POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
SIMON VS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GR NO. 100150. JAN. 5, 1994
AREVALO
DOCTRINE:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
FACTS:
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo
(one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents
(being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period
of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's
Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo,
filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution
of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering
said petitioners to appear before the CHR. However, the petitioners carried
out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari store and carinderia. The CHR
cited the petitioners for contempt for violating the cease and desist order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the
private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition.
1 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
HELD:
NO. (T)he Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
ERMITA - MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION VS
CITY OF MANILA
DOCTRINE:
The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x
x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there
is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.2
FACTS:
The petitioners Ermita - Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one
of its members, Hotel Del Mar Inc. and a certain Go Chiu (President and
Gen. Manager) filed a petition for prohibition against the respondent Mayor
of the City of Manila. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of
its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than
2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million.
That the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
The petitioner assailed the validity of Ordinance No. 4760 on the ground
that it was violative of their right to due process because (1) as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels;(2) that the provision in the same section which would
require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person
or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence (personal information needs to
be supplied such as name, address, occupation, etc); (3) that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their
duly authorized representatives (4) not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self-incrimination;(5) Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels; (6) that the
provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours; and (7) insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause.
HELD:
NO. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that
2 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to
the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes
to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view
at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.
PICHAY VS OFFICE OF DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
677 SCRA 408
DOCTRINE:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
FACTS:
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, which arose from the purchase
by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy
Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available
to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the grounds that E.O. 13 is
unconstitutional for being violating the guarantee of due process and equal
protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's
investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level
positions in the government.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not EO 13 is violative of the right to due process
2) Whether or not EO 13 is violative of right to equal protection clause
HELD:
1) NO. Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due
Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws. The equal protection of the
laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government.29 It is embraced under the due process concept and
simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is not
absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations
bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
3 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in government from non-presidential
appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on
the substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive
public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
2) In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process,35 which simply means having the opportunity to explain ones
side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain
his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was
issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath
with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own
failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent
claim of denial of due process.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION ET. AL. VS CITY OF MANILA
GR NO. 122846 JAN. 20, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed
to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare.
FACTS:
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to
have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that
the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed
by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves
as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The
said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into
motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes
only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be
recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL INC VS SOLUTA
GR NO. 163087 FEB. 20, 2006
DOCTRINE:
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a
waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and
4 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a
waiver thereof.28 There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right
exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
FACTS:
Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at
the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard
pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she
failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel,
forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union
officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida
narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he
fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with
clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio
thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did.
Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over
the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant.
A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union
office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a
complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscals Office
of Manila. Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was
reasonable under the circumstances,21 given that the hotel owns the room
where the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause
as it was conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that
the union office was being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly
the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs;22 and the search was conducted
with the consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of
constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure
HELD:
YES. In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own
claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the
union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and
their companions barged into and searched the union office without a
search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and
notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not
falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is
allowed by law. Petitioners violation of individual respondents
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis
for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
That a violation of ones constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in
relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there is no
doubt. Since the complaint29 filed before the trial court was for damages
due to malicious prosecution and violation of constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages
to respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court.
RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
G.R. No. 14078. March 7, 1919
CRUZ, Chanine
DOCTRINE:
The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local
authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.
FACTS:
Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence
from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a
resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one permanent
settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior
as required under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This
provision authorized the establishment of non-Christian sites to be
selected by the provincial governor. Manguianes had been ordered to live
in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under
certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low
culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the
Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is
5 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined.
One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was
taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan,
solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas
corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province,
alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
reading: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board, was challenged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the delegation of legislative powers to the local authorities
is valid?
RULING:
YES, such delegation is valid. "Non-Christian" is an awkward and
unsatisfactory expression. Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has
held that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or
a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to
degree of civilization. This has been the uniform construction of executive
officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The
term "non-Christian" refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization.
The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected. The true distinction, therefore, is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. "
The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the
decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity," of the case. An
exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
officials and a department head.
Since the term "non-Christian" is here construed to refer to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate between individuals on
account of religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature
is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on
matters that are of purely local concerns.
BAPTISTA vs. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 194709. July 31, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
FACTS:
Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines Network
Employees Union (RPNEU), a legitimate labor organization and the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Radio
Philippines Network (RPN), a government-sequestered corporation
involved in commercial radio and television broadcasting affairs, while the
respondents were the union's elected officers and members.
On suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners, together with some
other union members, filed a complaint for impeachment of their union
president, Reynato Siozon, before the executive board of RPN, which was
eventually abandoned. They later re-lodged the impeachment complaint,
this time, against all the union officers and members of RPNEU before the
DOL.
Then, two written complaints, were filed against petitioners and several
others for alleged violation of the union's Constitution and By-
Laws. Months later, a different group of union members filed a third
complaint against petitioners and 12 others, before the Chairman of
6 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
RPNEU's Committee on Grievance and Investigation (the Committee) citing
as grounds the "commission of an act which violates RPNEU Constitution
and By-Laws, specifically, Article IX, Section 2.2 for joining or forming a
union outside the sixty (60) days period and Article IX, Section 2.5 for
urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice
or external investigative body against the Union or its officer without first
exhausting all internal remedies open to him or available in accordance
with the CBL." These complaints were, later on, consolidated. Thereafter,
petitioners received a memorandum notice from Jeric Salinas, Chairman of
the Committee, requesting them to answer the complaint and attend a
hearing. Petitioners and their group, through an exchange of
communications with the Committee, denied the charges imputed against
them and contested the procedure adopted by the Committee in its
investigation. Then, the Committee submitted their recommendation of
expulsion from the union to RPNEU's Board of Directors. RPNEU's Board of
Directors affirmed the recommendation of expulsion of petitioners and the
12 others from union membership in a Board Resolution No. 018-
2005. Through a Memorandum, petitioners were served an expulsion
notice from the union. Consequently, petitioners wrote to RPNEU's
President and Board of Directors that their expulsion from the union was
an ultra vires act because the Committee failed to observe the basic
elements of due process because they were not given the chance to
physically confront and examine their complainants.
In a letter, RPNEU's officers informed their company of the expulsion of
petitioners from the union and requested the management to serve them
notices of termination from employment in compliance with their CBA's
union security clause. They were later informed of the termination of their
employment, enforcing Article II, Section 2 also known as the union
security clause of their current CBA. Aggrieved, petitioners filed three (3)
separate complaints for ULP against the respondents, which were later
consolidated, questioning the legality of their expulsion from the union and
their subsequent termination from employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their ULP case would prosper?
RULING:
No. In the case at bench, petitioners claim that the respondents, as union
officers, are guilty of ULP for violating paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article
249 of the Labor Code, to wit: ART. 249.UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS. It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor
organization, its officers, agents or representatives: (a)To restrain or
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.
However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership; (b)To
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate
an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions
under which membership or continuation of membership is made available
to other members. Petitioners posit that the procedure that should have
been followed by the respondents in resolving the charges against them
was Article XVII, Settlement of Internal Disputes of their Constitution and
By-Laws, specifically, Section 2 thereof, requiring members to put their
grievance in writing to be submitted to their union president, who shall
strive to have the parties settle their differences amicably. Petitioners
maintain that any form of grievance would be referred only to the
committee upon failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Court is not persuaded. Based on RPNEU's Constitution and By-Laws,
the charges against petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but
violations that demand proper investigation because, if proven, would
constitute grounds for their expulsion from the union. Besides, any
supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee was
deemed cured when petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard.
Due process, as a constitutional precept, is satisfied when a person was
notified of the charge against him and was given an opportunity to explain
or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. It cannot be denied that petitioners were properly notified of the
charges filed against them and were equally afforded the opportunity to
present their side. Next, petitioners point out that they were not given the
opportunity to personally face and confront their accusers, which were
violative of their right to examine the complainants and the supposed
charges against them. Petitioners' contention is without merit. Mere
absence of a one-on-one confrontation between the petitioners and their
complainants does not automatically affect the validity of the proceedings
before the Committee. Not all cases necessitate a trial-type hearing. As in
this case, what is indispensable is that a party be given the right to explain
one's side, which was adequately afforded to the petitioners.
It is well-settled that workers' and employers' organizations shall have the
right to draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their representatives
7 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to
formulate their programs. In this case, RPNEU's Constitution and By-Laws
expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
internal remedies within the organization. Petitioners were found to have
violated the provisions of the union's Constitution and By-Laws when they
filed petitions for impeachment against their union officers and for audit
before the DOLE without first exhausting all internal remedies available
within their organization. This act is a ground for expulsion from union
membership. Thus, petitioners' expulsion from the union was not a
deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to organize, but was
triggered by the commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5
of Article IX of the union's Constitution and By-Laws.
ORQUIOLA vs. TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002
DOCTRINE:
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased a registered parcel of land from Mariano Lising.
Subsequently, private respondent, the registered owner of Lot 689, filed
Civil Case No. Q-12918 against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon her lot. The trial court adjudged Pedro and
Lising to pay damages, remove all constructions and relocate the
boundaries. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to
prohibit the judge from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from
implementing the alias writ of execution against their property. They
claimed that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, hence,
they would be deprived of their property without due process of law. The
CA dismissed the petition ruling that as buyers of Mariano Lising,
petitioners were privies and could be reached by the execution order.|
ISSUE:
Whether or not parties who were not impleaded in the case may be
reached by the decision thereto?
RULING:
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
No. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners
have rights over the subject property and hence are proper parties in
interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should
have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do
so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of
execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to
resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under
the Torrens system, the person dealing with the registered property need
not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he
is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated
on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by
the Torrens system. The Supreme Court granted the petition and thereby
reversed and set aside the assailed decision. The Court noted that
petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-
12918. They could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising's certificate of title
because at the time of purchase, it was still free from any third party
claim. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value,
petitioners are proper parties in any case involving subject property. But
since private respondents failed to implead them in Civil Case No. Q-
12918, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case.
PANGILINAN vs. BALATBAT
G.R. No. 170787. September 12, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Such
process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered.
FACTS:
Spouses Jocelyn N. Balatbat and Vicente A. Balatbat were found by the
PARAD to have landholdings totaling 25.2548 hectares, which consisted of
8 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
9.8683 hectares of riceland and 15.3864 hectares of sugarland. The
9.8683 hectares of riceland was covered by land reform.
Out of the 25.2548 hectares of land owned by respondents, 18.2479
hectares or 182,479 square meters thereof was under Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 6009. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Victorino D.
Guevarra found that in OCT No. 6009, 8.6402 hectares or 86,402 square
meters was riceland covered by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, while 96,077 square meters was
sugarland.
Title Nos. 181464 and 181469, representing Lots 21-0 and 21-1, were
utilized by respondents in a subdivision/condominium project particularly
called Carolina Village II, located at San Juan, Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while
Title No. 181462, representing Lot 21-B, was subdivided among the
children of respondents. The exact area of riceland respondents applied for
retention is 8.3749 hectares.
Although 8.6402 hectares was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer
Program under P.D. No. 27, as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
474, this case involves only 2.9941 hectares or 29,941 square meters
thereof, covered under TCT No. 181466-R, and identified as Lot 21-F of
the subdivision plan Psd-03-005059, being a portion of Lot 21 Sta. Ana
Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Sta. Ana,
Province of Pampanga. The said Lot 21-F, with an area of 29,941 square
meters, was transferred to petitioner as evidenced by TCT No.
25866, which was registered in the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pampanga on May 30, 1997, pursuant to Emancipation Patent No.
00728063 issued by the DAR on April 18, 1997. Hence, respondents
sought to cancel the said emancipation patent on the ground that they
applied to retain the land covered by it. Respondents first filed an
Application for Retention of their landholdings under P.D. No. 27 on
December 24, 1975. However, it was not acted upon. In May 1996,
respondents received a letter from Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
Victorino Guevarra informing respondents of a conference for the
determination of the value of their landholdings and the final survey of the
land preparatory to the issuance of emancipation patents. Respondents
alleged that they received a Notice of Coverage on OCT No. 6009
under R.A. No. 6657 and a final notification to landowner, which notices
were all issued by Guevarra.
