ReTanTye(decd)TanLianChyevBritish&MalayanTrusteesLtd

[1966]2MLJ107
SuitNumber : CAY6/1965

DecisionDate : 23March1966

Tribunal/Court : FederalCourt

Coram : AVWINSLOWJJTANAHTAHFJFAChuaJ

Jurisdiction : Singapore

LandlordandTenantCovenantsAgreementtolicenceandauthorizetherunningofbusinessofan

amusementparkonlandWhetherlicenceortenancyWhe

ReTanTye(decd)TanLianChyevBritish&MalayanTrusteesLtd
CaseDetails:

SINGAPORE FEDERALCOURTCIVILAPPEALNOY6OF1965
Judges AVWINSLOWJ
TANAHTAHFJ
FACHUAJ
Date 23MAR1966
Citation [19651968]SLR114, [1966]2MLJ107

Catchwords:
LandlordandTenantCovenantsAgreementtolicenceandauthorizetherunningofbusinessofan
amusementparkonlandWhetherlicenceortenancyWhetherexclusivepossessionoflandandpremises
conferredonlicenseeProfitsaprendre

Facts:
ThiswasanappealagainstthedecisionofButtroseJwhoheldthatonaconsiderationoftheagreementasa
wholeitconstitutedalicencepersonaltothelicenseeanddidnotcreatealeaseoratenancy([1966]1MLJ74).
TheagreementinthiscasepurportedtogivealicenceofpartoftheGayWorldAmusementParktooneGohEng
Wahontermsandconditionstobeapprovedbythecourt.Itwascommongroundthatthetrusteeshadno
powertograntaleaseofthelandandpremisesandtheysoughttheapprovalofthecourtforthegrantofthe
licence.

Holdings:

Held,dismissingtheappeal:

Asinthiscasenoexclusivepossessionofthelandandpremiseshadbeenconferredonthelicenseeandas
moreovernoprofitofthenatureofaprofitaprendrewasconferredonthelicensee,theagreementconstituteda
merelicenceandwasrightlyapprovedbythecourt.
CasesReferredTo(Precedents)Cases):

ClorevTheatricalProperties[1936]3AllER483(refd)

CobbvLane[1952]1AllER1202(folld)

ErringtonvErrington[1952]1KB290(refd)

FacchinivBryson[1952]1TLR1389(refd)

FrankWarrandCovLondonCountyCouncil[1904]1KB713(refd)

RvMorrish[1863]32LJMC245(folld)

RoadsvOverseersofTrumpington[1870]6LRQB63(refd)

SmithvLambethAssessmentCommittee[1882]10QBD327(refd)

LegislationReferredTo:

Lawyers:

Appellant/Defendant PhillipHoalimSr(PhillipHoalim&Co)
Respondents/PlaintiffsNAMallalandYRJumabhoy(Mallal&Namazie)

Judgment:
AVWINSLOWJ

ThisisanappealagainsttheoraljudgmentofButtroseJdeliveredon7October1965inwhichheheldthatan
agreementdated12August1965betweentherespondentsoftheonepartandoneGohEngWahoftheother
(theagreement)constitutedalicencepersonaltothesaidGohEngWahanddidnotcreatealeaseforfiveyears
ofthelandandpremisesreferredtotherein.

TheappellantisoneofthebeneficiariesoftheestateofTanTyedeceasedandrepresentsbothhimselfandthe
majorityoftheincomebeneficiariesofthesaidestateofwhichtherespondentsarethepresenttrusteesin
whomthesaidlandandpremisesarevested.Thelatterformpartofalargerterrainofapparentfelicityknown
formerlyastheHappyWorldandnowastheGayWorldAmusementPark.Fivebuildingsinthepark,including
buildingshousingtheHappyCabaret,TaiThongRestaurantandanumberofcinemas,havebeenexceptedfrom
thepurviewoftheagreementandwiththese,therefore,Iamnotconcerned.

Itiscommongroundthat,earlierin1965,ButtroseJheldthatthetrusteeshadnopowertograntaleaseofthe
GayWorldAmusementParkandindicatedthatthetrusteesmightconsidergrantingalicenceofpartofthepark
ontermsandconditionstobeapprovedbythecourt.Itisalsocommongroundthatthetestator`swilldoesnot
empowerthetrusteestosell,mortgageorotherwiseencumberthepropertyinquestion.

