E28180 V 70 P10850 Nubaria 0 Metnama 0 QRA0

Nubaria-Metnama Pipeline QRA
The Egyptian Natural Gas Company Nubaria-Metnama

Natural Gas Pipeline,
Egypt
1.1.1.1.1.1.1
E2818 v7
1.1.1.1.1.1.2
Prepared by: QUANTITATIVE
1.1.1.1.1.1.3 RISKDahshour-
ASSESSMENT
Atfeeh and Nubaria-
Metnama gas
June 2011 Egypt
pipelines,
Final Report
RESETTLEMENT POLICY
FRAMEWORK
2
Draft Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline starts from Al-Nubaria power
station passing by North Giza power station and ends at Metnama area. This
pipe line is used to feed this area with Natural Gas for power plants to be
used in the production of electricity.
EcoConServ was assigned to prepare a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

study for the proposed Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline, on behalf of
the The Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO). This report is the main
deliverable of this assignment.
This document sets out the Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline QRA in
order to identify the key hazards and risks associated with the new pipeline.
The study focuses on the major, worst-case hazards, essentially in order to
prioritize the potential impacts to the public.
RISK CRITERIA
Individual risks are the key measure of risk acceptability for this type of
study, where it is proposed that:
Risks to the public can be considered to be broadly acceptable if below

10-6 per year. Although risks of up to 10-4 per year may be considered
acceptable if shown to be ALARP.
Risk in the range of 10-6 to 5 x 10-7 may cause injury to persons who
could not find a shelter within 30 seconds.
RISK RESULTS PUBLIC

From the day of construction and until 20 years of operation, only two
villages will be affected by the 5 x 10 -7 risk of injury contour which are Izbt
Masjid Ar-Rahman and Al-Baradah villages, with no real risk for the residents
of the villages.
After 20 and until 30 years of operation, five villages will be affected, but
again only by the 5 x 10-7, which means that they are no real risk too.
After 30 years, the 1x10-6 risk appears but does not reach any villages except
Al-Baradah village; also the 5 x 10 -7 reaches 7 villages with no real risk to the
residents.
1
Concerning Al-Baradah village, GASCO ensures that they performed a field

visit and that the exact placement of the pipeline will be based on real
conditions according to real ground situation. This will decrease the risk at Al-
Baradah village to a high extent. Furthermore, all villages which may be
affected in the future will be repeatedly visited by the GASCO team to ensure
that populations are not exposed to unacceptable risk. Special attention will
be paid to the village of Al-Baradah.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this QRA report show that the 1 x 10-6 risk contour (which is the
risk of fatality to the public) does not appear except after 30 years of
operation and even then has a negligible effect. However the 5x10 -7 risk of
injury contour appears but with a limited effect and it is acceptable for
population to exist within its vicinity.
GASCO will take all possible actions to organize building construction and
encroachment around both banks of the pipeline. Also, they are committed
to coordinate with local authorities about any new projects to be constructed
in the area of the project. This will limit the effect of any accident to a great
extent.
The emphasis on risk reduction should be on preventative measures, i.e. to

minimize the potential for leaks to occur. This would chiefly be achieved
through appropriate design (to recognized standards) and through effective
inspection, testing and maintenance plans / procedures. All of these
measures are already included in the pipeline design and mitigation
measures to be followed strictly by GASCO.
Rapid isolation of significant leaks will not eliminate the risks but will help to
further minimize the hazards and, particularly, the ignition probability (by
limiting the total mass of flammable gas released). For isolation to be
effective first requires detection to occur. Close monitoring and rapid
shutdown of the pipeline in case of an emergency are important to limiting
the effects of leaks.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................1
RISK CRITERIA......................................................................................................................... 1
RISK RESULTS PUBLIC............................................................................................................. 1
RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................................. 2
ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................. 8
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 9
1.1 BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................. 9
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE................................................................................................. 9
1.3 LAYOUT OF STUDY......................................................................................................... 9
2 SITE DESCRIPTION.....................................................................................11
2.1 LOCATION.................................................................................................................. 11
2.2 LAND USE................................................................................................................. 11
2.3 LOCATION OF VALVE ROOMS......................................................................................... 12
2.4 METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.....................................................................................15
3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION...............................................................................17
3.1 PIPELINE DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................17
3.2 PIPELINE SPECIFICATIONS.............................................................................................. 17
3.3 MITIGATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PIPELINE OPERATION................................................17
4 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.......................................................................19
4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK.....................................................................................19
4.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA............................................................................................ 20
4.3 SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA.............................................................................................. 21
5 METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................22
5.1 DATA COLLECTION...................................................................................................... 22
5.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID).................................................................................23
5.3 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS.................................................................................................. 23
5.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS.............................................................................................. 23
5.5 RISK CALCULATIONS.................................................................................................... 23
5.6 RISK SOFTWARE TOOLS...............................................................................................24
6 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS................................................................................25
6.1 GENERAL.................................................................................................................. 25
6.2 BASIC FAILURE FREQUENCIES........................................................................................26
6.3 EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE FACTORS ADJUSTMENTS.............................................................27
6.3.1 Marker Tape....................................................................................................... 27
6.3.2 Depth of Cover................................................................................................... 27
6.3.3 Wall Thickness.................................................................................................... 28
6.4 GROUND MOVEMENT FACTORS ADJUSTMENTS..................................................................28
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6.5 ADJUSTED FAILURE FREQUENCIES...................................................................................29

6.6 PROBABILITY OF PIPELINE IGNITION.................................................................................30
7 ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................................... 31
7.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 31
7.2 BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS.........................................................................................31
7.2.1 Weather Categories........................................................................................... 31
7.2.2 Wind Direction................................................................................................... 32
7.2.3 Atmospheric Parameters....................................................................................32
7.3 VULNERABILITY/ IMPACT CRITERIA ASSUMPTION FOR JET FIRE...............................................33
7.4 FAILURE CASE DEFINITION ASSUMPTIONS.........................................................................33
7.4.1 Failure Cases - Definition...................................................................................33
7.4.2 Failure Cases - Parameters.................................................................................34
7.4.3 Failure Cases - Release Types............................................................................34
7.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS..........................................................................35
7.5.1 General.............................................................................................................. 35
7.5.2 Fire Modeling...................................................................................................... 35
8 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION............................................................................36
8.1 GENERAL HAZARDS..................................................................................................... 36
8.2 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF NATURAL GAS.....................................................................39
8.3 DETAILED HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION...............................................................................39
8.3.1 Natural Gas Line................................................................................................. 39
9 FAILURE CASE DEFINITIONS........................................................................42
9.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 42
9.2 METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................... 42
10 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT......................................................................44
10.1 CONSEQUENCE OF JET FIRE ACCIDENTS...........................................................................44
11 RISK ASSESSMENT.....................................................................................45
11.1 CALCULATED RISK DUE TO JET FIRE................................................................................45
12 RISK RESULTS............................................................................................47
12.1 FREQUENCY ESTIMATION.............................................................................................. 47
12.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS......................................................................................... 48
12.3 RISKS TO THE PUBLIC.................................................................................................. 49
12.4 RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................... 50
13 BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................68
A1 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.......................................................................70
A1.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 70
A1.2 BASIS FOR CRITERIA.................................................................................................... 70
A1.2.1 Need for Criteria............................................................................................. 70
A1.2.2 Principles for Setting Risk Criteria..................................................................70
A1.2.3 Framework..................................................................................................... 71
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A1.3 PROPOSED RISK CRITERIA............................................................................................ 73

A1.3.1 Individual Risk................................................................................................ 73
A1.3.2 Societal Risk................................................................................................... 75
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 2-1: A GOOGLE EARTH IMAGE SHOWING THE NUBARIAMETNAMA PIPELINE WITH VALVE ROOMS
LOCATIONS AND POWER PLANTS ON THE LINE...........................................................................14
FIGURE 5-1: QRA METHODOLOGY................................................................................................22
FIGURE 6-1: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION OF INCIDENT CAUSES FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF PIPELINES................26
FIGURE 6-2: GENERAL CONTRIBUTION OF FAILURE CAUSES IN CASE OF FULL-BORE RAPTURE..................26
FIGURE 7-1: WIND ROSE (PROBABILITY OF WIND DIRECTION)............................................................32
FIGURE 10-1: ALOHA JET FIRE OUTPUT AT 70 BAR.........................................................................44
FIGURE 11-1: RISK AT 70 BAR PRESSURES AS AFUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF PIPELINE AT 1.2 M
DEPTH OF COVER................................................................................................................ 46
FIGURE 12-1: PIPELINE PATH GENERAL VIEW SHOWING THE FOURTEEN VILLAGES AROUND THE PIPELINE......52
FIGURE 12-2: LESS THAN 20 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT MASJID AR-RAHMAN (10-6 RISK
CONTOUR DOES NOT APPEAR)............................................................................................... 53
FIGURE 12-3: LESS THAN 20 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT AL-BARADAH VILLAGE (10-6 RISK
FIGURE 12-4: 20 30 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT MASJID AR-RAHMAN VILLAGE (10-6 RISK
FIGURE 12-5: 20 30 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT SIDI IBRAHIM(10-6 RISK CONTOUR DOES
NOT APPEAR)..................................................................................................................... 56
FIGURE 12-6: 20 -30 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT JAMAL AL-FRANSAWI (10-6 RISK CONTOUR
DOES NOT APPEAR)............................................................................................................. 57
FIGURE 12-7:20 - 30 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT KAFR MANSOUR VILLAGE (10-6 RISK CONTOUR
DOES NOT APPEAR)............................................................................................................. 58
FIGURE 12-8: 20 30 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT AL-BARADAH VILLAGE (10-6 RISK CONTOUR
DOES NOT APPEAR)............................................................................................................. 59
FIGURE 12-9: 30 -40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT AS-SUKHNA AL-JADIDA......................60
FIGURE 12-10: 30 40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT MASJID AR-RAHMAN......................61
FIGURE 12-11: 30 40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT SIDI IBRAHIM................................62
FIGURE 12-12: 30 40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT IZBT JAMAL AL-FRANSAWI......................63
FIGURE 12-13: 30 40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT KAFR MANSOUR..................................64
FIGURE 12-14: 30 40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT DARAWA VILLAGE................................65
FIGURE 12-15: 30-40 YEARS INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS AT AL-BARADAH VILLAGE.............................66
FIGURE 12-16: F-N CURVE MARKING THE ALARP ZONE AND THE FREQUENCY FOR LESS THAN AND GREATER
THAN 20 YEARS OF OPERATION.............................................................................................67
FIGURE A- 1: "ALARP" FRAMEWORK FOR RISK CRITERIA..................................................................73

