CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
G.R. No. L-7424 August 31, 1954
LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ, on her behalf and as guardian ad
litem of the minors, SALVADOR C. LOPEZ, JR., and LUIS CARLOS
LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Davao,
MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ, ENRIQUE LOPEZ, SALVADOR LOPEZ,
JR., LEOPOLDO LOPEZ, RODOLFO LOPEZ and the guardian ad
litem for the minor FLORDELIZ LOPEZ, respondents.
Petitioner Lourdes Camus de Lopez, on her behalf and as guardian ad
litem of her minor children, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos
Lopez, is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1035 of the Court of First Instance
of Davao. Respondents Maria N. Vda. de Lopez, Enrique Lopez,
Salvador Lopez, Jr., Leopoldo Lopez, Rodolfo Lopez and Flordeliz Lopez
are the defendants in said case No. 1035, the purpose of which is to
secure delivery of some property of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as
alleged share of the petitioner, who claims to be his widow. She contends
that, although his previous marriage with respondent Maria N. de Lopez,
which was unknown to petitioner, had not been dissolved and was still
subsisting, and acting in bad faith, and without advising petitioner of such
first marriage, Salvador Lopez, Sr., wedded the latter in 1938, and,
thereafter, lived as husband and wife with her; and that, as a
consequence of said union, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos
Lopez were born in Manila on December 6, 1939, and November 25,
1940, respectively, and then christened as legitimate children of Salvador
Lopez, Sr. and the petitioner, as set forth in their respective birth and
baptismal certificates. After the filing of the answer of said respondents,
as defendants in said Civil Case No. 1035, or on December 8, 1953,
petitioner herein through her counsel filed a "notice for the taking" of her
deposition and that of one Pilar Cristobal, at Room 202 of the Vasquez
Building, 1865 Azcarraga Street, Manila, on January 16, 1954, at 2:00
p.m. Acting, however, upon an urgent motion of the defendants in said
Civil Case No. 1035, respondent Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren, as Judge of
First Instance of Davao, issued an order, dated January 11, 1954,
prohibiting the taking of said deposition. Accordingly, petitioner instituted
the present case for the purpose of annulling said order of January 11,
1954, and of having no restraint to the taking of the aforementioned
deposition.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in forbidding the taking of said deposition, she being entitled
thereto as a matter of right, without leave of court, after the filing of the
answer of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 1035, for section 1 of
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
Deposition pending action, when may be taken. By leave of
court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled
by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 29. Deposition shall
be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes.
Under the other hand, respondents invoke, in their favor, section 16 of
the same rule, reading:
Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. After notice
is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined
and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not
be taken, or that it may be taken at some designated place other
than that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on
written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired
into, or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to
certain matters, or that the examination shall be held with no one
present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened
only by order of the court, or that secret processes, developments
or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the
court may make any other order which justice requires to protect
the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to "order that the
deposition shall not be taken" and, this grant connotes the authority to
exercise discretion in connection therewith (National Bondholders
Corp. vs. McClintic, 1 Fed. Rules Service, 388, 99 F. [2d] 595). It is well-
1

settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited; that
it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the
end that its purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of section
16 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, former Chief Justice Moran has the
following to say:
The advisory committee of the United States Supreme Court said
that this provision is intended to be one of the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents on account of the
unrestricted right to discovery given by section 1 and 2 of this
Rule. A party may taken the deposition of a witness who knows
nothing about the case, with the only purpose of annoying him or
wasting the time of the other parties. In such case, the court may,
on motion, order that the deposition shall not be taken. Or, a party
may designate a distinct place for the taking of a deposition, and
the adverse party may not have sufficient means to reach that
place, because of poverty or otherwise, in which case the court,
on motion, may order that the deposition be taken at another
place, or that it be taken by written interrogatories. The party
serving the notice may wish to inquire into matters the disclosure
of which may oppressive or embarrassing to the deponent,
especially if the disclosure is to be made in the presence of third
persons, or, the party serving the notice may attempt to inquire
into matters which are absolutely private of the deponent, the
disclosure of which may affect his interests and is not absolutely
essential to the determination of the issues involved in the case.
Under such circumstances, the court, on motion, may order "that
certain matter shall not be inquired into or that the scope of the
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being
sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court,
or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be
disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously filed specific
documents or informations enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court." In other words, this provision
affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in
the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said:
"Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs a
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which
is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy,
embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party,
or both. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. I, pp.
435-6, 1952 ed.)
It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert any of the
evils which said section 16 was meant to prevent or arrest. Moreover,
petitioner was permitted to institute and maintain Civil Case No. 1035
as a pauper. As such, she can ill afford to meet the expenses to make,
with her witnesses, the trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to stay in
said province for the time necessary for the hearing of the case, which
might not take place on the first date set therefor. Hence, the order in
question tended, in effect, to deprive her, not only of her right, under
section 1 of Rule 18, to take the deposition in question, but also, of the
opportunity to prove her claim and, consequently, of the due process
guaranteed by the Constitution. Upon the other hand, the records
indicate that the defendants in Civil case No. 1035 who are the widow
of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their legitimate children must be well-off
financially, for the estate of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., which has
already been partitioned among them, appears to be worth approximately
half a million pesos. The main reason given in support of the contested
order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the
behaviour of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to
justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent
when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken,
said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other
words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without
nullifying the right to take depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect
repealing section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was
not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule.
It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was committed
by respondent Judge in issuing the aforesaid order of January 11, 1954,
for which reason the same should be, as it is hereby annulled and set
aside, with cost against the respondents, except the Hon. Cirilo C.
Maceren.
So ordered.
2

G.R. No. L-41154 January 29, 1988
SILVERIO VERAN, LUIS VERAN, CRISTINA VERAN, LEON VERAN,
GREGORIO SALAMERA, and GENEROSA
SALAMERA, petitioners, vs. The HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PRIMITIVA VILLAREAL, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46367-R, entitled Silverio Veran, et. al. v.
Primitiva Villareal, reversing the trial court's decision declaring petitioners
the owners pro-indiviso of the property subject of the litigation.
As found by the Court of Appeals in its Decision promulgated on May 27,
1975:
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover possession of a parcel of
land located in Atimonan, Quezon and registered in the name of a
Aleja Glodoveza, mother and grandmother of said plaintiffs,
against the defendant Primitiva Villareal, who died during the
pendency of this action and was subsitituted accordingly.
It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs only allowed the afore-
named defendant, being a cousin, to erect her house on a portion
of the and in dispute, which they inherited from Aleja Glodoveza,
who in turn received it as her share from her mother's estate.
Said defendant, however, refused to vacate the lot when
demanded to do so repeatedly, claiming co-ownership also by
inheritance from their common ancestor, the mother of Aleja
Glodoveza. Thus, in the amended answer, defendant interposed
the following special defenses:
a. That the land particularly described in paragraph No. 5
of the Complaint was originally owned pro-indiviso and in
common by the late Leocadia Glodoveza, defendant's
mother, the deceased Aleja Glodoveza, plaintiffs'
predecessor, and the late Ladislawa Glodoveza, all
children of Cornelio Glodoveza and Filomena Padilla,
after whose death their children above-mentioned orally
partitioned said land, by virtue of which the portion
occupied by the defendant was given and received by her
from her predecessor, and the other portion by the
plaintiffs and other co-heirs over said realty.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
a.1. That in the said oral extrajudicial partition,the above-
indicated Lot No. 1744 was adjudicated to the three
children of the late spouses Cornelio Glodoveza and
Filomena Padilla above-named, for a special purpose,
i.e., to enable each of them to own a land by the roadside
suited for residential purpose.
a.2. That of all the real properties, left by the aforenamed
spouses, the plaintiffs' mother Aleja Glodoveza received
as her share in the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1742 a
portion of Lot No. 1744, consisting of residential and rice
land; and a part of Lot No. 1832, all of the Atimonan
Cadastre; whereas, the defendant's mother Leocadia
Glodoveza received only two parcels of land.
b. That even if the plaintiffs have registered the said land
in whole as described in paragraph No. 5 of the cited
Complaint, yet it is also a fact that said registration was
secured thru fraud, deceit, representation and by illegal
means to great damage of herein defendant and the heirs
of Ladislawa Glodoveza, and she and the latter have filed
their protest to the Director of Lands after they learned
that the plaintiffs through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation,
by illegal means and irregularly obtained their free patent,
as evidenced by the aforedsaid protest together with the
two affidavits supporting it to be presented at the trial of
this case.
Because of the pendency of the administrative case as
mentioned in the answer, the trial of the case was suspended
indefinitely on petition of both parties. However, when the
plaintiffs changed their counsel, the latter moved for the setting of
the case for trial after almost four years from Dec. 5, 1955 when
the complaint was filed, the motion was granted, but for failure of
the defendants to appear on the date set for hearing, plaintiffs
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte, after which
decision was rendered on Dec. 15, 1959 in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the
decision was set aside in order to allow the defendant to present
her evidence, after filing an amended answer, on the advice of
the trial court itself, so as to include a prayer for the
reconveyance of the disputed portion of the lot, said lot, described
3

as Lot 1744, having been already registered in the name of Aleja
Glodoveza, the predecessor of plaintiffs.
Defendant offered as part of her evidence the deposition of
Apolonia Glodoveza, but it was denied admission by the trial
court on the ground that no proof was submitted to show that the
witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to come to court
to testify, as contended by plaintiffs in their opposition to the
deposition-taking.
After trial, judgment was rendered the dispositive portion reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant, declaring the former owners
pro indiviso of Lot No. 1744, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P. 1589 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and
ordering the latter to vacate the portion of the land occupied by
her house, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P300.00 as damages,
P200.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of this suit. (pp. 1-4,
Decision.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is
hereby reversed, and the complaint is accordingly dismissed. On
the counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
appellees to reconvey the portion of Lot No. 1744, designated in
the subdivision survey plan as Lot No. 1744-B to the appellant, as
substituted by her heirs. Costs against appellees in both
instances. (p. 11, Decision).
As respondent court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration,
the case was elevated to this Court. After petitioner filed her comment,
this Court, on November 5, 1975, resolved to give the petition due
course.
After petitioner and respondent filed their respective briefs, the case was
submitted for decision.
Petitioners assign as errors the following.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE
REJECTION BY THE COURT A QUO OF WITNESS APOLONIA
GLODOVEZA'S DEPOSITION AS ERRONEOUS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE COURT A QUO'S CONCLUSION UNDER THE PREMISES
WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF
THE RULES OF COURT,
II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
APPRECIATION TO THE MATTERS RELATED IN THE IRREGULARLY-
ACCEPTED DEPOSITION OF WITNESS APOLONIA GLODOVEZA
WHEN THE SAME MATTERS STANDING ALONE ARE HARDLY
ADEQUATE TO BELIE THE CONTRARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
PETITIONERS.
III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 25, 1921 OF FEDERICO
VERAN, HUSBAND OF PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST,
ADDRESSED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT, SEEKING A P1.00 YEARLY
CONTRIBUTION FOR TAXES COULD GIVE RISE TO ANY
PRESUMPTION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION SINCE 1921.
IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ATTACHING
MISPLACED SIGNIFICANCE ON EXHIBIT "4" A SUBDIVISION
SURVEY PLAN OF THE LOT IN QUESTION-WHEN WHATEVER
PROBATIVE VALUE EXHIBIT "4" MAY HAVE ON THE MATTER IN
ISSUE IS RENDERED PRACTICALLY USELESS SINCE IT WAS
PREPARED ALMOST ONE (1) YEAR AFTER ALEJA GLODOVEZA
THE PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAD
OBTAINED AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (NO. P-1589)
WHICH ACTUALLY LAID TO REST ANY DOUBT AS TO THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT "NO EVIDENTIARY WORTH CAN, THEREFORE, BE ATTACHED
TO WHAT TRANSPIRED IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS (BEFORE THE BUREAU OF LANDS)" WHEN SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS HAD PRECISELY BEEN
DESIGNED TO LAY AT REST WHATEVER CONFLICTING CLAIMS THE
CONTENDING PARTIES HAD OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.
4

