LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 22. Arnobit v. Arnobit

23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
INTRODUCTION 24. Advincula v. Macabata

1. Banogan v. Zerna CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
2. Ledesma v. Climaco professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
3. Cui v. Cui
4. Alawi v. Alauya 25. Reyes v. Chiong
26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect 27. Alcantara v. Pefianco
for law and legal process. 28. Camacho v. Pagulayan
29. Torres v. Javier
5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho 30. Linsangan v. Tolentino
6. Chua v. Mesina
7. Soriano v. Dizon CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
8. Stemmerik v. Mas
9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC 31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
10. Cordon v. Balicanta 32. Cayetano v. Monsod
33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner 34. Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. 35. Aguirre v. Rama
36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts. CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

11. In re Tagorda CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo and should insist on similar conduct by others.
13. Canoy v. Ortiz
14. Linsangan v. Tolentino 37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
38. Rivera v. Corral
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by initiating or supporting 39. Johnny Ng v. Alar
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice. 40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land
41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as in the CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and efficient administration of justice.
jurisprudence.
42. Berbano v. Barcelona
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their 43. Sebastian v. Bajar
official duties. 44. Hegna v. Paderanga
45. Plus Builders v. Revilla
15. Suarez v. Platon 46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
16. Ramos v. Imbang
17. Catu v. Rellosa CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
support t he activities of the integrated bar.
47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio
19. In re Galang 48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao
20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas
21. Samaniego v. Ferrer

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 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions 79. Gamilla v. Marino
with his clients. 80. Pineda v. De Jesus
81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
49. Hilado v. David 82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA
50. Nakpil v. Valdes
51. Hornilla v. Salunat CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo client relationship is terminated.
53. Quiambao v. Bamba
54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio 83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan
55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez 84. Pfleider v. Palanca
85. Mercado v. Vitriolo
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into 86. Genato v. Silapan
his possession. 87. Hadjula v. Madianda
88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
56. Licuanan v. Melo
57. Posidio v. Vitan Canon 22 A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in
58. Lemoine v. Balon the circumstances.
59. Re: Atty. Maquera
60. Reddi v. Sersbio 89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA
61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag 90. Venterez v. Cosme
62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya 91. Santero v. Vance
63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II 92. Francisco v. Portugal
93. Metrobank v. CA
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and 94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA
confidence in him. 95. Sesbreno v. CA

CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

64. Hernandez v. Go 96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza

65. PANELCO v. Montemayor 97. Santos v. Llamas
66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut 98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo
67. Belleza v. Macasa 99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput
68. Overgaard v. Valdez 100. Barrientos v. Daarol
69. Angalan v. Delante 101. Berbano v. Beltran
70. Santon-Tan v. Robino 102. Tabas v. Malicden
71. Somosot v. Lara 103. Sesbreno v. CA

CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

72. Briones v. Jimenez CANON 1 Independence

73. Pena v. Aparicio
104. Libarios v. Dablos
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER 105. Go v. CA
106. Sabitsana v. Villamor
74. Manalang v. Angeles 107. Tan v. Rosete
75. Garcia v. CA 108. Dimatulac v. Villon
76. Santiago v. De los Santos
CANON 2 Integrity
CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
109. Fernandez v. Hamoy
77. Sesbreno v. CA 110. Dawa v. De Asa
78. Bautista v. Gonzales 111. In re judge Marcos

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 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
112. Lachica v. Flordeliza
113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero

CANON 3 Impartiality

115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan

116. Pimentel v. Salanga
117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
118. Oktubre v. Velasco
119. Sandoval v. CA
120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.

CANON 4 Propriety

121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas

122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon
123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante
124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.
125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10 Malolos City
126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda
127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo

CANON 5 Equality

CANON 6 Competence and diligence

128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.

129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta
130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional
132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez
133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag

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 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
BANOGAN V. ZERNA
Facts:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9,
1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years
later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an
opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss
the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for
reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question
the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision
rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches,
it was held, had operated against the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because
the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment
would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If anyone was
guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land
registered in their the pursuant thereto.
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final
and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They
slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the
cadastral court.
It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have
delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one
years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even
ordinary common sense.
Issue:
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.
Held:
YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that
the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by
efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so,
they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the
sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the
adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court,
lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this
duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
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which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer
lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge
Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead
appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw
because he was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict
between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de
oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their
services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the
community that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2
of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to
such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of
the spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent
administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either
the convenio or of his brothers assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding
that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower
court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to
the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado),
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although
disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence
of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has successfully completed all
the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of
an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and
unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote
similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her
grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that
he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
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Justice Hofilena
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
CANON 1
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case against Atty
Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit
P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that
these amounts were stored in the courts safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him
that he should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho complied
with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his common-law wife, a
stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court,
personally deriving profit from the interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA
Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that
its report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD:
YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
RATIO:
Dishonesty Conduct
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to remit the
funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people
in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for
failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.
Unlawful conduct
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the
law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than
just staying out of trouble with the law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain
from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in
order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct.
CHUA V. MESINA
Facts:
Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed
trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building (Burgos Property) owned by Mesinas
family, and another property (Melencio Property), also owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses
constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas mother,
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina
failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to
settle her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at
P850.00/sq. m.
The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank
obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the
Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein
as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount
of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to
them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of
the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of
Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears
therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also
indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA
properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of
P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit
acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property.
Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Tecson
filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue
Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and
was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the
property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate
that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated
to evade payment of capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9,
1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et
al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein
complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00.A new title
was accordingly issued in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was
entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986
alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference with
herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them.
Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he would borrow the
owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina
execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave
complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite respondents repeated
promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were
later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and
complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and
Reconveyance of Real Property.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
HELD
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
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First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to
evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes,
and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a
private party but the government is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated
Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property
to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into
turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in
four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed
dishonesty.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must
be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is
required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business
dealings where the parties trade at arms length.
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and
Rules 1.02.
SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that
Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga,
may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon
diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba
problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of
his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify
disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land.
The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his
probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for
the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
STEMMERIK V. MAS
FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted
Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such properties.
Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of
this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he
went back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big
piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the
money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the necessary paperwork.
When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name, Atty Mas
cant be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to his horror, was informed
that aliens couldnt own Philippine Lands and that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a
DISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD
ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.
HELD:
YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed
disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents
that he knew were void and illegal.
Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the
Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately deceived
his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of
the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
DE YSASI III V. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator,
petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and
attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in
June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the
7 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for
acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice,
private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he
is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back
wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal
goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as
officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting
a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been
less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
CORDON V. BALICANTA
FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband with the help of
Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporation to develop the real
properties inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the properties were registered in the corp.s name. Atty
Balicanta was the one who single-handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being its Chairman, President,
General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a
voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some
of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the
following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the Corps
right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the Cordons and
sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceeds coming the
sales and dispositions.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to
account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminated
Balicantas services and filed a complaint for disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner,
in its report, recommended for Balicantas disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that
Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.
HELD: YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to
misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious scheme by
making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although
he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He
also entered into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a
deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left
to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses
itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
CANONS 2 & 3
IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election, he
admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a candidate for third
member of the Province of Isabela & offering services as notary public (such as free consultation,
execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if
his home municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make
known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his services to handle land
registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
1 By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
this resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for final
action.
8 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because
of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of
the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting
to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it
was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve
separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued
that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines
the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise
disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a
reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine
etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar.
CANOY V. ORTIZ
Facts:
A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing him for
misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Coca
Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the
documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several
unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000, Canoy was
shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute, the
parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to
him about the status of the case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at
considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period within which to file the
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that
after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a
local government official and as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.
Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity to his
clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. He owes his entire
devotion to the interest of the client. His negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under
Canon 18.04, the relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need for
the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the
dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire the status about the case as this
is one of the lawyers duties.
The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as councilor does not
exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw his legal service if the
lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise
their legal profession.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of
professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their
claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation,
Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him
to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents calling card:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said
calling card.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their
talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics
estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain,
either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes ambulance chasing
(involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from
barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication
in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby
taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

Fe Marie L. Labiano CANONS 4, 5 & 6

Paralegal
SUAREZ V. PLATON
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820 Facts:
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in turn filed a case
Fax: (632) 362-7821 for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed to Judge Platon following
Grace Park, Caloocan City several changes in trial judge and several refusals by fiscals to prosecute the case.
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Issue:
Back Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?

SERVICES OFFERED: Held:

9 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must reinvestigate in order to
properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that a prosecutor is the representative
of a sovereignty; he is interested only in the fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to
prosecute if the innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-fold aim is
not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty to strike foul blows because it is
his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to use legitimate methods of prosecution.
RAMOS V. IMBANG
FACTS
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would
then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This
happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked
to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
HELD
Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to
devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
10 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as
this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal
fees other than his salary.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases
and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance
of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the
prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a
complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led
the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear
that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that
never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant
(such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the
client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.
CATU V. RELLOSA
FACTS
Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said
building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the place. The
parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong
Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the
petitioner brought the case to court.
Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted
Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety.
IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 2 and
RA 67133. The committee recommended Rellosas suspension from practice for 1 month.
ISSUE
W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03
2 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in service
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
HELD
No.
Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an
incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 7160 4, which actually allows him to
practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil Service
Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of
DILG. This he failed to do.
SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyers oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the
profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look up and take to
heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
__________
Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?
Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says if the constitution or law allows it Public officers however are subject to
Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should
first secure a written permission from their department head.
PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on,
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten
wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage
of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were
represented by Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al.
and became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?
3 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers
and Employees
4 Local Government Code of 1991
11 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve
whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included
within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure
provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject
'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and
substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of
the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern
does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing
the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.
CANON 7
IN RE GALANG
Doctrine:
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well
settled.
IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS
FACTS
Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was precluded from
taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court
This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas
of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result of hazing.
Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995
May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and attached to his petition
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
ISSUE
May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications attesting to his
righteous, peaceful and law abiding character?
HELD
Yes.
Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that moral fitness
required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the petitioner a chance based on the various
certifications: they sufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he
has proven that he has taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER
(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate child)
Facts:
Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship became intimate,
when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together as "husband and wife" from 96-97
and their daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed to give support to their
daughter.
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did
not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to
see Samaniego.
Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position paper. He also
reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Samaniego.
IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension for his
refusal to support his daughter.
Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further cause
extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality
required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced penalty was denied.
Held:
SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6 months.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true that Samaniego was not
entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it does not make this case less serious since it is
immaterial whether both are in pari delicto.
Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY.
DELA CRUZ
Facts:
Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela
Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:
a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent: criminal case for
child abuse; admin case for unethical acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the
labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal deduction of salary.
Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of
his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after, he
contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for being bigamous.
12 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the expiration of
his notarial commission in 87.
Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted his second
marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarized documents when his notarial
commission had already expired. However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and
noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1 year also
for notarizing without commission (2 years total)
Held:
SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the practice of law
for 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous marriage.
However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2 nd marriage, showed his good
intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and he never absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty
of disbarment is too harsh.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the necessary
commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. For doing such
constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Respondent also
violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7.
The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT
FACTS
Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano
Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him.
Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12 children; that
she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar; that several
years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita
Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a
complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery.
Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having cohabited with
Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she was always
traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations
toward her family. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who identified a letter sent
to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and the other was Melecio
Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress
knowing fully well of their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly
absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement, pleading
illness, on the hearing dates.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. It averred that an
indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent supports himself through the
practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him of this at this time when he is already
advanced in age.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
HELD
The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral conduct was
sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses itself in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of
disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of his license.
Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. This, he
failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against him, irresistibly suggesting that
they are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children
with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore be disbarred.
ADVINCULA V. MACABATA
FACTS
Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty.
Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents occurred after
meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed
Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to
Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2nd kissing incident.
Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of grossly
immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his
feelings toward Advincula.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment?
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character.
Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to show the common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.
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Justice Hofilena
Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not
motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology and the fact that it
happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took
advantage of her.
While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given a
stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.
(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)
CANON 8
REYES V. CHIONG
FACTS
Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a
factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not
established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the
services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The
complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan to
appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest
against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the
RTC of Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the
dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact
vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa
case. Salanga was impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The
SC referred the case to the IBP.
ISSUE
W/N the civil complaint was groundless
W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil complaint
HELD
Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor
Salanga in said civil complaint.
IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case. There was
no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not parties in the business venture.
Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass
both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension
SC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative
remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a
motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salangas decision to file the information for
estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis.
Relevant Provisions:
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same.
ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether
the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the
counsel of either party in that case.
Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of
the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, You mean to say, I would have to
go to Manila to get a copy? Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the
party he represents. Respondent then replied that complainant shouldve notified him. Complainant
explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in
Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and
shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)
Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she wont appear in the hearing of the case in
view of the respondents public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.
Held:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will
enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable.
Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He
violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.
His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainants subordinates.
For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the
latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations.
People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO
Facts:
Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a complaint
against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper and offensive language and
threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with
his client in the PAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a
settlement. Moved by the plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted
at Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would realize his mistake. As
head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara
was an idiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at
him, Gago ka!
The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8
Held:
Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers. Pefiancos meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
incident. And although Pefianco was moved by the womans plight, what he thought was righteous did
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Justice Hofilena
not give him the right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down. Whatever
moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN
FACTS
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students
due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho
who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for
AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer
should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with
his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The
complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students
and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have
against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The
compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty.
Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of
Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics
HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated
the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty.
Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case filed by
the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty.
Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating
the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of
the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in
this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of
Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel."
TORRES V. JAVIER
Facts:
Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in office
as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyers oath. This stemmed from the remarks made by Javier in the
pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA)
as counsel: 1. Motion to Expedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and
theft of UEFAs funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.s fees case, Javier in his Reply used abusive
and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to the integrity of the profession (not
uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries asking their family members to sign for them).
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreading reports and rumors
implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. With respect to the atty.s fess case, he alleged
that Torres, in his Answer, did not confront the issues but mocked and made malicious accusations against
his wife.
The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code
Held:
Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely privileged so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be (must be material
and relevant). This privilege does not extend to those matters not related to the controversy.
The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but not those in the Reply.
The SC does not countenance Torres incorporation of criticisms against Javiers wife as past president of
UEFA, but this does not justify Javiers retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies
through his teeth).
Canon 8 instructs that a lawyers arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to
another.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
FACTS
Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by offering, in some
instances, a 50K loan.
ISSUE
Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02
which provides that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer,?
HELD
Yes.
Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees for his service. In this case, promise
of a loan.
CANON 9
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret
marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on
Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of
15 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal
support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on
certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide
range of activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as
advertised, engaged in the practice of law.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided
for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law
list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack.
Hence, it should be enjoined.
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for the position of
COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on the ground that
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least 10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the
Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite Cayetanos
opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsods
nomination.
ISSUE
Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
HELD
YES.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law under modem
conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of Monsods
employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. From 1963
to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica.
His job involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank and a business conglomerate. By 1986,
he rendered his services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant and he also worked as a
Chief Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in
1986-1987. His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in election law. Also, he sat as a member
of the Davide Commission in 1990.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law."
1. Habituality
2. Compensation
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law.
4. Attorney-client relationship.
CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO
FACTS
Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment complaint
on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a prior existing
marriage
Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a Makati City counselor.
Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a senior partner in
her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which included the husband as a senior
partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an atty, 3) appearance in court as counsel.
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Justice Hofilena
HELD
Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01
Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law
Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the performance of a task that
may only be performed by members of the bar in good standing
Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through with the
investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no private interest affected such that
desistance of the complainant will terminate the proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those
unfit to practice law.
AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION V. CIR
FACTS
This case involves a controversy over Attorneys Fees for legal services in the CIR.
On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged a complaint
agains Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor practices, as specified in the
Industrial Peace Act.
On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it became final on
March 1963.
On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute the
backwages of the complainant workers
Atty. Fernandez filed a Notice of Atty.s lien amounting to 25% of their money claim
(PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyes requested him to 25% to
satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%.
Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement entered into by the
UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.s Fees shall be divided equally by him, Atty. Fernandez &
Felisberto Javier, the UNIONs president.
There are other matters in this case regarding Jurisdiction but the one related to Legal Ethics is
on the issue on Atty.s Fees
ISSUE
W/N IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY SHARE IN THE
ATTORNEYS FEES.
HELD
NO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement that the UNION President should share
in the Atty.s Fees. The UNION President is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation
only as such president. An agreement whereby a UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.s Fees is
immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. Note Rule 9.02.
AGUIRRE V. RAMA
FACTS
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21
May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
the charge against him.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct,
alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George
Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate.
On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal government employee (Secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate).
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he
took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. Respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law.
HELD
Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the
Philippine bar.
1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
- Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as counsel in the pleadings
- was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of party
REFORMA LM-PPC
*all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys
2. What constitutes the practice of law
- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts
- all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
- any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
- perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
- render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
* respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
3. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege.
- limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified.
- A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations.
17 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
- although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA
Facts:
Judge Laquindanum charged Atty. Quintana with the offense of notarizing documents beyond
the jurisdiction of his notarial license and with notarizing documents not known to him to be based on
actual facts. It was also found that his wife sometimes notarized the documents herself.
Issue:
Is Atty. Quintana guilty of violating Canon 9?
Held:
Yes. He was found to have assisted in the unauthorized practice of law by negligently letting
his wife notarize documents herself in his absence. His contention that he rectified this error by slapping
his wife is of no moment because he did not in the first place take the necessary steps to prevent this. He
was also charged with violations of the notarial law.
CANONS 10 & 11
FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON
FACTS
This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty. Villalon. It started
from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty.
Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the case against Fernandez.
In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to help him in a case
against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of Fernandez.
In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in buying Palacios
Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who allegedly had a Deed of Donation
which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of Donation was registered.
Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed against Fernandez.
However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute
Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in
taxes.
In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule
1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has suppressed and excluded in the complaint
filed by her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way,
unregistered. He says that no mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of
Donation.
Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining Atty. Villalons
argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no duty to include the fact that the Deed of Sale
existed because only the clients operative facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the
complaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely point out
during the trial.
Fernandez appealed the case.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
HELD
None. Case against Villalon is dismissed.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings. However, this
duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her clients opponent.
She (Villalon) is not duty bound to build the case for her clients opponent, Fernandez.
The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. Client
Palacios informed her that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration. Also, it was not registered
and was not the basis of the transfer of title of Palacios property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is not a
necessary evidence/fact to their case.
RIVERA V. CORRAL
Facts:
Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was received by
Atty. Corrals secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on March 13,
1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date February 23 to February 29 without the
courts prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a reply to plaintiffs manifestation
claiming that he received the decision on February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).
Issue:
W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the decision of
the court without the courts prior knowledge of decision
Held:
No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made not to
reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice of appeal filed on March
13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty. Corral altered the date he
received the courts decision. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal
was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.
JOHNNY NG V. ALAR
FACTS
The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng Company against its
employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive their service incentive leave pay from their
employers due to the latters claim that the employees conducted a strike at the Companys premises
which hampered its ingress and egress. The case was referred to the labor arbiter and the latter found that
the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees appealed to NLRC but the
latter affirmed the labor arbiters decision.
In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI) where
respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to support his complaint. He said that the
labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the
same manner with malice thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring
commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim involved in the
case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the latter violated certain codes and rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein
a lawyer is prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against an
opposing counsel and before the courts.
18 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the canons found in the Code
because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to in the rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not
judges; and 3) the complainants in labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to
respondents counter-complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the lawyers
of the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when they filed
multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when they deliberately lessened the number of
complainants in the labor case.
The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude that respondent is
guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the complainant did not violate any canons of the
Code. It recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be
imposed in case a similar conduct will be committed again.
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession. The MRMI contains
insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and
offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if
we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors
is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant, the Court finds no
reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as
approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims
despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND
FACTS
De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga claiming that
Justice Tinga, who was the ponente of the decision, received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in
exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already
given out 10M to JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case
between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna said
that Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said
that the case was prioritized for resolution and that Mr. Chan had prior knowledge of the outcome of the
case before the decision was promulgated.
However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably
settling their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. However, he denied having
said to De La Serna that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court
ISSUE
W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but such
conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in
some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not
in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice has also been considered to constitute indirect contempt.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his duty to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust criticism
and clamor." His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the
fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it
is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An
omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public's trust in, the judicial
system.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the court. It is a
long recognized and respected right of a lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be critical of courts and
magistrates as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels. But it
is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear the badges of falsehood while the common
version of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the hallmarks of truth. De La Serna's
declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries of decency and
propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity
of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it.
BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN
FACTS
There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private prosecutors representing the
government were repeatedly absent or unprepared.
This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private prosecutor was unhappy with the
dismissal and accused the judge of favoritism and gross ignorance of the law.
The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and through him filed a case against the
judge. this subsequent reached the supreme court.
HELD
The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer was found to be the one behind the
case (against the judge) not the congressman.
The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a stern warning as well as fined
for 2500php by the court.
Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the justice system (ie office of the court
administrator / IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial people.
CANON 12
19 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
BERBANO V. BARCELONA
FACTS
Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-in-fact for their
pending casevwith the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being
claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of
Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty.
Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they
learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told
Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was
already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with
her.
There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the
grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a pay-to-
cash check for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him
P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daens nephew while Berbano gave
him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty.
Daens because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona
reached P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance, Berbano filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautista found Atty.
Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer
and to appear before the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted
the Commissioners findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD
Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and remove from the profession of law
persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar.
Berbanos Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding that
respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and
ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the
Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of
promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by
taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure
the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found
guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty.
Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated a
penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek,
and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12).
SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR
FACTS
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the DAR who represented
Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of
a land owned by Sebastians spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed
an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to
residential. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of
disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed another case for
Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. RTC dismissed this due to res judicata and lack of
cause of action. Bajar again filed another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DAR Adjudication
Board which raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation.
Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for
obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the
Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for
the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory
tactics.
The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the complaint lodged against her.
After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally submitted her Comment which was alleged to not confront
the issues raised against her. The Court required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and was later
ordered to show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for such failure. The Court
referred the case to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that Bajar be SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and
incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law. However, Bajar continued to
practice law despite the decision claiming that she did not receive a copy of the order.
ISSUE
Whether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law.
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed
cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in
the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that an important factor in
determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants
by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[72] Indeed, while a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice. It
is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment
in theEjectment case. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders.
Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for
the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE YEARS effective
from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
HEGNA V. PADERANGA
FACTS
Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10 years but
during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation, stealth and strategy
20 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
(FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed a shop for which he filed a forcible
entry case.
Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to vacate the leased premises and to
pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of
execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to
Hegna for a possible amicable settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party
Complaint alleging that he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001 which
caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff.
Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar confidant for deliberately falsifying
documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice. He also filed criminal charges against Atty.
Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip
spouses for false testimony and perjury. His grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the
Register of Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didnt reflect any change of ownership & (3) the
Notarial Register Book showed tampering and erasures.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of prima facie evidence of guilt
but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Atty. Paderangas defense alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these
properties in the name of the previous owner and that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were
made to correct mistakes so that entries will speak the truth.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light of the letter
handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgiveness in relation to
the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of
ownership of properties. In addition, there were several instances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with
Hegna offering settlement and it was only when he denied them that he received the Third Party
Complaint.
ISSUE
W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty. Paderanga?
HELD
Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. His non-registration of the sale
transaction so it would not appear in the records of the BIR, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds,
on the Land Registration Office so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer
twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying estate and
inheritance taxes upon his death.
Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his client
which is in litigation.
violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood
or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the
standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The act of non-
registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a servant
of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate.
PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA
FACTS
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO
E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty of gross
misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law.
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite
(PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that
respondents clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case
was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainants rights over the
land. Continuing to pursue his clients lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional
falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through
the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title
despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he
took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999,
but were based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years
and on the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he
took were valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship
with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel
did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them.
As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his
interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was
resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he
merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law,
considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary
eviction by the complainant. He posited that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a
good father would be protective of his own family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al
were almost pro bono.
HELD
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every
honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by
law to enable the latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On
the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts complained of were committed out of his over-
zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We
are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels
from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and
foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the
duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to
be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every
exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case
by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ
21 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
FACT
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA for a sum of
money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia
as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the day before the
expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and a
senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his
work will not allow him the limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for Extension, this time, because he fell ill,
and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse that because he fell
ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time to conclude on the work load he
missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later,
he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for Extensions were denied by
the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the resolution denying the appeal all together. However,
instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial of the appeal
some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE
Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to violation of his oath as a
lawyer, which warrant his disbarment?
HELD
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each motion will be
granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of the Court's action thereon,
constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he
belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or
misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a
lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for
extension of time will be granted. Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a
matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his
motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time
running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the client and ask
that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel
who can study the situation and work out a solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he received a copy of the
Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent humbly admitted his fault
in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case.
CANONS 13 & 14
FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO
FACTS
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr. Cordero bought
canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver spread canned good. When Mr.
Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that
the canned good was infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of the parasites.
BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos, where the latter demanded P150k.
Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos threatening to bring up the matter to the media.
Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid he was involved
with, which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened to publish it if they didnt pay the
amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a Kasunduan
between the two, where Foodsphere agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that
Foodsphere advertise in Mauricios tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the withdrawal of the
complaint. The Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against
Foodsphere.
Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an Advertising Contract asking the latter advertisements of
various media (which were a lotand expensive!) owned by Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill, Foodsphere
offered to patronize some advertisements only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to
proceed with the publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show (Batas ng Bayan)
held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its liver spread. He also
wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same topic.
Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the discrediting remarks
that he has been making against the company. Foodsphere also filed the present administrative complaint
against Mauricio to the IBP, where he was ordered not to make any more statements on the matter.
Notwithstanding the pending cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against Foodsphere
and discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be suspended for 2
years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension.
ISSUE/S
W/N Mauricios suspension was valid.
HELD
YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years.
Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of Rule 13.02
Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBPs orders that he discontinue with
his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere and its products. This is a clear and
conscious violation the Code of Professional Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of
the bar.
NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.
SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO
FACTS
Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144:
People v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman.
Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer
to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence presented was sufficient to prove the crime of
homicide but not murder.
Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo
(who was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not
subject to bail (Rules of Court).
22 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of
Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate by allegedly suggesting the filing
of the motion to fix the amount of bail.
Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40k.
Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article
regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.
In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but admitted that a
judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is
weak. He claims that the former judge found the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid
to be cited for contempt because it was the only way for the public to know that there are judges
displaying judicial arrogance.
RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding
judge with its lies and misrepresentations.
Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court, sentencing him to 30
days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released).
Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS
and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan.
In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and
be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05
and Rule 13.02).
Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached
by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his response to the interview (at the
instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was
made without malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law
for 1 year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which recommended the implementation of the RTCs order of suspension.
ISSUE
W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11
and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility YES
HELD
Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers.
Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of the law.
Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference and submitted
to a radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge Tan.
Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article, which were made while
Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CANON 15
HILADO V. DAVID
FACTS
- Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house & lot between
Assad and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese occupation
- Assads counsel is Atty. Francisco
- Mrs. Hilados counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
- Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because Mrs. Hilado
consulted her about the case and even turned over some documents to Atty. Francisco
- Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado regarding the same
case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs. Hilado in the case and he thinks
that the action against Assad will not prosper
- Mrs. Hilados counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco
- Atty. Franciscos version of the story:
o Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he refused to become
her counsel because he thinks that the action will not prosper
o Days later, Atty. Franciscos assistant, Atty. Agrava, informed him that Mrs. Hilado
left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructed Atty. Agrava to return
the expediente because they will not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado
o Later, the firms stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter allegedly dictated by
Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why they refuse to take the case
o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it
o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Franciscos office. Afterwards, Atty. Francisco
accepted the retainer fee
- Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco other than those in
plaintiffs complaint and there was no attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and
Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motion to disqualify is denied.
ISSUE
W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado
HELD
Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado was to obtain Atty.
Franciscos personal service as a lawyer
- Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the purpose is to obtain
professional advice or assistance and the attorney permits, then an attorney-client relationship
is established
- Formality is not essential
- Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorney-client relationship
which precludes accepting opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
type of information was received
- Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance to administration of justice
- Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still considered as professional
service, besides an information imparted to a member of a firm is made available to the entire
firm
- Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assads counsel
Ratio: Rule 15.02 a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client
23 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
NAKPIL V. VALDES
FACTS
Valdes is Jose Nakpils accountant, consultant and lawyer.
Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds,
he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust.
Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title issued in his
name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses estate. And,
Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate.
Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Joses inventory of
estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name.
The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes family realty
corp.
Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also, handled the claims of
Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.
ISSUE
w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional
ethics
HELD
Yes.
The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.
Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts
among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously improper because he
had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for the other side.
The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by evidence. His
resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite some time but returned to
work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.
The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the certainty of such
existence but mere probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant,
the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal
field, as the good moral character requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.
HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
FACTS
Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation.
Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA)
and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors.
Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest.
ISSUE
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation
in a derivative suit?
HELD
No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors
have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and
other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real
party in interest, while the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal
party.
The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors
unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO
FACTS
Northwestern University filed an administrative case against Atty. Arquillo for representing
conflicting interests in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty. Arquillo appeared as counsel for
both the petitioner and the respondent (Castro) in the labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense, contended
that the petitioners and respondent he represented in the labor case belonged to the same side as the latter
party was absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict of interests.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests.
HELD
YES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests,
the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a
lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2)
when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty.
Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that
there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same
side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which
Castro was one of the respondents.
QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA
Facts:
Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing conflicting interests
when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for
committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation
Bureau (AIB) and its president and managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of
Quaimbao in an ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the ejectment case was
still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against Quiambao.
24 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Held:
Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year.
At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of
record of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This is founded on the principles of public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:
1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty
3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment
HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO
FACTS
Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and his brother
Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A
special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his
attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh
stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case,
Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his businesses until his
death in 1996.
However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed
a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that was the subject matter in the first case.
Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds,
