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Case Digests in Civil Procedure

A Compilation

This is a compilation of digests of cases in Civil Procedure based on the

Civil Procedure Course Outline AY 2009 - 2010 made by the Legal
Resource Center
 JURISDICTION corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.

THIRD DIVISION While petitioner's counterclaims were filed on December 1, 1998, the second
[G.R. No. 153886. January 14, 2004.] challenged order of the trial court denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of
the denial of its motion to dismiss was issued on October 9, 2000 at which time P.D.
MEL V. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. LOPEZ, INC., respondent. 902-A had been amended by R.A. 8799 (approved on July 19, 2000) which mandated
the transfer of jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies, subject of the
Facts: counterclaims, to RTCs.

Lopez filed a collection suit against Velarde, while the latter filed a counterclaim, But even if the subject matter of the counterclaims is now cognizable by RTCs, the
claiming that as the General Manager of Sky Vision (a subsidiary company of the filing thereof against respondent is improper, it not being the real party-in-interest, for
respondent), he was entitled to retirement benefits, unpaid salaries and incentives, it is petitioner's employer Sky Vision, respondent's subsidiary. It cannot be gainsaid
shares and similar benefits after he was supposedly coerced into retirement. Lopez that a subsidiary has an independent and separate juridical personality, distinct from
filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. He asserts that the counterclaims, that of its parent company, hence, any claim or suit against the latter does not bind
being money claims arising from a labor relationship, falls within the exclusive the former and vice versa.
competence of the NLRC. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleges that due to the
tortuous manner that he was coerced into retirement, it is the RTC and not the NLRC
which has jurisdiction over his counterclaims.
SECOND DIVISION
Issue: [G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004.]
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the counterclaims.
Facts:
Ruling:
Adriana Chua filed an annulment case against his husband Jose Lam on the ground of
In determining which has jurisdiction over a case, the averments of the
psychological incapacity. However, Chua later on asked for the reopening of the case,
complaint/counterclaim, taken as a whole, are considered. XXX At the heart of
and was allowed to present new evidence of Lams previous marriages with other
petitioner's counterclaim is his alleged forced retirement which is also the basis of his
women. During the proceeding, she verbally asked for support of their son from Lam.
claim for, among other things, unpaid salaries, unpaid incentives, reasonable return on
The Trial judge asked for the prayer to be handwritten on the pleadings of Chua,
the stock ownership plan, and other benefits from a subsidiary company of the
without any formal amendment being made thereon. The case was decided in favor of
respondent.
Chua and the prayer for support was likewise granted. Lam now questions the
propriety of the grant of support arguing that there was already a provision for support
Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A (as amended by R.A. 8799, the Securities Regulation Code)
of the child as embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana
applies to a corporate officer's dismissal. For a corporate officer's dismissal is always a
agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.
corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy and that its nature is not altered
by the reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action.
Issue:
With regard to petitioner's claim for unpaid salaries, unpaid share in net income,
Whether or not the Trial Court has acted with jurisdiction on the granting of support.
reasonable return on the stock ownership plan and other benefits for services
rendered to Sky Vision, jurisdiction thereon pertains to the Securities Exchange
Ruling:
Commission even if the complaint by a corporate officer includes money claims since
such claims are actually part of the prerequisite of his position and, therefore,
There is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him
interlinked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration
and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated
involving a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer of the
February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of
corporation is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of
gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The
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provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in
the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the
Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for
support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and
the capabilities of the parents to give support.
residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias,
Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued
summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. The sheriff served the
summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on the petitioner's son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.

However, it is serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on issue not
presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment
of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore,
indispensible so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage
of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should
have been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the Trial Court rendered
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon
Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived Lam of due
process.
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. The trial court, upon motion,
declared the petitioner in default and declared their marriage void ab initio. Almost
four years after, the petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the Order, alleging
that the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for
lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by
the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004.]
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition against the respondent for the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support
and support pendente lite. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72
CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. A
Compromise Agreement was entered into where certain properties including the resort
Munting Paraiso were adjudicated to Marietta and her children.
Respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the respondent knew
that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
3|CASES DIGESTS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ruling:
Jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform
him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He
is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even
if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000.]
MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner, vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT,
respondents.
Facts:
AQ - LRC
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Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, contested Pepito Magalits,
deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit, application for fishpond Registration
claiming that for 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the five-hectare area
included in Magalit's application. It was found that Macahilig was merely a laborer of
Magalit. Hence, the same was denied by the BFAR Director and the Office of the
President upon appeal. For failure to vacate the premises upon Order, Magalit
instituted a case in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Aklan implemented the Writ issued on October 30, 1985.
The heirs of Magalit filed on August 6, 1990, a "Motion for Correction of the
Implementation of the Decision of the Court of Appeals..." In that Motion, they prayed
that the trial court properly implement said IAC Decision by ordering Spouses
Macahilig to turn over to her the possession of the Lot. Dr. Magalit contended that the
Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because the spouses had refused to give up the
fishpond in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Magalit and the same was
sustained by the CA upon appeal by Macahilig.
Macahilig now questions the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the execution of the
decision rendered by the IAC. Macahilig contends that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the res.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the lot in question.
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the lot in question.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. The trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the
Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents' predecessors in interest.
Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized
potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which
it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to
Dr. Magalit.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004.]
ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA, petitioners, vs.
FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her co-respondents), and
her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and
ELOISA, all surnamed DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents were the registered owners of a parcel of land. By virtue of an SPA,
Fidela mortgaged the land to Mariano Rivera. They executed Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage and a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell). Although Fidela intended to sign only
the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature
on a Deed of Absolute Sale that was made by Marianos lawyer. From then, the Riveras
represented themselves to be the new owner of the land and negotiated with the
lands tenant Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latter's tenurial right. When Nieto
refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras
offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in exchange for the surrender. Respondents filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be
rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with damages. They
also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
cancellation of the new TCTs, and the reconveyance to them of the entire property.
The RTC decided in favor of the respondents, which when appealed was upheld by the
CA with modifications.
Petitioners now question the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Petitioners contend that
jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid was only
P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was worth
P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid
filing fees amounting to P12,183.70. Petitioners also contend that the trial court does
not have jurisdiction over the case because it involves an agricultural tenant. They
insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038, it is the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.

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Issue: [G.R. No. 149554. July 1, 2003.]

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged
deficiency in the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an
agricultural tenant is involved in the case.
Ruling:
Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction was validly
acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the
payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient
considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or
his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment.
The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not
automatically lost.
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was
incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petitioners
belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition,
attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Clerk of
Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on
the instant case.
Further, the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights
and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, the
cause of action in this case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable
parties, for rescission of the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the
TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary
party, stemming from whatever rights he may have acquired by virtue of the
agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding TCT issued. Hence, it
is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over the case.
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES TEOFREDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of deed of sale and
partition, alleging that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a portion of
his 150-square meter parcel of land in Talisay, Cebu for a consideration of P15,000.00,
but despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them. Respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss, insisting that the action is one for annulment of title, and
since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Petitioners opposed the motion to
dismiss, alleging that the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
therefore is cognizable by the RTC. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Petitioners
maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment
of deed of sale and partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and
since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P 15,000.00, it
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and is thus cognizable
by the RTC.
Ruling:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of

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money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).XXX
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to
secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from
respondents. Petitioners' cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-
square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared
owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00,
which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of
sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No.
99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot
may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed
to petitioners.
Petitioners' argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. As
stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the
caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed
for. Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to
real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154184. July 8, 2003.]
TEODORA A. CAPACETE and RODOLFO CAPACETE, petitioners, vs. VENANCIA
BARORO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT CABUYAO, LAGUNA * and PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF LAGUNA stationed at BIAN, LAGUNA, respondents.
Facts:
This case arose from an unlawful detainer case filed by respondent Venancia Baroro
and her husband against petitioners contending that the latter took possession of the
disputed property by mere tolerance from them. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled
in favor of respondent and her husband. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint
against respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for accion reivindicatoria,
annulment of decision and quieting of title which was decided by the trial court in favor
of respondent. Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was
granted by the RTC. Consequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition to annul the judgment on the ground that it was rendered with extrinsic or
collateral fraud. However, the CA dismissed the petition, and denied the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal where petitioners contend that the writ
of execution should be deemed void as the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue it. They
argue that the power of the court is limited to either upholding or setting aside the
validity of the decision of the MTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution.
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention that the writ of execution issued by the RTC is void for lack of
jurisdiction does not hold water. We do not agree that the RTC is circumscribed solely
to either upholding or setting aside the validity of the decision of the MTC and that it is
the latter court which has the authority to direct their ejectment. The complaint filed
by the petitioners was not only for annulment of the MTC decision; it was also for
accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title. This is unmistakable from the allegations
made therein. The RTC was consequently not restricted to determining the validity of
the MTC decision. It may, as it correctly did, decide on the issue of who, between
petitioners and respondent Baroro, owns the disputed land as ownership is the crux of
the matter in an accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title.
Perforce, the RTC has the power to direct the ejectment of the petitioners and order
them to vacate the disputed land. Accion reivindicatoria is a remedy seeking the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as
well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession. As the RTC found that respondent Baroro owns the
disputed land, it can also adjudicate its possession in her favor. The writ, therefore,
was issued well within its authority.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155713 May 5, 2006]
MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent.
Facts:

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[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332. February 16, 2004.]

