ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged
that respondent maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On
February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing
the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in
substitution of Atty. de Leon.
On April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose
Dela Cruz F. Mercado for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public
document) of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live
Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979,
when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took
place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using
any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten
married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are
pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City; (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private
business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service
rules and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"
before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption; (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found
guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without
pay; and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that
the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all
the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies.
Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.
He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month
without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found
guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in
no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent
as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said
about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are
accessible to anyone.
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant
failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus
granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted
for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. 14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She
stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for
those who have wronged her

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for
falsification?

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations.

Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the
respondents. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.

Duties to Client:
owe utmost learning and ability
maintain inviolate the confidence of the client
disclose all circumstances/interest regarding the controversy
undivided loyalty
not reject cause of defenseless and oppressed
candor, fairness and loyalty
hold in trust money or property
respond with zeal to the cause of the client
Appointment of Amicus Curae

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.

FACTS:
William Uy engaged the services of respondent lawyer Atty. Fermin Gonzales to
prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After telling
with respondent the circumstances issues and discussing the fees and costs,
respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his (complainant's)
office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from him other than
what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning
with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out
later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title,
Respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for "Falsification of Public Documents."The letter-
complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of
title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to
have filed.

Notwithstanding respondent's own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the

records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent
stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the
practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he
redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his
(complainant's) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00
and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption.
However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the
bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent
as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to
offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in
lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily
permits or agrees with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on
any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or
charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice
and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. 15
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the
present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents" filed by respondent against complainant were
obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent
volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land
he has redeemed from complainant. Respondent's immediate objective was to
secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier bought from his son.
Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only
incidental to their personal transaction.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Alberto C. Magulta was introduced to complainant at the
Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices who agreed to legally represent
the latter in a money claim and a possible civil case against certain parties
for breach of contract.
Upon respondent's instruction, complainant deposited the amount of
P25,000.00 allegedly for the filing fees of the case to be filed. A week
later, complainant was informed by respondent that the complaint had
already been filed in court.
A few months ago, complainant did not receive any notice from the court.
Complainant also visited respondent's office to inquire, but the latter
repeatedly told him each time to just wait. Sensing that he was being
given the run-around by respondent, complainant went to the Office of the
Clerk of Court to verify the progress of the case and found out that there
was no record at all filed by respondent on his behalf. Feeling disgusted
for the inconvenience and deception of respondent who admitted that he
had spent the money for the filing fee for his own use.
Therefore, the complainant filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint against respondent for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct. The Commission
submitted its Report and Recommendation to the Court recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year.
The Supreme Court affirmed the recommendation of the Commission. In
failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant,
respondent violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall
hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into
their possession. The Court also stressed that after agreeing to take up
the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even
if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship and
lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.
LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; AFTER AGREEING TO TAKE UP A CAUSE OF
CLIENT, A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO SUCH CAUSE AND MUST ALWAYS BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THEM. A lawyer-
client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's
business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that
the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and
the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite
the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent,
and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal
favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he
had agreed to prepare and had actually prepared at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not
neglect legal matters entrusted to them. This Court has likewise
constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire devotion to the interest
of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's
rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM
JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

FACTS:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an
action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and
lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now
deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on
behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores
and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On
October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob
Assad as party defendant.On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered
his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for
Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.

On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney
Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the
ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which
occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney
Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any
answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on
June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was
and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Atty. Francisco wrote a letter address to the petitioner saying that due to
the foregoing reasons, Attorney Francisco regret to advise the petitioner
that he cannot appear in the proceedings. The records of the case that
loaned to him are herewith returned.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco
alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in
connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been deserted
by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending
suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a
real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian
during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was
willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told
the woman that the sales of real property during the Japanese regime
were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this
being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to
defending the Syrian;

That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she
had instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real
estate which her husband had made; that according to her the case was in
the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did
not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same
reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of
her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military
notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that
she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced that this was the
theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens
title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband;
that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;

That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street,
he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs.
Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned
that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and
requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she
did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs.
Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava's attention
to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;

That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo
Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated in English by Mr.
Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him
(Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought
it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was
rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it and
without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel
about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;

That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his
case stating that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left the
case in the hands of other attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on
January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in

corroboration of his answer.

The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted
to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that
no information other than that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in
the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that
the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain
the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.

Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is

undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a
written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this
opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his
office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure
Attorney Francisco's professional services. Granting the facts to be no
more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of
attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued.
The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet
with our approval: