Professional Documents
Culture Documents
333
333
LADD, J.:
334
334
" 'It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil
Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its
continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the
military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail
or deported. * * * [Reference is then made to the appointment of
one Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work
that the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating
insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have
during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.'
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
335
335
* * * * * * *
"Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the
province [of Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is
said that it is impossible to secure the conviction of lawbreakers
and outlaws by the native justices, or a prosecution by the native
fiscals.
* * * * * * *
"The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an
arbitrary government, especially when evidences of
carpetbagging and rumors of graft are too thick to be pleasant."
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article
in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office," or to "instigate" any
person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government" All these various tendencies, which are described in
section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of
a certain form of libel, may be characterized in general terms as
seditious tendencies.
337
337
338
338
were, they were made under such diff erent conditions from those
which prevail at the present day, and are founded upon theories
of government so foreign to those which have inspired the
legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part, that
they would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In
England, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written
censure upon public men for their conduct as such," as well as
any written censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions of the
country," would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the
Government. (2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England,
348.) This has ceased to be the law in England, and it is doubtful
whether it was ever the common law of any American State. "It is
true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication
tending to 'possess the people with an ill opinion of the
Government' is a seditious libel (per Holt, C. J., in R. vs. Tuchin,
1704, 5 St Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in R. vs. Cobbett,
1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine
now. Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or
rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the
Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all
public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge
Cooley says (Const. Lim., 528) : "The English commonlaw rule
which made libels on the constitution or the government
indictable, as it was administered by the courts, seems to us
unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of
America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the several
States."
340
340
341
341
342
342
343
343
Defendants acquitted.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.The terms of the treaty of Paris ceding the Islands
to the United States did not extend the Constitution to the Islands,
but left the determination of their status to Congress.
270
270
COOPER, J.:
On May 23, 1902, a complaint was filed in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against Fred L. Dorr and Edward F.
O'Brien, charging them with the publication of a false and
malicious libel against Seor Benito Legarda, one of the United
States Philippine Commissioners, by placing certain headlines or
caption above an article published in the "Manila Freedom," a
newspaper in the city of Manila, of which the defendant Fred L.
Dorr was the proprietor and the defendant Edward F. O'Brien was
the editor.
271
271
The article over and above which the headlines were placed was a
report of certain judicial proceedings had in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, in the criminal case of the United
States vs. Valdez for the offense of libel,1 and the report was a
copy taken from a document prepared by the attorney for Valdez,
in which the offer was made, as a defense, to prove the truth of
the material allegations contained in and which were the basis of
the complaint against Valdez. The facts offered to be proven were
published in the "Miau," a newspaper of which Valdez was editor,
and related to Seor Legarda, the prosecuting witness in the
Valdez case as well as in this case.
At that time, under the libel law, the truth of the libelous matter
was inadmissible as evidence. The judge of the Court of First
Instance excluded the proof tendered in the document, but
permitted it to be filed in the case, and the copy was taken from it
by one Vogel, the city reporter of the "Manila Freedom." The
report was handed by the reporter to the defendant O'Brien, the
editor of the paper, and the headlines were written by O'Brien,
and the report with the headlines thus prepared was published in
the "Manila Freedom" of date April 16, 1902.
On August 25, 1902, the defendants were tried and found guilty
of the offense charged in the complaint, and each was sentenced
to six months' imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $ 1,000,
United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have
appealed to this court.
(1) That by the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, ratified on the 11th day of April, 1899, the Philippine
Islands became a part of the United States;
(2) And being a part thereof, they are subject to the provisions of
section 2, Article III, of- the Constitution, and to the provisions
contained in the sixth amendment to the Constitution, by which in
all criminal cases a trial by jury is guaranteed;
273
VOL. 2, MAY 16, 1903
273
the passage of the Foraker Act, is exempt from duty, and involved
the question whether the revenue clauses of the Constitution
extend of their own force to the newly acquired territories from
Spain, and whether the act is in contravention of the unif ormity
clause of the Constitution.
The conclusion was reached that the act in question was not
unconstitutional. In the consideration of the case an exhaustive
review was made of the powers of Congress to govern the
territories belonging to the United States, under the power to
acquire territory by treaty and the incidental right to govern such
territory, and under the clause of section 3, Article IV, of the
Constitution, which vests Congress with the power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property of the United States. This review was made in
the light of the opinion of contemporaries, the practical
construction placed upon the Constitution by Congress, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon
questions arising thereunder. Distinctions were found to exist in
the application of the Constitution depending upon the relation
which was borne to the National Government whether by a State
or by the territories which belonged to certain States at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, and which were situated
within the acknowledged limits of the United States, and such
territory as might be acquired by the establishment of a disputed
line; or by those which were acquired by cession from foreign
powers and to which the Constitution was extended by the treaty
under which they were ceded, sanctioned by Congress, or to
which the Constitution was expressly extended by Congressional
act; or by those territories acquired from a foreign power by
treaty, which have not been incorporated as a part of the United
States nor to which has been extended the Constitution by act of
Congress.
274
274
Both Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the majority opinion, and Mr.
Justice White, in delivering the concurring opinion, refer to these
constitutional restrictions.
______________
1 182 U. 8.,290.
275
275
United States vs. Dorr
He also says:
Again he says:
______________
276
276
Florida was ceded by Spain to the United States, as was also the
Philippines.
"This case originated in the district court of South Carolina for the
possession of 356 bales of cotton, which had been wrecked on the
coast of Florida, abandoned to the insurance companies, and
subsequently brought to Charleston. Canter claimed the cotton as
bona fide purchaser at a marshal's sale at Key West by virtue of a
decree of a territorial court consisting of a notary and five jurors,
proceeding under an act of the governor and legislative council of
Florida. The case turned upon the question whether the sale by
that court was effectual to divest the interest of the underwriters.
The district judge pronounced the proceedings a nullity, and
rendered a decree from which both parties appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court reversed the decree of the district court
upon the ground that the proceedings of the court at Key West
were legal, and transferred the property to Canter, the alleged
purchaser.
