Elizabeth Barker Brandt1994 The Treatment of Community Contributions To Mortgage Payments (Including Princip

{\rtf1 \ansi
{\colortbl;
\red0\green0\blue0;
\red255\green255\blue255;
}
{\fonttbl {
\f0 Arial;}{
\f1 Symbol;}{
\f2 Times New Roman;}{
\f3 georgia;}{
\f4 sans-serif;}{
\f5 serif;}{
\f6 Courier New;}
}
{\*\generator Apache XML Graphics RTF Library;}
\fet0 \ftnbj \paperw12240 \paperh15840 \margt1080 \margb1080 \margl1080 \margr10
80 \headery720 \footery720 \itap0 \cols1
\sectd {\header {
{\trowd \ltrrow \trleft0
\clpadb60 \clpadfb3 \clpadl400 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrb \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \b
rdrs \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalb \clwWidth9380 \cellx9380
\clpadb60 \clpadfb3 \clpadl400 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrb \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \b
rdrs \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth700 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
}
{\f0 \b1 \fs18 \cf18 \i0
{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \cf18 \i0
THE TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO..., 30 Idaho L. Rev. 697
}
}
}
}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \intb
l
{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \qr \i0
}\f0 \li0 \b0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \row }
{\trowd \lastrow \trleft0
\clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth10080 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
}\f0 \li0 \b0 \ql \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }}\par }{\footer {
\clpadl60 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \
clvertalb \clwWidth9300 \cellx9300
\clpadl60 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \
clwWidth700 \cellx10000
\intbl
{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf17 \i0
}
{\*\shppict {\pict \pngblip \picw78 \pich10 \picwgoal1170 \pichgoal150 89504e470
d0a1a0a0000000d494844520000004e0000000a08030000002dbd985500000300504c5445fffffff
8a969f6913ff68931fff9f5f69241f5852af68d38fcddc4f58326fac294f8a868fac193fcdabefab
985fcdfc7fef5eef58022f8a35efef6effde5d2fac092fffaf6f9ac6ffffcfafde8d7fef7f1f9b27
9f6862cf8aa6af79e56f79c53f58327fef1e7fde3cefeeee2f9b076f79a4efef8f4f58123f58224f
9ae72feefe4f58021f9ae71fac295fffaf7fcdabffef7f2f9af73f9b177f8ac6ef9b47cf8a15bf68
72ef79648fef5edf9b278fcd9bdf9b782f9b57efbc89ffde3cffffefdf6872df8aa6bfcd6b8fac59
af9b781fabc8bfffbf8fac091fac396fbceaaf8a461f68e39f6882ffabe8dfabf8ff9b884f79c52f
deadbfeede0f68c36f89f58fcdcc3fde0c9fef0e5fef3eaf68f3cfbcaa2f8a867f9b37afaba87f68
b35fde7d6fabf90fffcfbfaba86fde7d5f6903efffdfcfef4ecf68f3bfde1cafcdfc6fbd1affbcea
9fcd6b7f68a33f79444fbcba5f58429fcdec6f9af74f8a25df58428f7a461fef4edfdede0fde6d4f
de7d4f9b680fbc69cfbc8a0f9b37bfac9a1f69240f79d54fcd4b4f9b883f68e3afef8f3fdebddfde
2cbf7984cf8a35ff6882efef3ebf9bd8cfcd4b5feecdef8a562fde6d3fef9f4fcdbc1f9bc8afcd8b
cf8ab6dfef8f2fcd7b9fffbf7feefe3f79546f8aa69f79f57fde1cbfcd3b3fcd2b1f8a25cfcd3b2f
de2ccfac599fac397f9b379fcd8bbfbd2b0fef2e9fcd5b6fac79ef8a664f8a460f68a32fac090fff
bf9fef2e8f8ab6cfde4d0f7994df6903df79749fffefcf79e55f8a766f8a059f68830f7974afde2c
dfbcca6fabd8cf57f200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000007df8d2030000000174524e530040e6d866000000097048597300000b1300000b1301009
a9c18000002814944415478da636680023eb5570ce186e2a55b85b5f54d94595f337247083ee592d
448fdcda26527d272e93da364d58d865d10c58b1f7a9d67708e7cf97682a87fe1ca5469f97b50539
860c62dfb67c1f029a9f211c3d7ae33bff2ffb03046ae53e3dac4106b76e2b9c17235a9598c8caa5
f179f80a80d94eeb9c9c0a0ef22c1a09de8f891e168e14d98292c3046e2ca55271e247d9cc1a0cae
067ca607583618efd56be2f0f7318b4b215661d7efa9289e1d07b67a8e3f8e3384d84dfaa30c830f
4de7f64c0f09841fe11ba71210c9f18945efc3fc3d0d5744389618d0483e77cb587bb27763ebb96c
dc0f0e6a6fb1f0686fb309b972c5d9dea9ad4fd428381e7bbc84986bf0cd761a630c318f7150ffee
e3fd478f6cb0ce15bd767fff9f1e3b2d0e36a4ff1d97a1f8006b1fe7af31d6875d4ca9f20a539792
fdb7f9dbffd4131e6c16f3981f7e12f9f5dfcc7800e84cc6dd80c380a7c657818fa39f33475c4973
130f0aa30ed2be9616010601602aae0dac70f56e9b24f3fa84f41912189792fe7c234366b5646064
ce0acee309ba18c9d992d8c41649f3b4c542c67df0e84714ae0f099b98f8d4d7b5f36833e27f3660
3860033f57c060ccf3230be9d767ff7d115e98bdf7ee60a65c8bd2eae7fb7dc7ff757a5b65d1f193
836f01d077a396aaec04f95b7ba519fde581d7ffef3da1fdbe9c18f199ecd5977e90ba671c59c669
9bf187e5aac7ac7b09cbd63d64b9f131cbb2523c3b8eec51d60889bc37803e8c650f725ffdeb1ff0
9c9397de1d7c74ec9dd550276eb1916720b3c7a8969dcbee0e9124f182c7a7ffd62f8bfebdb4b869
b759f0a369e8dde9b92cbc070d1e21d3029fcbb76f0298383ef8997a0e427be85e3eae7d99f6f300
4aff2ef861b0200a155f504c5b3927b0000000049454e44ae426082}}
\u169\'3f 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
}
}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \intbl \cell \int
bl
{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf17 \qr \i0
{\b0 \i0 \ul0 \fs20 \f0 \chpgn }
}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \row }}\par }
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \par}\sect\sbknone\pgncont\cols1{\ids0 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_document_1}{\*\bkmkend co_document_1}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25_Target}{\*\bkmkend Ib85138f15adb
11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25_Target}
\par
}
{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
30 Idaho L. Rev. 697
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
Idaho Law Review
\par
}
}
}
{\f3 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1994
\par
}
}
{\li100 \f3 \b0 \ri100 \fs20 \cf19 \qc \i0
THE TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO MORTGAGE PAYMENTS (INCLUDING PRINCIP
AL AND INTEREST) ON
}
{\f3 \b1 \chcbpat27 \fs20 \cf19 \i0
SEPARATE
}
}
}
}
PROPERTY
}
}
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Elizabeth Barker Brandt
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_Fa1104553803_ID0E5N}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_Fa1104553803_ID0E5N}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnote_Fa1104553803_1" }{\fldrslt
{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \cf5 \i0
a1
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
Copyright (c) 1994 by the Idaho Law Review; Elizabeth Barker Brandt
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETOAC_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETOAC_1}
TABLE OF CONTENTS
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4OAC_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4OAC_1}
I. INTRODUCTION
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EFPAC_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EFPAC_1}
II. STATE BY STATE APPROACH
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENPAC_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENPAC_1}
A. California, Nevada and New Mexico
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZPAC_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZPAC_1}
B. Louisiana
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGAAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGAAE_1}
C. Texas and Arizona
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESAAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESAAE_1}
D. Idaho and Washington
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5AAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5AAE_1}
E. Wisconsin
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKBAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKBAE_1}
III. APPORTIONMENT
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESBAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESBAE_1}
IV. REIMBURSEMENT
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E1BAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E1BAE_1}
A. Availability of an Equitable Lien
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGCAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGCAE_1}
B. Measure of Recovery
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESCAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESCAE_1}
C. Setoffs for Fair Rental Value
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5CAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5CAE_1}
V. CONCLUSION
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGDAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGDAE_1}
I. INTRODUCTION
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQDAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQDAE_1}
Courts have not been clear on how to treat community contributions to mortgage p
ayments, including interest, on property initially acquired by one spouse prior
to the marriage.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F1104553803_ID0EYDA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F1104553803_ID0EYDA}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnote_F1104553803_1" }{\fldrslt
1
}}}
}
The confusion derives from the courts\rquote failure to define what is meant b
y an equitable lien.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBEAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBEAE_1}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_1164_698_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_1164_698_1}
*698
}
}
First, the language in the opinions referring to equitable liens does not disti
nguish between a pro tanto lien that attaches at the time the community property
contribution is made and a lien granted to secure a reimbursement claim at the
time of the dissolution of the marriage.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F2104553803_ID0ENEA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F2104553803_ID0ENEA}
2
}}}
}
To further compound this problem, some courts have relied on recent California
authority without appreciating the extent of ownership rights accorded to the no
n-owner spouse in that state.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F3104553803_ID0ESEA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F3104553803_ID0ESEA}
3
}}}
}
Second, courts have been confused over the valuation of the community property
interest. While almost all courts giving a reimbursement claim have agreed that
community property contributions which reduce the equity on a mortgage of the se
parate property of one spouse must be reimbursed, the courts have disagreed as t
o whether community property contributions toward interest must also be reimburs
ed. Some courts have not permitted reimbursement of the latter expense; others h
ave held that expenses such as interest, taxes and insurance are offset by the b
enefit received by the community through use of the separate property.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBFAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBFAE_1}
To a large extent, the confusion in the case authority reflects the absence of a
consistent approach to, and analysis of, the nature of the contribution of comm
unity property to the mortgage on separate property. On the one hand, the contri
bution of community property to the paydown of a separate property mortgage, inc
luding interest, could be viewed as an investment of community property by the h
usband and wife. If this is the case, one would expect that the husband and wife
would actually acquire a community property ownership interest in the property
with all the attendant benefits and risks of ownership such as dual management,
inheritability and equitable division. Consequently, the spouse\rquote s claim s
hould be for a partition of the subject property with the community property int
erest comprised of the principal and pro rata share of the appreciation attribut
able to the community property contributions, if any. This interest should be tr
eated as an ownership interest from the time the husband and wife begin to make
mortgage payments with community property. Furthermore, the community estate wou
ld not be entitled to any reimbursement for interest paid because it is part of
the necessary cost of maintaining the community\rquote s capital investment.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3FAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3FAE_1}
On the other hand, such a contribution could be viewed as a loan thereby placing
the husband and wife in the position of creditors of the separate property esta
te. As such, the community should be entitled
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*699
}
}
to reimbursement of the full amount loaned including that portion of the loan c
onstituting interest on the mortgage.