FIGURE A- 2: AN INTERPRETATION OF UK HSE SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA (F-N CURVE)...........................76
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 2-1: LOCATION OF VALVE ROOMS........................................................................................12
TABLE 2-2: TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY FOR NORTH GIZA AREA.......................................................15
TABLE 6-1: BASE FREQUENCIES FOR PIPELINE RELEASE....................................................................26
TABLE 6-2: BASE FREQUENCY FOR PIPELINES IN THE DIAMETER CATEGORY OF 29 35........................27
TABLE 6-3: REDUCTION FACTOR RELATED TO THE DEPTH OF COVER...................................................28
TABLE 6-4: FREQUENCY REDUCTION FACTOR RELATED TO WALL THICKNESS.........................................28
TABLE 6-5: SUB CAUSES OF GROUND MOVEMENT AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS......................................28
TABLE 6-6: FINAL FREQUENCY AFTER ADJUSTMENTS FOR THREE YEARS CATEGORIES...............................29
TABLE 6-7: PROBABILITY OF IGNITION FOLLOWING A RELEASE FROM PIPE.............................................30
TABLE 7-1: ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS.........................................................................................32
TABLE 7-2: SUMMARY OF IGNITED RELEASE OUTCOMES, OR HAZARD TYPES.........................................35
TABLE 8-1: HAZARD CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND PROPOSED OR INHERENT SAFEGUARDS......................37
TABLE 12-1 : FREQUENCIES USED FOR ALL THE CASES AT THE THREE OPERATION YEARS CATEGORIES.........47
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ABBREVIATIONS
AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres
API American Petroleum Institute
BP British Petroleum
CCPA Center for Chemical Process Safety
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DNV Det Norske Veritas
EGIG European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group
EGPC Egyptian General Petroleum Company
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESD Electrostatic Discharge
F/N Frequency Number of Fatalities Curve
FM200 Dupont waterless fire suppression system
FRED Fire, Release, Explosion and Dispersion
GASCO Egyptian Natural Gas Company
HAZID Hazard Identification
HCRD Hydrocarbon Release Database
HRSG Heat Recovery Steam Generator
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IP Intermediate Pressure
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LP Low Pressure
MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NG Natural Gas
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEM Office of Emergency Management
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
UK United Kingdom
8
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline is planned to be constructed between
Nubaria Power Station and Metnama area for the transfer of natural gas
through the West of the Nile Delta area. The design of the project is
performed by the Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO).
EcoConServ was assigned to prepare a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

study for the proposed Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline, on behalf of
GASCO. This report is the main deliverable of this assignment.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The main objectives of this QRA study are:
To identify and quantify the major hazards associated with the

proposed pipeline
Assess the acceptability of the risks to people (any nearby residential

areas), against internationally recognized criteria.
The scope covered is for a QRA, which is focused on the worst-case hazards,
and associated risks, in order to assess the key risks.
1.3 LAYOUT OF STUDY

The layout of the remainder of this document consists of the following
sections:
Section 2 and Section 3 describe the site of the pipeline and the give
details about the project, and the mitigation measures adopted by
GASCO.
Section 4 sets out the risk criteria proposed for this study, on which the
determination of acceptability will be based. This is covered in detail by
Appendix A1.
Section 5 clarifies the methodology adopted while carrying out the risk
assessment and the tools used for the study.
Section 6 describes the frequency analysis and the effect of the

preservative measures on the frequency
9
Section 7 summarizes the assumptions undertaken in this study in

detail (detailed assumptions / failure case definition).
Section 8 and Section 9 summarize the outcome of the Hazard

Identification step and enumerate the failure cases.
Section 10 describes the Consequence Assessment steps and presents

its results.
Section 11 describes the Risk Assessment steps and presents its basic
results.
Section 12 details the final risk results, which are primarily based
around the individual risk contours. These are discussed with respect
to the potential risks to the public. It also presents the Conclusions and
Recommendations of the analysis.
10
2 SITE DESCRIPTION
2.1 LOCATION
The Nubaria-Metnama Natural Gas pipeline starts from Al-Nubaria power
station passing through several villages and agricultural land in the West of
the Delta, near its end it passes by North Giza power station and ends at
Metnama area. The pipeline is 104 Km long and passes through the Bhaira,
Menofia, Giza and Qalyubiyah Governorates. Figure 2 -1 shows the Google
earth image for the pipeline showing the valve rooms locations and numbers,
Al-Nubaria power station as the starting point of the line, and North Giza
power station that benefits from the pipeline.
2.2 LAND USE

The pipeline passes through agricultural land, and moves adjacent to the
agricultural area border where possible. First part of the pipeline is located to
the West bank of Al-Rayyah An-Nasiri canal, after valve-room 7 the line
crosses the canal to North Giza power plant. After this, the pipeline crosses
the Rashid Branch, the Damietta Branch of the Nile and several other canals.
It is memorable to note that the detailed maps on which the pipeline was
placed are old dating back to 1992, on the other hand the Google earth
images are based on the satellite photos taken within 2010. During this time
some villages extended and the pipeline now passes through one of them,
namely Al-Baradah village (see Figure 12 -9).
GASCO ensures that they have done a physical survey of the entire route and
that they will not construct a pipeline passing through villages, only through
agricultural land, and that the exact placement of the pipeline will be based
on real conditions according to real ground situation. Limited accuracy due to
drawing the pipeline on the Google Earth image or during measuring
distances from the actual maps may account for the difference than the real
case.
The pipeline passes beside several Villages; these Villages are listed from the
North (beginning of the line) and moving South then East with the line. The
villages are:
Al-Iman
Salah Al-Din
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Badr -
Umar Makram
Umar Shahin
Izbt As-Sukhnah Al-Jadida
Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman
Al-Khatatba -
Izbt Sidi Ibrahim
Izbt Jamal Al-Fransawi
Ar-Raml -
Al-karadi -
Kafr Mansour
Sheshaa -
Darawah -
Kafr Ash-Shurfa Al-Gharbia
Al-Baradah -
As-Sabah and Kafr ash-Shaheed
2.3 LOCATION OF VALVE ROOMS

Table 2 -1 shows the approximate location of each of the 12 valve rooms
placed on the pipeline according to Geographical coordinates from Google
earth.
Table 2-1: Location of Valve Rooms
Distance to Valve Room

Location Name North East (km between valve
rooms)
Valve Room 1 30 40 0
30 42 16.88
12.77
Valve Room 2 30 42
3035 38.02 13
49.77
12
Valve Room 3 30 45
30 32 29.54 8
58.70
Valve Room 4 30 48
30 29 43.12 8
15.81
Valve Room 5 30 48
30 25 34.84 8
56.89
Valve Room 6 30 48
10
30 20 17.17 17.59
Valve Room 7 30 55
15
30 14 55.05 07.53
Valve Room 8 30 56
4
30 14 48.49 33.74
Valve Room 9 31 00
10
30 12 12.10 25.64
Valve Room 10 31 05
10
30 14 09.06 51.72
Valve Room 11 31 11
30 14 08.57 9
08.57
Valve Room 12 31 16
30 12 42.76 9
00.60
13
Room 1
Room 2
Al-Nubaria Power
Room 3
Room 4
Room 5
Room 6
North Giza Power
Room 7
Room 10 Room 11
Room 8
Room 9 Room 12
Figure 2-1: A Google Earth image showing the NubariaMetnama pipeline with valve rooms locations and power
plants on the line
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2.4 METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

The meteorological conditions for the pipeline were taken as the
meteorological data for the of North Giza Power Plant site, as the pipeline
feeds the plant and the meteorological conditions of the area through which
the pipeline pass is nearly constant. The meteorological data for the North
Giza Power Plant were obtained from the Giza Meteorological Station, and
cover the area of 50 km around the station.
Table 2 -2shows the annual temperature and humidity variation around the
site. The wind rose for the area is shown in Figure 2 -2. The wind rose shows
that wind blows mainly from the North and that the wind speed seldom
increases over 10 knots.
Table 2-2: Temperature and humidity for North Giza area
Av. Temperature (oC) Relative

Month Av. Av. Highest Lowest Daily Humidity
Daily Max. Daily Min. Daily Max. Min. (%)
January 19.8 6.9 31.5 3.3 66
February 21.2 7.6 36.2 2.0 61
March 24.1 9.8 39.0 1.2 59
April 28.7 13.1 43.5 3.5 51
May 32.5 16.7 48.0 7.9 48
June 34.8 19.8 48.0 11.9 51
July 35.3 21.5 45.5 15.0 58
August 34.8 21.6 42.9 15.3 62
September 33.0 19.6 44.0 11.9 61
October 30.6 17.0 44.5 8.9 62
November 25.7 12.7 38.8 3.4 67
December 21.1 8.6 36.3 -1.1 68
Annual-average 28.46 14.58 59.5
15
Figure 2-2: Wind rose of North Giza (wind speed in

Knots)
16
3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
3.1 PIPELINE DESCRIPTION
The pipeline is 104 km long starting at Al-Nubaria power station and feeds
the North Giza power plant along its path. The line has 12 valve rooms to act
as a safeguard for the pipeline.
3.2 PIPELINE SPECIFICATIONS

The pipe diameter is 32 inch with a daily average flow-rate of 8 MMscmd, an
inlet gas pressure is in the range 60-70 bar. The pipeline will be buried at a
depth of 1.2 m and has marker tapes to indicate its path.
3.3 MITIGATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PIPELINE OPERATION

The following mitigation measures are followed by GASCO during the
construction and operation of the pipeline:
The Quality Control ISO 9001 is applied throughout the project,
International codes and criteria are used during the choice of the path
and the design of the pipeline,
Direct and accurate supervision on all the construction phases will be

present through the companys engineers and technicians,
Engineering inspection will be done during all the project phases,
Pipelines must successfully pass the hydrostatic test at a pressure of