277
277
United States vs. Dorr
278
278
were the constitution of Florida; that while under these acts the
territorial legislature could enact nothing inconsistent with what
Congress had made inherent and permanent in the territorial
government, it had not done so in organizing the court at Key
West."1
_________________
279
279
It seems fairly deducible from all that has been said upon this
subject that such provisions are negative in character rather than
of a direct positive or affirmative nature, denying to Congress the
power to pass laws in contravention with such principles of the
Constitution.
280
280
In Callem vs. Wilson (127 U. S., 540) the defendant had been
convicted without jury trial, in the District of Columbia, but the
District of Columbia was not only within and a part of the United
States but had formed a part of the original States of Virginia and
Maryland.
In the case of Springville vs. Thomas (166 U. S., 707) it was held
that a verdict returned by less than the whole number of jurors
was invalid, because in contravention of the seventh amendment
to the Constitution and the act of Congress of April 7, 1874, which
provide that no party shall be deprived of the right of trial by jury
in cases cognizable at common law. This is, as stated by Mr.
Justice Brown, "obviously true with respect to Utah, since the
organic act of that Territory had expressly extended to it the
Constitution and laws of the United States."1
The other decisions cited by counsel for the appellants can all be
traced to the same principle; that is, that where Congress has
extended the laws and the Constitution to the territories, then
Congress would be inhibited by the Constitution from enacting a
law depriving persons living in such territories from the right to
trial by jury.
The only case which we have been able to discover arising under
an act of Congress, and which deprived a party of the right to a
trial by jury at a place where the Constitution had not been
extended by express provision, is the case of In re Ross (140 U. S.,
453). This was a case in which the American consular tribunal in
Japan,
_______________
281
281
Trial by jury was unknown to the law in force in these Islands prior
to the date of cession, nor has the Philippine Commission passed
any law which would give it effect. Such provisions of a
constitution as those relating to trial by jury can hardly be
regarded as self-executing. It
________________
282
The testimony shows that the defendant Fred L. Dorr was the
proprietor, and that the defendant Edward F. O'Brien was the
editor, of the "Manila Freedom;" that the article upon which the
complaint is founded was published in the issue of that paper on
the 16th of April, 1902; that the privileged statements or report of
the judicial proceedings, the headlines of which are the basis of
the prosecution, arose on the trial of the case of the United States
vs. Valdez, in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila, in
which case Valdez was charged with the offense of libel, the
complaining witness in that case being Seor Legarda, who was
also the complaining witness in this case; that counsel for the
defendant Valdez prepared a written statement of certain facts
and offered to prove the truth of these statements if permitted by
the court.
285
285
286
286
287
287
The law declares the motive of the writer, in the absence of proof
of justifiable motive and the truth of the matter, to be malicious.
The decisions of some of the courts of the United States have held
that an index of words contained in the privileged matter, when
fairly and truly made, will partake of the nature of the article
indexed; but, as we have shown, our law does not permit this. Nor
is it possible to reach the conclusion that the words contained in
the headlines are a fair index. No idea can be gathered from these
headlines of the real nature of what is contained in the published
article.
288
288
It is also said that the headlines in this case are not worse than
the matter contained in the report. This may be admitted as true,
but in the eyes of the law there is a distinction. The injurious
matter contained in the report is regarded by the law as protected
by a privilege which should be extended to the report of judicial
proceedings, but here the privilege ends.
289
289
placed at the top of the first page of the paper. The other words
were in smaller type, but much larger than the ordinary type. It is
hard to conceive language stronger than that contained in the
three words "traitor, seducer, and perjurer."
1. The important part of the article in question, and the only part
which contained any libelous matter, was the offer to prove
contained therein. This offer was actually made a part of the
record of the case on trial in the Court of First Instance. Under
section 7 of the libel law, the defendants had the right to publish
it if they did so without malice. The Government recognized this
right when it limited the charge in the complaint to the headlines
of the article, and it is not and can not be claimed that the
defendants are guilty of libel for publishing the article itself.
290
290
They are, however, prosecuted for placing over the article certain
headlines.
291
291
The case at bar illustrates this proposition. The first line consisting
of these three words of itself means nothing. The words are not
spoken of any person. In order to find out to whom they refer it is
necessary to go to the line below, in which, while it is learned that
they refer to Seor Legarda, it is also seen at the same time that
they were allegations made against him.
292
292
The result upon this branch of the case is that the headlines are
nothing more than a fair index of the article and are therefore
privileged with exception of the words "sensational" and "Legarda
pale and nervous," which are not libelous.
293
293
The newspaper articles do not show any express malice, and any
inference of that kind which could be drawn from them is, to my
mind, overcome by the proof that the defendants did not know
the person whom they are charged with having maliciously
libeled.
Judgment affirmed.
500
* EN BANC.
501
501
502
502
xxx xxx
________________
503
503
_______________
504
504
________________
3 School Dist. No. 45 vs. Board of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108.
505
505
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed.5 Rather, it is an example of a general
repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws.6 This latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.
_________________
7 Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351
(1936)
506
506
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does
not cover not attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and
still others.
______________
9 Supra, note 7.
10 Supra, note 4.
507
507
xxx x x x
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.12
What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose
to repeal.13
We come now to the second category of repealthe enactment of
a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole
subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code
was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and
perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is
deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole
subject matter of the former statute.14 When both intent and
scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and
provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act
are deemed repealed.15 Furthermore, before there can be an
implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of
the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior
act.16
________________
16 Supra, note 9.
508
508
_______________
17 84 SCRA 364 (1978).
509
509
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted.
o0o
________________
22 Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Estate of Maronilla, 41 Phil. 557 (1916).
[Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500(1992)]
282
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
283
283
BIDIN, J.:
_______________
285
285
After trial, the lower court render judgment on April 6, 1976 the
dispositive part of which reads:
No pronouncements as to costs.
II
III
288
288
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the
leased premises but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party
of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, such transfer
of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this
agreement.
290
290
(Letterhead)
It has been found out by the undersigned that you have sublet the
property of the CAA leased to you and by virtue of this, your lease
contract is hereby cancelled because of the violation of the
stipulations of the contract. I would like to inform you that even
without having sublet the said property the said contract would
have been cancelled as per attached communication.
