POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN
GR NO. L- 14639 MARCH 25, 1919
DOCTRINE:
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy,
and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives."
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of
ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers.
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings,
and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board
the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment
of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court. The application set forth the salient facts, which need
not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally re- strained of
their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The
writ was made returnable before the full court. The court awarded the writ
1 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
which directed them to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant the petition for
habeas corpus.
2. WON the writ may be granted even if the parties in whose behalf it
was asked were under no restraint; that they were free in Davao, and
the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend
beyond the city limits
HELD:
1. Yes. The fiscal contended that the writ should have been asked for in
the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made
returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that,
to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first
instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus
may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made
returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests
in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the
Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had
any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the
other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and
the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was
shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the
Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
2. Yes. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women
of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going
when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila
and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would
mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle
should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court
and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo
the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even
if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police,
acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow
the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
Government of Laws. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta
decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed,
or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1
eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
2 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106
U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable
in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself."
TUASON VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY
GR NO. 70484
DOCTRINE:
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those
facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises.
These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of
jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide
or determine a cause.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On
April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and
savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel)
a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's
subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale,
Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new
one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took
possession of their property.
They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were
no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-
earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision
had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide
occupants thereof."
A year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand
Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers,
issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree
invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had
earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently
subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate
(one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act
No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Said Presidential Decree No. 293
made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314,
of the following:
MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate
of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered
cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is
declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc.
ARGUMENTS:
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them
of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the
constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of
the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens
titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the
derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the
alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance
Fund.
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment
on the petition, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of
certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the
public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial
officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses
had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in
legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of
non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and
the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the
Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing
housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left
homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park
where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too,
that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the
Assurance Fund.
3 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
ISSUE:
1. WON the remedy of certiorari is proper considering that Pres. Marcos
is neither a judicial or quasi-judicial officer.
2. Whether or not PD 293, as exercise of the Presidents emergency
powers, is valid
HELD:
1. Yes. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly
issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of
prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or
ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the
writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule
treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial
or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in
reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
2. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to
those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the
premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an
exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or
try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an
established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of
the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms,
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ...
(the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to
that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has
remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the
members of said association has never ceased to form part of the
property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts
affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said
property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the
law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari,
because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a
judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr.
Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the
circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts
were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly
beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had
assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the
relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all
interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence
to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the
controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the
records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is
no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and
that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the
petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never
confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their
trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet
another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly
violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are
entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not
only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the
Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it
unconstitutionally.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
GR NO. L-45081
DOCTRINE:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
4 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial
board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest,
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest
in question was filed out of the prescribed period
Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"
alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,
denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative,
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
HELD:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable
and appropriate cases.
In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly
of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
5 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations
which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both
the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is
not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4)
creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is
also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly
that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the
period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of
the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the
legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created
with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to,
but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to
act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of
the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner,
the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by
admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary
processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however,
that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much
confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the
proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great
ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be
desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate
power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which
the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had
been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature
at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged
in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole
judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix
the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
6 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that
the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the
Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope
and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy,
we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within
the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission
is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS
G.R. 88211 September 15, 1989
CRUZ, CHANINE
DOCTRINE:
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as
a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare; The
right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel.
FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into
exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed
coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses
themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition to order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Manglapus, et. al to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family, and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Marcos invokes
the constitutional guarantees of liberty of abode and right to travel.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos
to the Philippines?
(2) Whether or not Marcos liberty of abode and travel are impaired by
Pres. Aquino/s prohibition of their return?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light
of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from
their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in
chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision.
Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
7 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat,
peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting)
bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the
situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court: We cannot also lose sight of the fact that
the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought
about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their
close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government
has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
(2) No. In essence, the right involved in this case is the right to return to
ones country, which is a separate and distinct right from the liberty of
abode and the right to travel. These two rights may only be restricted by
reasons of national security, public order, public health, etc. Being distinct
from each other, it would be inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to ones country in the same context as those two other
rights. Our Bill of Rights only embraces the liberty of abode and the right
to travel, but we must take into consideration this right to return, pursuant
to the generally accepted principles of international law.
