Inquiry

ISSN: 0020-174X (Print) 1502-3923 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory

Gap

Neil C. Manson

To cite this article: Neil C. Manson (2002) Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap,
Inquiry, 45:4, 521-540, DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947586

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/002017402320947586

Published online: 06 Nov 2010.

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 Inquiry, 45, 52140

Review Discussion

Consciousness-Dependence and the

Explanatory Gap*
Neil C. Manson
Kings College, Cambridge

Contrary to certain rumours, the mindbody problem is alive and well. So

argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. The main
argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal ef cacy require us to
accept that subjective experiential, or phenomenal, properties are realized in
basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge
of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about
the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of
deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem an explanatory gap but
does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine
introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple
Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical
context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best
understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he
also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical
theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative
theories of consciousness all fail.
Levines work is best seen as an attempt to rmly establish a de nite status
for the mindbody problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real,
substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical
one. Because Levines work is tightly focused upon contemporary
Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the
broader conceptual background to the mindbody problem. My aim here is to
place Levines work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on
the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that
doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levines arguments
and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and conscious-
ness.

* Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousnes s. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001. 204 pp. ISBN 0-19-513235-1 . Unprefixed page reference s are to this work.

# 2002 Taylor & Francis

522 Neil C. Manson

I. Intentionality and Consciousness: the Shift from the MindBody

problem to the Problem of Consciousness

Levine begins with a question: Why is there a mindbody problem? (p. 3). It
is worth noting, from the outset, that the mindbody problem which exercises
Levine (and contemporary philosophy of mind) is not the traditional mind
body problem which vexed Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and countless other
philosophers. The traditional mindbody problem arose because mental
subjects and mental states exhibit a cluster of properties all of which seem to
be inexplicable in objective, material terms. Mental states seem to be
knowable in a direct, authoritative way. Indeed, such direct knowability
seemed to be an essential feature of mentality in traditional modern
philosophy (Manson [2000, 2002a]). Material objects and properties, by way
of contrast, are not known in this special direct way. Mental states are
intentional, they are about things. Rocks and atoms, by way of contrast, dont
have states which are about other things in the way that mental subjects do.
Rocks and atoms dont have intentional states. Worse still, not only are our
mental states about things, they can be about things that do not exist. How can
a relation to non-existent things be instantiated in the natural world? Human
subjects also seem to be capable of free rational action, of engaging with the
world according to their conception of what ought to be done. Non-mental
material objects, by way of contrast, interact with each other according to
blind arational causal laws of nature. Finally, it is like something for us to be
awake and in a position to experience the world. Pains, sensations, and
perception feel a certain way to us conscious beings. Even if pains arent
about anything it does seem that they are mental, and that rocks and atoms are
constitutively ill-suited to having such states. Pains and sensations are felt by
subjects, and where there is no mental subject there seems to be no possibility
of pain.
When we re ect upon the nature of mind, we can identity a number of
different features each of which is hard to conceive of as instantiated in non-
mental particulars. Mental subjects and their states are so distinctively unlike
non-mental objects and their properties that it is tempting to assume the
existence of non-material mental particulars (subjects, souls, egos) as the
bearers of non-material mental properties (beliefs, sensations, ideas,
decisions, willings, and the like). This conceptual move acknowledges the
distinctive nature of mentality but it also gives rise to a problem. Mental
subjects and their states seem to be part of the causal nexus of the non-mental
material world. The non-mental world impinges upon us, constrains us; we
are able to act in the world, or express ourselves in the world, on the basis of
what we want, believe, and feel. The traditional mindbody problem arises
because minds seem to be both part of the non-mental material world but also
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 523

distinct from it. So distinct, in fact, as to make it a puzzle as to how mentality

could be implemented in the non-mental world.
The contemporary mindbody problem shares certain features with the
traditional problem, but in other ways it is quite different. The contemporary
mindbody problem begins with the assumption that intentionality can, in
principle, be fully explained in objective causal terms. Although there is little
agreement as to how we might cogently do so, this simple assumption is
enough to radically transform the mindbody problem. The assumption that
intentionality is explicable allows naturalistically minded theorists to draw
upon intentional notions in their theories of mind. Elsewhere, I have referred
to the orthodox conception of intentionality as a consciousness-independent
one (Manson [2000, 2003]). Now, consciousness is itself a polysemic
notion, having (a) various epistemic strands (e.g. consciousness of the world,
consciousness of mental states) and also (b) an experiential strand (it is like
something to have conscious experiences) (Block [1995]; Manson [2002a]).
These different notions of consciousness give rise to different notions of what
it is for an intentional state to be a conscious one. Contemporary naturalistic
theories of intentionality (pace Searle) hold that an intentional state (i) need
not be like anything for the subject, that is, it need not be experientially or
phenomenally conscious; (ii) need not be a state via which the subject is
(epistemically) conscious of something; (iii) need not be an object of
(epistemic) consciousness for the subject (i.e. the subject need know of, or be
aware of, it). That is, contemporary naturalistic theories of intentionality are
consciousness-independen t in both the epistemic and experiential senses of
consciousness. Intentionality is viewed as something more basic than, and as
something distinct from, conscious mentality. This consciousness-indepen-
dent conception of intentionality is a relatively recent arrival on the
philosophical scene. Most modern philosophers, up to the 1960s, accepted a
consciousness-dependent conception of mind of some form or other. It is this
fact that explains the widespread rejection and criticism of the notion of
unconscious mentality (Manson [2000]). Against the background assumption
of a consciousness-dependent conception of mind there is no point in
separating the mindbody problem from the problem of consciousness. But
nowadays things are different. The consciousness-independen t conception of
intentionality allows one radically to trim the traditional mindbody problem
and, in doing so, shift the philosophical worry onto (some kind of)
consciousness. With naturalized intentionality in place (or promised),
rationality and freedom of the will seem to be, in principle, explicable in
terms of certain kinds of mental processes (truth-preserving inferences,
evaluative representations linked to types of action, and so on). Once we have
the idea that intentionality and mental processes are a causal affair, we lose
the motivation for postulating non-mental subjects for intentional properties.
Mental subjects are taken to be spatiotemporal creatures: animals like you,
524 Neil C. Manson

