Section 2.
The right of the people to be Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
(Article 3 par. 2, exclusionary clause: Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding)
UMIL v. RAMOS
F, I, H: These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus
filed before the Court, which have been consolidated
because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the
respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should
not be set at liberty without further delay.
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOUCAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible
for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day
before in Caloocan City. Dural was transferred to
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who
went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car, and fired at the 2 soldiers.
- As a consequence of this positive identification,
Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an information charging Rolando Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of Double Murder
with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.
- Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato
Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents
filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and
Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for
violation of the Anti Subversion Act had been filed
against them, and they were accordingly
released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar
as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now
moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed,
since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in
favor of an accused in a criminal case who has
been released on bail.
- As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he
was not arrested while in the act of shooting the
2 CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he
arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the
said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
- However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being
a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated
by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above narrated, the claim of
the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and
in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the
herein detainees was well within the bounds of
the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion
whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing nonviolent acts but in furtherance
of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
 judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities. If killing and other
acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in
case of invasion, merely seizing their persons
and detaining them while 3any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less
justified. x x x
-Other cases:
2. ROQUE v. DE VILLA
the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also
justified. When apprehended at the house
of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to
Renato Constantino and other members of
the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the
other hand, was a member of the National
United Front Commission, in charge of
finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house
of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also
in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had
no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows
that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos
y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had
surrendered to the military authorities,
told military agents about the operations
of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in
Metro Manila. He identified some of his
former comrades as Ka Mong, a staff
member of the Communications and
Transportation Bureau; Ka Nelia, a staff
member in charge of finance; Ka Miller,
an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez,
Quezon; Ka Ted, and Ka Totoy. He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by
Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a
safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPPNPA.
In view of these revelations, the
Constantino house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August
1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued
by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house
was conducted at about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, by a combined team of the
Criminal Investigation Service, National
Capital District (CISNCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG).
When confronted, Renato Constantino
could not produce any permit or authority
to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio
and other communications equipment.
Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When
questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he
was a staff member of the executive
committee of the NUFC and a ranking
member of the International Department
of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP).
At about 8:00 oclock in the evening of the
same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound.
When accosted, he readily admitted to the
military agents that he is a regular
member of the CPP/NPA and that he went
to the place to deliver letters to Ka
Mong, referring to Renato Constantino,
and other members of the rebel group. On
further questioning, he also admitted that
he is known as Ka Miller and that he was
from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon.
As officers and/or members of the NUFC-
CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was
justified for the same reasons earlier
stated visavis Rolando Dural. The arrest
without warrant of Roque was additionally
justified as she was, at the time of
apprehension, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess
them.
3. ANONUEVO v. RAMOS
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are
admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato
Constantino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried
firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows
that at about 7:30 oclock in the evening
of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of
Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights,
Marikina, which was still under
surveillance by military agents. The
military agents noticed bulging objects on
their waist lines. When frisked, the agents
found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo
 and Casiple were asked to show their
permit or license to possess or carry
firearms and ammunition, but they could
not produce any. Hence, they were
brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation.
4. OCAYA v. AGUIRRE
The arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya
is justified under the Rules, since she had
with her unlicensed ammunition when she
was arrested. The record of this case
shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the
PC Intelligence and Investigation of the
Rizal PCINP Command, armed with a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, conducted a search of a
house located at Block 19, Phase II,
Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito
Tiamson, head of the CPPNPA. In the
course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived
in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds
of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were
found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a
result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were
brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to
possess the ammunition, an information
charging her with violation of PD 1866 was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera,
on the other hand, was released from
custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf
of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was
alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was
illegally arrested and detained, and denied
the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky
Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so
that her arrest without a warrant is
justified. No preliminary investigation was
conducted because she was arrested
without a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
5. About petitioners allegations on the planting
of evidence
6. ESPIRITU VS. LIM
The release on habeas corpus of the
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is
detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said
petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of
public service vehicles in the Philippines,
organized for their mutual aid and
protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 oclock
in the morning of 23 November 1988,
while he was sleeping in his home located
at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he
was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic
who told him that a group of persons
wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went
down to talk to them, he was immediately
put under arrest. When he asked for the
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col.
Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their ownertype jeepney.
He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz
Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but
the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of
the Western Police District at Blumentritt,
Manila where he was interrogated and
detained. Then, at about 9:00 oclock of
the same morning, he was brought before
the respondent Lim and, there and then,
the said respondent ordered his arrest and
detention. He was thereafter brought to
the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western
Police District under Police Capt.
Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was
detained, restrained and deprived of his
liberty.7
The respondents claim however, that the
detention of the petitioner is justified in
view of the Information filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-
68385, charging him with violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the
petitioner was lawfully arrested without a
judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner
when arrested had in fact just committed
an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, during a press
conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through trimedia was
heard urging all drivers and operators to
go on nationwide strike on November 23,
 1988, to force the government to give in
to their demands to lower the prices of
spare parts, commodities, water and the
immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON
president Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the Alliance
Drivers Association to go on nationwide
strike on November 23, 1988.8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the
National Press Club in order to investigate
him, but he gave the lawmen the slip.9 He
was next seen at about 5:00 oclock that
afternoon at a gathering of drivers and
symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay
Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na
ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi
tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng
gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin
at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si
Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10
(emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the
petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was
invited for questioning and brought to
police headquarters after which an
Information for violation of Art. 142 of the
Revised Penal Code was filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a
warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the
Rules of Court and that the petitioner is
detained by virtue of a valid information
filed with the competent court, he may not
be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as
recommended. However, we find the
amount of the recommended bail
(P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it
to P10,000.00 only.
7. NAZARENO VS. STATION COMMANDER
We also find no merit in the submission of
Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally
arrested and is unlawfully detained. The
record of this case shows that at about
8:30 oclock in the morning of 14
December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men near the corner of
T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the
suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala
who was arrested by the police on 28
December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions in the killing of the said
Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the
police officers, without warrant, picked up
Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the
police headquarters for questioning.