Lumbuan leased to respondent a lot for a period of 3 years with monthly rentals and a
stipulation that it will be exclusively used for the respondents food business. However,
respondent later on used it as his residence without the petitioners consent. He also
failed to pay the increase in rentals. Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to
pay and vacate the premises. Petitioner referred the matter to the Brgy. Chairmans
office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Brgy. Chairman then issued a
Certificate to File Action. Petitioner filed against respondent an action for Unlawful
Detainer. The MeTC decided in favor of petitioner but the same was set aside by the
RTC which directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or the Punong Brgy.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of RTC and ordered the dismissal of the ejectment
case for being prematurely filed. According to the appellate court, when the
mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level has not been complied
with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the case to the court of
origin.
RODRIGO Q. TUGOT, complainant, vs. Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES,
respondent.
Facts:
Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in an ejectment case which was dismissed by the
respondent judge. It was found that the respondent judge conducted the preliminary
conference more than two years after the filing of the last answer which, according to
Section 8 of Rule 70, shall be held "[n]ot later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed."
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be held administratively liable.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the
alleged failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation
proceedings in the barangay level.
Ruling:
In this case, the Lupon/ Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the
Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While
admittedly no Pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the
office of the Brgy. Chairman for possible settlement. Although no Pangkat was formed,
there was substantial compliance with law. Under Sec. 412 (a) of RA 7160
(Katarungang Pambarangay), the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. This
is true notwithstanding the mandate of Sec. 410 (b) of the same law that the Brgy.
Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Sec. 410 (b)
should be read together with Sec. 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Brgy. Chairman or Punong
Brgy. is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the LGC.
Ruling:
Respondent judge failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an
ejectment case. It must be noted that unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are
covered by summary procedure because they involve the disturbance of the social
order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure should be carefully avoided. It must be emphasized that the
adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary
to enforce the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It
was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases." Any member of the judiciary who causes the delay sought to
be prevented by the Rule 15 is sanctionable.
The present respondent has failed to abide by the provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. He has thereby undermined the wisdom behind it and diminished respect
for the rule of law. He thus becomes administratively liable under Rule 140 Section 9,
which sanctions violations of Supreme Court Rules.

FIRST DIVISION THIRD DIVISION

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[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184. March 2, 2000.]
AMPARO S. FARRALES and ATTY. RAUL S. SISON, complainants, vs. JUDGE
RUBY B. CAMARISTA, respondent.
Facts:
Complainants filed an Ejectment/ Unlawful Detainer Case which was raffled to the
court presided over by the respondent judge. In the first case, therein defendant, on
June 22, 1994, filed her responsive pleading. On January 25, 1995, respondent, motu
proprio issued an order referring the case for conciliation to the barangay chairman.
After a year, the case remained uncalendared for hearing. On February 2, 1996, the
plaintiff (complainant herein) filed a motion to set aside the order of January 25, 1995,
and to set the case for preliminary conference, which was denied by respondent.
Subsequently, the parties submitted themselves to conciliation but no settlement was
reached. There being no clarificatory hearing set, the case was deemed submitted for
decision as of October, 1996. On February 27, 1997, plaintiff filed a motion for early
decision. However, despite repeated follow-ups, the case remained undecided. When
still no decision was rendered, complainant Sison (plaintiff's counsel) wrote respondent
on July 18, 1997 requesting that a decision be rendered in the case. Still, the case
remained unresolved.
Herein complainants contend that the delay in the disposition of the abovestated cases
was a result of respondent's lack of basic knowledge of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure and/or her ignorance of the law. They likewise question
respondent's act of referring the case to the barangay level for conciliation when the
parties actually reside in barangays of different cities/municipalities.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the part
of the respondent judge.
Ruling:
The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the period
within which judgment should be rendered. Section 10 thereof provides:
SECTION 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,
8|CASES DIGESTS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
the court shall render judgment. However, should the court find it necessary to clarify
certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence
on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment.
Section 8 thereof, which provides the contents of the record of the preliminary
conference, includes a statement as to
c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions
made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further
proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from issuance of the order;
It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgment in cases falling under
summary procedure is thirty days. This is in keeping with the spirit of the rule which
aims to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases falling
thereunder. The jurisprudential direction consistently taken by the Court adheres to
the rule that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency.
CIVIL ACTIONS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005.]
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, and NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Corporation obtained loans from respondent Neal B. Christian, as evidenced
by three promissory notes. While the payment of the principal loans was not yet due
and demandable, Christian filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against
the Corporation. Two of the promissory notes matured during the pendency of the
case. The corporation contends that the action should have been dismissed by the trial
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court and the CA because there was no cause of action at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case cure a
complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed.
Ruling:
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential element
are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means or by whatever law it
arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not violate
such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief [i]t thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has
not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading
alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such
an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The
underlying reason for this is that a person should not be summoned before the public
tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the CA decision affirming the RTC Order which
dismissed their complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of the Original Certificate of
Title and other titles in the name of respondent Santiago over parcels of land which
petitioners allege to have been occupied and possessed by them by virtue of a Deed of
Assignment executed by a certain Ismael Favila who claimed to be one of the heirs of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. According to the Deed, the Subject Property was part of a
vast land that was awarded by the Queen of Spain to Don Rodriguez. Respondent
claims, on the other hand, that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the
complaint and thus, the complaint stated no cause of action.
Issue:
[1] Whether or not the petitioners had no legal capacity to sue.
[2] Whether or not the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest.
Ruling:
[1] The petitioners had the legal capacity to sue. Lack of legal capacity to sue means
that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualifications to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims The term lack of capacity to sue should not be confused
with the term lack of personality to sue. While the former refers to the plaintiffs
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack
of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers
to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first
can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity
to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on
the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

[2] The petitioners are not the real parties in interest. Petitioners failed to allege any
SECOND DIVISION other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject
[G.R. NO. 157447. April 29, 2005.] Property from time immemorial, which the Court was able to controvert; and the
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, et. al, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, Spanish title which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property
respondent. by virtue of the applicable provisions of P.D No. 892. Therefore, without legal or
equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an
Facts:

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action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their complaint was properly corporation, which is a juridical person with a personality separate and distinct from its
dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. individual stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs,
that is the real party in interest.

THIRD DIVISION EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 127210. August 7, 2003.] [G.R. NO. 160261. NOVEMBER 10, 2003.]
ALVIN TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR DY GUANI, ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., vs. NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL
respondents. NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC. [CONSOLIDATED CASES]

Facts: Facts:

Private respondent Guani, as agent of Guani Marketing Inc., bought a Mercedez Benz
from petitioner Tan through a lease-financing agreement with CIFC, of which Tan was
Assistant Manager. Less than two years after, the Bureau of Customs seized the vehicle
forhaving been imported without payment of dues and taxes. The BOC filed a case
against Guani as possessor of the vehicle. Private respondent thus filed a complaint for
damages and attorneys fees against petitioner which was granted by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA. Tan now questions the aptness of the decision, contending
that private respondent did not have the legal personality to file the complaint, he
being merely the agent of Guani Marketing which was the lessee of the vehicle.
Former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide and seven Associate Justices. The House Committee on Justice ruled
that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the
same for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks after the filing
of the first impeachment complaint, the second impeachment complaint was filed by
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Thus
arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: Intervenor Atty. Jaime Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners have no standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
Whether or not private respondent Guani is the real party-in-interest. sustain direct personal injury. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that
petitioners do have standing as taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in
Ruling: cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the Rule
means material interest, an interest in issue ad to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Private respondent merely acted as agent of Guani Marketing, lessee of the vehicle. He
is thus not the real party in interest- plaintiff to prosecute the case. It is the
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a standing to file the instant petitions.
Ruling:
There is a difference between the rule on real party in interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has
Constitutional underpinnings. Xxx the question on standing is whether such parties
have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court