In a letter respondents, reiterated their application for retention to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Director, Region III, San
Fernando Pampanga, thru the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, San
Fernando, Pampanga. The DAR Regional Director referred respondents'
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
application for retention to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer in San
Fernando, Pampanga, which application was later endorsed to Guevarra.
After investigation and verification of the landholdings of respondents,
Guevarra recommended to the DAR Provincial Office, San Fernando,
Pampanga that respondents' re-application for retention be denied. The
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga issued TCT No. 25866 to
petitioner, pursuant to Emancipation Patent No. 00728063, which is a
portion of the land sought to be retained by respondents. This prompted
respondents to file on February 4, 1998 with the DAR Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a
Complaint for annulment of emancipation patent, ejectment and damages
against petitioner Crispino Pangilinan, Municipal Land Officer Victorino D.
Guevarra, and the DAR Secretary. Respondents alleged that although
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Victorino Guevarra knew that the land
cultivated by petitioner is one of those included in their application for
retention, Guevarra, acting in bad faith and without notice to them and in
disregard of their rights and in collusion with petitioner, recommended for
the coverage of their land under Operation Land Transfer. Thereafter,
Emancipation Patent No. 00728063 and TCT No. 25866 were unlawfully
issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on May 30,
1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right to be heard and was
denied due process of law?
RULING:
NO. Petitioner invokes these rights because he was not personally
furnished a copy of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85017, which copy was
furnished to Mr. Fernando Dizon, his legal counsel before the PARAD and
the DARAB. According to petitioner, the legal services rendered to him by
Mr. Fernando Dizon in DARAB Case No. 5357-P'98 was merely an
accommodation to him in Mr. Dizon's capacity as Legal Officer for the
Legal Services Division of the DAR. Petitioner asserts that after the case
was decided and resolved by the DARAB, the legal assistance extended to
him by Mr. Fernando Dizon ended, simply because Mr. Fernando Dizon is
not a full-fledged lawyer, which the respondents knew very well. Thus, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, cannot be enforced
against him. Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Petitioner was not denied
due process or the right to be heard as he was furnished with a copy of
the petition through his counsel of record, Mr. Fernando Dizon, who was
his legal counsel before the PARAD and the DARAB. The Court notes that
the applicable DARAB New Rules of Procedure (1994) allows a non-lawyer
9 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
to appear before the Board or any of its adjudicators if he is a DAR Legal
Officer. As Mr. Dizon was his counsel of record before the PARAD and the
DARAB, it may be presumed that petitioner and Mr. Dizon communicated
with each other as Mr. Dizon even filed a Comment to the Petition for
Review filed by respondents before the Court of Appeals. The filing of the
said Comment would show that petitioner was informed by Mr. Dizon that
respondents filed a Petition for Review of the Decision of the DARAB with
the Court of Appeals. Hence, it is the responsibility of petitioner to engage
the services of a lawyer to file a Comment in his behalf and to inform the
court of any change of counsel. As petitioner had a counsel of record,
service was properly made upon the said counsel, absent any notification
by petitioner to the court of circumstances requiring service upon
petitioner himself. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered. In this case, petitioner was not denied due
process as he was able to file a comment before the Court of Appeals
through his counsel of record, DAR Legal Officer Dizon. Moreover, records
show that petitioner, with the assistance of two lawyers, Atty. Paul S.
Maglalang and Atty. Jord Achaes R. David, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Hence, there was
no violation of such rights.
JAVIER V. COMELEC
G.R. NOS. L-68379-81, SEPTEMBER 22, 1986
CRUZ, CHRISTINE
DOCTRINE:
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts
and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is
probable or even only possible, due process demands that the judge
inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza.
FACTS:
The petitioner (Evilio Javier) and the private respondent (Arturo
Pacificador) were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support
but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all
its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened
the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the
candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner
went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private
respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent
took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11,
1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the
presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which
flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently
believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one
of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the
February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the
present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor.
ArticleXII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution expressly provides that:
The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases
maybe heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members
of theBatasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc..
The decision of the second division alone regarding the protest was invalid.
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
10 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can
go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice
they expect.
In this case, given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections
toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship
between Commissioner Opinion (TAO to, maybe opinion ang family name
niya) and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not
certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner.
As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his
objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified
by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his
wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its decision. The relationship of the judge with
one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice
of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only possible, due
process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense
of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion.
Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty
and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do
so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding
null and void.|||
Addl info: Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.
Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial
(and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending.
The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all
the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.
The court held that, were it not for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been
granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23,
1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. (the supreme court
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
decided on the case despite the fact that the constitutional body in issue
no longer existed.)
GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1987
DOCTRINE:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions"
from the very President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to
refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is
the very essence of due process of law.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
FACTS:
This is a case about the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition
leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., who was imprisoned
for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September,
1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death
by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have
been committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose
jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil
courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are
admittedly not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of
the President as created by him under the General Orders issued by him
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he
had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of
the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971
when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but
overwhelming." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21,
1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates
for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and
practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito
Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on
August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the
communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President
never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
11 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave
the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile
and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to
return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on
justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by
soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to
2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of
accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August
17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the
killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all
TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President
instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally
televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22,
1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a
hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was
not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and
outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-
day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest
and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for
his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
Marcos established a Fact Finding Board (the Agrava Board) to investigate
the case
After 125 days of hearing the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in
transcript, the Agrava Board came up with a minority and majority report,
both contending that the killing was not a communist plot but a military
conspiracy.
Minority report 6 persons who were at the service stairs as plotters, and
Gen. Luther Custodio was essential to the implementation of the plan.
Majority report 26 persons headed by gen Fabian Ver, all acting in
conspiracy with one another in the premeditated killing of Ninoy
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman together with 29 other
petitioners, charged the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan of serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in the miscarriage of justice
for want of due process of law; they argued that there was failure to exert
genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary
evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.
They prayed for a TRO, a nullification of the proceedings and a re-trial
before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor A 9-to-2 vote of the
SB granted the TRO while later on the same 9-to-2 ratio dismissed the
petition and lifted the TRO. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration based on the lack of legal ground for the dismissal All of
the accused were acquitted while even though Galman was not on trial, he
was, in effect, convicted as the assassin of Ninoy
The Mla Times published an article entitled Aquino Trial A Sham, which
had for its context the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera
that the graft court were convinced by Marcos to whitewash the criminal
cases.
SC appointed a 3-member commission (Vasquez Commission) to hear and
receive evidence of the charges of collusion and pressure. The Vasquez
Commission submitted its report with an affirmation of the secret
meeting held in Malacaang, wherein Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran to
handle the case (without raffling the case first) and for the entire tribunal
to have all of the accused acquitted)
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused
from the charges against them.
b) Whether or not a call for a re-trial of the case would be tantamount to
double jeopardy.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process
and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly
violates the due process clause.
Why? The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then
President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of
the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
12 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
graphically depicted in the Report, and borned out by the happenings (res
ipsa loquitur), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel
Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's
dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets and at any rate was not
acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for
acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the
Malacaang conference, would accomplish the two principal clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their
acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. Indeed, the secret
Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan
Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and
the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined
ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in out annals
and jurisprudence.
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions"
from the very President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to
refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is
the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be
determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could
be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondent at the secret Malacaang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly General Ver and Olivas
and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or
witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas
as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial
of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
2. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and
trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where
the authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan
to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due
pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of
jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial
therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot
be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on
the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for
the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court
was set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null
and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
PEOPLE V. CASTILLO
G.R. NO. 120282, APRIL 20, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court
should be received with caution, especially when the queries by
the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries
is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in
any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such
questioning.
FACTS:
Appellant Castillo was charged with murder in connection with the fatal
stabbing of Antonio Dometita. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the
defense of denial and alibi claiming that he was then asleep in his house at
the time of the incident. Prosecution witness Eulogio Velasco testified that
he was sitting outside the pub house when appellant suddenly arrived and
stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest. Another prosecution
witness, Melinda Mercado, testified that although she did not see the
actual stabbing, she saw appellant wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt.
However, defense witness Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver, testified
that he was about twenty-five meters away from the crime scene when he
saw a group of persons ganging up on a person who was later identified as
the victim, and that appellant was not one of the assailants. The trial court
gave full credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses and
13 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
rendered judgment of conviction of the crime charged, with the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, this recourse, appellant
questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the partiality
of the trial judge in favor of the prosecution as shown by his participation
in the examination of witnesses.
ISSUE:
Was the Judge impartial?
HELD:
No. It is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to
ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court finds that the questions
propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions
which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant
evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches
that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received
with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice
the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is determined not
necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the
test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning.
In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the
questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions
and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be
convicted. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "there was no
showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the
prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted
regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the
'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' implicit in the guarantee of due
process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18)." That the trial judge believed
the evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not
indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused.
HEIRS OF BUGARIN V. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 174431, AUGUST 06, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Essence of Due process is right to be heard. Due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due
process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then
his cry for due process must fail.
FACTS:
The late Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E. Marcos was still the
president of the country from 1965-1986. After the latter's downfall in
1986, the new administration, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the Sandiganbayan.
The SB dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for reconsideration, the PCGG
sought a review of the dismissal before the Court on 1991. Sitting En
Banc, the Court found manifest errors and misapprehension of facts
leading it "to pore over the evidence extant from the records," including
Bugarin's very own summary of his property acquisitions. Thereafter, the
Court found Bugarin to have amassed wealth totaling P2,170,163.00 from
1968 to 1980 against his total income for the period 1967 to 1980 totaling
only P766,548.00. With this, the Court held that Bugarin's properties,
which were visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to
1980, should be forfeited in favor of the government.
Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his motion was pending, he
passed away in September 2002. With this development, his heirs, the
petitioners herein, moved to have the case dismissed. The Court denied
both Bugarin's Motion for Reconsideration and petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the same was likewise
denied. Still, they filed their Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for
Reconsideration and its Admission with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading
while the attached motion was merely noted without action. On June 2004,
the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court became final and executory
and was entered in the Entry of Judgment.
to submit "a list of properties more or less equivalent to the amount
of P1,403,615.00 and still remaining in the name of defendant Bugarin."
Pursuant to the order to submit "a list of properties more or less
equivalent to the amount of P1,403,615.00 and still remaining in the name
of defendant Bugarin, during the last hearing, the PCGG filed its Partial
Complianceand Amended Partial Compliance, dated April 2005. The latter
contained a list of properties and investments found by the Court in
the Republic case to have been acquired by Bugarin from 1968 to 1980 at
P1,697,333.00. The PCCG, in a manifestation, informed the
14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the status of Bugarin's
other business investments not included in their Amended Partial
Compliance but only one replied to inform them that Bugarin was "not a
stockholder of nor has he any investment in this company." Thus, in the
same manifestation, the PCGG prayed that its latest compliance be
considered sufficient conformity to the Sandiganbayan's Order of January
12, 2005. No comment was filed by petitioners.
On May 10, 2005, instead of a copy of their motion for leave to file motion
to dismiss, petitioners served upon PCGG their Manifestation and Ad
Cautelam Motion to Dismiss dated May 5, 2005, to which PCGG filed a
comment/opposition. On August 8, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
the case sought to be dismissed had already been decided by the Court
and which decision has, in fact, attained finality on June 25, 2004. As a
result, the Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss subsequently
filed by petitioners was ordered stricken off the record by the
Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005.
Hearings ensued, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was eventually
denied and the hearing to determine the properties for forfeiture was held.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the Court shall determine which properties
shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the decision of
the Supreme Court dated January 30, 2002.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of this order arguing that the
Sandiganbayan could not determine the properties to be forfeited on its
own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed to present evidence to
determine what properties of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
Finally, on April 3, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution
ordering the forfeiture of certain properties of Bugarin. Among others court
ordered, the forfeiture of the properties listed in page 3 hereof, the
immediate issuance of a Writ of Execution pertinent to the Honorable
Supreme Court's Decision, dated January 30, 2002, and the instant
Resolution; the concerned Register of Deeds to effect the immediate
transfer of the titles of the forfeited real properties of Bugarin and/or his
transferees in favor of the Republic of the Philippines; and, the Corporate
Secretary of Makati Sports Club and of Manila Polo Club to effect the
transfer of forfeited shares of Bugarin and/or his transferees in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON the heirs were deprived of due process of law.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
HELD:
NO. The preceding summary of the Republic case, readily shows that
Bugarin was accorded due process. He was given his day in court to prove
that his acquired properties were lawfully attained. A review of the full text
of the said case will reveal that the summary of properties acquired by
Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was based on his very own
exhibits. From this enumeration, the Court set aside those properties that
had been liquidated or those that had been obtained in 1981 onwards.
Even those properties whose acquisition dates could no longer be
determined were also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What
remained was a trimmed down listing of properties, from which the
Sandiganbayan may choose in executing the order of forfeiture of the
Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful income or
disposable income during his incumbency as NBI Director, the Court
subtracted from Bugarin's income as stated in "Exhibit-'38," the personal
expenses of his family, which according to the Court was quite
conservative, again redounding to the benefit of Bugarin.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Based on the
foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not denied that right.
Petitioners cannot now claim a different right over the reduced list of
properties in order to prevent forfeiture, or at the least, justify another
round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due
process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his
side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then
his cry for due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for execution,
petitioners were likewise accorded due process. Records of this case reveal
that every motion by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was
granted, and every motion filed, either for reconsideration or leave of
court, was heard. In the end, it concluded that "respondent's (Bugarin's)
properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his
lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the
government for failure of the respondent to show, to the Court's
satisfaction, that the same were lawfully acquired.
15 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
The properties of Bugarin in the list have been found unlawfully acquired.
The same have been ordered forfeited in favor of the government a
decade ago. It is high time that the Republic decision be finally carried out.
AGUILAR V. O'PALLICK
G.R. NO. 182280, JULY 29, 2013
GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
FACTS:
Contract to Sell was executed between Primetown Property Group, Inc.
(PPGI) and Poblete & Villanueva over a unit in Makati Prime Citadel
Condominium. Poblete and Villanueva executed in favor of O'Pallick a Deed
of Assignment covering the unit. Later, PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor
of O'Pallick after the latter paid the purchase price in full.
Although O'Pallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor
was never registered nor annotated. Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI
and Aguilar before HLURB, the latter was able to obtain a final and
executory Decision in her favor, thus levying the subject condominium
unit. The sale at public auction was scheduled to be held on March 30,
2000. But before the scheduled auction sale, O'Pallick filed an Affidavit of
Third-Party Claim. Eventually, though, Aguilar was declared the highest
bidder and became the owner since PPGI failed to redeem the property.
Subsequently, O'Pallick instituted an action to quiet title and to set aside
the levy on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate of sale
issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit. O'Pallick claimed
that when PPGI executed a Deed of Sale in his favor, all rights and
interests over the unit were transferred to him, and the subsequent levy
and sale thereof to Aguilar created a cloud on his title. Petitioners sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that PPGI remained the registered owner
of the unit and the title covering the same remained clean and free of
annotations indicating claims by third persons.
RTC: It had no jurisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered
by the HLURB, an agency under the Office of the President, because said
Office is a co-equal body.
CA: It sustained O'Pallick's argument that since he was not a party to the
HLURB case, he could not be bound by its disposition as well as the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
incidents and actions taken therein; thus, he had the right to file a
separate action to protect and vindicate his claim.
ISSUE:
WON OPallick can still assail Aguilars title of ownership over the unit.
HELD:
Yes. This Court's pronouncement in a former case [case decided by the SC
involving Aguilar and PPGI wherein the Court ruled that the foreclosure
proceeding already vested ownership to Aguilar] can in no way constitute
a final determination of O'Pallick's claim. In his Amended Complaint,
O'Pallick averred that Aguilar obtained her title through unlawful means.
Clearly, therefore, although captioned as one for Quieting of
Title, O'Pallick's suit is actually a suit for annulment of title. Basic is the
rule that "[t]he cause of action in a [C]omplaint is not determined by the
designation given to it by the parties. The allegations in the body of the
[C]omplaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not
controlling more than the allegations in the [C]omplaint. It is not even an
indispensable part of the [C]omplaint."
"The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law." Thus, we agree with the
CA's pronouncement that since OPallick was not impleaded in the HLURB
case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. Because he
was not impleaded in said case, he was not given the opportunity to
present his case therein. But, more than the fact that O'Pallick was not
impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate his claim in a
separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same
condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim.
CARAS Y SOLITARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 129900, OCTOBER 02, 2001
DOCTRINE:
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural
due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of
fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. Blg. 22.
16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
FACTS:
Caras obtained from Atienza on installment various gift checks and
purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused
issued to Atienza checks drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank. When
the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed". Despite repeated verbal and
written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash,
she failed and refused to do so. The accused admitted that she issued the
fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they were given to
Nakpil, alleged sister of Atienza, as "guarantee deposit," that is, for every
gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued personal
checks to guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor
deposited with any bank. Caras, during trial, argued that no notice of
dishonor was ever received by her. Nevertheless, RTC QC found Caras
GUILTY for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. CA sustained the RTC in
toto.
ISSUE:
WON the absence of notice of dishonor violates Carass right to due
process and thus qualifies her to be acquitted.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2)
knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon presentment; and (3) said check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Knowledge
of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the
act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90
days from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be rebutted
by the accused-petitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the
maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the
check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had
been dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be
notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or
make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
We find that indeed no clear evidence is shown on whether petitioner was
informed that her checks had been dishonored. The notice of dishonor may
be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified
that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The
prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding
payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the
prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioner's actual
receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to
petitioner. No acknowledgment receipt nor return card for the first and
second demand letters were offered in evidence. The absence of proof that
petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks
were dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make
arrangements for payment of the said checks prevents the application of
the disputable presumption that she had knowledge of the insufficiency of
her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such presumption, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of
the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks, otherwise,
she cannot be held liable under the law. Even more crucial, the absence of
any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a
violation of the petitioner's right to due process. The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a
right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. Absent a clear
showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and
was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided
for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.
COSCOLLUELA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 191411, 191871, JULY 15, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that
an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose.
FACTS:
17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental
(Province) for three full terms. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his
Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales' subordinate, and
Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman received a letter-complaint from People's Graftwatch,
requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical
and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20M which
allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from
office. The complaint was soon upgraded into a criminal case for violation
of RA 3019, "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." Information was
prepared and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman Miro for recommendation
on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval came only on May 21, 2009,
and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB
(Sandiganbayan). [What is matagal?!]
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution
and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after
its filing with the SB. Hence, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing,
among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after
almost eight years since the complaint was instituted.
SB denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners' right to
speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
HELD:
Yes. A person's right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed
under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) which provides: SEC. 16.All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action
to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to
a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered
and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay. Examining the incidents in the present
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
case, the Court holds that petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of their
criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a
protracted amount of time to complete. The Court does not lend credence
to the SB's position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was
terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when Caares
prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This
is belied by Section 4, Rule II of "Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman," which provides: No information may be filed and no
complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of
the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete
resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman
approves the investigating officer's recommendation to either file an
Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case
at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners
were not terminated upon Caares' preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally
approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings
were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the
filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman's resolution of the
case largely remains unjustified. Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was
created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the
"protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of
the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
in order to promote efficient service." This great responsibility cannot be
simply brushed aside by ineptitude.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged
failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Records show
that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going.
They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or
when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June
19, 2009. Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the
prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
18 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all
complaints lodged before it.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners
by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. Akin to the right to
speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person
may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense
he may interpose.
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the
Ombudsman's resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice
that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that petitioners'
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had
been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and
bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with
reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for
its delays, as it ought to determine in this case. Based on the violation of
petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the
present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or
the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the
Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether
petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil
liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court. Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the
Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on
the delict if only to recover the amount P20M.
ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 79690-707, 80578, APRIL 27, 1988
DOCTRINE:
Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and
who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with
the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Gonzalez from proceeding with the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases on the ground that said cases
were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority,
since under the1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, it
is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who
has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. In G.R. No.
80578, Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first petition,
prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting
preliminary investigations (PI) and filing similar cases with
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
WON Tanodbayan is authorized to conduct the PI.
HELD:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from
the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to: "Investigate on
its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." (Sec. 13, par. 1) The
Constitution likewise provides that: The existing Tanodbayan shall
hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law,except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution." (Art XI, Section 7)
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the
Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under
the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties
NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with
the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to
do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. Under the present Constitution,
the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only
upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate
the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do
so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena is now
deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in
the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to
investigate. It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor
remains the Ombudsman as long as he has not been replaced, for the fact
is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman
is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the
Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly
19 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
some of the powers of the two offices are identical or similar. The Special
Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of
Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
VILLARUEL VS FERNANDO
G.R. NO. 136726. SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
GLORIA
DOCTRINE:
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this
opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the
trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity
to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner's former
counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds
petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence
of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and
prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
FACTS:
Petitioner Villaruel, Jr. is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office, Department of Transportation and Communication.
Respondents Fernando, Abarca, Jr, and Cleofas are the Chief, Chief
Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the
Civil Aviation Training Center. The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO.
Petitioner issued a memorandum addressed to the respondents, detailing
them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Cal effective on May 2, 1995.
Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Garcia and Undersecretary Lichauco
through Villaruel requesting for reconsideration of such detail order.
Having received no response, respondents reported to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC in compliance with the order. Villaruel, instead
of acting on the request, issued a memorandum addressed to Abarca
placing him under "preventive suspension" for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. Respondents
requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return
to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed, and
sought the intervention of the Ombudsman. Secretary Garcia issued a
memorandum directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the
continuous detail of respondents. Despite repeated demands by
respondents, Villaruel failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
mother unit. Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with
Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Villaruel, but the
latter failed to file his answer. He was declared in default and the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
judgment was rendered in favor of respondent. Villaruel, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
However, it was dismissed for failure of the OSG to file the required
memorandum. Subsequently, the Writ of Execution was issued. Petitioner,
through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and
to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. He alleged that the trial court's decision never
became final and executory as he was deprived of his right to due process.
He further asserted that the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto
Abarca guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713
superseded the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the trial court
quashed the Writ of Execution because the sheriff failed to follow Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, however, it issued an alias Writ of
Execution. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari wherein the
Court of Appeals ruled that the OSG's negligence found petitioner and it
concurred with the trial court's ruling that the nature of the case before
the Ombudsman was different from the case before the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether Villaruel was denied of his right to due process when the
appellate court dismissed his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the
memorandum.
HELD:
No. Villaruels contentions that: (1) the the OSG "virtually abandoned" his
case in violation of his right to due process and (2) the inexcusable
negligence of the OSG did not bind him and prevented the decision of the
trial court from becoming final and executory, are without merit. Due
process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this
opportunity was not denied Villaruel. Throughout the proceedings in the
trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, Villaruel had the opportunity
to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, his former counsel, the
OSG, was negligent and this negligence binds Villaruel. The trial and
appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve Villaruel of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of
the trial court from becoming final and executory. In the present case,
there was no proof that he suffered serious injustice to exempt him from
the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. He did
not even attempt to refute the respondents' allegations in the petition for
mandamus and damages. Moreover, he is not entirely blameless for the
dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG's failure to file the answer to the
petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring
petitioner in default lifted, he should have already replaced the OSG with
another lawyer. However, Villaruel still retained the services of the OSG,
20 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
despite its apparent lack of interest in his case, until the trial court's
decision became final. Furthermore, Villaruel cannot now complain of the
OSG's errors, for he should have taken the initiative of making periodic
inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his
case. Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. The Court will
not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled
doctrines of trial and procedure.