}
This claim could, of course, be offset by any claims the owner spouse has for no
n-donative benefits the community estate received from the use of the separate p
roperty such as the fair rental value of the separate property.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETGAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETGAE_1}
A combination of the above two approaches seem to hold sway in most jurisdiction
s. California, New Mexico and Nevada appear to follow an investment approach, tr
eating the interest acquired through community contributions as an ownership int
erest. However, courts within these jurisdictions have not always been clear abo
ut the nature of the interest so acquired during the existence of an ongoing mar
riage as opposed to at dissolution. Thus, the courts have sometimes characterize
d the non-owner\rquote s claim at dissolution as one for reimbursement as oppose
d to division, and there has been disagreement about how to value the non-owner
spouse\rquote s claim in the property.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EIHAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EIHAE_1}
Idaho, Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, Texas and Wisconsin appear to follow a cr
editor approach because these jurisdictions treat the non-owner spouse\rquote s
claim as one for reimbursement rather than apportionment of an ownership interes
t. The confusion arises, however, because despite the apparent recognition of a
creditor\rquote s claim, by way of reimbursement, most of these jurisdictions va
lue the reimbursement claim based on an enhancement in value standard and they h
ave discussed the possibility of an equitable lien in inconsistent and confusing
ways.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXHAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXHAE_1}
In this article, I will review the approach of each of the nine community proper
ty states concerning the use of community property to pay mortgage principal and
interest on separate property. I will then argue that the community estate ough
t to be treated as a creditor of the separate estate and should be entitled to r
eimbursement of both principal and interest contributed to acquisition of the se
parate property which may be secured by an equitable lien at the time of judgmen
t, if appropriate. Finally, I will argue that to the extent any offset is permit
ted for benefits obtained by the community through use of the property, courts s
hould entertain evidence as to the actual value of the benefit received by the c
ommunity and should consider whether the use of the property was donative in nat
ure.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJIAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJIAE_1}
II. STATE BY STATE APPROACH
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETIAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETIAE_1}
A. California, Nevada and New Mexico
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3IAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3IAE_1}
Recent California cases have adopted an investment approach to determine the nat
ure and extent of the community property rights created when community property
is used to reduce the principal,
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*700
}
}
and pay interest on a separate property mortgage.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F4104553803_ID0EJJA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F4104553803_ID0EJJA}
4
}}}
}
Moore v. Moore
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F5104553803_ID0EMJA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F5104553803_ID0EMJA}
5
}}}
}
culminated the development of the law in this area. In Moore, the California Su
preme Court concluded that \u8220\'3fthe rule developed through decisions in Cal
ifornia gives to the community a pro tanto community property interest in such p
roperty in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community fund
s bear to the payments made with separate funds.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F6104553803_ID0E4JA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F6104553803_ID0E4JA}
6
}}}
}
Consistent with its holding that the community payments are in the nature of an
investment and give rise to a present property interest, the court clarified th
at the community interest was not merely an \u8220\'3fequitable charge\u8221\'3f
but instead should be characterized as \u8220\'3fa community property interest
in the house.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F7104553803_ID0ELKA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F7104553803_ID0ELKA}
7
}}}
}
The court\rquote s underlying rationale in adopting the pro rata ownership appr
oach is clear from its consistent reference to the community interest as an inve
stment.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F8104553803_ID0EQKA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F8104553803_ID0EQKA}
8
}}}
}
The court concluded that the payment of interest with community funds was not r
elevant in calculating the share of the community in the underlying property and
was not reimbursable because such expenses represented
}
\u8220\'3fexpenses incurred to maintain the investment.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F9104553803_ID0E5KA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F9104553803_ID0E5KA}
9
}}}
}
Finally, the court reasoned that to the extent the property in question had inc
reased in value due to market forces, the community and separate estates should
share in the increase in value in proportion to their respective contributions t
o the purchase of the property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F10104553803_ID0ECL}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F10104553803_ID0ECL}
10
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJLAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJLAE_1}
Thus, the Moore court calculated the community and separate property interest as
follows: The separate property percentage interest consisting of the down payme
nt and the proceeds of the mortgage loan, subtracted by the amount by which the
community property reduced the balance of the loan.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F11104553803_ID0ERL}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F11104553803_ID0ERL}
11
}}}
}
The resulting sum is divided by
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*701
}
}
the purchase price.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F12104553803_ID0E2L}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F12104553803_ID0E2L}
12
}}}
}
The result is the separate property percentage share in the property. Conversel
y, the community property share is arrived at by dividing the amount the communi
ty property payments reduced the principal by the purchase price.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F13104553803_ID0EDM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F13104553803_ID0EDM}
13
}}}
}
The resulting percentages are applied to the fair market value of the property
to determine the value of the community property interest in the property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F14104553803_ID0EHM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F14104553803_ID0EHM}
14
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EOMAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EOMAE_1}
Like California, Nevada also appears to adopt an investment approach. However, a
lthough the case law is fairly consistent, confusing language in the court opini
ons could lead to conflicting outcomes. Recently, in Malmquist v. Malmquist,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F15104553803_ID0E1M}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F15104553803_ID0E1M}
15
}}}
}
the Nevada Supreme Court relied extensively on California\rquote s Moore decisi
on in delineating the nature and extent of the community property interest in re
al estate acquired by one spouse prior to marriage but where community property
was used to reduce the mortgage principal and interest.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F16104553803_ID0E6M}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F16104553803_ID0E6M}
16
}}}
}
Unfortunately the clarity and consistency of the California reasoning and appro
ach was not maintained in the Nevada decision because the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*702
}
}
court used the terms reimbursement and ownership interchangeably. For example,
the Nevada court stated:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Both parties agree that the community and separate property interests are entitl
ed to reimbursement to the extent that those interests actually contributed towa
rds reduction of the principal on the mortgage.... Additionally, this court has
recognized that the community is entitled to a pro rata ownership share in prope
rty which community funds have helped to acquire.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F17104553803_ID0E4N}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F17104553803_ID0E4N}
17
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The use of the term \u8220\'3freimbursement\u8221\'3f by the Nevada court is inc
onsistent with the basic premise of Moore that the community is entitled to an o
wnership interest. By characterizing the claim as one for reimbursement, the cou
rt implies that no right arises unless and until the marriage is dissolved; gene
rally speaking, reimbursement refers to the right of a spouse, upon dissolution
of the marriage, to seek an accounting and compensation for contributions to the
separate property of the other spouse.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F18104553803_ID0EQO}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F18104553803_ID0EQO}
18
}}}
}
While a pro tanto ownership right may have to be valued at the time of dissolut
ion in order to facilitate distribution, it is nonetheless a pre-existing right
in the property itself. Presumably both spouses would be able to assert ownershi
p rights to the property during the existence of an ongoing marriage, and the ri
ghts would be inheritable.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F19104553803_ID0EYO}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F19104553803_ID0EYO}
19
}}}
}
Moreover, because a pro tanto interest is created the property would presumably
be subject to dual management rules and to creditor\rquote s claims as communit
y property and not merely the separate property of one spouse. Finally, the prop
erty should be subject to equitable division at divorce.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EEPAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EEPAE_1}
This confusion over the consequence of recognizing an ownership right as opposed
to a claim for reimbursement is reflected in other Nevada authority. For exampl
e, in Robison v. Robison
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F20104553803_ID0ENP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F20104553803_ID0ENP}
20
}}}
}
the court refused to consider the benefit the community received in using a res
idence owned by one spouse prior to marriage as the family residence, analogizin
g the situation to the implied gift that arises when one spouse uses his or her
separate property to pay community expenses.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F21104553803_ID0ESP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F21104553803_ID0ESP}
21
}}}
}
This analogy clearly implies that the court viewed the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*703
}
}
house as the spouse\rquote s separate property despite the fact that the court
had just concluded that the community contribution to the mortgage payments crea
ted a pro tanto community property interest in the house.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F22104553803_ID0E2P}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F22104553803_ID0E2P}
22
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECQAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECQAE_1}
Thus, while Nevada appears firmly wedded to the same sort of investment approach
adopted in California, troubling language in some of the Nevada opinions indica
tes that the court may not fully recognize the consequences of the ownership int
erest created by the contribution of community property to a mortgage on one spo
use\rquote s separate property.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EOQAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EOQAE_1}
Like Nevada, the New Mexico Supreme Court has followed Moore, but has not truly
clarified the nature of the interest created when community funds are used to pa
y the mortgage on property acquired by one spouse prior to marriage. In Chance v
. Kitchell,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F23104553803_ID0EXQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F23104553803_ID0EXQ}
23
}}}
}
the New Mexico Supreme Court treated the surviving spouse as a cotenant with th
e deceased spouse\rquote s heirs with respect to property acquired by the deceas
ed spouse prior to marriage, but upon which mortgage payments were made with com
munity property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F24104553803_ID0E3Q}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F24104553803_ID0E3Q}
24
}}}
}
The extent of the surviving spouse\rquote s co-tenancy was apparently equal to
the contribution of community funds to the reduction of principal on the house.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F25104553803_ID0EBR}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F25104553803_ID0EBR}
25
}}}
}
In a subsequent case, Dorbin v. Dorbin,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F26104553803_ID0EER}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F26104553803_ID0EER}
26
}}}
}
the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on Moore, in apportioning the ownership
interests in a family home initially acquired by the wife as her separate proper
ty but upon which mortgage payments were made with community property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F27104553803_ID0EIR}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F27104553803_ID0EIR}
27
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPRAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPRAE_1}
Chance is a curious case in that the court characterized the community interest
as an ownership interest, but employed language suggesting that the community ri
ght is in the nature of a reimbursement claim.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F28104553803_ID0EXR}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F28104553803_ID0EXR}
28
}}}
}
As the Dorbin court recognized, the supreme court implicitly accepted the notio
n that the community property contributions to equity create a property interest
to the extent of the contribution and attributable appreciation. This conclusio
n logically flows from the Chance court\rquote s conclusion that the wife was a
cotenant with the husband\rquote s heirs.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F29104553803_ID0E6R}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F29104553803_ID0E6R}
29
}}}
}
Since the husband had initially acquired the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*704
}
}
property before the marriage with his separate property, the only basis for the
wife\rquote s cotenancy could be that the community contributions created a com
munity property interest which she then inherited under New Mexico intestacy law
when the husband died. In Dorbin, the court of appeals recognized the creation
a property interest by distinguishing between claims for reimbursement, which, a
ccording to the court, arise when community property is used to benefit a separa
te estate but no asset is acquired, from claims for apportionment, which the ari
se when mixed community and separate property are used to acquire an asset.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F30104553803_ID0ELS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F30104553803_ID0ELS}
30
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESSAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESSAE_1}
Thus, while the New Mexico Supreme Court does not provide much of a hint about i
ts rationale, it appears certain in light of the court of appeals decision in Do
rbin that the New Mexico courts will treat community property contributions to m
ortgage payments on separate property as giving rise to a community interest in
the property equal to the reduction in equity and the proportional appreciation.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5SAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5SAE_1}
The investment approach adopted by California has the benefit of treating the co
mmunity contribution to mortgage payments on separate property in a consistent w
ay.