Obviously, the evidence of petitioners
guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989,
an information charging Narciso Nazareno,
Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed
a motion to post bail, but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated
10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his coaccused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the
same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January
1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1
February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna
issued a resolution denying the petition for
habeas corpus, it appearing that the said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information
filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had
taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by
said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence
against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are
based upon the facts and the law.
Consequently, we will not disturb the
same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno
was effected by the police without warrant
pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of
Court after he was positively implicated by
his coaccused Ramil Regala in the killing of
Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation
by the police authorities. As held in People
vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to
make an arrest by reason of a crime, does
not presuppose as a necessary requisite
for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable
existence of a crime. For the detention to
 be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the
agent or person in authority making the
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the
same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated
therein.
8. CASE AT HAND (?)
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions
here considered, criminal charges have
been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, or if such
person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as
amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or
discharge authorized.If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines
or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment. (emphasis
supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners plea
for the Court to reexamine and, thereafter,
abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs.
Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is
no longer available after an information is
filed against the person detained and a
warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment is issued by the court where
said information has been filed.
GO v. CA
F: A road rage case: an Eldon Maguan was driving
in the right direction along Wilson St. when
Petitioner entered the one-way street driving in
the wrong direction. They almost had a collision
and petitioner stepped out of his car and shot
Maguan in his car. Petitioner just left. A security
guard from a bakeshop was able to take down the
plate number. Police showed up and were able to
retrieve an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition from the scene. LTO verified that the
plate number was registered to an Elsa Ang Go.
- The following day, the police returned to the
scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop
shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The
security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of petitioner and he positively identified
him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was
probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.
-Go, with 2 lawyers, went to the police when he
heard of news of his manhunt.
- The police forthwith detained him.
-An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the
police station at that time, positively identified
petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the
police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
-The Prosecutor informed petitioner, in the
presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
himself of his right to preliminary investigation
but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such
waiver.
- While the complaint was still with the
Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of
his gunshot wound(s).
- The Prosecutor, instead of filing an information
for frustrated homicide, filed an information for
murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail
was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
-In the same afternoon the information was filed,
the Petitioner filed an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, stating that the arrest was
unlawful. They later filed for a petition for
certiorari because the information was filed
without the preliminary investigation.
- On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an
order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
- In the midst of the setting of the trial of his
criminal case with the lower court, Petitioner filed
for a writ of habeas corpus with the CA. He
alleged that in view of public respondents failure
to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier
filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
month, thus prolonging his detention, he was
entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
- NOT GRANTED.
- In Umil v. Ramos, by an eighttosix vote, the
Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to
fourteen (14) days after the actual commission of
the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses
constituted continuing crimes. Those offenses
were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New Peoples Army, etc. In
the instant case, the offense for which petitioner
was arrested was murder, an offense which was
obviously commenced and completed at one
definite location in time and space. No one had
pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was
a continuing crime.
I: 1. W/N the warrantless arrest had been lawful
2. W/N petitioner had effectively waived his right
to preliminary investigation
H: 1. NO. Petitioners arrest took place six (6)
days after the shooting of Maguan. The
arresting officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the arrest effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had
any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shootingone stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunmans cars plate
number which turned out to be registered in
petitioners wifes name. That information did not,
however, constitute personal knowledge.
- It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too
that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without
warrant.When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in
case of non availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding
rule and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investiga tion having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this
Rule.
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not
arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers,
he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was
surrendering himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime.
2. NO. We note that petitioner had from the very
beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed
out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with
the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and
that petitioner should accordingly be held to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation.
- The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation,
humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to
an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a
valuable right. To deny petitioners claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
of the full measure of his right to due process.
- The question may be raised whether petitioner
still retains his right to a preliminary investigation
in the instant case considering that he was
already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is
that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before
or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously
insisted on his right to preliminary investigation
before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
- Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do
not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation.
- we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the
merits has already began. Trial on the merits
should be suspended or held in abeyance and a
preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to
petitioner.
- To reach any other conclusion here, that is, to
hold that petitioners rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively
obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted
into the record would be to legitimize the
deprivation of due process and to permit the
Government to benefit from its own wrong or
culpable omission and effectively to dilute
important rights of accused persons wellnigh to
the vanishing point.
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE
F: Accusedappellant Rogelio Mengote was
convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the
strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his
person at the moment of his warrantless arrest.
- The incident occurred shortly before noon of
August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious looking persons at
the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen
Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, they there
saw two men looking from side to side, one of
whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accusedappellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His
companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos,
had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to
police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
- Besides the police officers, one other witness
presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto
Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as
among the articles stolen from him during the
robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987.
He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He
had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him, including
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort
to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it and claimed instead that
the weapon had been planted on him at the
time of his arrest.
- He was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in
a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with his companion.
I: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest
H: NO.
The exceptions are: Rule 113, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been
committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
- Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accusedappellant was merely
looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
- The case before us is different because there
was nothing to support the arresting officers
suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes and
his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence. 7
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where
the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected
while he was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting
suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.
-Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of Mengotes arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet
to be committed.
- Before these events, the peace officers had no
knowledge
even of Mengotes identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a
firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganans house.
MANALILI v. CA
F: Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged
by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R.
Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in
Caloocan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Manalili,
without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his custody, possession and control crushed
marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug
and knowing the same to be such. Contrary to
Law.
-PROSECUTION FACTS: The surveillance was being
made because of information that drug addicts
were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the
policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs.
-The person was observed to have reddish eyes
and to be walking in a swaying manner. When
this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves
as police officers. The policemen then asked the
male person what he was holding in his hands.
The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo
Espiritu asked the male person if he could see
what said male person had in his hands. The
latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected
crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the
wallet and its marijuana contents and had it
tested.
-MANALILIS VERSION: He was in a tricycle on his
way to his boarding house and he passed by the
cemetery where the police stopped his driver and
accused them both that they were under the
influence of marijuana.
- The policemen brought the accused and the
tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera, which the
policemen were riding in. The policemen then
bodily searched the accused and the tricycle
driver. At this point, the accused asked the
policemen why he was being searched and the
policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
marijuana.
- Nothing was found on the driver and he was let
go, while they brought the accused to the police
headquarters at Kalookan City where they said
they would again search the accused.
- On the way to the police headquarters, the
accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to
follow him. The neighbor thus followed the
accused to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused
was asked to remove his pants in the presence of
said neighbor and another companion. The
policemen turned over the pants of the accused
over a piece of bond paper trying to look for
marijuana. However, nothing was found, except
for some dirt and dust. This prompted the
companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell
the policemen to release the accused. The
accused was led to a cell. The policemen later
told the accused that they found marijuana inside
the pockets of his pants.
-He was asked to call his parents however, they
did not have any cellphones.
- Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
With the agreement of the public prosecutor,
appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00
bail bond. After trial in due course, the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as
a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19,
1989 the conviction of appellant for the illegal
possession of marijuana residue. CA upheld the
decision, hence the case.
I: W/N the evidence was admissible
H: YES.
-We disagree with petitioner and hold that the
search was valid, being akin to a stopandfrisk. In
the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stopand-
frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the
person from whom they were taken.
-The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is not absolute. The recent case of
People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search
and seizure, viz.:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
(2) search of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
In People vs. Encinada, the Court further
explained that [i]n these cases, the search and
seizure may be made only with probable cause as
the essential requirement. Although the term
eludes exact definition, probable cause for a
search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground
of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched.
- Stopandfrisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals,24 the Court held that there were many
instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest, one of which was stopandfrisk.
- Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor
Generals contention that petitioner effectively
waived the inadmissibility of any evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise this
issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid
waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search,
requires the concurrence of the following
requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed;
(2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual
or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
PEOPLE v. CAMAT
F: A case of homicide, frustrated homicide, and
robbery. The victims Sinoy and Penalver were
members of the Marine but were at that time in
civilian clothes, and were walking long Quirino
Ave., having attended a birthday party. They
noticed 2 men following them and it turns out to
be del Rosario and Camat. Del Rosario kicked
Sinoy while Camat stabbed him, and when
Penalver attacked, Camat also stabbed him,
which gave del Rosario the chance to seize the
clutch bag that contained items worth 150P. The
victims ran away and sought the aid of a
policeman who then brought them to a hospital.
Sinoy died from excessive bleeding but Penalver
survived.
- Camats alibi: He was home, corroborated by his
mom.
- del Rosarios alibi: He came from selling
vegetables and went straight home.
- Both appellants claim that they did not know
each other prior to the date of the commission of
the crime and that they met each other only after
they were arrested and brought to the police
precinct.9
- Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was
assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985,
stated on the witness stand that appellant Camat
orally admitted to him his (Camats) participation
in the killing of the soldier during interrogation at
the police precinct. In addition, Camat also
allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario
and one Roland as his coconspirators in the crime
charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as
the one who actually stabbed Sinoy.
- With this information, Patrolman Cario and
another policeman traced the whereabouts of Del
Rosario and, when they found him, they invited
him for questioning. In the police station,
appellant Del Rosario allegedly confessed to
Patrolman Cario his involvement in the crime
and informed the latter that the electric tester
could be recovered from his relatives.
- The investigation of the case centered upon
Camat only after the latter was pointed to by a
vendor who allegedly saw what happened during
the night of September 1, 1985. As fate would
have it, Camat was arrested by Paraaque
policemen on October 11, 1985 for acts of
lasciviousness, upon the complaint of his sisterin-
law. Since Camat fitted the description given
earlier by the eyewitness to the investigating
policemen, Patrolman Cario fetched the vendor
to verify the identity of Camat. At the police
station, said witness recognized and identified
Camat as the one who killed Sinoy. On the
witness stand, Patrolman Cario refused to give
the identity of the anonymous vendor witness
who was allegedly afraid of the accused, but the
policeman promised that he would present said
witness if ordered to do so by the court.
- Appellants insist that the trial court cannot rely
on the extrajudicial confession of appellant Camat
as a basis for their conviction because such
confession was obtained during custodial
investigation in violation of their constitutional
rights.
I: W/N the confessions were admissible
H: NO.
PROCEDURE FOR CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient meansby
telephone if possibleor by letter or
messenger. It shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
- As interpreted in the jurisdiction of their origin,
these rights begin to be available where the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, and the police carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements.
- A reading of the challenged decision shows that
the court below relied upon appellants
confessions to disaffirm their credibility and to
impugn their denial of complicity in the
commission of the felony. This the lower court
cannot do because, absent any showing that
appellants were duly advised of the mandatory
guarantees under the Bill of Rights, their
confessions made before Patrolman Cario are
inadmissible against them and cannot be used in
support of their conviction.
- As we have heretofore held, it is now incumbent
upon the prosecution to prove during the trial
that, prior to questioning, the confessant was
warned of his constitutionally protected rights
because the presumption of regularity of official
acts does not apply during in custody
investigation. Trial courts should further keep in
mind that even if the confession of the accused is
gospel truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
- As to the implication of Del Rosario in the
extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can
be placed on the imputation therein because it
violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does
not fall under the exceptions thereto, especially
since it was made after the supposed homicidal
conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his coaccused. As against the latter, the
confession is hearsay.
- However, even disregarding the
extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the
lower court stands and can be sustained.
Worthy of consideration is the trial courts
conclusion that although there is only 1
eyewitness presented by the prosecution in the
person of Gonzalo Penalver, the Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the prosecution has
satisfactorily proved the guilt of both accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
- It is well settled that the testimony of a
single eyewitness, if found convincing and
trustworthy by the trial court, is sufficient
to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. We also see no reason to
deviate from the trial courts observation that
Penalvers testimony bore the attributes of truth,
having been delivered in a candid and
straightforward manner.
- The Court, citing People vs. Jose, et al., clarified
that the phrase criminal prosecutions in the
said constitutional provision shall be interpreted
to mean proceedings before the trial court, which
in its most expanded concept is from arraignment
up to the rendition of the decision. It will also be
observed that under both the 1964 Rules of
Court, and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the right of confrontation is specified as a right of
the accused at the trial.34 We accordingly
reiterate that an accuseds constitutional right to
meet the witnesses face to face is limited to
proceedings before the trial court. Accordingly,
appellants reliance upon this constitutional right
is evidently misplaced as the same is available to
him at the trial and not during a custodial
investigation.
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
F, I, H: 4 consolidated cases:
"No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," and that
"the accused shall have the Assistance of
Counsel."
Custodial interrogation--questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or deprived of liberty.
The constitutional issue we decide in
each of these cases is the admissibility
of statements obtained from a defendant
questioned while in custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. In each, police officers,
detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a
room questioned the defendant. In none of
these cases was the defendant given a full
and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. In all the
cases, the questioning elicited oral
admissions, and in three of them, signed
statements as well which were admitted at
their trials. They all thus share salient features
-- incommunicado interrogation of individuals
in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights.
In-custody interrogation is psychologically,
rather than physically, oriented. To obtain a
confession, the interrogator must "patiently
maneuver himself into a position from which
the desired objective may be attained." The
police then persuade, trick, him out of
exercising his constitutional rights.
In these cases, subject are interrogation
atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In
Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the
defendant and took him to a special
interrogation room, where they secured a
confession. In Vignera v. New York, the
defendant made oral admissions to the police
after interrogation in the afternoon, and then
signed an inculpatory statement upon being
questioned by an assistant district attorney
later the same evening. In Westover v.
United States, the defendant was handed
over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by
local authorities after they had detained and
interrogated him for a lengthy period, both at
night and the following morning. After some
two hours of questioning, the federal officers
had obtained signed statements from the
defendant. Lastly, in California v. Stewart,
the local police held the defendant five days
in the station and interrogated him on nine
separate occasions before they secured his
inculpatory statement.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has the right to remain silent. For those
unaware of the privilege, the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of it -- the
threshold requirement for an intelligent
decision as to its exercise.
An individual need not make a pre-
interrogation request for a lawyer. While such
request affirmatively secures his right to have
one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not
constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the
right to counsel during interrogation can be
recognized unless specifically made after the
warnings we here delineate have been given.
If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel.
To summarize, we hold that, when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect the
privilege, and unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure that the exercise
of the right will be scrupulously honored, the
following measures are required. He must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity
to exercise these rights must be afforded to
him throughout the interrogation. After such
 warnings have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against
him. Custodial interrogation, by contrast, does
not necessarily afford the innocent an
opportunity to clear themselves. A serious
consequence of the present practice of the
interrogation alleged to be beneficial for the
innocent is that many arrests "for
investigation" subject large numbers of
innocent persons to detention and
interrogation.
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
Petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested
at his home and taken in custody to a
Phoenix police station. The complaining
witness there identified him. The police
then took him to "Interrogation Room No.
2" of the detective bureau. There he was
questioned by two police officers. The
officers admitted at trial that Miranda was
not advised that he had a right to have an
attorney present. Two hours later, the
officers emerged from the interrogation
room with a written confession signed by
Miranda. At the top of the statement was a
typed paragraph stating that the
confession was made voluntarily, without
threats or promises of immunity and "with
full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may
be used against me."
At his trial before a jury, the written
confession was admitted into evidence.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping
and rape. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Arizona held that Miranda's
constitutional rights were not violated in
obtaining the confession, as Miranda did
not specifically request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the
officers and by the admission of
respondent, it is clear that Miranda was
not in any way apprised of his right to
consult with an attorney and to have one
present during the interrogation, nor was
his right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself effectively protected in
any other manner. Without these
warnings, the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed
a statement, which contained a typed-in
clause stating that he had full
knowledge of his legal rights, does not
approach the knowing and intelligent
waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights.
VIGNERA v. NEW YORK
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, picked up by
New York police in connection with the
robbery. A detective questioned Vignera
and he orally admitted the robbery. The
detective asked on cross-examination
whether Vignera was warned of his right to
counsel before being interrogated but the
prosecution objected and the court
sustained.
While at the 66th Detective Squad,
Vignera was identified by storeowner and
a saleslady as the robber of the dress shop
then arrested. It appears that he was not
given any warning by the assistant district
attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of
first-degree robbery, the detective
testified as to the oral confession. Vignera
found guilty of first-degree robbery. In
argument to the Court of Appeals, the
State contended that Vignera had no
constitutional right to be advised of his
right to counsel or his privilege against
self-incrimination.
We reverse. The foregoing indicates that
Vignera was not warned of any of his
rights before the questioning by the
detective and by the assistant district
attorney. No other steps were taken to
protect these rights. Thus, he was not
effectively apprised of his Fifth
Amendment privilege or of his right to
have counsel present, and his statements
are inadmissible.
WESTOVER v. UNITED STATES
Petitioner, Carl Calvin Westover, was
arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A
report was also received from the FBI that
he was wanted on a felony charge in
California. The local authorities took him to
a police station and placed him in a line-up
on the local charges, and, then he was
booked. Kansas City police interrogated
Westover on the night of his arrest. He
denied any knowledge of criminal
activities. The next day, local officers
interrogated him again throughout the
morning. Shortly before noon, they
informed the FBI that they were through
interrogating Westover and that the FBI
could proceed to interrogate him. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that
Westover was ever given any warning as
to his rights by local police.
At noon, three special agents of the FBI
continued the interrogation in a private
 interview room of the Kansas City Police
Department, this time with respect to the
robbery of a savings and loan association
and bank in Sacramento, California. After
two or two and one-half hours, Westover
signed separate confessions to each of
these two robberies which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the
interrogation. At trial, one of the agents
testified, and a paragraph on each of the
statements states, that the agents advised
Westover that he did not have to make a
statement, that any statement he made
could be used against him, and that he
had the right to see an attorney.
Westover was tried by a jury in federal
court and convicted of the California
robberies. His statements were introduced
at trial. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
We reverse. On the facts of this case, we
cannot find that Westover knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to remain
silent and his right to consult with counsel
prior to the time he made the statement.
At the time the FBI agents began
questioning Westover, he had been in
custody for over 14 hours, and had been
interrogated at length during that period.
The FBI interrogation began immediately
upon the conclusion of the interrogation
by Kansas City police, and was conducted
in local police headquarters.
Although the two law enforcement
authorities are legally distinct, and the
crimes for which they interrogated
Westover were different, the impact on
him was that of a continuous period of
questioning. There is no evidence of any
warning given prior to the FBI
interrogation, nor is there any evidence of
an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. The record
simply shows that the defendant did, in
fact, confess a short time after being
turned over to the FBI following
interrogation by local police. Despite the
fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at
the outset of their interview, from
Westover's point of view, the warnings
came at the end of the interrogation
process. In these circumstances, an
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights
cannot be assumed.
We do not suggest that law enforcement
authorities are precluded from questioning
any individual who has been held for a
period of time by other authorities and
interrogated by them without appropriate
warnings. A different case would be
presented if an accused were taken into
custody by the second authority, removed
both in time and place from his original
surroundings, and then adequately
advised of his rights and given an
opportunity to exercise them. But here,
the FBI interrogation was conducted
immediately following the state
interrogation in the same police station --
in the same compelling surroundings.
Thus, in obtaining a confession from
Westover the federal authorities were the
beneficiaries of the pressure applied by
the local in-custody interrogation. In these
circumstances, the giving of warnings
alone was not sufficient to protect the
privilege.
CALIFORNIA v. STEWART
In the course of investigating a series of
purse-snatch robberies in which one of the
victims had died of injuries inflicted by her
assailant, respondent, Roy Allen Stewart,
was pointed out to Los Angeles police as
the endorser of dividend checks taken in
one of the robberies. Police officers went
to Stewart's house and arrested him. One
of the officers asked Stewart if they could
search the house, to which he replied, "Go
ahead." The search turned up various
items taken from the five robbery victims.
At the time of Stewart's arrest, police also
arrested Stewart's wife and three other
persons who were visiting him. These four
were jailed along with Stewart, and were
interrogated. Stewart was taken to the
University Station of the Los Angeles
Police Department, where he was placed
in a cell. During the next five days, police
interrogated Stewart on nine different
occasions. Except during the first
interrogation session, when he was
confronted with an accusing witness,
Stewart was isolated with his
interrogators.
During the ninth interrogation session,
Stewart admitted that he had robbed the
deceased and stated that he had not
meant to hurt her. Police then brought
Stewart before a magistrate for the first
time. Since there was no evidence to
connect them with any crime, the police
then released the other four persons
arrested with him.
Nothing in the record specifically indicates
whether Stewart was or was not advised
of his right to remain silent or his right to
counsel. In a number of instances,
however, the interrogating officers were
asked to recount everything that was said
during the interrogations. None indicated
 that Stewart was ever advised of his
rights.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to
commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his
trial, transcripts of the first interrogation
and the confession at the last
interrogation were introduced in evidence.
The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery
and first degree murder. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California reversed. It
held that, under this Court's decision
in Escobedo, Stewart should have been
advised of his right to remain silent and of
his right to counsel, and that it would not
presume in the face of a silent record that
the police advised Stewart of his rights.
We affirm. In dealing with custodial
interrogation, we will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of
his rights and that his privilege against
self-incrimination has been adequately
safeguarded on a record that does not
show that any warnings have been given
or that any effective alternative has been
employed. Nor can a knowing and
intelligent waiver of these rights be
assumed on a silent record. Furthermore,
Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged
offenses through eight of the nine
interrogations over a period of five days is
subject to no other construction than that
he was compelled by persistent
interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment
privilege.
TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE
F: On March 27, 1998, five separate
Informations7 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against
petitioner. The said Informations portray the
same mode of commission of the crime as in
Criminal Case No. 98163806 but differ with
respect to the numbers of the checks and
promissory notes involved and the dates and
amounts thereof. The prosecution alleged that on
different occasions, appellant caused to be
prepared promissory notes and cashiers checks
in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the
bank since he has substantial deposits in his
account, in connection with the purported loans
obtained by the latter from the bank. Appellant
approved and signed the cashiers check as
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be
signed the signature of Tan as endorser and
payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back
of the same to show that the latter had indeed
endorsed the same for payment. He handed the
checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda,
for encashment. Once said documents were
forged and falsified, appellant released and
obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the
alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his
use and benefit. After the discovery of the
irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted
and an administrative investigation was held in
the Head Office of Metrobank, during which
appellant signed a written statement (marked as
Exhibit N) in the form of questions and answers.
Witnesses: Valentino Elevado, a member of the
Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank,
testified that he conducted and interviewed the
appellant in January 1998; that in said interview,
appellant admitted having committed the
allegations in the Informations, specifically
forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds
of the loan were secured or personally received
by the appellant although it should be the client
of the bank who should receive the same; and
that all the answers of the appellant were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily
executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him.
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch
manager, testified that the signatures appearing
on the promissory notes were not the signatures
of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not
bear her signature although it is required, due to
the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her
manager accommodated valued clients; that she
signed the corresponding checks upon instruction
of appellant; and that after signing the checks,
appellant took the same which remained in his
custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a
handwriting expert, testified that the signatures
appearing on the promissory notes and specimen
signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan
were not written by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at
Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that
several cashiers checks were issued in favor of
Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to
encash the same; and that it was appellant who
received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee
testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was
the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998
[with] the abovenamed offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant
manager of Metrobank Dasmarias Branch,
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the
day-to-day operations of the branch, solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.
- Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit
Romeo Tan as a clientdepositor when he was the
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a
valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit
line for P40,000,000.00 by Metrobank. Tan was
also allowed to open a fictitious account for his
personal use and was assisted personally by
appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the
middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious
account and used the name Jose Tan. Such
practice for valued clients was allowed by and
known to the bank to hide their finances due to
rampant kidnappings or from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
- According to appellant, Tan availed of his
standing credit line (through promissory notes)
for five (5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July
1997 for P16,000,000.00, 2) 27 October 1997 for
P6,000,000.00, 3) 12 November 1997 for
P3,000,000.00, 4) 21 November 1997 for
P16,000,000,00, 5) 22 December 1997 for
P2,000,000.00. On all these occasions except the
loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to
the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions
regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon
receiving the instructions, appellant would order
the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note
and send the same through the banks
messenger to Tans office, which was located
across the street. The latter would then return to
the bank, through his own messenger, the
promissory notes already signed by him. Upon
receipt of the promissory note, appellant would
order the preparation of the corresponding
cashiers check representing the proceeds of the
particular loan, send the same through the banks
messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter
would return the same through his own
messenger already endorsed together with a
deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-
2501337 of Jose Tan.
Only Cashiers Check dated 21 November 1997 or
P16, 000, 000.00 was not endorsed and deposited
for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan
obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that
all the signatures of Tan appearing on the
promissory notes and the cashiers checks were
the genuine signatures of Tan although he never
saw the latter affix them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank
auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio
Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26
January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-
Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to
report to the Head Office on the following day.
When appellant arrived at the said office, he was
surprised that there were seven (7) other people
present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2)
bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform
and the other in plain clothes), and a
representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the
bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign
a paper (Exhibit N) in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made
to sign but was not offered any explanation; that
he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by
the police that he will be brought to the precinct if
he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a
lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose
of the meeting; [and] that just to get it over
with he signed the paper which turned out to be
a confession. After the said meeting, appellant
went to see Tan at his office but was unable to
find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to
no avail.
RTC: Guilty.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
I: W/N his confession was admissible
H: YES. The constitutional proscription against the
admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is GUARANTEED
CERTAIN RIGHTS WHICH ATTACH UPON THE
COMMENCEMENT THEREOF, VIZ.:
(1) to remain silent,
(2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and
(3) to be informed of the two other rights above.
- In the present case, while it is undisputed that
petitioner gave an uncounselled written
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in
the branch he managed, the following are clear:
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained
of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning.
- Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived
of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement.
-Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, we declared that the right to
counsel applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. Amplifying further
on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent
case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:
However, it must be remembered that the right
to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
 Here, petitioners written statement was given
during an administrative inquiry conducted by
his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in
the course of his employment. No error can
therefore be attributed to the courts below in
admitting in evidence and in giving due
consideration to petitioners written statement
as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
PEOPLE v. SUNGA
F: The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an
accused who turned state witness may suffice to
convict his coaccused if it is given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner and is full of
details which by their nature could not have been
the result of deliberate afterthought;1 otherwise,
it needs corroboration the presence or lack of
which may ultimately decide the cause of the
prosecution and the fate of the accused.
- On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn
Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and a high school student
of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS),
was found at a coffee plantation in Jacana,
Barangay BancaoBancao in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.
- Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga,
Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito
Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn
Cuyos as accomplice.
- Locil Cui, a minor, also cooperated in the
execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE.
- After raping Jocelyn, the accused repeatedly
stabbed and smashed her head with a stone.
- A motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil)
to be a state witness, averring therein that the
legal requisites for her discharge had been
complied with, and submitting her sworn
statement which detailed how her coaccused
carried out the crime.
- Locil was a highschool dropout at 14 years old
who ran away because of a pregnancy she later
aborted.
- Locil took a tricycle from the puetro princessa
SSS branch. She was with another passenger only
described as the lesbian. The driver was Sunga.
They went to Mendoza Park. When they arrived,
the lesbian was seen convincing Jocelyn to come
with them. Pascua was driving, and Sunga was
gone. When they reached the Barangay with the
forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga and
Lansang who took her by the waist to a nearby
buho clumps.
- That was when they raped and killed her.
- Locil was told to keep quiet or she would be
killed.
Witnesses:
- Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver,
recalled that
he was on his way home in Jacana, Barangay
Bancao Bancao at 12:30 a.m. of June 30, 1994, a
day after the incident, when from a distance of
about 30 meters, he saw Lansang walking back
and forth and appearing restless near the coffee
plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao Bancao
where Jocelyns body was later found on July 12,
1994. Although it was then nighttime, Devilleres
had a good look at Lansang due to the
illumination provided by the electric light post
under which Lansang was situated.
- Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana,
declared that she was among those who saw the
mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July
12, 1994 at a coffee plantation near her place;
that in the afternoon of that date and while
tending her sarisari store, a tricycle arrived with
three men on board, one of whom, Lito Octac
(Octac) alighted, leaving the two inside the
tricycle who seemed to be hiding their faces; that
one of those two men inside the tricycle inquired
from her whether the discovered corpse, that of
Jocelyn, was from Barangay Caroray; that the
following day, she reported to the police about
the three suspicious looking men who went to her
store; and that two days later, she was made to,
as she did, identify Lansang at the police station
as one of the men who went to her store in the
afternoon of July 12, 1994 and inquired as to
Jocelyns corpse.
- Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyns father, recounted as
follows: During the wake of his daughter at the
Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a.m. of July 14,
1994 (15th day following the incident), Lansang
arrived and told him as follows: Total tayo ay
magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin itong
kaso at magtulungan na lang, mayroon na akong
alam na makakapagturo kung sino and may
kagagawan sa krimen. Huwag na lang nating
sabihin sa mga polis. When he asked Lansang
who he was referring to, Lansang replied that he
would return. Lansang did not return, however,
prompting Tan to relay to law enforcers the
statements of Lansang, his neighbor who was
courting Jocelyn at the time and with whose
family his own family was in good terms.
- Testifying as to the investigation he conducted
upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras recalled that he was
on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct
in the morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy
Pantollano and patrolman Bolos arrived together
with Sunga. The two brought Sunga inside a room
and asked him questions pertaining to Jocelyns
death and after about thirty minutes, Sunga was
presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for
investigation. He initially asked Sunga whether he
knew anything about Jocelyns death and Sunga
replied affirmatively, prompting him to inform him
of his rights under custodial interrogation. After
Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services
of a lawyer, Sunga chose Atty. Rocamora to be his
counsel from among the names of lawyers
mentioned by him (SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon
fetched Atty. Rocamora from his residence. Atty.
Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking
him if he wanted to give a confession and
informing him of the consequences thereof.
Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with
Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions
he (SPO2 Janoras) propounded at the end of
which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora
affixed their respective signatures on the
recorded statement.28
The execution of Exhibit A was, during the
preliminary investigation before the Municipal
Trial Court,29 affirmed by Sunga. Apart from
acknowledging its contents, Sunga answered the
investigating judges other queries as he
implicated Lansang, Locil and Octac in the killing
of Jocelyn. This time, however, he alleged that not
only Lansang but also Octac raped Jocelyn,
adding that he merely held Jocelyns hand.
- Sunga executed another sworn statement where
he declared that in the morning of June 28, 1994
he already had an agreement with Lansang to
fetch Jocelyn from her school on the following
day; that at 8:00 a.m. of the following day, June
29, 1994, he, together with Lansang, Lito Octa
(should be Octac) and a certain Jun left Mendoza
Park and proceeded to Irawan after asking Locil,
one Bing Manila, and a certain Josie to fetch
Jocelyn at her school; that Jun drove the tricycle
back to the city proper and he transported their
female companions including Jocelyn to Irawan;
that at Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling
Jocelyn whose hands were then held by Josie; that
after Lansang and Jun raped Jocelyn, Lansang
smashed her head twice in accordance with his
plan to kill her which plan was known to him
(Sunga), Locil, Octac and Jun; that at 1:30 a.m. of
June 30, 1994, Lansang, Sunga, Octac and Jun
returned to Irawan, took Jocelyns corpse and
dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road;
and that he did not take part in the rape or killing
of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to
Lansangs promise to give him P500.00. Exhibit
I embodied a waiver by Sunga of his right to
counsel.
- While he admitted having participated in the
preliminary investigation at the MTCC of Puerto
Princesa City, he could not remember having
given most of the statements he made therein.
I: READ PRINT
H:
PEOPLE v. IBAEZ
F: Ibaez went to Weapons System Corporation
(WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy
Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought
a gun barrel at the companys gun show in SM
Megamall. Ibaez inquired from Henessy about
the schedule and the rates of WSCs firing range
and the amount of the membership fee of its gun
club. He also asked the days when there are
many people in the firing range, and whether
Henessy was WSCs only female employee.
- At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy
arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one
opened the door. She went to the back of the
office where the firing range was located, and
called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC.
Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy
did not understand what he said. Henessy
returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy
replied that he could not open the door because
his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo
Sian, the companys operations manager, and
informed him that Zaldys hands had been tied.
After one hour, the police arrived; they opened
the gate at the back using acetylene. When
Henessy and the police entered the premises,
they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the
vault. Zaldy informed the police that the
companys gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside
the firing range. The police entered the firing
range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.
- The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
received an information from an asset that the
group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of
WSC and in the killing of one of
its employees; and that Cachuela had been
looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The
NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded
to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon
their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them
and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela
and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The
police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas
that they were conducting an entrapment
operation against the suspects of the robbery at
WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and
gave the names of the other persons involved in
the crime.
- Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and
informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to
the buyers, and that they would like to see the
firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting
with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic,
Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino,
Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset
went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and
talked to them, and brought them inside his
house where Cachuela showed them several
firearms. When the agents inquired from
Cachuela whether the firearms had legal
documentation, the latter sensed that the
meeting was a setup. The NBI agents arrested
Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms from
Cachuelas home.
- The NBI conducted a followup operation on
Ibaez whom the asset also contacted. Ibaez
directed the asset to bring the prospective buyers
to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents
went to Imus and there met Ibaez whom they
saw inside a Nissan California car bearing plate
no. PMN 645. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered
the car, and asked Ibaez where the firearms
were. Ibaez brought out two (2) firearms, and
showed them to the agents. The agents asked
whether the guns had legal documentation; they
then arrested Ibaez when they sensed that he
was already becoming suspicious. The agents
recovered two guns from Ibaez.
-At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the
appellants, during a police lineup, as the persons
responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the
killing of Rex.10 Nabilgas also executed a
handwritten confession implicating the appellants
and Zaldy in the crime.
-Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants
as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC
and in the killing of Rex in a police lineup held at
the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We
note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he
was brought to the National Center for Mental
Health, and subsequently died there during the
trial. For this reason, we examine with greater
scrutiny Linos testimony regarding Zaldys
alleged outofcourt identification.
I: INCOMPLETE read case
H:
People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-
of court identification and the test to determine
its admissibility, as follows:
Outofcourt identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru showups
where the suspect alone is brought facetoface
with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru lineups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on outofcourt identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST where
they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by
the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
-To our mind, Linos failure to state relevant
details surrounding the police lineup is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldys outof-
court identification. No way exists for the courts
to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of outofcourt
identifications, such as the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. The absence of an
independent incourt identification by Zaldy
additionally justifies our strict treatment and
assessment of Linos testimony.