Ithereforeproposetoproceedwiththisappealonthebasisthatthetrusteescannotandshouldnotgranta
leaseofthesaidlandandpremises.ThequestionwhichIhavetodecide,therefore,iswhethertheagreementis
aleaseoralicence.Ifitisaleasethenthecourtshouldnotapproveit.Themajorityoftheincomebeneficiaries
contendthatitis,infact,aleasewhichshouldnotbeapproved.Thecorpusbeneficiaries,whowererepresented
byMrKCChaninthecourtbelow,acceptedthepositionthatthetrusteeshadnopowertograntaleasebut
agreedwiththetrusteesthattheagreementwasalicenceandnothingmore.

Theappellantstates,inhisaffidavitof29September1965thatheandthemajorityoftheincomebeneficiaries
areoftheopinion`thatitwouldbemoretotheadvantageoftheestatewithoutalicencewhichofcoursewould
involvethetrusteesinmoreworkfortheestate`.AccordingtoMrPhilipHoalimSr,counselfortheappellant,the
gistofthiscomplaintisthattheincomebeneficiarieswouldstandtolosefinanciallyifalicenceweregranted,and
thattheywouldratherhavethetrusteesdotheworkthemselveswithoutinterposingalicenseewhowould
minimisetheirincome.Ittherefore,suitedtheirbooktocomplainthattheagreementconstitutedaleaseand
notalicencebecausethecourthadalreadypreviouslyindicatedthatitwouldnotapprovealease.

Itissmallwonder,therefore,thatMrHoalimmadeadmirablystrenuousefforts,withalltheindustryhecould
command,accompaniedbyhisaccustomedflowofrhetoric,toconvincethecourtthattheircontentionwas
correct.Othercounselconcernedinthecase,bothinthecourtbelowaswellasbeforethiscourt,werenoless
enthusiasticinpresentingthefruitsoftheirdiligenceinsupportoftheoppositeview.Betweenthemall,
therefore,theyhavepresentedacomprehensivepictureofthefinedistinctionsthatdividealicencefromalease
andImustacknowledgemyindebtednesstothem.

Inowturntoanexaminationoftheagreement,inthelightofthenumerousauthoritiescited,inorderto
determinewhetheritisalicenceoralease.Fortunately,Ihavealsohadtheadvantageofhavingcomeacross
twootherauthorities,whichappeartometobeofsomeassistanceinthecontextofthecircumstancesofthis
particularcase,andhavehelpedtofortifymeinthedecisionatwhichIhavearrived.TheyareRvMorrish
(1863)32LJMC245andSmithvLambethAssessmentCommittee(1882)10QBD327(CA)towhichI
shallreferinduecourse.

AsDenningLJsaidinCobbvLane[1952]1AllER1202:

Thequestioninallthesecasesisoneofintention:Didthecircumstancesandtheconductof
thepartiesshowthatallthatwasintendedwasthattheoccupiershouldhaveapersonal
privilegewithnointerestintheland?

Iftheanswertothisquestionisintheaffirmativethentheoccupierwillbeheldtobealicensee.Counselforthe
appellantcontendedthatitwasonlywheretherewasnowrittenagreementthattheintentionoftheparties
shouldbegatheredfromthesurroundingcircumstancesandtheconductofthepartiesbutthatwheretherewas
awrittenagreementthecourtshouldlooknotsomuchatthewordsoftheagreementasthesubstanceofthe
agreement.Idonotthinkthatheintendedtogosofarastosuggestthatthesurroundingcircumstancesand
theconductofthepartiesshouldbecompletelyignored.AsDenningLJsaidinErringtonvErrington[1952]1
KB298:

Wordsalonemaynotsuffice.Partiescannotturnatenancyintoalicencemerelybycallingit
one.Butifthecircumstancesandtheconductofthepartiesshowthatallthatwasintended
wasthattheoccupiershouldbegrantedapersonalprivilege,withnointerestintheland,he
willbeheldtobealicenseeonly.

ItshouldbenotedthattheagreementbetweentherespondentsandGohEngWah,whowasthesuccessful
tendererforthegrantofalicence,refersthroughouttothecreationofalicenceandnothingelse,andthatthe
partiesarereferredtothroughoutthatagreementas`licensor`and`licensee`respectively.