1.5 times the maximum operating pressure before the starting to
operate,
The gases being transmitted must not contain any corrosive materials,
The pipelines have corrosion resistant internal lining,
The pipelines are externally coated with three layers of polyethylene

and checked before the pipes are put down and buried,
Cathodic protection systems are applied as soon as the line is put in

the ground,
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The most up-to-date internal testing systems are applied to discover

any defects and address them early, if any. (On-Line Inspection
technique).
The internal testing system is repeated periodically and the results are
compared against the previous test results.
The SCADA system, available at the National Control Center (NATA),

will be used to control and isolate the areas at risk immediately in case
of emergencies in order to ensure a speedy control and minimize the
damage,
The choice of the main pipelines paths to be outside the residential

areas,
The thickness of the pipeline is chosen to match the population class

near the highly populated areas,
The valve rooms are distributed on the pipeline in a way that

decreases the amount of confined gas and enables easy discharge in
case of emergency.
Coordination with the local authorities and the concerned authorities

about the pipeline path and maps to be taken into consideration when
approving any new projects or constructions,
Increasing the awareness about the pipeline in the nearby

communities through the patrol squads.
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4 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

In the absence of Egyptian legislation setting definite limits for acceptable
risk, the risks evaluated within this study were referenced against
internationally accepted criteria, in order to determine the acceptability of
the risks and any need for risk reduction measures to be implemented within
the design process. The EGPC does have its own standards for risk
acceptance, but it was considered more conservative in this case to apply
the internationally accepted criteria.
The risk criteria proposed to be used are drawn from the widely used
framework set out by the UKs HSE, using the As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP) principle, and proposes risk acceptance criteria to be
used as guidance for this study.
4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The following measures of acceptability should be evaluated in assessing the
risks from any hazardous activity:
Individual risk criteria should be used to limit risks to members of

the public.
Cost-benefit analysis should be used to ensure that, once the above

criteria are satisfied, an optimum level of safety measures is chosen
for the activity, taking costs as well as risks into account. (Note that
this is outside the scope of this study.)
The simplest framework for risk criteria is a single risk level which divides
tolerable risks from intolerable ones. Such criteria give attractively simple
results, but they need to be used very carefully, because they do not reflect
the uncertainties both in estimating risks and in assessing what is tolerable.
For instance, if applied rigidly, they could indicate that an activity which just
exceeded the criteria would become acceptable as a result of some minor
remedial measure which in fact scarcely changed the risk levels.
A more flexible framework specifies a level, usually known as the maximum

tolerable criterion, above which the risk is regarded as intolerable whatever
the benefit may be, and must be reduced. Below this level, the risks should
also be made As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This means that
when deciding whether or not to implement risk reduction measures, their
cost may be taken into account, using cost-benefit analysis. In this region,
19
the higher the risks, the more it is worth spending to reduce them. If the
risks are low enough, it may not be worth spending anything, and the risks
are then regarded as negligible.
This approach can be interpreted as dividing risks into three tiers (as is
illustrated in Appendix A1):
An upper band where risks are intolerable whatever the benefit the
activity may bring. Risk reduction measures or design changes are
considered essential.
A middle band (or ALARP region) where the risk is considered to be

tolerable only when it has been made ALARP. This requires risk
reduction measures to be implemented if they are reasonably
practicable, as evaluated by cost-benefit analysis.
A negligible region where the risks are negligible and no risk

reduction measures are needed.
4.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA

Individual risk is widely defined as the risk of fatality (or serious injury)
experienced by an individual, noting that the acceptability of individual risks
should be based on that experienced by the most exposed (i.e. worst-case)
individual.
The most widely-used criteria for individual risks are the ones proposed by
the UK HSE, noting that these have also been interpreted for projects in
Egypt.
These criteria are:
The acceptable criterion, for the public, corresponding to the level

below which individual risks can be treated as effectively negligible,
is 10-6 per year (i.e. 1 in 1,000,000 years)
If the risk calculated from heat radiation at residential areas

exceeds 5 x 10-7per year, this will cause injury after 30 seconds of
direct exposure to the heat. The risk of injury in this case is 5 x 10 -7
(i.e. 5injuries in 10,000,000 years), which may considered
negligible.
In terms of the acceptability of individual risks, it should be noted that:
20
Individual risks are typically presented as contours that correspond

to the risk experienced by a person continuously present, outdoors,
at each location.
While people are unlikely to remain continuously present,

outdoors at a given point, the individual risk levels used to assess
residential developments are not modified to account for any
presence factor or the proportion of time spent indoors. That is, it
should be conservatively assumed that dwellings are occupied at all
times and that domestic properties offer no real protection against
the potential hazards.
It should also be noted that lower criteria are often adopted with
respect to vulnerable populations, such that schools and hospitals,
for example, should be located such that the individual risks are
well below 10-6 per year.
4.3 SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA

A proposed criterion for Societal Risk is set out in Appendix A1in the form of
an F-N curve, which gives the cumulative frequency (F) of exceeding a
number of fatalities (N).
It is, however, important to note that the acceptability of societal risks can
be subjective and depends on a number of factors (such as the benefits
versus the risks that a facility provides). There is not a single established
indicator in terms of societal risk.
The proposed societal (F-N) criteria are considered to provide useful

guidance on the acceptability of the societal risk, although it should be
emphasized that the criteria are not as widely accepted as individual risk and
should be used as guidance only.
21
5 METHODOLOGY
QRA is a well-established methodology to assess the risks of industrial
activities and to compare them with risks of normal activities. The QRA
methodology used is shown in Figure 5 -3.
Figure 5-3: QRA Methodology
5.1 DATA COLLECTION

This study is based on information sent to EcoConServ by email in addition to
the general pipeline path map and detailed terrain maps, which were
obtained from (GASCO).
22
5.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID)

The hazard identification process is important for any risk analysis. A HAZID
was been performed in the course of preparing the QRA depending on
historical data for gas transportation accidents. The HAZID study for the
pipeline has enabled us to identify and enumerate the failure cases that
require further analysis.
5.3 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

Failure frequencies were determined for each event in order to perform a
probabilistic risk assessment. Generally, a number of techniques are
available to determine such frequencies. The approach relies on generic
data. This provides failure frequencies for equipment items where data has
been obtained from failure reports from a range of facilities. Frequency
assumptions are detailed in Chapter 7.
5.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

For each identified hazard scenario, consequence analysis tools were used to
determine consequence effect zones for each hazard. In general the different
possible outcomes could be:
Dispersing of Hydrocarbon Vapor Cloud
Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
The particular outcomes modeled depend on source terms (conditions like

fluid, temperature, pressure etc.) and release phenomenology. The current
understanding of the mechanisms occurring during and after the release is
included in our consequence analysis models and tools. These models and
tools are explained in Section 5.6.
5.5 RISK CALCULATIONS

The outcome of the risk analysis is risk terms presented in form of risk
curves, where the location of specific individual risk measurements is
displayed.
The individual risk is the risk for a hypothetical individual assumed to be

continuously present at a specific location. The individual at that particular
location is expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of
23
specified hazards. It is usually expressed in risk of death per year. Individual

risk is presented in form of risk contours.
Risk contours were generated using the tools described in Section 5.6
5.6 RISK SOFTWARE TOOLS

A collection of freely available software and in-house developed programs
were used to estimate the risk in this study. This approach has enables a
deep understanding of the risk calculations methodology. The use of this risk
software tools enables the users to have control over the modeling and
hence the majority of the assumptions are covered in the inputs to, rather
than within, the software.
Consequence modeling is done using ALOHA, a tool developed by EPAs

Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and Restoration (NOAA), to
assist front-line chemical emergency planners and responders. ALOHA is an
atmospheric dispersion model used for evaluating releases of hazardous
chemical vapors. ALOHA allows the user to estimate the downwind dispersion
of a chemical cloud based on the toxicological/physical characteristics of the
released chemical, atmospheric conditions, and specific circumstances of the
release. ALOHA can estimate threat zones associated with several types of
hazardous chemical releases, including toxic gas clouds, fires, and
explosions. The input to ALOHA is mainly the conditions at the release
source, and the output is a graph showing the release effect at the specified
standard radiation levels or overpressure according to the type of release.
The graphs from ALOHA are then turned into a digital format in the form of a
table showing the distances in all directions at each radiation level.
The general principles of consequence identification are:
Dispersion results are drawn in from ALOHA software, taking flammable

and toxic hazard ranges separately. These are used for delayed ignition
hazards, such as toxic impacts and flash fires.
Similarly, the way the risks are calculated, via event trees, is part of the user-
defined input. The risk assessment software is written using a programming
language that takes the digitized graphs from ALOHA as an input, taking into
consideration the frequency of occurrence and the probability of ignition of
each type of release. The inputs are consequences in the form specified
above, where each will have an event frequency together with an immediate
ignition probability or a background delayed ignition probability. The
24
probability of weather category and wind direction is determined as per

Assumptions of Chapter 7, as are the ignition and explosion probabilities (as
discussed further in Chapter 7). All other variations on the outcome
frequency are defined before input, e.g. the probability of isolation failure or
variation in release orientation. The risk from all different releases is then
added to give the final total risk contours graph, which is presented on a
Google Earth image for the pipelines.
25
6 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
6.1 GENERAL
The failure data of release are derived from the European Gas Pipeline
Incident Data Group (EGIG, 2008). The European data is derived based on a
significant exposure experience in terms of kilometer years experienced from
1970 2007 in fifteen European countries, which is a statistically significant
base for estimating release frequencies. The general statistical data is
averaged on all the fifteen countries without taking the regional differences,
such as population density and geological conditions, into consideration,
which makes the data more reliable for use. The frequency also takes into
consideration a number of variable factors such as: wall thickness, depth of
cover, probability of ignition, etc.
The operating conditions of the pipeline that will be constructed by GASCO

between the Nubaria and Metnama are covered well in the statistical data
used in the report of EGIG about pipelines, these conditions are the operating
pressure, pipe diameter, wall thickness, depth of cover and coating material.
The analysis of the main incident causes for all categories of pipelines
(different diameters, thicknesses, pressures, etc.) shows that the main cause
of incidents is through external interference followed by construction defect /
Material Failure then corrosion as can be seen in Figure 6 -4.
26
Figure 6-4: Average contribution of incident causes for all categories of pipelines
6.2 BASIC FAILURE FREQUENCIES