PEOPLE VS BARAOIL
G.R. NO. 194608. JULY 9, 2012.
DOCTRINE:
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent
until the contrary is proven. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed
out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left
to the trial courts to determine.
FACTS:
The case involves two informations for the crime of rape charged against
the accused Baraoil. On August 8, 2004, at about 2:00 p.m., while five
year old AAA was walking near the house of Baraoil, he invited her to take
a ride with him on his bicycle. AAA acceded because Baraoil is a neighbor
and a friend of her parents. They biked together towards the town rice
mill. BBB, the elder sister of AAA, saw them. Worried about AAAs safety,
BBB sought the help of CCC, her other sister, and their cousin DDD to look
for AAA. Baraoil parked his bicycle against the wall of the mill, and pulled
AAA inside the mill's comfort room. There he pulled AAA's shorts as she
was not wearing underwear. He sat on a toilet bowl, unzipped his pants,
lifted AAA, seated her on his lap, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina.
AAA did not shout despite feeling pain. Baraoil threatened AAA not to tell
his mother or father about what happened or else he will repeat the act.
He then inserted his right forefinger in AAA's vagina. AAA saw his finger
that was thrust into her, but she did not shout although she was about to
cry. Baraoil removed his finger then pulled up his pants. BBB, CCC, and
DDD arrived at the rice mill and saw the Baraoils bicycle. They entered
and heard thumping sounds coming from the comfort room. Baraoil then
suddenly opened its door and walked out. AAA followed him after a while
towards his bicycle looking visibly sweating and walking with difficulty.
CCC approached the accused-appellant and told him that they will take
AAA home. He refused and told them that he will take AAA home after
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
buying a new pair of slippers he needed for himself. He bought the pair of
slippers and a chocolate-filled biscuit for AAA. After half an hour, Baraoil
took AAA back to the comfort room of the same rice mill. There, he
undressed her and sucked her vagina. While doing this, AAA begged him
to take her home. Baraoil then stopped and boarded her to his bicycle and
brought her home.
Baraoil denied the charges and gave an alibi by stating that he was with
his friend Renato at the fish pond at the time when the alleged rape took
place. He alleged that AAA's family got mad at him after he disconnected
their jumper connection from the power source. They even threatened that
they will hack him to death. Thus, the accusation of AAA's family was a
means of revenge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt vis-a-vis his main defense that the rape charges were
merely concocted to get back at him as leverage against his act of
disconnecting the jumper owned by AAA's family.
HELD:
Yes. The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is
innocent until the contrary is proven. This basic constitutional principle is
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden
of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left
to the trial courts to determine. However, an appeal throws the whole case
open for review such that the Court may, and generally does, look into the
entire records if only to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. Courts
use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of
the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, conviction for
rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony provided it is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. After a meticulous review of the records of the
instant case, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond
21 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
reasonable doubt. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity
to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts - and when his findings have been
affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court. We find no reason to overturn the conviction of appellant under
Criminal Case No. T-3682 for the crime of statutory rape, it having been
proven that AAA was under seven years of age when she was raped. On
the other hand, the crime of rape by sexual assault was not duly
established by the prosecution for under jurisprudential law, a person's
tongue can be considered as an 'instrument or object' with which the crime
of rape by sexual assault may be perpetrated. In the instant case,
however, the record shows that no actual insertion of the tongue was done
by appellant to bring the act within coverage of Art. 266-A (2) of the RPC.
Not by any stretch of the imagination can the word "suck" be considered
as an insertion. Thus, the act complained of cannot be considered rape by
sexual assault. Nonetheless, appellant's act falls under the category of
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined under Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code. Also, the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to
fabricate and highly unreliable.
SY VS ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 192108. NOVEMBER 21, 2012.
DOCTRINE:
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or
defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sy and Andok's Litson Corporation entered into a 5-year lease
contract covering the subject 316 square-meter lot located in Sta. Cruz,
Manila owned by Sy. Monthly rental was fixed at P60,000.00, exclusive of
taxes, for the first 2 years and P66,000.00 for the third, fourth and fifth
year with 10% escalation every year beginning on the fourth year. Per
contract, the lessee shall, upon signing the contract, pay four (4) months
of advance deposit and a security deposit equivalent to four (4) months of
rentall. Accordingly, Andok's issued a check to Sy for P480,000.00.
Andok's alleged that while in the process of applying for electrical
connection on the improvements to be constructed on Sy's land, it was
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
discovered that Sy has an unpaid MERALCO bill amounting to
P400,000.00. Andok's further complained that construction for the
improvement it intended for the leased premises could not proceed
because another tenant, Mediapool, Inc. incurred delay in the construction
of a billboard structure also within the leased premises. Andok's informed
Sy about the delay in the construction of the billboard structure on a
portion of its leased property. Three more letters of the same tenor were
sent to Sy but the demands fell on deaf ears. Consequently, Andok's
suffered damages in the total amount of P627,000.00 which comprises the
advance rental and deposit, cost of money, mobilization cost for the
construction of improvement over leased premises, and unrealized income.
After three years of continued inaction on the request to have the billboard
construction expedited, a complaint for rescission was filed. In her Answer,
Sy stated that she has faithfully complied with all the terms and conditions
of the lease contract and denied incurring an outstanding electricity bill.
Despite due notice, Sy and her counsel failed to appear in the Pre-trial
Conference. Sy's urgent Motion to Reset Pre-trial was denied, and the RTC
allowed Andok's to present its evidence ex-parte. No motion for
reconsideration was filed on the trial court's order allowing ex-parte
presentation of evidence, so Andok's presented ex-parte the testimony of
its General Manager, Teodoro Calaunan, detailing the breach of contract
committed by Sy. The trial court rendered a decision favoring Andok's. For
lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed. On appeal, Sy
decried deprivation of her right to present evidence resulting in a default
judgment against her. Sy also denied that there was a breach on the lease
contract. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an infringement of spouses Sys right to due
process in the rendering of default judgment against them.
HELD:
No. What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels
from appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court is subject to the sound discretion of a judge. Such discretion was
shown by the trial court, which was correct in putting into effect the
consequence of petitioners' non-appearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed
an Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-trial, she cannot assume that her motion
would be automatically granted. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
denial of petitioners' motion for postponement is dictated by the motion
itself: A perusal of the Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference
discloses that other than the allegation that counsel will attend a hearing
22 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
in another branch of the same court in Manila, yet, it failed to substantiate
its claim. It did not state the case number nor attach the Calendar of
Hearing or such other pertinent proof to appraise the court that indeed
counsel was predisposed. We cannot allow petitioners to argue that their
right to due process has been infringed. In The Philippine American Life &
General Insurance Company v. Enario, we reiterated that the essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. Where
the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its interest in due
course, there is no denial of procedural due process.
ALMARIO VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 189028. JULY 16, 2013
DOCTRINE:
As to the Constitutional right of persons to equal protection, it is the
constitutional duty of the President to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines and policies as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists. This duty
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment
of the said award.
FACTS:
Proclamation No. 1001, Proclamation No. 1144, P.D. 208, and R.A. 7356
are the pertinent laws on the creation of the category of Award and
Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made
distinct contributions to arts and letters (Fernando Amorsolo was declared
as the first National Artist), and the creation of a National Artists Awards
Committee. E.O. No. 236, s. 2003 was issued, (1) renaming the National
Artists Award to Order of National Artists, (2) raising to the level of a
Cultural Order, (3) recognizing the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in
identifying Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters, (4) creating a Committee on Honors to "assist the President in
evaluating nominations for recipients of Honors," including the Order of
National Artists, and presidential awards.
On 2009, after due deliberations were made, a final list of four names was
agreed upon, including Conde, Santos, Francisco, and Aguilar-Alcuaz as
nominees for the Order of National Artists. Accordingly, a letter was sent
to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, recommending the four named artists
as part of the 2009 Order of National Artists. According to respondents,
the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to
the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals
strongly endorsing private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. The Committee on Honors, after the alleged processing of
such nominations, submitted a memorandum to then President Macapagal-
Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on
the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. Acting
on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a
National Artist was issued. Subsequently, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the
public by then Executive Secretary Ermita.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry
into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition,
certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that
the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. The Court granted such
petition.
Petitioners, an aggrupation of at least three groups, the National Artists,
cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned Artists of the
Philippines (CAP), claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening
and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting
her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to
petitioners, the President's discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be
exercised in the absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP. In adding the names of respondents Caparas, Guidote-
Alvarez, Maosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from the list of
conferees, the President's own choices constituted the majority of the
awardees in utter disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and
the arts and culture community which were arrived at after a long and
rigorous process of screening and deliberation. Petitioners further argue
that the choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez was illegal and unethical
because, as the then Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential
adviser on culture and arts, she was disqualified from even being
nominated. Such action on the part of the former President constituted
grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential treatment to respondent
23 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist despite her not
having been nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process
provided by the rules for selection to the Order of National Artists.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. Although the Court clarified that the President has discretion as to the
selection of the awardees and the role of the NCCA and the CCP is mere
advisory, there was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The former
President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe
the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the
selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment
of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was
therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National Artists, such
action should not be taken as a pronouncement on whether they are
worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the advise of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court simply
declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the said
proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision should be
read as a disqualification on the part of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno to be considered for the honor of National
Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the laws, rules and
regulations governing said award.
ROQUE VS OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 129978. MAY 12, 1999
DOCTRINE:
The long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints
against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the
Informations. The Court ruled that the inordinate delay in terminating the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due
process and the speedy disposition of cases against him. Accordingly, the
informations should be dismissed.
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South
Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991. Petitioner
Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS,
assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on
May 8, 1997. The Commission on Audit Regional Office conducted an audit
on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No.
11 to its Division Offices. The Auditors found some major deficiencies and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and COA Circular Nos.
78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of P.D. No. 1445.
Affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against several persons including petitioners Roque and
Mabanglo. In an order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. On
March 18, 1997, the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended the filing of the
appropriate complaints against several respondents, among them were
petitioners. The same was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. On
August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted a petition for mandamus premised
on the allegation that more than six (6) years had passed since the initial
orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation, yet no case
has been filed with the appropriate court against them. On November 24,
1997, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing
respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases
filed against petitioners. On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court
to cite respondents in contempt, contending that a criminal complaint was
filed in violation of the TRO. Hence, the present petition for mandamus
praying that respondent public officers be directed to dismiss the graft
cases filed against them and subsequently to issue the necessary
clearance in petitioners' favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the]
complaints against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their
constitutional right to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of
cases.
HELD:
24 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Yes. Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's
duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act
promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the
petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six
months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of
Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took
almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. Thus, in
Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had
been pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six
years, ruling that after a careful review of the facts and circumstances of
the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six
years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against
petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting
the dismissal of said criminal cases . . ." We are not persuaded by
respondents' argument that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and
academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same
contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court
declared that the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the
criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual
filing of the Informations. The Court ruled that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the
instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations . . . should be dismissed." Although
petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal
of Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this
Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, resolves to
dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in
which the Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner
therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so. The Court
granted the Petition for Mandamus, but denies the prayer to cite
respondents in contempt of court.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. NO. L-46496. FEBRUARY 27, 1940
GOMEZ
DOCTRINE:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does
not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The
Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio is the owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies leather goods to the Philippine Army. Toribio claimed that on
September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc (NLU) . However, members of NLU avers
otherwise. They claimed that Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the NLU and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood.
The NLU filed a motion for new trial asking the SC to allow the same as
they were able to obtain new evidence and documents that were not
presented before the CIR as the same were inaccessible at that time.