me, and the dog next door. By viewing intentionality in causal relational
terms, a great deal of the traditional mindbody problem disappears.
Is it consciousness that poses the residual mindbody problem, then? In a
sense yes, but a quali cation is needed here. Given the polysemic nature of
consciousness, the consciousness-independen t conception of intentionality
allows theorists to make headway into explaining certain kinds of
consciousness. Self-knowledge is, it would seem, something which one can
add in without extra cost (self-knowledge as higher-order representation).
Given that one strand of our notion of consciousness is an epistemic one (e.g.
a conscious as opposed to unconscious desire is one that the subject knows of
in a non-evidential rst-person way), we thus seem able to explain higher-
order epistemic consciousness in consciousness-independen t representational
terms (Lycan [2001]; Manson [2001, 2002b]).
The problem of consciousness is not the problem of higher-order
representation. There is one kind of consciousness which, many theorists
hold, resists explanation in naturalistic terms: subjective, qualitative
experiential consciousness. So, even though the mindbody problem has
been radically thinned down, it remains none the less. In contemporary
consciousness-independen t thought about the mind, the mindbody problem
has become the problem of consciousness, which really means the problem
of subjective qualitative character of experience.
But just what is it about the subjective qualitative character of experience
that maintains the mindbody the problem? One exegetical problem which
faces Levine is how, on the one hand, he holds that a major theme of this
book is that the deepest problem lies with understanding subjectivity (p. 7),
whilst, on the other hand, a great deal of the substantive debate in the book
concerns qualia, supposedly intrinsic qualitative properties of experience. For
Levine, and we will discuss this point at greater length below, these two
problems are intertwined precisely because qualia are, he thinks, properties
which must be objects of awareness for a conscious subject. Levine thus has a
particular conception of just why there is a mindbody problem and it is not
clear that this view is shared by the theorists whom he discusses.

II. Why Materialism?

We can, however, make headway in critically evaluating Levines arguments
without having to answer the question of whether his conception of the
subjective qualitative character of experience is coherent. Levine is a
materialist. He clearly states what materialism is and why it seems to lead to a
metaphysical mindbody problem. One great virtue of Levines account is
that he shows that the mindbody problem does not require a clear
formulation of the physical or physics. Various philosophers have
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 525

objected that physicalism is a metaphysical doctrine which cannot be

coherently formulated (e.g. Crane and Mellor [1990]). But, Levine argues, the
key metaphysical problems of mind arise because the mental properties we
encounter in our personal conscious experience cannot plausibly be viewed as
basic properties. The problem is that of seeing how subjective, qualitative
features can be implemented in something else, something non-mental.
But why cant we just view mental properties as basic, unanalysed properties?
Levines response is that if we assume that basic causal relations obtain between
particulars in virtue of their non-mental properties and also assume that there are
non-mentalmental causal interactions, then in so far as non-mental properties
wear the pants, causally speaking, we must conclude that mental properties
must, somehow, be realized in non-mental properties. This line of argument is
absolutely central for Levine: the materialist case essentially rests on the
phenomenon of mentalphysical causal interaction (p. 5).
But why should we assume that qualitative experiential properties are
causal? Mightnt qualia be epiphenomenal (Jackson [1982])? At this point it
is important to bear in mind the fact that the causal role of intentional
properties is not, for the purposes of Levines book, at issue. Levine assumes
that intentional properties are, in principle, explicable in causal terms.
Unfortunately, at least with regard to clarity of exegesis, the rst few
examples Levine gives to motivate his intuitive case against epiphenomen-
alism are cases where it is the intentional properties of some creature which
matter to the causal interactions in question. He cites the example of
withdrawing ones hand from a hot burner (p. 21). This is, perhaps, a doubly
unfortunate example because it is precisely one where the felt qualitative
experience often comes after the re ex action has occurred (and thus is a poor
basis for establishing the causal role of qualia). Levine goes on:
One reason to avoid epiphenomenalism is that it just seems crazy or, to put it more
politely, seriously counterintuitive . Is it really a serious possibility that pains dont
cause hands to withdraw from res (and by virtue of being painful)? Do our thoughts
not control our actions, what we say? How do we make sense of deliberation, if in fact
what were thinking about is causally irrelevant to what we do? Its clear that
thoroughgoin g epiphenomenalism would have drastic consequences for our self-
conception. (p. 23)
Our intuitions about the craziness of thoroughgoing epiphenomenalism are
bound up with our conception of the role of our intentional states. On the
consciousness-independen t conception of intentionality there is plenty of
conceptual space to keep apart intentionality and qualia (e.g. Block [1978]).
With such an assumption in place our intuitions about the causal ef cacy of
intentional states tell us little about the causal ef cacy of qualia.
Levine then turns to a less thoroughgoin g epiphenomenalism, one which
holds that only qualia are epiphenomenal. Levine suggests that still, the
charge of apparent craziness . . . seems apt (p. 23). But why? Levine notes
526 Neil C. Manson

