112

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioners,

vs.

BERNARDO VERGARA, JR

G.R. No. 172829

Facts: The MeTC dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public documents upon motion of
the petitioners based on lack of probable cause. The MeTC dismissed the criminal case. With the express
conformity of the public prosecutor, the private complainant Vergara Jr. appealed the dismissal to the
RTC. The RTC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the MeTC for trial. Petitioners
questioned the order of the RTC by petition for review before the CA which dismissed the petition saying
that the order of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal personality to appeal the July 9, 2004 order of the MeTC

Held: Suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the
public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has
authority to file an appeal with the RTC. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent
the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. On the
other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the
Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution
Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service, which was the law in force at the time the appeal
was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) shall have charge
of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts
of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal
prosecutions. In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by this Court that the
fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts.
Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor
or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the same.

Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision
refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file information or dismiss a
case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an
Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of
the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise ordered, an
Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal
by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.

BURGUNDY CORPORATION vs JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES

G.R. No. 181021

Facts: Josefa Jing C. Reyes (Reyes) offered her services to petitioner as the latter's real estate agent in
buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed
petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties.
Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be
used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and
misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal
demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said
demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City. After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the
Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City filed an information for the crime of estafa against reyes before the
RTC of Makati.

Issue: Whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that estafa has been
committed by respondent and should be held for trial

Held: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.
Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their
respective claims. A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in
finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa.

CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO vs JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804

Facts: The case sprang from a Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. City
Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the Information in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod
City, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
Respondent ordered the office of the City Prosecutor to present additional evidence, relevant records and
documents to enable the Court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause. the Office of the
City Prosecutor submitted a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and informed
respondent that the documents submitted by the parties for preliminary investigation were already
appended to the complaint. Complainant explained that there was no memorandum of transfer of the case
from the investigating prosecutor to him. Complainant discussed that the case was initially handled by
ACP Jarder who found no probable cause against Cresencio Palo, Sr., accused in Criminal Case No. 09-
03-16474. However, complainant, upon review found that there was probable cause against Palo. Thus,
complainant disapproved ACP Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court. The Office of the
City Prosecutor sent a letter explaining the impossibility of submitting the Jarder Resolution to the court
but respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor and insisted that
the Jarder Resolution should form part of the records of the case.

Issue: Whether or not respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all
other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his court

Held: The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. Thus, the courts must
consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination of the 2008 Revised
Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service31 (DOJ-NPS Manual),
therefore, is necessary.

There is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the removal of a resolution by an investigating
prosecutor recommending the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial,
city or chief state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an information
filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as
practicable. Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution
when all other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his
court, and in going so far as to motu proprio initiating a proceeding for contempt against complainant.

HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS

G.R. No. 175887 Nov. 24, 2010 (635 SCRA 91)

FACTS:

Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in the
Bicol Region, was shot at the nape by a lone gunman while waiting for his flight to Manila. The victim died
the following day in a hospital in Naga City. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution
charging Roberto Obet Aclan and Juanito Totoy Ona for the murder of Engr. Tria, excluding
respondent. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), assailing the Provincial
Prosecutors order which dismissed the case filed against the respondent. The DOJ, through then Justice
Sec. Serafin Cuevas, issued a Resolution modifying the Provincial Prosecutors order by directing the
latter to include respondent as co-accused. By resolution of the Supreme Court upon request, the venue
was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur to the RTC of Quezon City.
The RTC then admitted the amended Information filed by the DOJ. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Suspension of Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.

On February 6, 2002, the DOJ denied respondents motion for reconsideration stating that the proper
procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the Office of the President (OP) and not
before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated. 22 However, the DOJ directed the
Provincial Prosecutor to forward the records of the case to the OP in compliance with the Order dated
October 18, 2001 of Deputy Executive Secretary Jose Tale. 23 It turned out that respondent filed on October
1, 2001 a notice of appeal before the OP (O.P. Case No. 01-J-118).

On June 27, 2003, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores adopted the findings of facts and
conclusions of law in the appealed Resolutions dated January 25, 2000 and September 17, 2001 of the
DOJ, and affirmed the same. 25 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on September 17,
2003.26 On December 3, 2003, respondent filed a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly
Discovered Evidence.27 In its March 24, 2004 Order, Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted
respondents motion and reversed the DOJ resolutions. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the OP. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus (Rule 65) before the
Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA affirmed the decision of the OP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Office of the Presidents
reversal of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
RULING: The Supreme Court Third Division, through Associate Justice Martin Villarama
as ponente, granted the petition.

In resolving the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OPs reversal of the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice, it is necessary to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the
respondent for conspiracy in the murder of Engr. Tria.

A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against
respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.40

The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject
to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution
of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of
the complaint or information with notice to the parties. 41 Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause
is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

XX XX XX XX XX XX

A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against
respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.40

The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject
to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution
of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of
the complaint or information with notice to the parties. 41 Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause
is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

XX XX XX XX XX XX

Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is

essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably
charged with a crime.54 Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court
in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse. 55

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we find no such grave abuse when the
Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan
and Ona. The following facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation were
sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in respondents guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had credible
reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for estafa from her double
sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest of Engr. Trias family to run after said
property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third party; (b) Access - respondent was close to Engr.
Trias family and familiar with his work schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could
facilitate in the commission of the crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan)
she and her father categorically admitted being in her company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before
the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior -- respondent while declaring such close
personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any satisfactory explanation why
she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while they conversed and shook hands at the
airport. Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing
happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the authorities
investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the people to
bring her friend quickly to the hospital. She would not even dare go near Engr. Trias body to check if the
latter was still alive.

All the foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a
reasonable inference of respondents probable participation in the well-planned assassination of Engr.
Tria. We therefore hold that the OP in reversing the DOJ Secretarys ruling, and the CA in affirming the
same, both committed grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded facts on
record which established probable cause against the respondent. PETITION GRANTED. DECISION
OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT REVERSED AND ORIGINAL DECISION OF THE
JUSTICE SECRETARY REINSTATED.
 GERLIE M. Uy vs JUDGE ERWIN B. Javellana

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666

Facts: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug
(Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana,
Negros Occidental.

Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:

First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public
Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples:

O In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a
warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure;

oIn Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did
not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and
19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading;

oAlso in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the
same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were
all hearsay evidence; and

oIn Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did
not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination
and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the
case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.

Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a
warrantless arrest had been effected.

Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.
Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel

Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an
administrative complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint
against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
in cases appropriately covered by said Rule.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure

Held: Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case
was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find
irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The
following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.

(hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct
proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby
lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were
charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months
and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.