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration
and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, the SC reconsider
the legal conclusions of the majority opinion.
ISSUE:
WON due process has been observed in this case
HELD:
25 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
In view of the conclusion reached by the SC and to be herein after stead
with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., the SC is of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass
upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. The SC
proceeded to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, the SC deemed it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly
procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding
the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial
of cases brought before it.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary
to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively
to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized
legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for
the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case,
but their report and decision are only advisory.
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-52245. JANUARY 22, 1980
DOCTRINE:
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
Chose belonging to the same class.
FACTS:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor
of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of
the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. The said
provision provides for Special Disqualification:
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law,
and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the
26 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run
for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the
following statutory provisions:
Sec. 4. Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other
similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be
declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the equal protection clause has been violated in the passage of B.P.
52
HELD:
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can
be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service
may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials.
For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages,
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged
65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him
from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided
for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present,
and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not
deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
Chose belonging to the same class.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier,
and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact ...
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity
of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the
first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big.
52 which can stand by itself.
27 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES VS. POEA
G.R. NO. 114714. APRIL 21, 1995
DOCTRINE:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class. There can be no
dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to
social, civic, and spiritual activities.
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. (CMMA), an
incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino
seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals,
urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing
Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated
the standards for its exercise.
(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by
law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the
POEA.
In their comment, the public respondents contend that the petition is
without merit and should be dismissed becaus the issuance of the
challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of
the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation which
this Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
ISSUE:
WON the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal
protection and contract clauses of the Constitution
HELD:
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely
further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly
conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be
disputed.
There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of
the Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners
claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing
Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas
Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by
legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to
be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. 14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-
based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum
circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement
the social justice provisions of the 1973. Constitution, which have been
greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them
under a separate Article.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is
not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to
contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which
confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and
public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a
proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
28 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or
general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be
affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power
of the State to regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of
the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code,
contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State
because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public
interest.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police
power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they
violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established
constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract
clause.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS
G.R. NOS. 132875-76. FEBRUARY 3, 2000
DOCTRINE:
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will."
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible
by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
ISSUES:
WON being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment.
WON being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law
HELD:
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well
in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
29 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Premises considered, the SC is constrained to rule against the accused-
appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other
right or interest, including the police power of the State.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
20 SCRA 383; G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby|and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government (Respondent-
Prosecutors), several judges (Respondent-Judges) issued, on different
dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners alleged that said search warrants were null and void on the
ground that they contravene the Constitution and the Rules of Court since
said warrants did not describe with particularity the documents, books and
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.||
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have cause of action to assail the legality of the
search warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, with
respect to those found in the offices of the corporations.
2. WON the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid insofar as those which are found in the residences of the petitioners
are concerned.
HELD:
1. NO. Said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed,
it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
2. NO. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.| None of these
requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
30 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.|||
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be
particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.|||
PEOPLE vs. BELOCURA
679 SCRA 318; G.R. No. 173474. August 29, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The rule that there must first be a warrant of arrest and search warrant is
not absolute.
FACTS:
On March 22, 1999, at 11 o'clock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in
his office in the headquarters of the Western Police District (WPD) on
United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a male
person who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped
him off about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila.
After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to
form a team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and
to coordinate with the Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT) and the
Mobile Patrol of the WPD.||
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to
Lopez Street, reaching the site before 1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2
Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00
pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious
government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and told the rest
of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The
driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for
Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped
off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocura's jeep until they
blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop.
At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached the
jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp.
Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated
Belocura's Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked
in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could not produce the
appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate. They
arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocura's jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag
under the driver's seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect
the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on
board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and the red plastic
bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper
disposition. |||
Reynaldo Belocura was then charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823
grams of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and was found
guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
WON there is a valid arrest and search and seizure in this case..
HELD:
YES. No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of
personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches
and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its
Article III. The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a
violation of personal security and privacy and against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained.
31 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3 (2), Article III of the
Constitution. Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right
against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are
circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although
warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made
by a peace officer or a private person, namely:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of evidence under plain
view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search;
(e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g)
exigent and emergency circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the
necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.||
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic
Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code). In flagrante
delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in
flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit
by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence
of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption." Even by his own admission, he was actually
committing a crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting
policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under
the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked
with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or
any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and
to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his control, like
the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the
incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the
warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his
acquittal. Belocura was acquitted for the violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) not because of his warrantless arrest and search and
seizure but because of the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of Belocura.
GAMBOA vs. CHAN
677 SCRA 385; G.R. No. 193636. July 24, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest.
FACTS:
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. 5 Meanwhile,
respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.)
William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa
Commission, 8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the
10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.
Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP-
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, thereby causing
her inclusion in the Report's enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program
the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged
to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG
also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone
who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the
32 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.
As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report
also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with
her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE:
WON there is a violation of the right to privacy of Gamboa.
HELD:
NO. The right to privacy is not absolute. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons
affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right
to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions.
In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state
interest deemed legitimate and compelling.|||
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and
other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It
also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance
of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed
it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant
to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents,
books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa
Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other
law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its
functions.
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to
(a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.||
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP,
the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the
data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the
PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force
in the fulfillment of the former's mandate, and thus had the power to
request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally,
Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was
used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to
ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained
its integrity and accuracy. To accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court
nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence
gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to
receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy
is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a person's ordinary sensibilities."
33 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and
the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were
responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other
reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.
NOLASCO vs. PANO
139 SCRA 152; G.R. No. L-69803. October 8, 1985
DOCTRINE:
Search warrants which are too general are void for being violative of the
Constitutional mandate provided under Sec. 3, Article 4 of the
Constitution.
The rule that articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be
returned is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions.
FACTS:
AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission No. 1, and also one of the
accused of Subversion in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 of Military
Commission No. 25. She was then still at large.| At 11:30 A.M. on August
6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest
had previously been issued against NOLASCO.||At 12:00 N. on August 6th,
elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically
denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have
alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late
on August 6th. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G.
Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon.
Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to
be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of
"round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long
wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
It does not appear from the records that an application in writing was
submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao. According to the record, Lt.
Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined
under oath by Judge Pao, but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been
submitted to the court. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge,
there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and
other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion.
In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th,
TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested
by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The
searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items
in all. According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE
on August 10th, the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana
Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No
mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428
articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two
Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.|
AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the
Quezon City Fiscal's Offic upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion. The CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents)
against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE). CSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO be charged with Subversion which was however denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON the search warrant that was issued is void for being too general.
2. WON the articles seize should be returned.
HELD:||
1. YES. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
34 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be
seized as follows:
"Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such
as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of
possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources."
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It
is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of
the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in
the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the
witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant. The questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable
cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends
such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon
them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd
and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching
questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities
to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness.
Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
2. NO. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and
although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant
should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to
AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus,
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
"Section 12.Search without warrant of person arrested. A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where
the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this
latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided
on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to
what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched". "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's
right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals."
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which
is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not
been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested
within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion
that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City,
did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No. 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and
articles.
GARCIA vs. EXECUTIVE SECREATARY
677 SCRA 750; G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The equal protection clause guaranteed under the Constitution extends to
the class of those who have been convicted by any court.
FACTS:
35 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
The Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued
a Restriction to Quarters against petitioner. Thereafter, a Charge Sheet
dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial
NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.). Petitioner
allegedly committed the following violations: (1) failure to disclose/
declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Net Worth for different years; (2) violation of his solemn
oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people
with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the United States of America in
violation of the State policy governing public officers; (3) making
untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for 2003 and 2002. Petitioner had
undergone a preventive confinement for 6 years and 2 months.
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by
the Office of the President directing him to be confined for two (2) years in
the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive
confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to
him, the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his
confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that
petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive
confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a
penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code which specifically
mandates that the period of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall
be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or
the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the
execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as
confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.
ISSUES:
1. WON Article 29 (deduction of preventive confinement from the term of
imprisonment) of the Revised Penal Code should be made applicable to
petitioner.
2. WON there is a violation of petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of
his case.
HELD:
1. YES. A court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court
Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court
clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court," used in the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
Constitution. The words "any court" refers, not only to a civil, but also to a
military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it
must be taken as established that where words are used which have both
a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the
restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly
indicates that the limited sense is intended."
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of
War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification." In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of
those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the
rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction
between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature
under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. It must be remembered that the
provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in
nature.
2. NO. No less than our Constitution guarantees the rightnot just to a
speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of cases. However, it needs to be
underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
36 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
each case. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the
trial. What is being questioned by petitioner is the delay in the
confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already
been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by
the proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing
then was the confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do
not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the
General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally
confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his
right to a speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten
years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully
complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his
case, since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on
towards its ultimate resolution. Time runs against the slothful and those
who neglect their rights. In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his
sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation
from the President, his sentence cannot be served.
PEOPLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JULIETA G. ANDO
G.R. NO. 198589 - July 25, 2012
MATILLANO
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
private complainant Willie Tee (Tee) from the Decision1 dated July 2, 2011
of the CA. The instant petition is GRANTED. The November 6, 2008 and
May 2, 2008 Decisions of the RTC of Manila, and MTC of Manila, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
offenses charged. Respondent Julieta G. Ando (Ando) was convicted by the
MeTC, of three (3) counts of Falsification of Public Documents under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The MeTC found Ando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of making it appear
that Tee s father, Tee Ong, who was the owner of To Suy Hardware,
signed, executed and sworn a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit, and a Transfer of
Rights on January 31, 1996. Ando s conviction was premised on the
following factual findings:
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
(i) Tee Ong was already dead at the time the allegedly falsified
documents were executed and notarized on January 31, 1996;
(ii) (ii) Ando was in possession of the allegedly falsified documents,
giving rise to the presumption that she was responsible therefor; and
(iii) (iii) Ando used the allegedly falsified documents to cause the
transfer in her favor of the rights to the business name "TO SUY
HARDWARE".
On appeal, Court (RTC) of Manila affirmed the MeTC s findingsthe RTC
predicated Ando s guilt on the falsity of the subject documents as being
undisputed and stipulated upon by the parties.
The CA gave due course to Ando s appeal and reversed the RTC Decision
dated November 6, 2008. According to the CA, Ando deserves to be
acquitted of the charges against her in view of the prosecution s failure to
prove that the subject documents were indeed falsified. Specifically, the
prosecution did not present any expert witness or caused the examination
of the subject documents to determine whether Tee Ong s thumb mark
and signature were indeed forged. The CA found the lower courts to have
erred in sweepingly concluding that the signatures on the Deed of Sale,
Affidavit, and Transfer of Rights were forged on the basis of the
undisputed fact that Tee Ong was already dead at the time that such
documents were notarized on January 31, 1996. According to the CA the
prosecution did not eliminate the possibility that Tee Ong may have signed
the said documents before he died on December 15, 1995, thus, clouding
Ando s supposed guilt with moral uncertainty. What the CA found as
certain from the evidence of the prosecution is the notarization of the
subject documents after Tee Ong s death and not the impossibility of Tee
Ong s voluntary execution thereof before his death. Accordingly, it is the
notary public who notarized the subject documents, not Ando, who should
be held liable for any irregularities that may have attended the
notarization. The execution and notarization of the subject documents are
two (2) different acts and the irregularities attending their notarization do
not necessarily affect the validity of their execution. In this petition, Tee
attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA, alleging that the
latter has no reason to reverse the MeTC s and RTC s finding of guilt as
the inconsistencies in Ando s statements and her possession and use of
the subject documents prove beyond reasonable doubt that she was the
one who forged Tee Ong s thumb mark and signature. There was likewise
no necessity to produce an expert witness to determine if Tee Ong s
thumb mark and signature were forged. That Tee Ong was already dead at
the time the subject documents were executed and notarized coupled with
Ando s use thereof to her benefit sufficed to conclude that there was
forgery and that Ando was responsible therefor.Tee claimed that he filed
this Petition under the authority and supervision of the Office of the
37 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Solicitor General (OSG). Tee had also dispensed with the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, claiming that the same has been rendered futile by the
immediately executory nature and finality of an acquittal. The OSG filed a
Manifestation and Motion dated October 6, 2011, stating that it is adopting
Tee s petition as its own. Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of
the principle of double jeopardy, making it unnecessary to address and
extrapolate on the numerous factual issues raised by Tee against the CA s
Decision dated July 28, 2011 and the procedural lapses Ando attributes to
Tee. The mere fact that the decision being brought for this Courts review
is one for acquittal alerts ones attention to a possible violation of the rule
against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional rule against double jeopardy was
violated?