After a careful examination of the evidence on
hand, we hold that Nabilgas extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court
has consistently held that AN EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION, TO BE ADMISSIBLE, MUST
SATISFY THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:
(1) the confession must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, preferably
of the confessants choice;
(3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.
-It begins when there is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and the
investigation has started to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.
- In People v. Rapeza, we explained that the
lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably
possible, be the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished
by the police for the accused, it is important that
the lawyer should be competent, independent
and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individuals constitutional rights.
- After a close reading of the records, we rule that
Nabilgas confession was not made with the
assistance of a competent and independent
counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the
lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating
Nabilgas the NBI itself; she was assigned the
task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the
agencys investigators that he already had a
lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.
Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he
stated that he was already representing Nabilgas
at the time his client made the alleged
confession.
-Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not
disclose that she was a lawyer when she was
called to assist him; she merely represented
herself to be a mere witness to the confession.
There was also nothing in the records to show
that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas
confession was made voluntarily, and whether he
fully understood the nature and the consequence
of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on
his constitutional rights.
-To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance
required of lawyers in a custodial investigation.
An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily
and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and [be] able to advise and assist his client from
the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
-An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision
states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the
coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, IN ORDER THAT THE ADMISSION OF A
CONSPIRATOR MAY BE RECEIVED AGAINST
HIS OR HER COCONSPIRATORS, IT IS
NECESSARY THAT:
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself;
(b) the admission relates to the common object;
and
(c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
PEOPLE v. CHAVEZ
F:
I:
H:
GAMBOA v. JUDGE CRUZ
F:
I:
H:
PEOPLE v. LINSANGAN
F:
I:
H:
PEOPLE v. ANG CHUN KIT
F: ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed
to be a
member of a Hong Kongbased drug syndicate
operating in Metro Manila, was collared by
NARCOM operatives in a buybust operation after
he sold to an undercover agent for P400,000.00 a
kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
shabu. His car also yielded more of the regulated
drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box.
- Chief Investigator Razon immediately organized
a buybust team composed of Chief Inspector
Rolando Magno as team leader, SPO3 Lolita
Bugarin, SPO2 Cesar Jacobo as poseurbuyer,
SPO2 Albert San Jose, and SPO2 Domingo Rubi.
Forty (40) bundles of genuine and counterfeit
P100bills were prepared with each bundle
supposed to contain P10,000.00. To camouflage
the counterfeit bills genuine P100bills were
placed on the top and bottom often (10) bundles.
- At five oclock in the afternoon the team went to
the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. The CI and
SPO2 Jacobo who was carrying the plastic bag of
money proceeded to the lobby of the hospital
while the others moved around to avoid
detection. At fifteen minutes past seven the
accused arrived in a gray Toyota Corolla with
Plate No. TBC958. He was met at the lobby by the
CI who introduced SPO2 Jacobo to him as the
person interested to buy shabu. After allowing the
accused a quick look at the bundles of money,
SPO2 Jacobo and the CI followed him to the
parking lot where the latter took out from the
trunk of his car a blue SM Shoemart plastic bag
and handed it to SPO2 Jacobo. After ascertaining
that the bag contained approximately one (1) kilo
of shabu, SPO2 Jacobo handed the boodle money
to the accused. Then SPO2 Jacobo casually lit a
cigarette to signal to the other NARCOM
operatives to move in and effect the arrest. The
other members of the team closed in, placed the
accused under arrest and seized the money from
him. They also searched his vehicle and found on
the dashboard of his car three (3) packets more
of crystalline substance in a Kleenex box.
- Appellant said he was on his way to dinner and
a friend asked to be dropped off at the hospital
and while he was smoking, he was attacked and
taken by men, He was then detained in Camp
Crame and interrogated without counsel or being
informed of the reason for the arrest.
I: W/N the witnesses are credible
H: YES.
-It is elementary in the rule of evidence that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their declaration nor the veracity or weight of
their testimony.
-Such minor inconsistencies even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses as they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony and thus can be considered recognizance as may be provided by law. The
a badge of truth rather than of falsehood. right to bail shall not be impaired even when
Consequently we consider innocuous whatever the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
discrepancies there were in the testimonies of the suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
government agents.
required.
- For sure the alleged inconsistencies do not
detract from the established fact that the
YAP v. CA
accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a
F:
result of a buybust operation since the arresting
I:
agents were able to give an otherwise clear and
H:
convincing account of the circumstances leading
to the arrest of the accused. And, in every
GOVT of HK v. HON. OLALIA
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
F:
what is material and indispensable is the
I:
submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug
H:
took place between the seller and the
poseurbuyer.
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
- In People v. Mauyao we said that conformance
F:
to these documents are declarations against
I:
interest and tacit admissions of the crime
H:
charged, since merely unexplained possession of
prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have
DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE
been obtained in violation of his right as a person
F:
under custodial investigation for the commission
I:
of an offense, there being nothing in the records
H:
to show that he was assisted by counsel.22 With
regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,
we already said in People v. Morico that when an Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to
arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest answer for a criminal offense without due
Report at a police station he does not admit the process of law.
commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
merely a statement of the accuseds being shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
booked and of the date which accompanies the is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
useful in charges of arbitrary detention against of the nature and cause of the accusation
the police themselves. It is not an extrajudicial
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment
of conviction.
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
-But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, face, and to have compulsory process to
accused Ang Chun Kits conformity to the secure the attendance of witnesses and the
questioned documents has not been a factor in production of evidence in his behalf.
his conviction since his guilt has been adequately However, after arraignment, trial may
established by the detailed and unshaken proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. accused provided that he has been duly
Hence even disregarding the questioned notified and his failure to appear is
documents we still find the accused guilty beyond unjustifiable.
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
US v. LULING
MACASIRAY v. PEOPLE F:
F: I:
I: H:
H:
DUMLAO v. COMELEC
Section 13. All persons, except those F:
charged with offenses punishable by I:
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is H:
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on