that we know of our own qualia. We have already noted that, on his account,
being knowable in a special rst-person way is an essential feature of qualia.
But this seems to bring in representation, which in turn brings in causal
relations between the object of knowledge and the knower. That is, if we
know our qualia then they have to be causally implicated in our formation of
beliefs about them. Chalmers (1996) suggests that qualia might be known via
some non-physical mental states. In response to this, Levine returns to the
problems posed by thoroughgoin g epiphenomenalism and gives the example
of a person deliberating with regard to their pain experience (e.g. thinking
about how the pain felt, and deciding to try to avoid touching hot surfaces).
But it is not at all clear what role, if any, that qualia must play in deliberation,
especially when we begin with a consciousness-independen t conception of
intentionality and intentional processes.
The general problem here is that it is very hard indeed to exclude
intentionality from considerations of mental causation. But if intentionality
is in the picture, and intentionality is accepted as causally explicable, we
have the problem of establishing that the causal role assigned to qualia is
not, in fact, being played by the surrounding intentional states. Levine
himself accepts that there can be psychological or functional zombies:
creatures who have the same intentional properties as a conscious subject
but who lack qualia. Such a zombie will deliberate, think, perceive, act in
just the way that a phenomenal subject does, even if it is the case that the
functional zombie differs with regard to certain causal properties (e.g. those
which supervene upon the molecular features which realize phenomenal
properties).
Levine has another line of objection against the epiphenomenalist about
qualia. We can think about and talk about our qualia. If qualia are
epiphenomenal and only known via non-physical states of acquaintance
then how, Levine worries, can we engage in talk about our qualia? If our
qualia are epiphenomenal, how can they stand as objects of reference? But
this objection seems to miss its mark. First, it presupposes that we do talk
about qualia in some way that suggests causal representational relations.
But if qualia are epiphenomenal, then my talk is about some state (a
representational state, say, with the content that part of my body is damaged)
which throws off an epiphenomenal property. My utterance may seem to be
about the epiphenomenal property, just because of the regular correlation
between types of epiphenomenal property and types of subvening
representational state. Second, we can talk about non-existent objects and
properties. Being an object of reference cannot imply a causal relation
between the referential object and the speaker. We shall return to this issue
below, when we examine Levines case against eliminativism.
Given the divorce between qualia and intentionality central to the
consciousness-independen t conception of mind, and given that mental
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 527

causation seems primarily to involve intentional causality, Levines dismissal

of epiphenomenalism seems less than conclusive.

III. Phenomenal Zombies and the Explanatory Gap

If materialism is true, then there will be sets of non-mental conditions which
necessitate the instantiation of various qualia. If some creature meets the non-
mental, materialist conditions which necessitate qualia of a certain kind, then,
as a matter of nomological necessity, she will have qualia of that kind. But,
for any such speci cation of materialist conditions for qualia, we seem to be
able to conceive of some creature satisfying the materialist necessitating
conditions who, at the same time, fails to have the qualia in question: a
phenomenal zombie. But if we can conceive of such phenomenal zombies,
then surely such creatures can exist. But this seems to imply that qualia arent
necessitated by sets of non-mental, materialist conditions.
This line of argument hinges upon the assumption that considerations of
conceivability have implications for what is metaphysically possible. The
zombie question has thrown up many dense metaphysical claims and counter-
claims, and Levine engages with this debate in intricate, meticulous detail,
distinguishing the various types and subtypes of argument by identifying the
various assumptions about semantics and modality which underpin different
positions in this dispute. It will not serve our purposes here to expound or
elaborate upon these details. Levine, to my mind, makes his case fairly
convincingly. The key conclusion is this:
From the fact that the phenomenal facts are not derivable a priori from the physical
facts it does not follow that the phenomenal facts are not realized by the physical
facts. (p. 68)
Let us brie y take stock of where we are with regard to the mindbody
problem. The traditional mindbody problem arose against a background
consciousness-dependen t conception of mind and was viewed as a
metaphysical problem. Contemporary consciousness-independen t theorists
of mind assume that intentionality and intentional processes are relatively
unproblematic. Intentionality makes no contribution to the maintenance of
the traditional mindbody problem. Phenomenal properties seem to be more
problematic, but we have the argument for materialism noted above, and we
know that we cannot legitimately move from epistemological premisses (to
do with knowledge and conceivability) to metaphysical conclusions. So,
doesnt this mean the end to the mindbody problem?
Levines positive claim is that the mindbody problem persists in a new
guise: as an explanatory problem. Let us, for now, persist with the assumption
that intentionality poses no problem for a naturalistic theory of mind. What
528 Neil C. Manson