CASIBANG vs AQUINO
G.R. L-38025 August 20, 1979
DOCTRINE:
A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
FACTS:
Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein
petitioner, Dante Casibang who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971
a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral
precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of
petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by
respondent Judge Aquino, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is
unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972,
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation
No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and
two mont hs t he reafte r, m ore or le ss, or specifically on Nov
29, 1972, the 1971Const it utional Conve nt ion passed and a
p p r o v e d a C o n s t i t u t i o n t o s u p p l a n t t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitutin; and
the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people
of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on
March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect". The
petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had
rested his case, when Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the
ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally (Section 9 of
Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2of Article XI) a political question has
intervened in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question?
RULING:
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy.
No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of
the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election
protest.
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
par la nce , name ly, a q uest i on of p o l icy . It refer s t o th o se q
u e s t i o n s w h i c h u n d e r t h e Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should
proceed.
GARCIA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992
DOCTRINE:
The President is authorized by the Congress to fix tariff rates and other
duties and imposts; The Tariff and Customs Code establishes the general
standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
8 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be
exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security."|||
FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and
other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public
hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and
appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which
levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per
liter of imported oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to
enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course,
within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that
they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. There is
explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2] of Article VI of the
Constitution) to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within
specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." The
relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.
These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in
promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards
with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is
the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that
delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is
the sum total or the alpha and omega of "the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and
policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the
protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our
population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national
economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local
industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed
precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and
shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized
local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community. Hence,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which levied special duties on imported crude oil and
imported oil products as a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority
under the Tariff and Customs Code.
ARANETA VS DINGLASAN
G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949
CRUZ, CHRISTINE
DOCTRINE:
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must
be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency.
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of three petitions filed by J. Araneta (who is
prosecuted under Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings), Antonio Ma. Guerrerro (who filed
a mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and
the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes but
denied because it violates E.O 192, which aims to control exports from the
Philippines), and Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., (application for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing
money under this Executive Order. Affected here is Executive Order No.
226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection
with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in
November, 1949).
The common factor among these cases is the challenge on validity of
executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
During World War II, on December 16, 1941, Congress enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 671 otherwise known as the AN ACT DECLARING A
STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
9 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Commonwealth Act No.
671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of
the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished,
the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to
as additional aid to interpretation.
Under this law, Congress delegated its legislative power to the President
during a time of war as provided for in Section 26 Art. VI of the
Constitution. On June 21, 1947 Pursuant to this delegation, the President
issued Executive Orders regulating rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings etc. The petitioner specifically Araneta, is under
prosecution for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and
prays for the issuance of the Writ of Prohibition contending that the
Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect.
ISSUE:
When did the Emergency Powers Act become inoperative?
HELD:
The SC ruled that Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session on May 25, 1946. Since the assailed executive orders were
issued after the said date, they were issued without authority of law.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness,
but Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for a limited period." Emergency, in order to justify the
delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said
to be an emergency. It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671
was approved with this limitation in view.
The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be
in harmony with the Constitution. If a new and different law were
necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, would
be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended
to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law. After the
convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the
continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. The
fact that Congress was able to hold a regular session denotes that the
emergency such as war which caused congress to delegate its legislative
powers to the president no longer existed. The holding of a regular session
by Congress has made the Emergency Powers Act automatically
inoperative.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Separate opinions:
Act no. 671 should have become inoperative when Congress held a special
session on June 9, 1945. The SC did not appreciate the fact that a special
session also signifies that congress is no longer prevented to conduct
sessions by the threat of war or emergency. Also there shouldnt have
been a blanket voiding of all executive orders after Act no. 671 became
inoperative since those laws have created rights for the people and have
been issued in good faith. There should have been a careful deliberation by
congress for each executive order on whether or not they could stand as
valid laws on their own.
CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS
G.R. No. 96754. June 22, 1995
DOCTRINE:
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered
or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may
be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the
challenged legislation.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Art. X, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A.
No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
calling for a plebiscite to be held in several provinces of Mindanao. In the
ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in
favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and TawiTawi. In accordance with the
constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and
cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of
R.A. No. 6734 provides, that only the provinces and cities voting favorably
in such plebiscites shal be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing
administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Pursuant to the
10 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "Providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners at the time of the filing of their petition, are members of
Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotabato,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On
November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No.