VI THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING
THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO. (pp. 1-3, Brief for Petitioners).
Save for the first and second, which are closely interrelated, the errors
assigned by petitioners shall be discussed separately.
1. The deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza was taken on January 21, 1961.
At that time the applicable rules of procedure were provided in the (old)
Rules of Court, Section I of Rule 18 of which states:
Section 1. Deposition pending action, when may be taken.-By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or
without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at
the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories. ...
Considering that the deposition was taken long after the answer had
been filed and served, there was therefore no need to seek the approval
of the trial court for the taking of the deposition, notice of such taking
being sufficient. In the instant case, it is not disputed that notice of the
deposition-taking was received by petitioners well before the intended
date and that although petitioners filed an opposition, this was not acted
upon by the trial court before the taking of the deposition.
Leave of court for taking depositions should, however, be distinguished
from the approval of the court for the use of the deposition Under Section
4 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was already in force
and effect when the deposition was offered in evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
xxx xxx xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Thus, with regard to the use of a deposition, there is occasion for the
court to exercise its discretion, the proper time being when the deposition
is formally offered in evidence.
In the instant case, the trial court did not admit the deposition when it was
formally offered, on the ground that petitioners were denied their right to
cross-examine the deponent. However, the Court of Appeals, in deciding
to admit the deposition, observed:
The rejection of said deposition is assigned as one of the errors
of the trial court. From the facts sufficiently disclosed by the
records, We find no irregularity in its execution. The reason for
the taking was disclosed not only in the notice, but also in the
deposition itself. To reject such a deposition on the ground
considered by the trial court smacks of a technicality which does
not serve the ends of substantial justice. The counsel of the
plaintiffs was notified sufficiently in advance of the deposition-
taking, and his opposition was not acted upon favorably before
the day set for the taking of the deposition. If he failed to appear
on that day, as he could have done if he exerted diligent efforts,
he did so at his own risk. (p. 7, Decision).
The findings of fact supporting this conclusion of the Court of Appeals not
being disputed, We agree that, under the circumstance, petitioners'
contention that they were denied their right to cross-examine the
deponent is unfounded.
Further, as pointed out by respondent, before the deposition was formally
offered, respondent had already testified as to the age of deponent.
ATTY. BALDEO:
Q Do you know Apolonia Glodoveza?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is she now, do you know?
A She is in Atimonan.
Q Do you know how old she is now?
5

A She is very old, more or less, ninety years, (tsn, pp. 13-14, May
30, 1963).
Apparently, this was overlooked by the trial court when it denied
admission of the deposition.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be argued that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error when it decided to admit the deposition of
Apolonia Glodoveza.
As correctly observed by respondent court:
With the admission of the deposition, a very significant fact gets
into the records which is that the assignment of the lot in question
was to the three sisters, not to Aleja alone, and the segregation or
apportionment thereof among the said sisters was made by their
eldest sister, Ruperta Glodoveza in 1905. (p. 7, Decision).
As found by the Court of Appeals, this conclusion is buttressed by the
testimony of Enrique Glodoveza (p. 6, Decision) and documentary
evidence (p. 8, Decision).
This disposes then of petitioners' first two assignments of error.
2. Petitioners argue that respondent court erred in concluding that the
letter (Exhibit 2) dated February 25, 1921 of Francisco Veran addressed
to private respondent, seeking a P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes gave
rise to the presumption that private respondent had been in possession
of the disputed portion of the lot since 1921.
The pertinent portion of Exhibit 2 reads as follows:
At ang ikalawa, ay ang isang bagay na bakasakaling hindi na
itagubilin ng inyong ina bago siya yumaon. Ang bagay na ito ay
natutukol sa kabuwisan ng kapirasong lupa na kalakip sa
declaracion sa aking pangalan, kaparis din ng sa ina mong Lawa
(Ladislawa). Ang lugar na ito ay alam ninyo sapagkat kayo ang
naglinis at nag halaman doon.
At dahil dito ay gosto kong inyong ipagpatuloy ang pagambag sa
ka buwisan nito sa halagang peso (P1.00) sa taon-taon paris din
ng pagambag ng yumaon ninyong ina.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
At once it will be noticed that the letter does not specify which parcel of
land is referred to. Respondent claims that it referred to the disputed lot
and this view was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contend
that the letter refers to a different lot owned by Francisco Veran. As the
facts relative to this matter are not quite clear, this Court is inclined to
respect the findings of the Court of Appeals:
Thus Exhibit 2 would seem to prove that as early as Feb. 25,
1921, appellants were already in possession of the disputed
portion of Lot No. 1744, as by said exhibit, it is shown that on the
date aforementioned, appellees' father, Francisco Veran, was
asking Mr. and Mrs. Celso Villacruel (nee Primitive Villareal) for a
contribution of Pl.00 for payment of yearly tax on the property in
question. This document gives credence to Enrique Glodoveza's
testimony that it was since 1910 that appellant has occupied the
lot in dispute not only since 1950 as claimed by appellees. (p. 8,
Decision).
3. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the expiration of the one-year
period from the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title covering the
disputed lot in favor of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza will not bar private
respondent's action for reconveyance. Private respondent's counterclaim
for reconveyance was made in her amended answer filed on March 4,
1961, some seven and a half years after the issuance of the title in the
name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza on December 3, 1953, but well
within the ten-year prescriptive period for bringing an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust resulting from
fraud in securing title (Diaz v. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958]; J.M. Tuazon
& Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, G.R. No. L-15539, January 30, l962, 4 SCRA
84; Alzona v. Capunitan, G.R. No. L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
450). Thus, in Gonzales v. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-19073, January 30, l965,
13 SCRA 80, the Court said:
Since it appears that the land in question was obtained by
defendants thru fraudulent representations by means of which a
patent and a title were issued in their name, they are deemed to
hold it in trust for the benefit of the person prejudiced by it. Here
this person is the plaintiff. There being an implied trust in this
transaction, the action to recover the property prescribes after the
lapse of ten years. Here this period has not yet elapsed.
Further, no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in appreciating
the significance of the subdivision survey plan of the disputed lot (Exhibit
6
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
4). The fact that it was prepared a year after the title was issued in the
name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza does not per se render misplaced
respondent court's reliance upon it. The division in the subdivision survey
plan of the disputed lot into three portions assigned to Leocadia, Aleja
and Ladislawa respectively, merely served to corroborate testimony as to
the lot's apportionment among the three sisters.

4. Neither do We find error in respondent court's conclusion that no

evidentiary worth can be attached to what transpired in the administrative
case pending before the Bureau of Lands, considering that the decision
rendered by said bureau was still pending appeal before the Department
of agriculture at the time the decision of the trial court was rendered.
Further, it is not disputed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was
never offered in evidence, but was merely attached to petitioners' "Urgent
Ex-parte Petition to Render the Much Awaited and Long Overdue
Judgment." Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is quite
clear that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered."

5. To conclude, no reversible error was committed by the Court of

Appeals when it reversed the decision of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

7

G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994
FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION, respondents.
This petition impugns and seeks the review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals, dated September 23, 1992, which
affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City disallowing
the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito S. Teope, Chairman of the Board
of Directors of herein private respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation.
An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune
Corporation against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation, docketed
as Civil Case No. SP-3469, before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch 30. After respondent corporation had filed its Answer,
petitioner served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule
25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories were answered by
respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.
The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled for January 9,
February 12 and April 22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served upon private respondent
a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination 2 dated March 26,
1992, notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at San Pablo City, herein
petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in accordance
with Section 15, Rule 24.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take
Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination, 3 dated March 27, 1992, alleging inter alia that : (a)
herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the
written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims
and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or
justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking
would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the
prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of
leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in
open court if required during the trial on the merits.
The trial court thereafter issued on April 3, 1992 an order 4 that the
requested deposition shall not be taken for the following reasons:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
. . . , the Court opines that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope set
on April 7, 1992, appears unwarranted since the proposed
deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories of
the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court.
To allow the deposition will deprive the Court of the opportunity to
ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who
appears to be a vital witness.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an
original action for certiorari before the Supreme Court which was
docketed as G.R. No. 101526. However, in a resolution dated May 20,
1992, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and adjudication on the merits.
As earlier stated, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a decision on
September 23, 1992, dismissing the petition and holding that:
It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent court has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if
there are valid reasons for so ruling. This is provided for in
Sections 16 and 18,
Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. Said sections imply that the right of
a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute.
Thus, as held in the case of Caguiat vs. Torres, 30 SCRA 106,
110:
. . . sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, (which) are precisely
designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever
in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their
depositions under the guise of discovery is actually
intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In
such instances, these provisions expressly authorize the
court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop
one that is already being taken.
Moreover, the respondent court, in its assailed Order, has
indicated at least three (3) valid reasons for it not to order the
deposition taken: First, that the proposed deponent had earlier
responded to the written Interrogatories; Second, that the
proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court;
8

and Third, that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court
of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the
proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness.
Finally, anent private respondent's contention that certiorari does
not lie in this case, it should be recalled
that certiorari presupposes either lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. In the instant case, no question of
jurisdiction is possible simply because the respondent court
undoubtly had jurisdiction over petitioner's case. On the question
of abuse of discretion, appeal and not certiorari is the proper
remedy for the correction of any error as to the admission or
rejection of a deposition being offered as evidence since such a
situation would involve an error of law constituting a violation of
rules of evidence. Hence, as held in the case of Dearing
vs. Fredwilson (sic) & Co., Inc., 98 SCRA 758, 764:
. . . . Thus, the jurisprudential rule is that the admission or
rejection of certain interrogatories in the course of
discovery procedure could be an error of law but not an
abuse of discretion, much less a grave one. . . .
With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the instant
petition was filed, submitting the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the conclusion of the Honorable Court of
Appeals, based on a gross misapprehension of facts, constitutes
reversible error;
2. Whether or not the said order, based on the three reasons
stated therein, is arbitrary or whimsical because it is contrary to
reason, logic or equity;
3. Whether or not mere allegation, without proof, that the
examination sought by petitioner was intended merely to annoy,
embarrass or oppress the proposed deponent is, as a matter of
law, "good cause" within the purview of Rule 24, Section 16,
Rules of Court; and
4. Whether or not, absent the requisite element of "good cause"
as mandated by Section 16 of Rule 24, Rules of Court, a trial
court has unbridled discretion to forbid the taking of deposition
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
upon oral examination as authorized under Rule 24, Section 15,
Rules of Court.
Rule 24 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or property which is the subject of the action, or without
such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled
by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23. Depositions
shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition
of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court
on such terms as the court prescribes.
The seeming unreceptive and negative attitude of lawyers and the courts
towards discovery procedures has heretofore been observed and
discommended by the Court in this wise:
. . . Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers
(and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity
and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and
operations of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them
which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial
procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions
convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of
litigation and speed up adjudication. . . . . 5
It would do well, therefore, to point out the finer attributes of these rules
of discovery, the availment of which, we are convinced, would contribute
immensely to the attainment of the judiciary's primordial goal of
expediting the disposition of cases.
The rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, pre-trial inspection
of documentary evidence and other tangible things, and the examination
of property and person, were an important innovation in the rules of
procedure. The promulgation of this group of rules satisfied the long-felt
need for a legal machinery in the courts to supplement the pleadings, for
the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties
9

and of affording an adequate factual basis in preparation for trial. The
rules are not grounded on the supposition that the pleadings are the only
or chief basis of preparation for trial. On the contrary, the limitations of the
pleadings in this respect are recognized. In most cases under the rules
the function of the pleadings extends hardly beyond notification to the
opposing parties of the general nature of a party's claim or defense. It is
recognized that pleadings have not been successful as fact-sifting
mechanisms and that attempts to force them to serve that purpose have
resulted only in making the pleadings increasingly complicated and
technical, without any corresponding disclosure of the issues which it will
be necessary to prove at the trial. Thus the rules provide for simplicity
and brevity in pleadings, which in most cases will terminate with the
answer; and at the same time adapt the old and familiar deposition
procedure to serve as a device for ascertaining before trial what facts are
really in dispute and need to be tried. Experience had shown that the
most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying the issues was
a preliminary examination, as broad in scope as the trial itself, of the
evidence of both parties. 6
Stated otherwise, the rules seek to make a trial less a game of blind
man's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent. 7
The elemental purpose of the discovery procedure was pithily explained
by the Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in
the recent case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 8 which opinion, we feel,
should be reiterated through an extended reproduction, to wit:
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the
raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished
by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts
from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties,
and second, after that determination of the facts has been
completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that
the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and
finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in
this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are
indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that
adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that
extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice.
It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there be no
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the
facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material and
relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly
brought to his attention during the trial.
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonzo vs. Villamor, this Court
described the nature and object of litigation and in the process
laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be
conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather a contest in which each contending party fully
and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested right in technicalities. . . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to
lay before the court the facts in issue fully and fairly; i.e., to
present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to
him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another
party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of
pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within
his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is
accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only
in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the
pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the factual basis of a
party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law
says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
10

Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the
ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable . . . (an adverse
party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement"
may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a
bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or
definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. It is not its office to supply
evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said
evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court
only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact
arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and
learned by the parties before the trail. Indeed, it is the purpose
and the policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those
known to them individually, but also those known to their
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials
should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make
this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism
set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions
has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper
regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends of
modern procedure: It not only eliminates unessential issues from
trial thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires
parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the
possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. .
...
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was
designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by
the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to
serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule
20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those
issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus
prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by
depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial. The
inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be
ultimate or evidentiary, expecting only those matters which are
privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest
possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to
obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected
in Sec. 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions ) which generally allows
the examination of a deponent
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or
defense of any other party,"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of
information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such
as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing
expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
11

period preceding it, this reducing the possibility of surprise. . . . .
(Emphases in the original text.)
The other principal benefits derivable from the availability and operation
of a liberal discovery procedure are the following:
1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury. The reasons for this are:
(a) The witness (including a party) is examined while his
memory is fresh:
(b) The witness (including a party) is generally not
coached in preparation for a pre-trial oral examination
with the result that his testimony is likely to be more
spontaneous. Where the examination is upon written
interrogatories, however, it appears that some lawyers
furnish the witness with copies of the interrogatories and
thereby enable him to prepare his answers in advance.
(c) A party or witness whose deposition has been taken at
an early stage in the litigation cannot, at a later date,
readily manufacture testimony in contradiction to his
deposition;
(d) Testimony is preserved, so that if a witness
unexpectedly dies or becomes unavailable at the trial, his
deposition is available.
2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often
inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been
proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of
their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out
of court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
5. It expediates the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the
courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and
dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and
narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting
the trial.
7. It facilitates both the preparation and trial of the cases. 9
We shall now proceed to resolve the issues raised by herein petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the decision of respondent court dismissing its
petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy
in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts
which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had
already obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition
was offered as evidence, which was not done because there was nothing
yet to offer; and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen
because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered.
Petitioner claims that since the very purpose of Rule 24 of the Rules of
Court is to authorize the taking of a deposition in a pending action, either
to make a discovery in preparation for or to be used as evidence upon
the trial of such action, the taking of the deposition in the case at bar
should be done and finished before trial. Hence, it would be a grave
abuse of discretion to compel petitioner to proceed with the trial of the
case without the proposed deposition being first undertaken. Appeal will
be utterly inadequate to remedy the situation because, in that case, the
court shall have rendered its decision without the petitioner having been
afforded the opportunity to make use of the answers that the deponent
would have otherwise given as a result of the deposition. Reversal on
appeal of the said decision by the public respondent may only entail
retrial in the lower court and added expense, as well as unnecessary
delay in the case. By its very nature, the taking of the deposition in the
case at bar should be made and completed before trial, and the remedy
of appeal to determine whether or not the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner thereof is neither proper,
much less adequate.
We agree with petitioner.
12

Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the writ of certiorari lies if
the following requisites concur : (a) that it is directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a
deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any
party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among
others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the
deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to
exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however,
that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be
exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its
purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of Section 16 of then
Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the Rules of Court, former Chief Justice Manuel
V. Moran had these comments:
The advisory of the United States Supreme Court said that this
provision is intended to be one of the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents on account of the
unrestricted right to discovery given by sections 1 and 2 of this
Rule. A party may take the deposition of a witness who knows
nothing about the case, with the only purpose of annoying him or
wasting the time of the other parties. In such case, the court may,
on motion, order that the deposition shall not be taken. Or, a party
may designate a distinct place for the taking of a deposition, and
the adverse party may not have sufficient means to reach that
place, because of poverty or otherwise, in which case the court,
on motion, may order that the deposition be taken at another
place, or that it be taken by written interrogatories. The party
serving the notice may wish to inquire into matters the disclosure
of which may be oppressive or embarrassing to the deponent,
especially if the disclosure is to be made in the presence of third
persons, or, the party serving the notice may attempt to inquire
into matters which are absolutely private of the deponent, the
disclosure of which may affect his interests and is not absolutely
essential to the determination of the issues involved in the case.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Under such circumstances, the court, on motion, may order "that
certain matter shall not be inquired into or that the scope of the
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being
sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court,
or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be
disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specific
documents or informations enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court." In other words, this provision
affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in
the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said:
"Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs, a
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which
is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy,
embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party,
or both." 10
The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary
action of any tribunal. Also, as a general proposition, a writ of certiorari is
available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused
where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for
which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower
tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to
review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11 This is because,
like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are
interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that they do not finally
dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. 13
However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts
will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform
to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material
injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of
appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of
discretion. 14
It is our considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining
in the case at bar, and which will hereinavfter be
13

discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of
the trial court.
II. Petitioner asseverates that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause
therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot be
considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which
reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent had earlier
responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; and (c) that to allow the
deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask
clarificatory questions to the vital witness. It further claims that a mere
allegation, without any proof in support thereof, that petitioner intended to
annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent, and therefore acted in
bad faith, is not sufficient justification to order that the deposition shall not
be taken.
It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be
untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery,
such as dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or
arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance
with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses;
striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings.
But then, there are concomitant limitations to discovery, even when
permitted to be undertaken without leave of court and without judicial
intervention. As indicated by the Rules, limitations inevitably arise when it
can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to
the inquiry. Also, further limitations come into existence when the inquiry
touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains
of privilege.
In fine, as we have earlier clarified, the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good
faith and within the bounds of law.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for
good cause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be
taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the
exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason
one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist
is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for
determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause
shown." 15
The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective
order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly
adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of
facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to
establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. 16 What
constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective
order that is sought. 17
In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts and the
board statement of scope in Rule 24, and in view of the power of the
court under Sections 16 and 18 of said Rule to control the details of time,
place, scope, and financing for the protection of the deponents and
parties, it is fairly rare that it will be ordered that a deposition should not
be taken at all. All motions under these subparagraphs of the rule must
be supported by "good cause" and a strong showing is required before a
party will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition. A mere
allegation, without proof, that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is
not a sufficient ground for such an order. Neither is an allegation that it
will subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The mere fact that the
information sought by deposition has already been obtained through a bill
of particulars, interrogatories, or other depositions will not suffice,
although if it is entirely repetitious a deposition may be forbidden. The
allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved
does not justify prohibiting the taking of a deposition, nor that whatever
the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that
privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the
examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or
confirmed in writing. 18
In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that
there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the
deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.
14

