
sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed
in Wenphil. It must be stressed that in the present case, that Virgilio and Jenny
committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process
were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.

An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be
protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term
suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled
in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be
stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which the Court
sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of
indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into
special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.