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so largely depends for illumination of difficult Constitutional questions. Xxx on the
other hand, the question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who
would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably
invoke the vindication of their own rights which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150159. July 25, 2003.]
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, LAILANIE VILLAREAL MACANDOG, RODELO
VILLAREAL, ELY VILLAREAL, NOELITO VILLAREAL and LUISITO VILLAREAL,
as represented by his attorney-in-fact, TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIA RICAFORT, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent spouses instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 199241 in the name of spouses
Renato and Teresita Villareal covering a parcel of land located in Makati City. In the
course of the proceedings, both parties entered into a compromise settlement. The
trial court approved the parties' compromise agreement in a judgment promulgated on
July 30, 1999. As siblings of Renato and co-heirs to the disputed lot, petitioners
sought the annulment of the compromise judgment. According to petitioners, the
compromise judgment was null and void because they were not impleaded as parties-
defendants despite the fact that they were co-heirs of Renato and indispensable
parties therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are indispensible parties to the civil case.
Ruling:
In the instant case, the Court held that, for purposes of action for annulment of TCT
No. 199241, the only indispensable party-defendant was Renato and his wife. He was
the registered owner of the lot and was conclusively presumed, for all intents and
purposes, to be its owner in fee simple. A certificate of registration accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner, which, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title showing exactly the
owner's real interest over the property covered thereby. Renato thus had the authority
to bind the lot to the exclusion of all others and his participation, as party-defendant in
the civil case, was sufficient for the trial court to validly exercise its jurisdiction. Hence,
the non-inclusion of petitioners as parties-defendants will not affect the final
determination of the said civil case, because they were not the registered owners of
the subject lot. Moreover, petitioners have admitted that they donated and caused
registration of the subject lot to Renato and thus, would have no more rightful
interest, inchoate or otherwise, that would be affected by the assailed compromise
judgment. Petition denied.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141970. September 10, 2001.]
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. FLORO T.
ALEJO, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela; and SY TAN SE, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
SIAN SUAT NGO, respondents.
Facts:
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from petitioner, as security for
which they mortgaged their land covered by TCT No. V-41319. Petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage when the spouses Acampado defaulted in the
payment of their loans and, at the foreclosure sale, the mortgaged property was sold
to petitioner as the highest bidder. When the spouses failed to redeem the property
within the reglementary period, title to the property was consolidated to the petitioner.
When petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership before the
Register of Deeds, it was informed of the existence of an RTC decision in Civil Case No.
4930-V-96, which annulled TCT No. 41319. Said case, a complaint for declaration of
nullity of TCT No. V-41319, was filed by private respondent Sy Tan Se against the
spouses Acampado. Petitioner was not, however, made a party to the said case nor
was it notified of its existence despite being the registered mortgagee of the real

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property covered by the title sought to be annulled. Petitioners petition for annulment
of the RTC decision was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to ask for the annulment of the RTC Decision,
petitioner not having been impleaded as an indispensible party to the case.
Ruling:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160053. August 28, 2006.]
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, petitioners, vs. HON. JANE AURORA C.
LANTION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 13, PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, ELIZABETH C.
UMALI, ALICE PERCE, JELEN MOSCA, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LIPA CITY,
BATANGAS, THE CLERK OF COURT and EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BATANGAS, respondents.

In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. Evidently, petitioner
is encompassed within the definition of an indispensable party; thus, it should have
been impleaded as a defendant.
"An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest[;] a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is
one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward. A person is
not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter
is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between
them."
The joinder of indispensable parties to an action is mandated by Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present." "The evident aim and intent of
the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also
as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment
cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties."
Facts:
Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin obtained loans from respondent Planters
Development Bank and executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes
to cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so respondent bank foreclosed the
mortgaged lots and were later on sold at a public auction where the respondent bank
was the winning bidder. On November 8, 2003, petitioners filed against Planters
Development Bank and its officers Elizabeth Umali, Alice Perce and Jelen Mosca
(private respondents), a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale
and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent
Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that
only their peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had already been
fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged. They challenged the
validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-payment of their dollar loans as the
mortgages did not cover those loans.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila. The
respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue. Petitioners sought
reconsideration. They argued that the trial court in effect prejudged the validity of the
loan documents because the trial court based its dismissal on a venue stipulation
provided in the agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
dismissed the case for improper venue.
Ruling:

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At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where
the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Clearly, the words
"exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" used in the mortgages
and promissory notes executed by the parties are restrictive and used advisedly to
meet the requirements.
ground that it was bigamous. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that
the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the
action. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case was
properly cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD
No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied; hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. The case was,
however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, likewise, denied the
motion to dismiss. The petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court reiterating her
earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.

Petitioners claim that effecting the exclusive venue stipulation would be tantamount to
a prejudgment on the validity of the loan documents. We note however that in their
complaint, petitioners never assailed the validity of the mortgage contracts securing
their peso loans. They only assailed the terms and coverage of the mortgage
contracts. What petitioners claimed is that their peso loans had already been paid thus
the mortgages should be discharged, and that the mortgage contracts did not include
their dollar loans. In our view, since the issues of whether the mortgages should be
properly discharged and whether these also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the
said loan documents, the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto. Considering
all the circumstances in this controversy, we find that the respondent judge did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, as the questioned orders were evidently in accord
with law and jurisprudence.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.]
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A.
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married private respondent Zorayda in civil rites. Their
marriage supposedly remained subsisting until his death. Prior to his death, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita in civil rites. After the death of the Senator, Zorayda
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the
Issue:
Whether or not the sharia court is the proper venue for the case and not the RTC.
Ruling:
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal
actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
made by the plaintiff in this case. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned
that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083.
Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano
were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under
Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion
to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the

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complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
[G.R. No. L 18726. August 31, 1966.]
THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. DEMETRIO B.
ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendant and appellees.
Facts:
Gonzales filed with the CIF of Cagayan a complaint for damages against Encarnacion,
a resident of Cavite, who allegedly caused the filing of a pleading against him in Civil
case N- 151, containing words and expressions which are highly libelous, derogatory
and scurrilous to his worth, integrity and honor. Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint, alleging that it states no cause of action and that the venue is
improperly laid and/or the court has no jurisdiction. The CIF dismissed the complaint
for improper venue.
may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated, displayed,
or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended party
resides, in which case the civil or criminal actions may be brought in the court of First
Instance thereof. The verb may is permissive. Hence, it does not necessarily imply a
complete abrogation of the general rule laid down in the preceding sentence except
insofar as it broadens the [2] alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a
third choice of venue [i]ndeed, when the libelous imputations has not been published
or circulated in the locality wherein either of the parties resides, the offended party
may not wish to initiate the action therein, for the same would have the effect of
giving additional publicity to the derogatory statements and increasing harm to
complainant.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002.]
REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN, petitioner, vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

Gonzales takes the position that his venue is not improperly laid because under Art.
360 of the RPC, as amended by RA 1289, a civil action for damages in cases of written
defamation may be filed in the court of first instance of the province where the
offended party resides. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the complaint
should have been filed in Civil case N-151 of the CIF of Cavite because under the
aforesaid provision, the court where the criminal or civil action is first filed acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the CIF of Cagayan erred in dismissing the complaint for improper
venue.
Ruling:
Civil actions for damages in cases of written defamation shall be filed with the Court
of First Instance of the province or city in which any of the accused or any of the
offended parties resides. In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of venue
to the Court of First Instance of his residence or to that of any of the accused. Plaintiff
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action for specific performance with damages against the
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the
respondent be ordered to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a
portion of a property situated in Kay-biga, Paraaque, Metro Manila covered under TCT
No. S-30409, corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area, as compensation for the
undertakings she and her companions had performed and accomplished in favor of the
respondent. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint on grounds of improper
venue, non-joinder of necessary parties, and nonpayment of the proper docket fees.
Maintaining that the action is in personam, not in rem, petitioner alleges that the
venue was properly laid. The fact that "she ultimately sought the conveyance of real
property" not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is, she claims, an
anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action was instituted. On
the other hand, the RTC ruled that since the primary objective of petitioner was to
recover real property even though her Complaint was for specific performance and
damages her action should have been instituted in the trial court where the
property was situated. Hence this petition.
Issue:

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Whether or not the RTC of Pasig City is the proper venue for the case.
Issue:

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an
answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or
an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On
the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in
the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case,
petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the
parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific
performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the
conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
Whether or not the action filed by petitioner spouses is one in rem or one in
personam.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners' belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or
rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
possession of the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, it does
not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property,
or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127692. March 10, 2004.]
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.
Facts:
Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988,
and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property
to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr.
Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties
to petitioners, hence, the complaint. The RTC decided the case in favor of petitioners,
however the CA annuled the decision upon appeal for failure of the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant as they were not validly served with
summons. Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in its decision because the action
they filed was one in rem where jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant is not
necessary.
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liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against
the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and
not necessarily an action in rem. The objective sought in petitioners' complaint was to
establish a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the
title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who
was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No.
CEB-11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely,
herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of
summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of
jurisdiction over their persons.
PLEADINGS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136100. July 24, 2000.]
FELIPE G. UY, petitioner, vs. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Facts:
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The Land Bank of the Philippines filed before the Metropolitan Trial Circuit Court
(MTCC) of Iloilo City a complaint for unlawful detainer against Felipe Uy. The bank
claimed ownership of two parcels of land and the two-storey house built thereon, and
sought the ejectment of the petitioner, the occupant of the premises. The original
owner of the properties was Tia Yu. Yu authorized Gold Motor Parts Corporation to
mortgage the same as security for a loan from Land Bank. Unfortunately, Gold Motors
defaulted, hence, Land Bank foreclosed the properties. Before the foreclosure took
effect, Felipe Uy already occupied the house built on the lands. For Yu's failure to pay
the materials used in the construction of the house, Uy was allowed to occupy the
house and apply the rental thereon to the balance of Tia Yu's debt on the materials.
The terms of their agreement were later put into writing in a lease contract. The MTCC
rendered its judgment in favor of Uy. Land Bank appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), which affirmed the decision of the MTCC in toto. Land Bank filed in the Court of
Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. The CA
allowed only a 15-day extension, but Land Bank failed to file its petition within the
extension granted. Instead, Land Bank filed its petition beyond the extended period
with an accompanying manifestation. The CA granted the manifestation and motion,
and admitted the petition. Thereafter, the CA rendered a decision reversing the lower
court's decision. Felipe Uy filed a petition for review of the CA decision with the
Supreme Court. The Court first denied the petition due to lack of certification against
forum shopping and lack of verification. After thorough explanation, the Court granted
the second motion for reconsideration of petitioner and required respondent to
comment thereon. In its Comment, respondent submits that the Court should not have
reinstated the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should have been dismissed for lack of
certification against forum shopping and lack of verification.
Ruling:
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance
of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. The lack of certification against
forum shopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable by the submission thereof
after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that
the failure of petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. In some cases, though, this Court deemed the belated filing
of the certification as substantial compliance with the requirement. In the case at bar,
the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a
"special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition.
That counsel for petitioner filed the "verification/certification" before receipt for the
resolution initially denying the petition also mitigates the oversight. In any event, this
Court has the power to suspend its own rules when, as in this case, the ends of justice
would be served thereby.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128550. March 16, 2000.]
DIGITAL MICROWAVE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ASIAN HIGH TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner
Digital Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court
denied the motion, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then initiated a
special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals for alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Revised Circular No. 28-91, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The circular requires petitions filed before the Court of Appeals to
be accompanied by a sworn certification against forum shopping signed by the
petitioner himself. The petitioner's certification was signed by the counsel, thus the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the petitioner sought the reversal of the ruling by the Supreme Court. Petitioner
contends that in the case of a corporation as petitioner, the certification against forum
shopping may be signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with knowledge

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of the required facts. The authorized person may be anyone authorized by the
corporation, not necessarily an officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the
counsel of record has the authority to execute the certification on behalf of the
corporation
Issue:
Whether or not the counsel of petitioner corporation may validly sign the certification
against forum shopping in behalf of the latter.
Ruling:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint or the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period. Private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the
amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee and considering that the total amount sought to
be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed
and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.

If we follow petitioner's line of reasoning, then the requirement in Revised Circular No. Issue:
28-91 that petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping
would have been rendered useless. The reason the certification against forum Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the case.
shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar Ruling:
actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Even his counsel may be
unaware of such fact. The Court rules as follows:

We disagree with petitioner that a corporation cannot possibly hope to comply with the 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
requirement laid down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
and not a natural person. If this were so, then it would have been impossible for a over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
corporation to do anything at all. Needless to say, this is the reason why corporations pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
have directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions with others. The same is payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
true for the certification against forum shopping. It could easily have been made by a prescriptive or reglementary period.
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation. "Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction." 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
EN BANC reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
[G.R. NOS. 79937-38. FEBRUARY 13, 1989.] period.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
respondents. appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
Facts: been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall

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constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee
that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned
from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay
the deficiency, if any.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85909. February 9, 1993.]
TERESITA C. GERALES, CESAR DELA FUENTE, MARCELA GOLDING, MARIA
VERGARA and PERLITO TRIGERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ENRIQUE E. PIMENTEL, and LETICIA FIDELDIA, respondents.
Facts:
A car owned by Leticia Fideldia, then driven by Enrique E. Pimentel, hit a car, owned
by Teresita Gerales then driven by Cesar Dela Fuente; with Marcela Golding, Maria
Vergara and Perlito Trigero as passengers at San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga.
Private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga with the crime of Damage to Property with Multiple Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence. During the pendency of the criminal case,
petitioners filed a civil case for Damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against
Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia. This civil case is based on the same incident
for which private respondent, Enrique E. Pimentel was charged in the criminal case.
After filing of the civil case, but before service of summons to the private respondents,
the parties were able to settle amicably. They duly executed and signed a Release of
Claim. The Criminal Case was dismissed upon motion and presentation of the Affidavit
of Desistance. Respondent Enrique E. Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan informing the court of the settlement. After
receipt of respondent Pimentel's letter, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Balanga Bataan issued an order declaring the private respondents in default and
thereupon ordering them to pay damages to herein petitioners. The CA reversed the
RTC decision.
Whether or not the respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.
Ruling:
Under the factual setting of the case, the trial court ought to have considered the
letter of respondent Enrique E. Pimentel as a responsive pleading even if it lacks the
formalities required by law. Undoubtedly, the letter made mention of the fact that the
parties mutually settled the case, which allegation may be deemed as an averment of
an affirmative defense and if proven in a preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 16, would constitute a meritorious defense of private respondents which would
bar petitions from recovering damages from the former as the claim or demand set
forth in plaintiffs' (petitioners') pleading had been paid or extinguished. Pleadings as
well as remedial laws should be liberally construed in order that the litigant may have
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and possible denial of substantial
justice, due to technicalities, may be avoided.
Litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on
technicality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts, and because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a
liberal, not literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities
should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules, which is
the proper and just determination of a litigation. In the light of the foregoing, it is
evident that indeed the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
private respondents in default, and in denying their petition for relief from judgment.
Consequently, the validity of the order of default and all the proceedings that
transpired subsequent thereto cannot be sustained.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89114. December 2, 1991.]
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS,
AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Facts:

Issue:

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The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG and assisted by the OSG,
filed an action against Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Petitioner filed a motion for bill of
particulars which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that what petitioner
was asking were mere evidentiary facts. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion for a bill of particulars.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion for a bill of particulars. A complaint is
defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or
causes of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint
shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant
clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the
material facts on which the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the
theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of liability.
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate facts",
and the second, the "evidentiary facts." "The term 'ultimate facts' as used in Sec. 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement
of the cause of action insufficient. . . ." Ultimate facts are important and substantial
facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not
refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate,
constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests," while
the term "evidentiary fact" are those facts which are necessary for determination of
the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are
based.
The allegations in the complaint are deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions
of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the
particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the
end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 87434. August 5, 1992.]
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM
PLASTICS INC., petitioners, vs. SWEET LINES INC., DAVAO VETERANS
ARRASTRE AND PORT ERVICES INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
A maritime suit was commenced by petitioner against private respondents, seeking
recovery of the cost of the lost or damaged shipment plus damages allegedly due to
defendants negligence. Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into by the
parties, causing the dismissal by the trial court of the suit. The trail court thereafter
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the respondent court reversed
the decision of the trial court on the ground of prescription, based upon the bills of
lading covering their transaction. The petitioners thus question the propriety of such
reversal, contending that such bills of lading should not have been given weight since
it was not offered in evidence by the private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in reversing the trial courts decision.
Ruling:

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The respondent court committed no reversible error. As petitioners are suing upon
SLIs contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of
lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable document which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the
genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically
denied by the adverse party. The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to
both a cause of action or defense based on said documents.
Petitioners failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and
due execution, of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial
admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being
required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of
the adverse partys failure to make a specific denial thereof, the instrument need not
be formally presented in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
Even granting that petitioners averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the
procedural earmarks of what is in the law of pleadings called a negative pregnant, that
is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the
averment it is directed to. Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such
agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and
said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.
rendered a decision awarding said lots to Pastor. Hence, petitioner appealed the same
to the CA with the contention that the lower court erred in awarding said lots to Pastor
who herself adduced evidence that said lots were public land and were subject to a
previous cadastral proceeding. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the CIF, hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision rendered in the Cadastral proceedings constitutes res
judicata as to the nature of the lots in question, thus a bar to private respondents
application.
Ruling:
We find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear from
evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the CIF of Batangas, acting as
land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not
interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res judicata with respect to the lots
in question. Such failure on the part of the Director of Lands is a procedural infirmity
which cannot be cured on appeal. Sec. 2, Rule 9, Revised rules of Court of 1964
provides that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived Thus, the defense of res judicata when not set up
either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded
for the first time at the trial or on appeal.