would it be to explain the (non-intentional) subjective qualitative aspects of

experience? Levine lays out a number of different things that we mean by
explain, and sketches some of the dominant views about the nature of
explanation found in philosophy of science. We might seek to explain qualia
and subjectivity by giving an account of when it is that qualitative and
subjective events are to be expected. But this is, in this context, a thin,
unproblematic sense of explain. We can explain why Joe has a quale of
reddishness (rather than greenishness) at noon by making appeal to the
fact that Joe is looking at a red object (rather than a green object) at noon in
normal daylight, and that he has normal colour vision. We know that reddish
qualia tend to occur in these conditions. In a similar way, we might explain
why a particular ask of water boils at 212 F by citing the generalization that
water tends to boil at this temperature (at sea level) and that this water was at
sea level and was brought to this temperature. But a more general explanatory
question lurks behind these causal explanations: why does water (in general)
boil at this temperature in these conditions? This latter explanatory demand is
for a property or realization theory. If we possess a realization theory T for
some property F, the theory (together with our empirical knowledge as to
what conditions obtain in the world) licenses certain deductions. Once we
know the appropriate molecular realization theory about the micro-
constitution of water, we can legitimately deduce that water will boil at
this temperature. The target property is explained by the theory. The theory
links the properties naively identi ed via such terms as boiling, sea level,
and 212 F in a perspicuous and intelligible way, such that the initial
generalization (water boils at 212 F at sea level) is explicable in terms of
simpler laws ranging over basic micro-entities.
In general, Levine argues, if we are to explain how all non-basic properties
and lawful relations are realized in basic ones we have to be able to
deductively derive the instantiation of the non-basic properties and relations
from descriptions of the basic ones (p. 127). But, as we have seen, the
conceivability argument trades upon the fact that one cannot deduce certain
facts about qualia and subjectivity solely from premises specifying objective,
materialist states of affairs.
Levine suggests that the conceivability of zombies is thus the principle
manifestation of the explanatory gap (p. 79, my emphasis). The mistake,
identi ed in chapter two, is that of drawing a metaphysical conclusion from
such an argument.
At this point we may well object that the explanatory gap only comes into
play with regard to a narrowly construed notion of explanation. Nothing in
Levines account rules out a weaker form of explanation of qualia. For
example, we might successfully provide an inference to the best explanation,
where we identify and integrate (via some theory) a host of correlations
between elements in qualitative conscious experience and underlying
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 529

neurophysiologica l activity. If the theory does not allow us successfully to

deduce the existence of particular qualia, it fails to count as explanation in
Levines sense. So, there is a sense that those seeking to explain
consciousness (especially in the neurosciences) may view Levines
explanatory gap as something which they can ignore or avoid, in so far as
they are not in the business of providing a theory which would allow one
strictly to deduce the existence of individual qualia. Levines mindbody
problem may be one which psychological theorists of consciousness feel that
they can ignore. The explanatory gap seems to be most acute for
philosophical realization theories of qualia.
The second point to make is that the explanatory gap seems to appear all
over the place, for it is also true that this failure of deducibility from objective
premises applies to examples other than those involving subjective
qualitative properties. Levine is alert to this and draws the comparison with
indexical statements (p. 82). Descriptive non-indexical statements fail to
entail the truth of indexicals. A similar point holds for demonstratives. Given
that the explanatory gap obtains for demonstratives, might it not make sense
to wonder whether qualia just are some kind of demonstrative mode of
identi cation: e.g. our way of identifying certain of our own brain states. We
would then be able to explain subjectivity (other people cant demonstratively
identify my brain states in the way that I can) and also explain why the
explanatory gap holds (materialist theories have to be couched in non-
demonstrative terms and we thus cannot deduce facts about qualia from
them).
Levines response is that the explanatory gap that arises with regard to
qualia is different from the explanatory gap that applies to indexicals and
demonstratives. The reason is that phenomenal concepts such as our concept
of a reddish quale have a thick substantive mode of presentation (p. 84).
What does Levine mean by this?
[T]he mode of presentation of a property like reddishness is substantive and
determinate in a way that the modes of presentation of other properties are not. When
I think of what it is to be reddish, the reddishness itself is somehow included in the
thought; its present to me. This is what I mean by saying it has a substantive mode
of presentation. In fact, it seems the right way to look at it is that reddishness itself is
serving as its own mode of presentation. By saying that the conception is
determinate, I meant that reddishness presents itself as a speci c quality, identi able
in its own right, not merely by its relation to other qualities. (p. 8)

Taking Levine at his word, it is not at all clear why speci city and
determinacy should lead us to think that there is anything puzzling about
qualia. The key notion (one which is mentioned again and again) is that of
substantiveness. The idea here seems to be that we are, each of us, able to
identify a certain kind of properties in our own experience which present
themselves to the mind in a sui generis way. Intentionality, at least on the
530 Neil C. Manson

orthodox consciousness-independen t view, does not require (and, if Levine is

right, had better not require) the existence of such properties.
All that carrying information seems to support are presentationally thin concepts that
refer to the properties they carry information about. This feature, being for the subject,
with all it entails, seems a substantial addition to merely meaning, being about,
something in the rst place. (p. 9, my emphasis)
Qualia seem to be something present to the mind, over and above the
representational features of mentality. The explanatory gap for qualia, unlike
that for demonstratives and indexicals, essentially involves this extra element.
It is this extra, seemingly substantive element which tempts us to draw
metaphysical conclusions from the explanatory gap. Qualia seem to be
distinct subjective properties, intrinsic properties of experience. If we, or a
colour-deprived super-scientist, cannot deduce the existence of, or nature of,
qualia from objective descriptions of the world, that surely suggests that there
are substantive mental properties which are not captured in a full objective
description of the world.
The conceivability argument (and other manifestations of the explanatory
gap) seem to lead inexorably to metaphysical conclusions, but the argument
from epiphenomenalism rules out such conclusions. Levine concludes that
the mindbody problem, at least with respect to the issue of conscious
experience, presents us, in a way, with a Kantian antinomy (p. 8). Our
conception of qualia (as substantive, determinate properties of experience)
blocks the deduction of facts about qualia from objective premises. If we
accept materialism, and reject the view that we can draw metaphysical
conclusions from considerations of conceptual necessity, then we are stuck in
an unstable, unsatisfactory position. We are condemned to view qualia as part
of the natural world but with no way of explaining just how they are so. This
pessimistic antinomy is at the heart of the explanatory gap.