TCT issued as a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.
Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as
counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent
violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are
adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating
Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the dismissal of this case.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD
Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility provides: A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest that which his duty
another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should
not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. The protection given to a client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing
to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as
defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged
for.
As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely
owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent,
as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same
property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which
debase respondents rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of
Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not
reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been
respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent
maintained in the first civil case.
PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ
FACTS
Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC).
Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of
the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent.
Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for
Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they
constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and
Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an
attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through.
After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the
return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that
she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing
something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000;
then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued
communicating and he continued sending her money for the case.
25 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his
family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as
follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.
------------
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as
his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.
-----------
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him
the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise.
TRUST me! ----
Candy
When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never
happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade
him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.
HELD
Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests
and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana,
who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the
establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in
the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by
the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was
either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the
opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate
our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal
advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon
Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in
order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress
upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money
they invested with Multitel.
CANON 16
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
LICUANAN V. MELO
Facts:
Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics. Atty. Melo was
Licuanans counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to her the
rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year
from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because a demand made by the
latter.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals collected
Held:
Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.
Ratio:
The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1 year period, the
mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is deprived of its use, and withholding
information on the same despite inquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyers Oath to which he swore
observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melos professional misconduct, he has
breached the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melos unprofessional actuations considered, the SC
find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty
and good moral character.
POSIDIO V. VITAN
FACTS
Posidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate Proceeding of the deceased Nicolasa Arroyo
to which she paid Php 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan withdrew his appearance in the said case
thus, Posidio had to engage the services of another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contacted Posidio and
told her that he has with some tax declarations and other documents purportedly forming part of the estate
of Nicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory of properties for distribution. He convinced
complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties and demanded
P100,000.00 as legal fees. After several months, however, respondent failed to institute any action.
Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but
respondent refused despite repeated demands.
The lower court ruled in favor of Posidio and ordered Vitan to return the Php 100,000.00 and
pay an additional Php 20,000.00 as interest and damages. In compliance, Vitan issued a Prudential Bank
check that was dishonored later on. Despite being sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands to
pay, Vitan refused to honor his obligation.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding Vitan guilty of violating
the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check
without sufficient funds to cover the same. The IBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning
that a similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.
ISSUE
Whether or not Vitan should be penalized?
HELD
The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. However, they find that the penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by Vitan.
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing
additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an
26 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
action, thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand. Having
received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping
complainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so
despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay
any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his
possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer
of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his
client upon demand. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The
conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics
and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
LEMOINE V. BALON
FACTS
Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan
Insurance.
His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balons services as his counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered
payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.
Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of
Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance
of the offer
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the
amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan
Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to
avoid litigation
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of
the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as
attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire
amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine
will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies.
Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine,
however, he gave no evidence to such turnover
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21. Specifically, Canon
16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an account upon
receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount to Lemoine.
It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when demanded upon him.
Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to Lemoine contending that he has a lien on
the fund.
The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule 16.03,
presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of
his fees, but rather he can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present
case, Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon.
It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a 25% attorneys fees,
after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%.
SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and ordered disbarred.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF
ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA
Facts:
Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward Benavente who
obtained judgment in a civil case. Castros propery was sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation, but
Castro retained the right to redemption over said property.
In consideration for Maqueras legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into an oral
agreement that he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera.
Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for $320,000.
He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for
Obtaining an unreasonably high fee for his services
Did not comply with Guams Model Rules by entering into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition of
such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in writing
Issue:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?
Ruling:
It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence only.
The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court:
[]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code which prohibits a lawyer
from acquiring by assignment the clients property which is the subject of litigation. It extends to legal
redemption.
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Justice Hofilena
Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain why he should and
should not be suspended/disbarred on those grounds. Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic
NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law
for the non-payment of his IBP dues from 1977.
REDDI V. SERBIO, JR.
Facts:
Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She decided to put up a hospital in the
Philippines and acquired, with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties to help speed up generation of
funds. It was later found out that some of the properties did not in fact belong to the owners she paid.
Issue:
Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16?
Held:
Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly account for all amounts in his custody
which pertain to the client and return the same upon demand. This the respondent plainly failed to do even
after repeated demands made by Reddi.
DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. EUGENIA J.
MUOZ V. ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant de Chavez-Blanco
against respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.
Complainant and her husband was a resident of USA. They both owned parcels of land in
Quezon City, registered in complainants name. Complainant authorized respondent Atty. Lumasag [being
the 1st cousin of her husband] to sell the lands.
Complainant was informed by respondent that he had sold only one lot and remitted the
proceeds to complainant. Respondent further told complainant that the other lots remained unsold due to
the presence of squatters.
After few years, complainant discovered that more than one lot was sold. Complainant then
sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of the
sale of the properties. Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney, which respondent had
used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real
signatures of complainant and her spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr. is guilty of deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders
him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically,
Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the
complainant and her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her
spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter that he
had sold only one. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to so do.
WILSON CHAM V. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty.
Eva Paita-Moya. Complainant Cham alleges that Atty. Paita-Moya committed deceit in occupying a leased
apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due. Respondent stayed at the
leased premises up without paying her rentals. She also failed to settle her electric bills. Later on, a report
reached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with
her the door keys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Paita-MOya is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED
for one month. A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to
pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she
failed to settle. Hence, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already
constituted a ground for administrative sanction.
Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and
electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
JERRY T. WONG V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II
FACTS
Jerry Wong as owner of a business selling agricultural and veterinary products retained the
services of Atty. Moya for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company.
Sometimes also, Atty. Moya handled personal cases of Wong and his wife.
Later, Atty. Moya asked financial help from Wong for the construction of his house and the
purchase of a car. Wong purchased a car on installment basis for Atty. Moya. Wong issued postdated
checks to cover the payment of the car while Atty. Moya issued checks in favor of Wong to reimburse him
for purchasing the car. The checks issued by Wong were encashed by Transfarm (car seller) however, the
checks issued by Atty. Moya in favor of Wong were dishonored for the reason account closed. Despite
repeated demands, Atty. Moya refused to replace the dishonored checks.
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Justice Hofilena
Atty. Moya also introduced Wong to Quirino Tomlin from whom the construction materials for
his house was obtained. He bought this on credit but Atty. Moya filed to pay this indebtedness causing
embarrassment to Wong. Atty. Moya also handled a case of the Wong spouses against Berting Diwa.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses and as satisfaction of the judgment, Diwa paid P15,
680.50. Atty. Moya as the counsel of the spouses received the payment but did not inform them. The
Wongs only found out about the payment of money when they got hold of the Manifestation with Prayer
to Terminate Proceedings.
The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to the complaint for disbarment filed by
Wong. Atty. Moya filed 3motions for extensions (after the 1st motion was granted and the time had
elapsed, he filed another one and so on and so forth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and required him to file an answer. Atty. Moya
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed for an extension to file his answer
which was granted but with a warning that no further extension requests will be entertained. When the
time to elapse was near he filed a Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did
not accept this hence he was declared in default after failing to file his answer.
The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their position papers because a complaint for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years from the date of the professional
misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002 and that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file any
pleadings at all.
The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for 1year. The IBP Board of Governors
modified this and suspended Atty. Moya for 2years.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable?
HELD
Yes!
1) Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks. He did
not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyers shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that
the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct.
2) The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in the legal
profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial conditions. He
should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered
financial reverses he should have explained this with particularity and not though generalized and
unsubstantiated allegations.
3) Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his client. His failure to
explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that the same had already been
transmitted to the complainant.
4) His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious concern. He
submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer. His
failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary,
show a callous disregard of the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This
conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the
lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice.
5) It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the conditions required for remaining
a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
6) As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year suspension. However, in this case, Atty. Moya is
suspended for 2years because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he
also seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings.
CANONS 17 & 18
HERNANDEZ V. GO
FACTS
Sometime in 1961, Hernandezs husband abandoned her and her son
Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez s husband demanded payment of his loans
Hernandez, fearful of mortgage foreclosures and aware of a impending claim suit, engaged the
legal services of Atty. Go
Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in Zamboanga City
belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors
Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary
or valuable consideration
Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged to creditors. When
the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds
of sale in his favor covering the said lots
Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez
In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as agreed upon, but instead
he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name,
depriving her of real property worth millions
Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP
IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years
ISSUE
W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED
HELD
YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17
Atty. Go violated Canon 16
His acts acquiring for himself Hernandezs lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross
misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment
Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the honor of the legal
profession
Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in Atty. Go and
when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell the same
Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to
others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez
the real worth of her properties
Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he sold the lots
and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of law in similar
circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light
29 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.
PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I)
charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence.
Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were:
Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the
two extensions of time granted, hence the Court of Appeals considered the appeal Abandoned
The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not even bother to
answer the complaint nor present his defense
Hence, PANELCO I prays that the court impose sanctions on Atty. Montemayors gross
negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in mishandling
complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to the prejudice of the complainant.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law. As
counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to
protect his client. When he undertook his clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts
for its prosecution until its final conclusion.He should undertake the task with dedication and care.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS
DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
ADECER V. AKUT
FACTS:
Originally, there was a Criminal Case in which complainants were charged with committing a
crime (Other deceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits). Respondent, Atty. Akut
was their legal counsel in the criminal case. Complainant accuses Atty. Akut for being negligent.
First, despite Atty. Akuts receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the
fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting
complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, Atty. Akuts admission that complainants
were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for
probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a copy of the
decision to file their petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to give complainants timely legal advise.
Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office most of the time because, he and his wife
were always out of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife, who
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly, after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately
went out of town seeking faith healers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that one case or hearing is more important
than the other. We commiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife, however, failure of an attorney to
file a timely motion for reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for negligence.
By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or
that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to
do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary
BELLEZA V. MACASA
FACTS
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend,
Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her
son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged
violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their
mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000
balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions,
respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue
any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit
the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and
complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent in the
Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15
days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated
August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious"
without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to
submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time praying
to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
HELD
Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa is disbarred
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking
imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
30 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time,
knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law legally applied.
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client
with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship.
He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that
he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that
he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of
counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy
in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by
promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is
specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can only be
meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense
and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his
being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel,
the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused
secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents
and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued
inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice
complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use
the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ
FACTS
Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez. They entered into a
retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed
by him (Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of
the Anti-Violation against women and their children act).
Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4 months after,
Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of many phone calls and emails,
Valdez couldnt be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his own, and discovered that Valdez didnt file
his entry of appearance in any of the cases, that a counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the
criminal cases against him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest. He was
constrained to find a new lawyer.
Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return of documents
entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a
case with the IBP for Valdezs dismissal for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful
conduct.
The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also failed to attend the
hearing and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP
found him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he
was ordered to return Overgaards money.
HELD
SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be disbarred for falling below the
standards required of lawyers.
Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule
18.03 requires a lawyer to not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence will make him
liable. Valdez should indeed be liable because he was not just incompetent, he was useless; not just
negligent, he was indolent; and rather than helping his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client
and left him without any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the disbarment
case against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence on his part.
Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the status of his case and to
respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. Despite Overgaards efforts, Valdez
avoided his client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated.
ANGALAN V. DELANTE
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the Samal Tribe
against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility particularly Canons 16 and 17.
The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971, Angalan and
complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants
mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to the Spouses Eustaquio.
When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the Spouses Eustaquio, the
Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio
prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They
also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his name.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property.
Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property. Complainants and the Spouses
Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement, the complainants offered the
spouses the sum of P30K as repurchase price which the spouses accepted.
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Justice Hofilena
However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent
Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and
gather its produce until he is paid.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from
respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property
to his name.
Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the
Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared void, (2) title issued in the name of Atty.
Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to pay damages.
As defense, respondent alleges that:
1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without any intention to pay him back
or at least offer an explanation as to how they would be able to repay him
2. That the couple did not really engage his services as counsel for an annulment suit
against Navarro Eustaquio
3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was a valid sale and not a mortgage
4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delantes former client who is now residing in
New York. But after 11 years, the buyer did not return to the Philippines anymore so he
authorized Atty. Delante to have the property in his name upon refund of the purchase
price.
Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Court charging respondent with gross violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag of the IBP found that respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of governors approved but increased the
penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional
Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and against
their will?
HELD
YES.
The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delantes defenses. Angalan and complainants went to