}
However, courts adopting the approach have not always clarified the full signifi
cance of recognizing such ownership rights. None of the jurisdictions adopting t
he investment approach have fully addressed questions such as whether the intere
st is subject to the testamentary power of the non-owner spouse, or whether the
consent of both spouses is necessary to sell or encumber the property. Moreover,
the impact of these unrecorded interests on the claims of bona fide purchasers
of the property has not fully explored.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETTAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETTAE_1}
B. Louisiana
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3TAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3TAE_1}
The Louisiana Civil Code and Louisiana courts have adopted a creditor approach,
by treating the contribution of community property to the reduction of mortgage
indebtedness on separate property as giving rise to a claim for reimbursement.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F31104553803_ID0EEU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F31104553803_ID0EEU}
31
}}}
}
This claim is equal to
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*705
}
}
one-half the amount that the principal is reduced through the use of community
property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F32104553803_ID0EOU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F32104553803_ID0EOU}
32
}}}
}
The primary justification for measuring the reimbursement claim by reduction of
principal only and not including interest in the recovery is that the latter is
the cost of maintaining the civil fruits of the separate property for the benef
it of the community.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F33104553803_ID0ESU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F33104553803_ID0ESU}
33
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZUAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZUAE_1}
The approach of the Louisiana appellate court is puzzling in light of the expres
s language of the 1980 amendments to Louisiana matrimonial regimes law. Prior to
1980, claims for reimbursement for community funds used to reduce a separate pr
operty obligation were governed by
}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin
dType=L&pubNum=1000012&cite=LACIART2408&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5c
e1d08a25&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
article 2408 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
}}}
.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F34104553803_ID0EMV}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F34104553803_ID0EMV}
34
}}}
}
}
Article 2408
}}}
provided a right of reimbursement when separate property increased in value as
a result of community contributions measured by one-half the enhanced value.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F35104553803_ID0EZV}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F35104553803_ID0EZV}
35
}}}
}
}
Article 2408
}}}
was replaced by several new articles that attempted to codify the doctrinal ref
inements that had developed under
}
article 2408
}}}
.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F36104553803_ID0EOW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F36104553803_ID0EOW}
36
}}}
}
Even though the primary goal of the revisions regarding reimbursement was to co
dify the case
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*706
}
}
law developed under the former provisions, some important changes in the approa
ch to these issues appears to have been intended. In particular, the revisions o
f
}
article 2408
}}}
apparently were intended to change the measure of reimbursement.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F37104553803_ID0EDX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F37104553803_ID0EDX}
37
}}}
}
This intent can be seen in the express language of article 2364 of the revised
matrimonial regime law which applies to reductions in separate property obligati
ons with community funds.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F38104553803_ID0EIX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F38104553803_ID0EIX}
38
}}}
}
Article 2364 provides: \u8220\'3fIf community property has been used to satisfy
a separate obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursemen
t upon termination of the community property regime for one-half of the amount o
r value that the property had at the time it was used.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F39104553803_ID0EWX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F39104553803_ID0EWX}
39
}}}
}
This language appears to focus the reimbursement inquiry on the value of the co
mmunity property used to reduce the indebtedness rather than on the impact of re
ducing the indebtedness on the underlying separate property. To the extent that
a mortgage interest is an obligation of the separate estate, community property
used to reduce such indebtedness should rightfully be reimbursed under article 2
364. Moreover, the interest obligation would appear to be a separate obligation
because the definition of \u8220\'3fcommunity obligation\u8221\'3f in the Louisi
ana code does not appear to include obligations acquired prior to the marriage.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F40104553803_ID0EAY}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F40104553803_ID0EAY}
40
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHYAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHYAE_1}
The comments to article 2364 also appear to support the idea that the drafters o
f the provision intended to abandon the enhancement in value test and adopt a di
fferent measure of recovery in these sorts of cases. The comments provide:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Article 2408 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
}}}
created a right to reimbursement when separate property increased in value due
to community contributions, and the measure of reimbursement was one-half the en
hanced value. Article 2364 instead treats community property used to satisfy a s
eparate obligation as an interest-free loan.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F41104553803_ID0EIZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F41104553803_ID0EIZ}
41
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The language of this comment appears to anticipate that the interest free loan a
nalysis will lead to a different measure of the recovery than did the enhanced v
alue standard. The only way this could be
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*707
}
}
true is if contributions to interest in addition to principal are reimbursable.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EE1AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EE1AE_1}
C. Texas and Arizona
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EN1AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EN1AE_1}
Like Louisiana, Texas has adopted a creditor approach for evaluating the interes
t a spouse has when community property is used to reduce the indebtedness on sep
arate property with the added availability of an equitable lien.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F42104553803_ID0EV1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F42104553803_ID0EV1}
42
}}}
}
Until the Texas Supreme Court\rquote s 1990 decision in Penick v. Penick,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F43104553803_ID0EY1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F43104553803_ID0EY1}
43
}}}
}
the Texas courts had purported to treat claims for reimbursement based on commu
nity contributions to the reduction of separate property indebtedness differentl
y than claims based on community contributions to capital improvements on separa
te property. Capital improvement claims were reimbursed based on an enhancement
of value standard.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F44104553803_ID0EA2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F44104553803_ID0EA2}
44
}}}
}
However, until Penick, the lower Texas courts were in complete disarray regardi
ng the method of valuing a reimbursement claim based on reduction of indebtednes
s.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F45104553803_ID0EF2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F45104553803_ID0EF2}
45
}}}
}
In Penick, the Texas Supreme Court resolved the disunity among the lower Texas
courts by holding that a reimbursement claim based on community property contrib
utions to the reduction of indebtedness on one spouse\rquote s separate property
should be treated the same as claims based on capital improvements and that bot
h types of claims should be based on an enhancement in value
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*708
}
}
measure.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F46104553803_ID0EP2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F46104553803_ID0EP2}
46
}}}
}
Beyond concluding that it could see little distinction between the two types of
claims and surmising that the distinction was the result of \u8220\'3fhistorica
l accident,\u8221\'3f the court offered little analysis to support its conclusio
n.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F47104553803_ID0ET2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F47104553803_ID0ET2}
47
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E12AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E12AE_1}
In addition to its reasoning that community claims for reduction of mortgage ind
ebtedness should be measured by an enhancement in value test, the court conclude
d that the separate estate could offset the reimbursement claim by showing that
the community received benefits from the use of the separate property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F48104553803_ID0EC3}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F48104553803_ID0EC3}
48
}}}
}
In Penick, specifically, the court upheld the trial court\rquote s conclusion t
hat tax advantages obtained by the community as a result of depreciating the hus
band\rquote s separate property real estate should be set off against the wife\r
quote s reimbursement claim for community contributions to the payment of indebt
edness on that property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F49104553803_ID0EG3}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F49104553803_ID0EG3}
49
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EN3AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EN3AE_1}
Arizona adopts a creditor approach similar to that of Texas. The Arizona courts
have been clear that the use of community funds to pay the mortgage on property
acquired as the separate property of one spouse does not change the separate cha
racter of the property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
50
}}}
}
In Drahos v. Rens,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F51104553803_ID0E23}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F51104553803_ID0E23}
51
}}}
}
the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the community, while not acquiring a pro
perty interest in the separate property through the payment of mortgage payments
, was entitled to compensation and to an equitable lien against the separate pro
perty.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F52104553803_ID0EA4}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F52104553803_ID0EA4}
52
}}}
}
Thus, Arizona, like Texas, appears to grant the non-owner spouse some level of
interest in the underlying property above and beyond a mere claim for reimbursem
ent.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F53104553803_ID0EE4}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F53104553803_ID0EE4}
53
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EL4AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EL4AE_1}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*709
}
}
In addition to Arizona\rquote s hybrid reimbursement/equitable lien approach, t
he courts there have, even more curiously, looked to California to determine the
measure of the community claim for reimbursement.
}
Drahos, in particular, relied on a California decision that applied the Moore
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
54
}}}
}
formula for pro tanto ownership, In re Marriage of Marsden,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F55104553803_ID0E24}
55
}}}
}
to reach its conclusion that the reimbursement claim should be measured by a \u
8220\'3fvalue-at-dissolution/enhanced value\u8221\'3f formula.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F56104553803_ID0E64}
56
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EG5AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EG5AE_1}
The analytical basis for the Arizona and Texas approaches to the characterizatio
n of community contributions to the reduction of a mortgage on separate property
is simply not clear. The use of a reimbursement-oriented theory is inconsistent
with the granting of an equitable lien that appears to arise during marriage as
community mortgage payments are made. One must ask whether the existence of suc
h a lien would prevent the owner-spouse from alienating the property during the
existence of the marriage. Normally the owner of property subject to an equitabl
e lien has the duty to not deal with the property in such a way as to destroy or
interfere with the equitable lien.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F57104553803_ID0EX5}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F57104553803_ID0EX5}
57
}}}
}
Yet this negative duty could prove to be singularly elusive since, the non-owne
r spouse may not bring his or her reimbursement claim to effectuate the equitabl
e lien until a divorce is filed. By that time, the property could be long gone!
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ED6AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ED6AE_1}
By granting an equitable lien measured by an enhancement in value standard, Ariz
ona and Texas treat the community property estate as if it were an owner of the
property even though one of the spouses does not have any accoutrements of owner
ship during the existence of the ongoing marriage. Just as the equity only reimb
ursement cases are inconsistent with the theory of reimbursement, so too are the
cases that permit recovery for the appreciation attributable to the reduction i
n principal associated with payments of community property. Such ownership benef
its would include the right to exercise testamentary power over a spouse\rquote
s share of the community property interest, the availability of equitable divisi
on of the asset at divorce,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F58104553803_ID0EP6}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F58104553803_ID0EP6}
58
}}}
}
and the applicability of the dual management rules if the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*710
}
}
property is real estate. Enhancement rules can also be unfair to the spouse who
makes his or her separate property available during the marriage for the spouse
s\rquote use and enjoyment, foregoing the availability of rent and finds that h
e or she must make substantial restitution to the community in the form of a rei
mbursement claim.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBAAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBAAG_1}
Measuring the reimbursement claim by an enhancement in value standard is also in
consistent with the theory that the community estate is in the position of a cre
ditor vis a vis the separate property estate. A third-party creditor who loaned
money toward the purchase of real estate would not be entitled to share in the a
ppreciation of that real estate during the time of the loan. Little rationale ex
ists for treating spouses who loan assets to one of the spouses for the acquisit
ion of property differently.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETAAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETAAG_1}
D. Idaho and Washington
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3AAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3AAG_1}
While apparently also adopting the creditor approach of \u8220\'3freimbursement
supported by lien,\u8221\'3f the Idaho courts have often engaged in confusing an
d inconsistent analysis of claims involving the expenditure of community funds o
n a mortgage of separate property. In Fisher v. Fisher
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F59104553803_ID0EFB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F59104553803_ID0EFB}
59
}}}
}
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the use of community funds to make mortgage p
ayments did not change the character of property acquired by one of the spouses
prior to marriage.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F60104553803_ID0EKB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F60104553803_ID0EKB}
60
}}}
}
The court concluded that the non-owner spouse was entitled to \u8220\'3freimbur
sement for one-half of the community funds applied toward [[[[the payment of the
purchase contract price]\u8221\'3f on certain property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F61104553803_ID0EYB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F61104553803_ID0EYB}
61
}}}
}
The court allowed reimbursement based on the amount of community funds expended
as opposed to value of the underlying property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F62104553803_ID0E4B}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F62104553803_ID0E4B}
62
}}}
}
This result is completely consistent with a creditor approach to the resolution
of the claim. In a later decision, Griffin v. Griffin,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F63104553803_ID0EDC}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F63104553803_ID0EDC}
63
}}}
}
the Idaho Court of Appeals applied Fisher, concluding:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[T]he use of community funds to make payments on the purchase price [of property
initially acquired by one spouse prior to marriage] does not change the charact
er of the property from separate to community. However, the non-owner spouse has
the right to reimbursement for one-half of the community funds applied toward p
ayments on the property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F64104553803_ID0EWC}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F64104553803_ID0EWC}
64
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EADAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EADAG_1}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*711
}
}
Fisher and Griffin appear to be the only Idaho cases that cleanly address the q
uestion of the treatment of community funds used to reduce the indebtedness on p
roperty acquired prior to marriage by one of the spouses. However, in focusing o
n the amount of community funds expended, they stand in stark contrast to a line
of related Idaho cases dealing with community contribution to the reduction of
indebtedness on separate chattel, physical improvements by the community on the
separate property of one spouse, and cases where community property has been use
d for a mixture of making physical improvements and reducing indebtedness on sep
arate property. Cases addressing these issues hold that the community contributi
ons do not change the character of the property, but the community\rquote s reim
bursement claim is measured by using an enhancement in value formula. Gapsch v.