(Sgd.) Illegible
(Typed)
GUILLERMO P. JURADO
292
292
293
294
294
SO ORDERED.
295
162
_______________
* EN BANC.
163
163
164
Arbitration Law (RA 876); Under the Arbitration Law, the award or
decision of the voluntary arbitrator is equated with that of the
Regional Trial Courts.In the same vein, it is worth mentioning
that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the
Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of
which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none
be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in
which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which
the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the
controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award
is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order
confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless
the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect, this
equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that
of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari
from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court.
As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the
Court of Appeals
165
165
ROMERO, J.:
_____________
2 Ibid.
167
167
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor
Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
x x x. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
2. Termination disputes;
xxx xxx x x x
168
168
sion (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating
to voluntary arbitration provides that (t)he award or decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties,5 while the (d)ecision, awards, or orders
of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.6 Hence,
while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a
labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an
appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
xxx xxx x x x
10 Art. 262-A, in relation to Art. 217 (b) and (c), Labor Code, as
amended by Sec. 9, R.A. 6715.
170
170
_____________
171
_____________
172
172
538
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
539
539
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term Authority has
been used to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.It is worth
noting that the term Authority has been used to designate both
incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government. Same; Same; Same; Agency; The ISA is an
agent or delegate of the Republic, while the Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as
legal personality.We consider that the ISA is properly regarded
as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with
the full panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as legal personality.
540
540
541
541
FELICIANO, J.:
542
542
The list of powers and functions of the ISA included the following:
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel
facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies
involved if it is shown that such use of the States power is
necessary to implement the construction of capacity which is
needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority;
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5)
years counting from 9 August 1973.1 When ISAs original term
expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another
ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979.
______________
543
543
Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals
______________
(2) In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing
within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel
Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of
the aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject
lands as well as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and
related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter cede
the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the property, subject to
bonding and other requirements of P.D. No. 1533.
xxx xxx x x x
544
544
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however,
the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August
1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no
valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased
to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this
motion.
______________
3 Section 1, Rule 3.
545
At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was
premature for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation
suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had
not yet rested their respective cases.
In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since
ISA initiated and prosecuted the action for expropriation in
______________
546
546
Private respondent MCFC, upon the other hand, argues that the
failure of Congress to enact a law further extending the term of
ISA after 11 August 1988 evinced a clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA, and that the
authorization issued by the Office of the President to the Solicitor
General for continued prosecution of the expropriation suit could
not prevail over such negative intent. It is also contended that the
exercise of the eminent domain by ISA or the Republic is
improper, since that power would be exercised not on behalf of
the National Government but for the benefit of NSC.
Under the above quoted provision, it will be seen that those who
can be parties to a civil action may be broadly categorized into
two (2) groups:
(a) those who are recognized as persons under the law whether
natural, i.e., biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical
persons such as corporations, on the other hand; and
547
547
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel
facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies
involved if it is shown that such use of the States power is
necessary to implement the construction of capacity which is
needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority;
xxx xxx x x x
(Italics supplied)
x x x xxx xxx
xxx xxx x x x
(Italics supplied)
______________
548
548
_______________
549
550
550
______________
13 Rule 13, Section 11, Rules of Court. See, in this connection, St.
Anne Medical Center v. Parel (176 SCRA 755 [1989]), where the
petition had been filed in the name of St. Anne Medical Center
which was not a juridical person and where this Court invoked
Rule 3, Section 11 and impleaded the real party-in-interest.
551
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 25, 1995
551
It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the
Republic of the Philippines acted as principal of the Philippine
Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier
conferred on the latter as its agent. x x x15 (Italics supplied)
552
552
553
______________
554
554
SO ORDERED.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
195
195
QUISUMBING, J.:
_______________
196
196
A Mining Field Report for SSMP dated May 10, 1994 was submitted
pursuant to the inspection report prepared by respondents
CAYETANO, FELICIANO, HILADO and BURGOS, based on their
inspection conducted on April 25 to 29, 1994. The report
recommended, among others, that the proposed extraction of
materials would pose no adverse effect to the environment.
197
197
Balicas vs. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB),
from the area for a period of two (2) years from date of its issue
until September 6, 1996.4
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not
conducted, claiming that she monitored the development of
Cherry Hills Subdivision as evidenced by three (3) monitoring
reports dated March 12, 1994, August 10, 1994 and August 23,
1995. She averred that she also conducted subsequent
compliance monitoring of the terms and conditions of Philjas
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) on May 19, 1997 and
noted no violation thereon. She further claimed good faith and
exercise of due diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a
fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in
Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the
subdivision.
On November 15, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
decision imposing upon petitioner the supreme penalty of
dismissal from office for gross neglect of duty finding:
RESPONDENT BALICAS
Records show that she monitored and inspected the CHS [Cherry
Hills Subdivision] only thrice (3), to wit:
_______________
198
198
_______________
5 CA Rollo, pp. 70-71.
6 Rollo, p. 16.
199
199
_______________
7 CA Rollo, p. 416.
200
200
_______________
201
201
The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the Cherry Hills
Subdivision, against calamities such as landslides due to
continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the
petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist.
In fact, the law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to
perform such narrowly defined monitoring function.
_______________
12 Executive Order No. 90, dated December 17, 1986.
202
202
SO ORDERED.
o0o
516
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
517
517
CRUZ, J.:
518
518
______________
519
519
They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. vs. IAC,3 where the Court
allowed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
______________
520
520
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and
denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the
building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the
coverage of P.D. 1818. Even if it were not, the petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would still fail because
the sheriffs return showed that PBAC was served a copy of the
restraining order after the bidding sought to be restrained had
already been held. Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could
not be restrained from awarding the project because the authority
to do so was lodged in the President of the ISCOF, who was not a
party to the case.4
In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does
not cover the ISCOF because of its separate and distinct corporate
personality. It is also stressed again that the prohibition under P.D.