The average data derived from EGIG for all pipelines are shown in Table 6 -3,
where they are categorized by the cause of the incident and gives the
frequency of each cause. For more specification, only the data for pipes of
diameters greater than 29 will be used during the calculations of the
frequency. Also the frequency of material defects will be calculated according
to the year of construction as more advanced measure. Figure 6 -5 shows
the contribution of failure causes in case of full-bore rupture before the
specific measures applied for this case.
27
Figure 6-5: General Contribution of Failure Causes In Case of Full-Bore Rapture
Table 6-3: Base Frequencies for Pipeline Release
Pipeline General Base frequency by Cause and

Hole Size
Cause (Per 1000 km-year)
Hole
Full-Bore Rupture
(10 mm < d < 50 mm)
External Interference 0.1 0.03
Construction/Material Defect 0.015 0.01
Corrosion 0.0025 0
Ground Movement 0.008 0.009
Other/Unknown 0.003 0
Total 0.1285 0.049
The failure data indicate that for pipelines with a diameter from 29 to 35,
only full rupture can occur at this diameter with the frequency shown in Table
6 -4. Table 6 -4 also shows the change in the construction defect/ material
failure based on the number of years that passed since the construction, for
this study three categories are adopted, the first is since the construction till
20 years, the second is the period of 20-30 years since construction and the
third is 30-40 years since construction. More measures will be applied later
to account for all the mitigation measures taken by GASCO and the
difference between the Egyptian and European geographical terrain.
28
Table 6-4: Base Frequency for pipelines in the diameter category of 29 35
Pipeline Full Bore Rupture Base frequency for 29 35 Diameter Class

(Per 1000 km-year)
Years since Less than 20
20 30 years 30 40 years
construction years
Cause
External
0.0048 0.0048 0.0048
Interference
Construction/Materi
0 0.0029 0.0039
al Defect
Corrosion 0 0 0
Ground Movement 0.009 0.009 0.009
Other/Unknown 0 0 0
Total 0.0138 0.0167 0.0177
6.3 EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE FACTORS ADJUSTMENTS

The base frequencies in Table 6 -4 are adjusted to account for the additional
preservative measures taken for each pipeline, such as: Pipeline depth, wall
thickness and the presence of Marker Tape. These measures will result in
decreasing the likelihood of external interference; therefore it is the main
factor that is going to be affected.
6.3.1 MARKER TAPE

Corder (Corder, 1995) has reported that a damage reduction factor of 1.67
was achieved when marker tape is provided above pipelines based on
experimental data derived from testing undertaken by British Gas. This factor
will be used in this study to reduce the frequency of impacts resulting from
external interference for sensitivity cases with marker tape.
6.3.2 DEPTH OF COVER

The depth of cover presents the depth at which the pipeline will be buried, as
the depth of cover increase the reduction factor decrease and so the
frequency decrease. The depth of 1.11 m has no reduction factor where for
depths below this value the frequency increases and above it the frequency
decrease. These data were originally available to the depth of 1.4 m, which
were extrapolated to reach a value of 2.0 m and are shown in Table 6 -5.
Table 6-5: Reduction Factor Related to the Depth of Cover
Depth of Cover (m) Reduction Factor
29
0.8 1.30
1.0 1.11
1.2 0.92
1.4 0.73
1.6 0.54
1.8 0.35
2.0 0.157
Thus a reduction factor of 0.92 (for 1.2 m depth) will be used in this study.
6.3.3 WALL THICKNESS

The (EGIG, 2008) database summarizes pipeline failure frequencies by wall
thickness. Based on the data, the factors in Table 6 -6 are used for pipes
with varying wall thicknesses.
Table 6-6: Frequency Reduction Factor related to Wall Thickness
Pipe Wall Puncture Rupture

Thickness (mm) (Hole) (Full-Bore)
2.5 (0-5 mm) 2.4 5.8
7.5 (5-10 mm) 1.0 1.0
12.5 (10-15 mm) 0.5 0.5
Note that GASCO uses an additional conservative measure which is

increasing the pipe thickness from the usual 0.5 (12.7 mm) to 0.625 (16
mm) near the areas with low population and to 0.75 (19 mm) near the
highly populated areas, all the road and river crossings. Therefore, it is
convenient to assume a wall thickness higher than 15 mm for population
areas near the pipeline and roads and rivers which decreases the corrosion
probability to its minimum.
6.4 GROUND MOVEMENT FACTORS ADJUSTMENTS

The factors that compromise the ground movement frequency are not all
experienced in Egypt due to the difference in the geographical terrain,
although Europe is near enough; therefore these factors are either removed
or reduced to match the earthquake categories of Egypt versus Europe. Table
6 -7 shows the factors that contribute in the base ground movement
frequency.
Table 6-7: Sub causes of Ground Movement and their Contributions
Sub-Causes of Ground Percent

Movement Contribution
Land Slide 55%
30
Flood 19%
River 6%
Mining 5%
Dike break 1%
Lightning 3%
Other 2%
Unknown 9%
The factors that were removed are flood, mining, dike break and lightning
while the land slide factor was reduced to the third of its value to take into
consideration that the delta areas is far enough from the tectonic plates
boundaries, which are the main earthquakes reason, unlike some of the
contributing countries in the EGIG data like Italy and Spain.
6.5 ADJUSTED FAILURE FREQUENCIES

The effect of release from a hole in the pipe was found to be negligible
compared to the release from full-bore rupture; as the pipe diameter class
indicates according to the statistical data from EGIG. Also the preservative
mitigation measures taken by GASCO, such as the polyethylene coating, the
cathodic protection and the hydrostatic test on the pipe at 1.5 its maximum
operating pressure, eliminate the possibility of corrosion which is the main
reason for hole rupture. Therefore, the effect of hole-release is not carried
forward.
The frequency of full-bore rupture after taking into account the marker tape
and depth of cover in the external interference factor and adjusting the
ground movement factor is shown in Table 6 -8.
Table 6-8: Final Frequency after Adjustments for three years Categories
Pipeline Full Bore Rupture Base frequency for 29 35 Diameter Class

(Per 1000 km-year)
Less than 20
Years since construction 20 30 years 30 40 years
years
Cause
External Interference 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
Construction/Material
0 0.0029 0.0039
Defect
Corrosion 0 0 0
Ground Movement 0.002 0.002 0.002
Other/Unknown 0 0 0
Total 0.0138 0.0167 0.0177
31
It is important to note that the construction/ material defect factor will not
appear as a considerable factor except after 20 years since the pipeline was
built and will only slightly increase after 10 more years. Therefore three
calculations were made to take into consideration the change in this factor.
6.6 PROBABILITY OF PIPELINE IGNITION

The probability of ignition of holes and ruptures used in the frequency
assessment was based on the (EGIG, 2008) Report Section 3.4.3,
summarized in Table 6 -9. The probability differs in case of rupture according
to the pipe diameter.
Table 6-9: Probability of Ignition Following a Release from Pipe
Hole size Ignition Probability

Hole (50 mm) 2%
Rupture (d <406 mm) 10%
Rupture (d> 406 mm) 33%
Possible sources of ignition include but are not limited to: direct heat
(Smoking, cooking, etc.), electrical current (lights, irrigation pumps, tractors,
cars, etc.), lightning, etc.
32
7 ASSUMPTIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic aim of this Assumptions chapter is to document the details
underpinning this QRA study.
Background data:
The site-specific aspects that apply (or potentially apply) to each of the
release scenarios (failure cases) modeled are referred to as background
data. This covers the meteorological conditions and the potential ignition
sources that are specific to the site, and the potentially exposed populations.
General assumptions:
The basic methodology adopted for studies of this kind is set out in the
following sections, in order to describe the basis for the defined scenarios
and modeling approach. It should be emphasized that elements of these
sections are generic and are intended to define the broad approach only.
7.2 BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS

7.2.1 WEATHER CATEGORIES
As well as the wind direction, the actual weather conditions, in terms of the
wind speed and the stability (a measure of atmospheric turbulence),
determine how quickly the flammable plume disperses to lower non-
hazardous concentrations.
In the absence of detailed meteorological data (i.e. covering the stability

categories), two representative weather conditions are applied to model the
dispersion of each release scenario. These are D5 and F2 conditions, which
are widely adopted (such as by NFPA and the UK HSE) as broadly
representative of typical and worst-case dispersion conditions,
respectively:
D5 neutral stability (D) and 5 m/s wind speed.
F2 stable (F) conditions and 2 m/s wind speed.
UK HSE guidance suggests that good practice for QRA studies is to assume
that D5 conditions apply for 80% of the time and F2 for the remaining 20% -
again, in the absence of detailed data only.
33
Although based on the experience of conducting QRA worldwide suggests

that this provides a reasonably representative (and slightly conservative)
basis when compared against local weather conditions.
7.2.2 WIND DIRECTION

The wind rose for the region where the pipeline will be constructed is given
below.
Figure 7-6: Wind Rose (Probability of Wind Direction)
Please note that the above figure is based on the True North. The data
provided is based on annual averages and, hence, is applied to the risk
model as being the same for all time periods (e.g. day and night).
7.2.3 ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS

The representative atmospheric parameters that are applied to the
consequence modeling are summarized in Table 7 -10, below.
Table 7-10: Atmospheric Parameters
Val Unit
Parameter Notes
ue
The range of min/max temperatures is 2 to 41 C, where 20 C

Air
22 C is taken as a representative base value in case of absence of
temperature
representative data.
34
Surface
22 C Taken as the same as air temperature, above.
temperature
Relative Assumed. Note that its influence on dispersion / consequences

60 %
humidity is minor.
Surface Representative parameter for regular large obstacles based on

1 m
roughness TNO Purple Book guidance.
Solar kW/ Assumed. Note that its influence on dispersion / consequences