1. We agree with petitioner's submission that the fact that petitioner had
previously availed of the mode of discovery, which is by written
interrogatories supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and
defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause", because: (a)
the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by
answers to interrogatories does not bar an examination before trial, and
is not a valid objection to the taking of a deposition where there is no
duplication and the examining party is not acting in bad faith; and (b)
knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed
deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such
examination.
As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so
as to provide the litigants with information essential to the expenditious
and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be
disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the
Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or
mutually exclusive. 19
The issue of whether a party who has resorted to a particular method of
discovery will be barred in subsequently using other discovery devices
has been definitely discussed and resolved as follows:
On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken
after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively liberal
view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which
this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has
been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a
proper case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral
examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that
the relevant subject matter will not involve the
interrogation of the witness with respect to those
particulars upon which he was examined by
interrogatories.
In Canuso v. City of Niagara Falls, the fact that a bill of particulars
had previously been served and interrogatories answered was
held no objection to an oral examination since no duplication was
involved and bad faith had not been shown. And in Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., oral examination was allowed, even
though the individual had previously answered interrogatories,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
except as to matters with respect to which he had "given
responsive and categorical testimony." 20
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules
the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will
not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party
is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or
oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable
to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other
sequence. Additional lines of inquiry may come to light after the
deposition has been taken, as to which written interrogatories probably
would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party
should not be entitled to obtain all the relevant information he desires if
no substantial prejudice is done to the party from whom discovery is
sought. On the other hand, interrogatories may well be used as a
preliminary to the taking of depositions, in order to ascertain what
individuals have the information sought. And, of course, if the answers to
interrogatories are evasive and unsatisfactory, the interrogating party
should be able to utilize the more effective method of oral examination
rather than have to reframe interrogatories. Ordinarily, however, there will
be no occasion for a party to use both methods at the same time, at least
to obtain the same information. 21
It has long been recognized that there are far greater advantages in
obtaining the facts and circumstances involved in a confronting
examination than in a written one. Hence:
1. Examination by interrogatories is both more cumbersome and
less efficient than oral examination before trial. Where it develops
that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the
court unquestionably has, and in a proper case should exercise,
discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to
clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not involve the
interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon
which he was examined by
interrogatories. 22
2. In actual effectiveness, interrogatories are far inferior to the oral
examination. Their defects are quite obvious. In the first place, they
give the party to whom they are addressed more time to study their
effect, which furnishes a better opportunity to frame protective
answers which conceal or evade. In the next place, as a means of
forcing a specific, detailed and thorough disclosure from a reluctant
15

party, there is a tendency for the interrogatories to grow in number,
complexity and variety of form so as to call for as many aspects of
the proof as possible, with the result that they often become difficult
to administer. . . . .
In view of these limitations upon the effectiveness of written
interrogatories, it is evident that they are not well adapted for the
purpose of general examination. It is only when the facts sought
are few, formal and isolated, that this method can be satisfactorily
employed. So long as the discovery is restricted to the case of the
examiner, and he is not permitted to inquire into the case of his
adversary, the facts sought by discovery will usually be few,
formal and isolated, and written interrogatories will perhaps serve
reasonably well. For a small task, a feeble instrument may
suffice. But if discovery is to involve a thorough inquiry into the
vital and highly controversial phases of the case, resort must be
had to an oral examination. . . . .
. . . Where the facts to be elicited are relatively few and important,
whether ultimate facts or evidentiary facts, the legal machinery of
interrogatories is a very useful, expeditious and inexpensive
method; but where they are very numerous, . . . they tend to
become unduly burdensome, oppressive and vexatious to the
adverse party and difficult for the court to administer. . . . .
Furthermore, the procedure tends to be unnecessarily wasteful of
judicial time. The judicial ruling upon the interrogatories
themselves is not necessarily conclusive or even important in
most cases as determinative of the issues in the case. The
purpose of the interrogating party is to develop information or
force admission; but if the answers are not satisfactory or useful,
the time spent in considering them and the objections thereto is
generally wasted, because the answers do not become evidence
in the case unless voluntarily introduced by the interrogator as
admissions against interest on the part of the party interrogated.
. . . Where a more comprehensive examination of the adverse
party is desired it should ordinarily be done by taking his
deposition. 23
3. The obvious advantage of interrogatories over a deposition is that
they are much less expensive. There is no significant expense for the
party sending the interrogatories except for the time spent in
preparing the questions. In addition, interrogatories are a much
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
simpler device. There are none of the details that must be taken care
of in arranging for a deposition, such as obtaining a court reporter
and fixing the time and place for the examination.
On the other hand, depositions are preferable if a searching
interrogation of the other party is desired. At a deposition, the
examining party has great flexibility and can frame his questions
on the basis of answers to previous questions. Moreover, the
party being examined does not have the opportunity to study the
questions in advance and to consult with his attorney before
answering, as he does if interrogatories are used. Attempts at
evasion, which might be met by a persistent oral examination,
cannot be easily dealt with by interrogatories. The flexibility and
the potency of oral depositions is in large part lacking in written
interrogatories. It is for these reasons that depositions are . . . by
far the most widely used of the discovery devices.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, . . . written interrogatories are most valuable as a
device to compel admissions and the disclosure of major factual
matters not concerned with details; the deposition is the best
device suited to compel disclosure of detailed information. 24
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not
constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall
not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the
grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during
the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit
the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been
kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions;
restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the
widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts
before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a
substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the
remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the
facts to the parties before trial, drops out of judicial picture. 26
Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation,
our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on trial
itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses whose
16

demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge is
superior to the use of written statements of the same witnesses.
Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the
use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was
originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the
limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But
under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the
double function of a method of discovery with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated and a method of presenting testimony.
Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable. 27
3. We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere
fact that the court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent
does not justify the denial of the right to take deposition. As we have
already explained:
The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if
the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the
behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance
to justify the interdiction of the taking of the deposition becomes
apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could
ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all
depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge
cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take
depositions, and therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of
Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was
not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule. 28
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely
intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably
support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment
or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied
with:
(a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be
examined;
(b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good
cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the
other party. 29
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party
objecting to show that the discovery requested is not relevant to the
issues, 30 and to establish the existence of any claimed privilege. 31 These,
private respondent has failed to do so. Consequently, its objection to the
taking of the deposition cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, the fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City,
whereas the proposed deponent lives in Manila, is not sufficient to
establish private respondent's theory that the requested deposition was
intended to annoy and harass the proposed deponent.
Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid
objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt, private respondent
and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced as
are all parties when required to submit to examination but this is no
ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process. 33 The mere fact that
an officer of private respondent would be required to attend the examination
and thereby absent himself from some of his usual business affairs during
the taking of the deposition is utterly insufficient to justify the court in ruling
that he is being annoyed, embarrassed or oppressed, within the meaning of
this language. Something far beyond this is required in this connection to
grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has signified its willingness to
select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the deposition in order to
accommodate the proposed deponent. 34
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the
trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that
the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court
erred in affirming the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein
petitioner to take the deposition upon oral examination of Juanito S.
Teope in and for purposes of Civil Case No. SP-3469 pending before it.
SO ORDERED.
17

G.R. No. 147143 March 10, 2006
HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., and YU HE
CHING, Petitioners, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
nullification of the Decision dated May 4, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119, which remanded
Civil Case No. 94-1429 to the trial court and directed the latter to allow
the deposition-taking without delay;1 and the CA Resolution dated
February 13, 2001 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts are as follows:
On April 8, 1994, respondent Ley Construction and Development
Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1429, against petitioner Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its
obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real property in
Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDCs full payment of the purchase
price of P2,634,000.00; and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property
in a joint venture, despite LCDCs payment of 40% of the pre-construction
cost.3 On April 12, 1994, LCDC filed an amended complaint impleading
Princeton Development Corporation (Princeton) as additional defendant
claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton on March 30,
1994 in fraud of LCDC.4 On September 21, 1994, LCDC filed a second
amended complaint adding as defendant, Yu He Ching (Yu), President of
Hyatt, alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2,634,000.00 to
Hyatt through Yu.5
Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the
depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt.
Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel Ley, President of
LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and
Janet Ley.6
On July 17, 1996, the RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.7
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy on September 17, 1996, Hyatt
and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-
trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay
the resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and on the same day ordered
all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place on November 14,
1996.8
LCDC moved for reconsideration9 which the RTC denied in its October
14, 1996 Order, portion of which reads:
This Court has to deny the motion, because: 1) as already pointed out by
this Court in the questioned Order said depositions will only delay the
early termination of this case; 2) had this Court set this case for pre-trial
conference and trial thereafter, this case would have been terminated by
this time; 3) after all, what the parties would like to elicit from their
deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial conference; 4) no
substantial rights of the parties would be prejudiced, if pre-trial
conference is held, instead of deposition.10
On November 14, 1996, the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Pendency of Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.11 The petition, which sought to annul
the Orders of the RTC dated September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996,
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 12and assigned to the then
Twelfth Division of the CA.
Meanwhile, pre-trial proceeded at the RTC as scheduled 13 and with the
refusal of LCDC to enter into pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to
declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC granted in its Order dated
December 3, 1996, thus:
On September 17, 1996, this Court noticing that this case was filed as
early (as) April 4, 199414 and has not reached the pre-trial stage because
of several depositions applied for by the parties, not to mention that the
records of this case has reached two (2) volumes, to avoid delay, upon
motion, ordered the cancellation of the depositions.
On September 24, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration,
seeking to reconsider and set aside the order dated September 17, 1996,
18

which motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October
14, 1996, ruling among others that "after all, what the parties would like to
elicit from these deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial
conference", and, reiterated the order setting this case for pre-trial
conference on November 14, 1996.
On the scheduled pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996, a petition
for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the
Order of this Court dated September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996,
furnishing this Court with a copy on the same date.
At the scheduled pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996, plaintiff
orally moved the Court to suspend pre-trial conference alleging pendency
of a petition with the Court of Appeals and made it plain that it cannot
proceed with the pre-trial because the issue on whether or not plaintiff
may apply for depositions before the pre-trial conference is a prejudicial
question. Defendants objected, alleging that even if the petition is
granted, pre-trial should proceed and that plaintiff could take deposition
after the pre-trial conference, insisting that defendants are ready to enter
into a pre-trial conference.
This Court denied plaintiffs motion to suspend proceedings and ordered
plaintiff to enter into pre-trial conference. Plaintiff refused. Before this
Court denied plaintiffs motion to suspend, this Court gave Plaintiff two (2)
options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising plaintiff that what it
would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial
conference, thus expediting early termination of this case; and, terminate
the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on. Plaintiff insisted
on suspension of the pre-trial conference alleging that it is not ready to
enter into pre-trial conference in view of the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Defendants insisted that pre-trial conference proceed
as scheduled, manifesting their readiness to enter into a pre-trial
conference.
When plaintiff made it clear that it is not entering into the pre-trial
conference, defendants prayed that plaintiff be declared non-suited. x x x
xxxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, this Court is compelled to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
WHEREFORE, for failure of plaintiff to enter into pre-trial conference
without any valid reason, plaintiffs complaint is dismissed. Defendants
counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.15
LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration16 which was denied however by
the trial court in its Order dated April 21, 1997. 17 LCDC went to the CA on
appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 and assigned to
the then Seventh Division of the CA.18
On July 24, 1997, the CAs then Twelfth Division, 19 in CA-G.R. SP No.
42512 denied LCDCs petition for certiorari declaring that the granting of
the petition and setting aside of the September 17, 1996 and October 14,
1996 Orders are manifestly pointless considering that the complaint itself
had already been dismissed and subject of the appeal docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 57119; that the reversal of the said Orders would have
practical effect only if the dismissal were also set aside and the complaint
reinstated; and that the dismissal of the complaint rendered the petition
for certiorari devoid of any practical value.20 LCDCs motion for
reconsideration of the CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 decision was denied on
March 4, 1998.21 LCDC then filed with this Court, a petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 133145 which this Court dismissed
on August 29, 2000.22
On May 4, 2000, the CAs then Seventh Division issued in CA-G.R. CV
No. 57119 the herein assailed decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal meritorious, this
case is remanded to the court a quo for further hearing and directing the
latter to allow the deposition taking without delay.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA reasoned that: LCDC complied with Section 1, Rule 23 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly sanctions depositions as
a mode of discovery without leave of court after the answer has been
19

served; to unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial would defeat
the very purpose for which it is intended which is a pre-trial device, and at
the time of the trial, the issues would already be confined to matters
defined during pre-trial; the alleged intention of expediting the resolution
of the case is not sufficient justification to recall the order to take
deposition as records show that the delay was brought about by
postponement interposed by both parties and other legal antecedents
that are in no way imputable to LCDC alone; deposition-taking, together
with the other modes of discovery are devised by the rules as a means to
attain the objective of having all the facts presented to the court; the trial
court also erred in dismissing the complaint as LCDC appeared during
the pre-trial conference and notified it of the filing of a petition before the
CA; such is a legitimate justification to stall the pre-trial conference, as
the filing of the petition was made in good faith in their belief that the
court a quo erred in canceling the deposition scheduled for no apparent
purpose.24
Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which the CA denied on February 13, 2001.25
Hyatt and Yu now come before the Court via a petition for review
on certiorari, on the following grounds:
I the persons whose depositions were to be taken were listed as witnesses
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH DIVISION, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ACTUALLY AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING IN EFFECT INVALID THE ORDERS OF
THE LOWER COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 1996 AND OCTOBER
14, 1996 WHICH ARE NOT RAISED OR PENDING BEFORE IT, BUT IN
ANOTHER CASE (CA-G.R. SP. No. 42512) PENDING BEFORE
ANOTHER DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH
DIVISION, AND WHICH CASE WAS DISMISSED BY THE SAID
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FINALLY BY THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 133145.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH DIVISION, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
REVERSING THE LOWER COURTS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 3,
1996 AND APRIL 21, 1997 HOLDING RESPONDENT NON-SUITED
FOR FAILURE TO ENTER INTO PRE-TRIAL.26
Anent the first issue, petitioners claim that: the validity of the RTC Order
dated September 17, 1996 which set the case for pre-trial, as well as its
Order dated October 14, 1996 denying LCDCs motion for partial
reconsideration are not involved in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 but were the
subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 42512, assigned to the then Twelfth Division,
which dismissed the same on July 24, 1997 and which dismissal was
affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 133145; in passing upon the validity of
the Orders dated September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996, the CAs
then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 exceeded its authority
and encroached on issues taken cognizance of by another Division. 27
On the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CAs then Seventh
Division should have outrightly dismissed the appeal of LCDC as the
same did not involve any error of fact or law but pertains to a matter of
discretion which is properly a subject of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; conducting discovery thru deposition is not a
condition sine qua non to the holding of a pre-trial and the fact that LCDC
wanted to take the deposition of certain persons is not a valid ground to
suspend the holding of pre-trial and subsequently the trial on the merits;
during the trial; to take their depositions before the lower court and to
present them as witnesses during the trial on the merits would result in
unnecessary duplicity; the fact that LCDC has a pending petition
for certiorari with the CAs then Twelfth Division docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 42512 is not a ground to cancel or suspend the scheduled pre-trial
on November 14, 1996 as there was no restraining order issued; LCDCs
availment of the discovery procedure is causing the undue delay of the
case; it is only after LCDC has filed its complaint that it started looking for
evidence to support its allegations thru modes of discovery and more
than two years has already passed after the filing of the complaint yet
LCDC still has no documentary evidence to present before the lower
court to prove its allegations in the complaint.28
Petitioners then pray that the Decision dated May 4, 2000 and the
Resolution dated February 13, 2001 of the CAs then Seventh Division in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 be annulled and set aside and the validity of the
20

Orders dated December 3, 1996 and April 21, 1997 of the RTC of Makati,
Branch 62 in Civil Case No. 94-1429 be sustained.29
In its Comment, LCDC argues that the petitioners erred in claiming that
the CAs then Seventh Division overstepped its authority as this Court
has ruled in G.R. No. 133145 that the issue of whether LCDC has been
denied its right to discovery is more appropriately addressed in the
appeal before the then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 below
rather than by the then Twelfth Division in the certiorari proceeding in CA-
G.R. SP No. 42512; and while the appeal of the final Order of the RTC
dated December 3, 1996 also questioned the Orders dated September
17, 1996 and October 14, 1996, it does not render the appeal improper
as this Court in G.R. No. 133145 held that the subsequent appeal
constitutes an appropriate remedy because it assails not only the Order
dated December 3, 1996, but also the two earlier orders. 30
On the second issue, LCDC contends that: the mere fact that a deponent
will be called to the witness stand during trial is not a ground to deny
LCDC the right to discovery and does not cause "unnecessary duplicity",
otherwise no deposition can ever be taken; a deposition is for the
purpose of "discovering" evidence while trial is for the purpose of
"presenting" evidence to the court; if petitioners concern was the delay in
the disposition of the case, the remedy is to expedite the taking of the
depositions, not terminate them altogether; petitioners have nothing to
fear from discovery unless they have in their possession damaging
evidence; the parties should be allowed to utilize the discovery process
prior to conducting pre-trial since every bit of relevant information
unearthed through the discovery process will hasten settlement, simplify
the issues and determine the necessity of amending the pleadings; the
trial court erred in not suspending the pre-trial conference pending the
petition for certiorari before the then Twelfth Division of the CA since
considerations of orderly administration of justice demanded that the trial
court accord due deference to the CA; not only was LCDCs petition
for certiorari filed in good faith, the CA found it meritorious, vindicating
LCDCs insistence that the pre-trial be suspended; the undue delay in the
disposition of the case was not attributable to LCDCs deposition-taking
but to the flurry of pleadings filed by defendants below to block LCDCs
depositions and prevent it from gaining access to critical evidence; the
critical evidence that LCDC needs to obtain through discovery is
evidence that is totally within the knowledge and possession of
petitioners and defendant Princeton and is not available elsewhere. 31
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
On September 17, 2001, the Court required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.32 Hyatt and Yu on the one hand and LCDC on the
other filed their respective memoranda reiterating their positions.33
On January 2, 2002, Princeton filed a "Comment" which this Court
considered as its Memorandum in the Resolution dated January 30,
2002.34
In said memorandum, Princeton averred that: it is not true that Princeton
failed to comply with any discovery orders as all information requested of
Princeton was duly furnished LCDC and there are no pending discovery
orders insofar as Princeton is concerned; LCDC is seeking to dictate its
procedural strategies on the RTC and the opposing parties; LCDC was
not deprived due process as it was given all the opportunity to prepare for
its case and to face its opponents before the court; LCDC admits to the
probability of forum shopping as it filed a petition for certiorari with the
then Twelfth Division of the CA and later an appeal with the then Seventh
Division of the CA; the RTC did not bar LCDC from presenting witnesses
or discovering any evidence, as all it did was to transfer the venue of the
testimony and discovery to the courtroom and get on with the case which
LCDC did not want to do; that discovery proceedings need not take place
before pre-trial conference; trial court judges are given discretion over the
right of parties in the taking of depositions and may deny the same for
good reasons in order to prevent abuse; the trial court did not err in not
granting LCDCs motion to suspend proceedings due to the pendency of
a petition for certiorari with the CA since there was no order from said
court and there was no merit in the petition for certiorari as shown by the
dismissal thereof by the then Twelfth Division; there was proper and legal
ground for the trial court to declare LCDC non-suited; appearance at the
pre-trial is not enough; there is no evidence to support LCDCs claim that
Hyatt surreptitiously transferred title to Princeton.35
The Court is in a quandary why Hyatt and Yu included Princeton as
respondent in the present petition when Princeton was their co-defendant
below and the arguments they raised herein pertain only to LCDC. With
the failure of petitioners to raise any ground against Princeton in any of
its pleadings before this Court, we shall treat Princetons inclusion as
respondent in the present petition as mere inadvertence on the part of
petitioners.
21