Theargumentsinsupportoftheappellant`scontentionmaybesummarisedasfollows:
 (i)ThatGohEngWah,thelicenseeundertheagreement,hadexclusivepossessionoftheland
andpremisesinquestionuntiltheexpirationoftheagreementattheendoffiveyears.Hewas
empoweredbytheagreementto`enteruponanduse`thesaidlandandpremisesforan
amusementpark,fairorplaygroundandatthedeterminationofthelicencehewas,byhis
covenant,boundtodeliveruptheamusementparkwiththefixturesandadditionstheretoin
goodrepairandcondition.Itwas,therefore,contendedthatthiswasexclusivepossession
whichgavehimalease

(ii)whereas,inalicence,nointerestinlandpassestothelicenseeandnorightinremis
therebycreated,inthepresentcaseGohEngWahacquiredaninterestinlandbecausehewas
empoweredtochargeandcollectadmissionfeestotheparkandtocollectalllicencefeesin
respectofthebuildingsanderectionsonthesaidlandandpremises.Byvirtueofthisrightto
collectmoneysarising`bywayofaprofitissuingoutoftheland`,hewastheholderofan
interestinlandand,therefore,atenantandnotalicensee.Manycasesreferringtoprofitsa
prendrewerecitedinsupportofthispropositionand

(iii)thelanguageoftheoriginalleasedated31December1964whichwassubmittedtothe
courtforapprovalandwasdisapprovedonthegroundthatthetrusteeshadnopowertogrant
alease,usedalmostthesamelanguageassomecovenantsinthepresentlicenceand,
therefore,thelicence,althoughitwascalledalicence,wasinsubstanceandeffectalease.Mr
HoalimproceededtocomparethecovenantsintherespectivedocumentsandMrNAMallal(for
therespondents)acceptedasafactthattherewasagreatresemblancebetweenthem.There
is,aswillappearlater,littlemeritinthisparticularsubmissionandIshallnowdealwiththe
questionofexclusivepossession.

Itwascontendedontheappellant`sbehalfthattheexpressions`toenteruponanduse`and`deliverup`were
sufficienttoshowexclusivepossessionandcounselcitedRoadsvTheOverseersofTrumpington(1870)LR
6QB63insupportofthisproposition.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatBlackburnJ,whilstholdingthatthese
wordsclearlyshowanintentiontogivearightofexclusiveoccupation,neverthelessaddedthatifthelandlord
hadtodoanythingontheland,astodrainit,suchfactsmightshowthatthepossessionremainedinthe
landlord.HisLordshipwentonfurthertoholdthat,evenwithoutsuchstrongwordsas`enterupon`and
`deliverup`,thewholenatureoftheagreementshowedthatthegranteewasintendedtohaveexclusive
possessionoftheland.Thefactthatthegranteewasempoweredtodiguponthelandforcoprolitesandtoraise
themandlatertorestorethelandtoitsoriginalstateseemedtoweighgreatlywiththelearnedjudgewhofound
thatthisseemedtogivearightofconstantandexclusivepossession.

Itshouldbeobservedthatthemeregrantofexclusivepossessiondoesnotnecessarilyconvertthegranteeintoa
tenantalthoughthefactofhisbeingletintoexclusivepossessionisprimafacieevidenceofanintentiontocreate
atenancy.This,however,maybenegatived.

Itisalsoestablishedlawthattherelationshipbetweenthepartiesisdeterminedbythelawandnotbythelabel
whichpartiestoacontractchoosetoputonit.ThispropositionisborneoutinLordJusticeDenning`sjudgment
inFacchinivBryson[1952]1TLR1389.Thatwasacaseinwhichtheoccupationhadallthefeaturesofa
servicetenancywhichwassoconstruednotwithstandingaclausetotheeffectthat`nothingintheagreement
shallbeconstruedtocreateatenancy`.

