Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DOI 10.1007/s10584-007-9269-9
Received: 14 February 2006 / Accepted: 11 April 2007 / Published online: 7 July 2007
# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007
Abstract This article presents an analytical framework for analyzing Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) projects in terms of their contribution to employment generation, equal
distribution of CDM returns, and improvement of local air quality. It assesses 16 officially
registered CDM projects with regard to whether they fulfill the two objectives required by
the Kyoto Protocol: greenhouse gas emission reductions and contribution to sustainable
development in the host country. While a large part (72%) of the total portfolios expected
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are likely to represent real and measurable emission
reductions, less than 1% are likely to contribute significantly to sustainable development in
the host country. According to our analysis, there are currently no UNFCCC registered
CDM projects that are likely to fulfill the Kyoto Protocols twofold objective of
simultaneously delivering greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction and contributing to
sustainable development.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was designed with two objectives: To
contribute to local sustainable development in the host country and to assists Annex-I
countries to achieve their emission reduction targets in a cost-efficient manner (UNFCCC
C. Sutter
South Pole Carbon Asset Management, Technoparkstrasse 1, 8005 Zrich, Switzerland
Present address:
J. C. Parreo
Schuitenweg 33, 2586 AE Den Haag, The Netherlands
juancaparre@hotmail.com
Present address:
C. Sutter (*)
Zrichstrasse 123, CH-8700 Ksnacht, Switzerland
e-mail: christoph.sutter@gmx.ch
76 Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590
Table 1 Overview of sustainable development criteria and respective indicators as applied in this study
1997). The CDM inherited its twin objective from the two main instruments that were
merged into the CDM. The sustainable development objective originates from the proposed
Clean Development Fund (CDF), whereas the objective of cost-efficient emission
reductions was the main driver behind the concept of Joint Implementation (JI). As a
consequence of the amalgam, the CDM was given a twin objective. Hence, the question
rose: Is it possible to fulfill both these objectives through one single mechanism? Sutter
(2003) identified a trade-off between the two objectives of the CDM in favor of the cost-
efficient emission reductions goal.
The Marrakech Accords affirm that it is the host Partys prerogative to confirm whether
a clean development mechanism project activity assists it in achieving sustainable
development (UNFCCC 2002). Consequently, non-Annex I countries can define the
sustainable development requirements for CDM projects in their country according to their
own wishes. At the same time, most countries will not have the market power to
considerably influence the global market price for emission reductions. Competition among
non-Annex I parties in attracting CDM investments could, therefore, create an incentive to
set low sustainable development standards in order to attract more projects with low
abatement costs. This could lead to a race to the bottom in terms of sustainable
development standards with non-Annex I parties undercutting each other to attract CDM
investments (Kelly and Helme 2000), thereby weakening the sustainable development
objective.
The absence of international sustainable development standards alongside a highly
competitive supply side of the CDM is likely to cause a trade-off in favor of the cost-
efficient emission reduction objective. Neither Annex I countries nor single non-Annex I
parties have direct incentives to implement strict sustainable development criteria (Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the theoretical and highly hypothetical distribution of CDM projects that
would be required if no trade-off existed. Absence of a trade off between abatement costs
and sustainable development objectives would only be possible if all projects were located
on a strictly decreasing function in the cost-sustainable development space.
Such a clear correlation could not been described for CDM projects so far. If it is
assumed that such a strictly decreasing function does not exist within the worldwide pool of
potential CDM projects,1 then, a trade-off between the two objectives of the CDM is likely
to exist.
This paper analyzes the first 16 registered CDM projects to see whether a trade-off
between objectives exists.
1
Empiric data that supports this intuition can be found, for example, in Sutter et al. (2001). In fact, the
authors show that some of the projects analysed showed a very high degree of sustainable development but at
the same time enormous abatement costs.
Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590 77
- 0/0 +
Contribution to
sustainable development
-
Fig. 1 Theoretical, highly hypothetical distribution of CDM projects (indicated by squares) in the cost-
sustainable development space, which would ensure no trade-off between the twin objective of CDM
2 Methodology of evaluation
The Assessment of CDM projects, on the basis of their fulfillment of the two objectives of
the CDM, is based on the methodology Multi-Attributive Assessment of CDM (MATA-
CDM). This methodology was introduced by Sutter (2003) to evaluate the contribution of
CDM projects to sustainable development in host countries and is based on the Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT).2
The objective of MATA-CDM is to generate a holistic overview assessment of the
sustainable development contribution of CDM projects rather than a strictly scientific
evaluation of single parameters. It draws from various disciplines and is designed to assist
decision makers, aiming at being accurate and practical at the same time.