Gapsch,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F65104553803_ID0ETD}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F65104553803_ID0ETD}
65
}}}
}
a curious case in which the spouses were appealing, in part, the disposition of
a $50 increase in value of an antique automobile, is the leading Idaho case.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F66104553803_ID0EYD}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F66104553803_ID0EYD}
66
}}}
}
In Gapsch, the court set down an approach followed in numerous later cases:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri800 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
As a general rule where the separate property of the husband is improved or his
equity therein enhanced by community funds the community is entitled to be reimb
ursed from such separate estate.... The claim for reimbursement has been held to
be in the nature of a charge or an equitable lien against such separate propert
y so improved or the equity of the husband therein enlarged. It would appear tha
t the measure of the compensation generally is the increased value of the proper
ty due to the improvement; in instances where his equity therein has been increa
sed through the application of community funds to the payment of the debt thereo
n the measure should be the amount by which such equity is enhanced.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F67104553803_ID0ERE}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F67104553803_ID0ERE}
67
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Neither Fisher nor Griffin dealt directly with the issue of how to measure the r
eimbursement claim. In both cases, the only issue presented
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*712
}
}
on appeal was whether the community contributions to mortgage payments converte
d the separate property of one spouse into community property. It is possible th
at the courts in both cases merely equated community funds contributed to the pu
rchase price to equity. If so, the cases are in accord with Gapsch and its proge
ny. Even so, at best the Idaho authority is comparable to Arizona where an inves
tment oriented measure of recovery is being used in a creditor situation.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F68104553803_ID0ERF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F68104553803_ID0ERF}
68
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EYFAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EYFAG_1}
The Washington courts have recognized a community claim for reimbursement of fun
ds used to reduce the principal on a mortgage of separate property. The expendit
ure of community funds on mortgage principal and interest does not change the ch
aracter of property that was separate at the time it was acquired, and the commu
nity reimbursement claim is entitled to be secured through an equitable lien.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F69104553803_ID0ECG}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F69104553803_ID0ECG}
69
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJGAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJGAG_1}
While this much is relatively clear from the Washington authority, the measure o
f the reimbursement claim is not clear. Professor Cross suggests, \u8220\'3f[w]
hen money has been contributed, the amount advanced has been the measure of the
right [or reimbursement], without particular attention being given to the possib
ility that the use of the money may not have increased the value of the asset by
the amount advanced.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F70104553803_ID0E4G}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F70104553803_ID0E4G}
70
}}}
}
Professor Cross\rquote general rule does not appear
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*713
}
}
to be borne out by all the Washington case law. In Merkel v. Merkel,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F71104553803_ID0EIH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F71104553803_ID0EIH}
71
}}}
}
for example, the court granted the non-owner spouse a lien equal to one half th
e value of community funds used to reduce the mortgage principal on certain farm
property, noting, \u8220\'3fthis sum representing one-half of the $4,500 of com
munity funds paid on mortgage principal, it being considered that interest, tax
and upkeep payments made by the community represent no more than reasonable rent
al for the use of the land.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F72104553803_ID0EWH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F72104553803_ID0EWH}
72
}}}
}
This per se attribution of interest, taxes and
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*714
}
}
insurance as fair rental value (apparently without any findings of fact regardi
ng rental values) has the de facto result of limiting the recovery of the commun
ity estate to the principal reduction or the enhanced value attributable to the
community property payments. Later Washington cases have followed Professor Cros
s\rquote reasoning but are confusing because of the continual citation to the e
arlier conflicting cases.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F73104553803_ID0ECI}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F73104553803_ID0ECI}
73
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJIAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJIAG_1}
The approach adopted by Idaho and Washington have the best possibility of consis
tently following the creditor approach. The problem is that the courts in both j
urisdictions have not worked out the inconsistencies in their authority.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EYIAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EYIAG_1}
E. Wisconsin
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBJAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBJAG_1}
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has not considered a case in which community fund
s were used to reduce the indebtedness on separate property since Wisconsin\rquo
te s version of the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA) became effective in 1986
.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F74104553803_ID0EJJ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F74104553803_ID0EJJ}
74
}}}
}
Section 766.63 of the Wisconsin Code governs situations in which community and
separate
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*715
}
}
property are used as consideration in the acquisition of an asset.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F75104553803_ID0ETJ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F75104553803_ID0ETJ}
75
}}}
}
The section clarifies that if the separate component of an asset cannot be trac
ed the entire asset becomes community property. However, the section does not cl
arify what the result should be if the separate and community components can be
traced; that is, it does not specify whether the asset is owned jointly between
the separate and community estates or whether the ownership is fixed and the con
tributing estate is entitled to reimbursement. In 1991, the federal Bankruptcy C
ourt for the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied California\rquote s Moore
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F76104553803_ID0E3J}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F76104553803_ID0E3J}
76
}}}
}
decision to determine whether any community property interest, includable in a
bankrupt husband\rquote s estate, existed in a house acquired by the wife using
her separate funds.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F77104553803_ID0EBK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F77104553803_ID0EBK}
77
}}}
}
After applying Moore, however, the court held that the marital property interes
t in the house ($276.22) was so de minimus, relative to the value of the house (
$62,000), that apportionment of the interest was not appropriate.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F78104553803_ID0EGK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F78104553803_ID0EGK}
78
}}}
}
More recently, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered a case in which commun
ity labor and funds were used to make physical improvements on the wife\rquote s
separate property home which substantially increased the value of the home.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F79104553803_ID0ELK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F79104553803_ID0ELK}
79
}}}
}
In In re Estate of Kobylski the Wisconsin court applied Texas law and concluded
that when the use of community funds and labor to make physical improvements to
separate property a \u8220\'3fclaim for reimbursement exists in favor of the ma
rital estate measured by the property\rquote s enhanced value attributable to th
e improvements, not the amount of marital funds actually expended.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F80104553803_ID0EYK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F80104553803_ID0EYK}
80
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6KAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6KAG_1}
It\rquote s difficult to say whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court would follow th
e same approach as either Kobylski or In re Geise in a situation in which commun
ity funds are used to reduce indebtedness on separate property. In Kobylski, the
appellate court recognized that other community property jurisdictions have spl
it on the question of
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*716
}
}
whether contribution of community funds to a mortgage on separate property give
s rise to an ownership right or a claim of reimbursement.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F81104553803_ID0EPL}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F81104553803_ID0EPL}
81
}}}
}
The language of section 766.63
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F82104553803_ID0ESL}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F82104553803_ID0ESL}
82
}}}
}
and
}
dType=L&pubNum=1002206&cite=ULMPS14&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce1d0
8a25&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Doc
umentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 14 of the UMPA
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F83104553803_ID0E4L}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F83104553803_ID0E4L}
83
}}}
}
on which the cases are based, appears to codify an ownership rationale rather t
han create a claim for reimbursement. Both the Wisconsin statute and the UMPA fo
cus on tracing property interests and imply that tracing means \u8220\'3funmixin
g\u8221\'3f those interests.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F84104553803_ID0EFM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F84104553803_ID0EFM}
84
}}}
}
Thus, if the separate property component of mixed property is \u8220\'3ftraced\
u8221\'3f the result would be the existence of two property interests in the sam
e asset\u8212\'3fseparate and community. The comments to
}
UMPA section 14
}}}
also support the ownership approach. These comments indicate that if community
property is used to make mortgage payments on separate property, the result woul
d be a mixture of separate and community property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F85104553803_ID0EYM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F85104553803_ID0EYM}
85
}}}
}
Finally, prominent commentators on the UMPA also assumed that, while the provis
ions were ambiguous, mixing under
}
section 14
}}}
through use of community property to reduce indebtedness on separate property w
ould create an ownership right and not merely a claim for reimbursement.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F86104553803_ID0EEN}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F86104553803_ID0EEN}
86
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELNAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELNAG_1}
Given the adoption of a reimbursement theory in Kobylski and the apparent confli
ct between that approach and the language of the Wisconsin statute and the UMPA
comments, Wisconsin\rquote s potential approach to community contributions to re
duction of indebtedness on separate property is hopelessly unpredictable.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXNAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXNAG_1}
III. APPORTIONMENT
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBOAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBOAG_1}
The apportionment approach of California, Nevada and New Mexico is based on the
notion that the payment of mortgage payments constitutes providing consideration
for the acquisition of the asset and consequently gives rise to an ownership in
terest in the asset. There are several problems with the approach, however. Firs
t, it is inconsistent with the general approach to ownership outside the area of
community property. Second, it creates ownership interests
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*717
}
}
that are not reflected in the recorded title documentation, casting doubt on th
e usefulness of the recording system. These interests are especially troubling b
ecause unlike equitable liens of the reimbursement states, these unrecorded inte
rests do not fit into an existing category of property rights. Finally, these in
terests may even survive purchase of the property by a bona fide purchaser.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F87104553803_ID0E3O}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F87104553803_ID0E3O}
87
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDPAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDPAG_1}
In general, outside the community property situation, the contribution of assets
toward the payment of a mortgage by itself does not give rise to an ownership r
ight in property. For example, parents who help a child make mortgage payments o
n a home owned by the child would not acquire an ownership interest in the child
\rquote s home. Rather the contribution of assets would either be treated as a g
ift or as a loan depending on the intention of the parties and the circumstances
at the time the parents contribute to the mortgage. Likewise, even where funds
are made available at the time of a purchase of property, the contribution of th
ose funds would not normally, by itself, give rise to an interest in the propert
y unless some intention that an ownership interest exists is present and can be
proved.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F88104553803_ID0ETP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F88104553803_ID0ETP}
88
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E1PAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E1PAG_1}
The policies of marital property law, and particularly of community property law
, does not yield a persuasive rationale for treating the contribution of marital
assets to the payment of a mortgage on non-marital property any differently.
}
Under Spanish law, title to property was fixed at the time the transaction to ac
quire the property was initiated and completion of the transaction after marriag
e, including installment payments made after marriage with community property, d
id not change the character of the asset as the separate property of the acquiri
ng spouse.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F89104553803_ID0EFQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F89104553803_ID0EFQ}
89
}}}
}
Most American jurisdictions followed this rule well into the 20th century.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F90104553803_ID0EKQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F90104553803_ID0EKQ}
90
}}}
}
The recent confusion has probably resulted, in some measure, because of the des
ire of courts to accomplish equity in inflationary real estate markets.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETQAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETQAG_1}
California is a good case study in the abandonment of the principle of inception
of right. A hypothetical may help illustrate the problem. Assume that H bought
a house on January 1, 1955, in Orange County California. At the time he bought t
he house he was not married and did not anticipate marriage. The purchase price
was
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*718
}
}
$50,000. H put down $10,000 and financed the remaining $40,000 using a conventi
onal 30 year mortgage at 3.5% interest. Several years later H met W and they got
married on January 1, 1961. Prior to the marriage, H made the mortgage payments
of $179.62/month using his salary. After the marriage he continued using his sa
lary for mortgage payments. At the time of the marriage, H had $15,112.97 equity
in the house and the fair market value of the house was $55,000. W did not work
outside the home during the marriage. In 1985, after four children and twenty-f
ive years of marriage, H and W are divorced. The mortgage on the house had just
been completely paid off and the fair market value of the house, at the time of
divorce was $250,000.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EISAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EISAG_1}
If a pure reimbursement approach, measured by the amount of contributions, is us
ed, at divorce, W will have a claim for reimbursement of one-half the value of t
he contributions to principal and interest, or $25,865.28.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F91104553803_ID0EQS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F91104553803_ID0EQS}
91
}}}
}
If, on the other hand, a pro rata approach is applied, W will have an ownership
interest in the house equal to approximately $87,217.57.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F92104553803_ID0EVS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F92104553803_ID0EVS}
92
}}}
}
The difference in these amounts and the apparent unfairness of not allowing W t
o share in the significant appreciation in the real estate market, combined with
the increasing difficulty of dealing with the economic consequences of the divo
rce on W through alimony
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F93104553803_ID0EYS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F93104553803_ID0EYS}
93
}}}
}
apparently motivated courts, particularly in California, to abandoned the notio
n of inception of right.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F94104553803_ID0E3S}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F94104553803_ID0E3S}
94
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDTAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDTAG_1}
If one accepts the abandonment of the inception of right test, the California ca
ses at least have the virtue of internal consistency. That is, the cases have tr
eated the interest created as a full-blown, vested, community property interest.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F95104553803_ID0EOT}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F95104553803_ID0EOT}
95
}}}
}
Moreover, the cases have not permitted offsets for rental value, correctly conc
luding that ownership includes the right to use and occupy the property. However
, the abandonment of inception of right is an unprincipled approach to the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*719
}
}
accomplishment of rough justice in an inflationary real estate market. This app
roach has both theoretical and practical problems.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECUAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECUAG_1}
The fact is that in most of these cases the property has already been purchased
at the time of the marriage and title is vested in the owner spouse. The origina
l investment risk was taken by the spouse who took the initial steps toward acqu
isition and the lender provided the purchase money necessary at the time the tra
nsaction was initiated. One of the fundamental principles of community property
has always been that the owner of separate property should be able to preserve t
he value of that separate property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F96104553803_ID0EQU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F96104553803_ID0EQU}
96
}}}
}
In an inflationary real estate market, the pro rata approach insures that a spo
use\rquote s separate property will steadily decrease in value as community prop
erty contributions and appreciation overtake the original investment.