InRvMorrish,byagreementbetweentheRoyalCommissionersfortheExhibitionof1862andMorrish,the
latteracquiredarighttosellrefreshmentsattheexhibition,tofitupthespaceallottedtohimwithcountersand
fittings,toprovidecellarsandtolayongasandwater.Hewastobesubjecttothebyelawsandregulations
madebythecommissioners.AllfittingsanderectionsmadebyMorrishweretobecomethepropertyofthe
commissioners.Itwasheldthathewasnotinexclusiveoccupationofthespacesoallottedtohim.BlackburnJ
atp249ofthisreportsaidthat`theclausecompellingtheappellanttoputupanofficeandtokeepthereinatall
timesarepresentativeforthepurposeofreceivingcommunicationsfromthecommissionersgoesalsotoshow
thattherewasnoexclusiveoccupation`.

Acovenantimposingasimilarrestraintistobefoundintheagreementbeforeme,ieincovenant(xiv)ofcl3
thereofwherethelicenseecovenantsto`permitthelicensororhisagentsatallhourstoentertheparktosee
thatthetermsofthislicencearebeingobservedorcarriedoutandinthatconnectiontopermanentlyreservea
tableintheofficeoftheamusementparkforusebythelicensororhisagents`.Inmyopinionsuchacovenant
showsthatGohEngWahwas,asinthecaseofMorrish,neverintendedtohaveexclusivepossessionofthe
saidlandandpremises.Further,covenants(vii),(viii),(ix)and(xx)inthesameclauserelatingtothekeepingby
thelicenseeofsuchbooksofaccountandrecordsasmayberequiredtobekeptunderthelaw,toobserveand
conformtoalltherulesandregulationsfromtimetotimemadebythelicensorforthemanagementofthe
amusementpark,todischargeanyservantofthelicenseewhoshallbeguiltyofanyconductconsideredbythe
licensortobeprejudicialtothepropermanagementofthepark,tokeeptheparkopenandlightedeverynight
upto12midnight,etc,makeitdifficultformetoacceptthesubmissiononbehalfoftheappellantthatGohEng
Wahwasgrantedexclusivepossessionundertheagreement.Thesearenotminorrestrictionssuchasonedoes
comeacrossinleasesbut,tomymind,stronglyindicatethatthecontrolandsupervisionofthesaidlandand
premisesremaininthetrustees,aslicensor,andnooneelse.

InSmithvLambethAssessmentCommitteetherewasapowerreposedinthelandlordtoexercisecontrol
overtheemployeesofthetenantswhowereliabletoimmediateremovalbythelandlordincaseofinsobrietyor
misconduct.Hereagain,despitethefactthattheindenturereferredtotheappellantsastenants,itwasheld
thattheydidnothaveexclusiveoccupation.Clause3oftheagreementreservesasimilarpowertothetrustees
todismissemployeesofthelicensee.

Inadditiontothelicensee`scovenantstowhichIhavereferredthereareothercovenantsalsowhichtendto
showthemeasureofcontrolreservedtothelicensortowhichIthinkIneednothererefer.

Inowturntoanotherclauseintheagreement.Amostsignificantprovisionwhich,tomymind,clearly
distinguishesitfromaleaseiscontainedincl5thereof.Apartfromparas(i)and(ii)thereofastotherighton
thepartofthelicensortodeterminethelicenceonsevendays`noticeincertaincircumstances,andtoissue
freepassestothepark,whichareinconsistentwithalease,para(iii)states:
Thislicenceshalldetermineonthedeathorbankruptcyofthelicenseeinthecaseofan
individualandonwindingupinthecaseofalimitedliabilitycompany.

Aprovisionsuchasthisclearlyseemstoshowthataleasewasneverintended.Suchaprovisionisnotonly
inconsistentwithbutrepugnanttoaleaseortenancy.

Itiswellknownthatinthecaseofatenancyneitherdeathnorbankruptcyworkanautomatictermination
thereof.Onbankruptcy,forexample,theOfficialAssigneestepsintothebankrupt`sshoes(thoughhemay
disclaimanoneroustenancy).

Therenowremainsafinalquestionfordetermination,iewhetheranyinterestinthesaidlandandpremises
passestothelicenseeundertheagreement.Itwasarguedthat,byvirtueofthelicensee`srighttocollect
admissionfeestotheparkandtocollectlicencefeesfromotheroccupiersorusersofthesaidlandandpremises,
hewouldbemakingaprofit`issuingoutoftheland`andthattherefore,theagreementgrantsaninterestin
land.Counselfortheappellantcitedanumberofauthoritiesrelatingtoprofitsaprendrealthoughhedidnot
submit,insomanywords,thatthiswassuchaprofit.