Now to the merits. The issues that need to be resolved in this case may
be simplified as follows: (1) Whether the CAs then Seventh Division
exceeded its authority in ruling upon the validity of the Orders dated
September 17, 1996 and November 14, 1996; and (2) Whether the CA
erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the deposition-
taking to proceed.
We answer both questions in the negative.
Petitioners assert that the CAs then Twelfth Division in CA-GR SP No.
42512 and this Court in G.R. No. 133145 already ruled upon the validity
of the Orders dated September 17, 1996 and November 14, 1996, thus
the CAs then Seventh Division in CA G.R. CV No. 57119 erred in ruling
upon the same.
A cursory reading of the decisions in CA-GR SP No. 42512 and G.R. No.
133145, however, reveals otherwise. The CAs then Twelfth Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 was explicit in stating thus:
x x x Any decision of ours will not produce any practical legal effect.
According to the petitioner, if we annul the questioned Orders, the
dismissal of its Complaint by the trial [court] will have to be set aside in its
pending appeal. That assumes that the division handling the appeal will
agree with Our decision. On the other hand, it may not. Also other issues
may be involved therein than the validity of the herein questioned orders.
We cannot pre-empt the decision that might be rendered in such appeal.
The division to [which] it has been assigned should be left free to resolve
the same. On the other hand, it is better that this Court speak with one
voice.36
This Court in G.R. No. 133145 also clearly stated that:
x x x First, it should be stressed that the said Petition (CA-G.R. SP No.
42512) sought to set aside only the two interlocutory RTC Orders, not the
December 3, 1996 Resolution dismissing the Complaint. Verily, the
Petition could not have assailed the Resolution, which was issued after
the filing of the former.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Under the circumstances, granting the Petition for Certiorari and setting
aside the two Orders are manifestly pointless, considering that the
Complaint itself had already been dismissed. Indeed, the reversal of the
assailed Orders would have practical effect only if the dismissal were also
set aside and the Complaint reinstated. In other words, the dismissal of
the Complaint rendered the Petition for Certiorari devoid of any practical
value.
Second, the Petition for Certiorari was superseded by the filing, before
the Court of Appeals, of a subsequent appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the two Orders. In this light,
there was no more reason for the CA to resolve the Petition for Certiorari.
xxxx
In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In
fact, it is the appropriate remedy, because it assails not only the
Resolution but also the two Orders.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED. x x x.37
With the pronouncements of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 and by this
Court in G.R. No. 133145 that the subsequent appeal via CA-G.R. CV
No. 57119 constitutes as the adequate remedy to resolve the validity of
the RTC Orders dated September 17, 1996 and November 14, 1996, the
arguments of petitioners on this point clearly have no leg to stand on and
must therefore fail.
On the second issue, the Court finds that the CA was correct in
remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to
proceed.
A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would
prejudice any party.38 It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the
liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is
made in good faith and within the bounds of law.39 It is allowed as a
22

departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the
trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; 40 and provided it
is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with
leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an
answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for
its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). 41 The rules on
discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a
liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the
disposal of litigation would be defeated.42
Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the
Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided
for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court
in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures.
Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders
requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and
request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures
under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The
parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial,
pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of
their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners.43
Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity
of said issuance, however, the depositions sought by LCDC shall be
evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing,
particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as
follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.--- By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or
without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony
of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance
of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken
only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court
prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted
provision as it made its notice to take depositions after the answers of the
defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then
prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously scheduled
depositions.
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the
examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or
when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege,44 such circumstances, however are
absent in the case at bar.
The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the
scheduled depositions. While speedy disposition of cases is important,
such consideration however should not outweigh a thorough and
comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are reached
not only through the speedy disposal of cases but more importantly,
through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits of the
case.45 Records also show that the delay of the case is not attributable to
the depositions sought by LCDC but was caused by the many pleadings
filed by all the parties including petitioners herein.
The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary
duplicity as the intended deponents shall also be called as witnesses
during trial, is also without merit.
The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals46 which already settled the
matter, explained that:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not
constitute "good cause" to justify the courts order that his deposition shall
not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the
grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during
the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit
the taking of his deposition.
23

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been
kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions;
restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the
widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts
before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a
substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the
remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the
facts to the parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.
x x x [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition
serves the double function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated - and a method of presenting testimony.
Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable.47
Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims
and that it was only after the filing of its Complaint that it started looking
for evidence through the modes of discovery.
On this point, it is well to reiterate the Courts pronouncement in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan48:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information
which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant
facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things.
Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing
expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,
either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in
his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the
stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to
the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.49
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
It also does not escape this Courts attention that the trial court, before
dismissing LCDCs complaint, gave LCDC two options: (a) enter into a
pre-trial conference, advising LCDC that what it would like to obtain at the
deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus expediting
early termination of the case; and (b) terminate the pre-trial conference
and apply for deposition later on. The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to
choose only from these options and in dismissing its complaint upon
LCDCs refusal to choose either of the two.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena
Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan Go, an Account Officer of
RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said
deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.
As also pointed out by the CA:
x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat
the very purpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then,
the issues would have been confined only on matters defined during pre-
trial. The importance of the modes of discovery cannot be gainsaid in this
case in view of the nature of the controversy involved and the conflicting
interest claimed by the parties.50
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is
to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters
of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis
during the preparation for trial.51
Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan52 the Court explained that:
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned
by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of
the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before
the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually,
but also those known to their adversaries; in other words,
the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the
dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the
deposition- discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The
experience in other jurisdictions has been the ample discovery before
24

trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary
ends of modern procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from
trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to
play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair
settlement before trial is measurably increased.
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to
remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation
theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as
a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to
repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the
dark.53 (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the
depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in
determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such
information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in
the dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to
prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a game of
blind mans bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent. 54
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA was correct in
remanding the case to the trial court and ordering the depositions to
proceed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145542 June 4, 2004
ELENA S. ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO V. MAZO as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Guiuan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 3, ELVIRA C. LANUEVO and CHARITO A.
TOMILLOSO, respondents.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
Assailed in the present petition for review is the Court of Appeals August
17, 2000 Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner
Elena S. Ong and October 10, 2000 Resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
The facts originative of the petition are as follows:
Respondents Elvira C. Lanuevo (Lanuevo) and Charito A.
Tomilloso (Tomilloso) filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner along with Iluminado J. Caramoan (Caramoan) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern
Samar,1 docketed as Civil Case No. 887. The complaint which
was raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC, arose from a vehicular
accident whereby a bus owned by petitioner and driven by
Caramoan allegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by
respondent Lanuevo, with respondent Tomilloso as her
passenger at the time.
After petitioner filed her Answer with Counterclaim, 2 and later a motion to
dismiss3 the complaint, respondents filed a motion4 for leave of court to
file an amended complaint5 which was granted.6
On November 14, 1996, petitioner served written interrogatories 7 upon
respondents and on November 21, 1996, she filed a "Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion"8 seeking, among other things, an order from the trial
court directing respondents to answer the interrogatories.
To the motion bearing on the written interrogatories, respondents filed
their objection.9
By Order of May 6, 1999,10 the trial court denied the motion to compel
respondents to answer the interrogatories upon the ground that it
constituted a "fishing expedition" which would be more properly ventilated
in a pre-trial conference.
Following petitioners receipt on May 26, 1999 11 of said May 6, 1999
Order, she filed on July 19, 1999 12 a motion for reconsideration thereof
where she also manifested that her original answer to the complaint
would serve as her answer to the amended complaint. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by Order of July 4, 2000.13
25

After her receipt on July 18, 2000 of the aforesaid July 4, 2000 Order,
14
petitioner filed on August 4, 2000 with the Court of Appeals a petition
captioned as "Petition for Certiorari" 15 assailing the above twin orders of
the trial court as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By the now assailed Resolution of August 17, 2000, 16 the appellate court
dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it was
belatedly filed. Read the Resolution:
An examination of the petition for certiorari shows that the
assailed order dated May 6, 1999 was received on May 26,
1999 and that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
July 10, 1999, hence petitioner had only 15 days left from
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration
on July 18, 2000 or until August 2, 2000 within which to file the
petition. When the instant petition was filed on August 4, 2000,
the same was late by two (2) days without any explanation being
made by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved to reconsider the appellate courts dismissal of her
petition, arguing that what was filed was a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not an appeal, which special civil
action was timely brought within the 60-day reglementary period.17
By Resolution of October 10, 2000, the appellate court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.18
Hence, the present petition, petitioner insisting that the appellate court
erred in treating her petition as an ordinary appeal to thus lead it to
conclude that it was belatedly filed.19
To the present petition, respondents filed their Comment, 20 explaining that
the appellate court considered petitioners petition thereat as an appeal
because it found the assailed orders of the trial court as not warranting
the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
On the denial by the trial court of petitioners motion to direct respondents
to answer the written interrogatories, respondents justified the same, it
contending that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the propriety
of such mode of discovery under Section 3, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
and that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing since what is traversed is
an error of law or fact that is properly the subject of an appeal.
Insisting that the trial court erred in refusing to compel respondents to
answer her written interrogatories, petitioner, in her Reply 21 to
respondents Comment, invokes this Courts plenary power to resolve not
only the issue of the appellate courts dismissal of her petition but also
the question of whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
disallowing the written interrogatories.
In their respective memoranda,22 both parties raise the issue of the
propriety of availment of written interrogatories.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2001, the trial court suspended indefinitely
the proceedings in the initiatory civil case between the parties in light of
petitioners appeal before this Court.23
The appeal is impressed with merit.
On August 4, 2000, when petitioner filed her petition for certiorari before
the appellate court, Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-
98 read:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall
be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration
in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the
26

period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event, reckoned from such notice of denial. No extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing rule, when petitioners counsel received on July 18,
2000 the trial courts order of July 4, 2000 denying her motion for
reconsideration of the Order of May 6, 1999, she still had 15 days left of
the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari.
Section 4 of Rule 65 was subsequently further amended, however, by
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000 as follows:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion. (Emphasis supplied)
In Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC24 and Unity Fishing
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court
applied retroactively the above-quoted amended rule on a fresh 60-day
period for the filing of certiorari petitions from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. Thus, a petition for certiorari admittedly filed
past the 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular
No. 39-98, but filed on time where considered under the amendment in
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, was held to be seasonably filed.
Applying retroactively too Sec. 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC, since petitioners petition for certiorari was filed with the
appellate court on August 4, 2000, after receipt on July 18, 2000 by
petitioner of the order of the trial court denying her motion for
reconsideration from which latter date the 60-day period should be
reckoned, the petition was seasonably filed. It was thus error for the trial
court to dismiss the same.
Contrary then to petitioners protestation that the appellate court erred in
treating her petition for certiorari as an appeal which was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period, as reflected above, the 15-day period left for
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
petitioner to file the petition referred to the remaining number of days left
after computation of the 60-day period in Section 4 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as then amended by Circular No. 39-98
With the setting aside of the appellate courts questioned orders, the
resolution of the present petition should have been accomplished.
Nonetheless, considering that the relatively simple case for damages,
which was instituted by respondents against petitioner way back in 1996
or eight long years ago, had virtually come to a halt due to the lingering
legal issue respecting the trial courts order stopping petitioner from
availing of her written interrogatories as a mode of discovery, instead of
remanding this case to the appellate court as anyway both parties have
advanced and argued the sole issue which is purely one of law, in the
overriding interest of justice, this Court shall now resolve the issue as if it
had been raised via a special civil action for certiorari with this Court. 26
No doubt, the twin orders denying the written interrogatories were
interlocutory in nature for they leave something more to be done on the
merits of the case.27 And the extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally
not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, the proper
remedy in such cases being an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment where incorporated in said appeal are the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order.28Nonetheless, this by no means is an absolute
rule. If the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief,
certiorari may be allowed as a mode of redress.29
This Court finds that the orders disallowing petitioners written
interrogatories are patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is
warranted. In denying petitioners availment of interrogatories, the trial
court was of the view that
. . . in as much that the written interrogatories is (sic) a sort of
fishing expedition, said questions and answer would be properly
ventilated in a pre-trial conference for which this court direct the
defendant Elena Ong to file her answer to the amended complaint
anent thereto, both parties are required to file their respective pre-
trial briefs after which this case will be calendared for pre-trial
conference.30
This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of
the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24
27
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,31 it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should
discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the
action, not only those known to them individually, but also those
known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is
that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules
of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-
discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of
discovery depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions
without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessary to
put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint has been
served.32 The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of
discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the
adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the
trial of the case.33

Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories

answered by his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that
the interrogatories were a "fishing expedition," is to disregard the
categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of fishing expedition can no
longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opposing partys case through the discovery procedures. 34

The trial courts orders, not being in accordance with law and
jurisprudential dictum, are therefore correctible by writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated August 17,

2000 and October 10, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE as are the orders of
Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Guiuan, Eastern Samar in Civil
Case No. 887. The Presiding Judge of said branch of the court
is ORDERED to REQUIRE respondents to serve their answers to
petitioners written interrogatories and to proceed with dispatch the
disposition of said case.

SO ORDERED.

28

G.R. No. 101682 December 14, 1992
SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and
assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA, respondents.
On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, * in CA-G.R. SP No. 20114 dated 13 August 1990 as well as its
resolution dated 9 September 1991 denying the petitioner's for
reconsideration.
Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private respondents to
comment thereon. After the private respondents had filed their comment,
the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer and to give due
course to the petition and the case was deemed submitted for decision. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a
complaint 2 for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private
respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 55961, alleging inter alia that:
2. Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the
registered owners (of) a parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam
Street Provident Village, J. de la Pea, Marikina, Metro-Manila,
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Copy
attached herewith as Annex A) more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land . . . situated in the Municipality of
Marikina, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon . . . containing
an area of THREE HUNDRED (300) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, . . .
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's
residential house where his wife and children used to stay until
they migrated to the United States.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
3. The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the
residential house was constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned
salaries and benefits from his employment abroad.
4. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the above-
described parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes
under P.D. No. 464, copies of Declaration of Real Property
attached herewith as Annexes B and B-1.
5. Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A.
Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, copy attached herewith as Annex C, the
abovementioned house and lot.
6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or
empowered Nonita A. Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf,
stead or representation to enter into any transaction regarding the
sale, transfer or conveyance of the abovedescribed house and
lot.
7. Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot
shall be for his family, particularly his children.
8. As a result of the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the
use and enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B.
Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had
prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
9. By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his
properties, plaintiff suffered serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish
and wounded feelings and further subjected him to social
humiliation and embarassment, particularly considering that the
abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned salaries
and emoluments from his employment abroad, for which
defendants Mag-isa must be adjudged liable for moral damages
in an amount not less than ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) or as may be equitably determined by this
Honorable Court.
10. In order to serve as an example or correction for the public
good, defendants Mag-isa should likewise be adjudged liable for
29

examplary damages in an amount not less than ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) or as may be equitably
determined by this Honorable Court.
11. Plaintiff, in protection of his legitimate right and interests
prejudiced by defendants Mag-isa, was constrained to engage
the services of undersigned counsel for P50,000.00, exclusive of
appearance fees and expenses.
Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.
12. The next move of defendants Mag-isa is to consolidate
ownership over the properties by means of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Annex C herein) which is inceptually void.
13. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina would have no other
alternative but to give due course to the consolidation of
ownership over the properties in the name of defendants Mag-
isa which eventually causes grave and irreparable injury, untold
injustice and undue prejudice to plaintiff unless a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order
is immediately issued by this Honorable Court enjoining or
restraining defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro-
Manila or any person acting on his behalf from consolidating
ownership of the house and lot covered under TCT No. N-29895
of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Rizal in the name of
defendants Mag-isa or their heirs or successor-in-interest.
14. Plaintiff is ready and willing to post a bond in such amount as
this Honorable Court may equitable determine subject to such
conditions and terms as may be appropriately imposed thereon.
In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed
her answer 3 alleging as follows:
1. Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph
1, the age of plaintiff but denies the rest of the allegations therein
for lack of knowledge and/or information sufficient to form a
judgment as to the truths thereof.
2. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant
to Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Annex "A"), plaintiff
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
together with his wife appears to be the registered owners of the
subject parcel of land but that is more apparent and (sic) real
considering that defendants have admittedly bought the land and
the improvements thereon and defendants were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of
knowledge and information to form a judgment as to the truths,
and granting arguendo that the acquisition of the land and the
construction of the house came from the salaries and benefits of
the plaintiff, said salaries and benefits are considered conjugal.
4. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a judgment as to the
truth thereof although it may be of judicial notice that the Office of
the Provincial/Municipal Assessor motu proprio accomplishes
(sic) Annexes "B" and "B-1" and all tax declarations for that
matter based on existing records in said office.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as
the transaction of absolute sale between them and defendant's
(plaintiff's) wife who acted not only in her behalf but also as
attorney-in-fact of her husband, plaintiff in the instant case, which
transaction was actually known by and with the consent of or
should at least have been known to and with the consent of
plaintiff as evidenced by a letter of plaintiff to his wife, a xerox
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an
integral part hereof.
6. Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 6, the truth and
fact being that plaintiff's wife was duly authorized by a Special
Power of Attorney to transact on and sell the subject house and
lot, a xerox copy of which marked Annex "2" is hereto attached
and made an integral part hereof.
7. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficiento (sic) form a judgment as to
the truths thereof.
8. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 8 to the effect
that he was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties for
the reason that as the owners of the property, defendants have
the absolute rights of use and enjoyment over said properties with
30

the prerogative to lease the same to any party of their choice, the
lessee with the right to exclude others from the use and
enjoyment of the premises.
9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11
not only for lack of knowledge and information to form a judgment
as to the truths thereof but also because said allegations have no
factual and legal basis.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as
the prospective registration of Annex "C" is concerned but deny
the rest of the allegations for reasons stated earlier to the effect
that Annex "C" is a valid and binding sale, with defendants as the
purchasers in good faith and for value.
11. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as
the ministerial functions of defendant Register of Deeds but deny
the rest of the allegations the same being without any factual and
legal basis for reasons essayed earlier.
12. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 14 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a judgment as to the
truths thereof aside from the fact that plaintiff's alleged readiness
and willingness to post a bond will simply be exercises in futility.
On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined,
petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-isa a request for
admission 4 reading as follows:
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO
Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa
Balaga-Luna Building
Malolos, Bulacan
Greeting:
Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests your admission
within ten (10) days from service hereof pursuant to Rule 26,
Rules of Court of the following:
The Material facts
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land together with the
improvements thereon covered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint) located at 59 Amsterdam
Street, Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-Manila.
2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner had declared for the
year 1988 the parcel of land and residential house for tax
purposes under P.D. 464.
3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential house.
4. That defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location address
of plaintiff's properties.
5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but
he (plaintiff) regularly comes home and stays with his family at
their residential house abovementioned.
6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired through
plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment
abroad.
7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to stay
to (sic) with his family upon his retirement from his employment.
8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that
matter to sell or to dispose of the property covered under TCT
No. N-29895.
9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of
Attorney dated November 14, 1984 appended as Annex 2
Answer.
10. That the alleged Special Power of Attorney mentions
"Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29995 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Rizal."
11. That plaintiff never personally appeared before Notary Public
Jose Constantino upon whom the acknowledgment of said
Special Power of Attorney was made.
31

12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never consented
to the sale or disposition of properties covered under TCT No. N-
29995.
13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the alleged
sale, and he never benefited therefrom in any manner.
14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed with plaintiff
notwithstanding their being neighbors, the authenticity of the
alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity of the alleged
Deed of Absolute Sale particularly considering that the subject
matter thereof involves plaintiff's properties.
15. That plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his
properties since defendant Mag-isa had even leased the
premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from
entering the premises.
The Material Documents
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, copy attached to the Complaint as Annex A.
2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D.
Briboneria pursuant to P.D. 464 for the year 1988, copies
attached to the Complaint as Annexes B and B-1.
On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a
quo their Answer to Request for Admission, 5 alleging that most if not all the
matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted,
denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that
the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant
or improper.
On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary
Judgment, 6 claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by
private respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and
that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private
respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents
subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. The private respondents filed an opposition 7 to the motion for
summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply 8 to said opposition.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order 9 denying
the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration 10 which the court granted in its order dated 20 July 1989,
setting aside the order of 28 December 1988. 11 The private respondents, in
turn, filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, to which the
petitioner filed an opposition. 12 On 1 February 1989, the trial court issued
another order 13 this time setting aside its order of 20 July 1989 and set the
pre-trial conference on 22 February 1989.
The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order
dated 1 February 1989 of the court a quo, alleging that the said order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, 14 dismissing the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
having been likewise denied, 15 he is now before us in the present petition.
Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that the
matters of fact and the documents requested to be admitted are mere
reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He
claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for
admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of
action. He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly
admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for
admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission
within the period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.
The petition can not be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of
merit.
To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his
request for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate
court, that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request
for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which
private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer." 16 The
respondent court therefore correctly held that this case falls under the rule
laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals. 17 wherein this Court held:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already
admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue
(Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor
should he be required to make a second denial of those already
denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is
32