}
In the previous hypothetical, H\rquote s ownership interest decreased from 100%
on the date of the marriage to approximately 30% on the date of divorce even tho
ugh no formal transmutation of the property took place.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F97104553803_ID0EXU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F97104553803_ID0EXU}
97
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5UAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5UAG_1}
A second justification offered for the adoption of the pro rata approach is the
apparent harshness of the inception of right approach on the non-owner spouse. T
he problem with this justification is that it fails to consider that because the
community resided in the property rent-free, community assets were freed up for
other purposes thereby benefitting the community.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENVAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENVAG_1}
If by harshness, courts are referring to the economic consequences of divorce on
the parties, and particularly on the wife, confusing ownership concepts of comm
unity property is not the appropriate mechanism for dealing with these issues. R
ather, equitable divisions of community property or awards of alimony would seem
to be better approaches.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3VAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3VAG_1}
IV. REIMBURSEMENT
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGWAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGWAG_1}
As the foregoing analysis shows, all the community property jurisdictions except
California, Nevada and New Mexico treat the community paydown of mortgage princ
ipal and interest on separate property as a loan, giving rise to a claim for rei
mbursement.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F98104553803_ID0EOW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F98104553803_ID0EOW}
98
}}}
}
Beyond that the similarity among the jurisdictions recognizing reimbursement
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*720
}
}
ends. Several have adopted a standard of enhancement in value as the measure of
the reimbursement claim rather than reimbursing the non-owner spouse for that a
ctual benefit received from the community\u8212\'3fmortgage principal and intere
st.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F99104553803_ID0E2W}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F99104553803_ID0E2W}
99
}}}
}
Others have created equitable liens to secure this claim without being clear re
garding the nature of the lien and with out questioning its propriety.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F100104553803_ID0EA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F100104553803_ID0EA}
100
}}}
}
Finally, these jurisdictions have, in large measure failed to adopt a meaningfu
l approach to assessing the value of the benefit received by the community in th
e form of rent-free use of the premises where such an assessment is appropriate.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJXAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJXAG_1}
A. Availability of an Equitable Lien
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESXAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESXAG_1}
Many jurisdictions adopting the reimbursement approach have also held that an eq
uitable lien arises at the time the payments are made.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F101104553803_ID0E1}
101
}}}
}
While, in general, equitable liens are frequently given when benefits are confe
rred on real estate, rarely do such liens arise under circumstances in which the
y cannot be enforced.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F102104553803_ID0E6}
102
}}}
}
In addition, the courts are anything but clear about the nature of this lien. I
n 1969, Professor Bartke documented the confusion regarding the nature of the li
en created in these cases.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F103104553803_ID0EH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F103104553803_ID0EH}
103
}}}
}
While most of the jurisdictions today appear to recognize the pro tanto nature
of the lien, confusion still abounds. One commentator has even suggested, presum
ably erroneously, that the remedy of the non-owner spouse is limited to the equi
table lien.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F104104553803_ID0EP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F104104553803_ID0EP}
104
}}}
}
Even where the courts are careful to describe the lien as a pro tanto lien, as
opposed to a judgment lien, securing the eventual reimbursement judgment confusi
on exists. Can this lien be cut off by a bona fide purchaser? Does its existence
mean that the property has to be treated as community property for purposes of
dual management, inheritance and equitable division? Can it be recorded during t
he existence of an on-going marriage?
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBZAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBZAG_1}
The answers to these questions are complex. At first blush one might answer the
bona fide purchaser question in the affirmative because such unrecorded interest
s generally can be cut off.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F105104553803_ID0EM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F105104553803_ID0EM}
105
}}}
}
However,
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*721
}
}
when the third party\rquote s rights are considered in the context of dual mana
gement rules, this equitable lien is, after all, a community property interest i
n real estate.
}
Generally transfers of community real estate require the consent of both spouses
and the transaction is at least voidable by the non-consenting spouse.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F106104553803_ID0EZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F106104553803_ID0EZ}
106
}}}
}
In most jurisdictions that have broad recording statutes that allow the recordi
ng of almost any document relating to land, an affidavit of lien is probably rec
ordable and such recording would resolve much of the bona fide purchaser issue.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F107104553803_ID0E5}
107
}}}
}
However, it\rquote s not likely that the average married couple would consider
recording the fact that they make mortgage payments on a piece of separate prope
rty real estate with community property!
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EH1AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EH1AG_1}
The incremental benefit that the pro tanto lien adds over and above a reimbursem
ent claim is not always clear. Especially if the lien can be cut off by a bona f
ide purchaser, it seems to add little protection to the non-owner spouse\rquote
s interest. The community property interest giving rise to the lien cannot be re
duced to judgment and executed upon until divorce. At that time, if sufficient p
roperty exists, the lien can attach to that property to secure the reimbursement
claim, or, in jurisdictions that permit, an unequal division of community prope
rty can be accomplished to set off the reimbursement claim. If there are not eno
ugh assets at the time of divorce, the equitable lien won\rquote t somehow incre
ase the total asset pool!
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E61AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E61AG_1}
B. Measure of Recovery
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EI2AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EI2AG_1}
Some reimbursement jurisdictions measure the reimbursement claim by the enhancem
ent in value of the separate property attributable to the community contribution
s.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F108104553803_ID0EQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F108104553803_ID0EQ}
108
}}}
}
That measure has been held by some courts to be equivalent to the amount the eq
uity on the mortgage is reduced,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F109104553803_ID0ET}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F109104553803_ID0ET}
109
}}}
}
and by others to include, in addition, a pro rata share in any appreciation of
the underlying property.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F110104553803_ID0EY}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F110104553803_ID0EY}
110
}}}
}
This
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*722
}
}
enhancement in value measure of recovery seems to be inconsistent with principa
ls of restitution which should govern the valuation of the reimbursement claim.
Reimbursement is based on the notion that property, once acquired, does not chan
ge its character as separate or community property in the absence of a gift or o
ther transmutation. Thus, when property of one estate is used for the benefit of
the other estate, a reimbursement claim arises to prevent unjust enrichment by
forcing the one spouse to disgorge the benefit received.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F111104553803_ID0EH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F111104553803_ID0EH}
111
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EO3AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EO3AG_1}
This concept of preventing unjust enrichment by requiring one spouse to reimburs
e the community estate for contributions made by it for the benefit of that spou
se\rquote s separate property is fundamentally inconsistent with the enhancement
in value test. Any appropriate measure of the unjust enrichment action for reim
bursement would include not only principal but also interest within the definiti
on of benefit. Certainly the paydown of the loan interest is a benefit received
by the separate property estate. Without such interest payments, the loan would
have been in default with the possible foreclosure and loss of the property to f
ollow.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ED4AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ED4AG_1}
Defining benefit to include both principal and interest may not actually be inco
nsistent with the approach the courts are taking. For example, one Louisiana cou
rt appeared to recognize that the payment of interest by the community benefits
the separate estate since interest was part of the actual \u8220\'3fcost of main
taining the natural and civil fruits of this separate property.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F112104553803_ID0EX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F112104553803_ID0EX}
112
}}}
}
However, the court concluded that interest was not reimbursable because the spo
uses benefitted from residing in the house.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F113104553803_ID0E3}
113
}}}
}
Other cases however, do not permit reimbursement of more than the principal and
do not discuss the reasons for limiting the claim, giving rise to the appearanc
e that enhancement in value is limited to principal reductions alone.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F114104553803_ID0EB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F114104553803_ID0EB}
114
}}}
}
Even
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*723
}
}
in courts allowing the reimbursement of both principal and interest, the approa
ch needs to be clarified. Interest, as a benefit received by the separate proper
ty estate, is reimbursable. Only when an offsetting claim for fair rental value
is made, should the reimbursement claim for both interest and principal be reduc
ed. Language to the contrary in the cases is inconsistent with the theory of rei
mbursement. The only possible incremental benefit of the pro tanto lien approach
is that the existence of such a lien subjects the property to equitable divisio
n and inheritance rights of both spouses because that position of the property i
nterest encumbered by the lien is community property.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E25AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E25AG_1}
C. Setoffs for Fair Rental Value
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EE6AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EE6AG_1}
Many jurisdictions have recognized that where the community resides in the prope
rty, or where the community obtained the benefits of rents,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F115104553803_ID0EK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F115104553803_ID0EK}
115
}}}
}
the rental value should be set off against the reimbursement claim.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F116104553803_ID0EP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F116104553803_ID0EP}
116
}}}
}
In theory, this is entirely consistent with the law of unjust enrichment. After
all, the availability of rent-free housing freed the community assets for other
purposes. The problem is that, in the courts of the community property states,
this setoff has little content. Many cases that consider a setoff appear to pres
ume, in the absence of any reasonable proof, that the fair rental value of the p
roperty is equal to the payment of principal, taxes and insurance.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
ference_F117104553803_ID0E4}
117
}}}
}
They do not appear to entertain evidence on the question of rental value.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGABG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGABG_1}
V. CONCLUSION
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQABG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQABG_1}
The most theoretically consistent approach to the mortgage paydown situation is
to treat the community claim as one for reimbursement at the time the marriage i
s terminated. The measure of this reimbursement claim should be the amount of co
mmunity property contributed to mortgage payments set off by the fair rental val
ue of the property if the spouses resided in it or obtained the benefits of rent
als. While a court may choose to secure the reimbursement claim at divorce with
a lien on the other spouse\rquote s property, it should avoid the pro tanto lien
with its potential for confusion. This approach best
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*724
}
}
respects the interests of the spouses within the framework of the community pro
perty policy. It avoids unintended transmutation of property yet provides a mech
anism by which the true benefit and detriment to the community and separate esta
tes can be considered. Finally it avoids altering ownership rights during marria
ge for the purpose of effectuating equity at divorce.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0 {
\clpadl200 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth10080 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Footnotes
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row
}
\clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \clwWidth600 \cellx600
\clpadb90 \clpadfb3 \clpadl90 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth9480 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_Fa1104553803_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_Fa1104553803_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_Fa1104553803_ID0E5N" }{\fld
rslt
a1
}\f2 \super \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs20 \cf5 \i0 }}
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li0 \b0 \ql \fs20 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. B.A., 1979, the College
of Wooster, J.D., 1982, Case Western Reserve University. Several graduates of t
he University of Idaho served as research assistants and made significant contri
butions to the preparation of this article and I deeply appreciate their efforts
. They are Tamsen Leachman, 1993, Kellie Youmans, 1993, and Judith Felt, 1993.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\f2 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \qj \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_F1104553803_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_F1104553803_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F1104553803_ID0EYDA" }{\fld
rslt
1
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In this article I will refer to the spouse who originally acquired the separate
property as the \u8220\'3fowner spouse,\u8221\'3f and I will refer to the spouse
who did not originally acquire the property but who has contributed community p
roperty to the paydown of mortgage principal and interest, \u8220\'3fnon-owner s
pouse.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F2104553803_ID0ENEA" }{\fld
rslt
2
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
IDAHO LAW FOUNDATION, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO
}
}
\u167\'3f 5.2, at 2-4 (Joann Henderson ed., 1982); Richard W. Bartke, Yours, Mi
ne and Ours\u8212\'3fSeparate Title and Community Funds, 44
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WASH.L.REV.
}
}
379, 398-405 (1969); Richard W. Mollerup, Comment,
}
dType=Y&serNum=0102737383&pubNum=1164&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce1
d08a25&refType=LR&fi=co_pp_sp_1164_1026&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1164_1026" }{
\fldrslt
Improvements to Real Property During Marriage: It\rquote s Time for Idaho to Mak
e a Decision, 28
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
IDAHO L.REV.
}
}
1021, 1026-27 (1992)
}\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0 }}
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F3104553803_ID0ESEA" }{\fld
rslt
3
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See discussion of Nevada and New Mexico, infra notes and accompanying text.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F4104553803_ID0EJJA" }{\fld
rslt
4
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
California law has not always been so clear. Prior to the decision in
}
dType=Y&serNum=1980144026&pubNum=661&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce1d
08a25&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_661_210&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_661_210" }{\fldr
slt
Moore v. Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210 (Cal.1980)
(en banc), one line of authority even suggested that no right, ownership or oth
erwise, was created by the expenditure of community funds on separate property.
For an interesting discussion of the earlier confusion in California, see Bartke
, supra note 2, at 405-10. The author notes there that \u8220\'3f[t]he law of Ca
lifornia must be discussed separately. It defies not only classification, but ra
tionalization as well.\u8221\'3f Bartke, sufra note 2, at 405-10.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F5104553803_ID0EMJA" }{\fld
rslt
5
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
08a25&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
618 P.2d 208 (Cal.1980)
(en banc).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F6104553803_ID0E4JA" }{\fld
rslt
6
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
dType=Y&serNum=1980144026&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25&refTy
pe=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&
contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Id. at 210
(emphasis added) (quoting
}
slt
Forbes v. Forbes, 257 P.2d 721, 722 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1953)
).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F7104553803_ID0ELKA" }{\fld
rslt
7
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 210 n. 1.