1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the
project was vitiated with irregularities, to wit:
_______________
4 Annex F, Rollo, pp. 44-48.
521
521
law (P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the
particulars of the project subject of bidding for the purposes of
(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;
The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction had not yet become moot and academic
because even if the bids had been opened before the restraining
order was issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The
ISCOF president was not an indispensable party because the
signing of the award was merely a ministerial function which he
could perform only upon the recommendation of the Award
Committee. At any rate, the complaint had already been duly
amended to include him as a party defendant.
In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the
members of the board of trustees of the ISCOF are all government
officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the operations and
maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General
Appropriations Law, it should be considered a government
institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.
______________
522
522
______________
7 Rollo, p. 87.
523
523
______________
524
524
We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D.
1818.
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the
opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior
notice to prospective participants.
______________
10 IB 13 1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1594
as amended.
525
525
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the
discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve
merely technical matters. What is involved here is noncompliance
with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict
observance. The purpose of the rules implement-
______________
*** B.E. & Best Builts licenses were valid until June 30, 1989. (Ex.
P & O respectively: both were marked on December 28, 1988)
12 51 CT. C1. 211, 214, 249, U.S. 313, 39 S. Ct. 300 25 Comp.
Gen. 859.
526
526
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the
pre-qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the
elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because
of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the contractors
guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus
defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on equal
footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of competitive
bidding is negated if some contractors are informed ahead of their
rivals of the plans and specifications that are to be the subject of
their bids.
_______________
13 Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372.
527
527
______________
528
528
SO ORDERED.
454
_____________
* FIRST DIVISION.
455
455
456
456
statement will not prevail over the clear and competent testimony
and the report submitted by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms.
Demelen R. dela Cruz, who was the one who conducted the test
and found petitioners right palmar hand positive for flourescent
powder, the same hand he used, according to witnesses Resoso
and Sta. Maria Jr., to get the money from the latter.
KAPUNAN, J.:
457
457
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
SO ORDERED.2
_____________
1 Rollo, p. 31.
2 Id., at 65.
458
458
x x x.
______________
459
VOL. 247, AUGUST 21, 1995
459
6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until
the 8th of June, perceiving financial constraints (Ibid.).
10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money
to the NBI. Thereafter, the money was dusted with flourescent
powder and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17, Ibid.).
Resoso got the attache case and was instructed not to open it.
Similarly, he was advised to proceed at the Wendys Restaurant
earlier than the designated time where a group of NBI men
awaited him and his companion, Sta. Maria, Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.).
11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley
Restaurant in Timog, Quezon City, to fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).
12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the
Wendys Restaurant. They were led by the NBI men to a table
previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a
table occupied by them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
We asked him his order and we talked about the punch list.
460
460
x x x.
PROS. CAOILI:
When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did you talk about
anything else?
Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were conversing with Dave Preclaro
and he told [him], O, paano na.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
And then Dave Preclaro told, Puede and he asked Jimmy Sta.
Maria, Jr. if there is express teller and could he deposit during
night time but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr. told him, I do not have any
knowledge or I do not have any express teller you can deposit. I
only know credit card.
PROS. CAOLI:
When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and interviewed him that way,
was there anything that happened?
Did Claro Preclaro receive these two envelopes from Engineer Sta.
Maria?
Yes, sir. (Pp. 19-21, Ibid., See also pp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct.1990.)
14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with
his right hand, thereafter placing them under his left armpit, he
was accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).
16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two enve-
lopes. Petitioner refused. Hence, one of the NBI men picked up the
envelopes and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p. 27,
Ibid.).
461
461
x x x.
_______________
9 Id., at 12-13.
10 Id., at 11-12.
462
462
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s);
463
463
The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours
by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office
became unessential considerations in view of the above-
mentioned provision of law clearly including petitioner within the
definition of a public officer.
____________
14 Id., sec. 9.
15 Rollo, p. 15.
464
464
We disagree.
____________
19 Rollo, p. 301.
465
465
xxx
You said when you were computing your Change Order Mr.
Preclaro or Dave Preclaro whom you identified approached you,
what did you talk about?
Q
Did you ask the accused here, Dave Preclaro why it is considered
deductive?
Yes, sir.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
What is 460?
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the
P200,000.00. (Italics ours.)
PROS. CAOILI:
I do not know sir. He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it
to your boss. (Italics ours.)
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
What is P200,000.00?
PROS. CAOILI:
466
466
What was the reaction of your boss when you relayed the
message to Mr. Preclaro?
The next day he told me to ask Dave where and when to pick up
the money so the next day I asked Dave Where do you intend to
get the money, the Boss wanted to know.
When?
June 6, Wednesday.
When he told you that did you comply with June 6 appointment?
A
I told my boss what he told me again that the meeting will take
place at Wendys Restaurant corner Edsa and Camias Street at
around 8:00 oclock p.m. June 6, Wednesday.
Did you go to the NBI and report the incident to the NBI?
Yes sir.
Did you give a statement before any of the agents of the NBI?
Yes, sir.21
xxx
_____________
467
467
xxx
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
What is 460?
A
P460,000.00 and it ended to P215 thousand or P20,000.00 and he
said take of the butal and get the Two Hundred Thousand Pesos.
(Italics ours.)
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
WITNESS:
And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the
P200,000.00.
______________
23 Rollo, p. 17.
468
468
PROS. CAOILI:
A
I do not know sir. He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it
to your boss.24
xxx
The records, however, do not show the true and actual amount
that the Sta. Maria Construction will earn as profit. There is,
therefore, no basis for petitioners contention as the actual profit
may be lower or higher than his estimation.
_________________
25 Id. at 12.
26 Rollo, p. 18.
469
469
PROS. CAOILI:
The billing paper was being taken cared of by the, of our office. I
personally do my job as supervisor in the construction.
Q
Do you have any counterpart to supervise the project from the
government side?
xxx
ATTY. CAOILI:
A
First if there is any problem in the site I consult my boss.
PROS. CAOILI:
How about with the other consultants representing the ITDI and
DOST?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
No basis.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically.
470
470
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
COURT STENOGRAPHER:
WITNESS:
A
Every Monday meeting we tackle with accomplishment report the
billing papers.28 (Italics ours.)
xxx
(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4) P500 bills were dusted
with flourescent powder and used in the alleged entrapment.