1
radiation m2 is negligible.
Atmospheric 1.01
bar Negligible influence on dispersion /consequences.
pressure 3
As indicated in the above table, assumptions such as surface roughness can

significantly affect the hazard ranges predicted for the worst-case release
scenarios. However, the influence on most releases is minor and the purpose
of the risk study is to determine the frequency of the most representative
outcomes. Hence, the overall risks will be reasonable robust to the above
assumptions.
7.3 VULNERABILITY/ IMPACT CRITERIA ASSUMPTION FOR JET FIRE

The basis for the jet fire impact levels and criteria is summarized below.
The levels at which impairment from fires occurs are defined for three
radiation levels, of greater than 37.5 kW/m 2, 12.5 kW/m2 and 4.7
kW/m2which are referenced within the risk model as flame, radiation
and Injury impacts, respectively.
A fatality rate of 100% is assumed at radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m 2 or

greater and 50% for 12.5 kW/m2 or greater for personnel outdoors that
are exposed to radiation effects from jet fires. These values involve a
degree of judgment, but are consistent with standard practice (and
slightly conservative).
For the 4.7 kW/m2 radiation level the risk of injury assigned is 50
chances in million years.
7.4 FAILURE CASE DEFINITION ASSUMPTIONS

7.4.1 FAILURE CASES - DEFINITION
The key factors in selection of the representative sections (i.e. the generic
failure cases) are:
35
Gas released.
Flow conditions (temperature and pressure).
Release location (the area in which the release occurs, including the
height).
Isolation.
For each of the pipe sections, up to five representative release sizes are
considered:
Full-bore rupture (where the hole diameter is larger than the

diameter of the pipeline, based on the most representative line size
within each section)
Large leaks (e.g. due to connection failures) - 75 mm (3) equivalent

diameter
Medium, Small and Very Small leaks (e.g. due to corrosion, impact
and other such cases) 25, 12 and 2 mm (1, and 1/10)
equivalent diameter leaks respectively.
7.4.2 FAILURE CASES - PARAMETERS

For each of the release scenarios to be modeled, the key inputs to the
derivation of release parameters are the flow conditions, flow-rate and
location, where the parameters are derived as follows:
Flow conditions (temperature and pressure) were obtained through

GASCO as mentioned in section 3.2, where the pressure drops
through the whole pipeline from about 70 bar to about 30 bar.
However, according to GASCOs request, the pressure in the pipe is
taken to be 70 bar along the pipeline, representing no-flow
conditions, as a conservative measure.
Release location: The release location selected is necessarily

representative as it is taken to be at any point along the pipeline.
The release is modeled at a depth of 1.2 m from the surface of the
ground, which is the depth of cover of the pipeline, also the
presence of marker tape is taken into account as stated by GASCO.
7.4.3 FAILURE CASES - RELEASE TYPES

The outcome, and hence the way in which the discharge and subsequent
dispersion parameters are modeled are listed below:
36
In case of immediate ignition after the release the result is jet fire.
If the release is not followed by immediate ignition, it will result in a

flash fire. The flash fire consequence is negligible compared to the
jet fire consequence and is not carried forward for further
assessment.
Toxicity. Natural gas has no known toxic or chronic physiological

effects (that is, it is not poisonous). Exposure to a moderate
concentration may result in a headache or similar symptoms due to
oxygen deprivation but it is likely that the sound accompanying the
release would be heard well in advance of concentrations being high
enough for this to occur.
7.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS

7.5.1 GENERAL
For each release event defined, dispersion modeling and fire size calculations
are conducted within ALOHA modeling software tool. These consequence
results are used directly by the risk modeling software.
The consequences are input to the risk model in groups of hazard type,
which depend upon the type of release and when ignition occurs, as
summarized Table 7 -11 below. Note that this table addresses flammable
impacts only; toxic impacts will also apply for unignited releases depending
on the composition.
Table 7-11: Summary of Ignited Release Outcomes, or Hazard Types
Release Type Hazard Type (Consequence)

Immediate Ignition Delayed Ignition
Gas release Jet fire (or fireball for short Flash fire/explosion
duration release)
7.5.2 FIRE MODELING

Based on the derivation of the release parameters, the determination of the
initial fire effects is handled by the ALOHA as follows.
All immediately ignited releases are modeled as jet fires.
All delayed ignition events are modeled as flash fires or VCEs (not
applicable for this study).
37
Flash fires are based on the LFL (Lower Flammability Level) distance
(not applicable for this study).
38
8 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
8.1 GENERAL HAZARDS
The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards. The merits of
including the hazard for further investigation are subsequently determined
by its significance, normally using a cut-off or threshold quantity.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of

the risk it presents to the neighboring community. In principle, both
probability and consequence should be considered, but there are occasions
where if either the probability or the consequence can be shown to be
sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.
Table 8 -12 shows the general hazards that were found for the N.G. pipeline,
along with possible causes, expected consequences and proposed or
inherent safeguards.
39
Table 8-12: Hazard causes, consequences and proposed or inherent safeguards
Hazard
Site Area Hazard Cause Proposed / Inherent Safeguard
Consequence
pipeline marker signs to be installed at regular
intervals
The national control center (NATA) will be used to
control and isolate the areas at risk immediately
in case of emergencies
The choice of the main pipelines paths to be
outside the residential areas
External Leak/rupture, Increasing the awareness about the pipeline in the
Pipeline
interference ignition, jet fire, flash nearby communities through patrol squads
Coordination with the local authorities and the
concerned authorities about the pipeline path and
maps to be taken into consideration when
approving any new projects or constructions
The thickness of the pipeline is chosen to match
the population class near the highly populated
areas
hydrostatic test at a pressure of 1.5 times the
maximum operating pressure before operating
The most up-to-date internal testing systems are
Leak/rupture,
Pipeline Construction error applied to discover any defects and fix them early
ignition, jet fire, flash
The internal testing system is repeated
periodically and the results are compared against
the previous test results
40
Hazard
Site Area Hazard Cause Proposed / Inherent Safeguard
Consequence
External coating system corrosion protection
Corrosion resistant internal lining
Leak/rupture,
Pipeline Corrosion Gases transmitted must not contain any corrosive
ignition, jet fire, flash
materials
Cathodic protection systems are applied
land is flat with no subsidence potential
Use of Horizontal Directional Drilling as a
Ground Movement, Leak/rupture,
Pipeline construction method for water way crossings
Earthquake ignition, jet fire, flash
Use of steel pipes which are flexible enough to
take the shape of the ground beneath it
Inherent flexibility and strength of gas
transmission pipelines and equipment
Equipment failure Gas release Closed rooms for security
NG Valve causing leaks due Jet fire if ignited QA, welding inspection
rooms to corrosion or Flash fire if ignition is Hydrostatic testing of equipment
defects delayed Radiography of circumferential welds ultrasonic
on pipes
Maintenance/inspection
41
8.2 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF NATURAL GAS

The inherent hazards of the fitting line arise from the flammability of the
natural gas, and the pressure at which it is transmitted and processed in the
station. The types of hazardous incident which may occur, in theory at least,
would all require a leak in the fitting line or associated equipment (e.g.
valves, meters, flanges, etc.). They are: Jet fire and flash fire.
It is noted that natural gas is lighter than air (i.e. a buoyant gas) and if
released tends to rise and disperse rather than accumulate forming a
flammable cloud thus it is not possible for Vapor Cloud Explosion to occur.
8.3 DETAILED HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

The following section constitutes detailed qualitative hazard identification for
those incidents listed in Table 8 -12.
8.3.1 NATURAL GAS LINE

The following fitting line design and operational details, below, were used:
Inlet Pressure 70 bar
Outlet Pressure 70 bar
Length 104 km
Diameter 32 inch (8128 mm); and
Wall thickness varying according to the population density in each

area (from 0.5 to 0.75 (12.7mm -19mm)), therefore, taken as
above 15mm.
There is historical evidence of gas transmission pipeline failure. Historical

evidence (Bolt & Horalek, 2004)indicates that there are a number of factors
that can lead to fitting line leak and subsequent release of gas. The details
below summarize those incidents that have historically led to fitting line
failure and gas release:
External Interference external interference accounts for the

majority of release incidents in gas transmission fitting lines (Bolt &
Horalek, 2004).
Flood Damage this may occur where the fitting line traverses river
beds or water courses. The potential for fast running water could lead
42
to scouring above the fitting line exposing the pipe to potential impact
from rocks and debris moving in the water stream. In addition, surface
flooding could lead to the fitting line floating from the trench, leading
to fitting line damage. A review of the fitting line route indicates that
the fitting line will be laid away from flood areas. Additionally,
Horizontal Directional Drilling will be used as a construction method for
waterway crossings. Hence, this hazard has not been carried forward
for further analysis.
Subsidence Damage where fitting lines are installed near or in

banks and levees, wash away may expose the fitting line and uneven
weight could cause severe fitting line damage. However, the fitting line
is not installed in a bank or levee and therefore, incidents resulting
from subsidence have not been carried forward for further analysis
External Corrosion Damage many soils are acidic and fitting lines
installed without external protection are susceptible to corrosion and
eventual failure (leaks). The fitting line is installed underground and
hence is exposed to acidic soils increasing the potential for external
corrosion. Therefore, polyethylene coating is applied for protection as
well as cathodic protection. Incidents involving external corrosion
(excluding impact) have not been carried forward for further analysis.
Internal Corrosion Damage the introduction of corrosive gas to the

fitting line could result in accelerated corrosion or moisture in the gas
could lead to corrosion impact on the pipe internal surface. However,
gas fed is dry and non-corrosive, having passed many kilometers
through this line, also internal lining is used to protect the pipe. Hence,
the likelihood of corrosion from this source is considered negligible.
Incidents as a result of corrosion have therefore not been carried
forward for further analysis.
Faulty Material the use of faulty materials, such as fitting line with
manufacturing defects, could lead to premature fitting line failure
resulting in rupture. However, pipe material will be purchased from a
quality assured organization (i.e. ISO9001), which minimizes the
potential for faulty materials. Further, the fitting line will be fully tested
in accordance with the appropriate requirements, including a pressure
test to prove fitting line will operate safely and without failure at
maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP). The quality assurance
testing regime minimizes the potential for fitting line failure as a result
43
of material defects. These measure are strictly followed, therefore the