respondents office not to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose
of recovering their property.
First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent filed a complaint
with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and
complainants.
Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of unwarranted refusal on the part
of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to
engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel."
Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED from Mr.
MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to
the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)."
Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of
Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants.
As to his claim regarding his former client purchasing the property
1. Amicable settlement there was an agreed repurchase price to which both parties agreed to
2. Letter to the barrio captain the lawyer stated that complainants repurchased the property
from the Spouses Eustaquio. (This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September,
1978.)
3. Insufficient proof Respondent did not give any detail or proof to substantiate his story
the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old passport of the alleged
client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him and the
alleged client. The Court agrees with the observation of Commissioner Hababag that
respondents "vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and
acceptance."
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him.
Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their
property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty
too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Court for gross misconduct.
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of
telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and
ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO
FACTS
Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly neglecting his duties
and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a bouncing check.
Complainant found out that her case had not progressed and that the only pleading that
respondent had filed was his notice of appearance.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case (NO); and
(2) Whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check (YES).
RATIO:
On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling complainants case, the Court
agrees that based on the facts presented there was nothing that he could have done to expedite the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered
that the motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent could not be faulted if the
acting presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until the regular presiding judge return.
Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially
Bouncing Check Law. By issuing a check in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient funds
constitutes deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the
issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates
a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. As such, we have held that
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated the
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Justice Hofilena
Attorneys Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is ORDERED SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) month.
SOMOSOT V. LARA
FACTS
Atty Gerardo Lara represented Ofelia Somosot in a collections case against Golden Collections
Marketting Corp.
Golden Collections filed interrogatories and request for Admission
Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be sent directly to
Mrs. Somosot
At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about the P27,000 in
unpaid attys fees
Nov. 2001, Atty Lara was appointed as a consultant in the Board of Investment, a government
position
Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office was locked and
according to the security guard, they had moved office without leaving a forwarding address.
Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs Somosot, but they couldnt be reached
Lara filed his Withdrawal of Appearance in court, without the required conformity of his client,
Somosot, because she could be located. This was denied.
Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosots new office was in Pasig, he called her where he
advised that she should find another Lawyer. She informed her that she already did.
September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosot giving him one last chance to give her a
reason not to instigate a disbarment suit against him.
ISSUE
W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia
Somosot.
HELD
Yes.
Atty Laras services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the Interrogatories
and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to rule against Mrs. Somosot. Records do
not show how exactly he tried to address the Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not.
He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about the Interrogatories
and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he learned that he had been appointed into a
government position.
Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldnt be a reason for him
not to inform his client about the cases development
He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment in a government
office; and two, Somosots refusal to pay his fees. He could have secured her conformity to the
withdrawal of appearance when they talked on December 2001, but because he failed to do so, he remain
as counsel of record.
CANON 19
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez.
Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the
counsel for Heirs of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order (2002). The RTC
Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their
shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal
complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of Rule 19.01
of the Code of Professional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against complainant
to obtain an improper advantage:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of
malice or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Fair play
demands that respondent should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the
residue of the estate delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal
prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client
with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client
must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to
resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of
the purposes of the state the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are,
first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
PENA V. APARICIO
FACTS
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the
NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation
pay. Pea rejected the claim. Thereafter, Pea sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio
replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the
company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as,
criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the companys
business license.
Pea filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the
complaint because Pea had allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum
shopping. The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC.
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against Pea in the
amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Pea likewise filed
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Justice Hofilena
this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of
due process.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?
HELD
Yup!
First of all, the SC found that Pea actually submitted his position paper. In addition,
disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not
to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any rate, Pea actually submitted a certification against
forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in the original
complaint.
Now to the merits
Canon 19, a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, this
shows that a lawyers duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice.
Rule 19.01, a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under such Rule, a lawyer should not
file or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyers client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did
in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail extortion of
money by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only
entail disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and
even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Pea. He also stated that the
writing of demand letters is standard practice.
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicios assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he
used such threats to gain leverage against Pea and force the latter to accede to his clients claims. The
letter even implied a promise to keep silent about the said violations if the claim is met.
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such
letters must not contain threats such as those found in this case.
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio
wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his clients interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded
him with a stern warning.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
POST MIDTERM CASES
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER: CONDUCT OF LITIGATION
MANALANG V. ANGELES
FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and
separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the National
Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of
P6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his
clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the
amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused
and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650.
Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they insisted
that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the
counsel of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative
expenses." Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that he "would not be
compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law
because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.
HELD
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant
solely to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good
moral character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the
practice thereof.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise
effected by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned . A client has every right to expect from
his counsel that nothing will be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By
compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the
stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well
as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of and
failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of
Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other
administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly
failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens. The records of this case
are barren of any statement of respondent's claims for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor
did respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money judgment to be
served upon his clients and to the losing party
His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of
lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no
right. He appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession.
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Justice Hofilena
This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by way of
mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months suspension appears to
us in order.
GARCIA V. CA
FACTS:
Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ring which they bought from Rebullida.
Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea restaurant, she
recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she bought it, which Garcia answered
from her comadre.
Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Garcia handed
the ring to Guevara and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of Guevarra, her husband
Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr.
Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question.
Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it
was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to Garcia who despite a
written request failed to deliver the ring to Guevara.
Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was
lost.
Garciass defense was that they denied having made any admission before Guevara or Mr.
Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring was purchased by her from Mrs.
Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who
was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring plaintiff
purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond
was never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts, unlike the one
claimed by Guevara spouse.
Apparently Garcias own counsel admitted through an answer that the ring in question was the
same ring, which is being claimed by the Guevara spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth of certain facts
HELD:
NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made by her
counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such, has the authority to
manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose of the litigation...
Garcias proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is futile because the liability to error as
to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather
remote.
The rings identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose testimony is entitled
to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business
Indeed, Garcia made no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card
told Guevara that that was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand,asserting ownership.
None of the people whom she mentioned, was able to corroborate the story of how she bought
the ring.
SANTIAGO V. DELOS SANTOS
Facts:
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of land. In a motion to set the case
for hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being public in character, thus lending support to
the opposition of the Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos. The
then Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Its reversal is
sought in this appeal.
Issue:
Was the counsel negligent in the preparation of the pleadings? Yes.
Held:
Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in the language of the then Judge
Palma, "show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain ... ." Former
counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission. If it were his
intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the
present, he could not have succeeded any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as to such
parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive and binding.
How did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firm of Luna and Manalo, seek to extricate
him from a predicament of his own making? It would rely on certain procedural doctrines; more
specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss of oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being
entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the
registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a pasture lease agreement
in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present
evidence. What purpose, it may pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming
effort, it would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to be forgotten that in
the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated: "That the son of applicant Luis Santiago,
namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time the Lessee of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered
by him under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled
by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the improvements and
comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease Contract; ... ." There was no denial of such
allegation.
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not.
CANON 20
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for reinstatement
and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as
attorneys fees and 20% expenses to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor the employees and fixed Atty. Sesbrenos attorneys fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave,
gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the
employees. The court later on modified the attorneys fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA,
which decided that the attorneys fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded to the
employees. Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorneys fees amounting to 50% of all
35 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing
case law and the contract of professional services between the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees
awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by the client
Held:
Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees. A lawyer may charge
and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to judicial control. In the case at bar, the parties entered
into a contingent fee contract, wherein Atty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims if
they will win the case. However, the court finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorneys fees
are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the
services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. Contingent fee contracts are under the
supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The
court held that a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.
BAUTISTA V. GONZALES
Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to
pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in
litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is
valid
Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However, the
agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the
expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same
should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not
provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous. Such
agreements are against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
GAMILLA V. MARINO
Facts:
Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. Theres a long history of
collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements
between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to
serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42
million pesos for back wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the
UST Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits
(42M) for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the
balance of 42M ceded to them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from
the benefits allotted to faculty members.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Issue:
Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty.
Marino
Held:
No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any
clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the
same duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there
was lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty
Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and others
concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have
enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and
guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary
case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative
justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more
stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action.
Hence, Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including
circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
transactions with his client.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora
proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted by
Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed
petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but
instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main
action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the properties
awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional payment for service rendered in the
same case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by quantum
meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies
with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances
force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of
unconscionable greed!
36 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR
Facts:
The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor,
to represent them in the case. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement, wherein it was contained that the
attorneys would endeavor to secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a
price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not entitle them to any attys
fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee
shall be 30% of the just compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyers fees shall be in proportion
to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
[]
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The
Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui
properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December
1985, the RTC, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned
over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just
compensation, although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA
was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to
bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or
criminal action.
Issue:
The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that the letter-
agreement re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties
Held:
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact,
it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of
confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to
show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution
and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the
same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception that the
stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their
professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They
are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this
Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the,
unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four
percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the
Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there
was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the
44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in
order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably
reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the
Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by
Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided
between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must
be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts
for they would still be earning or actually earned attorneys fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no
direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees
are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive and
unconscionable, which we have already done.
LAW FIRM OF TUNGOL & TIBAYAN V. CA AND SPOUSES INGCO
Facts:
Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. Complaint was filed by
the law firm in behalf of the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista alleging that the Ingcos had
paid P5.1M for a lot but Villa Crista failed to deliver the title thereto. The Ingcos and Villa Crista entered
into a compromise whereby the latter was bound to refund P4.8M provided that in case of breach of such
obligation, an additional P200k would be paid by way of liquidated damages.
Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sheriff levied and auctioned 10 lots belonging to Villa
Crista. The Ingcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes P5.1M contract price for the initial lot
they primarily bought, P1.35M attorneys fees and other expenses. The Ingcos then terminated the services
of the law firm.
The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of the excess of the existing prevailing
selling price or the fair market value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in the RTC.
The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M; that in their contract the law firm was
entitled to 25% of the excess of the total bid price.
HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed. The Office of the President reversed,
affirming the HLURB arbiters decision. CA reversed the OP.
Held:
SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional fees. The spouses acquired the 3 lots as
the highest bidder at the auction sale. It can be said that the lots had been acquired not through the
recovery efforts of the law firm.
Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, it was Renato Ingco who was actually
negotiating, not the lawyers.
When the auction sale was made, the attorney-client relationship no longer existed, hence the
lawyers are not entitled to the additional fees.
CANON 21
37 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB),
through the Presidential Commission on Good Govt (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one
of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks
in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients and in the performance
of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the
office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c
excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised hell
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved
in PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed,
conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial
& corporate framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly
3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their
participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG
exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the
same conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didnt refute petitioners' contention
that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he
undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the
conditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences
of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and
identity of the client.
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, assailing SBs resolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners,
namely:
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of
agency.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &,
thus, deserving equal treatment
SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of partydefendants be based on
reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the
identity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.
RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections ):
WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE
IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PCGG
YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires
them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on
whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust
and confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in
fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties
that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx An attorney cannot, without
the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.) Canon 15, CPE also demands
a lawyer's fidelity to client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence
which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information. Thus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing
to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
38 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name
or identity of his client.
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship
Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary.
Exceptions to the gen. rule:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt reveal name of his client as this would expose the
latter to civil litigation.
Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that under such conditions no case has
ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to w/c it related, when such information could be made the
basis of a suit against his client.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed
him to pay sums of money to govt voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, &
w/ no govt audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule:
if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance
where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed & it is the
identity w/c is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences.
Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was
duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure,
framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in
the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case where a client
takes on the services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a client thinks
he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act
for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the
disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action
against him.
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy
behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by
clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be
avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the