not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of
the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said
party's cause of action or defense. . . .
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, 18 the request
for admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to
whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the
genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the request or
relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the
request for admission. 19
In one case, namely, CA-G.R. No. 20561-R, entitled "Jose Ledesma, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Guillermo Locsin, Defendant-Appellant", 20 the
Court of Appeals in favorably resolving the defendant-appellant's motion for
reconsideration of its earlier decision (wherein it affirmed the summary
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in favor of
plaintiff Jose Ledesma, Jr. upon failure of defendant Guillermo Locsin to
answer a request for admission served upon his counsel by the plaintiff) held
in its Resolution dated 1 June 1963, as follows:
The issue raised by the first two assigned errors is whether or not
a request for admission must be served directly on a party, and
not his counsel, in order that said request can be considered as
validly served. In our decision which is sought to be reconsidered,
we held that a request for admission may be validly served upon
party's counsel. After a further review of the facts of the case and
the circumstances surrounding the same, we are now fully
convinced that it should not be so.
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now
Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must
be served upon counsel and not upon party. This is so because
the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one
responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural
aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose
of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated
to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's
case (Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29,
1952; Capili v. Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962).
However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly
provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
such cases, service must be made directly upon the person
mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice
be valid.
Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was
served on the proper person, and there must be strict
compliance with a statute requiring service on a particular
person, so that service on another person is not sufficient.
In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a
proceeding on the attorney of record is sufficient, if not
otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule of court.
(66 C.J.S. 658)
Thus, we see that section 7 of Rule 40, with regard to notice of
pendency of an appeal from an inferior court to a Court of First
Instance, provides that "it shall be the duty of the clerk of the
court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail", and the
Supreme Court construing said section held, in Ortiz v. Mania,
G.R. No. L-5147, June 2, 1953, that the notice of the pendency of
the appeal must be served upon the parties for said section being
express and specific cannot be interpreted to mean that the
notice can be given to the lawyer alone.
Similarly, section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25) provides
that "any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories", and Chief Justice Moran commenting on this rule
states that "the written interrogatories referred to in the instant
provision should be delivered directly to the adverse party." We
see no valid reason why a different rule should govern request for
admission inasmuch as written interrogatories and request for
admissions are both modes of discovery.
Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of
Court which expressly states that "a party may serve upon any
other party a written request" should receive no other
construction than that the request for admission must be served
directly on the party and not on his counsel. Section 2 of Rule 27
(now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court does not control
the mode of service of request for admission. It should be
observed that the orders, motions and other papers mentioned in
said section have this property in common: they have to be filed
with the court. A request for admission, on the other hand, need
33

not be filed with the court; it was intended to operate extra-
judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to determine
the propriety or impropriety of the request for admission (I
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., 372-73; I
Francisco's Rules of Court, Part 2, p. 282).
. . . Permission of the court is not required to make such a
request or demand, or to file it, or serve it on the adverse
party; but service must be made in the manner specified
by the statute or rule. (27 C.J.C. 277)
And the answer to the request for admission is likewise not a
matter of record and would require another step in procedure to
bring it on record (Seranton Lackawanna Trust Co. vs.
McDermont, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. 2nd 539, 55 Lack. Jur. 265, cited in
27 C.J.S. 277, fn 19). Section 2 of Rule 27 governs only those
papers that have to be filed in court and does not govern papers
which, by the rules of procedure, do not have to be filed in court.
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the
request for admission made by plaintiff was not validly served and
that, therefore, defendant cannot be deemed to have admitted the
truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested and,
consequently, the summary judgment rendered by the court a
quo has no legal basis to support it. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.
The plaintiff-appellee Jose Ledesma, Jr. filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari of the aforesaid resolution, docketed as G.R. No.
L-21715. On 2 October 1963, this Court denied the petition, thus
After a consideration of the allegations of the petition filed in case
L-21715 (Jose Ledesma, Jr. vs. Guillermo Locsin), for review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals referred to therein, THE
COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was
not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel,
Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be
deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request
for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period
fixed in the request.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986
MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOB. B. MADAYAG in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, of Branch CXLV, Regional Trial
Court of Makati, et al., respondents.
The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
renamed Court of Appeals) which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner against respondent Judge Job B. Madayag of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and respondent First Interstate Bank of California.
Petitioner sought to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
denying her motion to dismiss the complaint based on res adjudicata.
On June 15, 1983, respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner
to recover the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid to her on
October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged that on September 30, 1981,
petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company which was the remitting bank of respondent Bank. But
due to computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los Angeles Office
erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of US-
$500.00, and as a consequence respondent Bank issued and delivered
to petitioner Cashier Check No. 1217681 amounting to US-$8,500.00
dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner deposited to her account and
subsequently withdrew.
In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-
stated allegations in the Complaint and alleged that immediately after
receipt of a formal demand letter to return the overpayment, she offered
to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a
month but the offer was unreasonably rejected.
It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was attached to the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the Intermediate Appellate
Court, nor was any copy thereof attached to the petition for review on
certiorari filed with this Court. It was only in the Comment of respondents'
counsel filed with this Court that a copy of said Answer was attached
thereto.
34

On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141, sent the following "NOTICE OF CASE
STATUS" to the parties through their respective lawyers.
G R E E T I N G S:
Please take notice that cases where issues have been
joined will be scheduled for pre-trial conference only after
Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29-where applicable,
necessary and or feasible have been resorted to by the
parties.
If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not
applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to him, he
shall file a manifestation to that effect.
The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as
the respective manifestations of having resorted to, or of
dispensing with, those modes of discovery have been
filed by the parties.
The party, who has dispensed with those modes of
discovery shall be deemed to have waived resort thereto,
and, unless for good cause shown, motion to resort
thereto, after termination of the pre-trial, shall not be
grantee. The costs entailed the waiving party in
presenting evidence during trial that could have been
obtained through any of those modes of discovery which
were waived, shall not be assessed against the adverse
party nor awarded as part of the litigation expenses.
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such
manifestation has been filed, the case shall be archived
or dismissed as the case may be.
Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August 1983.
Makati, Metro Manila.
(SGD.) E.R. BELEN
Officer-in-Charge
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29,
1983, the presiding Judge (not respondent Judge), issued the following
order:
For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case
Status) dated August 19, 1983, more particularly the last
paragraph thereof, this case is hereby dismissed.
This order was received by respondent Bank's counsel on December 28,
1983.
On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its
complaint which was assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati presided over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, as well as a
supplement thereto, which was opposed by respondent Bank.
On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and
on November 27, 1984, he denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
on the following grounds:
(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the
plaintiff of its day in court.
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with
said notice of case status (above quoted), the court (Branch 141) should
have set the case for pre-trial conference since the last pleading had
been filed and there are no other conditions to be complied with before
any case is calendared for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20.
(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut
decision as to her liability or non-liability, instead of winning a case on a
technicality.
On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Intermediate Appellate Court praying that the orders denying the motion
to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be set aside as null and
void and that the complaint be ordered dismissed. On May 21, 1985, the
appellate court, finding no merit to the petition, resolved not to give it due
course. In its decision, the appellate court ruled as follows:
35

We concur with the above reasoning of respondent
Judge. We should add to that our observation that the
order of dismissal of Judge Elbias in Civil Case No. 4272
(Annex F) was null and void for lack of legal basis. The
'notice of case status' (Annex D) was not an order' of the
court. I t was, as its title indicated, only a 'notice,' not an
order. The warning in the last paragraph of the notice
advising the parties that-
'If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such
manifestation has been filed, the case shall be archived
or dismiss as the case may be.'
was not an order of the court. It was a warning emanating
from E.R. Belen, the officer-in-charge (of civil cases). The
failure of the parties to heed the warning was not
tantamount to disobedience of a lawful order of the court,
for the 'officer-in-charge' was not the court or judge.
Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not
have the force of a judgment. It did not constitute a bar to
the refiling of the bank's complaint. Respondent Judge did
not err, or abuse his discretion, in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7765. (pp. 35-36,
Record)
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court. We are constrained to
affirm Indeed, with the admission in petitioner's Answer of the allegations
in the Complaint that due to computer error there was an overpayment to
her of the amount of US-$8,000.00, coupled with her offer to pay
respondent Bank the amount of the overpayment in installments of
$100.00 a month, we cannot find any justification for ruling that the order
dismissing the first complaint operated as an adjudication on the merits
or constituted a bar to the second complaint. In fact, the trial court could
have, on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first case
in favor of respondent Bank.
True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should have taken the
precaution of complying with the instructions contained in the "NOTICE
OF CASE STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent delay resulting from
non-compliance; that respondent Bank's counsel was negligent in not
seeking a reconsideration or clarification of the order of dismissal or
appealing therefrom. But, fortunately for respondent Bank, the omissions
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
of its counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective procedure
which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint.
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised
Rules of Court) are intended to enable a party to obtain knowledge of
material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of third parties
through depositions to obtain knowledge of material facts or admissions
from the adverse party through written interrogatories; to obtain
admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant
documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to
inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other property in the
possession or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical
or mental condition of a party when such is in controversy. This mutual
discovery enables a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party
and thus facilitates an amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the
case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that
justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the
rules on discovery. However, recourse to discovery procedures is not
mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the
pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to the mandatory provisions
of Section 1 of Rule 20.
Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-
trial order should have been issued since the last pleading had been
filed, because the "notice of case status" was issued on August 19, 1983,
while the last pleading or the answer to petitioner's counterclaim was filed
much later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading which has to be filed
before the court shall set the case for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20
is the answer to the counterclaim (Itchon vs. Baligod, 17 SCRA 268;
Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447), in the
case at bar, petitioner's counterclaim for damages resulting from the filing
of the complaint did not require an answer (Navarro vs. Bello, 102 Phil.
1019; Gojo vs. Goyola, 35 SCRA 557). Since the counterclaim was the
last pleading, the court should have issued a pre-trial order after its
submission and it was the duty of the clerk of court to place the case in
the pre-trial calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which reads as
follows:
36

Failure to prosecute.-If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by court.
This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the appellate court
correctly held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of the court. It
was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the
notice (that if no such manifestation has been filed after 30 days from
receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be) was
ambiguous. The failure of the parties to heed the warning did not
constitute disobedience of a lawful order of the court. Consequently, the
order of dismissal could not have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits. Neither could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to
prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as
petitioner's Answer was dated August 17, 1983 and the order of dismissal
was dated November 29, 1983.
Petitioner cites the case of Arellano vs. Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon (65 SCRA 45) in support of her stand. However, in said case,
the Court upheld the order of dismissal for failure of respondent Barreta
to serve any answer to petitioner Arellano's interrogatories. The dismissal
was based on Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides that if a party fails to
serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Modes of Discovery
service of such interrogatories, the Court on motion and notice may
dismiss the action or render judgment by default.
Petitioner further contends that if the ruling of the appellate court
regarding the legality of the notice signed by the officer-in-charge were
sustained, then court processes such as summons, notices of pre-trial,
writs of execution and the like can be merely disregarded by lawyers.
This contention is without merit. Section 1 of Rule 14 expressly provides
that upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue
the corresponding summons to the defendant. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule
20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the pre-
trial and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the clerk of court to issue the
notice of the date of the trial. A writ of execution may be issued by the
clerk of court pursuant to an order of execution signed by the judge.
There is no rule authorizing the issuance of the "notice of case status" in
question signed by an officer-in-charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed, with costs
against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
37