faulty material frequency will not start to affect the flow except after
20 years of operation, which could be minimized through regular check
of the pipeline.
Faulty Construction like the faulty materials incidents detailed

above, faulty construction can also lead to failure of the fitting line. For
example, faulty welding can lead to premature failure and gas release.
However, fitting line welds will be subjected to X-Ray inspection
minimizing the potential for failure from this source. Further, the fitting
line will be subjected to a testing regime, further minimizing the
potential for faulty construction failure. Additional construction
problems, such as poor support or alignment in the pipe rack will be
minimized by strictly following the appropriate requirements. These
measure are strictly followed, therefore the faulty material frequency
will not start to affect the flow except after 20 years of operation,
which could be minimized through regular check of the pipeline.
Ground Movement this may occur where fitting lines are installed in
an earthquake zone. Earthquakes and excessive ground movement
may lead to damaged pipe racks and buckled pipework or, in the worst
case, rupture. However, the fitting line would not be installed in an
earthquake zone. Delta area is relatively stable and earthquakes of the
magnitude that could result in fitting line rupture are rare. The risk of
ground movement is slightly taken into consideration in the frequency
of pipe rupture, as not all the ground movement factors are present for
the proposed pipeline.
Hot Tap by Error hot tap is the connection to a live gas line
during operation. When this is conducted by expert personnel the risk
is negligible. However, failure to identify a live gas fitting line and
attempts, by error, to connect to this fitting line could lead to fitting
line breach and gas release. To identify gas fitting line, marker signs
will be installed on the fitting line in accordance with the appropriate
requirements. This incident therefore, has not been carried forward for
further analysis.
The above analysis is supported by the results of studies conducted by the

European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Base (Bolt & Horalek, 2004), which
conducts research into gas pipeline incidents both in Europe and overseas.
The results of these studies indicate that the majority of pipeline incidents
44
50% occur as a result of external interference, 17% due to material defects

and 15% due to corrosion.
45
9 FAILURE CASE DEFINITIONS

9.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic aim of the Failure Case Definition stage is to identify the failure
cases, or major accident hazards, that will have the potential to result in risks
to populations around the pipeline path, and hence will be inputs to the risk
modeling.
The basic approach adopted is summarized in Section 9.2.
Note that the failure case definition presented in this section is underpinned
by the methodology set out in Section 7.
9.2 METHODOLOGY
For the purposes of this risk assessment it is not necessary (or practical) to
attempt to model all of the potential hazards associated with all the points of
the pipeline. The basic approach adopted instead is summarized below.
70 bar pressure will be used over the whole pipeline as a conservative

measure.
The scenario is carried out at the valve rooms and then extended over
the whole pipeline length
Two risk values were considered 1 x 10 -6 and 5 x 10-7 per year, where
the first value represents the risk of fatality and the second represents
the risk of injury.
These failure cases are then superimposed upon the image of the
pipeline on Google Earth to define the populated areas that are at risk
from this line.
Note that the general methodology adopted in deriving the initial failure
cases, and the subsequent development of each, is detailed in Section 7 .
Note also that the subsequent modeling approach is also described in
Section 7.
The failure cases derived for each unit are presented in the following section.
The section includes a basic description of the failure case, as well as the
representative flow conditions and the primary hazard outcome(s) of each
release.
46
Due to the insignificance of the risk due to the hole compared to the full-bore
rupture, as detailed in Section 7, therefore the hole consequence is not
carried forward for investigation.
47
48
10 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
The consequence of the failure cases were estimated using the methodology
of Section5 and the assumptions detailed in Chapter7. Consequences
presented here are jet fire consequence as the flash fire consequence was
found to be negligible compared to the jet fire consequence.
10.1 CONSEQUENCE OF JET FIRE ACCIDENTS

The failure case which result in jet fire, has the following calculated data by
ALOHA, where the hole diameter is equal to the pipe diameter: The total
amount burned in 1 hr is 237,173 kg and the flame length is 91 m.
A sample jet fire output is shown in Figure 10 -7shows radiation contours of

37.5, 12.5 and 4.7 kW/m2 for 70 bar jet fire scenarios. Note that ALOHA
figures assume that the wind blows towards the positive x-axis
Figure 10-7: ALOHA jet fire Output at 70 bar
49
11 RISK ASSESSMENT
The Risk assessment is based on the data presented in Section6. Before
calculating the risk, the rupture was first assumed to be at every point in the
pipeline each representing a separate case. Then during the risk assessment
the risk for each heat radiation contour was calculated, and the risks of all
cases were added to reach the final result which shows the risk as a function
of the distance from the center of the pipeline.
11.1 CALCULATED RISK DUE TO JET FIRE

The collected Risk calculated for each section is shown as a function of the
distance from the center of the pipeline. Figure 11 -8shows the calculated
risk from the center of the pipeline at 70 bar with distance for the time of
construction of less than 20 years, then between 20 - 30 years and after 30
40 years in operation.
The distance from the center of the pipe to the 1 x 10 -6 and 5 x 10-7 risk
contours (fatality and injury) was obtained from the Risk Distance curve
(Figure 11 -8). From the time of construction and until 20 years the 1 x 10 -6
risk contour does not appear and the distance for the 5 x 10 -7 risk contour is
80 m in average. Between 20 30 years of operation the 1 x 10 -6 risk contour
does not appear again and the distance for the 5 x 10 -7 risk contour is 180 m
in average. Between 30 - 40 years of operation the 1 x 10 -6 risk contour has
an average distance of 35 m and 190 m for the 5 x 10-7 risk contour.
50
Figure 11-8: Risk at 70 bar pressures as afunction of distance from center of pipeline at 1.2 m depth of cover
51
12 RISK RESULTS
The risks were calculated from the results of the consequence analysis of the
failure cases and the estimation of the frequencies of those cases. The
frequencies were estimated based on the assumptions; data and practices
explained in Sections 6&7 and are presented in Section 12.1.
Individual risks are the key measure of risk acceptability for this type of
study, where it is proposed that:
Risks to the public can be considered to be broadly acceptable if below

10-6 per year, although noting that societal risk factors should also be
considered (including the type of population potentially exposed).
Although risks of up to 10-4 per year may be considered acceptable if
shown to be ALARP.
Individual risks are presented in Section 12.2, while risk to the public is
presented in Section.12.3
12.1 FREQUENCY ESTIMATION

Table 12 -13 shows the frequencies calculated for each of the cases
identified during the hazards identification phase at the three operating
years categories.
Table 12-13 : Frequencies used for all the cases at the three operation years
categories
Years of Frequen Frequency of

Fire accident Basis for Frequency
Operation cy of Injury
type Calculations
Fatality
1.52 x 10-6 from Section
6x 1 probability of
fatality for 37.5 kW/m2
Less than 20 1.52 x 10-
Jet Fire and x 0.5 probability of 1.78 x 10-8
years 6

Frequency of injury is at
4.7 kW/m2
20 30 years Jet Fire 2.48 x 10-6 from Section 2.48 x 10- 2.90 x 10-8
6
6x 1 probability of
and x 0.5 probability of
52
Years of Frequen Frequency of

Fire accident Basis for Frequency
Operation cy of Injury
type Calculations
Fatality
4.7 kW/m2
7.2 x 10-6 from Section

6x 1 probability of
2.64 x 10-
30 40 years Jet Fire and x 0.5 probability of 6 3.09 x 10-8
4.7 kW/m2
12.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS

At this stage in the risk assessment the most useful measure of risk is
individual risk, which is presented in the form of contours. The individual risk
contours for the risk assessment are presented for each village at risk alone
to emphasize the type of risk that will affect the residents and to what
extent. The individual risk contours give the risk of fatality (or serious injury)
experienced by a person continuously present, outdoors and the risk of injury
that can be experienced by a person if he did not find a shelter within 30
seconds.
Figure 12 -9 shows the villages that are present around the pipeline with
their positions as a reference, these villages are:
Al-Iman
Badr
Umar Makram
Umar Shahin
Izbt As-Sukhna Al-Jadida
Izbt Sidi Ibrahim
Izbt Jamal Al-Faransawi
53
Izbt Ar-Raml
Kafr Mansour
Sheshaa
Darawah
Al-Shurfa Al-Gharbia
Al-Baradah
At 1.2 m depth of cover and in the operating time till 20 years, Figure 12 -10
and Figure 12 -11 represent the two affected villages which are Izbt Masjid
Ar-Rahman and Al-Baradah consecutively, these villages are affected by the
5x10-7 risk of injury contour only.
Between 20 30 years of operation, 5 villages are expected to be affected,

also by the 5x10-7 risk of injury contour only. These villages are shown in
Figure 12 -12 to Figure 12 -16, and in order they are: Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman,
Izbt Sidi Ibrahim, Izbt Jamal Al-Faransawi, Kafr Mansour and Al-Baradah.
The expected villages to be affected between 30-40 years of operation are 7

villages as shown in Figure 12 -17 to Figure 12 -23. These 7 villages are
mainly affected by the 5x10-7 risk contour, and the 1x 10-6 although
appearing does not affect any villages except Al-Baradah. The seven villages
are: Izbt As-Sukhna Al-Jadida, Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman, Izbt Sidi Ibrahim, Izbt
Jamal Al-Faransawi, Kafr Mansour, Darawa and Al-Baradah
12.3 RISKS TO THE PUBLIC