\par
}
}
}
}\f2 \li0 \b0 \qj \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F8104553803_ID0EQKA" }{\fld
rslt
8
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 210.
Pro rata ownership refers to the idea that the present ownership interest is ap
portioned between the separate and community estates in relation to the amount o
f consideration provided by each.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STAT
ES
}
}
6-5 (4th ed. 1994). By contrast, the inception of right doctrine fixes ownershi
p at the time there is a right to acquire title. Id. at 6-4. Thereafter, under t
he inception of right doctrine, contributions of consideration give rise to only
a right of reimbursement.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F9104553803_ID0E5KA" }{\fld
rslt
9
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Moore, 618 P.2d at 211
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F10104553803_ID0ECL" }{\fld
rslt
10
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. Presumably, if the value of the property had decreased the community and sep
arate share of ownership would also decrease proportionally.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F11104553803_ID0ERL" }{\fld
rslt
11
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F12104553803_ID0E2L" }{\fld
rslt
12
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F13104553803_ID0EDM" }{\fld
rslt
13
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F14104553803_ID0EHM" }{\fld
rslt
14
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. Moore has been criticized for assigning the entire value of the outstanding
loan balance to the spouse who acquired the property. See Peter M. Moldave, Comm
ent, The
}
d08a25&refType=LR&fi=co_pp_sp_1107_1286&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1107_1286" }{
\fldrslt
Division of the Family Residence Acquired with a Mixture of Separate and Communi
ty Funds, 70
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
CAL.L.REV.
}
}
1263, 1286 (1982)
( \u8220\'3fThe ... [Moore] method is defective, however, as applied to loans w
hich are taken out by one party before marriage and paid by the other or by the
community after marriage. The defect is that, as part of its allocation of the a
ppreciation in proportion to the contributions to the purchase price, ... [[[[Mo
ore] treats the loan proceeds as an asset that was contributed entirely as separ
ate or community property. This means that the loan proceeds are misallocated to
the extent that principal payments are made by other than the interest taking o
ut the loan.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F15104553803_ID0E1M" }{\fld
rslt
15
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
792 P.2d 372 (Nev.1990)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F16104553803_ID0E6M" }{\fld
rslt
16
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 376-77.
Consistent with the critique of Moore in Moldave, supra note 14, at 1286, the N
evada court modified the valuation formula adopted in Moore so that the balance
of the loan is allocated to the separate and community payments in proportion to
the number of payments each interest made as opposed to the amount of principal
contributed by the community.
}
slt
Malmquist, 792 P.2d at 377
.
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Despite the Malmquist court\rquote s extensive reliance on Moore, a California c
ase, the concept that community contributions to a mortgage on separate property
give rise to a pro tanto community property interest in the property had been l
ong recognized by Nevada courts. See
}
slt
Barrett v. Franke, 208 P. 435, 437 (Nev.1922)
(\u8220\'3f[T]he property would have been community property \u8216\'3fto the e
xtent and in the proportion that the consideration furnished by the community, t
he spouse supplying the separate funds have a separate interest in the property
in proportion to the amount of his or her investment\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f (quoti
ng
}
slt
Guye v. Guye, 115 P. 731, 735 (Wash.1911)
)); see also
}
slt
York v. York, 718 P.2d 670, 671 (Nev.1986)
(holding that if part of separate property is purchased with community funds, t
he community acquires a pro tanto interest in that property);
}
08a25&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_661_1262&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_661_1262" }{\fl
drslt
Sly v. Sly, 679 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Nev.1984)
(explaining that the community acquires an interest to the extent of the purcha
se price contributed by the community);
}
slt
Robison v. Robison, 691 P.2d 451, 453 (Nev.1984)
(concluding that the community is entitled to a pro tanto interest in separate
property).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F17104553803_ID0E4N" }{\fld
rslt
17
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Malmquist, 792 P.2d at 376
(emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F18104553803_ID0EQO" }{\fld
rslt
18
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.; Bartke, supra note 2, at 386.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F19104553803_ID0EYO" }{\fld
rslt
19
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
California appears to have concluded, consistent with its finding of an ownershi
p interest, that ownership rights exists during an ongoing marriage. In
}
Reiserer v. Foothill Thrift & Loan, 256 Cal.Rptr. 508 (Ct.App.1989)
, a court recognizing the creation of such a pro tanto community interest, grant
ed a preliminary injunction to a wife seeking to block foreclosure of property a
cquired by her husband prior to marriage but paid for, in part, by community pro
perty contribution to the mortgage.
}
Id. at 511.
In addition, such ownership rights would include the requirement that both spou
ses consent to the alienation or encumbrance of community property. Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F20104553803_ID0ENP" }{\fld
rslt
20
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
691 P.2d 451 (Nev.1984)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F21104553803_ID0ESP" }{\fld
rslt
21
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 454.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F22104553803_ID0E2P" }{\fld
rslt
22
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 453.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F23104553803_ID0EXQ" }{\fld
rslt
23
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
659 P.2d 895 (N.M.1983)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F24104553803_ID0E3Q" }{\fld
rslt
24
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 897.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F25104553803_ID0EBR" }{\fld
rslt
25
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. The court relied on Moore for the proposition that community contributions t
o interest, taxes and related expenses did not give rise to a community property
interest in the property. Id. (citing
}
slt
Moore v. Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Cal.1980)
).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F26104553803_ID0EER" }{\fld
rslt
26
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
731 P.2d 959 (N.M.Ct.App.1986)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F27104553803_ID0EIR" }{\fld
rslt
27
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 963.
Earlier New Mexico cases had reached similar results but were not as clear rega
rding the method of apportioning ownership. See, e.g.,
}
drslt
Hertz v. Hertz, 657 P.2d 1169, 1176 (N.M.1983)
;
}
slt
Michelson v. Michelson, 551 P.2d 638, 645 (N.M.1976)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F28104553803_ID0EXR" }{\fld
rslt
28
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
Chance, 659 P.2d at 897
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F29104553803_ID0E6R" }{\fld
rslt
29
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F30104553803_ID0ELS" }{\fld
rslt
30
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Dorbin, 731 P.2d at 964
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F31104553803_ID0EEU" }{\fld
rslt
31
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
LA.CIV.CODE ANN.
}
}
art. 2364 (West 1985)
.
}
Article 2364
expressly refers to a claim for reimbursement. See also
}
slt
Loyacono v. Loyacono, 618 So.2d 896, 898 (La.Ct.App.1993)
(holding that the non-owner spouse was entitled to reimbursement of one-half of
the community property spent on the improvements or the enhanced value of the p
roperty);
}
slt
Parker v. Parker, 517 So.2d 264, 266 (La.Ct.App.1987)
the principal payments on the mortgage);
}
slt
Longo v. Longo, 474 So.2d 500, 503 (La.Ct.App.1985)
(\u8220\'3f[T]he reimbursement should be limited to one-half the amount of prin
cipal paid on the mortgage notes.\u8221\'3f), cert denied,
}
477 So.2d 711 (La.1985)
;
}
slt
Cook v. Cook, 457 So.2d 235, 241 (La.Ct.App.1984)
(holding that only the principal paid on the mortgage is a debt owed to the com
munity);
}
slt
Willis v. Willis, 454 So.2d 429, 430-31 (La.Ct.App.1984)
the principal payments on the mortgage).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F32104553803_ID0EOU" }{\fld
rslt
32
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
;
}
slt
, writ denied,
}
477 So.2d 711 (La.1985)
;
}
slt
Cook v. Cook, 457 So.2d 235, 241 (La.Ct.App.1984)
;
}
slt
Willis v. Willis, 454 So.2d 429, 430-31 (La.Ct.App.1984)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F33104553803_ID0ESU" }{\fld
rslt
33
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Parker, 517 So.2d at 266
(\u8220\'3f[T]he payment of interest benefited the community because this was a
cost of maintaining the natural and civil fruits of this separate property for
the community\rquote s use. Therefore, the interest cost should not be included
in the amount to which the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement.\u8221\'3f)
. Apparently the Louisiana courts are ready to presume that the benefits receive
d by the community are equal to interest costs.
}
It does not appear that the independent factual finding regarding the value to t
he community of residing in the separate property house are necessary to support
the courts\rquote conclusion that only principal is reimbursable.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F34104553803_ID0EMV" }{\fld
rslt
34
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
1972
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
}
}
}
art. 2408 (West 1973)
(repealed 1979).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F35104553803_ID0EZV" }{\fld
rslt
35
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
}
Article 2408
provided:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been increased
or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be
entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase or amelioration
s, if it be proved that the increase of ameliorations be the result of common la
bor, expenses of industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved tha
t the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in valu
e of the property, or to the chances of trade.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. Under this provision the recovery for community contributions that reduced a
separate indebtedness was equal to the enhancement in value, or, in other words
, one half the reduction in principal. See
}
slt
Hurta v. Hurta, 260 So.2d 324, 327 n. 4 (La.Ct.App.1972)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F36104553803_ID0EOW" }{\fld
rslt
36
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
LA.CIV.CODE ANN.
}
}
arts. 2358
-
}
2368
(West 1985 & Supp.1994); see also Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Ma
nagement Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regim
es Law, 40
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
LA.L.REV.
}
}
83, 141-142 (1979).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F37104553803_ID0EDX" }{\fld
rslt
37
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Spaht & Samuel, supra note 36, at 142.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F38104553803_ID0EIX" }{\fld
rslt
38
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
LA.CIV.CODE ANN.
}
}
art. 2364
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F39104553803_ID0EWX" }{\fld
rslt
39
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. (emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F40104553803_ID0EAY" }{\fld
rslt
40
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Article 2360 defines community obligations as follows: \u8220\'3fAn obligation i
ncurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the
common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a comm
unity obligation.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
LA.CIV.CODE ANN.
}
}
art. 2360 (West 1985)
(emphasis added). But see Spaht & Samuel, supra note 36, at 142 (\u8220\'3fUnde
r
}
article 2360
... the definition of a community obligation includes one incurred during the r
egime for the common interest of the spouses. The definition in Act 709, however
, also includes an obligation incurred for the interest of the other spouse.\u82
21\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F41104553803_ID0EIZ" }{\fld
rslt
41
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
LA.CIV.CODE ANN.
}
}
art 2364
cmt.d (West 1985) (emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F42104553803_ID0EV1" }{\fld
rslt
42
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex.1990)
(\u8220\'3fThis divorce case concerns the proper measure for reimbursement when
community funds are used to pay a prenuptial, purchase money debt.\u8221\'3f) D
espite the reimbursement language of Penick and most other modern Texas cases in
this area, early Texas cases speak of the claim arising from community contribu
tions that reduce separate property indebtedness as being in the nature of an \u
8220\'3fequitable charge\u8221\'3f on the subject property. See, e.g.,
}
slt
Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.1935)
. Such an equitable charge appears similar in nature to the pro tanto community
property interest that arises in California under the same circumstances, althou
gh California professes to acknowledge a more substantial interest than an equit
able charge. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text. In any case, such a cha
rge would create an interest in the property merely by virtue of the contributio
n of community property to the reduction of the indebtedness. Such an interest w
ould seem to inconsistent with the language of more modern Texas cases that spea
k exclusively of a claim for reimbursement. Many of these modern cases result in
the placing of a equitable lien on the separate property of the spouse who bene
fited from the reduction of indebtedness; however, these cases appear clearly to
be referring to a lien in the nature of a judgment lien.
}
See
}
08a25&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_713_11&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.
0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_713_11" }{\fldrsl
t
Mullins v. Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5, 11-12 (Tex.Ct.App.1990)
; Joseph W. McNight,
}
d08a25&refType=LR&fi=co_pp_sp_1243_422&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1243_422" }{\f
ldrslt
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 45
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
SW.L.J.
}
}
415, 422-23 (1991)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F43104553803_ID0EY1" }{\fld
rslt
43
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
783 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.1988)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F44104553803_ID0EA2" }{\fld
rslt
44
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex.1985)
(\u8220\'3f[A] claim for reimbursement for funds expended by an estate for impr
ovements to another estate is to be measured by the enhancement in value to the
benefited estate.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F45104553803_ID0EF2" }{\fld
rslt
45
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
The confusion in the Texas courts is aptly documented in Fred C. Weekley,
}
d08a25&refType=LR&fi=co_pp_sp_1099_963&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1099_963" }{\f
ldrslt
Reimbursement Between Separate and Community Estates\u8212\'3fThe Current Texas
View, 39
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
BAYLOR L.REV.