429. They contended that there is no law which authorizes the President to
pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions some of
which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province
of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz
and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand,
the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that
"provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing administrative regions.
Simply stated, petitioners contention is that ---while the authority
necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does
not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's
authority under RA No. 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to reorganize.
Another petition was filed a Jaldon, filing in his capacity as taxpayer and
citizen of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX,
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge
[by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate
provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the
power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
ISSUE:
1.WON the president has the authority to reorganize the said province/
WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to the president
2. Won the Congress has provided sufficient standard by w/c the president
is to be guided in the exercise of such power
HELD:
1. There is no undue delegation. In conferring on the President the power
"to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following
the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The
choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the
country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
local governments but also the direction of executive departments which
the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in
Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
2. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it
may be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the
challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing
administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were
established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in
authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of
the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of
Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of
administrative regions.
The reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on
relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (a)
transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language
grouping (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers
adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in
the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
KUROSAWA VA JALANDONI
G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949
DOCTRINE:
International rules and principles, form part of the law of our nation even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them,
for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
11 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
have been or shall be a signatory.
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines, is charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to
control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the
laws and customs of war." Petitimer Kuroda comes before this Court
seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S.
Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's
case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit
respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Executive Order No. 68, established a National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals.It was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day
of July, 1947.
Petitioner's contention:
1. E.O 68 is unconstitutional for it violates not only the provisions of our
constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that)
the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention
on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner
is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international.
2. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner
before the Commission in behalf of the United States of America, of
attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
3. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the
United States not being a party in interest in the case.
ISSUE:
WON E.O 68 is unconstitutional on the ground that the philippines is not a
signatory of the mentioned conventions.
HELD:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
E.O 68 is valid. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of
international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the
Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military
of civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan,
who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles,
therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not
a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to
the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States,
and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state
entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those
who committed crimes against our people.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts
the generaly accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation.( tingin ko 1935 constitution to since 1943 case)
Add'l info:
There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel
appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice
law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is
common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually
military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal
training.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law,
with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the
12 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not
interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission.
Dissenting opinion:
Executive Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure for the conduct of
trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court. It further authorizes military
commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate
that power to military commissions.
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the
Philippines emergency powers to promulgate rules and regulations during
national emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the
Philippines, or at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on September 2,
1945. The absurdity of the contention that these emergency acts
continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid.
Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of
Japan, the Congress started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on
continuance prevail will result in the existence of two distinct, separate
and independent legislative organs. the Congress and the President of
the Philippines.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION
G.R. NO. 139465, JANUARY 18, 2000
GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national
or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
FACTS:
In 1977, Marcos issued PD 1069, prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.
Consequently, Secretary of Justice Drilon signed the RP-US Extradition
Treaty. The Senate also expressed its concurrence in the ratification of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
said treaty. In 1994, DOJ received from the U.S. DFA a diplomatic note
requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached was the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court.
Jimenez appears to be charged with conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; attempt to evade or defeat tax; fraud by wire,
radio, or television; false statement or entries; election contributions in
name of another.
Jimenez, subsequently, requested that he be given at least a copy of, or
access to, the request of the US Government. However, Sec. Drilon denied
the request stating that evaluation by this Department of the documents is
not a preliminary investigation or akin to preliminary investigation of
criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It is only after the filing of
the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition
documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents. Moreover, the formal request
for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy
rules under United States law.
Jimenez then filed with RTC Manila a petition against the Secretary, et al.
for mandamus to compel Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity
to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively; prohibition to
restrain DOJ from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court. RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE:
WON Jimenezs entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.
HELD:
No. The rule of pacta sunt servanda equires the parties to a treaty to keep
their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's
legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
13 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law
form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed
to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or
local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them; in a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs
of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national
or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
In the case at bar, there is no conflict between international law and
municipal or national law. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty/PD 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings. Prior the filing of petition to extradite, the law is silent as to
these rights. Thus, in the absence of a law or principle of law, we must
apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Take note that Jimenez does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually
lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. He faces the threat of
arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even
during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest
allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation
process, in essence, partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation
making available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extradite.