IV. Contemporary Reductivism

Many contemporary theorists of consciousness reject Levines pessimism.
They hold that the subjective qualitative aspects of experience can be
reductively explained. One central element in Levines case against reductive
explanations of consciousness is the intuition that qualia are intrinsic
properties of mental states. The intrinsic nature of qualia supports the
explanatory gap. If we could view qualia and subjectivity in relational terms
we could, perhaps, reductively explain qualia in causal terms. Levine has
already made much of the causal ef cacy of qualia. So why should we not
accept that qualia might be explicable in complex causalrelational terms?
Levine lays his cards on the table fairly early on: the problem is that
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 531

relational accounts of qualia are so plainly implausible (p. 96). Now, this
remark might seem a bit odd given that Levine himself insists that when
qualia are instantiated they are necessarily objects for the subject in whose
experience they appear (p. 174). But what Levine seems to mean is that
qualia necessarily have relational properties (something is a quale only if it
stands in a certain kind of epistemic accessibility relation to a subject). What
he objects to is the idea that qualia are exhaustively or reductively relational
(that is, that they consist in nothing other than relational properties). When
Levine attacks relational accounts of qualia it is this latter conception of
qualia as relational which he has as his target.
Some theorists (e.g. Kirk [1994]; Clark [1993]) argue that qualia are
relational properties of mental states in that certain mental states (conscious
experiential ones) play a certain kind of functional role, e.g. they control
action; make content available for decision making; facilitate the integration
of multi-modal inputs with behavioural outputs. Qualia are then identi ed
with the relational, functional property in question. Against such theories
Levine argues that we cannot infer from the fact that qualitative states play a
certain kind of functional role that the qualitative properties of such states are
identi able with the functional role property.

However complex the description of the functional role played by, or network of
relations maintained by, my reddish visual experience of the diskette case, it seems
like the right way to characterize the situation is that the reddish experience is playing
a certain role, not that it is a certain role. (p. 98)

Here, once again, Levines case rests upon the assumption that one can just
tell from ones own experience that qualia are intrinsic properties of mental
states. This seems especially problematic for Levine, for even though he
denies that qualia are reductively relational he holds that they necessarily
have relational properties. That is, every epistemic encounter any subject has
ever had with qualia has involved subject-qualia relations: so how can he be
con dent that introspection allows one to identify some self-standing intrinsic
qualitative property?
It is worth re ecting upon Levines general dialectic here. Levine presents
the problematic antinomy which qualia seem to raise for materialism. But he
also holds that (a) intentionality is naturalistically explicable; (b) qualia are
essentially relational; and (c) the relation in question is intentional (i.e.
subjects must be aware of the qualia of their mental states). Given that Levine
holds that qualia are qualitative properties that the subject is necessarily
aware of, it might seem that Levine should be sympathetic to higher-order
representation theories of consciousness (Rosenthal [1997]; Carruthers
[2000]; Lycan [1996]). Such theories hold that a mental state is conscious if
and only if one is conscious of it. Higher-order theorists give a two-tier story
about conscious experience. Qualia are properties instantiated by rst-order
532 Neil C. Manson

states, so some theory of qualitative content is required. The higher-order

theorist then draws upon an epistemic notion of consciousness to argue that
conscious mental states and conscious qualia are ones which the subject
knows of, or is aware of, in a suitably direct rst-personal way.
But Levine rejects such theories precisely because higher-order theories
imply a conceptual divorce between qualia and subjectivity. On higher-order
theories it is a contingent fact whether or not the rst-order state is
represented by a higher-order one. Qualitativeness is conferred by one set of
conditions, conscious qualitativeness by some further set of conditions
(accompaniment by higher-order thought). There are two objections which
have their source in this divorce of subjectivity and qualitativeness. First there
is the problem raised by Neander (1998), that the higher-order theorist must
allow misrepresentation of rst-order states. Suppose the rst-order state has
(according to the theory) an unconscious reddish quale, but the higher-order
state mistakenly represents it as greenish. What is it like for the subject who
has the state? If the higher-order theorist goes for reddish then the higher-
order thought is redundant, if they go for greenish then the lower-order one
is. Underlying Neanders objection is a deeper intuition, one which Levine
emphasizes: it is that subjectivity and qualitative character are internally,
necessarily linked (p. 109).
With this deeper objection we are back, once again, to Levines core
assumption about the relation between subjectivity and qualia. Levines view
is, then, that qualia are readily and unproblematically identi able as being
substantive intrinsic properties of experience, but they are also essentially
bound up with awareness. But how can a material property be essentially
bound up with awareness? Given that qualia are beginning to look like very
odd properties indeed (especially for a committed materialist), perhaps the
natural question to raise is: are there really any properties like that? Maybe we
just think that there are qualia.