name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction
which may or may not be illegal.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege
and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during
the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients
under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearly fall
w/in recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it
would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY
PALANCA:
WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA
Facts:
Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural land to Palanca known
as Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission of the lease contract for
defaulting in rental payments. He also filed this administrative complaint of gross misconduct against
Palanca. Pfleider alleged that in a criminal case for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his
counsel, the latter sought to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca
informed him through letters that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and that he
had deposited P5k with the court.
Issue:
W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?
W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract terminated the attorney-
client relationship?
Held:
Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters relied upon by Pfleider did not show
that Palanca stated that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the criminal complaint against
Pfleider.
39 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the object of the
suit was the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual
confidence and trust essential to every attorney-client relationship.
MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO
Facts:
Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage filed by the
latters husband. Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents against Mercado
alleging that the latter made false entries in the certificates of live birth of her children which were
presented in the annulment case.
Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case filed against her by Vitriolo,
information relating to her civil case for annulment was divulged. Hence, Vitriolo breached the privilege
and confidence reposed within a lawyer-client relationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.
Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when
he filed a criminal case against his former client?
Held:
SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the communication
privilege between an attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it
is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to substantiate Mercados
allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged communication. all her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity.
GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN
Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genatos building. Atty. Silapan handled some of
Genatos cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan
bought the car, and issued a postdated check to Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that Genato
was in the business of buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady
deals and that he was also involved in bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship.
Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him, especially with privileged communication the protection is only limited to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer.
It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapans rights as they were
not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked
in the said case. A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.
HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA
Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed
confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by
Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just
wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against
Hadjula for falsification of public documents and immorality using the disclosures as basis for the
charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the
information secret and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that
there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It
appears that she was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of
giving bent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.
PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN
Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a
case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the
stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws
of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-
client privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad
who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.
Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?
Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have
been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal
or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote
thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of
members of a non-stock corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to
the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the
amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
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Justice Hofilena
attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could
not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed
amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-
laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus,
the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of
his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed
by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its
former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against
Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel.
Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech.
A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to
protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated
CANON 22
WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO BERNARDO
Facts:
Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case, Wack-wack
wanted to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so Arcangel was
allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment to Arcangel. The law
firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This
petition was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the petition.
It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel because Chudian
only entered his appearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack.
Issue:
Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?
Held:
Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that, its
impending relief as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation to protect the
clients interest until its final release from the professional relationship with such client. The court could
recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal
substitution of attorney is effected.
Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the
presentation of the clients case in court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in court cannot be
made to depend on them.
VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME
Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court rule
against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or
refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was
withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case.
Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be
counsel any longer.
Issue:
Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery who undertakes an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination that is, until the case becomes final and executory. Any
dereliction of duty affects the client.
The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosmes defense that he had already withdrawn from the case. A
lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client fileed in court and with a copy thereof
served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an
application with the court. The application must be based on a good case.
What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22.
There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3 months.
SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE
Facts:
Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as
acceptance money. Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to
file a petition for certiorari with the CA.
She didnt.
She also didnt appear during scheduled hearings, causing the case to get dismissed for failure
to prosecute.
Issue:
Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?
Held:
Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she abruptly stopped
appearing as complainants counsel even as proceedings were still pending with neither a withdrawal nor
an explanation for doing so. This violated Canon 22.
Suspended for 5 years.
FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL
Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was
rendered convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the
judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time
and for failure to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one of the
complainants giving them instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice to Withdraw. But the
complainant didnt file it with the court because they were aware that it would be difficult to find another
counsel.
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Justice Hofilena
Issue:
Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly
wanted to withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was
negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the petition out of time. eventually he would have known that
the petition was denied but still he failed to informe the convicts and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only
from the clients written consent or from a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA
Facts:
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of nullity of certain
deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter his charging lien equal to 25% of
the market value of the litigated properties as atty fees. The court granted and the attys lien was
annotated on the TCTs. The cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs
therein. Thus the Bank now had the TCTs in its name and the attys lien was carried over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted the motion and
fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the lien?
Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings. A
charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine
qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by
the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as
an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the
action from which the fee is to be paid.
Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no authority
to fix a charging lien.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the
main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim.
DORONILLA V. CA
Facts:
Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The RTC declared that
Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs.
Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of land of the estate
which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Is the order of annotation proper?
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Held:
No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation.
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would take 30% of
whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. The
employer appealed the decision.
Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they waived their right
to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at once. The court adopted the
compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of
withholding, the employer directly paid the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection
against the employer and employees.
Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees.
Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the employer liable for the Attys fees?
Held:
No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients and the judgment
debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was
withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against
employers because, according to him, the computation of the employees money claims should have been
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should
be made liable for the difference.
Attys act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to settle their dispute
may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien.
Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to claim against the
respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him.
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA
Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from
complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could
take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the
SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented
complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for $2.5K.
Issue:
Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?
Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldnt be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly preponderant evidence.
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Justice Hofilena
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa. Neither will a favorable disposition in the
civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to
him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an
official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a
member of the bar.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There
is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES
Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUTIES
FACTS:
Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of IBP duties
amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted to the Bar in 1961. He
was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986. After that, he migrated and worked in the USA
until 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the above amount because he
was working with the Civil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he was
working in the USA.
IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on the actual
practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP, and one of his
obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of such dues has been upheld by the SC
in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the Integrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from
paying the dues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination and reinstatement later on of
membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldnt be assessed.
Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBPs policy of Non-Exemption in
payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive for one who has been in an
inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property
right without due process.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was
inactive in the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad?
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The public interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the
annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one
is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
43 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated
Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT
Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer
(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolver on his lap when she
refused to do so)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in the estate
proceedings of her late husband. Laput presented to her several papers or pleadings for her signature.
However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may
ask somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his revolver
from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs.
Barrera was compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.
Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that they were
performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is compounded by the circumstance
that, being a member of the BAR, the offender should have set an example of a man of peace and
champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the
offender had pledged to defend and protect his client. He was suspended from the practice of law for 1
year.
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to
her house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a
single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the
Masons convention so the latter said he should ask for the permission of her parents. They consented and
so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioners house and invited her for a joy ride, with the
permission of her mother (who was Daarols former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol
proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within 6
months from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations
continued and they agreed to get married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an
airport in Sicayab where there were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual
intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he would marry her and that December was very near
anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She cried after
the deed.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented
because she loved him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that
she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told her that she didnt have to worry because they were
getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he
could not marry her because he was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated
from his wife for 16 years and that he would work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently
marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasnt able to contact Daarol
anymore (he went MIA).
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having
been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would
work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent
never bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the
gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my
being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such,
could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As
records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any
evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol
has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.
FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was
being claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen
as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the
assistance of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month,
Atty. Barcelona went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his
release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that
he could secure Daens release the following day. Berbano didnt have enough money and time to
immediately come up with such big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty.
Barcelona the money. He said that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of
Daen, and that they should just meet tomorrow.
The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The day
after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter). There were other
payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of
the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasnt seen again and he didnt return their calls. Daen was still in
jail.
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Justice Hofilena
Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona
guilty of malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000.
IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings but recommended only suspension.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for
their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members
of the bar.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.
Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the
Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act of respondent in not
filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice,
emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.
Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person in
the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection
with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has
demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the
relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections. In this
case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through
his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and
public contempt. He is disbarred.
HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed
forgery.
Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to
secure a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On October 2001 however, a
certain Castillejos, falsely representing herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him to
prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards.
Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didnt ask Castillejos for any other
document other that a Community Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the
mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage the same property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When
Tabas learned of the cancellation, she promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the deed was
forged. However, he did not help her.
Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the falsification under a
claim of good faith. He says he did not know of Castillejos fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted.
He claims it is beyond the realm of his futy to investigate the identity of persons appearing before him.
And that as a matter of routine, he only requires the CTCs of persons appearing before him.
IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the preparation
of legal documents so that such situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidant however
recommended suspension. He was found guilty of gross negligence.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the
practice of law.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, suspended for 2 years.
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be
undermined. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the
very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take even ordinary
precautions required in the premises. Respondents conduct showed serious lack of due care in the
performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his carelessness, respondent failed to notice the
glaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her purported
signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal processes as
well as to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute
their cases. They had undertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated that Sesbreno will get 30% of
whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they may recover. Atty. Sesbreno registered his charhing/retaining
lien on the Agreement.
The camineros he was representing obtained a favorable judgment. RTC ordered that they be
reinstate with back salaries, with privileges and adjustments. The respondent to that case DPWH appealed
to the SC where Sesbreno still represented the camineros. Later on, the Governor of Cebu proposed a
compromise settlement of the cases. The parties signed a Compromise Agreement wherein it is stated that
camineros will be paid full back wages. Also states that the camineros are subject to lawyers charging and
retaining liens as registered in the lower court.
Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting the compromise
agreement. The camineros moved for execution however, only 45% of the amount due them was released
because the court retained the 55%, holding it was payment of the lawyers fees pending determination of
such amount. However, instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province
of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorneys Fees against respondents and his former
clients. RTC ruled in favor of Sesbreno. The court further upheld the petitioners status as a quasi-party
considering that he had a registered charging lien. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the
camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court.
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Justice Hofilena
Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorneys fees
voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former thirty (30%) percent of
whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they
were filing or have filed. Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was
a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word
whatever shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the court would award in
favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to
be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in
keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until
what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained
by the client.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in
a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural
equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without
paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not
capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is
a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.
Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further
that he had settled his case as against his former clients, SC did not sustain his right to damages for breach
of contract. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to
the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the
petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed
attorneys fees.
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 1
LIBARIOS V. DABALOS
(Gross ignorance of the law; close association)
Facts:
Judge Dabalos without conducting any hearing directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against accused and at the same time fixed the bail for accused Calo and Allocod.
Held:
Judge Dabalos is fined with a warning.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the
accused. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not
strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed.
Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law,
which is subject to disciplinary action.
Considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former
employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should have
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was
merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge
should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled
to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a
just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
GO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Accused presented himself before the police to verify reports that he was being hunted by the
police. He was thereafter detained. The prosecutor then informed accused of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused
to execute such waiver. The prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and a
certification that no preliminary investigation was conducted because accused did not sign a waiver of the
provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however later filed a motion for release and proper
preliminary investigation. After the case was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initially allowed the
release of accused on a cash bond and issued an order granting the leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the granting of bail and
proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously opposed this.
Held:
(Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez)
I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a
sensational murder case without a preliminary investigation despite vigorous and continued objection and
reservation of rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that said
rights be respected I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been moved by a
desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. Mass media
has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case
has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and
impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR
Facts:
It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge beyond the 90-day
reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent judge which was described as
bereft of any dignity as a court of law has been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his
clerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the management of the court records.
Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as acting judge of the
MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case was being backed up by someone
powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao through Lipangos wife. However, Pitao still convicted
Lipango because the evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found
out that Villamor revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And finally, when
the case was elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he acquitted Lipango.
Held:
Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2
A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his
responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of
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Justice Hofilena