PROS. CAOILI:
What did he do with the two envelopes upon receiving the same?
Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is bank teller express,
if he could deposit the money but Mr. Sta. Maria
_____________
28 Id. at 8-11
29 Rollo, p. 20.
471
471
xxx
Yes sir.
Yes sir.
_______________
472
472
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
From the time of the handing over of the envelopes until the
entrapment would have been terminated?
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Why did you not position the photographer to a far distance place
with camera with telescopic lens?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Yes, sir.32
xxx
Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed under ultra-
violet light, both were found negative for flourescent powder. This
is petitioners own conclusion which is not supported by evidence.
Such self-serving statement will not prevail over the clear and
competent testimony and the report33 submitted by the forensic
expert of the NBI Ms. Demelen R. dela Cruz, who was the one who
conducted the test and found petitioners right palmar hand
positive for flourescent powder, the same hand he used,
according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr., to get the
money from the latter.
xxx
Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been a Forensic Chemist at
NBI?
473
473
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
PROS. CAOILI:
Yes sir.
Q
If that person whom you examined is here in court would you be
able to recognize him?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
ATTY. CAOILI:
Yes sir.
PROS. CAOILI:
The left and right hands of the accused were placed under the
ultra violet lamp sir.
Q
What was the result?
It gave a . . . under the ultra violet lamp the palmar hands of the
suspect gave positive result for the presence of flourescent
powder.
And also the clothing, consisting of the t-shirts and the pants were
examined. Under the ultra violet lamp the presence of the
flourescent powder of the t-shirts and pants cannot be seen or
distinguished because the fibers or the material of the cloth under
the ultra violet lamp was flouresce.
Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and pants under the ultra
violet lamp was flouresce?
474
474
xxx
For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the
part of the construction company is hardly plausible. It is highly
improbable for the company to embark on a malicious
prosecution of an innocent person for the simple reason that such
person had recommended the services of another construction
firm. And it is extremely impossible for such company to enlist the
cooperation and employ the services of the governments chief
investigative agency for such an anomalous undertaking. It is
more in accord with reason and logic to presuppose that there
was some sort of a mischievous demand made by the accused in
exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as, favorable
recommendation on the completeness of the project, hasslefree
release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale
for the occurrence of the meeting and the demand for money is
infinite and boundless.36
______________
35 Rollo, p. 25.
36 Id. at 296-297.
475
475
Judgment affirmed.
o0o
141
_______________
* EN BANC.
142
142
143
143
144
144
PUNO, J.:
_______________
145
145
146
146
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year
of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
Petitioner contends:
147
147
Respondents counter-argue:
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
We now resolve.
_______________
148
148
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No.
308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges
_______________
4 Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]; Guingona v. PCGG,
207 SCRA 659 [1992]; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41
SCRA 702 [1971].
149
149
_______________
150
150
_______________
21 Id., at 234.
151
151
_______________
22 Id., at 235.
152
152
_______________
27 See Cortes, Philippine Administrative Law, pp. 2-5 [1984].
153
153
his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of
a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.29 In
the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,30 the United States
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when
it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that
there is a right of privacy which can be found within the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments,31 viz.:
_______________
29 Cooley on Torts, Sec. 135, vol. 1, 4th ed., [1932]; see also
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law
Review 193-220 [1890]this article greatly influenced the
enactment of privacy statutes in the United States (Cortes, I., The
Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, p. 15 [1970]).
31 AMENDMENT I [1791]
154
154
AMENDMENT IV [1791]
AMENDMENT V [1791]
xxx
AMENDMENT IX [1791]
155
155
x x x
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy
of married persons; rightfully it stressed a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
_______________
156
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution.33 It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill
of Rights:
x x x.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
x x x.
_______________
157
157
_______________
158
158
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right
to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our peoples right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference
number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies
through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer
application designs.
_______________
41 R.A. 4200.
42 R.A. 1405.
43 R.A. 8293.
159
159
_______________
46 Biometric Identification,
http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/=organizations/HQ-
AFMC/LG/LSO/LOA/bio.html; see also Biometrics Explained-
Section-1, http://www.ncsa.com/services/consortia/cbdc/-
sec1.html.
47 Id.
48 Id.
160
160
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will
show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the generation of population
data for development planning.54 This is an admission that the
PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation
of other data
_______________
52 The Libertarian Library: Facing Up to Biometrics, The Mouse
Monitor, The International Journal of Bureau-Rat Control [1998],
http://www.cyberhaven.com/libertarian/biomet.html.
161
161
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No.
308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and security. His transactions with the government
agency will necessarily be recordedwhether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individuals file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more
frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files.55 The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to
misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our
authorities to resist.56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be
limited to the name, address and other basic personal information
about the individual.57 Even that hospitable assumption will not
save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order
does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these
information gathered shall be han-
_______________
162
162
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
dled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data,
under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity
of the information.58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives
other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there
are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer
system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system.59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will
only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.60 The
lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave
the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.61
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.62 They
_______________
61 Ibid., p. 718.
163
163
_______________
66 Id.
164
164
_______________
69 Id.
165
165
_______________
166
166
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one,
R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A.
3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what
practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly
drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have
been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now
hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake,
this Court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule
or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to
invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act
is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally.
They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state
interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987
Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human
rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least
we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger
the rights protected by the Constitution.
_______________
78 Id., at 435.
167
167
_______________
168
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that
the Court is not per se against the use of computers to
accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve
our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the
efficiency which both government and private industry seek.
Many information systems in different countries make use of the
computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better
law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient
management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities.81
Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
administration by making accurate and comprehensive
information for those who have to frame policy and make key
decisions.82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized
information technology. It developed the internet,83 introduced
the concept of cyberspace84 and the information superhighway
where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may
surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries
and databases connected to the net.
_______________
169
169
_______________
170
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
IV
SO ORDERED.
171
171
Regalado, J., In the result. Davide, Jr., J., In the result and I
join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his Separate Opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and
Woman defying the injunction of God by eating of the forbidden
fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were opened, forthwith
they sewed fig leaves together, and made
172
172
_______________
1 3 Genesis 7.
173
VOL. 293, JULY 23, 1998
173
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
_______________
174
174
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
_______________
2 At p. 195.
175
175
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
_______________
1 Basic is the doctrine that constitutional issues should not be
used to decide a controversy, if there are other available grounds,
as in this case. (See Justice Isagani Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995
ed., pp. 29-31.)
176
176
177
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year
of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
178
178
The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
2. Encashment of checks
4. Purchase of stocks
_______________
1 SSS, Primer on the Social Security Card & A.O. No. 308, p. 1.
2 Id., at 2.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
179
6. Insurance claims
1. A.O. 308 merely establishes the standards for I.D. cards issued
by key government agencies such as SSS and GSIS.
5. The I.D. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent one
to travel.
6. There will be no discrimination. Non-holders of the improved
I.D. are still entitled to the same services but will be subjected to
the usual rigid identification and verification beforehand.
The issue that must first be hurdled is: was the issuance of A.O.
No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative power properly
belonging to Congress?
_______________
5 Id., at 3.
180
180
It is not.
_______________
181
181
______________
182
182
II
_______________
183
183
_______________
184
184
The majority opines that the petition is ripe for adjudication even
without the promulgation of the necessary guidelines in view of
the fact that respondents have begun implementation of A.O. No.
308. The SSS, in particular, has started advertising in newspapers
the invitation to bid for the production of the I.D. cards.14
III
_______________
14 Annex E, Petition.
185
185
The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new
system are clear-cut and unequivocably spelled out in the
WHEREASES and body of the order, namely, the need to provide
citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities; the computerized
system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services or social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; the
national identification reference system is established among the
key basic services and social security providers; and finally, the
IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with different Social Security and
Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular
form and extent of Biometrics Technology that will be applied and
the parameters for its use (as will be defined in the guidelines)
186
186
_______________
187
187
_______________
16 Id., at 77.
188
188
III
_______________
17 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262 (Dissenting
Opinion) cited in Whalen v. Roe, 249 US 589.
189
189
SEPARATE OPINION
Department of Health
190
190
provide for the funding of the System from the budgets of the
agencies concerned.
I do not see how from the bare provisions of the Order, the full
text of which is set forth in the majority opinion, petitioner and
the majority can conclude that the Identification Reference
System establishes such comprehensive personal information
dossiers that can destroy individual privacy. So far as the Order
provides, all that is contemplated is an identification system
based on data which the government agencies involved have
already been requiring individuals making use of their services to
give.
For example, under C.A. No. 591, 2(a) the National Statistics
Office collects by enumeration, sampling or other methods,
statistics and other information concerning population . . . social
and economic institutions, and such other statistics
_______________
191
_______________
192
192
Justice Romero herself says in her separate opinion that the word
privacy is not even in the lexicon of Filipinos.
_______________
193
VOL. 293, JULY 23, 1998
193
Indeed, the majority concedes that the right of privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy . . . [only that such]
incursions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions.11 In the case of the Identification Reference System,
the purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with service
agencies of the government and to prevent fraud and
misrepresentation. The personal identification of an individual can
facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of
emergency. On the other hand, the delivery of material
assistance, such as free medicines, can be protected from fraud
or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it
possible for unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from
more than one government agency.
Second. Thus, the issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No.
308 violates the right of privacy formed by emanations from the
several constitutional rights cited by the majority.12 The question
is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience
guaranteed in the following provisions of our Bill of Rights (Art.
III):
_______________
194
194
_______________
195
_______________
14 See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 30 L.Ed. 178,
186 (1886).
16 Id., at 532.
196
196
That, more than any doctrine of constitutional law I can think of,
succinctly expresses the rule on ripeness, prematurity, and
hypothetical, speculative, or conjectural claims.
_______________
197
VOL. 293, JULY 23, 1998
197
_______________
198
198
199
VOL. 293, JULY 23, 1998
199
_______________
200
200
_______________
363
_______________
* EN BANC.
364
364
365
365
SARMIENTO, J.:
PRODUCTS
OPSF
Premium Gasoline
1.7700
Regular Gasoline
1.7700
366
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Avturbo
1.8664
Kerosene
1.2400
Diesel Oil
1.2400
Fuel Oil
1.4900
Feedstock
1.4900
LPG
0.8487
Asphalts
2.7160
Thinners
1.71211
Caltex
P 3.2697 per liter
Shell
Petron
The petitioners submit that the above Order had been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and
correctible by certiorari.
_______________
1 Rollo, 45.
2 Id., 32.
3 Id., 44-45.
4 He is the petitioner in G.R. Nos. 95203-05.
367
367
The Court set the cases (in G.R. Nos. 95203-05) for hearing on
October 25, 1990, in which Senator Maceda and his counsel, Atty.
Alexander Padilla, argued. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Board, also presented his arguments, together with Board
Commissioner Rex Tantiangco. Attys. Federico Alikpala, Jr. and
Joselia Poblador represented the oil firms (Petron and Caltex,
respectively).
The parties were thereafter required to submit their
memorandums after which, the Court considered the cases
submitted for resolution.
_______________
368
368
369
369
________________
8 Supra, at 535.
370
370
Anent claims that oil companies can not charge new prices for oil
purchased at old rates, suffice it to say that the increase in
question was not prompted alone by the increase in world oil
prices arising from tension in the Persian Gulf. What the Court
gathers from the pleadings as well as events of which it takes
judicial notice, is that: (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has
incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen
to P28.00 to $1.00; (3) the country's balance of payments is
expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at $2.855
Billion as of the first nine months of the year.
371
371
The OPSF, as the Court held in the aforecited CACP cases, must
not be understood to be a funding designed to guarantee oil
firms' profits although as a subsidy, or a trust account, the Court
has no doubt that oil firms make money from it. As we held there,
however, the OPSF was established precisely to protect the
consuming public from the erratic movement of oil prices and to
preclude oil companies from taking advantage of fluctuations
occurring every so often. As a buffer mechanism, it stabilizes
domestic prices by bringing about a uniform rate rather than
leaving pricing to the caprices of the market.
At this point, the Court shares the indignation of the people over
the conspiracy of events and regrets its own powerlessness, if by
this Decision it has been powerless. The constitu-
372
372
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING OPINION
PARAS, J.:
I dissent.
In fixing the oil prices complained of, the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) gravely abused its discretion
________________
1 The majority opinion itself concedes that when Sec. 3(e) is
applicable, a hearing is indispensable (See Decision, p. 6).
373
373
Petitions dismissed.
Note.Alleged lack of notice of public hearing in NEA's approval
of increase in electric rates of the electricity cooperative, not
tenable, where the consensus and members of the cooperative,
and the consumers are already represented by the Board of
Directors whom they elected. (National Electrification
Administration (NEA) vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 632.)
o0o
782
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
783
783
784
784
785
785
786
786
787
_______________
788
788
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to
UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per
cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the
balance to be amortized within one year from its date of
execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31,
1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this
time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association,
Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed Civil Case No. 3382-
_______________
789
789
_______________
790
790
2
ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS [COSLAP] HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER, IS IT
EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR CASE OF FORUM
SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS?
_______________
791
791
_______________
Chairman
Action Officer
Member
Member
Member
PANAMIN Chairman ............................................................
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
792
792
Notably, the said Presidential Decree No. 832 did not contain any
provision for judicial review of the resolutions, orders or decisions
of the PACLAP.
_______________
Chairman
Member
Deputy Executive Secretary ...................................................
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
793
VOL. 353, MARCH 7, 2001
793
_______________
794
794
_______________
795
795
Given the facts of the case, it is our view that the COSLAP is not
justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. As matters
stand, it is not the judiciarys place to question the wisdom behind
a law;17 our task is to interpret the law. We feel compelled to
observe, though, that by reason of the ambiguous terminology
employed in Executive Order No. 561, the power to assume
jurisdiction granted to the COSLAP provides an ideal breeding
ground for forum shopping, as we shall explain subsequently.
Suffice it to state at this stage that the COSLAP may not assume
jurisdiction over cases which are already pending in the regular
courts.
_______________
796
796
_______________
19 Id. The definition adds: For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned
the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation.
21 Id.
797
797
_______________
798
798
_______________
799
799
800
800
A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and the
COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents propensity
for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification
against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or
principal party, and not by his counsel.31 Hence, one can deduce
that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the
part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or
other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the
case at bar, private respondents litany of omissions range from
failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping
to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself.
First, the petition filed
_______________
801
801
_______________
802
802
Thus, while we might admit that the causes of action before the
Makati court and the Paraaque court are distinct, and that
private respondent cannot seek civil indemnity in the contempt
proceedings, the same being in the nature of criminal contempt,
we nonetheless cannot ignore private respondents intention of
seeking exactly identical reliefs when it sought the preliminary
relief of injunction in the Makati court. As earlier indicated, had
private respondent been completely in good faith, there would
have been no hindrance in filing the action for damages with the
regional trial court of Paraaque and having it consolidated with
the contempt proceedings before Branch 274, so that the same
issue on the alleged violation of the sub judice rule will not have
to be passed upon twice, and there would be no possibility of
having two courts of concurrent jurisdiction making two
conflicting resolutions.
Yet from another angle, it may be said that when the Paraaque
court acquired jurisdiction over the said issue, it excluded all
other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring jurisdiction
over the same. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where
courts of concurrent jurisdiction might have conflicting orders.
This will create havoc and result in an extremely disordered
administration of justice. Therefore, even on the assumption that
the Makati court may acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action for damages, without prejudice to the application of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, it cannot nonetheless acquire
jurisdiction over the issue of whether or not petitioner has
violated the subjudice rule. At best, the Makati court may hear the
case only with respect to the alleged injury suffered by private
respondent after the Paraaque court shall have ruled favorably
on the said issue.
803
803
whereas the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3382-R was signed
by a different lawyer, Atty. Thomas S. Tayengco. With regard to
the petition filed with the COSLAP, the same was signed by
private respondents individually. As to the latter case, we noted
that the petition itself could not have been prepared by ordinary
laymen, inasmuch as it exhibits familiarity with statutory
provisions and legal concepts, and is written in a lawyerly style.
In the same manner, the plaintiffs in the three (3) different cases
were made to appear as dissimilar: in Civil Case No. 3316-R, the
plaintiff was ASSOCIATION of which private respondent Mario
Padilan was head, while the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3382-R was
the BENEFICIARIES. Before the COSLAP, private respondents
themselves were the petitioners, led again by Padilan.34 Private
respondents also attempted to vary their causes of action: in Civil
Case No. 3382-R and COSLAP Case No. 98-253, they seek the
annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and
among UNITED, the PMS, and HIGC as well as the transfer
certificates of title accordingly issued to petitioner. All three (3)
cases sought to enjoin the demolition of private respondents
houses.
_______________
804
804
SO ORDERED.
o0o
491
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
492
492
493
493
raised and passed upon in the lower court, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari to
be given due courseto require petitioner to question COSLAPs
jurisdiction in a motion for reconsideration as a condition
precedent for the filing of the instant petition could only be an idle
exercise.It is significant to note that the instant petition does
not show that petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed Resolution before respondent COSLAP, which is a
condition precedent in order that this petition for certiorari shall
be given due course. The general rule that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual
or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case. However, this rule is subject
to certain recognized exceptions. Where the order (or a resolution
as in the case at bar), is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction, or where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower
court, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not necessary
for a petition for certiorari to be given due course. As will be
shown later, COSLAP was totally without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the case. This was correctly pointed out by
petitioner even before the assailed Resolution was issued by
COSLAP. To require petitioner to question COSLAPs jurisdiction in
a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent for the filing
of the instant petition could only be an idle exercise.
494
494
495
495
Same; Same; Same; Same; Agrarian Reform Law; R.A. No. 6657;
Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the COSLAP vests
the latter and the DAR concurrent jurisdiction in respect to
disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws.
The grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or
agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by
the DAR. Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the
COSLAP vests the latter and the DAR concurrent jurisdiction in
respect to disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian
reform laws. Instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP
should have simply referred private respondents complaint to the
DAR or DARAB, where another case involving the same parties,
the same property and the same issues was pending on appeal.
496
496
497
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005
497
498
498
TINGA, J.:
499
_______________
500
500
_______________
501
501
_______________
502
502
_______________
503
503
_______________
504
504
SO ORDERED.16
16 Id., at p. 24.
17 Id., at p. 5.
18 Id., at p. 6.
505
505
_______________
24 People v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 492, 498; 308 SCRA 687,
699
(1999).
506
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
be given due course. The general rule that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual
or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case. However, this rule is subject
to certain recognized exceptions.25 Where the order (or a
resolution as in the case at bar), is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction, or where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
in the lower court, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not
necessary for a petition for certiorari to be given due course.26 As
will be shown later, COSLAP was totally without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the case. This was correctly pointed out by
petitioner even before the assailed Resolution was issued by
COSLAP. To require petitioner to question COSLAPs jurisdiction in
a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent for the filing
of the instant petition could only be an idle exercise.
_______________
507
507
On March 19, 1971, E.O. No. 305 was issued reconstituting the
PACLAP. Apart from its policy-making, oversight and investigative
duties, E.O. No. 305 vested the PACLAP with adjudicatory powers
phrased in broad terms, to wit:
_______________
508
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
....
...
_______________
509
509
...
_______________
510
The instances when COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited
only to those involving public lands or lands of the public domain
or those covered with a specific license from the government such
as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a
reservation grant. The Cuison property is private property, having
been registered under the Torrens system in the name of
petitioner. Thus, the government has no more control or
jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are
herein petitioner and private respondents. None of them is a
squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation
grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any
cultural minority.31 The dispute between the parties was not
critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or
unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action.32
It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP
may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving other similar
land problems of grave urgency. Where general words
_______________
30 Ibid.
31 Under Section 32, Chapter 11, Title III, Book IV of The Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the COSLAP shall also be
responsible for the settlement of land problems involving small
landowners and members of cultural minorities.
511
511
512
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
33 Rollo, p. 105.
34 G.R. No. 66386, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 599, 607-608.
513
513
_______________
514
514
37 Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 389 Phil. 153, 165; 333 SCRA 628, 640
(2000).
39 Id., at p. 795.
515
515
SO ORDERED.
689
________________
* EN BANC.
690
690
691
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
691
ROMERO, J.:
_______________
692
692
________________
693
693
__________________
5 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
694
694
________________
6 Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
695
695
_______________
696
696
pine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the
Council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority
and other personnel.
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No.
857, Sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which
would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No.
125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications was issued, the PPA retained
its attached status.10 Even Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency
attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of
the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the DOTC
shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the
respective charters or laws creating them, except when they
conflict with this Code.
_______________
10 Sec. 18(a).
697
697
_______________
12 Sec. 39 (2).
698
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
699
699
facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in
accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the
_______________
(d) The investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor
later than ten days from the date of receipt of respondents
answer by the disciplining authority, and shall be finished within
thirty days from the filing of the charges, unless the period is
extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. The decision
shall be rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days
from the termination of the investigation or submission of the
report of the investigator, which report shall be submitted within
fifteen days from the conclusion of the investigation.
(e) The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent
shall consist of the sworn statement and documents submitted in
support of the complaint or answer, as the case may be, without
prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed
necessary but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the
complaint or answer, upon which the cross-examination, by
respondent and the complainant, respectively, shall be based.
Following cross-examination, there may be redirect and recross-
examination.
(f) Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and
may require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory
process of
700
700
_______________
701
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
701
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes
under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to
act, decide and recommend to him all cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the
Department. Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the
AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25
issued by the President on May 25, 1987.15 Its special nature as a
quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not
exempt from the observance of due process in its proceedings.16
We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents
protestation that petitioner waived his right to be heard
notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was
precisely questioning the AABs jurisdiction when it sought judicial
recourse.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID
and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General
_______________
702
702
SO ORDERED.
o0o
196
PUNO,J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commision to abolish the Career
Executive Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
_______________
198
198
199
199
x x x
x x x.
Thank you.
A.
B.
200
200
_______________
201
201
xx x
_______________
4 P.D. No. 1 was later amended by P.D. No. 336 and P.D. No. 367
on the composition of the CESB; P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) reiterated the functions of the
CESB. The General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993 also
uniformly appropriated funds for the CESB.
202
202
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the
General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent
Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
x x x
203
203
204
204
_______________
205
VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
205
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
227
* SECOND DIVISION.
228
228
Same; Police Power; Taxation; The coconut levy funds were raised
by the states police and taxing powers such that the utilization
and proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the
Government.We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy
funds were raised by the States police and taxing powers such
that the utilization and proper management thereof were certainly
the concern of the Government. These funds have a public
character and are clearly affected with public interest.
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC);
Requisites; Any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51%) percent of its capital stock.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether
PETROPHIL was a government owned or controlled corporation
the employees of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the
Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the
ratiocination thatWhile it may be that PETROPHIL was not
originally created as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a
government-owned or controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became
a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now
funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired
to perform functions related to government programs and policies
on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was
acquired not
229
229
230
230
BELLOSILLO, J.:
231
231
_______________
232
232
_______________
2 Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II David B. Corpuz
approved by Director Angel C. Mayoralgo, Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Aportadera and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto;
Rollo, p. 22.
233
233
234
234
_______________
235
235
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF
companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF
owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares
of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED
COCONUT.15 Obviously, the below 51%
_______________
15 See Note 7.
236
236
SO ORDERED.
_______________
16 G.R. No. 134171, 18 November 1998, 298 SCRA 736.
237
237
o0o [Ley son, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 331 SCRA
227(2000)]
413
* THIRD DIVISION.
414
414
415
415
CORONA, J.:
_______________
1 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25750-25751.
416
416
417
417
_______________
418
418
_______________
4 EO No. 292.
419
419
_______________
420
420
421
421
422
422
_______________
423
423