ALIH, ET AL. V. GEN. GASTRO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-69401, JUNE 23, 1987
DOCTRINE:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Respondents defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the
civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
FACTS:
More than 200 Philippine marines raided (commonly known as operation
zona) the compound occupied by Alih, et al. in Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The initial
reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with
a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely
to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as
might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon
enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued,
resulting in a number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered
the following morning. The military also inventoried and confiscated rifles,
grenades, among others. Alih, et al. filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order to
recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as
evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-
incrimination. They argued further that these were taken without a search
warrant pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which
was inforce at the time of the incident in question, and Article IV, Section
4(2).
Respondents, while admitting the absence of the required search warrant,
sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under
superior orders, and it was necessary because of the aggravation of the
peace and order problem generated by the assassination of the Mayor.
ISSUE:
WON the civilian authority has been bypassed and thus violated the
Constitutional rights of the petitioners.
HELD:
Yes. The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state
of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
14 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
committed therein against the petitioners. Alih, et al. were merely
suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and
not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were
assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not
have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which
covers both the innocent and the guilty.
Moreover, if the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when
they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing
so. In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in
the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-
passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead,
they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was
in fact not urgent. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga
City before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside
the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely
no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required
by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into
the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of
the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against
the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree."
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 151445, APRIL 11, 2002
DOCTRINE:
Sections 2, 7, and 8 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are
allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
FACTS:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
In 2002, personnel from the armed forces of USA started arriving in
Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." In theory, they are a simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Prior to 2002, the last
"Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal
agreement relative to the treatment of United States personnel visiting the
Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments of the two
countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of
consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999. The entry of American troops
into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism
campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
Consequently, Lim, et al.filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They argued that the
Philippines and US signed the mutual defense treaty (MDT) in 1951 to
provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the 'constitutional
processes' of each country only in the case of an armed attack by an
external aggressor, meaning a third country against one of them. By no
stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandits in
Basilan constitute an external armed force that has subject the Philippines
to an armed external attack to warrant US military assistance under the
MDT of 1951. Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to
engage in combat operations in Philippine territory, not even to fire back
"if fired upon.
On the other hand, Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of
Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," the
issues raised by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a
fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Apart from these
threshold issues, the Solicitor General claims that there is actually no
question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant suit, it
is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the VFA.
ISSUE:
WON Balikatan 02-01 is constitutional.
WON American troops may engage in combat while in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the
decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense
relations, until it was replaced by the VFA. It should be recalled that in
15 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
2000, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The VFA provides the
"regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian
personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with
activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains provisions
relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle
registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation,
movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the
agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued
relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to
facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and
Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe. Now,
is "Balikatan 02-1" covered by the VFA? The VFA permits United States
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined. However, applying the provisions of
the Vienna Convention to interpret the treaty, it appears that the Terms of
Reference, as approved by the Senate, rightly fall within the context of the
VFA. After studied reflection, the joint exercises may include training on
new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine
resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a
"mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of
the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty
and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as
opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized. IN SHORT, IF VFA IS VALID, THE BALIKATAN IS
ALSO VALID.
No. The Terms of Reference, approved by the Senate, stipulates that US
exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense.
Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive
war on Philippine territory. In the same manner, both the MDT and VFA
must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the
MDT was concluded way before the present Charter, though it
nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international obligation
[Remember Hofi!]. The Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides
that:
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.
The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence,
foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception. Moreover, provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to
the police power of the State. The foregoing premises leave us no
doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
GLORIA
DOCTRINE:
Social justice is not to be achieved through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
FACTS:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition
against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission (NTC); Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
The NTC issued a resolution, recommending to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following
for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30 am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm
16 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm. The Chairman of
the NTC recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned pursuant
to the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548. The Director and the
Secretary approved the recommendations with the modifications. The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila then caused to be
enforced the rules and regulation. Consequently, all animal-drawn vehicles
were disallowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well. Calalang contends that (1) Commonwealth Act No. 548,
which authorizes the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets, is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power; (2) the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion; and (3) the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution is valid.
HELD:
Yes. (1) Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer legislative power to
determine what public policy demands. Rather it confers authority to
promulgate the rules and regulations to merely carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated
as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders
of the President of the Philippines, and to close them temporarily to any
or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to
traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
(2) Also, Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say
the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. (3) There
is no infringement of the promotion of social justice, because social justice
is not to be achieved through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.
POSTIGO VS PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC. (PTSI)
G.R. No. 155146 January 24, 2006
DOCTRINE:
No provision in R.A. No. 7641 justifies the exclusion of employees in the
public sector, who are already enjoying retirement benefits under the GSIS
law, from the New Retirement Law. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7641 provides
that nothing in this Act shall deprive any employee of benefits to which he
may be entitled under existing laws or company policies or practices. (In
this case, there was no mention of anything on the 1987 Constitutions
Principles and State Policies. But considering that the main issue of the
case involves labor, the case is a reflection of Sections 9, 10 and 18 of Art.
II of the Constitution.)
FACTS:
Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., regular employees of the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI), retired on various dates from 1996 to
1998. Upon retirement from service, some of them who were compulsory
members of the GSIS obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS. At the
time the petitioners retired, Republic Act No. 7641 amended Article 287 of
17 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
the Labor Code, granting retirement pay to qualified employees in the
private sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with
the company. PTSI did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside
from its contribution to the GSIS, so Postigo claimed from PTSI their
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 7641. PTSI denied their claims on the
ground that the GSIS benefits removed them from the coverage of the
law. The Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) of the Department of Labor
and Employment regarding, upon Postigos inquiry, confirmed their
entitlement to the retirement benefits provided in R.A. No. 7641. Despite
the same opinion rendered and submitted by the PTSIs legal counsel,
Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento, to its Board of Directors, PTSI refused to pay the
petitioners their retirement benefits. Postigo then filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter, where the Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor. However,
one petitioner, Dr. Tan who was awarded her terminal leave pay, was not
included in the award of retirement benefits. PTSI then appealed to the
NLRC. Instead of posting the required cash or surety bond equivalent to
the amount of the award, PTSI filed a Motion to Reduce Bond on the
ground that the amount awarded by the Labor Arbiter was erroneous. The
NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to post the required cash or surety
bond. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC.
Postigo et al. contend that despite their compulsory membership in the
GSIS, they are still covered by R.A. No. 7641 for the following
reasons: (1) PTSI is registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as a non-stock and non-profit corporation as a private entity
and its employees are employees in the private sector; and (2) they are
not included in the exemptions from coverage of Rep. Act No. 7641. PTSI
counters that as an employer in the public sector, it is not covered by R.A.
No. 7641 which applies only to employees in the private sector.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Postigo et al. are entitled to benefits under Rep. Act No.
7641.
HELD:
Yes. Extant on the records is PTSIs admission that although its employees
are compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees are not governed
by the Civil Service Law, pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the
1987 Constitution. PTSI is a non-profit but private corporation organized
under the Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the Labor
Code and not by the Civil Service Law. It is clear to us that the petitioners
are employees in the private sector, hence entitled to the benefits of R.A.
No. 7641. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory inclusion in
the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public sector, they are
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
still entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 7641 since they are not covered by
the Civil Service Law and its regulations. The Supreme Court does not find
merit in PTSIs argument that the rationale behind the enactment of R.A.
No. 7641 justifies the exclusion of employees in the public sector, who are
already enjoying retirement benefits under the GSIS law, from the New
Retirement Law. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7641 provides that nothing in this
Act shall deprive any employee of benefits to which he may be entitled
under existing laws or company policies or practices. In Juco v. NLRC, it
was clarified that employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations with special charters are covered under the Civil Service. On
the other hand, employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations under the Corporation Code are governed by the provisions of
the Labor Code. PTSI belongs to the latter category and is covered by R.A.
7641. The accommodation under Rep. Act No. 1820 extending GSIS
coverage to PTSI employees did not take away from Postigo et al. the
beneficial coverage afforded by Rep. Act No. 7641. Hence, the retirement
pay payable under Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7641 should be considered apart from the retirement benefit claimable
by the petitioners under the social security law or, as in this case, the
GSIS law.
PT&T vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997
Gomez
Doctrine:
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and
women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of
protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14,
Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State
to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor
whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly
requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly,
Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working
women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to
reach their full potential.
FACTS:
18 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically
as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November
21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner
company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter she was hired again as a
reliever on 2 counts (June 10-July 1,1991 and July 19,1991-August
8,1991).
On September 2, 1991, she was asked by PT&T to become a probationary
employee for the probationary period of 150 days. In the job application
form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated
in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation
in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10,
1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the
same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to
private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her
to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about
the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment.
In her reply letter, De Guzman stated that she was not aware of PT&T's
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had
not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Thereafter, she was dismissed
from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily
contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a
claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Baguio City.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent, who had already gained
the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner and
that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the labor arbiter and ruled that private
respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor
arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved
to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her
acts which should not be condoned.
ISSUE:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
WON private respondent De Guzman had been discriminated by PT&T in
violation of the constitutional provision under Art. II, Sec 14 which
recognizes the fundamental equality of men and women
HELD:
Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be
regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have
responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that
women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against
womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the
matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine
setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the
vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with
preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and
exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and
women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of
protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14,
Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State
to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor
whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly
requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly,
Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working
women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to
reach their full potential.
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs
afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that
her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the
company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
19 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it
likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by
all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said
that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that
the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not
merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest
that the same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone
that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the
other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. In the final
reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct
derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively
required.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
Doctrine:
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
FACTS:
Principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. The Philippine Ecological Network Inc (PENI) is also
impleaded as an additional plaintiff. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
Petitioners prays that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
They likewise aver that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State
in its capacity as the parens patriae.
Herein defendant Sec. Factoran, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss to which the
RTC granted. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and asked the SC to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
ISSUE:
20 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
WON petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Art II, Sec 15
(Promotion of health and ecology)
HELD:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. The SC found no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The SC do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or
a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
VILLAR vs. TIP
135 SCRA 706 G.R. No. 69198. April 17, 1985
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
ACADEMIC FREEDOM JUSTIFIES THE EXCLUSION OF PETITIONERS WHO
HAVE SEVERAL FAILING GRADES
FACTS:
The case involves the barring of enrolment of the petitioners by TIP
because of the exercise of their freedom of assembly. However, other
circumstances were also taken into consideration by the court. Two of the
petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one
failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either
semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear and the second having failed in only
one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985
schoolyear. Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two subjects but passed in
four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984.
Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first semester
of 1983-1984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its second
semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 1984-
1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Noverto Barreto, had five failing grades in the
first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second
semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first
semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had
three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the
21 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
first semester of schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana
had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-
1985 schoolyear.
ISSUE:
WON the school has the right to deny enrolment of some of the petitioners
by virtue of the constitutional provision on academic freedom.
HELD:
Yes. Among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the
right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but
also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State
maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas
where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public
education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise
of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection
of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of
students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is
concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of
the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all
on the basis of merit."
It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the
social, economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the
obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being
"generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible
to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is
justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because
of their marked academic deficiency.
Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment
in view of such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under
no obligation to admit them this coming academic year. The constitutional
provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning
justifies such refusal. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of
higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine
under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students
thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being
disregarded. The petitioners were allowed to enrol with the exception of
Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana.
SORIAO vs. PINEDA
CA-GR SP NO. 31546 10 AUG. 1994
FACTS:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan,
Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school
authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete
his fourth and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to
readmit. Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a
hearing on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right
to due process. The administration ignored the students plea to reconsider
its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their prerogative.
Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to
the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.
HELD:
YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C.
Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he
was meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of
Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II, Sections
13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps
to make such education accessible to all.
Section 2: The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the
elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of
22 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all
children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to
deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the
under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as
well as self-study programs particularly those that respond to community
needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with
training in civics,
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of
education, he may only deprived of such right with due process of law as
stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
PHILILIPPINES ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. DRILON
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
MATILLANO
DOCTRINE:
That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an argument of
unconstitutionality. Not all of them are similarly situated. What the
constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group within
an existing class to the prejudice of such a person or group resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong,
United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the
validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the
police power of the Philippine State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment is valid?
HELD:
SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification,
the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by
themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed.
There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract
workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between
sexes. It is well settled that equality before the law under the constitution
does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to all members of the same class.
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial
distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to
the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
23 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that
Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power
as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers."The police
power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is
not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the
requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor
Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may
not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in
the enforcement whereof.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
GR NO. 110526, FEB 10, 1998
DOCTRINE:
(FREE ENTERPRISE) Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.
FACTS:
PCA was created by PD 232 as an independent public corporation to
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and
other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut
farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such
development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA
is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No.
018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered
by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this
caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested
areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based
commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA
to revoke BR No. 018-93.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation.
HELD:
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of
protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so
because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government
reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare and when the public interest so requires.
BASCO. VS. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
Local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization, and does not make local governments sovereign within
the State or an imperium in imperio.
FACTS:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant
petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary
to morals, public policy and order, and because
24 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
"B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph,
the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
"D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is
contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy"
and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is
said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of
Article XIV, of the present Constitution.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the Court can settle policy issues.
(2) WON exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local
autonomy.
HELD:
No. Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend
of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and
toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a
ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter
to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to
recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. "The judiciary does not
settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state power."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
No. Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local."
Their contention is without merit for the following reasons:
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its
"power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress which has the power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative powers." Congress, therefore,
has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long
been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to
regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title
II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. PAGCOR has a dual role,
to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government,PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution
will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of
the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: "Sec. 5.Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
25 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government." (emphasis supplied).
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation
or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under
the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean
a measure of decentralization of the function of government.
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be
delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which
concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question.
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing
with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of
the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004
DOCTRINE:
Equal access of opportunities for public service under Sec. 26 Art. II
does not bestow a constitutional right to run for or hold public office nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to
include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back
up his candidacy.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on
similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions,
denied the same. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35)
others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner
Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal
access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only
to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that
the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose
their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he
is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise
attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared
by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear
and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of
government.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner has constitutional right to run for or hold public office by
virtue of the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to
opportunities for public office
HELD:
No. Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision
ensuring equal access to opportunities for public office is the claim that
there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing
26 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give
rise to any cause of action before the courts.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein
the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is
not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their
proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and
reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed
resolutions of theCOMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it
considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This
precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which theCOMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various
documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for
the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly
pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither
the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their
respective Comments.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence
is in order.
The case is remanded to the COMELEC.
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 72119. May 29, 1987
MURILLO
DOCTRINE:
Civil service eligibilities of employees who claim to be civil service eligibles
are matters of public concern. People have the right to access these info.
FACTS:
Government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians. Due to this, petitioner Legaspi
requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of these certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Respondent, however, denied the request.
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is thus invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted
by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution,
petitioner Legaspi prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
Mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil service eligibilities are considered matters of public concern
HELD:
Yes. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace
a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
27 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter
at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
for the positions to which they were appointed. Thus, it is indeed a matter
of public concern. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian is a matter of
public interest.
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among
the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligibility, the respondent CSC has failed to cite any provision in
the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who
are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The SC took judicial notice of
the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions,
are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
from the Civil Service Commission. The duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes, therefore, imperative.
Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution also reads:
"The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law."
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources
of information. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may
be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
discretion of such agencies.
(Additional note: SC defined "public" in this case)
. . . "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it
embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and
existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information
sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction. . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991
DOCTRINE:
There's no invasion of privacy of information if what is sought to be
divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official functions.
FACTS:
Aquino-Sarmiento, a member of respondent Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by
the individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut
or classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was denied by respondent Morato, MTRCB chairman,
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment
over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips
partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal. The individual voting slips are alleged to
be the exclusive property of the member concerned, and anybody who
wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent,
otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on
the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character.
Thereafter, respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared
as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing
committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE:
28 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
W/N the voting slips of the members are considered as private, personal,
and confidential information
HELD:
No. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in
character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs
to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental
agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public
duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is
sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of
performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every
public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public
scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature
but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to
which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. The Constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to
official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the
members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be
rendered nugatory.
Additional note: (exceptions to the general rule - this, take note, is not
applicable here. Added info lang in case itanong.)
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among
others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or
documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and
deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions
therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner's
request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but
with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been
rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets
or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the
right of access to official records.
(Last. There's another set of facts and issue in the case which concerns an
MTRCB officer's right to change decisions of the Board. Hindi ko na sinama
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [4]: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
since it does not cover State Principles and Policies / Consti. The issue
merely revolved around the IRR of MTRCB's implementing law.)

29 AREVALO, CRUZ (CHANINE), CRUZ (CHRISTINE), GATACELO, GLORIA, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MATILLANO, MUNEZ, MURILLO