}
}
945, 963-65 (1987)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F46104553803_ID0EP2" }{\fld
rslt
46
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F47104553803_ID0ET2" }{\fld
rslt
47
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F48104553803_ID0EC3" }{\fld
rslt
48
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 197-98.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F49104553803_ID0EG3" }{\fld
rslt
49
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
rslt
50
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
Drahos v. Rens, 717 P.2d 927, 928 (Ariz.Ct.App.1985)
( \u8220\'3f[A] residence which is separate property does not change its charac
ter because it is used as a family home and mortgage payments are made from comm
unity funds.\u8221\'3f);
}
slt
Potthoff v. Potthoff, 627 P.2d 708, 713 (Ariz.Ct.App.1981)
(\u8220\'3fIf the husband satisfied [a] separate obligation with community fund
s, then, at most, the community might acquire a claim for reimbursement for such
payment in the nature of an equitable lien on the property.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F51104553803_ID0E23" }{\fld
rslt
51
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
717 P.2d 927 (Ariz.Ct.App.1985)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F52104553803_ID0EA4" }{\fld
rslt
52
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 928-29.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F53104553803_ID0EE4" }{\fld
rslt
53
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
Horton v. Horton, 278 P. 370, 371 (Ariz.1929)
(recognizing that an equitable lien arises for the amount of community property
funds used to pay mortgage on separate property);
}
slt
Wolfswinkel v. Superior Court, 700 P.2d 852, 854 (Ariz.Ct.App.1984)
(\u8220\'3fAn equitable lien is a right over property constituting an encumbran
ce, so that the property itself may be proceeded against in an equitable action
and either sold or sequestered upon proof of a contract out of which the lien co
uld grow or of a duty on the part of the holder so as to give the other party a
charge or lien on it. It is merely floating equity until the time that a judgmen
t or decree is rendered actually subjecting the property to the payment of the d
ebt or claim.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
rslt
54
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
rslt
55
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
181 Cal.Rptr. 910, 915 (Ct.App.1982)
(citing
}
Moore v. Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal.1980)
).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
rslt
56
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Drahos, 717 P.2d at 929.
In an especially confusing opinion, one Arizona appellate court appears to have
endorsed a measure of recovery equal to \u8220\'3fcommunity funds expended for
the benefit of\u8221\'3f the separate estate.
}
slt
Hanrahan v. Sims, 512 P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz.Ct.App.1973)
. This language seems to authorize a creditor approach to the resolution of the
community claim as opposed to an enhancement in value standard. The opinion is e
specially confusing because it relies on authority that expressly adopts the enh
ancement in value standard. In addition, to the extent the opinion appears to au
thorize a non-enhancement test, the Drahos court expressly disavowed it.
}
slt
Drahos, 717 P.2d at 929
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F57104553803_ID0EX5" }{\fld
rslt
57
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
I AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
}
}
\u167\'3f 10 (4th ed. 1987).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F58104553803_ID0EP6" }{\fld
rslt
58
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In most community property states, a divorce court only has jurisdiction to divi
de community property and cannot divest a spouse of his or her interest in separ
ate property.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F59104553803_ID0EFB" }{\fld
rslt
59
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F60104553803_ID0EKB" }{\fld
rslt
60
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 842-43
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F61104553803_ID0EYB" }{\fld
rslt
61
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 843
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F62104553803_ID0E4B" }{\fld
rslt
62
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F63104553803_ID0EDC" }{\fld
rslt
63
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
102 Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 (Ct.App.1982)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F64104553803_ID0EWC" }{\fld
rslt
64
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Id. at 861, 642 P.2d at 952
(emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F65104553803_ID0ETD" }{\fld
rslt
65
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F66104553803_ID0EYD" }{\fld
rslt
66
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Id at 52, 277 P.2d at 282
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F67104553803_ID0ERE" }{\fld
rslt
67
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Id. at 53, 277 P.2d at 283.
Gapsch has been followed in many Idaho cases. See, e.g.,
}
drslt
Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 465, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1976)
(holding that non-owner spouse is entitled to reimbursement for community funds
used to make physical improvement on husband\rquote s separate farm property);
}
slt
Hooker v. Hooker, 95 Idaho 518, 521, 511 P.2d 800, 803 (1972)
(holding that enhancement in value is the measure of reimbursement when communi
ty funds are used to make physical improvements on separate property);
}
drslt
Hiatt v. Hiatt, 94 Idaho 367, 368, 487 P.2d 1121, 1122 (1971)
(holding that the reimbursement claim was for the amount of the improvements to
husband\rquote s business property);
}
slt
Tilton v. Tilton, 85 Idaho 245, 250, 378 P.2d 191, 194 (1963)
(holding that the amount of reimbursement to the community is measured by an en
hancement in value of the husband\rquote s estate).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F68104553803_ID0ERF" }{\fld
rslt
68
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In
}
Keller v. Rogstad, 112 Idaho 484, 733 P.2d 705 (1987)
, the court held that certain separate property of the husband could not be tran
sferred without the wife\rquote s consent because she had acquired an interest i
n the property as a result of community contributions to improvements and becaus
e of several other factors which should have been insufficient to create such an
interest.
}
slt
Id. at 487, 733 P.2d at 708.
At worst, this recent Idaho case may have recognized a pro rata sharing approac
h. For a thorough discussion see Mollerup, supra note 2, at 1034-38.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F69104553803_ID0ECG" }{\fld
rslt
69
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
Merkel v. Merkel, 234 P.2d 857, 863 (Wash.1951)
;
}
slt
Conley v. Moe, 110 P.2d 172, 174-75 (Wash.1941)
; see also
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK
}
}
\u167\'3f 3.70A.4, at 3-89 to 3-94 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK
}
}
]; Harry M. Cross, The
}
d08a25&refType=LR&fi=co_pp_sp_1281_67&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1281_67" }{\fld
rslt
Community Property Law in Washington (Revised 1985), 61
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
WASH.L.REV.
}
}
13, 67 (1986)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F70104553803_ID0E4G" }{\fld
rslt
70
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Cross, supra note 69, at 71. Professor Cross propounds a unique position, based
on notions of implied consent, that the crucial question is whether a spouse is
using community funds with respect to his or her own separate property versus wh
ether a spouse is using community funds to with respect to the other spouse\rquo
te s separate property. Cross, supra note 69, at 71. Thus he concludes \u8220\'3
fif a spouse expends community funds in connection with his or her separate prop
erty, the claim for the community estate should be the full expenditure, both be
cause the other spouse\rquote s interest in those funds would otherwise be deple
ted without consent and because the funds could be used to secure a full return
by almost any other use.\u8221\'3f Cross, supra note 69, at 71. Whereas, Cross a
rgues, where community funds have been used by one spouse to improve the other s
pouse\rquote s separate property
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
only the increased value should be the measure, because the contributing spouse
hardly needs to be protected against an unintended use of the community asset, a
nd there would be a danger that a contrary result could involve giving a power t
o one spouse to \u8216\'3fimprove the other out\u8217\'3f of his (or her) separa
te property.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Cross, supra note 67, at 71. Cross\rquote notion seems to be rooted in outmoded
notions of male management. Given concepts of equal management it is difficult
to draw the conclusion from the payment of a mortgage that one spouse is acting
to the exclusion of the other spouse. Moreover since either spouse can seize man
agerial control of community funds (by marshalling them first) it is hard to see
how one would need to be protected after the fact from the managerial power of
the other. Finally, to the extent that inequities have controlled the management
of marital property it would seem more appropriate to deal with these issues in
the context of equitable division rather than in the context of property classi
fication.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F71104553803_ID0EIH" }{\fld
rslt
71
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
234 P.2d 857 (Wash.1951)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F72104553803_ID0EWH" }{\fld
rslt
72
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 864;
see also
}
slt
In re Marriage of Harshman, 567 P.2d 667, 671 (Wash.Ct.App.1977)
(\u8220\'3fAlthough the Nevins property must be characterized as the husband\rq
uote s separate property, the community has a right of reimbursement protected b
y an equitable lien against the property to the extent that community funds were
used to discharge the principal on the mortgage....\u8221\'3f) (emphasis added)
. Two other Washington cases are frequently cited with Merkel, for the propositi
on that the measure of reimbursement is the value of the funds contributed.
}
Farrow v. Ostrom, 133 P.2d 974 (Wash.1943)
involved an attempt by a tort creditor of the husband to execute against former
community property in possession of the wife.
}
Id. at 975.
The property had been acquired during the marriage by use of a down payment tha
t consisted, in part, of the wife\rquote s separate property.
}
Id. at 977.
The court concluded that he property had been community property and remained s
ubject to execution and attachment for the husband\rquote s debt; however, it cr
edited the wife for her separate contributions to the acquisition of the propert
y, supporting this action by analogy to the situation where community funds are
used to reduce indebtedness on community property.
}
Id. at 977-78.
The court did not break down the nature of the wife\rquote s contributions to t
he property into principal and interest; the lion\rquote s share of the amount w
as a contribution to principal.
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Fritch v. Fritch, 335 P.2d 43 (Wash.1959)
, involved a dispute between a former husband and wife over property acquired du
ring the marriage but not divided by the divorce decree.
}
Id. at 45.
The court concluded that the property had been community property and that, con
sequently, the parties held interest as co-tenants.
}
Id. at 47.
The issue in the case was whether the husband as one co-tenant had ousted the w
ife so that adverse possession of her interest had taken place.
}
Id. at 47-48.
The court held that there had been no ouster but impressed the former wife\rquo
te s co-tenancy interest with a lien for one half the value of the taxes, assess
ments and improvements to the property added by the husband as the amount of con
tribution he was entitled to as co-tenant.
}
Id. at 49.
The court also held that the wife has waived her claim as co-tenant to any rent
s she may have otherwise been entitled to offset this amount. Id. Again, the cas
e may be relevant to the extent community property interests are treated similar
ly to co-tenancy but did not involve any consideration of the unique policies or
principals of community property in adjudicating the parties rights.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F73104553803_ID0ECI" }{\fld
rslt
73
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
In re Marriage of Wakefield, 763 P.2d 459, 461 (Wash.Ct.App.1988)
(\u8220\'3fIf the money was used to pay mortgage expenses that were not met by
rental income, i.e., debt reduction as opposed to improvements, it is suggested
... the measure of recovery is dollar for dollar, rather than a portion of the i
ncrease in value.\u8221\'3f (citing
}
08a25&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_661_49&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.
0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_661_49" }{\fldrsl
t
Fritch v. Fritch, 335 P.2d 43, 49 (Wash.1959)
));
}
slt
Pollock v. Pollock, 499 P.2d 231, 237-38 (Wash.Ct.App.1972)
(\u8220\'3fIf post-marital payments came from community property, the community
would have an interest in or with respect to the separate property involved, ei
ther for reimbursement of community funds expended or by way of equitable lien t
o protect the community\rquote s interest....\u8221\'3f (citing
}
slt
Farrow v. Ostrom 133 P.2d 974, 977 (Wash.1943)
));
}
slt
). One author has concluded, \u8220\'3fprior [Washington] case law gave the comm
unity a right to reimbursement plus interest for principal payments made on sepa
rate mortgage obligations.\u8221\'3f Martin Gales, Comment, Serving Two Masters:
Expenditure of Community Labor and Assets on Separate Property in Washington,
}
19
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
GONZ.L.REV.
}
}
519, 532-33 (1984) (citing
}
Merkel v. Merkel, 234 P.2d 857 (Wash.1951)
). Gales continues by stating that more recent Washington authority such as
}
In re Marriage of Elam, 650 P.2d 213 (Wash.1982)
, may require a court to apportion increases in value using a formula similar to
California\rquote Moore formula. Id. On the latter point the author seems to b
e misplaced. The majority of Washington authority has distinguished between situ
ations involving physical improvements to real estate such as Elam, and contribu
tions of community funds to the reduction of indebtedness on separate property.
See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK,
}
}
supra note 67, \u167\'3f 3.70.A.1, at 3-83; Cross, supra note 69, at 71.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F74104553803_ID0EJJ" }{\fld
rslt
74
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
For reasons of consistency, this article will use the terms community property a
nd separate property to refer to marital and individual property, respectively.