the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel. Also, under Rule 3.09 is that: A judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business,
and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or
the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
TAN V. ROSETE
Facts:
Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for P150,000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges decision in the
criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that
respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a very
strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent
judge.
Held:
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes
the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself.
It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his
daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of
his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute
gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
DIMATULAC V. VILLON
Note: Ill skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjies 40page case.
Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon is related to us). Basically, there was
denial of due process.
Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the date of arraignment without even perusing the
records (otherwise he wouldve known among others, that there was a motion to defer proceedings
because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there was an order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition
with the CA, the filing of such petition, order of the CA directing respondent accused to comment on the
petition to show cause why the application for a write of preliminary injunction should not be granted
etc.,).
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as these were
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately
held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicial
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
instinct should have led him to peruse the documents to initially determine if indeed murder was the
offense committed; or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal
within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, judge Villon should not have merely
acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must
view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the
same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the
judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in
him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The
judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended
party to due process of law.
CANON 2
FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render judgment in the case
were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was transferred, complainant learned he brought
the records of the case to his new station. Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records up and
because the dockets were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family court in the
area. He also failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, he was able to collect his salary when
he claimed in his certification that he had no pending cases.
Held:
Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.
Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court
personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On
meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application
for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his transfer to another
post, respondent Judge should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records
of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his action with respect thereto.
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey directives from this
Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and decisions of
higher tribunals, much more so this Court from which all other courts should take their bearings
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent
Judge must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded of judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a
false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of
all right thinking men. In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of justice, only those
with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers.
DAWA V. DE ASA
Facts:
Presiding judge Armando de Asa was charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of
lasciviousness by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto
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Justice Hofilena
were employed as stenographic reporters while Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of the
Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court. They charged de Asa for
allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing them on the lips.
Issue:
Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling.
Yes.
Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. He should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the
performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.
In the present case, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge
in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for
members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at
large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute
sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employees. Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority
over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. The Court concludes
with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants
his removal from office.
IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
Facts:
Two complaints were filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and a concerned citizen of Gerona, Tarlac.
These Complaints identically charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5 th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants. Zacarias alleged
that, on two occasions, Judge Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him in exchange for a
favorable decision in a criminal case against Zacarias and for his provisional release. He further alleged
that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without
bribe money and that the respondents are engaged in an illicit love affair which is common knowledge to
municipal and court personnel and as well as to the people of Gerona.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities and should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the judge --
like Caesars wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. the actions of respondent judge
were not free from all appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of
one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of behavior for which he
must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public confidence in the judicial system.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the performance of her duties.
By her own admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond, even though she had not been
instructed to do so by respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. The
determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the accused, is
purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the mandated duties of respondent clerk. It has been
stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work therein, from
the judge to the lowliest clerk.
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA
Facts:
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur,
charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jose Abad
Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly
compelling her to sign a death certificate even though she was not the attending physician. According to
Lachica, during a party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened to file an administrative
case against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.
Issue:
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and intimidation
amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the
charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been established by substantial evidence, which is
the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. His undue interest in having complainant sign the
Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent
behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is reprehensible in a judge and should be
subjected to disciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the
RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and
gross ignorance of the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin
for and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City
RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the criminal case,
the decision, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the tenth month
after the case was submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also cited for impropriety by complainant
because he was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle
respondent judge would even use at times.
Issue:
Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
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Justice Hofilena
Ruling:
Yes.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his close
association with a counsel for a litigant.
The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be
extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere
perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement
or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time
and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such
fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal
profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously
careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also
they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel
of the judges' competence, integrity and independence. The respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly
be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him.
SAMSON V. CABALLERO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document
against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero. Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent
Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional
qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a
pending administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed
the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of
Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges
for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article
208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
Issue:
Whether respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling:
Yes. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the
moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of
judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was
against the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary,
it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its
basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also
accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. The first step towards the
successful implementation of the Courts relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members,
officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a
good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is
and should be higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to
judge.
Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
CANON 3
DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN
Facts:
Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
specific performance against Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) and spouses Gregorio and
Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. The complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged
the services of respondent as geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision lots) 2 parcels of land
situated in Barrio Namuco, Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondents services, petitioner agreed to
give him 1 subdivision lot at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion
of respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in installments and delivered to him possession of
the lot. However, despite respondents demands, petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting
him to file with the RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages. The trial court issued an
order dismissing the complaint for improper venue. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration
with motion for inhibition alleging partiality on the part of the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA
denied the motion for inhibition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for inhibition
Ruling:
No. Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their
own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of the judges
themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, we
held that "bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be
proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice.
These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of
office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the
rich." Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order without
however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that
"such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case."
PIMENTEL V. SALANGA
Facts:
Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases where
petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel.
Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he
himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious
misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence."
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Justice Hofilena
Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in
Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that
the records of those cases be transferred to another sala.
Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the statement that
the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court
Issue:
Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is
his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him? NO.
Held:
Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being
challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted
to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge by either party, due
to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it
would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of
discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for such
inhibition.
The exercise of sound discretion mentioned in the rule has reference exclusively to a
situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. 7 For, the permissive
authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of
disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not
legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been he has
to continue with the case.
A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant
is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a
new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice.
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal.
But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this
ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel
for a party litigant happens to complain against him. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far
as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.
In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to
disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and
rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned
MONTEMAYOR V. BERMEJO
(The RULING portion is kind of lengthy because I think the refutation of the Court for every misconduct
alleged is important. )
Facts:
Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case within the period
provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court).
Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the instant
Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross
negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two Motions to Require
Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records of the
case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge received the
defendants supersedeas bond that the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch
Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of judgment. In
essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution was issued on
September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-
day period.
Issue:
Is the respondent judge guilty of delaying rendition of judgment and violating the Code of
Judicial Ethics? YES.
Held:
The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment should be
computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge
deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge
cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the law.
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejos Order requiring them to
submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming, however, that the court received the
defendants Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been
rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month
after the lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two months from the receipt
of the defendants Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and, thus, administratively
liable.
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice without delay.
Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. The failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable,
constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of administrative sanctions against the
defaulting judge.
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the plaintiffs
Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution prayed that hearing be set on a date
that was not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to be
scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next
working day, the same Rules provides an exception for motions requiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs
believed that their motion came under the exception. However, if the respondent Judge did not share this
view, he could have simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion day. Instead, he untenably
ignored the motion.
Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground that there was no
proof yet that the defendants counsel had received notice of the Judgment.
The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on December 12,
2002. The fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had not yet returned at this point would
have been cause for apprehension for any responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any
semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from, nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the
receipts two months after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the lack of
registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.
These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things.
One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is denying it
to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr.
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Justice Hofilena
Montemayors allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings any
evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence of
incompetence and lack of professionalism.
A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous
events.
Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he is
not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in favor of the
defendant.
Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a flimsy justification
for his inaction on Dr. Montemayors Second Motion for Execution. According to the respondent Judge,
the court was undertaking its semestral inventory when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to
admit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the motion
for hearing on the next motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the second motion.
Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file any supersedeas
bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate execution of the inferior courts judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory.
However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in obvious
disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge
Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be
impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically,
under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to
public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of delay in the
rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is
fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of
Canon 2 of said Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00.
OKTUBRE V. VELASCO
FACTS:
Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by Peggy DArcy. DArcy is the aunt-in-
law of Judge Velasco.
Shortly after Velascos appointment to the MTC of Maasin, he asked DArcy if he could reside
at the Paler Building. He was initially allowed by DArcy however when he sought an extension to stay
thereat he was denied by DArcy. Nevertheless, Judge Velasco was able to stay in the building albeit in
another room.
Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of the building declaring that he was the lawful
owner of the building and all rentals should be deposited by them at his office in the MTC. He also sent a
strongly worded letter using the MTCs letterhead to DArcy asserting possession over the building.
Judge Velasco caused the removal of the buildings service jeep from its garage. DArcy then
instructed Oktubre to replace the vehicle in the building and to take measures to ensure that the removal
would not be repeated. Oktubre successfully replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheels and put it
inside the computer room of the building.
Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction and replacement of the padlock to Oktubres
room and the access gate to the third floor of the building.
Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in the Punong Baranggay. Conciliation
proceedings failed.
After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officer to come with him to the station at the
chiefs request. Upon arrival, he was confronted with an arrest warrant signed under authority by Judge
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Velasco in connection with the alleged robbery of the jeepneys wheel and he was put behind bars
pursuant thereto.
After obtaining his release he was again filed suit for malicious mischief and falsification of
documents again by Judge Velasco. All the complaints were supported by the sole affidavit of Judge
Velasco which he prosecuted using his Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority.
Note Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 3.12 of the same code. For
inappropriately using his Offices letterhead and for acting on his own criminal complaints against
complainant and DArcy, respondent Judge violated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct
[
and grave abuse of authority.
On Respondent Judges failure to Recuse Himself from His Criminal Complaints. Note the
principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias
and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law.
However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him
have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of
partiality is proscribed.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not
disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485,
resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12
and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12.
Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly,
paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the
sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a
judge from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own
case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule
3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judges subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his
culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on
disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait
accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and
Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or
controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this date.
SANDOVAL V. CA
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
It appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property lawfully titled in anothers name by
misrepresenting himself as the latter. The lower court ruled in favor of the original owner and nullified the
deed of sale in favor of the buyer who claims to be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed.
[]
Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of the Court of
Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First, petitioner contends that he was denied
due process when the ponente of the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit
himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the
case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who should not be held
accountable for the fraud committed against private respondent Tan, Jr.
Issue:
Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of Appeals should
have inhibited himself from taking part in the case.
Held:
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he
should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public
clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal
with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private
interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.
From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from
deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over the case below, heard part of
plaintiffs evidence and ruled on motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the
Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was
promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge
from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court is the subject of review or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. Granted that Justice
Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the
decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his
own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the
case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to
take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not
handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality,
which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the
judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view
that his active participation in the case below constitutes a just or valid reason, under Section 1 of Rule
137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ V. JUSTICE DICDICAN
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Justice Dicdican filed by Ma. Asparen, a party to a
case involving St. Mary Mazzarello School. In that case, the school imposed disciplinary sanctions on Ms.
Asparen but the same was lifted by Hon. Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondent justice of the
CA issued a TRO.
So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the
latter had previously represented various religious organizations during his practice in law and the
petitioner in this case is run by a religious organization.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Respondent denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case but he
nevertheless inhibited himself.
Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged that Justice still appeared as one of the signatories
of a resolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting the memorandum of the petitioner school and
which deemed the petition as submitted for resolution.
Complainant alleged that respondent justices actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice
against his client in the case. Respondent Justice however, was able to show that no document was
forwarded to him when he inhibited from the case. It was also shown that another Justice took over the
same. It was also shown that his inclusion as a signatory was a mere mistake by the stenographer as shown
by the letter of apology.
Held:
Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, burden of proof is upon
complainant. If complainant fails to do so, respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
In the present case, the complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and
partiality against respondent justice. He failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges.
A partys remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper reviewing
court, not with the office of the court administrator by means of an administrative complaint. When some
other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act
of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.
CANON 4
J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS
Facts:
Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC presided over by
respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment. An
urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the
respondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment.
Said Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding companys Supreme
Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency.
At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so
that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by
complainant. Respondents favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by
herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore."
Held:
We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-
day notice rule.
Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift
attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution,
and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on
the same day without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a