V. Eliminativism
If there arent any qualia, then Levines residual mindbody problem
dissolves. Levine is keen to dismiss eliminativism about qualia. At times he
seems to be simply impatient with the qualophobe who denies that qualia (as
he conceives them to be) exist.
On the face of it, of course, the qualophobes denial of conscious experience seems
ludicrous. After all, what could be more obvious than the fact that we have conscious
sensory experiences? How could you deny that there is something its like to see red,
smell a rose, or feel pain? What possible illusion could we be suffering from in
thinking these are all genuine properties of our experience?
There are moments when Im tempted to stop there. What are you talking about? I
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 533

would say to the qualophobe. I literally dont understand what it means to deny this
(pointing somewhere vaguely in the direction of my head). But Im going to attempt
to do better. (p. 131)
At this point the qualophobe might quite intelligibly reply that she doesnt
understand just what it is that Levine is talking about (What? Do you think I
am denying that you have a head? That you see red, smell roses, feel pain?).
Levine admits that it very hard indeed to put across just what these qualia are
that he nds so problematic:
I have to admit that providing a helpful characterization of the explanandum at issue
here is quite dif cult. So far, all I know how to do is point at the phenomenon, using
hand-wavy terms like what its like to see the red diskette case. (p. 132)

If qualia cant be properly and clearly identi ed, whats the cost of leaving
them out from ones theory of mind? Dennett (1991), in Levines view, fails
to acknowledge that qualia are simply part of the data which any theory of
consciousness must explain. He thus objects to Dennetts hetero-
phenomenological method where it is talk about experience which provides
the primary data for theorizing about consciousness. Levine holds that our
conscious experience themselves, not merely our verbal judgements about
them, are the primary data to which a theory must answer (p. 134). Against
Dennett, he claims that we have access to data in our own experience that
demands explanation from a theory of the mind (p. 135).
But in response, the eliminativist can argue that until we have clear
speci cation of just what the data in question are, in something other than
hand-wavy terms, we are doing a disservice to the best methodological
approach we have to the mind. Shouldnt we be prepared to call into question
the authority of introspection when, by the lights of our best thinking about
the mind, there seem to be good reasons to do so? We know that human
beings are capable of systematic error, we suffer from illusions which are
beyond our control (e.g. perceptual illusions). The eliminativist, like the
representationalist, can argue that we represent ourselves as having qualia,
and then add that it is this representation of qualia which makes us believe
that our experience has such problematic properties.
We can, of course, represent objects and properties which do not exist. We
cannot, in general infer from the fact that there seem to be certain properties
that such properties exist. It is thus slightly odd to read Levines challenge to
Reys (1995) projectivist version of eliminativism: how could I have the
sort of substantive and determinate idea I have of the difference between
reddish and greenish if there werent any reddish and greenish in the rst
place (pp. 1467). This kind of rhetorical move can be made by, say,
believers in fairies and elves: how could I have a determinate idea of fairies,
and of the difference between fairies and elves, if there werent any fairies
and elves in the rst place?
534 Neil C. Manson

The very fact that Levine is forced to specify the putative data in terms of
reddish and greenish properties will surely fuel the eliminativists case.
Just what is reddishness (over and above the properties which red objects
appear to have). Given the deep problems with even stating what qualia are,
surely it is not a completely crazy hypothesis to suggest that maybe there just
arent any intrinsic, self-presenting, essentially-known properties: we just
think that there are? Or, perhaps we misdescribe the nature of our experience,
introducing notions of intrinsic reddishness without any real de nite
conception of just what (or where) the reddishness is. Where Levine nds it
intuitive that we can just tell that our experience has such properties, Dennett
(1988) offers a wide range of alternative intuition pumps which suggest,
equally intuitively, that the very notion of a self-intimating intrinsic property
of experience is a logically perilous, perhaps incoherent one. It is unfortunate
that Levine doesnt engage with Dennetts case for eliminativism in more
detail, rather than relying upon an emphatic iteration of his own deep
qualophilia. But perhaps this is because, at root, there is nothing else Levine
can do by way of making his case that there are these intrinsic qualitative
properties which, necessarily, are accessible to a subject.

VI. The Limits to the Consciousness-Independen t Conception of

Mind
Levine raises what seems to be a powerful objection against the explanatory
gap. A phenomenal zombie would, like you, me, or Jacksons Mary, be
unable to deduce facts about qualia from objective facts. Given that the
phenomenal zombie is an intentional duplicate of a normal person, then it
seems possible that such a zombie could be puzzled by the explanatory gap.
But if this right, then it cannot be the existence of, or acquaintance with,
qualia that supports the explanatory gap. Indeed, a world of phenomenal
zombies might engage in exactly the disputes outlined above where a zombie-
Levine (Zjoe) writes a book all about his experiences of his qualia and how
substantive and determinate they are. This suggests that there must be a
functional account of Zjoes perception of the explanatory gap (p. 164). But
if there is a functional account of our perception of the explanatory gap, the
explanatory gap can be explained away. Levines response is to deny that he
and Zjoe are in a cognitively similar situation, and thus a functional account
of Zjoes puzzlement will not do as an account of his (Joes) puzzlement
about consciousness. But in what way do Joes puzzlement and Zjoes
puzzlement differ?
The key difference, Levine argues, is that Joes thought is really
phenomenally constituted, whereas Zjoe is, as it were, merely going through
the motions (p. 166). But what does Levine mean by a really phenomenally
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 535

constituted thought? He notes that such a notion is anticipated in my claim

that the mode of presentation associated with phenomenal concepts is
substantive and determinate in a special way (p. 159). But wouldnt a zombie
say and think all these things too? Wont Zjoe hold that he has special access
to properties which have a substantive and determinate mode of presentation?
The problem here is that any claim Levine makes about his access to qualia,
or about the nature of qualia, will be made by his zombie twin. Levines
response is, once again, to insist emphatically that there really is a difference
between Joe and Zjoe: when Im considering how this experience could be a
matter of such-and-such neural rings, there is a mode of presentation of what
Im wondering about that is absent from any thought of Zjoes (p. 166).
Levine has conceded that such a difference wont be a functional one, so what
can it be? I must confess that at this point I found Levines account very hard
to follow. If we assume a consciousness-independen t conception of
intentionality and intentional processes then Joe and Zjoe think the same
thoughts, make the same inferences. So, just how does the special mode of
presentation of Joes qualia get to be cashed out in cognitive terms?
What Levine seems to hold is that thoughts about qualia are epistemically
special. When Joe has a phenomenally constituted thought about his qualia,
the qualia are somehow or another an essential part of that thought. At rst
this might just seem to be the thesis that certain thoughts ought to be
individuated in terms of their objects in such a way that we distinguish
thoughts which actually are about those objects from thoughts that only seem
to be about such objects. This move is, for example, central to disjunctivist
theories of perceptual content, but Levine dismisses this as merely a verbal
trick (p. 170). If the connection between qualia and phenomenally
constituted thought doesnt have its source in our individuative practices,
where does it come from?
The striking conclusion is that Levine rejects the orthodox consciousness-
independent conception of intentionality, at least with regard to some types of
mental state. Qualia are essentially bound up with ones awareness of them.
Qualia are bits of awareness which, as experiences of a subject, are
simultaneously objects of, and acts of, awareness (p. 174); they are, Levine
insists, necessarily objects for the subject in whose experience they appear
(p. 174).
Levines view that qualia and subjective awareness are intertwined is not a
speculative afterthought. It lies in the background of his thinking about mind,
coming to the fore from time to time, especially in his critical rejection of
reductive and eliminativist theories of consciousness. The deep question
facing philosophy of mind is:

How is it that there can be the sort of cognitive relation to these properties that
engenders the explanatory gap? Subjectivity, the fact that when qualia are instantiated
536 Neil C. Manson

they are necessarily objects for the subject in whose experience they appear, is itself a
phenomenon that has no model in physical interactions and relations. (p. 178)

Levine then notes that:

I am inclined to think, then, that there are fundamentally two different types of
intentionality: conscious and unconscious. For unconscious intentionality we have an
idea how to theoretically construct it out of its physical constituents, but for conscious
intentionality we are in the dark. (p. 177)

Levine thus denies that the consciousness-independen t conception of

mentality is cogent for all types of intentional state.
Though Levine does not discuss the matter, there are in fact two kinds of
consciousness-dependenc e operative here. First there is the claim that qualia
are properties that we are essentially aware of. This suggests that qualia are
essentially epistemically conscious states. This kind of consciousness-
dependence plays a pivotal role in Levines rejection of higher-order
representation theories. Higher-order representation theories require the
higher-order and lower-order states to be distinct existences (Armstrong
[1968, p. 106]). The rst-order state or property is a mental one in
independence of its (epistemically) conscious status. That status is only
conferred when the rst-order element becomes the object of a higher-order
representation. If Levine is right about qualia, then certain conscious mental
properties cannot exhibit this kind of (epistemic) consciousness-indepen-
dence and thus the higher-order representation theory cannot be appropriate
for such properties.
I argued above that the contemporary mindbody problem is a radically
thinned-down version of the traditional mindbody problem. Levines
conclusion may thus be seen as a retrograde step in this thinning-out process.
Contemporary theorists hold that qualia, and not self-knowledge, rationality,
or intentionality, pose the hard problem for theorizing about mind. What
Levine is saying is that qualia, but not mental states in general, exhibit
something more of the traditional mindbody problem: they exhibit the
epistemic peculiarities which were taken at one time to be distinctive of, even
criterial for, mentality. Descartes, Locke, Mill, and James all assumed that
mental states were essentially known in a rst-personal way (and thus rejected
the notion of epistemically unconscious mentality as conceptually incoherent)
(see Manson [2000]). Levine is arguing that this traditional, intuitive line of
thought about the epistemological distinctiveness of mind still has an
legitimate application, albeit in a very restricted way. Levine is quite happy
with the idea of unconscious mental (i.e. intentional) states, it is only
unconscious qualia which he rules out as incoherent.
The second kind of consciousness-dependenc e comes into play with the
claim that certain intentional states are phenomenally constituted. This
suggests that some intentional states are essentially experientially conscious.
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 537

They cannot be the intentional state that they are unless it is like something to
be in that state. Zombie Zjoes experiential intentional states are not the same
as Joes. Phenomenally constituted intentional states are essentially
(experientially) conscious. Qualia cannot be epistemically unconscious,
phenomenally constituted thoughts cannot be experientially unconscious.
In Levines view, not only do qualia exhibit the two kinds of
consciousness-dependenc e (epistemic and experiential), but that they
essentially exhibit both kinds of consciousness-dependence . Qualia entail
thoughts about qualia, so we end up with a two-way consciousness-
dependence. The problem for materialism is, as it was in Descartess and
Lockes day, a problem arising from the consciousness-dependen t nature of
mentality.
Qualia are such as to necessitate awareness of them, and certain thoughts seem to
include qualia in their modes of presentation in a cognitively special way. These are
the two sides of the problem of subjectivity. (p. 168)

Qualia, Levine insists, have a dual nature: there is an awareness relation,

which ought to entail that there are two states serving as the relevant relata,
yet experience doesnt seem to admit of this sort of bifurcation (p. 168).
Qualia pose the problem of duality (p. 168).
Where Levine differs from the traditional metaphysicians of mind is that he
is willing to let considerations of causal ef cacy secure the assumption that
qualia must be material properties even though we have no model for how
that is possible. So, rather than assuming that the peculiar knowability of
qualia implies that they must be non-material (because we have no idea of
how they could be so), Levine ends up with his problematic antinomy where
the duality of qualitativeness and subjectivity sits ill with a commitment to a
materialist realization theory.
As we noted earlier, however, Levine does not expand his discussion to
take in the wider epistemological and methodological issues which are
pertinent here. Rather than concluding that there is some essential paradoxical
element in our thinking about mind, an alternative approach is to take that
antinomy as the starting-point for re ection upon the assumptions which lead
us inexorably towards such an antinomy. In particular, the key element in
Levines explanatory gap turns out to be the assumption that introspection
and pre-theoretical intuitions x, immutably, something about the essentially
dual nature of qualia and subjectivity. Presented as a package deal, Levine
concludes that qualia, even though they are hard to describe clearly or
identify, have this dual nature, and because of this the explanatory gap will
continue to be a problem.
The alternative is that we take the antinomy to be one which gives us
grounds to question our intuitions about what we seem to encounter in
introspective experience. Or, more speci cally, the antinomy gives us
538 Neil C. Manson

grounds to question our nave conceptualization of the nature of experience as

identi ed introspectively. The key problem with Levines account is that a
great deal of philosophica l work is being done by sketchy and hand-wavy
discourse and thought about the mind. Obviously, philosophical thinking
about the mind has to start somewhere, and has to take some assumptions as
xed points. But Levine never makes a convincing case, to my mind at least,
that we either ought to, or have to, hold xed the particular intuitions about
qualia and subjectivity which he favours.

VII. Conclusion
To conclude: Purple Haze is a fascinating and challenging exploration of the
mindbody problem as it appears from the vantage point of contemporary
consciousness-independen t thinking about the mind. It is an articulate, rich,
and stimulating book that places the reader right in the thick of the
contemporary urry of theorizing about consciousness, and it will provide
rewarding reading for professional philosophers and students alike. The book
serves, at the very least, (i) as an indication of the shape of the contemporary
mindbody problem (though with no discussion as to how and why the mind
body problem has changed its conceptual shape); and (ii) as an indication of
the potential limitations of the orthodox consciousness-independen t concep-
tion of intentionality (though it is strange, given Levines conclusions about
intentionality, that he does not discuss Searles more wide-ranging rejection
of the consciousness-independen t conception of mind). Levines aim is to
show that the mindbody problem is still with us, contrary to the optimism
professed by many contemporary naturalistic theorists of mind. The
cornerstone of Levines case against such theories is the assumption that
qualia have the kind of dual consciousness-dependenc e discussed above.
Just as the traditional mindbody problem was bolstered by a consciousness-
dependent conception of mind, so too is Levines.
It is commonplace these days to distinguish two kinds of problems of
consciousness. There are the easy problems of characterizing and
explaining the information-processing which accompanies conscious experi-
ence and thought. But there is also the hard problem, much discussed by
Levine, of being able strictly to explain why it is like something to have
conscious experiences. One thing which we can draw from our discussion of
Levines book is that there is a further dialectical problem. This is not a
problem of consciousness but a problem of the philosophy of consciousness.
Levines anti-reductivism hinges upon a particular set of assumptions about
the scope and reliability of our introspective conceptualization of qualia. But
many reductivists and eliminativists simply disagree with Levine (and with
each other) about our introspective conceptualization of the mind. The really
 Consciousness-dependenc e and the Explanatory Gap 539

hard problem of consciousness is to nd some way of legislating between the

various sets of conceptual and methodological assumptions which shape the
philosophy of consciousness. Where Levine lets introspection bear the
weight, Dennett, in contrast, is willing and able to give a robust error theory as
to why our introspective take on our own minds is not to be relied upon. One
thing which we learn from the history of philosophy is that there is virtually
no assumption, no matter how obvious, intuitive, or seemingly fundamental,
that cannot be given up if ones best theory of how the world ts together
requires it. The consciousness-dependen t conception of mind, for example,
seemed entirely intuitive throughout most of the history of modern
philosophy. Though it was intuitive we eventually found that we had good
reasons to give it up. Levines work makes a powerful case for the persistence
of the hard problem of consciousness, and he ties the explanatory gap to a
particular kind of consciousness-dependence . But Levines focus leaves the
broader dialectical problem virtually untouched. This does not undermine
Levines work. It is simply a reminder that consciousness poses philosophical
problems of different kinds and most of them, if not all of them, are hard
problems in one way or another.

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Received 16 July 2002

Neil C. Manson, Kings College, Cambridge CB2 1ST, UK. E-mail: nm248@hermes.cam.ac .
uk