HELD:
The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the
prosecution s right to due process was violated or the proceedings before
the CA were a mockery such that Ando s acquittal was a foregone
conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the
interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA
may have committed in ordering Ando s acquittal, absent any showing that
the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due
process, THE CAS FINDINGS CAN NO LONGER BE REVERSED, DISTURBED
AND SET ASIDE WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RULE AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an
erroneous interpretation of the law and its implementing rules, the error
committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner
failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion such as the denial of the prosecution s right to due process or
the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the
Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on
appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. This petition cannot be given due course without running afoul of
the principle against double jeopardy.
In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, this Court reiterated that mistrial is the only
exception to the well-settled, even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. This Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of
the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
an accused, which is what is protected by the rule against double
jeopardy.
This petition does not allege a mistrial and the sole challenge posed by Tee
and the OSG against the validity of the CA s disposition is the latter s
supposed misappreciation of the evidence, which is an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction or a manifestation of grave abuse of discretion,
hence, not correctible by a writ of certiorari . In People of the Philippines v.
Hon. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) this Court clarified that for an
acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there
must be a showing that the prosecution s right to due process was violated
or that the trial conducted was a sham.Although the dismissal order is not
subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be
shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING, vs. PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS
SOCIETY, INC. (PTS)
G.R. No. 143384. February 4, 2005
FACTS:
On 16 April 1968, petitioner Dr. Maquiling was employed by respondent
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). On 8 June 1991, Dr. Maquiling,
then earning a monthly salary of P13,900.00 was dismissed from service
as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for 23 years. Dr. Maquiling
filed a complaint against PTS for reinstatement or, in the alternative, for
payment of full back wages and separation pay in accordance with Article
279 of the Labor Code, as well as moral damages in the amount of five
hundred thousand pesos P500,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of one hundred thousand pesos P100,000.00.
The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo dated 2 April
1991 from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Andres B. Soriano (Soriano)
directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a written
explanation on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial
statement for 1990;
38 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection with the Dale
Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial
statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.[6]
Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory letter dated 11 April 1991 inviting
attention to PTS Finance Managers Report. On 15 April 1991, Dr.
Maquiling had a thirty (30) minute conversation with Soriano at the latters
instance. No further related proceedings were undertaken before Dr.
Maquiling received a letter-notice dated 8 June 1991 informing him that
the PTS Executive Committee approved Sorianos findings and
recommendations calling for his dismissal effective immediately, without
any retirement benefits.
Despite Sorianos instruction for him not to report for work, Dr. Maquiling
manifested, through a letter to the OIC-Executive Director, his intention to
continue performing his duties as Deputy Executive Director. Dr. Maquiling
continued to report for work at the PTS daily. In the meantime, he
elevated his case to the PTS Board of Directors through a memorandum
dated 28 June 1991 which sought to point out the illegality of his dismissal
from office and prayed for a resolution upholding his position.
On 17 July 1991, Dr. Maquiling, protesting non-payment of his salary for
the period of 15 July 1991, wrote the OIC Finance Department and
formally demanded the release of his earned wages. PTS reacted through
Soriano by informing Dr. Maquiling that there are no wages forthcoming
inasmuch as the latters service had been terminated for cause since 7
June 1991.[9]
In an effort to exhaust the remedies within PTS, Dr. Maquiling wrote the
President of PTS a letter dated 5 August 1991 saying, among others: my
counsels agree with me that if your Board does not act on my 28 June
1991 Memorandum within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter, such
omission will mean a confirmation of Sorianos notice of my alleged
termination from the service a dismissal which is referable to the proper
outside forum.[10]
Receiving no response from the PTS, Dr. Maquiling stopped reporting for
work at the PTS in the last week of September 1991. Then, on 10 October
1991, Dr. Maquiling filed his complaint with the Labor Arbiter.
The evidence adduced by the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate Dr. Maquiling to the
position of Deputy Executive Director or its equivalent in rank and pay,
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
without loss of seniority rights inclusive of all benefits attached to said
position at the time of his dismissal. Upon appeal by PTS to the NLRC, the
Commission upheld the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed the
appeal.However, PTS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by ordering the
dismissal of the complaint and declaring that his dismissal from
employment as legal and valid. It, however, ordered PTS to pay Dr.
Maquiling the amount of,000.00 as damages or indemnity for violation of
his right to procedural due process and separation pay in the amount of
P159,850.00 in the interest of social justice. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari. Dr. Maquiling raised in his petition that the appellate court,
which agreed with the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that the
twin requirements of notice and hearing are wanting, erred in adopting an
abandoned doctrine by merely imposing a fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) against PTS and in disregarding the present doctrine on
termination of employment and monetary benefits accorded by law to Dr.
Maquiling, and in concluding with grave abuse of discretion that the
dismissal of Dr. Maquiling, who had served PTS for twenty-three (23)
years, was for just cause.
In its Comment dated 9 October 2000, PTS contends that the dismissal of
Dr. Maquiling was based on a just cause, supported as it was by the
evidence, law and jurisprudence. The termination of Dr. Maquilings
employment was allegedly due to loss of trust and confidence.[24] It avers
that for gross mismanagement, for acts inimical to the interest of PTS, and
also for reason that PTS has lost its trust and confidence in him, PTS
terminated his services without any retirement benefit.
PTS, however, alleges that it complied with the two-notice rule required for
termination of employment. According to PTS, the first notice was sent by
Soriano to Dr. Maquiling by means of confidential memorandum[26] dated
2 April 1991 requiring him to explain in writing, within five days from
notice, the matters stated therein. Dr. Maquiling honored the first notice
by submitting on 11 April 1991 a written reply to Soriano. The second
notice which allegedly informed Dr. Maquiling of the decision to terminate
his employment, stating reasons therefor, was sent to him by Soriano on 8
June 1991.[27]
ISSUE:
Whether or not PTS failed to comply with the twin notice requirements of
notice and hearing?
HELD:
39 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
After careful perusal of the factual backdrop of the case, we rule that Dr.
Maquiling was indeed validly dismissed for just cause. However, PTS was
remiss in its duty to observe procedural due process in effecting the
dismissal of Dr. Maquiling.
Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee
who is the subject of an investigation for acts which may warrant his
eventual dismissal from employment. The notices required before an
employee may be validly dismissed are:
(a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for
termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain
his/her side;
(b) a hearing or conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of
counsel if so desired, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut evidence presented against him/her; and
(c) written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify termination.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of due
process in cases of employees dismissal; the requirement of notice is
intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand
the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer
his employers charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. Clearly, the first notice must inform
outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the
charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal.
Such notice must not only contain a plain statement of the charges of
malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his
employment if the charges are proven to be true. This notice will afford
the employee an opportunity to avail all defenses and exhaust all remedies
to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at stake is his very
life and limb his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just
disregard the notice as a warning without any disastrous consequence to
be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the
requirement of due process. Ones work is everything, thus, it is not too
exacting to impose this strict requirement on the part of the employer
before the dismissal process be validly effected. This is in consonance with
the rule that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.It is worthy to note that the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all agree in concluding
that procedural due process in the instant case was not observed. As
revealed by the evidence on record, a confidential memorandum FN dated
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
2 April 1991 was sent to Dr. Maquiling by Soriano requiring him to explain
in writing the matters contained therein. The text of the memorandum
reads as follows:
02 April 1991
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING
Pursuant to the directive of the Board of Directors issued in its meeting on
March 25, 1991, you are hereby instructed to report and explain in writing
to this office, within five (5) days from notice hereof, on the following
matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial
statement for 1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection with the Dale
Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial
statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.
For immediate compliance.
(SGD.) ATTY. ANDRES B. SORIANO
OIC-Executive Director
On 11 April 1991, Dr. Maquiling submitted his written reply. The second
notice which informs Dr. Maquiling of the decision to terminate his
employment was sent to him on 8 June 1991. It must be noted that the
first notice dated 2 April 1991 is a mere instruction to explain the matters
enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any investigation
to be conducted or being conducted that will warrant his dismissal from
service if found guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell
short of the requirement of law that an employee must be afforded the
benefit of the two-notice rule in dismissal cases that will allow the
employee to substantiate the charges specified in the notice with full
knowledge at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may result
in his dismissal or suspension from employment.
US VS. BUSTOS
G.R. NO. L-12592, MARCH 8, 1918
DOCTRINE:
It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who
know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and
40 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the
part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs.
FACTS:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield
and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges
against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from
persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged
that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of
his right to free speech and free press.
HELD:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a
fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which everyone owes to society
or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of
a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The
right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has
been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice
and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient
if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he
is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although
the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were
believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office
existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure
the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable.
In no way did they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should
not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice
or falsity.
RODEL LUZ y ONG, vs. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court also discussed in Berkemer v.
McCarty at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue
of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. Since the
motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the
scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and
neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest.
FACTS:
The roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine
traffic stop does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
41 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. Traffic enforcer PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza flagged
down petitioner Rodel Luz for driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-station located near the area.
While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, Alteza
was alerted by Luzs uneasy movement and thus asked him to put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket. Consequently, it was revealed that
Luz was in possession of prohibited drugs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicted Luz of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC added that
Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and that he had been
subjected to a valid search. Upon review, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTCs decision. Luz, filed a Petition for Review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court, thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop can be considered a formal arrest
HELD:
There was no valid arrest of Luz. When Luz was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write
his citation ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could not be said to have been
under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went
to the police sub-station was that Luz had been flagged down almost in
front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into custody.
The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court also discussed in Berkemer v.
McCarty at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue
of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. Since the
motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the
scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and
neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can Rodel Luz here be
considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being
made. It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by Luz, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. This ruling
does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility
of an arrest for the same violation. If it were true that Luz was already
deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and
while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly
discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
BALDOZA VS. HON. DIMAANO
A.M. No. 1120-MJ. May 5, 1976
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
The right to information on matters of public concern is predicated not on
statutory grounds merely but on the constitutional right of the press to
have access to information as the essence of press freedom.
FACTS:
The Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection
with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the
said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that
there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records;
that although court records are among public documents open to
inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other
persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is
always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how
they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has
unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its
records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the
42 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but
acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to
promote public scandal.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge acted arbitrarily in refusing to allow employees
of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the
Municipal Court.
HELD:
No. We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. As
found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant
to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and
under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules
and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access
to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to
compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the
records of the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on
statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of
democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds
has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their
rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on
statutory grounds merely but on the constitutional right of the press to
have access to information as the essence of press freedom.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are
entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly
granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There
can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions
on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon
a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary
means of control inadequate to maintain order.
The case is dismissed.
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. CA
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
DOCTRINE:
The terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof.
FACTS:
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six
(6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and
their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; xxx
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or
from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo.
43 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the
restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay
with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor
Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground
that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules
and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right
to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
ISSUE:
WON the employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to
strike.
HELD:
No. It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which
was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned
strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities
exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with
proprietary functions:
In 1987, the CSC issued a Memorandum Circular enjoining under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service." At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O.
No. 180.
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under
the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in
the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by
the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Government employees may, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are
not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may
be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government-
Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters
are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner
union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
PNB VS. REMIGIO
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994
DOCTRINE:
The Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the state.