FIRST DIVISION THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. L 47847. JULY 31, 1981.] [G.R. NO. 138822. JANUARY 23, 2001.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUELA EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION,
PASTOR, respondents. respondent.

Facts: Facts:

Private respondent Pastor filed with the CIF of Batangas an application for confirmation
of imperfect title over 13 lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. The
Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application. Pastor presented, together with
other evidences, a certification that said lots were declared public land in a cadastral
case and the other lots were subject of a decision in a cadastral proceeding. The CIF
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, alleging that the latter owed them a
sum of money incurred by the petitioner in the course of her work as insurance agent
of the respondent. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted
her right for the payment of a sum representing commissions and bonuses. Petiitoner
also prayed for the award of damages for the allegedly unfounded action by the

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respondents. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim,
contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of
petitioners non-payment of docket fees. Petitioner thus asked the respondent court to
declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is
compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer
such counterclaim. The trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, granted
respondents motion, finding that the counterclaim was merely permissive. Hence this
petition.
or dependent upon petitioners counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will
not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the
parties. However, petitioners claims for damages are compulsory.
There is no need for the petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.
On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her
permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed fees. The
compulsory counterclaim of petitioner is reinstated.

Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim of the petitioner is compulsory or permissive in
nature.
Ruling:
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals [263 SCRA 275, 1996], this Court capsulized the
criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely
the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as
well as defendants counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals [279
SCRA 397, 1997], is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical
relationship between the claim and the counterclaim, that is, where conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for
commissions, bonuses and premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence
required to prove petitioners claims differs from that needed to establish respondents
demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioners such as cash
advances and cost of premiums. The recovery of respondents claims is not contingent
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. L- 29673. NOVEMBER 12, 1987.]
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE REPARATIONS
COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
A "Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of Reparation Goods" was entered into
between petitioner and the private respondent REPACOM. Prior to the due date of the
first installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder thereof. Petitioners
response was to file two (2) special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging
ambiguity in the contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the agreement's
failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment
of the price would arise. On the other hand, when VISPAC subsequently failed, despite
several demands, to pay the first installment of the price on what REPACOM deemed
to be the due date, the latter instituted an ordinary civil action for collection thereof.
VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection suit on the ground of the pendency of the
declaratory relief actions, arguing that until and unless the latter were resolved, no
cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of REPACOM for collection of said
first installment. The motion to dismiss was denied. Here, petitioners contention is
that it was error on the Appellate Court's part to have affirmed the Trial Court's
decision for the collection of the first installment of the price due from it under its
contract with REPACOM, because that money claim should have been set up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since REPACOM had not
done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby become
barred.
Issue:

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violence to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for

Whether or not the claim of the private respondents have become barred for not being breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid
set up as a counterclaim. down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the achievement of
that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed
Ruling: for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

It is indeed the rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, that a
counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected
with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. In other words, a compulsory counterclaim
cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same
suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. The omission is not
however irremediable or irreversibly fatal. The Rules provide that when a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable negligence, or
when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-
claim by amendment before judgment.
Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated upon
a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia, and/or dismissed on the ground of
res adjudicata. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory
relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed
or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially
different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which
makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental
nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to
special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been
dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by
way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and
were decided on the merits. The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits
instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of
all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and
delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was
decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not
inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 105751. JUNE 30, 1993.]
B.A. FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, v. RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE
MERCANTILE INC., LUCITA VELOSO YAP, CLOVERLEAF SUPERMARKET, INC.,
SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action to recover a sum of money
arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted
to defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor
by his co-defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf
Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres Commercial. After defendants' Amended Answer to
Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial
Conference. For various reasons, however, the conference was repeatedly reset.
Petitioners counsel failed to attend the Pre-Trial Conference. Consequently, defendants
moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice. The motion was granted. The trial
court denied the motion of private respondents, prompting them to elevate the order
of denial to the Court of Appeals which reversed the questioned order and directed the
trial court to set the reception of their evidence on their counterclaim. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition. Petitioner
contends that the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that their compulsory
counterclaim should not have been included in the dismissal.
Issue:
Does the dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial,
upon motion of defendants, carry with it the dismissal of their compulsory
counterclaim?

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Ruling:
There is merit in the petition. The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely
permissive but compulsory in nature. Clearly, the same evidence needed to sustain the
counterclaim of private respondents would also refute the cause of action in
petitioner's complaint. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court." This is because a compulsory
counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no
longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, as when it
dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal
controversy, must likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the
grant of any relief under the counterclaim.
The Rules of Court provides a remedy to recover on defendant's counterclaim if
plaintiff moves to dismiss the case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise
objection to the dismissal of the complaint; in such case, the trial court may not
dismiss the main action.
However, we are not unaware of the seeming unfairness, if not harshness, of the
application of the Rule herein enunciated that dismissal of the complaint for failure
to prosecute automatically carries with it dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim
to a defendant who may be compelled to hire counsel to protect him in a frivolous
complaint. Equity and justice dictate that he be accorded adequate relief under the
circumstances.
Henceforth, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under
Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who
desires to pursue his compulsory counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move
for the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he should only move to have plaintiff
declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no longer present his
evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on the
compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his
counterclaim. This will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his
compulsory counterclaim, which is intertwined with the complaint, because the trial
court retains jurisdiction over the complaint and of the whole case. The non-dismissal
of the complaint, the non-suit notwithstanding, provides the basis for the compulsory
counterclaim to remain active and subsisting. But the procedure above stated,
unfortunately, was not adopted by private respondents herein in the court below,
hence, we reverse the Court of Appeals and sustain the trial court. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 104609. JUNE 30, 1993.]
PHILIP LEE GO AND SPECIFIQUE GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CLOVER MANUFACTURING CORP.,
respondents.
Facts:
Denim materials deliveries were made by Clover Manufacturing Corporation to Philip
Go. The delivery receipts and packing lists, indicated Go as the "customer" and were
duly acknowledged by his employees. Of the total purchase of P949,783.22, only the
price for the first delivery in the amount of P146,109.50 was paid to Clover. Demand
for the balance was made on Go but to no avail. Clover filed a complaint against the
petitioners for the said balance. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued but was
later on lifted after the filing by the defendants of a counterbond.
In their answer to the complaint, Go alleged that he had bought the denim materials
from William Lim, to whom he had made full payment, in cash for the first delivery and
by check subsequently encashed for the next four deliveries. Lim was no impleaded by
Go in a third party complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the denim materials were bought by Go from Lim or from Clover.
Ruling:
The issue in this case is a factual one which this Court will not touch upon. However,
the Court is convinced that the trial and respondent courts did not err in holding that
the denim materials were purchased by Go directly from Clover and not from William
Lim. The first thought that occurs to the Court is why, if Go had really paid Lim the full
value of the five deliveries, the latter was not impleaded by the plaintiffs in a third-
party complaint under Rule 6, Section 12, of the Rules of Court. This rule states:

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Sec. 12. Third-party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a portions of the river, with the same causing the property of the third-party plaintiffs to
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the become shallower and narrower. Third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or third-party complaint, which was sustained by the lower court and the CA, upon
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. reconsideration. Hence this appeal.