Inmyjudgmentthereisacleardistinctionbetweenaprofitaprendreandaprofitsuchashasbeensaidarises
outoftheuseofthelandinthepresentcase.

MrMallalstressedthataprofitaprendremustbearighttotakesomethingoutofthelanditselfwhereasinthe
presentcasenosuchrightisconferredonthelicenseewhoseonlyprofitmayariseoutoftheuseoftheland
butdoesnotariseoutofthelanditself.AsMegarryandWadehavepointedoutintheirsecondeditionofthe
LawofRealPropertyatp785:
Aprofitaprendrehasbeendescribedas`arighttotakesomethingoffanotherperson`sland.`
Thisitis,butnotallsuchrightsareprofits.Iftherightistobeprofit,thethingtakenmustbe
eitherpartoftheland,eg,mineralsorcrops,orthewildanimalsexistingonitandthething
takenmustatthetimeoftakingbesusceptibleofownership.Arightto`hawk,hunt,fishand
fowl`maythusexistasaprofit,forthisgivestherighttotakecreatureslivingonthesoil
which,whenkilled,arecapableofbeingowned.Butarighttotakewaterfromaspringora
pump,ortherighttowatercattleatapond,maybeaneasementbutcannotbeaprofitfor
thewater,whentaken,wasnotownedbyanyonenorwasitpartofthesoil.
Itisclearthattherighttocollectadmissionfeesandlicencefeesinrespectofthelandinquestiondoesnotfall
withinanyoftheknowncategoriesofprofitsaprendrebecausenorighttotakeanythingoutofthesaidlandis
giventothelicensee.Whatheisentitledtodoistocollectthesefeesandtherebytomakeaprofitforhimselfin
thelaysenseoftheterm.Hedoesnottakeanythingoutofthelanditself.AsStroud`sJudicialDictionaryof
WordsandPhrases(3rdEd)p2324,succinctlyprovides:
Theprofitmustbesomethingoutofthelanditself,asdistinguishedfrommakingaprofitby
theuseofthelandanditisbecauseitissomethingoutofthelanditselfthataLICENCEtoa
profitaprendrehasbeenheldtobewithintheStatuteofFraudsasbeinganinterestinland,
egtohuntorshootgameandtakeitaway.

Ifind,therefore,thattheagreementdoesnotconferanylicencetoaprofitaprendreonthelicensee.Itshould
benotedthatevenalicencetoaprofitaprendremaynotnecessarilygivethelicenseeexclusivepossessionof
theland.Itisonlyifhedoesgetsuchexclusivepossessionthatanyquestionofthelicencebeingconstruedtobe
aleasewillarise.Inthecircumstancesofthepresentcasebothfactorsaremissing,ienoprofitofthenatureofa
profitaprendreisconferredonthelicenseeand,asIhavefoundearlier,noexclusivepossessionofthesaidland
andpremiseshasbeenconferredonthelicensee.

InviewofmyfindingsaboveIdonotthinkthatIneeddealwithsuchfascinatingcasesaswerecited,involving
thesaleofrefreshmentsatatheatre(FrankWarr&CoLtdvLondonCountyCouncil[1904]1KB713),
thefrontofthehouserightsofatheatre(ClorevTheatricalPropertiesLtd&Westby&CoLtd[1936]3All
ER483)wheretherightsconferredwereheldtoevidencealicenceandnothingelseineachcase.

InconclusionIshouldliketoaddthatthelicensee,GohEngWah,hascategoricallyaffirmedthatsofarasheis
concernedtheagreementconstitutesamerelicenceandinnowaycreatesatenancyinhisfavourofthesaid
landandpremisesandhasconsentedtotherespondents`applicationforapprovaloftheagreementbythe
court.

Wheretheintentionofthepartiesisclearnotonlyfromthedocumentitselfbutfromtheirconductandthe
surroundingcircumstancesitwould,asMegarrypointsoutatp52inthenintheditionofhisRentActs,be
wrongforthecourttoextractfromthegrantoranestateorinterestinlandintheteethofsuchintention.

Theappealis,therefore,dismissed.

Appealdismissed.

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