[G.R. No.

166494, June 29, 2007]

CARLOS SUPERDRUG, CORP., petitioner vs. DSWD, respondent

POLICE POWER Whether or not Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the
"Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 as well as its tax deduction scheme is constitutional

FA C T S
- Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in thePhilippines.
Meanwhile, AO 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions of Republic
Act 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 was issued by the DOH,
providing the grant of twenty percent(20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines
from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
- DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty
percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall
extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it
stated that the grant of twenty percent(20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines
from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
- Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a
loss of profit and capital because 1)drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded
medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated
for the discount.
(a) Petitioners Arguments (Carlos Superdrug Corp., et al. Lost)
- Filed a case assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 as well as its tax deduction scheme
- Argued that such law is (1) The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the
Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; (2) it violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our
Constitution which states that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws;" and (3) the 20%
discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes
"essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost"
(b) Respondents Arguments (DSWD, et al. Win)
-
ISSUE
- Whether or not Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003 as well as its tax deduction scheme is constitutional

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003 as well as its tax deduction scheme is constitutional. The petition is dismissed.
- RULE: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
- For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare
- APPLICATION: In this case, The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
- The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and
diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and
sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens.

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 As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
- The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits.Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
- Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
- Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly
oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come
up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax
deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.

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[G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991]

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner vs. CA, respondent

POLICE POWER Whether or not Petitioner can order ex parte Respondent to cease and desist from
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations

FA C T S
(a) Petitioners Arguments (Pollution Adjudication Board Win)
- Ordered ex parte Respondent to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the
adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River
- Appealed to SC the decision of CA
(b) Respondents Arguments (CA and Solar Textile Finishing Corp. Lost)
- Argued that under the Petitioners own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made
no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat
- CA promulgated a decision in its favor

ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner can order ex parte Respondent to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installations

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Petitioner can order ex parte. The appeal is granted
- RULE: We note that under of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
- APPLICATION: In this case, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before
the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of
physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis
supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board
- Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents
into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power.

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[G.R. No. 120095 August 5, 1996]

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC, petitioner vs. CA, respondent

POLICE POWER Whether or not Department Order No. 3 of Respondent is constitutional

FA C T S
(a) Petitioners Arguments (JMM Promotion and Mgmt. Inc. and Kary Intl Inc. Lost)
- Filed a case assailing the constitutionality of Department Order No. 3 of Respondent requiring an
Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for
overseas employment
- Argued that the right to overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the
Constitution and aver that there is deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARB
which violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power
(b) Respondents Arguments (CA, et al. Win)
-

ISSUE
- Whether or not Department Order No. 3 of Respondent is constitutional

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Department Order No. 3 of Respondent is constitutional. The petition is dismissed.
- RULE: A profession, trade of calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and right to make a living because these
rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.
- Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state
particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to
define the mode and manner in which every one may so use of his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.
- APPLICATION: In this case, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of
employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for
exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

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[G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA & POBRE, respondent

EMINENT DOMAIN Whether or not Petitioner had deemed taken the 68,969 square-meter property of
Respondent and not only the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property

FA C T S
- Antonio Pobre owns 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of
Tiwi, Albay which he developed into a resort-subdivision, Tiwi Hot Spring Resorts Subdivision. When
theCommission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam, which were suitable for
domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use, were present beneath the
Property,National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), began initiating two expropriation complaints on the
said Property. The first expropriation complaint was granted by the court. During its pendency
however, NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. Said procedures produced
waste materials which NPC dumped beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of
waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobres
complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. In the meantime, the second appropriation
proceedings was filed by NPC to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of theProperty. Disturbed
by what NPC did with his property, Pobre filed a complaint for damages. Surprisingly, Napocor
withdrew its complaint for expropriation by filing a motion to dismiss, five years after filing the second
expropriation complaint, on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had
already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre's opposition. The trial court
granted NPCs motion dismiss but allowed Pobre to proceed with his complaint for damages. Despite
the opposition of NPC, the trial court ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to payP3,448,450.00 as
damages. On appeal, theCA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence the present appeal. NPC argued
that the complaint for damages filed by Pobre should bed ismissed because of the dismissal of the
second expropriation proceedings.
(a) Petitioners Arguments (NPC Lost)
- Argued that they had not taken the 68,969 square-meter property of Respondent but only the
8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property. In fact, they have desisted in pursuing further
expropriation
- Appealed to SC the decision of CA
(b) Respondents Arguments (CA and Pobre - Win)
- Filed a case for damages against Petitioner
- Argued that his expropriated property was constructed with steam wells and geothermal plants by
Petitioner and dumped waste materials on it which altered the topography of some portions of his
other properties making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision.
- CA promulgated a decision that Petitioner NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-meter portion
of his property but also the remaining area of the 68,969 square-meter property. Petitioner NPC had
rendered Pobre's entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. Petitioner NPC must therefore take
Respondent Pobre's entire property and pay for P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450 for
Respondent Pobre's 68,969 square-meter property

ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner had deemed taken the 68,969 square-meter property of Respondent and not
only the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Petitioner had deemed it taken. Petitioner should pay P3,448,450 as just
compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter with legal interest at 6%
per annum. The appeal is dismissed
- RULE: Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land
to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner
because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the
aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
- In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and
devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation.45 This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation
- APPLICATION: In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible
and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a
resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has

P a g e 5 o f 10
 completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property.
- In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC
dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation
proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation.
The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages
that NPC had to pay Pobre.
- NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre's claim for
damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the
dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case
law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made
either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case.35 The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as
the reservation of the defendant's right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.36
The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation
that has become final due to NPC's own fault.

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[G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974]

REPUBLIC OF THE PH, petitioner vs. CASTELLVI, et al., respondent

EMINENT DOMAIN Whether or not the taking should be reckoned from the year 1947, not 1959, for
purposes of assessing the just compensation

FA C T S
- After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary
period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
(a) Petitioners Arguments (Republic Lost)
- Expropriated a parcel of land from Defendant-Appellees
- Argued that the just compensation should be less than P10 per square meter because the "taking"
should be reckoned from the year 1947, not 1959, when by virtue of a special lease agreement
between the Republic and Defendant-Appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and
privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of
such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy
- Appealed to SC the decision of the lower court
(b) Respondents Arguments (Castellvi - Win)
- Lower court fixed the just compensation at P10 per square meter which is assessed as of the time
of taking which is during the filing of the expropriation proceedings by Plaintiff-Appellant on 1959
- Taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action

ISSUE
- Whether or not the taking should be reckoned from the year 1947, not 1959, for purposes of assessing
the just compensation

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Taking should be reckoned from the year 1959. However, the just compensation is set
at fixed at P5.00 per square meter
- RULE: The essential elements of the taking are:
(1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) Entry must be more than a momentary period,
(3) Must be under warrant of legal authority,
(4) Property must be devoted for public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
- Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present, therefore the taking of Castellvis property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee.
- First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case,
when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property
of Castellvi.
- Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary"
means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI,
page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every
moment." The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact
that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not
alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable
from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement
the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
time the property was first occupied by the AFP.
- Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance
in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee

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- Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public
use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP
- Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic
into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year,
and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment
of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
- APPLICATION: In this case, it is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential
elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance
and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in
1947.
- It is Our considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the
lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In arriving at this
conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of
Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could
be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances
relating to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being
expropriated the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the
commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has
also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down
since the year 1959. 30 Considering that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each
other, and are of the same nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all these
lands.

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[G.R. No. 146062June 28, 2001]

ESLABAN, petitioner vs. DE ONORIO, respondent

EMINENT DOMAIN Whether or not Respondent is entitled to the just compensation as fixed by the
lower court

FA C T S
- Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an
area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds,
South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the
construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter
portion thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they
be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission
on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right of-Way agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA.
The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any
compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the
construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of
P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035,
18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay.
- Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as
compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the
NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over
the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for
irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to
be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600
square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to
pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660
square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus
costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October 2000,
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for review.
(a) Petitioners Arguments (Eslaban Lost)
- Expropriated, as Project Manager of the NIA, a 24,660 square meter portion of Respondents
property for the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA
- Argued that Respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering
that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
- Argued that the just compensation shall be assessed as of the time of the finality of the decision not
at the time of taking
- Appealed to SC the decision of the lower court
(b) Respondents Arguments (De Onorio - Win)
- Lower court fixed the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation

ISSUE
- Whether or not Respondent is entitled to the just compensation as fixed by the lower court

HELD
- CONCLUSION: Respondent is entitled to the just compensation. The appeal is dismissed.
- RULE: With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money
which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."8 Further, just compensation means not
only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss
- Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."

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- APPLICATION: In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity
as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification and certification against forum-shopping were
signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the NIA,
which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation,
neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping
accompanying the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.
- The proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982,
based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer,
assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the
expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.
- We are inclined to give more credence to the appellees explanation that the waiver of rights and fees
"pertains only to improvements and crops and not to the value of the land utilized by NIA for its main
canal."

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