The circumstance that Go and Lim might have been close friends (although this is not
established in the record) was no impediment to Go's filing the third-party complaint
for the protection of his interests.
The Court cannot overstress the fact that Go should have sued William Lim in a third-
party complaint instead of merely using him as a defense witness. Whatever their
relations might have been before, Go could not have failed to realize that he was being
made to pay the amount of more than three quarters of a million pesos which he says
he had already paid to William Lim. His forbearance against Lim is difficult to
understand. The only plausible explanation is that, as the private respondent claims,
Go had not paid the balance of the purchase price either to Clover or to William Lim.
We sustain the finding of the respondent court that the petitioners are liable for the
balance of the articles sold by Clover and not to William Lim as the petitioners
contend, but directly to the petitioners themselves. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
[G.R. NO. L-18911. APRIL 27, 1967.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. CLEOFE RAMOS, et. al.,
defendants. CLEOFE RAMOS, et.al., third-party plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FELIPE ASUNCION, et.al., third-party defendants- appellees.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the third-party complaint is proper.
Ruling:
The order dismissing the third-party complaint is proper.
A third-party defendant may not be impleaded if the effect would be to introduce a
new and separate controversy into the action. Matters which should be threshed out
separately, cannot be joined to the original action by means of a third-party complaint.
Plaintiffs causes of action against defendants are unrelated to those of the latter
against third-party defendants. It is not alleged how those circumstances stated in the
pleadings could affect plaintiffs cause of actions against defendants, or render third-
party defendants liable for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in
respect of plaintiffs claim. The allowance of a third-party complaint is predicated on
the need for expediency and the avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits. But it should not
be considered as an excuse for indiscriminately filing any claim which a defendant may
have against a third-party defendant although unrelated to the main action.
[SECOND DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 160242. May 17, 2005.]
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

Plaintiff Republic filed a complaint against defendants for the annulment of the
registration of a lot in the name of defendants, alleging that the same is part of the
public domain, and for an order prohibiting defendants from further excavating the
Wawang Dapdap River, as well as for recovery of damages occasioned by such illegal
excavations and appropriation of the public domain. Defendants filed their answer with
counterclaim, denying the alleged illegal excavations and constructions, but admitting
that they are the registered owners of the lot in question. With leave of court,
defendants filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendants, alleging that it
is the latter who have illegally appropriated through artificial and illegal means
Facts:
Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a complaint for a sum of money with
against the Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) alleging that
ACDC leased generator sets, mobile floodlighting systems and several other
equipments from MEC, the rentals of which ACDC failed to pay despite several
demands. ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third party complaint
against Becthel Overseas Corporation. In its answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness
to MEC but alleged that all the equipments they leased were used for Becthels

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projects and that ACDC remained unpaid by Becthel for their services, resulting in
their non-payment of the lease rentals to MEC.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC on the ground that the defendant already admitted
its principal obligation to MEC and that the transaction between ACDC and MEC, on
one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other hand, are independent
transactions. The RTC denied the motion of ACDC, sustained by the CA on appeal.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether a third party complaint is proper.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to
permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party which he
would otherwise assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. A
prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-
party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation,
contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third party defendant is
proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of
the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third party defendants
liability arises out of another transaction.
The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of
liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his
complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant
against the third-party defendant.
In a case, the Court made out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based; or whether the third-party
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiffs claim; (2) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the
plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original
25 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
defendant, although the third-party defendants liability arises out of another
transaction; and (3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim.
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show
possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the
allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined.
A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is
entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party
defendant.
In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the petitioner
as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such transactions
are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner as third-
party plaintiff for the construction of the latters projects, where the equipment leased
from the respondent was used by the petitioner. The controversy between the
respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and
Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from each other.
[G.R. NO. L- 24103. AUGUST 10, 1967.]
BEATRIZ G. VDA DE DIOS, plaintiff- appellee, vs. LEANDRO BALAGOT,
petitioner- appellant, vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. AND PEDRO DEUDOR,
oppositors-appellees.
Facts:
An action for recovery of possession of land was filed by De Dios against Balagot,
alleging that the latter failed and refused to vacate a lot which she bought from J.M.
Tuason & Co. Balagot filed an answer with a counterclaim, alleging that he had bought
the land from Pedro Deudor, the successor-in-interest of the original owner of the land,
and that pursuant to an agreement between J.M Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs,
his right over the land in question has preference over the sale in favor of the plaintiff.
After the case was scheduled for hearing, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a
third party complaint against J.M Tuason & Co., and Pedro Deudor, for payment of the
value of the lot and house he constructed thereon, in case of eviction. De Dios
opposed the motion, stating that a third party complaint, to enforce a warranty of
eviction, should have been filed before filing the answer. The motion was denied. On
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appeal to CA, the appeal was certified to the SC since the CA found the same to by the National Treasurer in behalf of the petitioner corporation. Consequently,
involve pure questions of law. petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied and the case
Issue: was dismissed. The same was denied on reconsideration.

Whether the order denying the admission of the third-party complaint can be appealed Issue:
from at this stage of the proceeding.
Whether the denial of the Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence is
Ruling: proper.

[The SC ruled that the third-party complaint against JM Tuason & Co was inadmissible
because there is no relationship of vendor-vendee between the latter and Balagot]
As to the admissibility of the order disallowing the third-party complaint against Pedro
Deudor, suffice it to reiterate that the same would finally dispose of defendants right
to enforce his warranty against eviction, since a separate action for the same, without
having thus summoned to suit the vendor, would not prosper (Article 1558, CC). After
said disallowance, nothing further was left to be done in the court a quo, as regards
defendants right to enforce against Deudor the warranty of eviction. Said denial was
therefore appealable.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 120384. JANUARY 13, 2004.]
PHILLIPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION,
petitioner-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC. et. al.,
respondent-appellees
Ruling:
The denial of the Motion is not proper. It should be stressed that the amendment was
sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, particularly the testimony of
its treasury department manager and the debit memo from PNB proving that
petitioner had paid PNB in the amount pursuant to its guarantees accorded to
respondent. Evidently, respondents failure to object to the evidence at the time it was
presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived defect the
complained had was cured by the introduction of petitioners evidence proving actual
loss sustained by petitioner due to its payment to PNB. Thus, the contention of
respondents that the amendment would introduce a subsequently acquired cause of
action as there was none at the time the original complaint was filed, is not tenable.
Verily, it was patently erroneous on the part of the trial court not to have allowed the
amendments as to make the complaint conform to petitioners evidence that was
presented without any objection from the respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner issued five separate Letters of Guarantee in favor of Philippine National Bank
as security for various credit accommodations extended by PNB to respondent. When
PNB called on the guarantees made by the petitioner, respondents refused to settle
their obligation thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaints states no cause of action since it does not allege any damages caused to
the petitioner. Such motion was dismissed and hearing on the merits ensued.
Petitioner presented a debit memo issued by the PNB, showing that the latter was paid
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 153777. APRIL 15, 2005.]
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. LZK HOLDINGS and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
LHDC entered into a loan agreement with PDB whereby the former was extended a
credit accommodation to finance the construction of its building. To secure the loan,
LHDC executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PDB. For failure to pay the loan, PDB
foreclosed the lot and the property was sold to it as the highest bidder. LHDC filed a

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complaint against PDB alleging that the mortgage and its foreclosure was void. PDB
filed its answer with counterclaim. LHDC filed a Motion for Leave to file a supplemental
complaint to cover occurrences subsequent to the original complaint. PDB opposed the
supplemental complaint and urgent motion arguing that what goes against its
admission is the fact that the supplemental matters involved therein would bring into
the case new causes of action, distinct from the original complaint. The court admitted
the supplemental complaint.
Issue:
Whether the admission of the supplemental complaint is proper.
Ruling:
The admission of the supplemental complaint is proper.
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary pleading. A supplemental exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental
pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with
the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint. The purpose of the supplemental
pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of
relief to wich the plaintiff is entitled; hence any supplemental facts which further
develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitutes a right of action. The
parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original
pleading but not to introduce new and independent causes of action.
[THIRD DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 141180. JANUARY 11, 2005.]
GERTRUDES TEH, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of estafa by the MTCC, Branch 2 of Davao City. On appeal, the
RTC affirmed the MTCC decision. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA which
the CA however dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form, not being
accompanied by duplicate original or certified true copies of the documents and
material parts of the record that would support the allegations. Moreover, there was no
written explanation why service of the petition was not done personally. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, the instant
petition. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that she failed to
comply with Section 2, Rule 42 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals did not commit any error. Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules
provides:

By its supplemental complaint, the respondent merely enlarged its original causes of
action on account of events which transpired after the filing of the original complaint
and prayed for additional reliefs. The principal and core issues raised by the parties in
their original pleadings remain the same. There is no showing on record that the
petitioner would be prejudiced by the admission of the supplemental complaint. After
all, the petitioner has the right to file a supplemental answer to the supplemental
complaint, conformably to Section 7, Rule 11of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court cannot, thus be faulted for admitting the respondents supplemental complaint.
27 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
"SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the
reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of
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both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
We note that petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482 were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the
MTCC. There were no copies of the pleadings filed below or other material portions of
the record which would support the allegations in the petition. Indeed, this is contrary
to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above.
Further, Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She
contends, however, that no prejudice was caused to the parties by her non-
compliance. Clearly, petitioner violated both provisions quoted above which warrants
the dismissal of her petition by the Court of Appeals.
[THIRD DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 141255. JUNE 21, 2005.]
LUCIANO ELLO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
denial of substantial justice if their petition would be dismissed merely by reason of
technicality. Citing previous rulings of this Court that procedural rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote substantial justice, petitioners prayed that the
affidavit of proof of service attached to their motion be admitted and that their petition
be given due course. Still unconvinced, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated
October 8, 1999, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
Petitioners now allege that the said court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction by persisting in dismissing their petition for review
solely on technical grounds without regard whatsoever to the substantial merit of
their cause and the resulting injustice that could be created thereby. They pray that
the challenged Resolutions be annulled and that their petition be given due course.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion it dismissing the
petitioners petition for review on technical grounds.
Ruling:
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribe
two modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
other papers. However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that whenever practicable,
the filing of pleadings and other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers
on the adverse party or his counsel, must be done personally. But if such filing and
service were through a different mode, the party concerned must submit a written
explanation why they were not done personally.