judge is subject to disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondents inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that
respondents actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance
52 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
of the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the
opportunity to be heard on the matter
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due
care in examining the supporting papers. The respondent should know the basic requirements before
approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent
the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received
benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the
management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said
bar are quite clear that respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by
respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that
complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home and
receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial
conduct.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office
reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the legal
order by judicial corruption.
CENTRUM AGRI-BUSINESS REALTY CORP V. JUDGE BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON
Facts:
Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several stores leasing its
building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to
pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option).
MTCC ruled for Centrum, ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests.
The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the presiding judge. In that
appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC decision, but respondent refused. The tenants
moved for 30 days within which to file their supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but
limited the period to 10 days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that
Centrums motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the tenants a chance to file their
memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made).
The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with different rental rates
(higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15.
In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum charged her with 1.
Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct; 2. Knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.
Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially increased, it also
disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even before it was promulgated, signed by
the respondent. Judge claimed she was innocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also
alleges that the judge unjustly denied its motion for execution.
Held:
Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is dismissed from office.
Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a copy of the decision even before its
promulgation, the fact is that a copy was obtained by it and this is highly irregular. Since the judge is
ultimately responsible for the safekeeping of her papers, the burden of accounting is on her.
(judge claims that her stenographer was at fault)
This was not merely a simple case of breach of confidentiality, but evidence suggests a scheme
to extort money from Centrum.
There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum, as admitted by the latters counsel.
Why Centrum filed this case against the judge appears to be that the decision, although it was completed
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
as of June 15, was not promulgated until after nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent
judge would welsh on her undertaking to increase the awards in its favour.
On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law, the court finds the
judges errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge violated certain provisions in the rules of
court applicable to ejectment proceedings.
RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE
Facts:
Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante (respondent)
with violation of Canon 4.
The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call to the Mayor of Mandaluyong and they
talked about local allowance of judges. The Mayor noticed the disparity in the amounts received
(respondent was receiving more, compared to petitioner and other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the
allowance received by respondent be reverted to the previous rates.
During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, what happened in the courtesy call was
reported. Angered, respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the Executive judge (she was there during
the courtesy call and was presiding over the meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting, felt that she
had to rescue the executive judge and explained what happened. This time, respondent yelled at petitioner,
called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talking because nakakahiwa boses mo. Petitioner
yelled back, matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa
kami, to which the respondent answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong.
Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified.
Judge Villarante then wrote a Memorandum addressed to Executive Judge of the Mandaluyong
RTC, copies of which were furnished to the Justices of the SC, JBC, other judges of Mandaluyong, its
Congressman, and prosecutor. The memo suggested that the holding of monthly meeting of judges be
suspended, considering what transpired. Petitioner filed a complaint for libel based on the memorandum.
In causing the circulation of the memorandum, respondent claimed that it was her obligation to bring to
the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of petitioner that would put the judiciary in
public scrutiny and disrespect.
Held:
Both judges are fined (11,000 for petitioner, 16,000 for respondent) and given a stern warning
for having violated Sec 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges and
employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful
occurrence reflecting adversely on the image of the Judiciary. By fighting, respondent judges failed to
observe the proper decorum expected of members of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their
squabble arose out of a mere allowance coming from the local government.
The behaviour of both parties was very unbecoming. Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to
the standard of propriety required of judges. While she might have been provoked by Judge Acosta-
Villarantes referral to her as a liar, she should have maintained her composure instead of shouting back at
a fellow judge. She should have exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate
manner.
Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to observe the basic
norm of propriety demanded from a judge. She provoked petitioner by calling her sinungaling. She should
have been more cautious in choosing her words. She also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she
wrote the memorandum and caused its circulation. If indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to
allow the parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, there was no need to mention the
alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a
medium for retaliation against Judge Capco-Umali.
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BINALAY V. LELINA, JR.
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case against Judge Lelina, Jr. for violating
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct (both are with regard to
prohibition on judges in the private practice of law).
Respondent judge is preventively suspended for being charged with rape, abduction with rape
and slight illegal detention. While still under suspension, the judge filed a manifestation for the court to
grant him the permission to practice law during the remainder of his preventive suspension, or if such
cannot be granted, to consider him resigned from the judiciary.
It turned out, however, that even before he filed this manifestation, he had already engaged in
the private practice of law representing 2 persons in a criminal case, and one in a civil case, all of which
are still pending. All pleadings in those cases were signed by him, as a partner of the Bartolome Lelina
Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices.
In the meantime, the office of court administrator directed respondent to desist from engaging
in the practice of law pending the courts resolution of his manifestation.
In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition to engage in practice of law applies only
to judges who are in the active service and should not cover those under suspension. He also said he was
forced to practice law due to his impoverished life and because of the continuing sufferings of his wife
and children.
Held:
Judge is suspended and sternly warned.
By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the prohibition to practice law. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguire debemos. Law does not make a distinction between a suspended
judge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to secure an authorization to engage in the practice of law
only shows that he is aware of the prohibition.
Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to still carry his name. By allowing the firm to do
so, he held himself in public as a lawyer, in violation of the rules and norms of judicial ethics.
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE PORNILLOS
(Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending cases before her)
Facts:
Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others, the violation of the Canons of
Judicial Conduct for borrowing money from her staff and lawyers in amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made an investigation and found that such attaches no
administrative liability (since they were already paid or waived by the creditors and were obtained 19
years ago).
Issue:
W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively liable.
Held:
Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct (aggravated by
undue delay in rendering decisions and violation of SC rules). Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil service, borrowing money by superior officers from subordinates is a violation
punishable by reprimand, suspension, and dismissal from service. At the very least, she should be
admonished for dealing with her subordinates in an improper manner.
More severely prohibited is borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in case
pending before the court (a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of ROC). Under Canon 5 of the Code of
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
LIHAYLIHAY V. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CANDA
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the ff. acts:
Threatening her through text message that she would be in trouble (because he thought she was supporting
an applicant for sheriff which he opposed)
Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her
Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore, disgusting, repulsive, pakialamera, offensive,
etc. (in a letter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found out she ad him blotted with the police
because of the text threat)
Publishing such remarks in a newspaper
Issue:
W/N Judge Canda is guilty of gross misconduct
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2, Canon 4: As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizenin particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Sec. 6, Canon 4: Judges are entitled to freedom of expression, but in exercising such right,
they shall always conduct themselves in a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office.
The acts committed by Judge Canda are unbecoming of a judge, and these subjected the
judiciary to embarrassment. He was fined and was given a stern warning.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF LOUIS BIRAOGO
Facts:
The Supreme Court, en banc, continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben Reyes in
3 consolidated cases (Limkaichong case). Since there was no further objection, the En Banc approved it.
Being printed on Gilbert paper, Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same
session. However, they decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy because 9 justices
wanted to concur only in the result (if the majority concurred only in result, the ponencia would have no
doctrinal value). They decided to hold oral arguments.
Biraogo, a petitioner in one of the 3 cases, held a press conference and circulated to the media
an undated letter signed by him together with a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia. He insinuated
that the Court unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Since the unauthorized release of the copy infringed on the confidential deliberations of the SC
and constituted contempt of court, the SC directed an investigation. The Investigating Committee found
that the leak came from Justice Reyes himself. Hence, he must be liable for grave misconduct.
Issue:
W/N Justice Reyes is liable for gross misconduct
Held:
YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that confidential information* acquired by justices and judges in their official capacity
shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes not related to their judicial duties.
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*Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to
pending cases.
CANONS 5 & 6
REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA
Consolidation of 3 cases against respondent
FACTS
Case 1: Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Republic for the
implementation of a law5 which required the payment of duties and taxes to importers in the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, who formerly had an exemption to such taxes but was subsequently required by virtue of
such law. He also granted various ex-parte motions for interventions of different but similarly situated
corporations, and approved an injunction bond of P1M for all the petitioners. These orders were
immediately implemented despite the MRs filed by the OSG. The Republic filed administrative cases
against Caguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. This was acted upon by the OCA and subsequently by the CA, stating that Caguioa
gravely abused his discretion for ordering the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Case 2: (Almost similar circumstances, different people involved) Judge Caguioa issued a writ
of preliminary injunction and a TRO, to enjoin a person from acting as an officer in a Govt agency. The
agency filed administrative cases against Caguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Case 3: Caguioa ordered a Writ of Execution, after his order of dismissal of a case based on
prescription. Private Petitioner filed a case for Grave Misconduct against Caguioa. The CA saw this as
invalid, because the Writ should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision. The Order of dismissal
did not adjudicate any rights of the parties and resolved no other matter except the dismissal of the case.
The findings of the Investigative Justice of the CA:
Case 1: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law + conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Evidence on the Manifest Partiality was insufficient.
Case 2: Same as Case 1.
Case 3: Guilty of simple misconduct.
Penalty:1-year suspension + Stern Warning.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Caguioa is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Simple Misconduct.
HELD:
YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa Dismissed from service + forfeiture of retirement
benefits except leave credits.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Judge Caguioa issued the Writs of Preliminary Injunction that did not satisfy the legal
requisites for its issuance, and which was enforced outside of his territorial jurisdiction. In the former, the
applicants of the Writ showed no clear and unmistakable right that was material and substantial as would
warrant the issuance of such Writ, and the of its urgency and necessity. In short, he issued the Writs
without basis.
5 RA 9334
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
The requisites for the issuance of the Writ are basic and elementary, and should have been
known by Caguoia. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Where the law is basic, lack of
conversance with it, and for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, a judge should
be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Not Grave Misconduct
Even though Caguioa issued the Writs without basis, in this circumstance, it only amounts to
simple misconduct. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt, or
with evident bad faith. Such conduct was not evident in the case.
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA
FACTS:
Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case in favor of Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc.
An appeal was filed with Peralta, an RTC Judge.
March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of
execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the rentals due in accordance
with the decision of the MeTC.
March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta required appellants to file their comment.
August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003: DCCSI filed a motion to resolve.
However, despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent failed and refused to resolve the pending
motions. Complaint thus filed.
When asked by the OCA about the case, Peralta said that it "ha (d) been resolved by (his)
Court and the same (was) already for mailing" and attached a copy of his order dated May 5, 2004. In his
order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their memorandum and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of DCCSI. The OCA, in its report, found Peralta indeed failed to
resolve several motions for more than a year and showed indifference in his comment and recommended
that he be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties and fined in the amount of
P11, 000.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
HELD:
YES! FINED + Sternly Warned.
RATIO:
Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be
decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Peralta ignored this
mandate. Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve several motions the motion to dismiss appeal
and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to resolve, and didnt offer any reason or
justification on why it took him more than a year to resolve the motions. He thus violated the New Code
of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. A judges failure to resolve motions and incidents within the prescribed period
of three months as gross inefficiency for it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
BACULI V. BELEN
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FACTS:
Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a person-accused for frustrated
homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the notice of preliminary
investigation was duly served and received by such person. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi,
Belen directed the former why he should not be cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements
in his pleadings. No such reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt for making
scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in one of the latter's Motions, and
subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that such order be set aside, but was denied by Belen,
stating that such Decisions are final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen,
denying the claims against him, and added that Belen was induced by revenge because it was Baculi who
indicted him in a previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a 'power complex'.
ISSUE:
W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect contempt.
HELD:
YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and contumacious statements constitute direct
contempt because it is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge
as to interrupt the administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And even if
such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow the proper procedure under
the Rules of Court. This strengthens the OCA's findings that Belen is grossly ignorant of basic procedure.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural rules must
be at the palm of his hands. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court,
not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, and failure to follow basic legal commands
embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused,
and surely not a judge like Belen.
MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law,
dereliction of duty and violation of judicial conduct stemming from an action for ejectment.
In the ejectment proceeding, Judge Nacional issued a pre-trial order dated Sep. 3, 2004
requiring the parties to file their respective position papers on Sep. 30, 2004 (w/c the parties complied
with). Nacional subsequently issued an order dated Dec. 28, 2004 requiring parties to submit their
respective memoranda in the form of a court decision which the parties complied with. The case was
eventually decided by Nacional on Feb. 14, 2005.
Complaint alleges that the issuance of the Dec. 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on
memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and that Nacional violated the Rules when he
decided the case only on Feb. 14, 2005 (136 days from the date required by law).
Judge Nacional admits that he exceeded the maximum period allowed under the Revised Rules
and offered the following excuses: (1) quality of decision had priority over compliance w/ reglementary
pd; (2) heavy caseload; and (3) documents were voluminous.
Issue:
W/N Nacional violated basic procedure and code of judicial conduct?
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
Held:
Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, P20K for violation of
Canons 3 & 6 (Code of Judicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of CPR
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling unlawful
detainer and forcible entry cases. The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry
cases is made more imperative by express provisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 days
after receipt of the affidavits and position period, or expiration of the period for the filing the same
ROC/Rules of Summary Procedure). Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The justifications
advanced by Nacional cannot be accepted because doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural
rules & diminish respect for the law. The judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a case, he should
formally request the SC for an extension of the deadline.
Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. Lack of malice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional because the rules violated were basic
procedural law. All he had to do was apply them, but he chose not to. It is settled that one who accepts the
position of judge owes the public and the court the ability o be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain the professional competence at all times. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office. (Note: length of service does not mitigate administrative penalty)
CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendant Virginia Guzman, in Civil Case Roberto
Borromeo v. Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition pending with Judge Mechanvezs sala.
During the Dec. 14, 2005 hearing of said partition case, the motion to segregate the inheritance
shares of one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due to be taken up. During the hearing, the
defendants agreed to a partition subject to plaintiffs withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filed
before the SC to clear one of the areas (subject to partition) of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not
withdraw the MR before the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. Judge Menchavez blurted out never
mind mediation, walay hinundan na.
When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, Atty. Caneda remarked it was
being delayed because no proper summons had been served on the defendants who were residing outside
the country. Menchavez reacted angrily and banged his gavel & shouted I said no publication period.
Afterwards, Menchavez slammed the table with his hand and went inside his chambers. Afterwards, Judge
Menchavez came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he angrily shouted at Atty.
Caneda Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!
Atty. Caneda filed a complaint against Judge Menchavez alleging that the Judges act of
challenging him inside the courtroom in the presence of many people was improper
Issue:
W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable
Held:
Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a member of the
bench by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the hearing.
In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to hear and
consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a situation where two equals, such
as the opposing counsels, argue against each other. Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed
counsel to respond to his ruling instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. Atty.
Caneda also erred when he continued to argue despite Judge Menchavezs ruling. However, Menchavez
should have directed the complainant to wind up his arguments under pain of direct contempt if he
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Justice Hofilena
persisted in his arguments. Direct contempt is not enforced by the judges act of bringing out of his
weapon and asking counsel the direct question what do you want? This confrontational manner has no
place in our present justice system. There are agents of the law, officers of the court & the police who can
be called upon to implement contempt orders & restore order as needed.
Judge Menchavezs overreacting by bringing out a gun for everyone present in the court to see,
even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in court, is inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of
physical aggression by a party before the court. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires a
magistrate to maintain order and decorum in the court, the Code itself sets its limits (as provided for by
Sec. 6 of Canon 6) wherein the judge himself must observe decorum by acting with dignity and courtesy
to all those present in the courtroom. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient, and courteous
both in conduct and in language.
SUAREZ V. DILAG
Facts:
Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and corruption against Judge Dilag and
Court Stenographer Pascua and (b) grave misconduct and ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag
allegedly for collecting P30K from litigants in consideration of favorable judgments in cases for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting
decisions rendered by Judge Dilar (Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were all
previously dismissed but subsequently reopened the case and granted the petition).
After referral to an investigation officer, the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag liable for (1) gross
misconduct for singing conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of the law and procedure in handling
Moreno and Perez cases; and (3) gross negligence and inefficiency for failing to administer supervision
over his staff when a fake registry return receipt was effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment
were effected in Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was found guilty of graft and corruption.
Issue:
W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable?
Held:
Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding
accrued leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and maintain public
confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of developments in law and
jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg. taking
cognizance of a second petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when
Dilag had already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties, issues, and causes
of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good
faith, no administrative sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures
evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, Dilag failed to follow
basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law and procedure (During questioning, Dilag said that re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or
without prejudice. Also, he deiced a case even before the submission of the City Prosecutor relative to the
investigation to determine collusion between the parties as required under Sec. 9 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to warrant a finding of gross
ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. The
acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for ever
erroneous order or decision he renders would be intolerable. In the case at bar, there was no allegation
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
whatsoever that Dilag was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued the premature law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen,
warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the Court holds him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be
the rules on the conduct of prelim investigations. Judges should be conversant with basic legal norms and proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be
precepts as well as with the statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in the the embodiment of professional competence.

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