FACTS:
In 1967, private respondent obtained from petitioner a P65,000.00 loan
secured by a real estate mortgage covering five (5) parcels of land in
Isabela. Private respondent defaulted; hence, petitioner bank
extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired the
encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela. In 1971,
petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed
property for P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, or on
18 November 1970 (or one day after the foreclosure sale), private
respondent already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property.
44 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Subsequently, additional payments were made by private respondent. In
1972, PD No. 27 was enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform.
Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched;
among the areas it covered were the parcels of land in question.
Sometime later, private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property
for P284,000.00 which was the market and appraised value thereof fixed
by petitioner bank. The Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between
petitioner bank and private respondent. However, private respondent
questioned why he was still being made to buy the property for
P284,000.00 when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000 of the
P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for redemption of the
property. There was no response from the petitioner Bank. Hence, private
respondent instituted an action for "Annulment of Foreclosure Deed,
Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague,
Isabela, against petitioner bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato.
While the case was yet pending with the trial court, petitioner bank
additionally received from the Land Bank of the Philippines P26,348.12 in
cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in payment of the
foreclosed parcels of land. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of
the bank. Private respondent went to the CA which rendered a decision
reversing the trial court and entering a new one in favor of private
respondent. PNB files a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the parcels of land in question may still be the object of the
foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of PD No. 27.
HELD:
No. The petition cannot be sustained. Lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may
not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of
said decree. P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the
duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. The SC gave
weight to the opinion of the Secretary of the Department of Justice: there
is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government
as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself
(Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of
the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that
the Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation on
the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason being that
public welfare is superior to private rights. The situation here, is like that
in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private
property for public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
payment of just compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings
do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely
appropriate or take for public use. As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the
obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any
compensation.
The opinion deserves respect. This Court, likewise, in a number of cases
has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
DOCTRINE:
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the
witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.
FACTS:
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come
to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,
the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into
the matter of February 9, 1986. During the investigation, Ramos' answers
were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the
money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that
he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x
x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation."
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa. On arraignment on this charge,
Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the
direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which included
"the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been
45 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
marked as Exhibit A, as well as his handwritten admission given on
February 8, 1986, also marked as Exhibit K.
The respondent judge declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that the accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was [not] with the assistance actually of a counsel."
He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made
by accused Felipe J. Ramos, for the same reason stated in the exclusion of
Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by
counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied. Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
excluded the People's Exhibits A and K.
HELD:
Yes. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is
disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of
rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the
1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment
of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does
not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should
know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.
Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a
question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the
witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.
The second sentence refers the rights of persons "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by
police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that
embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any
proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as
this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a
hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too,
that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first
day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that
the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been
marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against
him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as
Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before
the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
46 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may
not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
The writ of certiorari is granted.
PEOPLE VS BRAVO
G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999
MURILLO
DOCTRINE:
Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and
custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any
information or admission given by a person while in custody which may
appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent
assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of Juanita Antolin (known in
her neighborhood as Len-len), 9 years old, was found in a vacant lot along
the road leading to Patul, Rosario Santiago City. Her body was found
between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her
panty stuffed in her mouth. The scalp on the left side of her head was
detached exposing a fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal
examination showed fresh lacerations and easily accepts two fingers. The
cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage.
Evelyn San Mateo, neighbor and cousin of the victim, testified that she
was with the deceased the night before she disappeared. She stated that
while they stood on the roadside watching "Home Along Da Riles" from an
open window of a neighbor's house the accused Benito Bravo approached
them and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he
will buy her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked her to go with them but she
did not want to because she was watching television. Len-Len went alone
with the accused. The following morning Len-Len's mother told Evelyn and
her mother that Len-Len was missing. In court, Evelyn positively identified
the appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was found
dead.
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department,
Alexander Mico, testified that he found the appellant at his place of work
at the Spring Garden Resort at Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl and
asked him to come with him for questioning. The appellant agreed. Mico
further narrated in court that at the police station the appellant admitted
he was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so
drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her. On cross-
examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his right against
self-incrimination before the appellant made the said admission because
according to Mico he was only "informally interviewing" the accused when
he made the admission and that custodial interrogation proper was
conducted by the assigned investigator.
ISSUE:
W/N the admission made by the accused is admissible in evidence
HELD:
NO. The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita
Antolin and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his
possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his
constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent
attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made
during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not
tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a
general inquiry for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under
investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant
was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape
and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the
alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid.
Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial
confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in court of the alleged
oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as
inadmissible.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory
protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a
crime and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce
such mandate. The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision
covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or
from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime
although not yet in custody. Also, the single circumstantial evidence
proven by the prosecution is not enough to convict the accused, as per the
Rules of Evidence.
47 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
(For purposes of recit: The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition
that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion,
physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the
crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the
accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires
but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit
although untrue. Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that
it is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered
a denial of such right. Courts are not allowed to distinguish between
preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying
the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person
while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time
without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be
struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission
made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by
the rule.)
__________
GAMBOA VS CRUZ
G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988
Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.
DOCTRINE:
The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, the accused
will not yet be entitled to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory, as when police investigation does
not elicit a confession, the accused may not yet avail of the services of his
lawyer.
FACTS:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Gamboa was
arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo
Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where
he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with
several others. The following day, during the lineup of five (5) detainees,
including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner
and said, "that one is a companion [of another accused]." After the
identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but
petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being
interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against
the petitioner. On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter,
hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its
evidence and then rested its case. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel,
instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was
filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980,
petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of
the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated
his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. Trial court denied
petitioner's motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner's right to counsel is violated
HELD:
NO. The right to counsel only attaches upon the start of an investigation,
i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at
least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General
states: "When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police
line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The
police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet
entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police
investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of
the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his
identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police
could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the
confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he
was identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any
statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he
was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police
did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it
was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time."
48 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
(Dissenting opinion - this may be the side of Comish as well):
YAP, C.J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. In my opinion, after
the police line-up with other detainees in which the accused was pointed
out by the complainant as one of the "companions" of those who allegedly
committed the crime of robbery, the investigatory part of the proceedings
started when the accused was singled out and "ordered to sit down in front
of the complainant" while the latter gave her statement which led to the
filing of the information. The majority opinion holds that the police line-up
was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner (the herein
accused) was not yet entitled to counsel. But this overlooks the fact that
the incident objected to took place after the police line-up, when the
accused was made to confront the complainant, and the latter made her
statement which became the basis of the information filed against the
accused. At this point, it can be said that the custodial investigation had
already begun.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
It is noteworthy that the accused was already in custody at the time. And
although he was detained for some other cause (vagrancy), it left him little
or no choice other than to face his accuser. It cannot be then gainsaid that
as far as he was concerned, the situation had reached what American
jurisprudence refers to as the "critical stage" of the inquiry, in which the
confrontation becomes an accusation rather than a routine procedure
preliminary to a formal prosecution. He was in custody not for the "usual
questioning" but for an existing charge, although the investigation was in
connection with another offense. The confrontation, exacerbated by the
pressure of actual custody, had become adversarial rather than
informational, and the assistance of counsel to the accused, a matter of
Constitutional necessity. That he was being held for vagrancy whereas the
line-up involved a complaint for robbery does not make a difference to
him. He was under detention, a development that made him vulnerable to
pressures, whatever offense was involved. Moreover, the confrontation
arranged by the police investigator between the self- proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime
especially at its most crucial stage- the identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of identification became just a confrontation.
At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly
against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness
Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls
within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For
this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS LARA
G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Identification in a police line-up is not a part of custodial investigation.
Hence, the right to have a counsel does not yet accrue.
FACTS:
Arturo Lara was found guilty by the RTC and CA of the crime robbery with
homicide. His victim was Joselito Bautista. The testimonies of some of the
witnesses retell the incident.
Sumulong, victim's co-employee, testified that: (a) on May 31, 2001 and
at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00
from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up
and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and
Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black
bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning,
while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up
and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";
(f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g)
heeding Bautista's advice, he threw the bag in Bautista's direction; (h)
after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran;
(i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had
the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and
called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he
went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of
the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one
bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
(m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2)
other companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (ii)
on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he
saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City;
(o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the
police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot
and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.
49 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the
Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7,
2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and
Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning;
(e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being
identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at
Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at
his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was
constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the
morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around
7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police
officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming
that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to
the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the
patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to
caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he
was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was
earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when
he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took
place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i)when his
witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to
come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up holding
a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at
uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they
were told that he will be subjected to an inquest
ISSUE:
W/N Lara's right to counsel is violated
HELD:
NO. Contrary to Lara's claim, that he was not provided with counsel when
he was placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading
to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance
of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment
custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up
is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People
vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The
right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation
and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-
up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course
of the line-up.
PEOPLE VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The prosecution must always prove with moral certainty that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items confiscated in drug-related cases are
established in court.
FACTS:
Sometime in May 2003, public officers received reports from the barangay
office and other concerned citizens of drug-dealing activities in the locality
of Porac, Pampanga. They immediately conducted a casing and
surveillance operation to verify the reports. About four operations were
carried out, on a weekly basis, which confirmed that Enriquez was indeed
dealing drugs among the truck drivers and helpers within the vicinity. After
confirming the reports, SPO2 David, together with one civilian asset,
conducted a test-buy on June 2, 2003. During the test-buy, SPO2 David's
asset was able to buy P200.00 worth of shabu, which he confirmed to be
so by burning it, contrary to standard police procedure.
After the test-buy, SPO2 David organized a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. At the briefing, SPO2 David was designated as the poseur-
buyer, with the other two police officers as back-ups. To purchase the
shabu, Chief of Police Erese gave SPO2 David a P100-peso bill and five
P20-peso bills, which SPO2 David marked. The team thereafter proceeded
50 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
to Brgy. Manibaug, Libutad in Porac, Pampanga. Upon arriving at the
target area at around 11:00 a.m., SPO2 David approached Enriquez,
whom they spotted sitting in a sari- sari store, while SPO2 Divina and
SPO1 Garung hid behind a dump truck parked across the store. SPO2
David called the attention of Enriquez by saying "dalawang (2) piso" while
handing him the P200.00. Without saying anything, Enriquez took the
money and went to the back of the store. After one to two minutes,
Enriquez emerged and handed SPO2 David a sachet of shabu. This
prompted SPO2 David to put his hand at the back of his head, to signal his
teammates that the sale had been consummated. Upon the execution of
the pre-arranged signal, SPO2 Divina and SPO1 Garung approached the
site of engagement, introduced themselves as police officers to Enriquez,
and thereafter conducted a body search on him, which resulted to the
discovery of a plastic game card containing one big and 45 small plastic
sachets of white crystalline substance. SPO2 David prepared the
Confiscation Receipt for the above-seized items, then subsequently
brought Enriquez to the Porac Police Station, wherein the team prepared
the papers necessary in filing a case.
Enriquez was then convicted for violating RA 9165, the CDDA.
ISSUE:
W/N the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the chain of custody
in building their case against Enriquez
HELD:
(disclaimer: the following, which consisted mostly of facts that transpired
in the case, appeared in the ruling part lang. Hindi sya naka-indicate sa
facts mismo.) NO. The SC explained that the prosecution was not able to
establish proper chain of custody to convict Enriquez. While non-
compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid,
this is true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed
procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said
conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag, that casts
reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation:
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure from
Enriquez of the dangerous drugs and its subsequent marking. Under the
law, such marking should have been done immediately after confiscation
and in the presence of the accused or his representative. While it is true
that the items presented in court bore the initials of SPO2 David, who was
also the poseur-buyer and primary apprehending officer, nowhere in the
documentary and testimonial evidence of the prosecution can it be found
when these items were actually marked and if they were marked in the
presence of Enriquez or at least his representative.