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing outright the petition for review filed by spouses Luciano and Gaudiosa Ello,
petitioners herein, on the ground that they failed to incorporate therein the affidavit of
proof of service required under Section 11 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. In their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners averred that they failed to append to their petition the affidavit of service
due to an excusable oversight considering the time constraint in filing the petition with
its voluminous annexes; that they have a meritorious case; and that there would be a
The requirement under Section 11 is mandatory. Any violation of this Rule may be
cause for the court to consider the paper as not filed. However, such discretionary
power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the
following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service; (2) the importance of
the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein; and (3) the prima facie
merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or

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filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the
prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
Significantly, Gabriel Manasans affidavit of service shows that the petition for review
was filed with the Court of Appeals in Manila through registered mail. This mode of
filing is permitted under Section 11 of Rule 13 since it s obviously impractical for
petitioners and their counsel, who are all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, to
personally file their petition in Manila. As to the service of copies of the petition,
Manasan personally served the same on respondents counsel and the RTC in Cagayan
de Oro City, thus fully complying with Section 11.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140158. January 29, 2001.]
FERNANDO T. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
ISAGANI PALAD, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, and
CATALINA BAGASINA, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Baltazar and private respondent Catalina Bagasina were both
candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga petitioner was
declared the duly elected mayor of the municipality. On June 29, 1998, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, an election
protest. Summons was served on petitioner on July 7, 1998. Thereafter, petitioner filed
with the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest. Private respondent filed a Motion
To Expunge From The Records Of this Case Protestee's Answer And Counter-Protest on
the ground that the same was filed out of time or three (3) days beyond the five-day
reglementary period. Petitioner in this petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution which sustained the trial court's ruling to strike out
petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest on the ground that the same was filed out of
time. Petitioner insisted that his Answer with Counter Protest was filed on July 13,
1998 as shown by the Certification issued by the Philpost Mail Management
Corporation, not on July 14, 1998, the date stamped in the registry receipt, nor on
July 15, 1998, the date postmarked in the envelope, which contained the answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it sustained the trial
court's ruling to strike out petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest on the ground that
the same was filed out of time.
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the record shows that the envelope which contained petitioner's
Answer with Counter-Protest was filed postmarked July 15, 1998. It is, therefore, clear
that the pleading was filed three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period
within which to file the same, considering that summons was served on him on July 7,
1998. Petitioner did not present the Operations Manager who issued the certification to
testify on the document and overcome the presumption, despite being given the
opportunity to do so.
It would be a legal absurdity for the Court to allow a mere certification, whose author
has not been presented to testify on its veracity, to overthrow the evidentiary value of
an uncontroverted documentary exhibit such as the Registry Receipt and the postmark
actually stamped on the envelope itself to prove the actual date of mailing of the
pleading. Consequently, since petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest was filed out of
time, the trial court correctly declared that it had no jurisdiction over the same.
The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of
an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
protest. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-
compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.
[SECOND DIVISION]
[A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1886. MAY 16, 2005.]
ALFREDO G. BOISER, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR.,
respondent.
Facts:

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Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the plaintiff in an ejectment case filed before the MTC
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of
complainant. The case was appealed to the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 55.
Defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion to release bond on the ground that
the MTC of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental had already resolved the writ of preliminary
injunction without mentioning the applicants liability. Respondent judge granted the
motion. Complainant alleged that the issuance by respondent judge of the Order is
indicative of his ignorance of the law considering that the motion did not state that he
was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
He also averred that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for failure to state the time
and date of hearing.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge committed gravely erred in issuing the questioned
orders.
Ruling:
It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not have a proper
notice of hearing. The date and time of the hearing were not specified. Neither
complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were never
controverted by respondent judge.
A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the
clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the
movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious
change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality
in the trial.
Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty
formality deserving no judicial cognizance. The rule mandates that the same shall not
be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is mandatory.

[THIRD DIVISION]
Respondent judge had ignored a fundamental rule. He acted too precipitately in
[G.R. NO. 143646. April 4, 2001.]
granting defendants motion despite the absence of the requirements prescribed by
SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM, petitioners, vs. PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ, respondent.
the Rules of Court.

The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant,
except those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must
specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide:
xxx
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary.- No written motion set for hearing shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.
Facts:
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by Vera Cruz
against Lim. Vera Cruz caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of
the Transfer Certificate of Title. A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by
petitioner on the ground that said notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is
not necessary to protect respondent's rights. The same was opposed by respondent
insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to protect his right over
the property covered by the TCT and to avoid sale of property pending the execution
of the judgment in the case. Respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of
lis pendens annotated at the back of the TCT upon the posting by petitioner of an
indemnity bond. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the CA
set aside the order of the trial court canceling the notice of lis pendens. Hence, this
petition.

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Issue: pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or
lien. It only means that a person purchases or contracts on the property in dispute
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed subject to the result of the pending litigation.
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.

Ruling: SUMMONS
[FIRST DIVISION]
Petitioners' contention lacks merit. Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO
practically covers his entire land covered by the TCT and thus molests his right as an
HERAS,respondents.
owner.
[G.R. NO. 128803. SEPTEMBER 25, 1998.]

Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and
that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. Based on this principle as well as the express provisions of
Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only
the 200 square meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis
pendens. In causing the annotation of such notice, respondent's aim is to protect his
right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the notice
of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and restriction of petitioners'
right of dominion over the entire lot covered by the TCT is, therefore, an erroneous
conclusion.
Facts:
Asiavest sought to enforce a Hong Kong judgment against private respondent Heras,
ordering the latter to pay Asiavest a sum of money. The RTC ruled in favor of Asiavest
but was reversed by the CA after finding that the Hong Kong Courts never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Heras through valid summons. It was shown that Heras
was a resident of Quezon City but stayed and maintained a business in Hong Kong at
the time of the filing of the complaint. The summons was served through substituted
service at Heras QC address. The CA held that the summons should have been
personally served in Hong Kong and that a notice sent outside the state to a non-
resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in action against him personally for money
recovery.
Issue:

Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, WON summons was validly served upon Heras so as to confer the Hong Kong court
earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two grounds: a) after jurisdiction over his person.
a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party; or
b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded. Ruling:

For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which
requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In fact,
there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice must
prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Hence, even on
the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on
the title. And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack against the
certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis
The summons was not validly served on Heras by the Hong Kong Court; hence its
judgment cannot be enforceable here in the Philippines. Since the foreign (HK) rules
on service of summons were not duly proved at the trial, it is presumed to be the
same as the rules here in the Philippines which applies according to whether the action
is one in rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is an action against a person on
the basis of his personal liability, while an action quasi in rem is one against the thing
itself wherein an individual is just named as defendant in order to subject his interest

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over the property to an obligation or lien. In actions in personam, jurisdiction over the Issue:
person of the defendant is necessary before the court can try the case, but not in
actions in rem where only jurisdiction over the res is necessary, the service of WON the court validly served to Pepsico, through a clerk, the summons necessary to
summons merely being for due process requirements. vest over it jurisdiction over the corporation.

The case at bar is an action in personam. Sections 7 and 8, Rule 14 of our Rules of
Court provides for how summons may be validly acquired over resident defendants.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does
not voluntarily appear in court, personal service of summons within the State is
essential to acquire jurisdiction over his person. This method of service is possible if
such defendant is physically present in the country, if not, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Since Heras was not a resident of HK and the action against him was one in personam,
summons should have been personally served on him in HK. The extraterritorial
service in the Philippines is invalid and did not confer upon the HK court jurisdiction
over the person of Heras. It follows that the HK court judgment cannot be given force
and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
[THIRD DIVISION]
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, et.al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
[G.R. NO. 81123. FEBRUARY 28, 1989.]
Facts:
An accident occurred between a vehicle owned by petitioners and a truck owned by
Pepsi Cola, giving rise to an action for damages. Summons for the defendant Pepsi
Cola was served and was received by one Nenette Sison who represented herself to be
an authorized person to receive the same as she was the secretary of Pepsi Colas
legal department. The case was decided in favor of petitioners. When the judgment
became final and executory, petitioners filed for a motion for execution, a copy of
which was received by private respondent Pepsico, Inc., a foreign corporation which
held offices in the country to settle the debts, liabilities and obligations of Pepsi Cola in
preparation for the latters expected dissolution. Pepsico opposed the judgment for
execution on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, questioning the validity of the service
of summons to a mere clerk. It invoked Sections 13 and 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court on the service of summons to private domestic and foreign corporations. The CA
granted the petition.
Ruling:
Summons was validly served through a mere clerk by virtue of the rule on substantial
compliance. The Rules of Court on the service of summons upon a private domestic
corporation is also applicable to a dissolved corporation. Thus, service upon a
dissolved corporation may be made through the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent or any of its directors. As held in one case, although a clerk is not
authorized to receive a summons and complaint, if it appears that the summons and
complaint were in fact received by the corporation through said clerk, the court shall
rule that there is substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons. The
purpose of said rule is to assure summons on the corporation had thereby been
attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a technicality. Whomsoever
Miss Sison was acting for in receiving the summons, there is no question that the
notice of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or Pepsico with whom
she is admittedly connected.
[SECOND DIVISION]
CIPRIANO M. LAZARO, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF FRANCISCO BALAGTAS,
INC., respondent.
[G.R. NO. 139895. AUGUST 15, 2003.]
Facts:
Two separate cases for collection of a sum of money were filed by respondent bank
RFBI against petitioner Lazaro. Summonses were served at petitioners address at
Valenzuela City. For failure to answer, petitioner was declared in default in both cases
and judgment was rendered against him. A writ of execution was issued and served on
petitioner at his actual residence at Quezon City. Lazaro sought annulment of
judgment from the CA which dismissed the same. In this petition, Lazaro maintains
that he was not validly served with summons under Section 7, Rule 14 which requires
that service be done by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence.
Issue:

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WON petitioner was validly served with summons.
Ruling:
Petitioner was validly served with summons by the court. Section 6 of Rule 14, Rules
of Court, lays the rule that summons must be personally served on the defendant.
Said provision requires that summons, whenever practicable, be served personally to
the defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Service to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the
defendants actual residence. It is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the
summons in person by anyone authorized by law. Substituted service under Section 7
of Rule 14 relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. The sheriffs certificate
of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out. The burden
is on the petitioner to overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of
official functions by the sheriff. Such he did not successfully do here.
[SECOND DIVISION]
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.
[G.R. NO. 158407. JANUARY 17, 2005.]
Facts:
No, Layno was not validly served with summons. Considering that she was in Norway,
the summons and the complaint may only be validly servd on her through substituted
service under Section 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the
mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. In a case, the court held that the term dwelling house or
residence are generally held to refer to the time of service. It refers to the place
where the person named in the summons is living at the time the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the
service of summons intended for the defendant that must be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. There is no showing
that the house where the sheriff found Laynos brother was the latters residence or
that of respondent. As it turned out even, the occupant of the house was a mere
lessee and Laynos brother was just collecting rentals. The service of summons at a
place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or
place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which
he intends to return.
[FIRST DIVISION]
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG, petitioner, vs., SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARAI
HEDY VELAYO, respondents.
[G.R. NO. 155488. DECEMBER 6, 2006.]

Petitioner Domagas filed an action for forcible entry against respondent Layno. The
summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter
was apparently out of the country. The sheriff left the summons with Laynos brother
who received the same. The court rendered judgment against Layno and order her to
vacate the lot in question. When the corresponding writ of execution was served,
respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the judgment, alleging that
summons was not validly served to her thorugh her brother who was never authorized
to receive the same for her and who was merely there to collect the rentals from the
lessee of Laynos house while she was in Norway. The RTC, affirmed by the CA ruled in
Laynos favor.
Facts:
Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner for maliciously instituting a
criminal complain before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which prevented them
from leaving the country, paralyzing all their business transactions. The case was
decided in favor of respondents. Petitioner now questions the validity of the judgment,
contending that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
validly served with summons. She insists that she should have been extra-territorially
served with summons as she was a non-resident defendant, pursuant to Section 17,
Rule 14, Rules of Court.

Issue: Issue:

WON Layno was validly served with summons through substituted service. WON petitioner should have been extra-territorially served with summons for being a
non-resident defendant.
Ruling:
Ruling:

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No. Under Section 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court, when the defendant is a non resident
and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extra territorially. There
are only four instances when extra-territorial service of summons is proper, namely:
(a) when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiffs; (b) when the action
relates to a property within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; (c) when the relief demanded in the action consists in
excluding, in whole or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in the
property and; (d) when the defendants property has been attached within the
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave or; (c)
any other manner deemed sufficient by the court.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons applies only in cases in rem or quasi in rem
and not in actions in personam such as the case at bar. Where the action is in
personam and the defendant is a non resident, personal service of summons must be
had by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses, by
tendering it to him. Such was done in this case. Petitioners bare allegations of non-
service are not sufficient. The certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts
set out therein. Regularity is presumed and evidence against it must be clear and
convincing.
[FIRST DIVISION]
FLORENTINO GONZALES, EDGARDO SANTOS, LEOPOLDO ROSETE, FELINA
VICTORIA and CRISTETA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs.BALIKATAN KILUSANG
BAYAN SA PANANALAPI, INCORPORATED, respondent.
[G.R. No. 150859. March 28, 2005]
Facts:
Petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained a loan with the other petitioners as co-makers.
When petitioner Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent
filed a case for sum of money and damages. Summons were thereafter served. On the
scheduled hearing, defendants appeared but because they failed to file their answer to
the complaint, the court declared them in default. MTC, as affirmed by the RTC and
CA, rendered its decision finding for the respondent and against the petitioners. In this
petition, the validity of the judgment by default is being assailed for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioners allegedly not having been properly served with summons.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have not been properly served with summons, thus making the
judgment against them void.
Ruling:
Petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a defendants
voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Further,
the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he does not wish to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object thereto.
As the records would show, summons and copies of the complaint were served on the
petitioners. The petitioners appeared before the court on the scheduled hearing, as
evidenced by their signatures in the minutes. Their voluntary appearance cured the
defect, if any, in the service of summons.
[THIRD DIVISION]
PH CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS M.
FARRALES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 109648. November 22, 2001]
Facts:
PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H.
Van Sebille and Federico C. Lim, for a sum of money. After service of summons upon
the defendants, they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period, hence
they were declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was then allowed to present its
evidence ex-parte. Judgment was rendered in their favor. Personal and real properties
of defendant Carlos M. Farrales were levied and sold at public auction wherein PH
Credit Corp. was the highest bidder. The CA declared null and void (a) the auction sale
of Respondent Ferrales' real property and (b) the Writ of Possession issued in
consequence thereof. It held that the liability of Farrales was merely joint and not
solidary. Consequently, there was no legal basis for levying and selling Farrales' real
and personal properties in order to satisfy the whole obligation.

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Petitioner contends that because private respondent did not question the joint and
solidary nature of his liability in his (a) Motion to Quash Levy Execution, (b) Urgent
Motion to Order Sheriff to Suspend Sale on Execution, and (c) Motion to Declare
Certificate of Sale Null and Void, he cannot now raise it as an objection. Petitioner
argues that the "Omnibus Motion Rule" bars private respondent's belated objection.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the basic policy of avoiding
multiplicity of motions.

Ruling:

The Rules of Court requires that all available objections to a judgment or proceeding
must be set up in an Omnibus Motion assailing it; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
In the case at bar, the objection of private respondent to his solidary liability became
available to him, only after his real property was sold at public auction. At the time his
personal properties were levied and sold, it was not evident to him that he was being
held solely liable for the monetary judgment rendered against him and his co-
respondents. That was why his objections then did not include those he asserted when
his solidary liability became evident.

Prior to his Omnibus Motion, he was not yet being made to pay for the entire
obligation. Thus, his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other
respondents was not yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to
by petitioner. Not being available, these objections could not have been deemed
waived when he filed his three earlier Motions, which pertained to matters different
from those covered by his Omnibus Motion.

True, the Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in
a single opportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory
norm, the objections must have been available to the party at the time the Motion was
filed.

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