The use of the terms \u8220\'3fmarital\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3findividual\u8221\
'3f in the Uniform Marital Property Act (\u8220\'3fUMPA\u8221\'3f) and in the Wi
sconsin marital property provisions based on the UMPA did not alter the essentia
l nature of the act as a community property statute. See Kornfield, Uniform Mari
tal Property Act\u8212\'3fPrefatory Note 4
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
EQUIT. DISTRIBUTION REP.
}
}
Dec. 1983, at 6, 70-71; James J. Podell, Impact of Wisconsin\rquote s Marital P
roperty Act on Family Law, 68
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
MARQ.L.REV.
}
}
448, 449 (1985).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F75104553803_ID0ETJ" }{\fld
rslt
75
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
dType=L&pubNum=1000260&cite=WIST766.63&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce
1d08a25&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
WIS.STAT.ANN.
}
}
\u167\'3f 766.63 (West 1993)
.
}
Section 766.63
provides:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(1) Except as provided otherwise in \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 766.71 and 766.62, mixing
marital property with property other than marital property reclassifies the oth
er property to marital property unless the component of the mixed property which
is not marital property can be traced.
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(2) Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inventiveness, physi
cal or intellectual skill, creativity or managerial activity to either spouse\rq
uote s property other than marital property creates marital property attributabl
e to that application if both the following apply:
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(a) Reasonable compensation is not received for the application.
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(b) Substantial appreciation of the property results from the application.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F76104553803_ID0E3J" }{\fld
rslt
76
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F77104553803_ID0EBK" }{\fld
rslt
77
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
In re Geise, 132 B.R. 908, 914-15 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1991)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F78104553803_ID0EGK" }{\fld
rslt
78
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 915.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F79104553803_ID0ELK" }{\fld
rslt
79
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
slt
In re Estate of Kobylski, 503 N.W.2d 369, 375-76 (Wis.Ct.App.1993)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F80104553803_ID0EYK" }{\fld
rslt
80
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 376.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F81104553803_ID0EPL" }{\fld
rslt
81
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. at 377 n. 9;
see supra notes\u8212\'3fand accompanying text.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F82104553803_ID0ESL" }{\fld
rslt
82
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
WIS.STAT.ANN.
}
}
\u167\'3f 766.63
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F83104553803_ID0E4L" }{\fld
rslt
83
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
UMPA \u167\'3f 14
, 9A U.L.A. 131 (1987).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F84104553803_ID0EFM" }{\fld
rslt
84
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
WIS.STAT.ANN.
}
}
\u167\'3f 766.63
;
}
UMPA \u167\'3f 14
, 9A U.L.A. at 131.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F85104553803_ID0EYM" }{\fld
rslt
85
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
UMPA \u167\'3f 14
cmt., 9A U.L.A. at 131.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F86104553803_ID0EEN" }{\fld
rslt
86
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See William A. Reppy, Jr., The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revi
sions For A Basically Sound Act, 21
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
HOUS.L.REV.
}
}
679, 705-706 (1984) (\u8220\'3fAlthough the text of the Act is unclear, the com
ment to section 14 suggests that the Act rejects the inception of title doctrine
in favor of pro rata sharing of ownership in those cases in which a down paymen
t is made from one estate and at least some subsequent principal payments are ma
de from a different estate.\u8221\'3f). An inception of right analysis would fix
ownership at the original date of acquisition and give the community a claim fo
r reimbursement for subsequent mortgage payments made with community property. P
ro rata sharing would divide title according to the amount each estate contribut
ed to the consideration.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F87104553803_ID0E3O" }{\fld
rslt
87
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See Mollerup, supra note 2, at 1041.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F88104553803_ID0ETP" }{\fld
rslt
88
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
A purchase money resulting trust would not spring up without such an intention.
See 1
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES
}
}
\u167\'3f 4.3(2), at 600 (2d ed. 1993).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F89104553803_ID0EFQ" }{\fld
rslt
89
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
}
}
\u167\'3f 64, at 130-31 (2d ed. 1971).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F90104553803_ID0EKQ" }{\fld
rslt
90
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See Bartke, supra note 2 for a general discussion of the state of the law in the
original eight community property jurisdictions as of 1969. Although Bartke div
ides the jurisdictions into reimbursement theory versus lien theory states, both
theories are based on the original Spanish notion that the separate property ch
aracter of the property did not change as a result of subsequent community prope
rty contributions to mortgage payments. Rather the community estate was entitled
to reimbursement, sometimes secured by a pro tanto equitable lien in the improv
ed property.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F91104553803_ID0EQS" }{\fld
rslt
91
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
This amount was calculated by multiplying the monthly payment of $179.62 times t
he number of months paid with community property (288) and dividing the product
($51,730.56) by two.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F92104553803_ID0EVS" }{\fld
rslt
92
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
This amount was arrived at using the Moore formula. Thus, the $10,000 down payme
nt was added to the $40,000 in loan proceeds. That sum was reduced by the amount
of principal reduction attributable to payments with community property\u8212\'
3f$34,887.03. The result, $15,112.97, was divided by the purchase price ($50,000
) to arrive a percentage of separate property ownership of 30.226%. Thus the com
munity share of the house, based on the present fair market value, would be $174
,435.15. W\rquote s one-half interest would be $87,217.57.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F93104553803_ID0EYS" }{\fld
rslt
93
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
For a thorough discussion of the failure of alimony to address the economic cons
equences of divorce, see Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social an
d Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
UCLA L.REV.
}
}
1181, 1188 (1981).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F94104553803_ID0E3S" }{\fld
rslt
94
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
The problem is even more intractable in California because the courts cannot acc
omplish equity through an equitable division of the community property, but must
instead divide the property equally.
}
dType=L&pubNum=1003409&cite=CAFAMS2550&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5ce
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
CAL.FAM.CODE
}
}
\u167\'3f 2550 (West 1993)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F95104553803_ID0EOT" }{\fld
rslt
95
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F96104553803_ID0EQU" }{\fld
rslt
96
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In his important work on Idaho community property law, Professor Brockelbank def
ined two basic elements of community property: 1) Marriage is not a way of acqui
ring property; and 2) Gains made during the marriage are shared.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
W.J. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO
}
}
32-33 (1962). This notion, that the community is only of acquests and gains dur
ing the marriage and does not include property acquired by either spouse prior t
o marriage, is also stressed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN,
}
}
supra note 83, \u167\'3f 1 at 1-3.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F97104553803_ID0EXU" }{\fld
rslt
97
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Admittedly, the 100% interest was subject to a mortgage and the 30
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
nterest is not. However, H had the exclusive right to discharge the mortgage as
the sole mortgagor.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F98104553803_ID0EOW" }{\fld
rslt
98
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See supra part II.A.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F99104553803_ID0E2W" }{\fld
rslt
99
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See supra part IV.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_F100104553803_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_F100104553803_
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F100104553803_ID0EA" }{\fld
rslt
100
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See supra part IV.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
rslt
101
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Texas, Arizona, Idaho and Washington all appear to take this approach. See supra
parts II.C-D.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
rslt
102
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES
}
}
\u167\'3f 4.3(3), at 600 (2d ed. 1993). Dobbs suggests that, in general, the eq
uitable lien places its holder in a better position than a general unsecured cre
ditor because the lienholder has a priority. This is only true to the extent the
lienholder can convert her lien into a legal lien. The spouse holding a pro tan
to equitable lien in community property cannot convert her lien until divorce.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F103104553803_ID0EH" }{\fld
rslt
103
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See Bartke, supra note 2, at 385, 397-405.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F104104553803_ID0EP" }{\fld
rslt
104
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See Gales, supra note 71, at 527.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F105104553803_ID0EM" }{\fld
rslt
105
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
That is the assumption made by at least two commentators. See Bartke, supra note
2, at 418; Mollerup, supra note 2, at 1041. This assumption is also consistent
with general rules of remedies. See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
DOBBS,
}
}
supra note 84, \u167\'3f 4.7(1), at 659.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F106104553803_ID0EZ" }{\fld
rslt
106
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
REPPY & SAMUELS,
}
}
supra note 8, at 15-1 (citing
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000007&cite=IDSTS32-912&originatingDoc=Ib85138f15adb11dbbd2dfa5c
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i0
IDAHO CODE
}
}
\u167\'3f 32-912 (1983)
). Probably the assumptions of Bartke and Mollerup are correct, but troubling ca
se authority exists. See
}
slt
United States v. McConkey, 430 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1970)
(purporting to apply Idaho law);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
REPPY & SAMUELS,
}
}
supra note 8, at 15-10 to 15-11.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
rslt
107
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
But see Mollerup, supra note 2, at 1043 (arguing that the recording of such pote
ntially one-sided documents would detrimentally affect the reliability of record
ing statutes).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F108104553803_ID0EQ" }{\fld
rslt
108
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
Drahos v. Rens, 717 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Ariz.Ct.App.1985)
;
}
slt
, cert denied,
}
477 So.2d 711 (1985)
;
}
Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.1990)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F109104553803_ID0ET" }{\fld
rslt
109
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
This would be the result in Louisiana and possibly Washington, see infra parts I
I.B and II.D, and Texas, see infra part II.C.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F110104553803_ID0EY" }{\fld
rslt
110
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Arizona takes this approach. See infra part II.C. In adopting this approach, Ari
zona relied on California law without addressing the differences between the app
ortionment approach of the California courts and the reimbursement approach adop
ted by the Arizona court.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F111104553803_ID0EH" }{\fld
rslt
111
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Weekley, supra note 45, at 973-74.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F112104553803_ID0EX" }{\fld
rslt
112
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
rslt
113
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Id. For a discussion of how courts are dealing with this question of off-setting
benefits see infra notes\u8212\'3fand accompanying text.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F114104553803_ID0EB" }{\fld
rslt
114
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See
}
slt
. Texas law is unclear on this point. The Texas Supreme Court adopted an enhance
ment in value standard to measure mortgage paydown reimbursement claims and auth
orized an offsetting benefits approach.
}
slt
. However, the court was not clear about whether the enhancement approach would
permit reimbursement of contributions to interest as well as principal. Id. Earl
ier Texas cases had held that interest, taxes and insurance were not reimbursabl
e. See, e.g.,
}
slt
Cook v. Cook, 665 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.Ct.App.1983)
(holding that the payment of interest from community funds would not create a c
laim for reimbursement unless it could be proven that expenditures by the commun
ity exceeded the benefits received);
}
slt
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 612 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex.Ct.App.1981)
(holding that the payment of interest from community funds would not create a c
laim for reimbursement unless the benefits received were greater than the amount
spent by the community).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F115104553803_ID0EK" }{\fld
rslt
115
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In Idaho, Texas and Louisiana rents on separate property are community property.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F116104553803_ID0EP" }{\fld
rslt
116
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Most of the reimbursement jurisdictions have recognized offset in at least some
way. See, e.g.,
}
slt
(attributing interest to the cost of maintaining property for the community);
}
slt
(permitting the husband to offset community reimbursement claim with the value
of tax benefits received by the spouses as a result of depreciating the property
);
}
slt
(characterizing interest, taxes and insurance as \u8220\'3freasonable rental\u8
221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \clwWidth600 \cellx600
\clpadb90 \clpadfb3 \clpadl90 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth9480 \c
ellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1}
rslt
117
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
See, e.g.,
}
slt
.
\par
}
}
}
}
}}\par
}
{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
30 IDLR 697
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0 {
\clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \
brdrcf20 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth4320 \cellx4320
\clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \
brdrcf20 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth5760 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li24 \ri24
{\li24 \f2 \b1 \ql \ri24 \fs16 \cf20 \i0
End of Document
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf20 \i0 \intbl \cell \i
ntbl
{\li24 \ri24
{\li24 \f2 \b0 \ri24 \fs16 \cf20 \qr \i0
\u169\'3f 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf20 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \r
ow }}\par
}
}\sect }

Elizabeth Barker Brandt1994 The Treatment of Community Contributions To Mortgage Payments (Including Princip

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Elizabeth Barker Brandt1994 The Treatment of Community Contributions To Mortgage Payments (Including Princip

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

{\rtf1 \ansi

You might also like