Figure 2 shows the five assessment steps and the central equation of MATA-CDM to
compute the overall utility of CDM projects. The formula presents the weighted sum of
utilities of the assessment criteria.
There are no fixed sets of assessment criteria within MATA-CDM; they are to be
identified in the first step. Since sustainable development is a very complex concept, a good
balance between manageability and scope should be found when selecting the criteria.
Consequently, evaluators should be aware of the normative nature of criteria selection. The
2
For an introduction and overview of MAUT, see e.g. De Montis et al. 2000 or Scholz and Tietje 2002.
78 Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590
Steps of MATA-CDM
Step 1: Identification of
sustainability criteria
i =1
Step 3: Weighting the criteria
Fig. 2 Steps involved in MATA-CDM and its central equation to compute the overall utility of CDM
projects
tool allows for a combination of criteria from different disciplines, as in this case from
economics, social sciences, and natural sciences. However, mapping contributions to
sustainable development by selected indicators remains a simplified construction of reality
and results should be interpreted accordingly.
The advantage of MAUT is that indicators can be measured in the units that best suit the
nature of each specific criterion. The concept of utility allows the quantities to be
normalized with different units and aggregated into a single value. All indicators are
measured against a reference case the so called baseline. For this study, the same baseline
scenarios have been used as defined in the validated and registered Project Design
Documents (PDDs).3
Each criterion selected during Step 1 of MATA-CDM must be specified and
supplemented with a clearly defined and assessable indicator. Indicators measure the extent
to which a CDM project meets the sustainable development (SD) criteria. The set of criteria
used for this study is shown in.
3
Defining baseline scenarios is a complex and much debated process. The purpose of this paper is not to
elaborate on various baseline possibilities. Therefore, baseline scenarios as registered at UNFCCC were used
for the evaluated projects.
Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590 79
In the following section the details regarding the indicators and their utility functions are
presented. In order to make the utility function more manageable for decision makers, their
values are rated with three letters: A, B and C. Thus, arithmetical operations will be
conducted with the numbers and the letter representation allows for a better communication
of how projects contribute to sustainable development. Such a presentation of ratings is
more manageable among decision makers and other stakeholders.
It is widely agreed that employment generation and poverty reduction are strong
components of sustainable development (United Nations 2005). Thus, CDM projects are
evaluated in regard to the amount of employment they generate measured in person months
during construction and operation of the projects and expressed as person month per 1,000
CERs. The formula to calculate employment generation (EG) is as follows:
JP JB
EG person months per 1;000 CERs
CERp
where JP = the total amount of person months created by the project, including the
construction and operation phases; JB = the total amount of person months created in the
baseline case; CERp = Emission Reductions (1,000 CERs)
For the purpose of this assessment, the projects will be qualified as shown in Table 2:
To assess the likely distribution of CER returns, the ownership structures of project
activities were analyzed. Evaluation of the ownership structure for CDM projects was
developed from the theoretical perspective of the Normative Stakeholder Approach
(Mygind 2004). It has evolved into the Analytical Shareholder Approach, where specific
weight, benefits and rights of the different stakeholders are considered (Mygind 2004).
Consequently, the distribution of power and benefits among stakeholders of a CDM project
activity can be deduced from its ownership structure.
Several ownership structures can be found in the literature, where ownership is
categorized as: state, international, individuals, financial, and non-financial (Bhren and
degaard 2001), or in simpler models as: state, private and foreign. It is also stated that the
ownership has an effect on wage interception and rent sharing, based on evidence that the
share of rents taken by workers in local companies tend to be higher that the ones working
in foreign companies (Dobbelaere 2004). For the purpose of the study, the ownership
structures of the projects are classified in Table 3:
Table 2 Utility and rating of criterion employment generation (adapted from Sutter 2003)
Largest fraction of profits from CER revenues flows to the poorer 50% of host 1 A
country population (e.g. project owner is small producer association).
Largest fraction of profits from CER revenues flows to the host country population 0.5 B
(e.g. project owner is a corporation of the host country, host country owned entity).
Largest fraction of profits from CER revenues flows to people outside the host 0 C
country (e.g. project owner is a internationally hold corporation).
Project activity reduces revenues of the host country. 0.5 D
Project activity reduces revenues of the poorer 50% of host country population. 1 E
MATA-CDM was used to evaluate whether the goal of sustainable development is met and to
what extent. A measure of the likelihood that the emission reductions claimed by the project
activity are really occurring is required to evaluate the emission reduction objective (Table 5).
To do this a rating system was applied which was not included in the sustainable development
rating of the project activities but was an indicator for the emission reduction objective.
Emission reduction calculations of CDM project activities are defined with the help of a
baseline scenario, which is by definition counterfactual as it describes what would have
happened in the absence of the project activity. Therefore, it is not possible to say with 100%
certainty whether a particular CER from a CDM project activity truly reflects real emission
reductions, thus is additional.4 However, a likelihood for emission reductions to be real and
additional can be indicated. We use the expected profitability increase of a project thanks to
the CDM registration as the indicator for this likelihood. The chosen profitability measure is
the projects Internal Rate of Return (IRR), hence the indicator is defined as IRR = IRR of
CDM project IRR of baseline. If the CDM makes a significant change in profitability, i.e.,
project shows a large IRR, then there is a high likelihood that the project is truly additional.
On the other hand, a CDM project showing only a slight IRR increase (or even a decrease) is
likely to be implemented even without the CDM. Three project categories were identified
each expressing the likelihood for real and additional CERs:
It should be noticed that this indicator includes remarkably high IRRs. This is due to the
high profitability that some CDM projects can achieve related to the necessary investments
and are also considerably affected by the global warming potential (GWP)5 of certain
gases. For example, each tonne of reduced HFC-23, whose GWP is 11,700, equals to
11,700 tonnes of CO2 equivalents and thus increases the profits from this type of projects.
4
On the different concepts of additionality see e.g. Greiner and Michaelowa (2003).
5
A measurement technique to define the relative contribution of each GHG to atmospheric warming. (IPCC,
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/168.htm).
Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590 81
The 16 CDM projects assessed in the analysis correspond to the projects registered at
UNFCCC as of August 30, 2005 (UNFCCC 2005; Table 6). Most of the information was
obtained from the Project Design Documents (PDDs) available on the UNFCCC web site
and scientific literature on different project types. As per U.N. rules, all PDDs have been
validated by independent validators (Designated Operational Entities, DOEs). Additionally,
a survey was sent to all the 16 project developers for detailed questions about the
sustainable development criteria discussed above. Four out of the sixteen responded. The
projects were evaluated on the basis of their contribution to sustainable development as per
the three criteria: employment generation, distribution of CER returns, and local air quality.
The portfolio evaluated consists of nine renewable power projects, three landfill gas
recovery projects, two Trifluoromethane (HFC-23) reduction projects, one fuel switch
project and one energy efficiency project applied in housing. The portfolio includes nine
small-scale and seven large scale project activities in nine countries.
3 Results
Our analysis of the approved CDM projects shows that the current CDM portfolio has a minor
effect on employment in host countries. Ninety-nine percent of the CERs come from projects
that are rated C regarding employment generation. In fact, the portfolios average CER
generates around 235 person months of additional employment per projects with an A rating,
3.5 for those with a B rating and 0.1 for those with a C rating, resulting in a portfolio average of
2.3 person month per 1,000 CERs. This low average is the result of large-volume projects such
as Trifluoromethane (HFC-23) decomposition projects, which are end-of-the-pipe solutions and
do not have a substantial employment effect. On the other end of the spectrum, the portfolio
includes a few small-scale projects in the biomass power generation sector that show very high
employment effects (over 300 person month per CER; Tables 7 and 8).
Table 5 Scale of indictor likelihood of real emission reductions and corresponding additionality rating
IRR>100% A
5%<IRR<100% B
IRR<5% C
82 Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590
Table 6 Overview of portfolio of CDM project activities approved by August 30, 2005
Table 6 (continued)
The majority of projects (13 out of 16) and the majority of CERs generated by the CDM
project portfolio (76%) have a B-rating for the distribution of project returns. Eleven of the
B-rated projects are owned by local private companies, while two are government owned
Portfolio analysis CERs from first Percent of portfolio Average person month/1,000
7 years (%) CER
projects. The assessment methodology assumes that when a project is owned by a local
private company or by the government, the largest fraction of profits from CER revenues
paid to the project participants flows to the host countrys population (Tables 9 and 10).
Twenty-three percent of all CERs are generated by projects owned by transnational private
companies, where it can be assumed that the largest fraction of profits from CER revenues
flows to people outside the host country. Only 0.3% of the portfolios CERs are A-rated
since their revenues are likely to flow to the poorer 50% of the host country population.
These are the most likely projects to directly contribute to poverty reduction.
Table 9 Ratings of registered CDM project activities regarding distribution of CER revenues
Table 10 Portfolio analysis of registered CDM project activities regarding distribution of CER revenues
Regarding improvements on local air quality per generated CER, three different groups of
projects within the current CDM project portfolio were identified. First, there are projects
that do not considerably reduce major local air pollutants. By volume of CERs this is the
largest group (96%) and includes projects that mainly eliminate Trifluoromethane (HFC-
23), and methane (CH4), which were given C-ratings regarding local air quality (see
Tables 11 and 12). Second are projects that either replace fossil intensive grid electricity or
undertake a fuel switch mainly from coal to natural gas. They account for 3% of total CERs
and were given a B-rating, which corresponds to considerable decrease in odor and/or
moderate decrease in respiratory disease pollutants or carcinogens. Finally, the remaining
1% of CERs comes from small-scale project activities that received an A-rating for local air
quality because they replace electricity generated by diesel generators.
In contrast to the low ranking of most CERs in the three sustainable development criteria,
the majority (72%) of CERs in the current CDM portfolio got an A-ranking for
additionality, this means that there is a high likelihood that the emission reductions happen
only due to the CDM component of the project. This result is influenced by the fact that the
largest two projects (both HFC-23 reduction projects) had an A-rating additionality. In
NovaGerar Landfill Gas to energy Project Mainly decrease in CH4 and odor C
Rio Blanco Small Hydroelectric Project Decrease of diesel generator pollutants A
GHG emission reduction by thermal oxidation of HFC 23 in Gujarat C
Decrease in HFC23
HFC Decomposition Project in Ulsan C
Cuyamapa Hidroelectric Project Decrease of fossil power plant pollutants B
e7 Bhutan Micro Hydro Power CDM Project Decrease of diesel generator pollutants A
Biomass in Rajasthan Electricity generation from mustard crop residues Decrease of fossil power plant pollutants B
Cortecito and San Carlos Hydroelectric Project Decrease of fossil power plant pollutants B
Santa Cruz landfill gas combustion project Mainly decrease in CH4 and odor C
Huitengxile Windfarm Project Decrease of fossil power plant pollutants B
Graneros Plant Fuel Switching Project Private company transnational C
5 MW Dehar Grid-connected SHP in Himachal Pradesh Decrease of diesel generator pollutants A
Clarion Biomass Power Project Decrease of diesel generator pollutants A
Salvador da Bahia Landfill Gas Management Project Mainly decrease in CH4 and odor C
La Esperanza Hydroelectric Power Decrease of fossil power plant pollutants B
Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade project, Khayelitsha Reduction in NOx and SOx at house level B
86 Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590
contrast, the majority of projects (11 out of 16) had a low probability of being additional
and was rated C for additionality. For details, see Tables 13 and 14.
After discussing the different evaluation criteria separately, we summarize the project ratings in
Table 15. Each project was given three ratings in the sustainable development field and one
additionality rating expressing the projects likelihood to generate real emission reductions.
To synthesize the findings, the three sustainable development criteria have been
integrated according to Step five of MATA-CDM, using equal weightings as shown in
Table 16. Together with the indicator for the likelihood of real emission reductions (the
additionality rating) the average sustainable development rating makes possible and
assessment of CDM projects for meeting the twin objective of the CDM.
The two indicators allow us to position all projects of the CDM portfolio in the two-
dimensional space of their contribution to sustainable development versus the likelihood of
emission reductions (Fig. 3). The size of dots plotted in Fig. 3 represents the CER volume
of the particular projects. Projects that contribute to both objectives of the CDM to
Table 15 Rating of the different indicator; for sustainable development indicators numeric values as well as
responding A,B,C ratings are presented
Table 16 Synthesized results: sustainable development and additionality rating of all registered projects (as
of August 30, 2005)
*Due to CDM transaction costs CDM project IRR estimated to be lower than baseline IRR
Biomass
0.8
Hydro
.
0.6
I IV
Fig. 3 Registered CDM project activities in the emission reduction sustainable development space. For
graphical purposes (log scale) negative IRR were set to 0.1%
Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590 89
Table 17 Distribution of CERs between likelihood of real emissions reductions and contribution to
sustainable development
contribute to one of the two CDM objectives, but neither contributes strongly to both
objectives. In addition, around 25% of all projects have neither a relevant contribution to
sustainable development nor are they likely to generate real emission reductions. This
means that they serve neither of the two CDM objectives as stated in the Kyoto Protocol.
If the volume of CERs is considered, a clear tendency of the CDM to deliver real
emission reductions but not to contribute towards host countrys sustainable development
can be observed. The portfolio is dominated by a few large projects with a high likelihood
to reduce emissions but no relevant contribution to host countries sustainable development
(95.7% of CERs volume are located in quadrant II of Fig. 3). This is evidence that the
trade-off is strongly in favor of the cost-efficient emission reduction objective, while
neglecting the sustainable development objective. To conclude, the applied analysis
suggests that currently registered CDM projects may be far from delivering their claims to
promoting sustainable development.
Nevertheless, as indicated in Section 3.1, the outcomes obtained here are depending on
the simplification of the concept of sustainable development represented in the selected
indicators. With the addition of different indicators and different normative weightings,
different outcomes may have been obtained.
Designed as a market mechanism, the CDM intends to make use of market forces.
However, so far, only one of the two CDM objectives is measured by the market: emission
reductions are given a price per reduced ton of CO2 equivalent. Currently, contributions to
sustainable development are not well reflected in CER prices. To be able to differentiate
CER prices regarding sustainable development, respective information from underlying
CDM projects has to be made available. The tool presented in this paper aids decision
maker to differentiate between projects as it makes information regarding sustainable
development available. Bringing such information to the market is a basis to differentiate
prices of CERs according to the sustainable development benefits of the underlying
projects. A premium price for CERs from projects with a strong contribution to sustainable
development might increase the share of such projects in global carbon markets.
References
Bhren , degaard BA (2001) Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set. Nord J
Polit Econ 27(1):5586
De Montis A et al. (2000) MCDA and sustainable development a comparison of methods, Working paper.
Universita di Cagliari, Cagliari
Dobbelaere S (2004) Ownership, firm size and rent sharing in Bulgaria. Labour Econ 11(2):165189
90 Climatic Change (2007) 84:7590
Greiner S, Michaelowa A (2003) Defining investment additionality for CDM projects practical approaches.
Energy Policy 31(10):10071015
Kelly C, Helme N (2000) Ensuring CDM project compatibility. Working paper. Center for Clean Air Policy,
Washington (www.ccap.org)
Mygind N (2004) Shareholder, stakeholder-owner or broad stakeholder maximization, Copenhagen Business
School. Working paper No. 53 presented at the IAFEP (International Association For the Economics of
Participation) 12th Biannual Conference, Mending the Global Economy: A Role for Economic
Participation. St. Marys University, Halifax, 810 July 2004
Scholz RW, Tietje O (2002) Embedded case study methods. Sage, Thousand Oaks, London
Sutter C (2003) Sustainability check-up for CDM projects: How to assess the sustainability of international
projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin
Sutter C et al. (2001) Small-scale CDM. Opportunities and limits, study on behalf of Swiss development co-
operation. Factor Consulting and Management AG, Zurich
UNFCCC (1997) Kyoto protocol to the UN framework convention on climate change. United Nations, New
York
UNFCCC (2002) Report of the conference of the parties on its seventh session, held at Marrakesh from 29
October to 10 November 200, Addendum. Part two: action taken by the conference of the parties.
Volume II. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2
UNFCCC (2005) CDM projects and methodologies database. http://unfccc.int/2860.php/
United Nations (2005) Millennium development goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/