As discussed above, Figure 12 -10 and Figure 12 -11are focused on the
villages that fall within the risk contours at the first 20 years of operation,
where it can be seen that:
The 10-6 individual risk contour does not exist
The 5 x 10-7 touches Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman and covers small part of Al-
Baradah village
Figure 12 -12 to Figure 12 -16 are focused on the villages that fall within the
risk contours after 20 years of operation and until 30 years, where it can be
seen that:
The 10-6 individual risk contour does not exist
54
The 5 x 10-7 passes through Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman, Izbt Sidi Ibrahim,
Izbt Jamal Al-Faransawi, Kafr Mansour and Al-Baradah villages.
Figure 12 -17 to Figure 12 -23 are focused on the villages that fall within the
risk contours after 30 years of operation and until 40 years, where it can be
seen that:
The 10-6 individual risk contour just barely exists and does not affect
any nearby villages except Al-Baradah village (see note below
regarding this village)
The 5 x 10-7 passes through Izbt As-Sukhna Al-Jadida, Izbt Masjid Ar-
Rahman, Izbt Sidi Ibrahim, Izbt Jamal Al-Faransawi, Kafr Mansour,
Darawa and Al-Baradah villages.
Concerning Al-Baradah village, GASCO ensures that they performed a field

visit and that the exact placement of the pipeline will be based on real
conditions according to real ground situation. This will decrease the risk at Al-
Baradah village to a high extent. Furthermore, all villages which may be
affected in the future will be repeatedly visited by the GASCO team to ensure
that populations are not exposed to unacceptable risk. Special attention will
be paid to the village of Al-Baradah.
From the above results it is apparent that the 1x10 -6 risk of fatality contour
will not appear except after more than 30 years of operation, and even then,
its effect will be negligible and is expected not to reach any of the nearby
villages. However, it is recommended to put this risk in consideration for
future expansion of the areas adjacent to the pipeline.
The F-N curve, Figure 12 -24, gives the cumulative frequency (F) of
exceeding a number of fatalities (N). In the region between the red and the
green lines the risks are acceptable only if demonstrated to be As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The maximum frequency is marked by a black line for the operating periods:
less than and greater than 20 years. The figure indicates that the number of
fatalities is the number of individuals present outdoors in the fire area with
no barrier separating them from the accident source. The Figure shows that:
For the first 20 years of operation: the risk is considered to be

negligible if less than 65 individuals are present outdoors near the
accident source, while the risk is considered to be ALARP if 6500
individuals are present outdoors near the accident source.
55
After 20 years of operation: the risk is considered to be negligible if

less than 40 individuals are present outdoors near the accident source,
while the risk is considered to be ALARP if 4000 individuals are present
outdoors near the accident source.
Based on the low population density along the path of the pipeline, and the
small affected area by the 10 -6 contour, it is to be concluded that the risk will
never exceeds the ALARP border for the whole lifetime of the pipeline,
resulting in an acceptable level of risk.
12.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this QRA report show that the 1 x 10-6 risk contour (which is the
risk of fatality to the public) does not appear except after 30 years of
operation and even then has a negligible effect. However the 5x10 -7 risk of
injury contour appears but with a limited effect and it is acceptable for
population to exist within its vicinity.
GASCO will take all possible actions to organize building construction and
encroachment around both banks of the pipeline. Also, they are committed
to coordinate with local authorities about any new projects to be constructed
in the area of the project. This will limit the effect of any accident to a great
extent.
The emphasis on risk reduction should be on preventative measures, i.e. to

minimize the potential for leaks to occur. This would chiefly be achieved
through appropriate design (to recognized standards) and through effective
inspection, testing and maintenance plans / procedures. All of these
measures are already included in the pipeline design and mitigation
measures to be followed strictly by GASCO.
Rapid isolation of significant leaks will not eliminate the risks but will help to
further minimize the hazards and, particularly, the ignition probability (by
limiting the total mass of flammable gas released). For isolation to be
effective first requires detection to occur. Close monitoring and rapid
shutdown of the pipeline in case of an emergency are important to limiting
the effects of leaks.
56
Al-Iman
Umar Makram
Umar Shahin
Izbt As-Sukhna Al-

Jadida
Bad
r Izbt Masjid Ar-
Rahman
Izbt Sidi
Ibrahim Shesha
Izbt Jamal Al-
a
Faransawi
Al-Shurfa Al-
Kafr
Gharbia
Mansur
Al-
Baradah
Izbt Ar-Raml
Darawa
Figure 12-9: Pipeline path general view showing the fourteen villages around the pipeline
57
Izbt Masjid Ar-

Rahman
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-10: Less than 20 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman (10 -6 risk contour does not
appear)
58
NG Pipeline
Al-Baradah
1 x 10-6 Risk
Village
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-11: Less than 20 years Individual Risk Contours at Al-Baradah Village (10 -6 risk contour does not
appear)
59
Izbt Masjid Ar-

Rahman
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-12: 20 30 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman Village (10 -6 risk contour does not
appear)
60
Izbt Sidi
Ibrahim
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-13: 20 30 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Sidi Ibrahim(10 -6 risk contour does not appear)
61
Izbt Jamal Al-

Fransawi
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-14: 20 -30 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Jamal Al-Fransawi (10-6 risk contour does not appear)
62
Kafr Mansur
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-15:20 - 30 years Individual Risk Contours at Kafr Mansour Village (10 -6 risk contour does not appear)
63
NG Pipeline
Al-
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level Baradah
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-16: 20 30 years Individual Risk Contours at Al-Baradah Village (10 -6 risk contour does not appear)
64
Izbt As-Sukhna Al-

Jadida
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-17: 30 -40 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt As-Sukhna Al-Jadida
65
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-18: 30 40 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman
66
Izbt Sidi
Ibrahim
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-19: 30 40 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Sidi Ibrahim
67
Izbt Jamal Al-Fransawi
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-20: 30 40 years Individual Risk Contours at Izbt Jamal Al-Fransawi
68
Kafr
Mansour
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-21: 30 40 years Individual Risk Contours at Kafr Mansour
69
Darawa
Village
NG Pipeline
1 x 10-6 Risk
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-22: 30 40 years Individual Risk Contours at Darawa Village
70
NG Pipeline
Al-
1 x 10-6 Risk Baradah
Level
5 x 10-7 Risk
Level
Figure 12-23: 30-40 years Individual Risk Contours at Al-Baradah Village
71
Al-
Figure 12-24: F-N curve marking the ALARP zone and the frequency for less than and greater than 20 years of
operation
72
13 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdul Rosyid, O. (2006). System-analytic Safety Evaluation of the Hydrogen
Cycle for Energetic Utilization. Otto-von-Guericke-University.
Alcock, J. (2001). Compilation of existing safety data on hydrogen and

comparative. EIHP2 Report.
API. (1995). Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process

Plant Buildings (First Edition ed.). API Recommended Practice 752.
Bolt, R., & Horalek, V. (2004). European Gas pipeline Incident Data Group
Pipeline Incident Database. 13th Colloquium Reliability of HP Steel Pipes.
Prague, Czech Republic.
CCPS, A. (1999). Guidelines of Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases.

New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Corder, I. (1995). "The Application of Risk Techniques to the design and

operations of pipelines". IMechE.
Eggen, J. (1995). GAME: development of guidance for the application of the

Multi-Energy Model. TNO Report PML.
EGIG, E. G. (2008). 7th EGIG Report 1970 - 2007, Gas Pipeline Incidents Data
Group (EGIG). Report Number EGIG08.TV-B.0502.
HSE, U. (1999). Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics. Offshore

Technology Report. UK HSE.
LASTFIRE. (1997). Large Atmospheric Storage Tank Fire Project LASTFIRE.

Technical Working Group.
Technica. (1990). Atmospheric Storage Tank Study for Oil and Petrochemical
Industries Technical and Safety Committee. Singapore.
TNO. (1997). Methods for the calculation of physical effects, (3 ed., Vol. 2).
The Hague: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters.
Witlox, H., & Bowen, P. (2001). Flashing liquid jets and two-phase dispersion
A review. HSE.
73
APPENDICES
74
A1 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

A1.1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix introduces the concept of risk acceptance criteria and the As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle, and proposes risk
acceptance criteria to be used as guidance for this study. It should be
emphasized that the selection of criteria is open to interpretation, in the
absence of any formal local regulations, but where the intention of this study
is to use criteria that are consistent with internationally accepted practice.
Section A1.2 describes the basis for the risk criteria, introducing the
widely accepted As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept.
Section A1.3sets out the criteria that are proposed for this study,
covering both individual and societal risk criteria.
A1.2 BASIS FOR CRITERIA

A1.2.1 NEED FOR CRITERIA
A risk analysis provides measures of the risk resulting from a particular
facility or activity. However, the assessment of the acceptability (or
otherwise) of that risk is left to the judgment and experience of the people
undertaking and/or using the risk analysis work. The normal approach
adopted is to relate the risk measures obtained to acceptable risk criteria.
A quantitative risk analysis produces only numbers, which in themselves

provide no inherent use. It is the assessment of those numbers that allows
conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be developed. The
assessment phase of a study is therefore of prime importance in providing
value from a risk assessment study.
A1.2.2 PRINCIPLES FOR SETTING RISK CRITERIA

Given that society accepts hazardous activities in principle, and does not
have limitless resources to devote to their safety, the following set of
principles is considered by some to be appropriate when making decisions
about their acceptability in specific cases:
1. The activity should not impose any risks which can reasonably be
avoided.
75
2. The risks should not be disproportionate to the benefits (in terms of

jobs, tax revenues and finished products) which the activity produces.
3. The risks should be equitably distributed throughout the society in

proportion to the benefits received.
4. The risks should be revealed in minor accidents which the emergency

services can cope with, rather than in catastrophes.
In reality, principles such as these are impossible to achieve. In fact, when

resources are limited, such principles may be in conflict with each other. For
example, reducing catastrophic risks may require expenditure that could
have saved more lives from low-fatality accidents.
The following approach is proposed for assessing the risks from any
hazardous activity, being the nearest practical approach to the ideal
situation:
Individual risk criteria should be used to limit risks to individual

workers and members of the public. These address the equity
requirement (3) above insofar as it applies to individuals.
Societal risk criteria should be used to limit risks to the affected

population as a whole. These attempt to address requirement (2)
above, although in a necessarily crude fashion since the benefits of
hazardous activities are even more difficult to quantify than their risks.
They also address the equity requirement (3) above insofar as it
applies to communities. By expressing societal risk criteria on a
frequency-fatality (FN) curve, they can also address the catastrophe
risk in requirement (4) above.
Cost-benefit analysis should be used to ensure that, once the above

criteria are satisfied, an optimum level of safety measures is chosen for
the activity, taking costs as well as risks into account. This addresses
requirement (1) above.
An activity is said to have tolerable risks if it satisfies all three aspects of this
approach, and intolerable risks if it fails to meet any of them.
Leaving aside other inputs to the decision, an activity with tolerable risks
would generally be regarded as acceptable to the company, the regulatory
authority and the public, while an activity with intolerable risks would
generally be regarded as unacceptable.
76
A1.2.3 FRAMEWORK
The simplest framework for risk criteria is a single risk level which divides
tolerable risks from intolerable ones (i.e. acceptable activities from
unacceptable ones). Such criteria give attractively simple results, but they
need to be used very carefully, because they do not reflect the uncertainties
both in estimating risks and in assessing what is tolerable. For instance, if
applied rigidly, they could indicate that an activity which just exceeded the
criteria would become acceptable as a result of some minor remedial
measure which in fact scarcely changed the risk levels.
A more flexible framework specifies a level, usually known as the maximum

tolerable criterion, above which the risk is regarded as intolerable whatever
the benefit may be, and must be reduced. Below this level, the risks should
also be made as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This means that
when deciding whether or not to implement risk reduction measures, their
cost may be taken into account, using cost-benefit analysis. In this region,
the higher the risks, the more it is worth spending to reduce them. If the
risks are low enough, it may not be worth spending anything, and the risks
are then regarded as negligible.
This approach can be interpreted as dividing risks into three tiers as is

illustrated in Figure A- .
An upper band where risks are intolerable whatever the benefit the
activity may bring. Risk reduction measures or design changes are
considered essential.
A middle band (or ALARP region) where the risk is considered to be

tolerable only when it has been made ALARP. This requires risk
reduction measures to be implemented if they are reasonably
practicable, as evaluated by cost-benefit analysis.
A negligible region where the risks are negligible and no risk reduction
measures are needed.
There is some consensus on this three-band approach, and versions are used
by the UK, Dutch, Swiss and US Santa Barbara criteria.
77
Figure A- : "ALARP" Framework for Risk Criteria
A1.3 PROPOSED RISK CRITERIA

A1.3.1 INDIVIDUAL RISK
Individual risk is widely defined as the risk of fatality (or serious injury)
experienced by an individual, noting that the acceptability of individual risks
should be based on that experienced by the most exposed (i.e. worst-case)
individual.
78
The most widely-used criteria for individual risks are the ones proposed by
the UK HSE (Reference 1), noting that these can also be used for projects in
Egypt.
These criteria are:
The maximum tolerable individual risk for workers is taken as 10 -3

per year (i.e. 1 in 1,000years).
The maximum tolerable individual risk for members of the public is

10-4 per year (i.e. 1 in10,000 years).
The acceptable criterion, for both workers and public, corresponding

to the level below which individual risks can be treated as
effectively negligible, is 10-6 per year (i.e. 1 in1,000,000 years)
Between these criteria the risks are in the ALARP or tolerability

region. In this region the risks are acceptable only if demonstrated
to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
In terms of the acceptability of individual risks, it should be noted that:
Individual risks are typically presented as contours that correspond

to the risk experienced by a person continuously present, outdoors,
at each location.
While people are unlikely to remain continuously present,

outdoors at a given point, the individual risk levels used to assess
residential developments are not modified to account for any
presence factor or the proportion of time spent indoors. That is, it
should be conservatively assumed that dwellings are occupied at all
times and that domestic properties offer no real protection against
the potential hazards. Hence, the individual risks contours can be
used directly with respect to the public, while for workers it is more
appropriate to consider the most exposed individual (accounting for
the time they spend in different areas, indoors, away from the
hazards, etc).
The individual risk criteria proposed for the public correspond to an

individual having a chance of death or serious injury (due to the
hazards assessed) of between 1 in 10,000and 1,000,000 years. To
79
put these risks into context, note that the risk of death in the UK
due to road accidents is just over 1 in 10,000 years, while the risk of
an individual being struck by lightning is widely quoted as being 1 in
10,000,000 years.
For risks approaching the maximum tolerable individual risk level for
the public of 10-4peryear (1 in 10,000 years) to be considered to be
acceptable, it should be demonstrated that all reasonably
practicable measures to minimize the risks have been, or will be,
taken. The same applies for risks closer to the acceptable criterion
of 10-6per year, but where the degree of effort (and expenditure)
that would be considered to be practicable would be less.
It should be emphasized that a variety of individual risk criteria are used

worldwide, as shown by selected examples given below:
For risks to the public a lower / tolerable criterion of 10 -6per year is widely
accepted. However, lower values are adopted by some companies and
legislators. For example, Statoil have a lower criterion of 10 -7 per year and
where for new facilities the Dutch authorities use 10 -6 per year as the upper /
maximum criterion.
It should also be noted that lower criteria are often adopted with respect to
vulnerable populations, such that schools and hospitals, for example, should
be located such that the individual risks are well below 10-6 per year.
The maximum criterion for the public varies between 10 -3 and 10-5 per year
(or lower in some cases as indicated above). The UK HSE value of 10 -4 per
year is maintained in this study as a representative maximum. However, it
should be emphasized that this is a maximum value and it would be
extremely rare for this level to be considered acceptable for a new facility /
development. That is, there is unlikely to be sufficient justification that there
are no practicable methods of reducing this level of risk. In fact, it is
considered to be best practice to treat 10 -6 per year as the target criterion,
while risks of up to 10 -5 per year would require strong justification and risks
above 10-5 per year should be avoided with respect to the public.
It should, in any case, be emphasized that risks above 10 -6 per year are
acceptable only if shown to be ALARP.
In summary, it is proposed that:
80
Risks to the public can be considered to be broadly acceptable if

below 10-6 per year, although noting that societal risk factors should
also be considered (including the type of population potentially
exposed). Although risks of up to 10-4 per year may be considered
acceptable if shown to be ALARP, it is recommended that 10 -5 per
year is adopted for this study as the maximum tolerable criterion.
A1.3.2 SOCIETAL RISK

A proposed criterion for Societal Risk is set out in Figure A- in the form of an
F-N curve, which gives the cumulative frequency (F) of exceeding a number
of fatalities (N).
It is important to note that the acceptability of societal risks can be

subjective and depends on a number of factors (such as the benefits versus
the risks that a facility provides). There is not a single established indicator in
terms of societal risk. For example, the UK HSE does not apply specific
societal risk criteria in general, although they are applied to particular sites
such as ports. Instead, the emphasis is placed on demonstrating that the
risks are ALARP, where judgment on the ultimate acceptability of the risks is
determined on a case by case basis.
However, the UK HSE do quote a single point risk criterion which has been
interpreted to form an F-N criterion, as shown in Figure A- . The maximum
tolerable risk line is based on a standard 1:1 slope through the UK HSEs
quoted intolerable societal risk level of 50 or more fatalities occurring with a
frequency of 1 in 5000 years (N=50 and F=2 x 10 -4 per year). The minimum
(broadly acceptable) risk line is simply assumed to be two orders of
magnitude lower.
This is considered to provide a useful guidance on the acceptability of

societal risk, although it should be emphasized that the criteria are not as
widely accepted as individual risk and should be used as guidance only.
81
Figure A- : An interpretation of UK HSE Societal Risk Criteria (F-N Curve)
82

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Nubaria-Metnama Pipeline QRA

The Egyptian Natural Gas Company Nubaria-Metnama

EcoConServ was assigned to prepare a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Risks to the public can be considered to be broadly acceptable if below

RISK RESULTS PUBLIC

Concerning Al-Baradah village, GASCO ensures that they performed a field

The emphasis on risk reduction should be on preventative measures, i.e. to

6.5 ADJUSTED FAILURE FREQUENCIES...................................................................................29

A1.3 PROPOSED RISK CRITERIA............................................................................................ 73

FIGURE A- 1: "ALARP" FRAMEWORK FOR RISK CRITERIA..................................................................73

EcoConServ was assigned to prepare a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

To identify and quantify the major hazards associated with the

Assess the acceptability of the risks to people (any nearby residential

1.3 LAYOUT OF STUDY

Section 6 describes the frequency analysis and the effect of the

Section 7 summarizes the assumptions undertaken in this study in

Section 8 and Section 9 summarize the outcome of the Hazard

Section 10 describes the Consequence Assessment steps and presents

2.2 LAND USE

Izbt As-Sukhnah Al-Jadida

Izbt Masjid Ar-Rahman

Izbt Sidi Ibrahim

Izbt Jamal Al-Fransawi

Kafr Ash-Shurfa Al-Gharbia

As-Sabah and Kafr ash-Shaheed

2.3 LOCATION OF VALVE ROOMS

Table 2-1: Location of Valve Rooms

Distance to Valve Room

North Giza Power

2.4 METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Table 2-2: Temperature and humidity for North Giza area

Av. Temperature (oC) Relative

Figure 2-2: Wind rose of North Giza (wind speed in

3.2 PIPELINE SPECIFICATIONS

3.3 MITIGATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PIPELINE OPERATION

The Quality Control ISO 9001 is applied throughout the project,

Direct and accurate supervision on all the construction phases will be

Engineering inspection will be done during all the project phases,

Pipelines must successfully pass the hydrostatic test at a pressure of

The pipelines have corrosion resistant internal lining,

The pipelines are externally coated with three layers of polyethylene

Cathodic protection systems are applied as soon as the line is put in

The most up-to-date internal testing systems are applied to discover

The SCADA system, available at the National Control Center (NATA),

The choice of the main pipelines paths to be outside the residential

The thickness of the pipeline is chosen to match the population class

The valve rooms are distributed on the pipeline in a way that

Coordination with the local authorities and the concerned authorities

Increasing the awareness about the pipeline in the nearby

4 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Individual risk criteria should be used to limit risks to members of

Cost-benefit analysis should be used to ensure that, once the above

A more flexible framework specifies a level, usually known as the maximum

A middle band (or ALARP region) where the risk is considered to be

A negligible region where the risks are negligible and no risk

4.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA

These criteria are:

The acceptable criterion, for the public, corresponding to the level

If the risk calculated from heat radiation at residential areas

In terms of the acceptability of individual risks, it should be noted that:

Individual risks are typically presented as contours that correspond