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the illegal drug
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Both SPO2 David
and SPO2 Divina testified that after the buy-bust operation, they brought
Enriquez and the seized items to the police station. However, they both
failed to identify the person to whom they turned over the seized items.
Records show that the request for laboratory examination was prepared by
Chief of Police Erese, and yet there is no evidence to show that he was the
person who received the seized items from the apprehending officers.
There is therefore a crucial missing link, i.e., what happened to the seized
items after they left the hands of SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina and before
they came to the hands of Chief of Police Erese.
As for the third and the last links, although records show that Chief of
Police Erese signed the request for laboratory examination, he was not
presented in court to testify as such. The testimony of Chief of Police Erese
is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link between
the testimony of SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp.
Dizon, which the parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for
whereabouts of the seized items from the time they were brought to the
police station to the time they were submitted to P/Insp. Dizon for
examination constitutes a clear break in the chain of custody.
This Court finds that the prosecution was not able to establish with moral
certainty that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items confiscated
from Enriquez were preserved such that they could be used as basis for
Enriquez's conviction. The Constitution demands that an accused in a
51 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
criminal case be presumed innocent until otherwise proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
ROGELIO ABERCA, ET. AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, ET.AL.
GR. NO. L-69866 APRIL 15, 1988
DUMALANTA
DOCTRINE
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or
any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional
rights of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibilities. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the article.
Respondeat superior: A superior officer must not abdicate his duty to
properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held
responsible for gross negligence and of being held liable under the cited
provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the
tortfeasor.
FACTS:
The case is the aftermath of alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by the various
intelligence unit of the AFP, then known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM),
ordered by respondent General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist underground houses in view of
increasing reports to sow disturbances in Manila. Plaintiffs allege that
complying upon said directive, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing defective judicial search warrants and that many of plaintiffs
personal effects were seized. Plaintiffs were also arrested without proper
warrants and denied visits from relatives and lawyers, and that the
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence to obtain incriminating information and confessions.
Plaintiffs now seek actual/compensatory damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Respondent allege through then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza that:
a.) plaintiffs cannot cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because as to them, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; b.) assuming that the courts
can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for
acts done in the performance of their official duties, and c.) the complaint
states no cause of action against the defendants.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
ISSUES:
WON plaintiffs can sue respondents for damages despite the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as to them
WON the doctrine of respondeat superior applies in the instant case
HELD:
A.) YES. It is obvious that the purpose of Article 32 of the Civil Code is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined
in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. Respondents invocation of the doctrine of
state immunity from suit is misplaced; it may be that respondents, as
members of the AFP, were indeed merely responding to their duty, but this
cannot be a blanket license or a roving commission untrammelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties protected by the Constitution.
The court also disagreed with the contention that since the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to plaintiffs bars them from bringing
suit. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from the detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
B.) YES. While the doctrine of respondeat superior is limited to the
application to principal and agent and master and servant, the Court
considered applying the doctrine in relation to Article 32. Where the law
speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly
responsible for the violation of such Constitutional rights, it is not just the
actor alone who must answer for damages under the article; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party. Article 32 encompasses within the ambit of its
provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
ANITA MANGILA, VS. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ET. AL.
GR NO. 160739 JULY 17, 2013
DOCTRINE
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as a
substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and
consider questions of error that might be raised relation to procedure or on
the merits.
52 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities,
which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief,
but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding petitioner in custody, and the only
question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive
the prisoner of his liberty.
FACTS
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints against petitioner Anita
Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to PD 1689, and with violations of
Section 7(b) of RA 8042, were filed in the MTC of Puerto Princesa in
Palawan. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of
employment by Mangila and others to private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and online application without lawful
authority from the POEA.
The following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the
complaints. He accordingly issued a warrant of arrest for Mangila and her
cohorts without bail. The next day, the entire records of the cases and the
warrant was transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa city.
Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the NBI
headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila.
Claiming that respondent judge did not have authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation and that the preliminary investigation he
conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest;
and that the warrant of arrest was issued without sufficient justification or
without a finding of probable cause, Mangila filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for habeas corpus to obtain release from detention. She alleged
that habeas corpus was resorted to because she could no longer file a
motion to quash the warrant considering that respondent judge had
already forward the records of the case to the City Prosecutor, who had no
authority to lift or recall the warrant. The CA denied the petition.
ISSUE
WON habeas corpus is a proper remedy?
HELD
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
A.) NO. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the
questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to
the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be
preserved and not destroyed. The primary, if not the only object, of the
writ of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of the restraint under
which a person is held.
With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could
not be inquired into through the writ. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities to the attention of the City Prosecutor.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO VS. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ
GR No. 134504 March 17, 2000
DOCTRINE
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail
can be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting
bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended party just
because he was married to the deceased. In the interest of justice and in
view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the sister of the victim may
be deemed to be an offended party, and has the legal personality to
challenge the void order of the trial court.
FACTS
After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon
Sta.Romana-Narciso, wife of the plaintiff, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed the Information for
parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991 with the RTC.
On August 3, 1992 petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to allow
petitioner to post bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and
53 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
the same motion was granted on the same day, allowing the accused to
post bail at P150,000. On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor
representing respondent, the deceaseds sister, filed an opposition against
the motion for bail. Not obtaining any resolution, respondent filed her
petition for Ceriorari to the CA, which granted the same.
ISSUES
a.) WON the grant of bail to petitioner was valid?
b.) WON private respondent had legal standing to question the grant
before the CA?
HELD
A.) NO. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed
between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting
bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court
to receive and evaluate any evidence. In the application for bail of a
person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any inquiry
as to the weight to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The absence of objection
from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases,
for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he
is doing on account of familiarity with the case.
B.) YES. The offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as persons aggrieved. The crime charged against petitioner is
parricide, and he cannot be regarded as an offended party. No one can
expect his minor child to think and act for himself. The sister of the
deceased is a proper party-litigant who as akin to the offended party, she
being a closer relative. There is no other who may be expected to take up
the cudgels of justice for the deceased.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG THRU THE DOJ VS. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA AND JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ
GR No. 153675 April 19, 2007
DOCTRINE
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
The case of US vs. Hon. Purganan declared that the exercise of the right to
bail is limited to criminal proceedings. However, in the case of Mejoff vs.
Director of Prisons, bail has been granted to a prospective deportee, in
view of the adherence of the Philippines to the ICC on Political Rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue.
The right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. The Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
FACTS
On January 30, 1995, the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an extradition
agreement, which took effect on June 20, 1997.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3
counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent and 7 counts of
offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were then issued
against him, and if convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 years to 14 years
for each charge.
On September 13, 1999 the DOJ received from Hong Kong a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. On September 23, 1999 the
RTC Branch 19 of Manila issued an Order of Arrest and on the same day,
the NBI agents arrested and detained private respondent. On October 14,
1999 private respondent then questioned the validity of his arrest with the
CA. On December 18, 2000, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the
arrest.
As early as November 22, 1999 Hong Kong had already filed a petition for
extradition of private respondent. Private respondent filed in the same
case a petition for bail, which petitioner opposed. On October 8, 2001, the
judge denied the petition for bail on the ground that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that respondent is a high flight
risk. On December 20, 2001, respondent judge, acting on respondents
MR, allowed him to post bail. The next day, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order. Hence this recourse.
ISSUES
54 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
a.) WON private respondent was rightly allowed to post bail?
HELD
A.) YES.
In the case of Govt of US vs. Hon. Purganan, it was decided that the right
to bail is restricted to criminal cases and that it cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
However, the Court, in reconsidering and overturning Purganan, held that:
if bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Considering also that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, then it
can also be invoked in extradition cases. Both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the detainee is not in issue.
The Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual
is not impaired.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by: a.) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite and b.)
the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the
machinery of criminal law. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extradite may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
While the extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution.
BRICCIO RICKY A. POLLO VS. CHAIRPERSON KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET. AL.
GR No. 181881 October 18, 2011
DOCTRINE
OConnor vs. Ortega teaches that public employees expectations of
privacy in their offices, desks and file cabinets may be reduced by virtue of
actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. The
employees right of privacy must be assessed in the context of the
employment relation.
Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the
question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
must be addressed on a case-to-case basis.
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance
the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against
the governments need for supervision, control and efficient operation of
the workplace.
In contrast to law enforcement officials, public employers are not enforcers
of criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding
interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper
and efficient manner. Therefore, a probable cause requirement for
searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on
public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused
by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be
translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys
work, and ultimately to the public interest.
The existence of a privacy right involves a two-fold requirement: a.) that a
person has exhibited actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and b.)
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).
FACTS
Petitioner Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the SCS
Regional Office No. IV and was also the OIC of the Public Assistance and
Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint was addressed and
received by CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David. The anonymous
complaint alleges that an employee of the agency has been lawyering for
an accused government employee having a pending case with the CSC. It
also further alleged that the said employee is the chief of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program. Respondent David immediately formed
a team of four personnel with background in IT and issued a memo
directing them to conduct an investigation and back up all the files in the
computers found in the PALD and Legal Divisions.
The backing up of all the files at the PALD and Legal Services Division was
witnessed by several employees together with Directors Castillo and Unite.
At around 6:00 pm, Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner,
informing him of the ongoing copying of the computer files in their division
upon orders of the CSC Chair. Petitioner replied thru text that he was
leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he was going to get a lawyer.
55 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Upon examination, it was found that the contents of the diskettes were
files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings and/or letters
in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On
the basis of this finding, respondent David issued a Show-Cause Order
against petitioner dated January 11, 2007.
Respondent David observed that the files of petitioner were draft pleadings
for and on behalf of parties who were facing charges as respondents in
administrative cases. This then gave rise to the inference that the one who
prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and
advancing interests inimical and adverse to the interest of the CSC as the
central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline
misfeasance and malfeasance in the service. The number of pleadings also
entailed that the person was not into isolated practice, but was doing it
with regularity. And since the draft pleadings were obtained from
petitioners computer, it raised the presumption that he was the one
responsible or aided in their preparation. One pleading even had a line
inserted into it that said Eric N. Estrallado, Epal kulang and bayad mo.
On February 26, 2007, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of RA 6713. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer, alleging that the charge was
without basis since the evidence proceeded from an illegal search which
was beyond the authority of the CSC chair.
Eventually, on July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420 where
petitioner was accordingly found guilty of the charges against him and
dismissed from the service.
ISSUES
a.) WON the search conducted on petitioners computer transgresses his
constitutional right to privacy?
b.) WON the search of petitioners files was reasonably conducted?
c.) WON the CSC was correct in finding petitioner guilty of the charges and
dismissing him from service?
HELD
A.) NO. The Civil Service Commission and the Supreme Court relied on the
US cases of OConnor vs. Ortega and U.S vs. Simons to reach a decision.
Ortega is the authority for the view that government agencies, in their
capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct
search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the
 POLIREV [4C] BILL OF RIGHTS
probable cause or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Simons
declared that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any
inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its
employees.

The Supreme Court explained thus: the constitutional guarantee is not a

prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable ones. It
is the nature of government offices that others may have frequent access
to an individuals office. Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally
protected privacy interests of government employees for non-
investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness
under all circumstances. A search of an employees office by a supervisor
will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for non-
investigatory work-related purposes.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy

either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone. He did not also allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees to access his
files. Under the circumstances, it could hardly be deduced that petitioner
had such reasonable expectation of privacy. The CSC also has Office
Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 that stated that employees waived privacy
rights over their computers and that passwords do not imply such privacy.

B.) YES. When the computers of the PALD and Legal Services were backed
up, several key personnel were present to witness it. Petitioner was also
informed thru text that his files were being backed-up.

C.) YES. The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial
number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored in petitioners
computer. There was also the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the
witnesses presented during the formal investigation. The CSCs factual
finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of
the office computer was well-supported by the evidence on record. There
was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CSC and the CA.

56 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), DUMALANTA, GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO